Penal Code, 1860 – Criminal Conspiracy – Two or more person agrees to, cause to be done i) an Illegal act ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means – No agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to Criminal conspiracy – Cheating – An act to cheat and thereby dishonestly induce the person so deceived to deliver any property and fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the representation or promise.

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 308 : 2024 INSC 284

Vipin Sahni and Another

v.

Central Bureau of Investigation

(Criminal Appeal No. 1980 of 2024)

08 April 2024

[Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar*, JJ]

Issue for Consideration

Whether it is open for High Court to convert or treat a petition

filed under section 482 Cr.P.C., as one filed under section 397

Cr.P.C.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.482 and 397 –

Special Judicial Magistrate while exercising the power given

under section 239 Cr.P.C. discharged the appellants – CBI

approached the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. –

High Court set aside the discharge order and directed the

learned Special Judicial Magistrate to proceed with the case

– Appellants preferred appeal against the said impugned

order – Order of the High court is set aside.

Held: When the specific remedy of revision under section 397

Cr.P.C. is available, it could not have been ignored – A petition

under section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be filed as an alternative of

revision. [Para. 25]

Penal Code, 1860 – Criminal Conspiracy – Two or more person

agrees to, cause to be done i) an Illegal act ii) an act which is not

illegal by illegal means – No agreement except an agreement

to commit an offence shall amount to Criminal conspiracy –

Cheating – An act to cheat and thereby dishonestly induce the

person so deceived to deliver any property and fraudulent or

dishonest intention at the time of making the representation

or promise.

Held: The sine qua non to make out an offence under section

420 IPC is an act on part act to cheat and thereby dishonestly

induce the person so deceived to deliver any property and

fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the

representation or promise and such culpable intention should 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 309

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

be there at the time of entering into the agreement – Ingredients

required to constitute an offence of cheating are (i) there

should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by

deceiving him; (ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced

to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any

person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived

should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything

which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

(iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b), the act or omission should be

one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the

person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. [Paras

9, 10, 19, 20 and 26]

Inherent power of the court – Can be exercised when there

is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for

redressal of the grievance.

Held: As per the Article 131 in the Schedule to the Limitation

Act, 1963, the limitation period for filing a criminal revision under

Section 397 Cr.P.C. is 90 days – However, there is no limitation

prescribed for invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court

under Section 482 Cr.P.C – It is well settled that the inherent

power of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no

express provision in the Code under which order impugned can

be challenged – When a revision is lawfully instituted before the

High Court but the same is thereafter found to be not maintainable

on some other ground, it would be open to the High Court to

treat the same as a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C in

order to do justice in that case – However, the reverse analogy

may not apply in all cases and it would not be open to the High

Court to blindly convert or treat a petition filed under Section 482

Cr.P.C as one filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C., without reference

to other issues, including limitation. [Paras 23 and 25]

Case Law Cited

Ram Jas v. State of U.P. [1971] 2 SCR 178 : (1970) 2

SCC 740; V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited

and others [2010] 11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361

– Followed.

Mohit alias Sonu and another v. State of U.P. and another

[2013] 7 SCR 86 : (2013) 7 SCC 789 – Relied on.

310 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; AICTE

Approval Process 2006.

List of Keywords

Inherent Power of the Court, Revision, Criminal Conspiracy,

Cheating, Discharge.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1980

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.01.2023 of the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 11426 of 2021

Appearances for Parties

Mukul Rohatgi, Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Samir Rohtagi, Ajay Singh,

Ms. Alka Sinha, Anuvrat Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.

Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Padmesh

Mishra, Arkaj Kumar, Anukalp Jain, Ms. Bani Dikshit, Merusagar

Samantaray, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Kumar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Exercising power under Section 239 Cr.P.C, the learned Special

Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad, discharged the appellants

herein of a charge under Sections 420 and 120B IPC, vide order

dated 31.08.2019 in Case No. 456 of 2012 arising out of RC-219

2011 (E) 0016 registered on the file of Police Station CBI, EO-1, New

Delhi. Aggrieved thereby, the Central Bureau of Investigation (for

short, ‘CBI’) approached the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,

under Section 482 Cr.P.C, by way of Application U/S 482 No. 11426

of 2021. By order dated 20.01.2023 passed therein, the High Court

set aside the discharge order and directed the learned Magistrate

to proceed with the case against the appellants. Assailing the said

order, they are before this Court.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 311

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

3. The appellants had established Sunshine Educational and

Development Society, NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh, and registered it

under the Societies Registration Act in the year 2004. The aims and

objectives of this Society, inter alia, included propagation of technical

education. Appellant No. 1 was the Chairman of the said Society

while his wife, viz., appellant No. 2, was its Secretary. In September,

2006, the Society acquired 4.90 acres of land in Greater NOIDA,

Uttar Pradesh, on a 90-year lease from Greater Noida Industrial

Development Authority, Gautambudh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, for

setting up educational institutions. The Society filed application dated

22.01.2007 seeking approval of the All India Council for Technical

Education (AICTE) to establish ‘Business School of Delhi’, offering a

Post-Graduate Diploma Course in Business Management (PGDM),

in an extent of one acre out of the leased land. In the application,

the Society disclosed that a loan of ₹5.75 Crore had been availed

by it from Corporation Bank and that the outstanding loan stood at

above ₹3 Crore. It also disclosed, in response to clause 6(v), that a

loan/mortgage had been raised against the land, by ticking the ‘Yes’

box. However, in the tabular form in the first page, against the query

– ‘Mortgaged with Bank - Yes/No’, the answer was stated as ‘No’.

There was, thus, an apparent contradiction in the application itself.

In any event, approval was accorded by the AICTE on 17.08.2007

to start the ‘Business School of Delhi’.

4. Thereafter, the Society submitted another application to the AICTE

on 27.10.2007 seeking to establish ‘Business School for Women’,

offering PGDM course. A day later, on 28.10.2007, the Society filed

yet another application seeking approval from the AICTE to start a

third institute, named ‘International Business School of Delhi’. The

first and third applications were moved on behalf of the Society by

appellant No. 1, being its Chairman, while the second application was

filed by appellant No. 2, as its Secretary. In the two later applications,

the Society failed to mention that the leased land was mortgaged

but it disclosed the fact that it had already been granted approval in

the year 2007 to operate another institute from the same premises.

By proceedings dated 29.05.2008, the AICTE granted approval for

starting the ‘Business School for Women’ in an extent of 0.8 acres

out of the said land. On 19.06.2008, the AICTE accorded approval

to commence the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ in the

leased land.

312 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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5. While so, it appears that an anonymous complaint was made to the

Chief Vigilance Commissioner alleging that officials of the AICTE

had shown undue favour to the Society. On the strength thereof,

the Chief Vigilance Commissioner referred the matter to the CBI for

investigation. In the first instance, the Regional Officer of the CBI at

Kanpur addressed letter dated 24.07.2011 to the Station-in-charge,

Police Station Greater NOIDA, to register a case for investigation but

the District Police of Gautambudh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, opined that

the complaint did not justify registering of a FIR and/or proceeding

with investigation as no cognizable offence was made out.

6. However, on 30.11.2011, Case Crime No. 219 2011 (E) 0016 was

registered on the file of PS CBI, EO-1, New Delhi, under Sections

420 and 120B IPC along with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)

(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This FIR was registered

against the appellants and unnamed officials of the AICTE, alleging

that the appellants had obtained approval by deceitful means from

the AICTE, in violation of Section 4.2(iii) of the AICTE Approval

Process 2006. As per this provision, the land approved for starting an

educational institution ought not to be encumbered. After completion

of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 11 of 2012 was filed by the

CBI for offences under Sections 420 and 120B IPC, naming only

the appellants as the accused. No official of the AICTE was charged

with criminality in granting approval to the Society’s institutions.

7. Aggrieved by their arraignment, the appellants approached the High

Court at Allahabad under Section 482 Cr.P.C, vide Application U/S

482 No. 37398 of 2012, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings

against them. By order dated 14.02.2013, the High Court accepted

their plea and quashed the said proceedings. However, upon the

CBI approaching this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2015, by

order dated 05.02.2018 passed therein, this Court set aside the

order dated 14.02.2013 but made it clear that the Trial Court would

be at liberty to go into the merits of the issue raised at the stage

of framing of charges. Thereafter, on 02.07.2018, the Trial Court

granted bail to the appellants.

8. On 25.09.2018, the appellants moved an application for discharge

before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad,

but the learned Magistrate rejected their plea by order dated

15.02.2019 and directed the matter to be listed for framing of charges. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 313

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

The appellants, thereupon, preferred Criminal Revision No. 101 of

2019 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad,

under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The revision was allowed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated 29.05.2019, whereby the

order passed by the learned Magistrate was set aside and the matter

was remanded for hearing afresh, in the light of the observations

made in the revisional order. In consequence, the learned Magistrate

reheard the case and passed order dated 31.08.2019, discharging

the appellants from the alleged offence under Sections 420 and 120B

IPC. Nearly one and a half years after the passing of this discharge

order, i.e., on 21.02.2021, the CBI filed a petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C assailing it before the High Court at Allahabad. The petition

was taken on file as Application U/S 482 No. 11426 of 2021 and the

High Court allowed the same by way of the impugned order, leading

to the present appeal.

9. Before we proceed to examine the case on merits, we may first take

note of relevant legal provisions. Section 415 IPC defines ‘Cheating’

and it reads thus: -

‘415. Cheating.-

Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or

dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any

property to any person, or to consent that any person shall

retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so

deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not

do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or

omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to

that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said

to “cheat”.

Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a

deception within the meaning of this section.’

Section 420 IPC, the provision we are concerned with presently,

reads as under: -

‘420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of

property.-

Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the

person deceived to deliver any property to any person, 

314 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a

valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed,

and which is capable of being converted into a valuable

security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to seven years,

and shall also be liable to fine.’

Sections 120A IPC and 120B IPC read thus: -

‘120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.-

When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be

done,

(1) an illegal act, or

(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such

an agreement

is designated a criminal conspiracy:

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to

commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy

unless some act besides the agreement is done by one

or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.’

‘120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit

an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment

for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two

years or upwards, shall, where no express provision

is made in this Code for the punishment of such a

conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if

he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than

a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable

as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term not exceeding six months,

or with fine or with both.]’

10. The sine qua non to make out an offence under Section 420 IPC,

insofar as the present case is concerned, is an act on the part of

the appellants to ‘cheat and thereby dishonestly induce the person

so deceived, viz., the AICTE, to deliver any property’. Therefore, the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 315

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

appellants, while applying for and on behalf of the Society, should

have either suppressed material information or projected incorrect

information so as to induce the AICTE, by such dishonest means, to

grant approval for its educational institutions. Further, as no official

of the AICTE has been implicated in the offence, as per the charge

sheet, the alleged ‘criminal conspiracy’ under Section 120B IPC

would also be attributable to the appellants only.

11. Viewed in this light, we may note that the first application dated

22.01.2007 submitted by appellant No. 1 for starting ‘Business

School of Delhi’ clearly mentioned the fact that a part of the leased

land admeasuring about 5 acres was to be used for setting up this

institution and that a term loan of ₹5.75 crore had been raised from

the Corporation Bank. The repayable outstanding loan was also

shown as above ₹3 crore. Clause 6 of the application dealt with

‘Land’ and it was stated thereunder that the government’s leased

land of about 5 acres was intended to be used for establishing the

college. Clause 6(v) of the application and the Society’s response

thereto are extracted hereunder.

'(v) Any loans/mortgage raised against the titles of the

land

Yes  No’

12. Further, as already noted, the AICTE deemed it fit to grant approval

on 17.08.2007 to start this institution. This was despite the AICTE’s

‘Approval Process 2006’ providing that the land should have been

registered in the name of the applicant’s society/trust on or before

the date of submission of the proposal, free from any encumbrances.

However, no official of the AICTE has been implicated in any

wrongdoing.

13. Coming to the Society’s second application for the ‘Business School

for Women’, the same extent of 5 acres was shown against clause 6

but there was non-disclosure of the mortgage of the land to secure

the outstanding bank loan. Under clause 6(v), the society failed to

state that a loan/mortgage had been raised against the title of the

land and tick-marked ‘No’ instead of ‘Yes’. Similarly, the application

for starting the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ also mentioned

the same extent of 5 acres of land but again, clause 6(v) contained

incorrect information as against the question whether any loan/

316 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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mortgage had been raised against the title of the land. The word

‘No’ was tick-marked instead of ‘Yes’.

14. These are the actions which formed the foundation for the CBI’s case

against the appellants. As already stated hereinbefore, it was not the

AICTE that claimed that it was deceived and dishonestly induced to

grant approval owing to suppression of material information by the

appellants acting on behalf of the Society. It was a third party who

chose to remain anonymous that initiated the investigation. Further,

by not implicating any official of the AICTE in the charge sheet and

by dropping the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,

the CBI found that the AICTE’s officials were not complicit at all and

they were given a clean chit.

15. At this stage we may note that, though the appellants were initially

successful in getting the proceedings quashed by the High Court,

this Court reversed the said order but left it open to the Trial Court

to examine the issue raised, on merits, at the time of framing of

charges. It is pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court that the

learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, chose to exercise

power under Section 239 Cr.P.C and discharged the appellants. The

validity of that exercise was called in question before the High Court,

which ultimately held against the appellants.

16. Significantly, the High Court was not inclined to accept the preliminary

objection raised by the appellants to the effect that the CBI ought to

have filed a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C against the discharge

order and could not maintain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

In this regard, the High Court observed that it could always treat a

petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C as a revision under Section

397 Cr.P.C and, therefore, the appellants’ objection had no substance.

On merits, the High Court opined that the appellants had deliberately

withheld relevant information knowing fully well that if the land was

encumbered in any manner, approval for setting up the educational

institutions there would be declined. Holding so, the High Court set

aside the discharge order.

17. We are, however, of the considered opinion that the finding of the High

Court as to deliberate withholding of information by the appellants

cannot be accepted on the given facts. It is a matter of record that

the first application dated 22.01.2007 filed by appellant No. 1 on

behalf of the Society disclosed that a bank loan was still outstanding 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 317

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

and that the subject land of nearly 5 acres had been mortgaged to

secure the loan. This was followed by scrutiny and verification by the

officials of the AICTE, including a spot inspection, following which,

approval for starting the ‘Business School of Delhi’ was accorded

on 17.08.2007. No wrongdoing has been attributed to the officials

of the AICTE in that regard. It was only the later application dated

27.10.2007 for the ‘Business School for Women’ and the application

dated 28.10.2007 for the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ that

did not state correct information with regard to the outstanding bank

loan and the mortgage of the land in connection therewith. However,

all three applications mentioned the extent of nearly 5 acres and the

AICTE could not be said to be in ignorance of the fact that the said

land was under an encumbrance at the time the applications were

made. Notably, both the later applications mentioned the fact that

an institution was already granted approval in 2007 to operate from

the same premises. This was obviously in reference to the ‘Business

School of Delhi’ and the application for the same did disclose the

subsistence of the loan and the encumbrance on the land.

18. That apart, it was not even the case of the AICTE that it was under

any illusions, whereby it was dishonestly induced to grant approval

for establishment of the colleges in question. The only party who

can speak of being ‘dishonestly induced to do or not do something’

is that party itself and when the AICTE made no such complaint,

it was not for others to insinuate that the AICTE was dishonestly

induced to do something.

19. In Ram Jas v. State of U.P.1

, the ingredients required to constitute

an offence of cheating were succinctly summed up thus: -

"(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement

of a person by deceiving him;

(ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to

deliver any property to any person, or to consent that

any person shall retain any property; or

(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally

induced to do or omit to do anything which he would

not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

1 [1971] 2 SCR 178 : (1970) 2 SCC 740

318 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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(iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b), the act or omission should

be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or

harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation

or property.’

20. In V.P.Shrivastava vs. Indian Explosives Limited and others2

, this

Court observed that in order to constitute an offence of cheating,

it must be shown that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest

intention at the time of making the representation or promise and

such a culpable intention should be there at the time of entering into

the agreement. On facts, it was found that the party alleged to have

been cheated was fully conscious of the situation at the time it decided

to enter into the contract and there was no dishonest inducement.

21. In the case on hand, there was disclosure of the fact that the subject

land was mortgaged to secure the bank loan but despite the same,

the AICTE granted approval for the ‘Business School of Delhi’ and it

never complained that it was under any misinformation in that regard.

Thus, the essential requisite to make out an offence of cheating is

lacking. Mere carelessness on the part of the appellants in filling up

the second and third applications and a part of the first application

also cannot be taken to be motivated by deliberate deception, on

the admitted factual position, so as to invite criminal charges.

22. Further, there is no evidence of the appellants consciously agreeing

or conspiring to deliberately furnish false information to the AICTE so

as to garner its approval for their colleges. As already noted, appellant

No.1 filed the first application, divulging the relevant details of the bank

loan and the mortgage over the leased land, but he failed to do so

in the third application filed by him. Appellant No.2 filed the second

application with the same non-disclosure but there is no evidence

whatsoever of the appellants resorting to deception in that regard

willfully and in connivance with each other. Therefore, the charge

under Section 120B IPC also does not withstand judicial scrutiny.

23. As regards the objection raised by the appellants as to the maintainability

of the CBI’s petition filed before the High Court under Section 482

Cr.P.C., we may note that, as per Article 131 in the Schedule to the

Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for filing a criminal revision

2 [2010] 11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 319

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

under Section 397 Cr.P.C, be it before the High Court or the Sessions

Court, is 90 days. However, there is no limitation prescribed for

invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482

Cr.P.C. and it can be at any time. It is a matter of record that when

the learned Special Magistrate, CBI Court, dismissed the appellants’

discharge petition in the first instance, they had filed a revision before

the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the matter was

remanded for hearing afresh. However, the CBI did not choose to adopt

this course when the appellants’ discharge petition was allowed by the

learned Special Magistrate in the second round. Long after the expiry

of the limitation period of 90 days, the CBI filed a petition before the

High Court at Allahabad under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This was obviously

to get over the hurdle of the limitation for filing of a revision under

Section 397 Cr.P.C. In this regard, useful reference may be made to

the decision of this Court in Mohit alias Sonu and another vs. State

of U.P. and another3

, wherein it was observed thus:

‘28. So far as the inherent power of the High Court as

contained in Section 482 CrPC is concerned, the law

in this regard is set at rest by this Court in a catena of

decisions. However, we would like to reiterate that when

an order, not interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in

the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, then there should

be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High

Court. In other words, inherent power of the Court can be

exercised when there is no remedy provided in the Code of

Criminal Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well

settled that the inherent power of the Court can ordinarily

be exercised when there is no express provision in the

Code under which order impugned can be challenged.

29. Courts possess inherent power in other statute also like

the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), Section 151 whereof

deals with such power. Section 151 CPC reads:

“151. Saving of inherent powers of court.—Nothing in

this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the

inherent power of the court to make such orders as may

be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse

of the process of the court.”

3 [2013] 7 SCR. 86 : (2013) 7 SCC 789

320 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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30. This Court in Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961

SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] regarding inherent power

of the Court under Section 151 CPC observed: (AIR p.

219, para 8)

“8. … The inherent powers of the court are in addition to

the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code.

They are complementary to those powers and therefore it

must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the

purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the

exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with

what has been expressly provided in the Code or against

the intentions of the legislature. It is also well recognised

that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner

which will be contrary to or different from the procedure

expressly provided in the Code.”

31. In a Constitution Bench decision rendered in Manohar

Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527] , this Court

held that: (AIR p. 537, para 43)

“43. … The inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders

ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of

the Code, but [inherent] jurisdiction cannot be exercised so

as to nullify the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Where the Code of Civil Procedure deals expressly with a

particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded

as exhaustive.”

32. The intention of the legislature enacting the Code of

Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure vis-à-vis

the law laid down by this Court it can safely be concluded that

when there is a specific remedy provided by way of appeal

or revision the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or

Section 151 CPC cannot and should not be resorted to.’

24. In the light of the above edict, it was not open to the CBI to blithely

ignore the statutory remedy available to it under Section 397 Cr.P.C

and thereafter resort to filing of an application under Section 482

Cr.P.C.

25. We may also note that in the event a revision is lawfully instituted

before the High Court but the same is thereafter found to be not 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 321

Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation

maintainable on some other ground, it would be open to the High

Court to treat the same as a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C

in order to do justice in that case. However, the reverse analogy may

not apply in all cases and it would not be open to the High Court

to blindly convert or treat a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C

as one filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C., without reference to other

issues, including limitation. When the specific remedy of revision was

available to the CBI, it could not have ignored the same and filed a

petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, therefore, find in favour of

the appellants even on this count.

26. On the above analysis we are of the opinion that the learned

Magistrate was fully justified in exercising power under Section 239

Cr.P.C. and discharging the appellants from criminal proceedings in

relation to Case No. 456 of 2012. The High Court adopted a rather

technical approach and practically concluded that the appellants

were guilty of deliberately withholding relevant information so as

to secure the approvals by deceitful means. This finding of the

High Court is not supported by the admitted facts, which indicate

disclosure of the mortgage at the outset when the first application

was made and, therefore, there is no possibility of inferring that the

appellants conspired in terms of Section 120A IPC to commit an

illegal act of suppression so as to secure the approvals. Further, the

AICTE itself never claimed that it was dishonestly induced to grant

such approvals and that essential link is altogether missing, whereby

any such criminal charge of cheating can be sustained against the

appellants. The impugned order dated 20.01.2023 passed by the

Allahabad High Court in Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C No. 11426 of

2021 is, therefore, set aside and the order of discharge passed by

the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad, in

Case No. 456 of 2012 is restored. In consequence, the appellants

shall stand discharged of the alleged offence under Sections 420

and 120B IPC in Case Crime No. 219 of 2011 (E) 0016.

The criminal appeal is allowed accordingly.

Pending applications shall stand closed.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Himanshu Rai, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.

(Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)