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Monday, December 31, 2018

HAPPY NEW YEAR 2019


Wish you all a HAPPY NEW YEAR 2019
God bless you all with great health, wealth and prosperty
     with warm regards
                  Your's 
                                       Advocatemmmohan

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

Suit for declaration of tenancy rights and injunction - even though plaintiff failed to prove his case - being a licensee as proved is entitled for permanent injunction till he was dispossed through process of law The appellant had filed Suit seeking declaration to the effect that he is holding leasehold rights in the aforesaid shop and, therefore, he is a protected tenant. He had also claimed relief of permanent injunction seeking restraint against the defendant(s)(respondent(s) herein) from dispossessing the appellant(s) from the shop (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit premises').- Trail court dismissed the suit - categorically recording a finding that the appellant(s) was only a licensee and not a lessee. -However, it was also found as a fact that the appellant(s) was in settled possession of the suit premises. The injunction was refused only on the ground that the appellant(s) had not filed any site plan. - High court confirmed the same - Apex cour held that even as a licensee the appellant could not have been dispossessed without the process of law. This proposition has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent(s). Accordingly, these appeals are partly allowed holding that the appellant(s) is a licensee, decree of injunction is passed in favour of the appellant to the extent that the appellant shall not be dispossessed without the process of law meaning thereby the respondent(s) shall be permitted to recourse of legal proceedings in this behalf.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).10338/2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)  No(s).  36887/2016)
SHRI PEAREY LAL(DEAD) NOW REPRESENTED BY LRS.      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
SHRI JIA LAL-PUJARI (DEAD)
NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS & ORS. Respondent(s)
     
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10339-10341/2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)  No(s). 2660-2662/2018 )

O R D E R 
Leave granted.
These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   common   judgment   dated
04.08.2016   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Delhi   in   Regular   Second
Appeals   which   were   preferred   by   the   appellant(s)   herein.   For   the
sake   of   convenience   we   take   note   of   the   facts   from   the   appeal
arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.36887 of 2016.
The dispute  pertains to  the sweet  shop which  the appellant(s)
is   having   in   the   precinct   of   Kalkaji   Mandir,   Kalkaji,Delhi.   This
shop   comprises   of   two   rooms   and   two   varandas.   The   appellant   had
filed   Suit   No.386   of   1976   titled   as   �Pearey   Lal   Vs.   Ram   Nath�
seeking   declaration   to   the   effect   that   he   is   holding   leasehold
rights   in   the   aforesaid   shop   and,   therefore,   he   is   a   protected
tenant. He had also claimed relief of permanent injunction seeking

2
restraint   against   the   defendant(s)(respondent(s)   herein)   from
dispossessing   the   appellant(s)   from   the   shop   (hereinafter   referred
to   as   'the   suit   premises').   It   was   pleaded   in   the   plaint   filed   by
the   appellant(s)   that   he   was   inducted   as   tenant   sometime   in   the
year   1963   and   had   been   paying   rent   to   baridars.   Ad-interim
injunction   was   granted   to   the   appellant(s)   restraining   the
respondent(s)   from   dispossessing   the   appellant(s)   which   was   made
absolute till the disposal of the suit.  The defendant(s) had taken
the   plea   that   the   appellant(s)   was   only   a   licensee   in   the   suit
premises     and   had   no   right   to   stay   therein.   Various   issues   were
settled on which evidence was led by both the parties. The original
plaintiff   namely   Pearey   Lal   passed   away   on   27.05.1989   during   the
pendency of the suit and his legal representatives including Radhey
Shyam Sharma were brought on record.
After   arguments   the   Trial   Court   passed   the   judgment   dated
31.01.2012   dismissing   the   suit   categorically   recording     a   finding
that   the   appellant(s)   was   only   a   licensee   and   not   a   lessee.
However,   it   was   also   found   as   a   fact   that   the   appellant(s)   was   in
settled possession of the suit premises. The injunction was refused
only   on   the   ground   that   the   appellant(s)   had   not   filed   any   site
plan.   Regular   First   Appeal   was   filed   by   the   appellant.   Cross
objections   were   also   filed   by   the   legal   representatives   of   the
defendant no.10. Other defendants had accepted the judgment of the
Trial   Court   and   did   not   file   any   appeal.   Regular   First   Appeal   as
well   as   cross   objections   were   dismissed   by   the   learned   Additional
District   Judge   vide   judgment   dated   01.04.2013.   Regular   Second

3
Appeal   there-against   was   preferred   by   the   appellant(s)   which   has
been dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 04.08.2016.
  Mr.   C.A.   Sundram,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellant(s), made one main submission on the basis of facts which
have   been   established   before   the   Trial   Court   and   affirmed   by   the
Additional District Judge as well as by the High Court. He accepted
the   position   that   the   appellant   is   only   a   licensee.   However,   the
submission was that the finding of fact was also that the appellant
was in possession of the suit premises right from the year 1963. On
this   basis,   he   argued   that   even   as   a   licensee   the   appellant   could
not   have   been   dispossessed   without   the   process   of   law.   This
proposition   has   not   been   disputed   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent(s).
Accordingly, these appeals are partly allowed holding that the
appellant(s)   is   a   licensee,   decree   of   injunction   is   passed   in
favour of the appellant to the extent that the appellant shall not
be   dispossessed   without   the   process   of   law   meaning   thereby   the
respondent(s)   shall   be   permitted   to   recourse   of   legal   proceedings
in this behalf. We may record that as and when such a suit is filed
the   same   shall   be   adjudicated   on   its   own   merits.   No   order   as   to
costs.
......................J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
......................J.
        [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 03, 2018.

4
ITEM NO.11               COURT NO.4               SECTION XIV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  36887/2016
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  04-08-2016
in RSA No. 92/2013 passed by the High Court Of Delhi At New Delhi)
SHRI PEAREY LAL(DEAD) NOW REPRESENTED BY LRS.      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
SHRI JIA LAL-PUJARI (DEAD)
NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS & ORS. Respondent(s)
                                                                 
I.A. NO. 1/2016-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING
I.A. NO. 3/2017- PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON. )

WITH
SLP(C) No. 2660-2662/2018 (XIV)

Date : 03-10-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
For Petitioner(s) Mr. C.A. Sundram, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Debesh Panda, Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Adv.
Ms. Pooja Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Anshul Goyal, Adv.
                    Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR
                   Mr. Debesh Panda, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)   Mr. Arun K. Sinha, AOR
Mr. Sumit Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, Adv.
Mr. Anil Nauriv, Adv.
                    Ms. Sumita Hazarika, AOR
Mr. Prabhas Chandra, Adv.
Ms. Ipsita Behura, Adv.
Mr. Harish Bhardwaj
Mr. R.K. Bhardwaj
                     Caveator-in-person

5
Mr. Dheeraj Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Neeraj Bhardwaj, Adv.
Ms. Sunita Bhardwaj, Adv.
                    Mr. Satyendra Kumar, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeals are partly allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending   application(s),   if   any,   stands   disposed   of
accordingly.
(ASHWANI THAKUR)                                 (RAJINDER KAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

No court can grant decree/relief infavour of the defendant without counter claim and without pleadings and without producing the documents , while granting decree in favour of the plaintiff as he prayed for The suit for declaration of title and injunction- the trial court decreed the suit with costs. However, the defendants have been given the right to grow Tulsi and pluck flowers in the suit land for performance of pooja. - High court also confirmed the same - Apex court held that The defendant has not set up the case of having right of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers in the land in question and had only set up own title. That has not been proved. In the circumstances, having failed to prove the title and in the absence of any counter claim with respect to the right of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers, no decree could have been granted by the Trial court or by the High Court. The very basis of the defendants case was Gift Deed in proving which they have miserably failed and being not related in any capacity to the plaintiff, there was no question of relinquishing or release of any right whatsoever. The defendant could have succeeded only on the strength of having title or Gift Deed. In case, gift was there, there was no question of limited right being given to the defendant of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers. In the facts and circumstances of the case and that no issue was framed with respect to growing Tulsi and plucking flowers, no counter claim was filed by the defendent with respect to the aforesaid relief, in our considered opinion, it was not upon the trial court to pass such a decree in favour of defendant as has been done. Thus, the part of the decree passed by the trial court and by the High Court with respect to growing Tulsi and plucking flowers is hereby set aside. The appeal filed by the plaintiff is hereby allowed and the appeal filed by the defendant is hereby dismissed.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6760  OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.24164 of 2014)
 M. THIMMA REDDY                                    Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
 G. RAVINDRA & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)

 WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6815  OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C)No. 31415 of 2014)

O R D E R
Leave granted.
These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the
plaintiff   as   well   as   by   the   defendants   aggrieved   by
the   judgment   and   order   of   the   trial   court   and   High
Court. The suit of the plaintiff has been decreed by
the   trial   court   with   costs   and   the   plaintiff   has
been   declared   to   be   the   absolute   owner   of   the   suit
schedule   property   and   injunction   has   also   been
granted   as   against   the   defendants   not   to   interfere
in   the   peaceful   possession   of   the   plaintiffs   over
the suit schedule property.   However, the defendants

2
have   been   given   the   right   to   grow   Tulsi   and   pluck
flowers   in   the   suit   land   for   performance   of   pooja.
It   is   the   later   portion   by   which   the   defendant   have
been given right to grow Tulsi and pluck flowers for
performing   the   poojas   has   been   questioned   in   the
appeal   by   the   plaintiff   whereas   defendant   has   come
up   in   the   appeal   as   against   the   decree   granted   in
favour of plaintiff. The High Court has affirmed the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
The defendant had based its case on the basis
of   a   Gift   Deed   executed   by   M.Thimma   Reddy.   The   said
gift   deed,   has   not   been   produced   in   evidence   to
prove the case.   The plaintiff and defendant are not
related to each other.
     In settlement deed � P-2, there is a reference
to   the   fact   that   certain   portion   of   land   was
reserved   for   growing   of   Tulsi   and   plucking   the
flowers   for   the   purpose   of   charity   and   performance
of   pooja.     Reading   of   the   document   P-2   does   not
prove   the   title   in   favour   of   the   defendants   in   any
manner   whatsoever.     In   the   circumstances,   in   order
to   prove   the   title,   it   was   necessary   for   the
defendant   to   produce   the   gift   deed   and   to   prove   it.
That   has   not   been   done.   Even   other   relevant
documents   have   not   been   filed   as   observed   by   the
trial   court.   As   such,   the   concurrent   finding   that
has   been   recorded   that   the   defendant   has   not   been

3
able   to   prove   his   title   is   unassailable   and   is   in
accordance   with   law   in   view   of   the   facts   and   the
evidence   on   record.   The   title   and   possession   of
plaintiff has rightly been found established.
The   defendant   has   not   set   up   the   case   of
having   right   of   growing   Tulsi   and   plucking   flowers
in   the   land   in   question   and   had   only   set   up   own
title.   That   has   not   been   proved.   In   the
circumstances,   having   failed   to   prove   the   title   and
in   the   absence   of   any   counter   claim   with   respect   to
the   right   of     growing   Tulsi   and     plucking   flowers,
no decree could have been granted by the Trial court
or   by   the   High   Court.   The   very   basis   of   the
defendants   case   was   Gift   Deed   in   proving   which   they
have   miserably   failed   and   being   not   related   in   any
capacity   to   the   plaintiff,   there   was   no   question   of
relinquishing   or   release   of   any   right   whatsoever.
The   defendant   could   have   succeeded   only   on   the
strength   of   having   title   or   Gift   Deed.     In   case,
gift   was   there,   there   was   no   question   of   limited
right   being   given   to   the   defendant   of   growing   Tulsi
and  plucking flowers.            
      In the facts and circumstances of the case and
that   no   issue   was   framed   with   respect   to   growing
Tulsi   and     plucking   flowers,   no   counter   claim   was
filed by the defendent with respect to the aforesaid
relief,   in   our   considered   opinion,   it   was   not   upon

4
the   trial   court   to   pass   such   a   decree   in   favour   of
defendant   as   has   been   done.     Thus,   the   part   of   the
decree   passed   by   the   trial   court   and   by   the   High
Court   with   respect   to     growing   Tulsi   and     plucking
flowers is hereby set aside.
The   appeal   filed   by   the   plaintiff   is   hereby
allowed   and   the   appeal   filed   by   the   defendant   is
hereby dismissed.
Parties to bear their own costs. 
       �����������������������J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
���������������������� J.
[ S.ABDUL NAZEER ]
   New Delhi;
   17 th
 July, 2018.

5
ITEM NO.24               COURT NO.8               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).24164/2014
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  27-03-2014
in   RFA   No.   35/2012   27-03-2014   in   RFA   No.   1565/2011   passed   by   the
High Court Of Karnataka At Bengaluru)
M. THIMMA REDDY                                    Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
G. RAVINDRA & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 31415/2014

Date : 17-07-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.ABDUL NAZEER
For Petitioner(s) Mr. H.N.Nagmohan Das,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Shekhar G Devasa,Adv.
Mr. Manish Tiwari,Adv.
Mr. Luv Kumar,Adv.
                    M/S.Devasa & Co., AOR
                    Mrs.Vaijayanthi Girish, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. V.Giri,Sr. Adv.
Mr. Gurukrishna Kumar,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Girish Ananthamurthy,Adv.
                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
                    Mrs.Vaijayanthi Girish, AOR
                    M/S.Devasa & Co., AOR                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appeal   filed   by   the   plaintiff   is   hereby
allowed   and   the   appeal   filed   by   the   defendant   is
hereby dismissed in terms of the signed order.
    (B.PARVATHI)                                (JAGDISH CHANDER)
    COURT MASTER                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

in a suit for mere injunction - an amendement of plaint can be allowed for specific performance of agreement of sale if it is in time Or.6, rule 17 CPC- amendment of plaint adding for specific perfromance of agreement of sale in a bare suit for injuntion - both courts dismissed the same - The reasoning given by the courts below is that the amendment would be barred by limitation if one is to calculate the limitation from the date of the agreement to sell or the date of the alleged cancellation, both of which took place in the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. Since the amendment was moved on 20.02.2014, the courts below have said that the amendment is time barred. - Apex court held that The Agreement to Sell dated 31.03.2004 itself states that a contingency has first to occur before the Agreement can be enforced, viz., a second appeal has to be disposed of. We are informed that the said second appeal was dismissed as withdrawn only on 12.12.2012. Therefore, at the earliest, limitation to enforce this Agreement would began only from the said date. The amendment made, therefore, cannot be said to be time barred. The amendment, therefore, stands allowed. The judgments passed by the courts below are set aside.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman 
1
IN�THE�SUPREME�COURT�OF�INDIA
�CIVIL� APPELLATE� JURISDICTION
� CIVIL�APPEAL�Nos.�10753�OF�2018
(Arising�out�of�SLP�(C)��No.�13459�of�2018)
��� �����������������
�� ���
KEWAL�KRISHAN ... � Appellant (s)

���������������������� Versus
DHARAMBIR�AND�ORS. ... � Respondent(s)
�������� O�R�D�E�R�
1) Delay condoned.
2) Leave granted.
3) An amendment application to a plaint which was filed for
injunction   simpliciter,   the   amendment   being   for   adding   the
relief   of   specific   performance,   has   been   turned   down   by   the
courts   below.     The   reasoning   given   by   the   courts   below   is
that the amendment would be barred by limitation if one is to
calculate   the   limitation   from   the   date   of   the   agreement   to
sell   or   the   date   of   the   alleged   cancellation,   both   of   which
took   place   in   the   years   2004   and   2005   respectively.     Since
the amendment was moved on 20.02.2014, the courts below have
said that the amendment is time barred.
4) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of
the   view   that   this   is   not   correct.     The   Agreement   to   Sell
dated   31.03.2004   itself   states   that   a   contingency   has   first
to occur before the Agreement can be enforced, viz., a second
appeal has to be disposed of.   We are informed that the said

2
second appeal was dismissed as withdrawn only on 12.12.2012.
Therefore,   at   the   earliest,   limitation   to   enforce   this
Agreement would began only from the said date.  The amendment
made, therefore, cannot be said to be time barred.
5) The amendment, therefore, stands allowed.  The judgments
passed by the courts below are set aside.
6) With these observations, the appeal is allowed.

����.......................J.
                                           ��������������(ROHINTON�FALI�NARIMAN)
�.........................J.
��������� �������������������(NAVIN�SINHA)

���������
New�Delhi,
Dated:�October�26,�2018.������������

3
ITEM NO.45               COURT NO.8               SECTION IV-B
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  13459/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  28-11-2017
in CR No. 8141/2014 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At
Chandigarh)
KEWAL KRISHAN                                      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
DHARAMBIR & ORS.                                   Respondent(s)
(Relief:-Permanent Injunction)
Date : 26-10-2018 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Daya Krishan Sharma, AOR
Mr. Rohit Vats, Adv.
Mr. I.C. Sharma, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Shish Pal Laler, Adv.
Mr. Sonit Sinhmar, Adv.
                   Mr. Devesh Kumar Tripathi, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(MANAV SHARMA)                           (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                 BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file.) 

Injunction can be granted as the appellant will not be dispossessed except in accordance with law or any other law. suit for injunction-According to the appellant, there was said to be an attempt to forcibly dispossess them by the respondents and that is what drove them to file a suit for injunction.-The Trial Court granted the injunction but on appeal the High Court set aside the order of the Trial Court. The High Court went to the extent of holding that the grant of land to the appellant under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 was not permissible or irregular. - Apex court held that We have been informed that steps have not been taken by the respondents under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 to cancel the grant made to the appellant. In view of the above, it is clear that the possession of the appellant is not in dispute. That being the position, the appellant will not be dispossessed from the allotted land under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 or the land allotted to them in exchange of land under the said Act, except in accordance with law or any other law.In view of the above, the order passed by the High Court is set aside.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan Bhimarao Lokur

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal  No(s).  1332/2009
DOKHAM TIBBAT FOUNDATION                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SATE OF UTTRANCHAL & ANR.                          Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.   The appellant
filed a suit for injunction (being Suit No. 212 of 2003) before the
Additional District Judge, Dehradun.
According to the appellant, there was said to be an attempt to
forcibly dispossess them by the respondents and that is what drove
them to file a suit for injunction.
The Trial Court granted the injunction but on appeal the High
Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 07.11.2007 in First
Appeal   No.   64/2003   set   aside   the   order   of   the   Trial   Court.     The
High Court went to the extent of holding that the grant of land to
the   appellant   under   the   U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   was   not
permissible or irregular.
We   have   been   informed   that   steps   have   not   been   taken   by   the
respondents   under   the   U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   to   cancel   the
grant made to the appellant.
In   view   of   the   above,   it   is   clear   that   the   possession   of   the
appellant   is   not   in   dispute.     That   being   the   position,   the
appellant will not be dispossessed from the allotted land under the
U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   or   the   land   allotted   to   them   in
1

exchange of land under the said Act, except in accordance with law
or any other law.
Should any steps be taken in this regard, all contentions are
open to the parties.
In   view   of   the   above,   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   is
set aside.
The civil appeal is disposed of.  No order as to costs.
� ....................J.
[MADAN B. LOKUR]
� ....................J.
[DEEPAK GUPTA]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 18, 2018.
2

ITEM NO.109               COURT NO.4               SECTION X
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  1332/2009
DOKHAM TIBBAT FOUNDATION                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SATE OF UTTRANCHAL & ANR.                          Respondent(s)

Date : 18-04-2018  This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Jain, Adv.
Ms. Abha Jain, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jatinder Kumar Sethi, Dy. A.G.
Mr. Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Ashutosh Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Kamlendra Mishra, AOR
                   
         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The civil appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.
(MEENAKSHI  KOHLI)                       (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER
[Signed order is placed on the file]

No injunction when the plaintiff's share is 6 pies and 3.125% in the entire suit property, and when the total undivided share of the other co-sharers including the plaintiffs share is 49% . Injunction order - Trail court granted - Hight court affirmed - Apex court held that The original plaintiff i.e., respondent No.1, holds 6 pies i.e., more than 3% in the suit property. Other defendants also have shares in the property which are specifically mentioned and out of which Kantilal has further purchased 2.1% shares of one Babubai and thus, Kantilal, the predecessor in title , was having approximately 51% share. Thus, the other persons including the original plaintiff, are holding 49% undivided share in the entire property. It is informed that one or two co-sharers have also filed suits against the present appellant. Thus, the plaintiffs in the suit may be having 3.125% share in the entire property but the total of other co- sharers is 49% and hence, not at all negligible. The appellant has challenged the title of the respondent/original plaintiff and also the document of 7.10.1965 is disputed. However, it is a matter of evidence. At this stage, the share of the appellant and the other co-sharers comes to nearly 50% and, therefore the appellant alone cannot be allowed to transfer, alienate or develop the suit property even to the extent of some share unless the suit property is partitioned especially, when he is predecessor-in-title who was a co-sharer had abandoned the property to him without the consent of other co-sharer earlier. Thus, though the share of the present plaintiff is 6 pies and 3.125% in the entire suit property, the total undivided share of the other co-sharers including the plaintiffs share is 49% and hence, i am of the view that the order passed by the learned trial Judge is correct and hence, not to be disturbed. The order of injunction is concerned, we are of the view that an adequate analysis was not made by the High Court and, therefore, the said order is set aside. The learned Single Judge while considering the proposals may look into various aspects and pass a reasoned order keeping in view the concept of � prima facie case� , balance of convenience and irreperable injury.

The Chief Justice of India, Justice Shri Dipak Misra during the 24th Foundation Day Function of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), in New Delhi on October 12, 2017 (cropped).jpg
The Chief Justice of India 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4307-4308 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.2672-2673 of 2018)
Cornell Housing Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.  Appellant(s)
                  Versus
Smt. Geeta Patkar and Others      Respondent(s)
O R D E R 
Leave granted.
These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   assail   the   order
dated   7 th
  August,   2017,   whereby   the   High   Court   of   Judicature
at   Bombay   in   appeal   from   Order   No.511   of   2017,   has   affirmed
the   order   of   injunction   passed   by   the   Civil   Judge,   Senior
Division, Thane.
On a perusal of the order passed by the High Court,
we find, after quoting few judgments, it has asribed reasons
which are to the following effect:-
�9. In   the   present   case,   both   the   parties
i.e.,   the   appellant   and   respondent   No.1/the
original   plaintiff,   both   claimed   rights
originally  on  the  basis  of  the  sale  deed  dated
5.10.1965.  Further, the plaintiff claims right
on   the   basis   of   second   document   dated
7.10.1965, which was executed between Kantilal,
the   plaintiff,   and   the   other   defendants.     In
the   said   impugned   registered   document,   of   the

2
total   suit   land   admeasuring   315   acres,
percentages   of   all   the   co-sharers   are
specifically mentioned.  Kantilal, the original
predecessor   in   title   of   the   appellant,
admittedly   holds   48.2%   shares   by   virtue   of   the
said   document.     The   original   plaintiff   i.e.,
respondent   No.1,   holds   6   pies   i.e.,   more   than
3% in the suit property.  Other defendants also
have   shares   in   the   property   which   are
specifically   mentioned   and   out   of   which
Kantilal   has   further   purchased   2.1%   shares   of
one Babubai and thus, Kantilal, the predecessor
in   title   ,   was   having   approximately   51%   share.
Thus,   the   other   persons   including   the   original
plaintiff,   are   holding   49%   undivided   share   in
the   entire   property.     It   is   informed   that   one
or two co-sharers have also filed suits against
the present appellant.  Thus, the plaintiffs in
the   suit   may   be   having   3.125%   share   in   the
entire   property   but   the   total   of   other   co-
sharers   is   49%   and   hence,   not   at   all
negligible.     The   appellant   has   challenged   the
title   of   the   respondent/original   plaintiff   and
also   the   document   of   7.10.1965   is   disputed.
However,   it   is   a   matter   of   evidence.     At   this
stage, the share of the appellant and the other
co-sharers   comes   to   nearly   50%   and,   therefore
the   appellant   alone   cannot   be   allowed   to
transfer, alienate or develop the suit property
even   to   the   extent   of   some   share   unless   the
suit   property   is   partitioned   especially,   when
he   is   predecessor-in-title   who   was   a   co-sharer
had   abandoned   the   property   to   him   without   the
consent   of   other   co-sharer   earlier.     The
submissions   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   that
the   plaintiff   has   not   asked   for   partition
cannot be appreciated at this stage because the
plaintiff   does   not   want   to   transfer   the
property   and,   therefore,   she   has   sought   only
declaration.
18. Thus,   though   the   share   of   the   present
plaintiff   is   6   pies   and   3.125%   in   the   entire
suit property, the total undivided share of the
other   co-sharers   including   the   plaintiff�s
share is 49% and hence, it am of the view that
the  order  passed  by  the  learned  trial  Judge  is
correct and hence, not to be disturbed.

3
It is submitted by Mr. Harish N. Salve and Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants
that   the   plaintiff-respondent   can   at   best   make   a   claim   of
49.25%   of   the   shares   in   the   property,   but   that   would   not
entitle   it   to   stop   development   in   the   rest   of   the   property.
Dr.   Abhishek   Manu   Singhvi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing
for   the   owner   would   submit   in   support   of   the   appellant   that
the development can take place in respect of the rest of the
property. 
Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   respondent   No.1   has   serious   objection   to   the   aforesaid
submission.  It is his contention that there was an agreement
between the owner and the respondent No.1 for a joint venture
in 1965.   The property is asset of the joint venture and the
purchase was made of the undivided property.  
A   proposal   has   also   been   given   by   Mr.   Salve   and
Mr.   Rohatgi   that   some   appeals   filed   by   the   other   plaintiffs
are pending before the High Court and they have no objection
if the appeals are allowed and the matter is remitted to the
trial   Judge   for   Suit   No.55   of   2010   to   be   tried   along   with
Suit   Nos.78   of   2011   and   776   of   2011   and   they   should   be
consolidated and tried by one Civil Judge, Senior Division.
Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   we
think   it   appropriate   that   the   High   Court   should   consider
these aspects appropriately.   However, as far as the present

4
order of injunction is concerned, we are of the view that an
adequate   analysis   was   not   made   by   the   High   Court   and,
therefore,   the   said   order   is   set   aside.     The   learned   Single
Judge   while   considering   the   proposals   may   look   into   various
aspects and pass a reasoned order keeping in view the concept
of � prima facie case� , balance of convenience and irreperable
injury.  
Liberty   is   granted   to   the   parties   to   mention   before
the High Court at Bombay.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   the   order   of   the   High
Court is set aside.  The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
The   matter   stands   restored   to   the   Single   Judge   for   hearing
afresh.
     

..................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
....................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
....................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi,
April 20 , 2018.

5
ITEM NO.35               COURT NO.1               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  Nos.2672-2673/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  07-08-2017
in   CAAST   No.   22083/2017   07-08-2017   in   AFO   No.   511/2017   passed   by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay)
CORNELL HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD             Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
GEETA PATKAR & ORS.                                Respondent(s)

Date : 20-04-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
          HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
          HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Harish N. Salve, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Praveen Samdani, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kunal Vajani, Adv.
                  Mr. Pranaya Goyal, AOR
Mr. Aman Gandhi, Adv.
Ms. Ankita Sangwan, Adv.
Ms. Priykshi Bhatnagar, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. C.U. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Anirudh B. Laad, Adv.
                   Mr. Anuvrat Sharma, AOR
Ms. Alka Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Rubin Vakil, Adv.
                    Mr. Nikhil Goel, AOR
                   
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.

6
The   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the   signed
order.
(Chetan Kumar) (H.S. Parasher)
 Court Master    Assistant Registrar
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

No need to disturb the partitioned properties while granting partition decree in respect of unpartitioned properties suit for partition and separate possession of ancestral properties set out in Schedules to the plaint.- The defendants stated that soon after the death of their father in the year 1944, there was a partition amongst the brothers and each of the brothers was enjoying agricultural lands separately and the house properties were also divided amongst the brothers and the respective branches were living separately - Trail court dismissed the suit - Appellate court confirmed the same - The High Court observed that Item Nos. 3 and 8 were admittedly ancestral properties and once the theory of previous partition was not accepted, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. With this view, the High Court accepted the second appeals and decreed the suit insofar as it related to Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B' properties - Apex court held that As admitted by Defendant No. 1, though the properties item Nos. 4 and 6 from Schedule 'A' were in his name, part of those properties were also in cultivating possession of the plaintiff. In the totality of the circumstances, in our considered view, the High Court was justified in interfering in its second appellate jurisdiction. We, therefore, affirm the view taken by the High Court in respect of properties mentioned in Schedule 'A'. In our view, the properties in Schedule 'B' must be left alone and if the parties are holding separate shares, there is no need to disturb the same.In the circumstances, the suit for partition as filed by Venkataramanappa (since deceased) is decreed in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' alone. The parties, namely, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to one third share in said properties in Schedule 'A'. Schedules 'B' and 'C' properties shall, however, remain undisturbed. The High Court decree is modified to that extent.




Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1632 OF 2007
   BYRASETTY (D) BY LRS. and ANR.        APPELLANT(S)
                       VERSUS
   VENKATARAMANAPPA (D) BY LRS.          RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Delay   condoned   in   filing   application   for
substitution   to   bring   on   record   the   legal
representatives   of   deceased   appellant   No.   1(a).
Abatement,   if   any,   is   set   aside.   The   substitution
application is allowed.
In   1980,   a   civil   suit   was   filed   by
plaintiff-Venkataramanappa   against   his   brothers   Byra
Setty   and   Subbanna   seeking   partition   and   separate
possession   of   ancestral   properties   set   out   in
Schedules   to   the   plaint.   Schedule   'A'   to   the   plaint
comprised   of   six   items   of   agricultural   land   while
Schedule   'B'   comprised   of   house   properties   where   the
parties   had   been   living.   Schedule   'C'   dealt   with
certain movables. The suit was re-numbered in 1984 as
O.S.   No.   134/1984.   Schedule   'A'   to   the   plaint   is   set
out hereunder for facility:

2
"�A� SCHEDULE
1. S. No.  241 dry land    5.15 ass Rs. 5.35
2. �    115/5 Wet land     0-18 ass. Rs. 0-85
3. �    116/1 Garden       0-17 �        0-73
4. �    109/2 Wet          0-03  �       0-24
5.  �  91/2 Wet            2-00 �        3-58
6. �   102/3 Wet           0.06 �        0-26
7. �  108/3 Wet            0.05 �        0-39
  8.  � 133/1 Dry            4.04 �        5-42
Items   1   to   8   are   situate   at   Thorahalli,   Malur
Taluk."
The   defendants   took   up   the   plea   that   soon
after   the   death   of   their   father   in   the   year   1944,
there   was   a   partition   amongst   the   brothers   and   each
of   the   brothers   was   enjoying   agricultural   lands
separately.   It   was   also   pleaded   that   the   house
properties were also divided amongst the brothers and
the respective branches were living separately.
The   plaintiff   did   not   examine   himself   but   his
son was examined as PW-1 and an acquaintance was also
examined   as   PW-2.   Defendant   No.   1   examined   himself
and   in   his   cross   examination   he   accepted   that   the
plaintiff   was   in   possession   of   one-third   area   from
Survey   No.   102/3   and   Survey   No.   133/1,   namely,   Item
Nos. 6 and 8 in Schedule 'A'. It was the case of the
defendants   that   originally   Item   Nos.   3   and   8   were
ancestral   properties   but   the   parties   had   partitioned

3
the   holding   and   they   were   in   separate   possession   of
their respective shares.
The   defendants   had   also   filed   original   Civil
Suit No. 172 of 1986 seeking injunction in respect of
two   items   from   Schedule   'B'   properties.   Both   the
suits were heard together and disposed of by a common
judgment   by   the   trial   court.   The   suit   filed   by   the
plaintiff-Venkataramanappa   was   dismissed   and   that
filed   by   Byra   Setty   and   Subbanna   for   injunction   was
decreed.
The decision of the trial court was challenged
by   way   of   Regular   Appeal   Nos.   26/1993   and   27/1993   by
Venkataramanappa.   During   the   pendency   of   the   appeal,
the   original   plaintiff   died   and   was   substituted   by
his   heirs.   The   lower   appellate   court   concurred   with
the   findings   rendered   by   the   trial   court   and
dismissed   both   the   appeals   vide   its   judgment   and
order dated 27.10.1999.
The   matter   was   carried   further   by   heirs   of
deceased   Venkataramanappa   by   filing   Regular   Second
Appeal   Nos.   176/2000   and   177/2000.   The   High   Court
accepted the second appeals and reversed the judgment
and   order   rendered   by   the   courts   below.   It   was   found
that   the   oral   and   previous   partition   alleged   by   the
defendants   was   not   proved.   The   High   Court   observed
that   Item   Nos.   3   and   8   were   admittedly   ancestral
properties   and   once   the   theory   of   previous   partition

4
was   not   accepted,   the   plaintiff   was   entitled   to
succeed.   With   this   view,   the   High   Court   accepted   the
second   appeals   and   decreed   the   suit   insofar   as   it
related to Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B' properties.
In   this   appeal   by   special   leave   filed   by   the
original   defendants,   we   heard   Mr.   S.N.   Bhat,   learned
counsel   for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   Srinivasan,
learned   counsel   for   the   respondents.   In   the
submission   of   Mr.   Bhat,   the   High   Court   was   not
justified   in   setting   aside   the   findings   of   fact
rendered by both the courts below. He relied upon the
decisions of this Court rendered in  Bhagwan Dayal (D)
through  Lrs.    vs.    Mst. Reoti  Devi (D)  through Lrs. ,
AIR   1962   SC   287   and   Mst.   Kharbuja   Kuer     vs.
Jangbahadur   Rai ,   AIR   1963   SC   1203   to   submit   that   the
issues   whether   the   parties   had   separated   and   the
properties   were   partitioned   were   essentially   issues
of fact and as such the findings rendered by both the
courts   below   ought   not   to   have   been   interfered   with
by the High Court.
On   the   other   hand,   Mr.   Srinivasan,   learned
counsel for the respondents, invited our attention to
the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Chinthamani   Ammal     vs.
Nandagopal   Gounder   &   Anr. ,   2007   (4)   SCC   163,   to
submit   that,   in   law,   there   exists   a   presumption   in
regard   to   continuance   of   a   joint   family   amongst
Hindus  and it  is for  the party  which raises  the plea

5
of   partition   to   prove   the   same.   He   further   invited
our   attention   to   the   extracts   of   record   of   rights
with   respect   to   all   the   items   in   Schedule   'A'.   All
these   properties   in   Schedule   'A'   are   shown   in   the
name of defendant No. 1 namely Byra Setty as  Khatedar
and   the   nature   of   possession   is   described   as
"ancestral".
We   find   from   the   record   that   the   house
properties   had   been   completely   partitioned   and   each
of   the   branches   has   been   living   separately.   There,
however,   appears   to   be   force   in   the   contention   that
insofar as agricultural properties are concerned, the
status   of   the   members   continued   to   be   joint.   This   is
well   reflected   by   the   entries   in   the   records   of
rights.   As   admitted   by   Defendant   No.   1,   though   the
properties   item   Nos.   4   and   6   from   Schedule   'A'   were
in   his   name,   part   of   those   properties   were   also   in
cultivating   possession   of   the   plaintiff.   In   the
totality   of   the   circumstances,   in   our   considered
view,   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   interfering   in
its   second   appellate   jurisdiction.   We,   therefore,
affirm the view taken by the High Court in respect of
properties   mentioned   in   Schedule   'A'.   In   our   view,
the properties in Schedule 'B' must be left alone and
if   the   parties   are   holding   separate   shares,   there   is
no need to disturb the same.

6
In   the   circumstances,   the   suit   for   partition
as   filed   by   Venkataramanappa   (since   deceased)   is
decreed   in   respect   of   the   properties   mentioned   in
Schedule   'A'   alone.   The   parties,   namely,   the
plaintiff   and   defendant   Nos.   1   and   2   are   entitled   to
one   third   share   in   said   properties   in   Schedule   'A'.
Schedules   'B'   and   'C'   properties   shall,   however,
remain undisturbed. The High Court decree is modified
to that extent.
While   effecting   the   partition   and   allocating
separate   shares   to   each   of   the   three   parties,
endeavour shall be made to maintain the possession of
the   parties   with   respect   to   the   areas/lands   in   their
occupation.
The   appeal   is   disposed   of   in   aforesaid   terms.
No costs.
...�.�................J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
...�.�................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 13, 2018

7
ITEM NO.101 (PH)         COURT NO.5               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  1632/2007
BYRASETTY (D) BY LRS. AND ANR.                    Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
VENKATARAMANAPPA (D) BY LRS.                       Respondent(s)
(IA No.95317/2017-I/A ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS TO COME ON RECORD
AS THE LRS and IA No.95320/2017-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING)

Date : 13-09-2018 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
For Appellant(s)    Mr. S. N. Bhat, AOR
Mr. Priyank Jain, Adv.
Mr. Ravi P., Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, AOR
Mr. Siddhant Kohli, Adv.
Ms. Garima Jain, Adv.
Ms. Pallavi Sengupta, Adv.                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the signed order.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA)                              (RAJINDER KAUR)
     AR-CUM-PS                                       BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file.)

Saturday, December 22, 2018

Whether the explanation [c] added in regulation 2[s] of regulations of 1995 ,in the month of January 2003 with retrospective effect is constitutionally valid? Indian Banks� Association was negotiating with the Officers� Association and a Joint Note had been entered into and was signed on 14.12.1999, with regard to periodical pay revision of the officers of the member Banks. Joint Note indicated the date of effect of scale of pay, dearness allowance and pension, as was magreed to be with effect from 1.4.1998. Thereafter, on 18.1.2003 amendment had been made in the definition of �pay�, as defined in Regulation 2(s) of the Regulations of 1995 and explanation thereof was added. By virtue of the explanation (c) that was added in Regulation 2(s) of the Regulations of 1995, it was provided that the pay shall be taken to mean the pay and emoluments that had been drawn before 1.4.1998 for the category of the officers, who have retired or died on or after 1.4.1998. The High Court of Delhi had opined that once the benefit had been taken under the Joint Note of revision of the salary, estoppel is created against the officers to claim the pension as per the existing formulae, which prevailed before its amendment and amendment could have been made with retrospective effect. Thus, the Delhi High Court had dismissed the writ petition filed by the Officers� Association, against which an appeal had been preferred. The High Court of Madras and High Court of Karnataka have taken the contrary view. They have observed that Joint Note of 1999 could not have supplanted the existing rules/regulations. Pension was required to be determined under the existing Regulations. By amending the Regulation and adding the Explanation (c) in Regulation 2(s) in the month of January 2003 benefit that has accrued could not have taken away. Thus, we have two contrary views of the High Courts to adjudicate upon in the instant matters. Apex court held that The only purpose of the addition of Explanation (c) to Regulation 2(s), was to take away the actual computation of the pension on the basis of the salary, which was drawn in the preceding ten months. Thus, we have no hesitation to strike it down being arbitrary and repugnant to other provisions/Regulations namely 2(d), 38(1)(2) and 35. The Explanation (c) to Regulation 2(s) is hereby struck down, as it could not have been enacted retrospectively to take away accrued rights. Even otherwise also it is held to be arbitrary and irrational. More so, in view of the fact that only by way of a temporary measure, that discrimination was created and the Explanation was deleted with effect from 1.5.2005. Thus, we set aside the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi and affirm that of High Courts of Karnataka at Bangalore and the High Court of Madras. The appeals filed by the Banks are dismissed and the appeal filed by the Association is allowed. Resultantly, let the amount which was due and payable be paid with 9% interest, be calculated and paid within four months from today.


                                             
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra

                                                                          1

                                           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.5525 OF 2012


                         BANK OF BARODA & ANR.                                   ... APPELLANT(S)


                                                           VS.


                         G. PALANI & ORS.                                        ... RESPONDENT(S)

                                                            WITH

                      C.A.NOS.6254/2012, 5611/2012, 3026-3253/2013, 3257-
                      3262/2013, 11205-11340/2014, 11342-11435/2014,9533-
                      9649/2014, 8357/2014, 4711-4800/2014

                                                            AND

                         C.A.NO.1880/2018 @ SLP(C)NO.23773/2012,
                         C.A.NOS.1881-1888/2018 @ SLP(C)NOS.20661-20668/2012,
                         C.A.NO.1890/2018 @ SLP(C)NO.24851/2012,
                         C.A.NOS.1892-1912/2018 @ SLP(C)NOS.23777-23797/2012,
                         C.A.NO.1918/2018 @ SLP(C)NO.23848/2012,
                         C.A.NOS.1919-2087/2018 @ SLP(C)NOS.15640-15808/2013 &
                         C.A.NOS.2088-2092/2018 @ SLP(C)NOS.31470-31474/2012


                                          O R D E R


                  1.         Heard learned counsel for the parties.

                  2.         I.A.Nos.3,        4   &   5   of       2012   for    intervention   are

                  permitted        to     be       withdrawn,         with     liberty   to   avail

                  appropriate           remedy.        Applications          stand   dismissed      as
Signature Not Verified


SARITA PUROHIT
Date: 2018.07.14
                  withdrawn.
Digitally signed by

13:11:12 IST
Reason:



                  3.         Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
                                              2

4.     In these civil appeals, question arises with respect

to the calculation of the pension on the basis of the

definition of average emoluments given in Regulation 2(d)

read with definition of the pay, as defined in Regulation

2(s)   of   the    Bank        (Employees)        Pension       Regulations,        1995

(hereinafter referred to as, �the Regulations of 1995), of

the concerned Banks.

5.     The dispute is with respect to the employees who

retired or died while in service on or after 1.4.1998 and

before 31.10.2002.              The Banks are governed by the Banking

Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act,

1970 (hereinafter referred to as, �the Act of 1970�).                                The

regulations        have        been     framed       in    exercise       of    powers

conferred under Section 19 of the Act of 1970.

6.     We    are    concerned           in    the    instant      cases    with      the

officer�s    class        of    the     Banks.        The       provisions     of    the

Industrial        Disputes            Act,     1947       are     admittedly         not

applicable to them.

7.     On    29.9.1995,           the        Board    of    Directors          of    the

respective nationalized banks, in exercise of their powers

under Section 19 of the Act of 1970, in consultation with

Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and with prior sanction of

Central Government, had notified in Gazette the aforesaid

Regulations of 1995.
                                      3




8.      It   appears      that   Indian   Banks�     Association        was

negotiating     with   the   Officers�    Association      and   a    Joint

Note had been entered into and was signed on 14.12.1999,

with regard to periodical pay revision of the officers of

the member Banks.         Joint Note indicated the date of effect

of scale of pay, dearness allowance and pension, as was

agreed to be with effect from 1.4.1998. Thereafter, on

18.1.2003 amendment had been made in the definition of

�pay�, as defined in Regulation 2(s) of the Regulations of

1995 and explanation thereof was added.

9.      The dispute arose after the amendment had been made

with respect to pension which would be payable to the

Officers who have died or retired after 1.4.1998.                Though,

the    definition    of    �average   emoluments�,    as    defined      in

Regulation 2(d) of the Regulations of 1995, specified that

the average of the pay drawn by the employee during the

last ten months of his service in the Bank shall be taken

as �Average Emoluments�, so as to work out the pension

under Regulation 35(2). Regulation 35(2) provided that the

basis of the calculation to be 50% of average emoluments,

as    defined   in   Regulation   2(d).     Regulation      38   of     the

Regulations 1995 provided the method of determination of

the period of ten months for average emoluments.                     In the

case    of   voluntary     retirement/premature      retirement,        the

Bank shall reckon the period of �preceding� ten months for
                                   4

the purpose of average emoluments, from the date on which

the employee voluntarily retires or prematurely retires.

By   virtue   of   the    explanation   (c)    that   was     added   in

Regulation    2(s)   of    the   Regulations    of    1995,    it     was

provided that the pay shall be taken to mean the pay and

emoluments that had been drawn before 1.4.1998 for the

category of the officers, who have retired or died on or

after 1.4.1998. The provisions contained in Regulations

2(d), 2(s)(c), 35, 37 and 38,are extracted hereunder:

       �Regulation 2(d):


       2. (d) "Average Emoluments" means the average of the
       pay drawn by an employee during the last ten months
       of his service in the Bank;�


       �Regulation 2(s)(c):


       �2(s) "Pay" includes, -
         (a) �..
         (b) �..
         (c) in relation to an employee who retired or
             died while in service on or after the 1st
             day of April, 1998-


                i) the basic pay including              stagnation
                increments, if any; and


                ii) all other components of pay counted for
                the purpose of making contribution to the
                Provident Fund and for the payment of
                dearness allowance; and


         iii)     increment component     of    Fixed     Personal
                Allowance; and
                     5

    iv) dearness allowance thereon on the above
    calculated up to Index Number 1616 points
    in the All India Average Consumer Price
    Index for Industrial Workers in the series
    1960 = 100.�


�Regulation 35:


35. Amount of Pension: -
    (1) Basic pension and additional pension
    wherever applicable, shall be updated as
    per the formulae given in Appendix-I.


    (2) In the case of an employee retiring in
    accordance with the provision of the
    Service Regulations or Settlement after
    completing a qualifying service of not less
    than thirty-three years the amount of basic
    pension shall be calculated at fifty per
    cent of the average emoluments.


    (3) (a) Additional pension shall be fifty
    per cent of the average amount of the
    allowance drawn by an employee during the
    last ten months of his service;
        (b) no dearness relief shall be paid on
    the amount of additional pension.


    Explanation: - For the purpose of this sub-
    regulation   "allowance"  means   allowance
    which are admissible to the extent counted
    for making contributions to the Provident
    Fund.


    (4) Pension as computed being aggregate of
    sub-regulation (2) and (3) above shall be
    subject to the minimum pension as specified
    in these regulations.


    (5) An employee who has commuted the
    admissible portion of his pension as per
    the provisions of Regulation 41 of these
    Regulations shall receive only the balance
    of pension, monthly.
                     6

    (6) (a) In the case of an employee retiring
    before completing a qualifying service of
    thirty-three years, but after completing a
    qualifying service of ten years, the amount
    of pension shall be proportionate to the
    amount of pension admissible under sub-
    regulations (2) and (3) and in no case the
    amount of pension shall be less than the
    amount of minimum pension specified in
    these regulations.

        (b) Notwithstanding anything contained
    in these regulations, the amount of invalid
    pension shall not be less than the ordinary
    rate of family pension which would have
    been payable to his family in the event of
    his death while in service.

    (7)   The   amount   of   pension   finally
    determined under these regulations shall be
    expressed in whole rupee and where the
    pension contains a fraction of a rupee, it
    shall be rounded off to the next higher
    rupee.�


�Regulation 37:


37. Dearness Relief: -
    (1) Dearness relief shall be granted on
    basic pension or family pension or invalid
    pension or on compassionate allowance in
    accordance with the rates specified in
    Appendix II.


    (2) Dearness relief shall be allowed on
    full basic pension even after commutation.�


�Regulation 38:


38. Determination of the period of ten months
    for average emoluments: -


(1) The period of the preceding ten months for
    the purpose of average emoluments shall be
    reckoned from the date of retirement.
                                         7


                  (2) In the case of voluntary retirement or
                  premature retirement, the period of the
                  preceding ten months for the purpose of
                  average emoluments shall be reckoned from
                  the date on which the employee voluntarily
                  retires or is premature retired by the
                  Bank.

                  (3) In the case of dismissal or removal or
                  compulsory retirement or termination of
                  service, the period of the proceeding ten
                  months   for   the    purpose of   average
                  emoluments shall be reckoned from the date
                  on which the employee is dismissed or
                  removed   or    compulsorily  retired   or
                  terminated by the Bank.

                  (4) If during the last ten months of the
                  service, an employee had been absent from
                  duty on extraordinary leave on loss of pay
                  or had been under suspension and the period
                  whereof does not count as service, the
                  aforesaid period of extraordinary leave or
                  suspension shall not be taken into account
                  in   the   calculation    of  the   average
                  emoluments and equal period before the ten
                  months shall be included.
                                                    Emphasis supplied�


10.     Reading of Regulation 2(d) makes it clear that the

average     emoluments     means    the       average   pay    drawn    by   the

employee during last ten months of his service in the

Bank.       Thus, the person becomes entitled for computation

of the salary drawn in the last ten months, along with its

components,        for   computation         of   the   pension   and    other

benefits.         The amended provision was added on 18.01.2003

by    way    of    explanation     (c)       to   Regulation    2(s)    giving

retrospective effect.
                                          8

11.   The   High   Court      of    Delhi      had   opined    that    once      the

benefit had been taken under the Joint Note of revision of

the salary, estoppel is created against the officers to

claim    the   pension     as      per   the    existing      formulae,         which

prevailed before its amendment and amendment could have

been made with retrospective effect. Thus, the Delhi High

Court    had    dismissed       the      writ    petition      filed       by    the

Officers� Association, against which an appeal had been

preferred. The High Court of Madras and High Court of

Karnataka      have    taken       the    contrary     view.          They      have

observed that Joint Note of 1999 could not have supplanted

the existing rules/regulations.                  Pension was required to

be determined under the existing Regulations. By amending

the     Regulation      and     adding         the    Explanation       (c)        in

Regulation 2(s) in the month of January 2003 benefit that

has accrued could not have taken away.                   Thus, we have two

contrary views of the High Courts to adjudicate upon in

the instant matters.



12.      It was urged by learned counsel on behalf of the

Banks that in view of the Joint Note that was prepared,

parties were bound as the benefits were to be given as

agreed to after revision of the pay in the method and

manner, which was agreed to by the officers.                      Thus, there

was     estoppel      created      against      the    Officers       to        claim

contrary to the Joint Note.                   They cannot claim/take one

benefit out of the Joint Note and deny the other part of
                                       9

the same.      There is power to amend the Regulations with

retrospective    effect       and     it   cannot   be   said   that   any

accrued right has been taken away in view of the Joint

note.    Parties were aware of the situation, as such; the

Joint Note that had been signed was binding and became

enforceable.      It    was    also    the   methodology    adopted    for

industrial   workers     under      conciliation     agreement   entered

into under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947.



13.     It was contended by Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-Officers

that accrued rights could not have been taken away.                    The

definition of average emoluments in Regulation 2(d) has

not been amended.        The only amendment made is by way of

insertion in the Explanation (c) to Regulation 2(s) of the

Regulations of 1995.          Regulations 35 and 38 have also not

been amended.     As such, the emoluments payable under the

aforesaid Regulation for the preceding ten months have to

be considered.         The Explanation is ineffective to take

away the rights conferred under the Regulation 2(d), read

with Regulations 35 and 38 of the Regulations of 1995.



14.     It was also contended on behalf of officers that

pension is not a bounty. The right to receive pension

under the prevailing formulae could not have been taken

away with retrospective effect by amending the provisions
                                       10

of the Regulations. The requisite amendments were not made

in    other    provisions      of     the     Regulations,        which    were

necessary      to   take    away    the     said    rights.   It    was    also

contended that only for few years the said provision had

been incorporated so as to deny the benefit from 1998 to

2002.    Thereafter, by amending the Regulations in the year

2005 the benefit has again been restored and pension had

been paid all throughout on the basis of emoluments, which

were drawn in the preceding ten months from the date of

retirement.



15.     First we come to the rigour of the Regulations. The

Regulations have statutory force, having been framed in

exercise of the powers under Section 19(2)(f) of the Act

of    1970    and   are    binding.         They    could   not    have    been

supplanted by any executive fiat or order or Joint Note,

which has no statutory basis.                      The Joint Note of the

officers also had no statutory force behind it and could

not have obliterated any of the provisions of Act of 1970

or the existing Regulations.              Thus, Joint Notes could, not

have taken away the rights that were available under the

Pension Regulations of 1995 to the Officer.



16.     Now what is provided under the Regulations is that

an employee is entitled to calculation of his pension, as

provided in Regulations 38(1) and 38(2) in the case of

voluntary      retirement     or    pre-mature       retirement,     and    the
                                                11

period   of    the    preceding            10    months      for    the    purpose     of

emoluments shall be reckoned from the date on which the

employee      had    been           voluntarily        retired      or     prematurely

retired by the Bank.                 A plain and literal reading of the

provisions     contained            in    Regulation         38   makes    it    crystal

clear that its emphasis is on the preceding 10 months. The

average emoluments no doubt take into consideration the

pay but by deeming fiction, by simply amending and adding

Explanation         (c)        in    Regulation         2(s)       the     mandate     of

Regulation      38(2)          had       not    been    taken       away     and     even

otherwise could not have been taken away that too with the

retrospective effect, which provides pension to be worked

out on the basis of average emoluments of preceding ten

months. It is apparent that Regulations 38(1) and 38(2)

have not been amended in any manner whatsoever.                              Thus, the

provisions     are        in    conflict         to    the    Explanation        (c)   of

Regulation 2(s) that had been added, which defined pay

with retrospective effect. Apparently for the purpose of

pension, the clear provisions in Regulations 38(1) & 38(2)

have to be considered as preceding ten months �from the

date of retirement� and not as per the Explanation (c) to

Regulation 2(s) what was drawn in the preceding ten months

before 1.4.1998. The interpretation of regulation 38(2) as

per   deeming       fiction          of    Regulation         2(s)(c)       is     wholly

impermissible.        That          it    is    not    permissible         to    add   or

subtract any word in a provision is a settled principle of

statutory interpretation.
                                       12


17.         Similarly, the provisions contained in Regulation 35

also make an incumbent entitled for opting the pension on

the basis of average emoluments.                  The average emoluments

have to be calculated on the basis of the preceding ten

months.       Adding   Explanation     (c)       to   Regulation       2(s),   as

done, could have created no fictional basis in view of

clear and unambiguous provisions in other provisions of

the Regulations.         Besides, the definition of the average

emoluments in Regulation 2(d) itself makes it clear that

it is average pay drawn �during the last ten months� of

his service by an employee. It cannot mean pay drawn by

the employee even before several years. Mentionably there

is     no    amendment   made     in   the       aforesaid    provision        of

Regulation 2(d) and the expression during the preceding

last    ten     months   before    date     of    retirement      is    clearly

culled out in Regulation 38(1) and 38(2).                     Thus, in our

considered       opinion,   the    view     taken      by   the   then    Chief

Justice Vikramajit Sen as he then was, at Karnataka High

Court and by the High Court of Madras are appropriate and

the view taken by the Delhi High Court cannot be said to

be sustainable for the various other reasons too mentioned

hereinafter.



18.         It is settled proposition, that pension is not a

bounty, as has been held by this Court in Deokinandan

Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 1971 (2) SCC 330 = 1971
                                13

Supl. SCR 634, as under:

      �...But we agree with the view of the majority
      when it has approved its earlier decision that
      pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet will
      and pleasure of the Government and that, on the
      other hand, the right to pension is a valuable
      right vesting in a government servant�..
      �..we are of the opinion that the right of the
      petitioner to receive pension is property under
      Act. 31(1) and by a mere executive order the
      State had no power to withhold the same.
      Similarly, the said claim is also property under
      Art.19(1)(f) and it is not saved by sub-article
      (5)of Art.19��...�


19.   In Grid Corporation of Orissa & Ors. vs. Rasananda

Das, (2003) 10 SCC 297, this Court held as under:



      ��.The appellants having given better pay scales,
      as early in 1969, cannot reduce the pay scales
      when it comes to granting pensionary/ retiral
      benefits for the period between the age of 58 to
      60 years. The argument advanced in this regard
      that although the employees are entitled to
      continue in service up to the age of 60 years but
      during the period of 58 to 60 years �..
      �.There cannot be two types of pay scales one for
      the purpose of continuing in service up to the
      age of retirement and the other for the period
      between 58 to 60 years. It must be kept in mind
      that pension is not a bounty but it is hard-
      earned benefit for long service, which cannot be
      taken away.�



20.   In   Bharat   Petroleum        (Erstwhile   Burmah   Shell)

Management Staff vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. &

Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 32 = 1988 (1) Supp. SCR 312, this Court

has observed :

           �Pension is no longer considered as a
      bounty and is has been held to be property. In
                                       14

      a welfare State as ours, rise in the pension of
      the   retired   personnel  who    are otherwise
      entitled to it is accepted by the State and the
      State has taken the liability��.�


21.   In      All      India       Reserve     Bank         Retired    Officers

Association      &    Ors.   vs.    Union     of     India    &   Ors.,   (1992)

Suppl.1 664, this Court observed:



            �5. The concept of pension is now well
      known and has been clarified by this Court time
      and again. It is not a charity or bounty nor is
      it gratuitous payment solely dependent on the
      whim or sweet will of the employer. It is earned
      for rendering long service and is often described
      as deferred portion of compensation for past
      service. It is in fact in the nature of a social
      security plan to provide for the December of life
      of a superannuated employee. Such social security
      plans are consistent with the socioeconomic
      requirements   of  the   Constitution  when   the
      employer is a State within the meaning of Article
      12 of the Constitution.�



22.   In    U.P. Raghavendra          Acharya &         Ors. vs.       State of

Karnataka    &       Ors.,   (2006)    9     SCC     630,    this     Court    has

observed thus:

      �Pension, as is well known, is not a bounty. It
      is treated to be a deferred salary. It is akin
      to right of property. It is co-related and has a
      nexus with the salary payable to the employees
      as on the date of retirement.
      �..Such emoluments were to be reckoned only in
      terms of the statutory rules.�


      This Court in Raghavendra Acharya (Supra) further

observed    that      number   of     times    it     has     been    held    that

executive   instructions           cannot     take    away     the    vested    or
                                    15

accrued right.       If the incumbent became entitled to the

benefits of the revised scale of pay, and consequently to

the pension calculated on the said basis in terms of the

impugned rules, there would be reduction of pension with

retrospective effect, it would violate Articles 14 and 16

of the Constitution of India.         This Court observed thus:



         �28. The impugned orders furthermore is opposed
         to the basic principles of law inasmuch as by
         reason of executive instructions an employee
         cannot be deprived of a vested or accrued right.
         Such a right to draw pension to the extent of 50%
         of the emoluments, computed in terms of the
         rules, w.e.f. 1.1.1996, vested to the appellants
         in terms of Government notification read with
         Rule 296 of the Rules.


         29. As the amount calculated on the basis of the
         revised scales of pay on and from 1.1.1996 to
         31.3.1998 have not been paid to the appellants by
         the State of Karnataka as ex gratia, and in fact
         was paid by way of emoluments to which the
         appellants became entitled to in terms of their
         conditions of service, which in turn are governed
         by the statutory rules, they acquired a vested
         right therein. If the appellants became entitled
         to the benefits of the revised scales of pay, and
         consequently to the pension calculated on the
         said basis in terms of the impugned rules, there
         would be reduction of pension with retrospective
         effect which would be violative of Articles 14
         and 16 of the Constitution of India.�


23.     Pension is a right and is not a bounty, and cannot

be    dealt   with   arbitrarily.    In   the    instant   cases   the

existing      provisions   could    not   have   been   amended    with

retrospective effect, taking away accrued rights on the

basis of joint note which had no statutory backing.
                                    16

24.      The rights that have accrued cannot be taken away

with retrospective effect, as laid down by this Court in

Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah &

Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 623.            This Court has dealt with the

vested    rights   and   whether    they   can   be   taken   away   by

retrospective amendments.      This Court observed:

         �24. In many of these decisions the expressions
         "vested rights" or "accrued rights" have been
         used while striking down the impugned provisions
         which had been given retrospective operation so
         as to have an adverse effect in the matter of
         promotion, seniority, substantive appointment,
         etc. of the employees. The said expressions have
         been used in the context of a right flowing
         under the relevant rule which was sought to be
         altered with effect from an anterior date and
         thereby taking away the benefits available under
         the rule in force at that time. It has been held
         that such an amendment having retrospective
         operation which has the effect of taking away a
         benefit already available to the employee under
         the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory
         and violative of the rights guaranteed under
         Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are
         unable to hold that these decisions are not in
         consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal
         Tandon vs. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185;
         B.S. Yadav Vs. State of Haryana, (1980) Supp.SCC
         524; and State of Gujarat Vs. Raman Lal Keshav
         Lal Soni & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 33.


         25. In these cases we are concerned with the
         pension payable to the employees after their
         retirement. The respondents were no longer in
         service on the date of issuance of the impugned
         notifications. The amendments in the rules are
         not restricted in their application in futuro.
         The amendments apply to employees who had
         already retired and were no longer in service on
         the date the impugned notifications were issued.


         26. In Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar
         &Ors., [1971] Supp.) SCR 634, decided by a
         Constitution Bench it has been laid down :
                      17


    �31. ���.Pension is not to be treated
    as a bounty payable on the sweet will
    and pleasure of the Government and that
    on the right to superannuation pension
    including its amount is a       valuable
    right vesting in a government servant."
                           (emphasis supplied)


In that case the right to receive pension was
treated as property under Articles 31(1) and
19(l)(f) of the Constitution.


27.   In D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India,
[1983] 2 SCR 165, this Court, after taking note
of the decision in Deokinandan Prasad (supra),
has said :


    "Pension to civil employees of the
    Government and the defence personnel as
    administered in India appears to be a
    compensation for service rendered in
    the past. However, as held in Douge v.
    Board of Education, 302 US 74, a
    pension is closely akin to wages in
    that it consists of payment provided by
    an employer, is paid in consideration
    of past service and serves the purpose
    of helping the recipient meet the
    expenses of living."


    29. ���.Thus the pension payable to a
    Government   employee  is   earned   by
    rendering long and efficient service
    and therefore can be said to be a
    deferred portion of the compensation or
    for service rendered."


28. It has also been laid down by this Court
that the reckonable emoluments which are the
basis for computation of pension are to be taken
on the basis of emoluments payable at the time
of retirement. (See : Indian Ex-services League
& Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc.,
[1991] 2 SCC 104.
                               18

      29.   Rule   2301   of   the   Indian   Railway
      Establishment Code incorporates this principle.
      It lays down :


              �A pensionable railway servants claim
              to pension is regulated by the rules in
              force at the time when he resigns or is
              discharged   from    the   service   of
              Government."
                  xxxxxxx
       33. Apart from being violative of the rights
       then available under Articles 31(1) and 19(1)
       (f), the impugned amendments, insofar as they
       have been given retrospective operation, are
       also violative of the rights guaranteed under
       Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the
       ground that they are unreasonable and arbitrary
       since the said amendments in Rule 2544 have the
       effect of reducing the amount of pension that
       had become payable to employees who had already
       retired from service on the date of issuance of
       the   impugned   notifications,   as    per the
       provisions contained in Rule 2544 that were in
       force at the time of their retirement.�


25.   In this regard in Indian Ex-services League & Ors.

vs. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 104, this Court has laid

down thus :

       �24. The learned Solicitor General has stated
       that the impugned GOs dated November 22, 1983
       (Annexure I) and dated December 3, 1983
       (Annexure II) issued by the Government of India
       (Ministry of Defence) in the present case are
       based on recomputation of pension of pre-April
       1, 1979 retirees of Armed Forces according to
       the liberalised pension scheme consequent upon
       the decision in D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India,
       (1983) 1 SCC 305.    He also added that if any
       error in computation is pointed out in respect
       of any particular person or rank or otherwise,
       the same would be promptly corrected.    On the
       above view taken by us, the prayer made in
       these writ petitions for quashing these orders
       has to be rejected.    For the same reason, its
       corollary that the same amount of pension be
       paid to all pre-April 1, 1979 retirees of Armed
                                     19

          Forces as to post-April 1, 1979 retirees must
          also be rejected�


26.    In   Secretary      (Estt.)    Railway    Board    &   Anr.   vs.

D.Francis Paul & Ors., 1996 (10) SCC 134, on the aspect of

retrospective provision, this Court has further observed

thus :

          �4. Relying    upon   this    proviso   by   later
          amendment, it is contended that since no
          specific provision was made in the conditions of
          service   at   the  time   of   appointment,   the
          respondents are not entitled to the benefit of
          the rule.    It is not in dispute that the rule
          came to be amended on 15.11.1976 long after
          their appointment.    Under these circumstances,
          the amendment would be prospective.     It is not
          in dispute that this amendment came to be made
          pursuant to recommendation made by the IIIrd Pay
          Commission and on acceptance thereof the rule
          came to be amended. Under these circumstances,
          the amendment cannot have retrospective effect
          in respect of the persons already in service but
          would be prospective; it would be applicable
          only to those candidates appointed after the
          date of the amendment introducing the proviso.�


27.      In N.S. Giri Vs. Corporation of City of Mangalore &

Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 697, also this Court has observed that

even   an   Award   made    under    the   Industrial    Disputes    Act,

1947, cannot be inconsistent with the law laid by the

legislature or by the Supreme Court and if it does so, it

is illegal and cannot be enforced.

28.      Thus joint note/agreement could not have been in

derogation     of   the    existing       statutory   Regulations    and

regulation 2(s)(c) could not have been given retrospective

effect.     It is also apparent from the decisions of this
                                               20

Court    in      P.     Sadagopan        Vs.    Food       Corporation        of   India,

(1997) 4 SCC 301, that executive instructions cannot be

issued      in     derogation       of    the       statutory        Regulations.       The

settled      position          of   law   is        that   no    Government        Order,

Notification            or    Circular     can       be    a    substitute         of   the

statutory rules framed with the authority of law.                                  In Dr.

Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001) 5 SCC

482, this Court had reiterated that the settled position

of    law     is      that     no   government         order,        notification        or

circular can be a substitute of the statutory rules framed

with the authority of law.                      In K. Kuppusamy & Anr. Vs.

State of Tamil Nadu, (1998) 8 SCC 469, this Court has

observed         that      statutory      rules       cannot     be       overridden     by

executive orders or executive practice.                                Merely because

the Government had taken a decision to amend the rules,

does not mean that the rule stood obliterated.                                 Till the

rule is amended, the rule applies.

29.      Thus, in our opinion, the Regulations which were in

force till 2003, would apply with full force and as a

matter of fact, the amendments made in it by addition of

Explanation (c) in Regulation 2(s) did not have the effect

of    amending          the    Regulations           relating        to    pension,      as

contained in Regulation 38 read with Regulations 2(d) and

35 of the Regulations of 1995.                       Even otherwise, if it had

the     effect        of      amending     the       pay       and    perks    �average

emoluments�, as specified in Regulation 2(d), it could not
                                               21

have       operated       retrospectively           and      taken    away      accrued

rights.         Otherwise       also,     it    would        have    been     arbitrary

exercise of power. Besides, there was no binding statutory

force      of      the    so    called    Joint        Note    of     the     Officers�

Association, as admittedly, to Officers� Association even

the     provisions         of     Industrial        Disputes         Act    were     not

applicable and joint note had no statutory support, and it

was not open to forgo the benefits available under the

Regulations          to    those     officers          who    have    retired      from

1.4.1998 till December 1999 and thereafter, and to deprive

them of the benefits of the Regulations. Thus, by the

Joint Note that has been relied upon, no estoppel said to

have been created. There is no estoppel as against the

enforcement of statutory provisions.                          The Joint Note had

no force of law and could not have been against the spirit

of     the        statutory      Regulations        and       the    basic      service

conditions,          as    envisaged      under        the    Regulations        framed

under the Act of 1970. They could not have been tinkered

with in an arbitrary manner, as has been laid down by this

Court        in     Central      Inland        Water      Transport        Corporation

Limited & Anr. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr., (1986) 3 SCC

156    &     Delhi       Transport      Corporation          vs.     D.T.C.    Mazdoor

Congress, (1991) Supp.1 SCC 600.


30.        Reliance has been placed on the decision of this

Court      by      learned      counsel    appearing          for    the    Banks,   on

Manojbhai N. Shah & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2015)
                                        22

4 SCC 482, where the position was converse.                        Revision of

pay was granted with retrospective effect to the eligible

employees.          Instant    cases       are     not    the    cases    of    the

revision     of     benefits        being     given       with   retrospective

effect, but taking away of a right that had accrued with

retrospective effect.           Thus the decision in the aforesaid

case has no application.


31.     Similarly, the decision in Union of India vs. P.N.

Menon   &   Ors.,     (1994)    4    SCC     68,    has   been    pressed      into

service in which this Court has laid down with respect to

dearness allowance granted to a Government servant, who

retired on or after 30.9.1977.                     It was claimed that the

said benefit should be given retrospectively to all the

employees irrespective of their date of superannuation.

It was not the case of taking away of vested right or

accrued     right    with     retrospective         amendment.       Thus,     the

decision has no application.


32.     Reliance has also been placed on the decision of

this Court in D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC

305.    It was observed in the context of pension scheme

that was non-contributory in character that the benefit,

which was given under the scheme, was prospective. In all

cases wherever they retire, they would be governed by the

liberalized       pension     scheme,       because       the    scheme    was    a

scheme for payment of the pension governed by 1972 Rules.
                                               23

The date of retirement would be the relevant date.                                   The

revised scheme would be operative from the date mentioned

in the scheme.             It was also not a case of taking away the

benefit       that    had    accrued          with    retrospective        effect      or

taking away of the vested or accrued rights.                               Thus, the

decision      has     no    application,            rather    the    spirit    of    the

decision       runs     counter          to    and    fails    to     buttress      the

submissions raised on behalf of the banks.


33.     The only purpose of the addition of Explanation (c)

to     Regulation          2(s),        was    to     take     away     the      actual

computation of the pension on the basis of the salary,

which was drawn in the preceding ten months. Thus, we have

no    hesitation       to        strike       it    down   being     arbitrary       and

repugnant       to    other           provisions/Regulations          namely      2(d),

38(1)(2) and 35.                 The Explanation (c) to Regulation 2(s)

is hereby struck down, as it could not have been enacted

retrospectively             to        take     away    accrued        rights.       Even

otherwise also it is held to be arbitrary and irrational.

More    so,    in     view       of    the    fact    that    only    by   way    of   a

temporary measure, that discrimination was created and the

Explanation was deleted with effect from 1.5.2005.

34.     Thus, we set aside the judgment rendered by the High

Court of Delhi and affirm that of High Courts of Karnataka

at Bangalore and the High Court of Madras.                              The appeals

filed by the Banks are dismissed and the appeal filed by

the Association is allowed. Resultantly, let the amount
                             24

which was due and payable be paid with 9% interest, be

calculated and paid within four months from today.



35.   All pending applications stand disposed of.




                                   ......................J.
                                              [ARUN MISHRA]




                                  .......................J.
                                              [AMITAVA ROY]

New Delhi;
13th February, 2018.
                                  25

ITEM NO.104               COURT NO.10                 SECTION XII

               S U P R E M E C O U R T O F      I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).5525/2012

BANK OF BARODA & ANR.                              Appellant(s)

                                  VERSUS

G. PALANI & ORS.                                   Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A.No.6254/2012 (XIV)

SLP(C)No.23773/2012 (IV-A)

C.A.No.5611/2012 (IV-A)

SLP(C)Nos.20661-20668/2012 (IV-A)

C.A.Nos.3026-3253/2013 (IV-A)

SLP(C)No.24851/2012 (IV-A)

SLP(C)Nos.23777-23797/2012 (IV-A)

SLP(C No.23848/2012 (IV-A)

SLP(C)Nos.15640-15808/2013 (IV-A)
(With appln.(s) for intervention/impleadment)

SLP(C)Nos.31470-31474/2012 (IV-A)

C.A.Nos.3257-3262/2013 (IV-A)

SLP(C)No.12038/2013 (IV-A)

SLP(C)No.12041/2013 (IV-A)

C.A.Nos.11205-11340/2014 (IV-A)
(With appln.(s) for bringing on record LRs. c/delay in filing
substitution, setting aside abatement and exemption from
filing O.T.)

C.A.Nos.11342-11435/2014 (IV-A)

C.A.Nos.9533-9649/2014 (IV-A)

                                                                   ..2/-
                                   26


                                  .2.
C.A.No.8357/2014 (IV-A)
C.A.Nos.4711-4800/2014 (IV-A)

Date : 13-02-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
          HONBLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
          HONBLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY


For Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)/Applicant(s) :

                    Mr.   Rajesh Kumar,Adv.
                    Mr.   Gaurav Kumar Singh,Adv.
                    Mr.   Anant Gautam,Adv.
                    Mr.   Aakash Sehrawat,Adv.
                    Mr.   V. Govinda Ramanan,Adv.
                    Mr.   Soumu Palit,Adv.
                    For   M/s. Mitter & Mitter Co.,AOR

                    Mr.   Adarsh B. Dial,Sr.Adv.
                    Mr.   Rajiv Nanda,AOR
                    Ms.   Ananya Datta Majumdar,Adv.
                    Mr.   Sumati Anand,Adv.

                    Mr. Jagat Arora,Adv.
                    Mr. Rajat Arora,Adv.
                    Mr. Anuvrat Sharma,AOR

                    Mr. Aayush Agarwala,Adv.
                    Mr. Pramod B. Agarwala,AOR

                    Mr. Shanthakumar Mahale,Adv.
                    Mr. Rajesh Mahale, AOR
                    Mr. Amith J.,Adv.

                    Mr.   Manoj Swarup,Adv.
                    Mr.   Mukul Kumar,Adv.
                    Ms.   Mansi Jain,Adv.
                    For   Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh,AOR

                    Mr.   Romy Chacko,Adv.
                    Mr.   Chandan Kumar Mandal,Adv.
                    Mr.   S.C. Jaidwal,Adv.
                    Mr.   Pulkit,Adv.

                                                              ..3/-



                                  .3.
                                     27


For Respondent(s) :

                      Mr. B.B. Sawhney,Sr.Adv.
                      Mr. Shashank Mishra,Adv.
                      Ms. Naresh Bakshi,AOR

                      Ms. Aparna Jha,AOR
                      Mr. S. Rajappa,AOR

                      Mr.   Sanjay Kapur,AOR
                      Ms.   Megha Karnwal,Adv.
                      Ms.   Mansi Kapur,Adv.
                      Ms.   Shubhra Kapur,Adv.

                      Mr. O.P. Gaggar,AOR
                      Mr. Aditya Gaggar,Adv.
                      Mr. Ajit Wagh,Adv.

                      Mr. M. Khairati,Adv.
                      Mr. Irshad Ahmad,AOR

                      Mr. Naveen R. Nath,AOR
                      Mr. Abhimanyu Verma,Adv.
                      Mrs. Lalit Mohini Bhat,Adv.

                      Mr. Shailesh Madiyal,AOR
                      Mr. Sudhanshu Prakash,Adv.

                      Mr. Mahesh Thakur,Adv.
                      Mrs. Vipasha Singh,Adv.
                      For Mr. E.C. Vidya Sagar,AOR

                      Mr. R.S. Hegde,Adv.
                      Mrs. Farhat Johan Rehmani,Adv.
                      Mr. Chandra Prakash,Adv.
                      Mr. Prashant Jain,Adv.
                      For Mr. Rajeev Singh,AOR

          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R

   SLP(C)Nos.12038 & 12041/2013 :

         List on 20.2.2018.


                                                          ..4/-
                                          28

                                          .4.


C.A.Nos.5525/2012, 6254/2012, 5611/2012, 3026-3253/2013,
3257-3262/2013,       11205-11340/2014,            11342-11435/2014,         9533-
9646/2014,    8357/2014,         4711-4800/2014              &   SLP(C)Nos.23773/
2012, 20661-20668/2012, 24851/2012, 23777-23797/2012, 23848/
2012, 15640-15808/2013 & 31470-31474/2012 :




      I.A.Nos.3,       4     &   5   of    2012        for   intervention    are
permitted     to     be      withdrawn,         with     liberty     to    avail
appropriate        remedy.       Applications          stand     dismissed    as
withdrawn.

      Delay condoned.

      Applications         for       substitution        and     setting   aside
abatement are allowed.

      Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

      The appeals filed by the Banks are dismissed and the
appeal filed by the Association is allowed in terms of the
signed order.




  (Sarita Purohit)                                 (Jagdish Chander)
     Court master                                    Branch Officer

              (Signed order is placed on the file)