In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

 

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Singavaram Nagamma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

2026:APHC:16788 | Andhra Pradesh High Court | W.P. No.8729 of 2026 | Decided on 06.04.2026

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Constitution of India—Article 226—Parens Patriae Jurisdiction—Comatose Person.

Where no statutory mechanism exists for appointment of a guardian to a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court can invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to protect the interests of such person.

Held: Extraordinary jurisdiction is maintainable in the absence of an effective statutory remedy.

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B. Guardian—Person in Vegetative/Comatose State—Appointment.

The spouse or other close legal heir may be appointed as guardian for the limited purpose of operating bank accounts and managing specified properties of a person in a vegetative/comatose state, subject to judicial supervision.

Held: Wife appointed guardian to operate the bank account of her comatose husband.

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C. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—Mental Healthcare Act, 2017—Legislative Vacuum.

Neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 nor the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 provides a procedure for appointment of a guardian to a person in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Constitutional jurisdiction fills the legislative vacuum until suitable legislation is enacted.

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D. Parens Patriae—Guidelines.

Pending legislative intervention, the Court may prescribe procedural safeguards governing appointment, powers, duties, supervision and accountability of guardians appointed for persons in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Kerala High Court guidelines substantially adopted with suitable modifications.

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E. Guardianship—Best Interest Principle.

The guardian must act exclusively in the best interests of the person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, and management of property must remain subject to continuous judicial oversight.

Held: Periodical statements and supervision by the High Court directed.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The petitioners were the wife and children of Sri Singavaram Subhan Singh, who suffered a severe cerebrovascular accident, underwent neurosurgery, and thereafter remained in a permanent vegetative/comatose state.

Medical evidence established that he required continuous medical treatment and was incapable of managing his affairs. Though substantial funds remained in his Axis Bank account, the family could not operate the account without legal authority.

Since no statute provided any mechanism for appointment of a guardian in such circumstances, the petitioners invoked the parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 seeking appointment of the wife as guardian for the limited purpose of operating the bank account and meeting medical expenses.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Maintainability under Article 226

The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because there exists no statutory procedure governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state.

Following the Delhi High Court decision in Professor Alka Acharya, the Court held that the High Court retains constitutional power to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction in appropriate cases.

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(ii) Legislative Vacuum

The Court observed that neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, nor any other legislation provides an effective procedure for appointment of a guardian for a person in a vegetative state.

Until Parliament or the Legislature enacts an appropriate law, constitutional courts must protect such vulnerable persons by exercising equitable jurisdiction.

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(iii) Adoption of Judicial Guidelines

The Court extensively relied upon:

• Professor Alka Acharya v. Government of NCT of Delhi

• Shobha Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala

• Rajni Hariom Sharma v. Union of India

• S. Sasikala v. State of Tamil Nadu

• Epari Sushma v. State of Odisha

and substantially adopted the procedural safeguards evolved by the Kerala High Court regarding:

• medical examination by competent Medical Board,

• appointment of close relatives,

• limitation of guardianship to specified assets,

• periodical reporting,

• judicial supervision,

• removal of guardian in case of misuse,

• requirement of Court permission for transfer outside jurisdiction.

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(iv) Wife as Natural Guardian under Parens Patriae

The Court observed that where the husband has completely lost the ability to make decisions owing to a vegetative state, there can ordinarily be no person more naturally, morally or legally suited than the wife to protect his interests.

Referring to the Indian philosophical concept of "Ardhangini", the Court held that the wife is the most appropriate person to act as guardian in such circumstances, subject to judicial control.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Writ Petition allowed.

• Petitioner No.1 (wife) declared guardian of her husband.

• Authority granted to operate Axis Bank Account No. 913010036494989 solely for the benefit of the comatose patient.

• Guardian directed to produce updated bank statements before the Registrar Judicial every three months for one year or until any major medical event, whichever occurs earlier.

• Registry directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of Andhra Pradesh for appropriate consideration regarding legislative measures.

• No order as to costs.

The expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act receives a liberal and expansive interpretation consistent with the object of providing just compensation. A father-in-law who establishes that he was dependent upon his deceased daughter-in-law and who answers the description of a legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation. Even otherwise, a non-dependent legal representative is competent to institute proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, dependency being relevant only for determination of compensation and not for maintainability of the claim.

 

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S. Khader Basha v. APSRTC

2026:APHC:14860 | Andhra Pradesh High Court | M.A.C.M.A. No.2084 of 2012 | Decided on 10.04.2026

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HEAD NOTES (AIR STYLE)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 163-A—Compensation—Father-in-law of deceased daughter-in-law.

A father-in-law is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation on account of the death of his daughter-in-law if the evidence establishes that he was dependent upon her and is also her legal representative.

Held: Dismissal of the claim merely because the claimant had already received compensation for the death of his son was erroneous.

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B. Motor Vehicles Act—Legal Representative—Meaning.

The expression "legal representative" occurring in the Motor Vehicles Act has a wider meaning than under the Fatal Accidents Act and includes every legal representative who suffers loss due to the death of the victim.

Held: Even persons other than spouse, parent or children can maintain a claim if they answer the description of legal representative.

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C. Motor Vehicles Act—Dependency.

Dependency is a question of fact to be determined from evidence. Joint residence, financial support and absence of contrary evidence sufficiently establish dependency.

Held: The claimant proved dependency on the deceased daughter-in-law.

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D. Motor Vehicles Act—Non-dependent Legal Heir.

Even a non-dependent legal representative is competent to maintain a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act. Dependency affects the quantum of compensation and not the maintainability of the claim.

Held: Right to claim compensation is not confined only to dependants.

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E. Motor Accident Claims—Dismissal—Impropriety.

Where evidence regarding dependency remains unrebutted and the Tribunal itself assesses compensation, dismissal of the claim on technical grounds is unsustainable.

Held: Tribunal's order set aside and compensation awarded.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The appellant's son and daughter-in-law died in the same motor vehicle accident involving an APSRTC bus. Separate claim petitions were filed in respect of both deaths.

The Tribunal awarded compensation for the death of the son but dismissed the claim relating to the death of the daughter-in-law on the ground that the father-in-law was neither her dependent nor entitled to compensation.

The claimant challenged the dismissal, contending that both the deceased and the claimant lived together as a joint family, that the daughter-in-law contributed to the family income through tailoring and milk business, and that after the death of both his son and daughter-in-law he had no one to support him.

The High Court examined the oral evidence and found that the claimant's dependency was never seriously disputed in cross-examination.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Meaning of "Legal Representative"

Relying upon Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, the Court reiterated that the expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act is of wider import and cannot be restricted to the categories mentioned in the Fatal Accidents Act.

The object of the legislation is to provide just compensation to every legal representative suffering loss because of the death of the victim.

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(ii) Dependency is a Question of Evidence

The Court found that the claimant and the deceased daughter-in-law were living together in a joint family.

Evidence established that she earned income by tailoring and milk supply and contributed to the family.

The respondent failed to challenge the claimant's evidence regarding dependency by effective cross-examination.

Accordingly, dependency stood proved.

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(iii) Non-dependent Legal Representatives

Following Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and the Full Bench decision in Dr. Gangaraju Sowmini v. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy, the Court held that even a non-dependent legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim.

Dependency is relevant only while assessing compensation and does not affect the right to institute the proceedings.

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(iv) Entitlement to Compensation

The Tribunal had already assessed the compensation payable at ₹3,65,000.

Once maintainability and dependency were established, there was no legal justification for dismissing the petition.

The claimant was therefore held entitled to the assessed compensation together with interest.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act receives a liberal and expansive interpretation consistent with the object of providing just compensation. A father-in-law who establishes that he was dependent upon his deceased daughter-in-law and who answers the description of a legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation. Even otherwise, a non-dependent legal representative is competent to institute proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, dependency being relevant only for determination of compensation and not for maintainability of the claim.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Appeal allowed.

• Judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing M.V.O.P. No.327 of 2009 set aside.

• Claim petition allowed.

• Claimant held entitled to compensation of ₹3,65,000/-.

• Interest awarded at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till realization.

• APSRTC directed to deposit the compensation within two months.

• No order as to costs.

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal may review its award where an error apparent on the face of the record has resulted in incorrect determination of compensation. Benefits such as family pension and compassionate appointment are not deductible as pecuniary advantages while assessing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellate Court, in discharge of its statutory obligation to award just compensation, may enhance the compensation even in an appeal filed solely by the insurer where the evidence on record demonstrates entitlement to a higher amount.

 

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The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Guddu Gurramma & Ors.

2026:APHC:14858 (A.P.)

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Motor Accident Claims Tribunal—Power of Review—Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal possesses the power to review its award where the ingredients of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC are satisfied, particularly where there exists an error apparent on the face of the record resulting in manifest injustice.

Held: Correction of the deceased's age from 56 years to 53 years and application of the correct multiplier constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, justifying review.

(Paras 14–18)

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B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation—Pension and Compassionate Appointment.

Family pension received by the widow and compassionate appointment granted or likely to be granted to a dependent are not "pecuniary advantages" liable to be deducted while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Held: Such statutory or service benefits are independent of compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot diminish the claimants' entitlement.

(Paras 20–24)

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C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Just Compensation—Conventional Heads.

While computing compensation, the Tribunal and the appellate Court are bound to award compensation under the conventional heads in accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., including consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses.

(Paras 25–28)

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D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Appeal by Insurance Company—Enhancement of Compensation.

In an appeal preferred by the insurer, the appellate Court is not precluded from enhancing compensation, even in the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the claimants, if the evidence on record establishes entitlement to higher just compensation.

Held: Duty to award just compensation overrides procedural limitations.

(Paras 29 & 30)

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E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Beneficial legislation.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare-oriented legislation. Courts must adopt a liberal approach to ensure payment of just and reasonable compensation and should not permit technical objections to defeat substantive justice.

(Paras 25–30)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The claimants sought compensation for the death of Gurappa, a Railway Watchman, who died in a motor accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of a car insured with the appellant Insurance Company. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal initially awarded compensation by adopting an incorrect multiplier owing to an erroneous recording of the deceased's age. Upon review, the Tribunal corrected the age from 56 years to 53 years and enhanced the compensation. Challenging both the review jurisdiction and the quantum of compensation, the Insurance Company preferred the present appeal.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Review Jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal

The High Court held that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its own award where there is an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

The incorrect adoption of the deceased's age and multiplier constituted a patent error resulting in substantial injustice. The Tribunal rightly exercised review jurisdiction to rectify the mistake.

(Paras 14–18)

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(ii) Pension and Compassionate Appointment

Rejecting the Insurance Company's contention, the Court reiterated that:

• family pension;

• compassionate appointment;

• provident fund;

• insurance benefits; and

• other service benefits

are independent statutory entitlements and cannot be treated as "pecuniary advantages" for deduction from compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Paras 20–24)

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(iii) Computation of Compensation

Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court reassessed compensation by:

• adopting multiplier 11;

• adding 15% future prospects;

• awarding spousal consortium to the widow;

• awarding parental consortium to each child;

• awarding compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses.

The Court found that the Tribunal had omitted proper compensation under several conventional heads.

(Paras 25–28)

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(iv) Power to Enhance Compensation

The Court reiterated that the statutory obligation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award just compensation. Consequently, even where only the Insurance Company has filed an appeal, the appellate Court is empowered to enhance the compensation if the evidence so warrants, notwithstanding the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the claimants.

(Paras 29 & 30)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal may review its award where an error apparent on the face of the record has resulted in incorrect determination of compensation. Benefits such as family pension and compassionate appointment are not deductible as pecuniary advantages while assessing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellate Court, in discharge of its statutory obligation to award just compensation, may enhance the compensation even in an appeal filed solely by the insurer where the evidence on record demonstrates entitlement to a higher amount.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Appeal filed by the Insurance Company dismissed.

• Tribunal's exercise of review jurisdiction upheld.

• Compensation enhanced from Rs.20,38,715/- to Rs.24,18,311/-.

• Enhanced compensation awarded with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition until realization.

• Insurance Company held liable to satisfy the award under the policy.

• Enhanced compensation directed to be apportioned to the widow's share.

• No order as to costs.

(Paras 28–30)

In a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the death of an injured victim occurring after an interval from the accident does not disentitle the legal representatives from compensation if the medical evidence establishes a causal nexus between the accident injuries and the subsequent death. The expression "legal representative" under the Act has a wide import and is not confined to dependants alone. The Claims Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under a beneficial legislation, is under a statutory obligation to award just compensation, even exceeding the amount claimed where warranted by the evidence.

 

advocatemmmohan

T. Krishnamma & Ors. v. A. Srinivasulu & Ors.

2026:APHC:14861 (A.P.)

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 166 & 173—Death occurring after accident—Causal connection.

Merely because the victim dies several months after the accident or after being discharged from the hospital, it cannot be presumed that the death was natural. If the medical evidence establishes a nexus between the injuries sustained in the accident and the subsequent death, compensation for fatal accident is maintainable.

Held: The medical evidence established that the grievous fracture sustained in the accident could have resulted in fat embolism leading to death. The Tribunal erred in treating the death as unconnected with the accident.

(Paras 30–34)

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B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 166—Legal representatives—Dependency.

A claim petition under Section 166 is maintainable not only by dependent legal heirs but also by legal representatives. Dependency is relevant for quantification and apportionment of compensation, but absence of dependency does not bar maintainability of the claim.

Held: Daughters, daughters-in-law and grandchildren, being legal representatives and dependants in the facts of the case, were entitled to maintain the claim petition.

(Paras 25–29)

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C. Motor Accident Claims—Negligence—Criminal conviction.

Where the driver of the offending vehicle has admitted guilt in the connected criminal case and has been convicted, such conviction constitutes strong evidence of negligence, dispensing with the necessity of further proof unless rebutted.

(Paras 23 & 24)

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D. Motor Vehicles Act—Beneficial legislation—Just compensation.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a social welfare legislation. Claims Tribunals are expected to adopt a liberal and holistic approach while assessing compensation and should not reject genuine claims on technical or hyper-technical considerations.

(Paras 32, 37 & 42)

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E. Motor Accident Compensation—Amount claimed—Power of Court.

There is no legal prohibition against awarding compensation higher than the amount claimed if the evidence justifies such award. The statutory duty of the Tribunal and the appellate Court is to determine and award "just compensation" under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Paras 42 & 43)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The claimants sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the death of Eswaramma, who sustained grievous injuries in a road accident involving a tipper lorry while travelling in an APSRTC bus. She underwent treatment in hospital on two occasions and died approximately three and a half months after the accident. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim holding that the death was natural and unrelated to the accident and further observed that the claimants were not dependants. Aggrieved thereby, the legal representatives preferred the present appeal.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Proof of Negligence

The High Court held that the driver of the offending lorry had admitted guilt in the connected criminal proceedings and was convicted. Such conviction sufficiently established negligence, making further proof unnecessary.

(Paras 23 & 24)

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(ii) Legal Representatives and Dependency

Relying upon Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., and the Full Bench decision in Dr. Gangaraju Sowmini v. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy, the Court held that the expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act receives a broad interpretation. Even non-dependent legal representatives may maintain a claim, though dependency assumes significance while assessing compensation.

The claimants, being daughters, daughters-in-law and grandchildren of the deceased, were therefore competent to maintain the claim.

(Paras 25–29)

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(iii) Death Attributable to Accident

The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to appreciate the medical evidence. The treating doctor deposed that the grievous fracture sustained by the deceased could lead to fat embolism causing death. Merely because the death occurred three and a half months after the accident did not sever the causal connection.

The Court emphasised that a welfare legislation demands a practical and empathetic appreciation of medical evidence rather than a rigid or technical approach.

(Paras 30–34)

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(iv) Determination of Just Compensation

Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., and Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, the Court assessed compensation under the heads of:

• Loss of dependency;

• Loss of estate;

• Parental consortium;

• Funeral expenses; and

• Medical expenses.

The Court further reiterated that it is duty-bound to award just compensation, even where such amount exceeds the compensation originally claimed.

(Paras 35–43)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the death of an injured victim occurring after an interval from the accident does not disentitle the legal representatives from compensation if the medical evidence establishes a causal nexus between the accident injuries and the subsequent death. The expression "legal representative" under the Act has a wide import and is not confined to dependants alone. The Claims Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under a beneficial legislation, is under a statutory obligation to award just compensation, even exceeding the amount claimed where warranted by the evidence.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Appeal allowed.

• Judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing the claim petition set aside.

• Death held to be attributable to the accident injuries.

• Claimants held entitled to compensation.

• Compensation of Rs.3,11,000/- awarded together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of petition until realization.

• Owner and insurer of the offending vehicle held jointly liable.

• Directions issued regarding apportionment, deposit and disbursement of the compensation.

• No order as to costs in the appeal.

(Paras 41–43)

The six-month cooling-off period prescribed under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is directory. Where spouses have lived separately for the requisite period, have voluntarily and completely settled all ancillary disputes, and there exists no possibility of reconciliation, the Family Court ought to exercise its discretion to waive the cooling-off period. Mechanical insistence upon expiry of six months frustrates the very object of the provision and warrants interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

 

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Chenikala Harshavardhini & Anr. v. Nil

2026:APHC:21296 (A.P.)

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Section 13-B(2)—Mutual Consent Divorce—Cooling-off period—Nature.

The six-month cooling-off period prescribed under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is directory and not mandatory. The Family Court possesses discretion to waive the period where the statutory object has already been achieved and there exists no possibility of reconciliation.

Held: The Family Court erred in treating the cooling-off period as mandatory and in refusing to advance the matter solely on that ground.

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B. Divorce by Mutual Consent—Waiver of cooling-off period—Conditions.

Where the spouses have lived separately for the requisite period, have amicably settled all matrimonial disputes including permanent alimony, custody of the child, withdrawal of criminal proceedings and distribution of properties, and have unequivocally expressed their intention to dissolve the marriage, insistence upon the cooling-off period serves no useful purpose.

(Paras 10–12)

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C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Section 13-B—Object of cooling-off period.

The object of the statutory cooling-off period is to afford the spouses an opportunity for reconciliation and reconsideration of their decision. Once that object stands exhausted and reconciliation has become impossible, continuance of the waiting period merely prolongs the agony of the parties.

(Paras 11 & 12)

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D. Family Court—Exercise of discretion.

A Family Court must examine the facts of each case while considering waiver of the cooling-off period. Mechanical insistence upon expiry of six months, ignoring a complete and genuine settlement between the parties, amounts to improper exercise of jurisdiction.

(Paras 10–13)

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E. Article 227 of the Constitution—Supervisory jurisdiction.

Where the Family Court refuses to exercise the discretion vested in it by law by proceeding on an erroneous understanding that the statutory cooling-off period is mandatory, the High Court may interfere under Article 227 and issue appropriate directions for expeditious disposal.

(Paras 9–13)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The petitioners, husband and wife, were married on 04.12.2022 and had a daughter born on 02.09.2023. Owing to matrimonial disputes, they lived separately for more than one year and jointly filed a petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. During the pendency of the proceedings, they amicably settled all disputes relating to permanent alimony, custody and welfare of the minor child, property distribution and withdrawal of criminal proceedings. They sought advancement of the divorce petition and waiver of the statutory cooling-off period. The Family Court rejected the application holding that the six-month period was mandatory. The petitioners challenged the said order under Article 227.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Nature of the Cooling-off Period

The High Court relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, AIR 2017 SC 4417, and Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal, (2023) 17 SCC 648, reiterating that the six-month period under Section 13-B(2) is directory and may be waived in appropriate cases.

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(ii) Purpose of Section 13-B(2)

The Court observed that the legislative intent behind the cooling-off period is to facilitate reconciliation and enable the spouses to reconsider their decision. Once the parties have genuinely resolved every matrimonial dispute and there remains no possibility of reunion, insistence upon the waiting period defeats rather than advances the object of the provision.

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(iii) Settlement Between the Parties

The Court found that the settlement comprehensively covered:

• permanent alimony;

• custody and welfare of the minor daughter;

• distribution of properties;

• withdrawal of criminal proceedings; and

• voluntary decision of both parties to dissolve the marriage.

The settlement was found to be voluntary, genuine and complete, leaving no surviving dispute.

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(iv) Improper Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Family Court

The Family Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the six-month cooling-off period was mandatory. Such an approach ignored the binding law declared by the Supreme Court and amounted to failure to exercise the judicial discretion vested under Section 13-B(2).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The six-month cooling-off period prescribed under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is directory. Where spouses have lived separately for the requisite period, have voluntarily and completely settled all ancillary disputes, and there exists no possibility of reconciliation, the Family Court ought to exercise its discretion to waive the cooling-off period. Mechanical insistence upon expiry of six months frustrates the very object of the provision and warrants interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Civil Revision Petition allowed.

• Order of the Family Court dismissing the application for advancement set aside.

• Held that the statutory cooling-off period under Section 13-B(2) is directory and liable to be waived in the facts of the case.

• Family Court directed to take up the mutual consent divorce petition and pass appropriate orders for dissolution of marriage, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.

• Pending miscellaneous petitions ordered to stand closed.