ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: advocatemmmohanConstitutional Analysis: The 2026 W...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: advocatemmmohanConstitutional Analysis: The 2026 W...: advocatemmmohan Constitutional Analysis: The 2026 West Bengal Constitutional Crisis, Caretaker Governance, and the Rule of Law              ...

Constitutional Analysis: The 2026 West Bengal Constitutional Crisis, Caretaker Governance, and the Rule of Law  

                                              —--------M. Murali Mohan, Advocate

 I. Introduction

The constitutional developments in West Bengal in May 2026 raise important questions concerning parliamentary democracy, gubernatorial authority, caretaker governance, and constitutional continuity under the Constitution of India. The reported electoral outcome gave the opposition a clear majority in the Legislative Assembly, while the incumbent ruling party suffered defeat. Against that background, the outgoing Chief Minister reportedly declined to resign immediately, citing allegations regarding large-scale deletion of voters during the electoral revision process.

The constitutional issue is not whether political allegations may be serious, but whether they can suspend the operation of constitutional rules governing executive tenure, legislative duration, and transfer of power. Under the Constitution of India, executive legitimacy depends on constitutional structure, legislative confidence, and lawful transition, not on unilateral claims that an election outcome is defective.

The relevant provisions are Articles 164, 172, and 174, together with the constitutional conventions governing responsible government and the limited role of the Governor. The resolution of such a crisis must rest on constitutional process, not political assertion.

 II. Constitutional Background

The reported controversy arose in the aftermath of the Assembly election, in which the opposition secured a majority and the incumbent ministry suffered defeat. Allegations were also made regarding deletion of a substantial number of voters during the electoral revision process. On that basis, the outgoing political leadership contended that the election itself stood vitiated and that resignation should await judicial adjudication.

Indian constitutional law, however, distinguishes between political grievance and legal invalidity. A declared election result continues to operate unless it is set aside through the process established by election law. The filing or contemplation of an election petition does not, by itself, prevent the formation of a new government or suspend the constitutional consequences of the election.

The further constitutional complication was that the term of the existing Legislative Assembly was drawing to its natural conclusion under Article 172. That provision is central to understanding the transition from one legislature to another.

III. Article 164 and Ministerial Continuance

Article 164(1) states that the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and that the other Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. Read in isolation, the phrase “during the pleasure of the Governor” may suggest broad discretion. In constitutional practice, however, that expression does not confer a personal or arbitrary power on the Governor.

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Governor ordinarily acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in limited constitutional situations. The doctrine of pleasure in India is therefore not monarchical in character. It operates within the framework of parliamentary government, collective responsibility, and legislative accountability.

Accordingly, the Governor cannot ordinarily dismiss a ministry merely because of political disagreement, personal dissatisfaction, or untested allegations about electoral irregularity. The real constitutional test is whether the ministry enjoys legislative support.

 IV. Collective Responsibility and Majority Support

Article 164(2) provides that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. This is the core principle of responsible government in a parliamentary system.

A ministry survives so long as it commands the confidence of the House. Political popularity outside the Assembly is not the constitutional test. Nor can the Governor substitute personal judgment for legislative determination. Where majority support is in doubt, the appropriate constitutional method is a floor test in the Assembly.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this principle in cases such as *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India* and *Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly*. Those decisions confirm that constitutional legitimacy in a parliamentary system flows from legislative confidence, not from unilateral executive assertions.

V. Article 172 and Article 174

A distinction must be drawn between dissolution under Article 174 and expiry under Article 172.

Article 174 empowers the Governor to dissolve the Legislative Assembly. But under settled constitutional law, dissolution ordinarily occurs on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Governor does not possess unrestricted authority to dissolve the House merely because of political controversy.

Article 172 is different. It provides that every Legislative Assembly shall continue for five years unless sooner dissolved. Expiry under Article 172 occurs automatically by operation of the Constitution. No separate act of dissolution is required. Once the constitutional term ends, the House ceases to exist.

This creates an important transition problem. The legislature may expire, but governance cannot stop. The executive must continue in some form until a successor government is formed. That is where caretaker continuity becomes relevant.

VI. Caretaker Governance

The Constitution of India does not expressly use the expression “caretaker government.” The concept is drawn from Westminster constitutional convention and the necessity of uninterrupted administration.

In ordinary practice, when an Assembly expires or a ministry loses its majority, the outgoing Chief Minister is expected to resign, and the Governor may permit the ministry to continue temporarily until a successor is installed. During that period, the ministry should limit itself to routine and necessary functions and avoid major policy decisions, significant appointments, or irreversible commitments, except where public interest requires otherwise.

The caretaker idea does not mean that constitutional authority disappears. It means that the outgoing executive remains only for limited transitional purposes. The central objective is continuity of administration without distorting the democratic transfer of power.

VII. Election Petitions and Legal Finality

Allegations relating to voter deletion or other electoral irregularities may certainly be the subject of election petitions and judicial review under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. That is the proper legal avenue for testing such complaints.

But constitutional governance cannot be held in suspension pending litigation. The law draws a clear line between challenge and invalidation. Unless and until a court sets aside the election, the declared result remains operative. A new Assembly therefore retains constitutional validity, and the process of government formation must proceed accordingly.

This principle preserves democratic continuity. It prevents political allegations from overriding the constitutional effect of an election result.

VIII. The Governor’s Constitutional Role

The Governor is not intended to function as a political sovereign, a partisan decision-maker, or an adjudicator of electoral disputes. The Governor’s role in a transition period is facilitative, not determinative.

The Supreme Court’s emphasis on constitutional morality in *Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India* reinforces this position. The Governor must act in a manner that upholds democratic accountability, institutional restraint, and the orderly functioning of representative government.

Accordingly, in a situation where a new majority has emerged, the Governor must ensure that constitutional transition occurs in accordance with the principles of responsible government and legislative legitimacy.

 IX. Conclusion

The 2026 West Bengal constitutional controversy illustrates the interaction between electoral dispute, legislative legitimacy, gubernatorial authority, caretaker convention, and constitutional continuity. The Constitution of India resolves such questions through collective responsibility under Article 164(2), limited gubernatorial discretion, automatic expiry under Article 172, and the principles of democratic continuity and constitutional morality.

The doctrine of pleasure under Article 164 does not authorize arbitrary removal of an elected ministry. Nor do allegations concerning electoral illegitimacy suspend the constitutional need for transfer of power. When an Assembly expires under Article 172, the previous House ceases constitutionally, the outgoing ministry may continue only as a temporary transitional arrangement, and the Governor must facilitate the formation of the next government in accordance with law.

The true constitutional duty in such a moment is not political resistance, but orderly transition consistent with representative democracy, majority rule, responsible government, and the rule of law.

Analytical Authorities

1.Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974):

• Crux: Confirmed that the Governor (and President) are formal/constitutional heads who must act on the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers, except in specific, narrow discretionary areas.

• Sigma Note: It settles that "pleasure" is not the Governor’s personal whim.

2.S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994):

• Crux: Established the "Floor Test" as the only legitimate way to determine if a ministry has majority support. It restricted the misuse of Article 356 (President's Rule).

• Sigma Note: It supports the argument that electoral results must be respected through legislative processes.

3.Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016):

• Crux: Reaffirmed that the Governor’s power to summon, prorogue, or dissolve the House under Article 174 is not discretionary and must follow the advice of the Cabinet.

• Sigma Note: It prevents "gubernatorial micro-management" of the Assembly’s schedule.

4.Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, M.P. Legislative Assembly (2020):

• Crux: Clarified that if a government appears to have lost its majority, the Governor can direct a floor test to ensure democratic accountability.

• Sigma Note: It proves that majority support is a continuous requirement, not just a one-time event at swearing-in.

5.Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006):

• Crux: Ruled that a Governor cannot recommend dissolution of an Assembly merely to prevent a political party from staking a claim to form a government.

• Sigma Note: It emphasizes institutional integrity over political engineering during transitions.

6.Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018):

• Crux: Introduced the concept of "Constitutional Morality" and "Institutional Trust," stating that functionaries must act within the spirit of the Constitution.

• Sigma Note: It provides the "moral compass" for the article's conclusion on orderly transition.

7.B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001):

• Crux: Held that a person who is disqualified (in that case, due to conviction) cannot be appointed as Chief Minister, even if they have the support of the majority party.

• Sigma Note: It proves that the Constitution prevails over a popular mandate—a vital point if an outgoing CM lacks a valid seat or qualification.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Environmental...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Environmental...: advocatemmmohan APEX COURT HELD THAT  Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Environmental Clearance (EC) — Formaldehyde manufacturing units —...

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Environmental Clearance (EC) — Formaldehyde manufacturing units — Whether units operating pursuant to Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO) can be closed for want of prior EC — Held, no, in peculiar facts.
The Supreme Court held that formaldehyde manufacturing units which had been established and commenced operations pursuant to valid Consent to Establish and Consent to Operate granted by the respective State Pollution Control Boards could not be directed to shut down merely because prior Environmental Clearance under the EIA Notification, 2006 had not been obtained at the initial stage, especially when the Pollution Control Boards themselves were under the bona fide misconception that prior EC was not required for such units. (Paras 17, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27)

Environmental Law — Ex-post facto Environmental Clearance — Permissibility in exceptional factual circumstances.
The Court reiterated that ex-post facto Environmental Clearance should not ordinarily be granted and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. However, where industries were established after obtaining statutory permissions from Pollution Control Boards and subsequently applied for EC upon being directed to do so by authorities, continuation of operations pending consideration of EC applications could be permitted in exceptional circumstances. (Paras 18, 24, 25, 26)

National Green Tribunal — Orders founded solely on earlier judgment subsequently set aside — Consequence.
The Supreme Court held that since the impugned NGT orders in the present matters were entirely founded upon the earlier NGT judgment in Dastak NGO, and since the said judgment had already been set aside by the Supreme Court in Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO, the impugned directions requiring closure of the appellant-units could not survive. (Paras 3, 10, 17, 20, 23)

Environmental Law — EIA Notification, 2006 — Synthetic Organic Chemical Units — Prior EC requirement — Subsequent regulatory clarification by Pollution Control Boards.
The Court noted that the respective Pollution Control Boards later examined the applicability of the EIA Notification, 2006 and clarified that formaldehyde manufacturing units fell within the category of “Synthetic Organic Chemicals” requiring Environmental Clearance. Thereafter, notices were issued directing operational units to apply for EC within stipulated periods. (Paras 8, 9, 24, 25)

Pollution Control Boards — Grant of CTE and CTO — Effect of authorities’ bona fide misconception regarding EC requirement.
The Supreme Court accepted that the Pollution Control Boards themselves were uncertain about the necessity of prior Environmental Clearance when they granted CTE and CTO to the units. Such bona fide misconception on the part of the regulatory authorities constituted a significant distinguishing circumstance while considering whether industries should be shut down. (Paras 7, 17, 24, 26)

Environmental Clearance Process — Screening, Scoping, Terms of Reference (TOR), Public Consultation and Appraisal — Units substantially complied with procedural requirements.
The Court recorded that the appellant-units had already applied for EC pursuant to notices issued by Pollution Control Boards; Screening and Scoping stages were completed; Terms of Reference had been granted; public consultation was either exempted because the units were situated in industrial areas or had already been completed; and only the appraisal stage remained pending. (Paras 13, 19, 25)

Environmental Jurisprudence — Vanashakti judgment and review — Scope.
The Supreme Court referred to the earlier Vanashakti judgment striking down Office Memorandums permitting ex-post facto Environmental Clearance as illegal, as well as the subsequent review judgment noting conflict with earlier decisions including Pahwa Plastics. The Court ultimately applied the ratio of Pahwa Plastics as the governing precedent in the peculiar factual matrix of the present cases. (Paras 5, 6, 12, 13, 26)

Air Act and Water Act — Alleged absence of deemed consent under Air Act — Rejected as irrelevant once CTO granted.
The Court rejected the contention that absence of deemed approval provisions under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 invalidated the CTO granted to the appellant-units. Since the concerned Pollution Control Boards themselves had granted CTOs and did not dispute their validity, alleged technical infractions under the Air Act were held not germane to adjudication of the appeals. (Para 21)

Environmental Law — Balance between environmental compliance and economic/public interest.
The Supreme Court clarified that while environmental laws must be strictly enforced, constitutional courts cannot ignore broader economic consequences, livelihood concerns, and operational realities of industries functioning pursuant to permissions granted by statutory authorities. (Paras 18, 22, 24, 26)

Directions Issued — Continuation of operations pending EC consideration.
The Court directed that:
(i) appellant-units be permitted to continue operations pursuant to valid CTE and CTO;
(ii) authorities decide EC applications within one month;
(iii) electricity supply, if disconnected, be restored subject to payment of dues; and
(iv) if EC applications are ultimately rejected for violations attributable to the units, authorities would be at liberty to disconnect supply and proceed according to law. (Para 27)

Result — Appeals allowed — NGT closure directions set aside.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the NGT orders directing closure of the formaldehyde manufacturing units, and applied the ratio of Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO mutatis mutandis. (Paras 20, 23, 27)

Debt Recovery Tribunal Proceedings — Parallel proceedings — Effect on invocation of IBC. The Supreme Court observed that proceedings were already pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the dispute regarding recovery and security interests was actively under adjudication and substantial deposit had already been made pursuant to orders of the DRT. Such circumstances reinforced the conclusion that the matter belonged appropriately to recovery proceedings rather than insolvency jurisdiction under the Code. (Paras 2(xiii), 2(xiv), 12)

APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Preconditions for initiation of CIRP — Existence of financial debt and default mandatory.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the sine qua non for invocation of Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is the existence of a “financial debt” coupled with “default” in repayment thereof. The Code is intended to trigger a collective insolvency resolution process upon genuine financial distress and not for adjudication of isolated contractual disputes or recovery claims. (Para 8)

IBC — Insolvency proceedings cannot be used as debt recovery mechanism or coercive recovery tool.
The Court reaffirmed that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code cannot be invoked with the dominant object of compelling payment or recovering money from a debtor. Use of insolvency proceedings as a coercive mechanism for recovery by individual creditors constitutes abuse of process. (Paras 8, 12)

IBC — Financial creditor — Loan disbursed directly to builder under quadripartite agreement — Nature of transaction examined.
The Supreme Court held that where the loan amount was directly disbursed by the Bank to the Builder under a quadripartite agreement and the transaction was inseparably connected with obligations concerning construction, transfer and delivery of immovable property, the arrangement could not be viewed as a simple bilateral financial lending transaction between the Bank and the Corporate Debtor. (Paras 9, 10)

Contractual Disputes — Predominantly contractual and property-related disputes — Invocation of IBC impermissible.
The Court held that disputes arising from competing contractual obligations involving transfer of immovable property, obligations of the builder, refund arrangements, liens, and associated rights under a quadripartite agreement are predominantly contractual in character and do not constitute a straightforward insolvency default warranting commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). (Paras 10, 11, 12)

Debt Recovery Tribunal Proceedings — Parallel proceedings — Effect on invocation of IBC.
The Supreme Court observed that proceedings were already pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the dispute regarding recovery and security interests was actively under adjudication and substantial deposit had already been made pursuant to orders of the DRT. Such circumstances reinforced the conclusion that the matter belonged appropriately to recovery proceedings rather than insolvency jurisdiction under the Code. (Paras 2(xiii), 2(xiv), 12)

Forum Shopping — Simultaneous recourse to different statutory remedies — Scope.
While the appellant-bank contended that taking recourse to multiple statutory remedies did not amount to forum shopping, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the NCLAT’s conclusion refusing CIRP initiation because the dispute was essentially contractual and recovery-oriented rather than insolvency-centric. (Paras 4, 5, 12, 13)

Quadripartite Agreement — Obligations of builder — Significance in determining nature of transaction.
The Court extensively relied upon clauses of the quadripartite agreement demonstrating that the Builder bore substantial obligations relating to construction, execution of sale deed, refund obligations upon cancellation, maintenance of clear title, creation of mortgage security, and restrictions against transfer or encumbrance of the property. These obligations established that the transaction was not merely a financial debt arrangement simpliciter. (Para 9)

Result — Appeal dismissed — NCLAT order setting aside CIRP upheld.
The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment of the NCLAT and upheld the setting aside of the NCLT order admitting the Section 7 application and initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. (Paras 12, 13, 14) 

SC/ST Granted Lands — Transfer after expiry of non-alienation period — Proceedings initiated by persons who themselves participated in alienation — Effect. The Supreme Court distinguished earlier precedents and held that proceedings under the Act could not be sustained where the very persons who later sought annulment of the sale had themselves participated in the original alienation transaction. In the present case, the sons of the original grantee, who initiated restoration proceedings, were parties to the first sale deed executed in 1997 after expiry of the 15-year non-alienation period. Such conduct disentitled them from seeking relief under the Act after substantial delay. (Paras 5, 7)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 — Section 4 — Annulment of transfer of granted land — Delay and laches — Applicability of doctrine of reasonable time.
The Supreme Court reiterated that even where no limitation period is prescribed under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, proceedings for annulment of transfers must nevertheless be initiated within a reasonable time. Relief may be denied where proceedings are instituted after inordinate delay depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. (Paras 6, 7)

SC/ST Land Grant — Beneficial legislation — Protection of granted lands — Scope and object.
The Court observed that the 1978 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to preserve lands granted to members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who may otherwise be induced or compelled to part with such lands. The statute seeks to protect vulnerable grantees from exploitation and unlawful alienation of granted lands. (Para 7)

SC/ST Granted Lands — Transfer after expiry of non-alienation period — Proceedings initiated by persons who themselves participated in alienation — Effect.
The Supreme Court distinguished earlier precedents and held that proceedings under the Act could not be sustained where the very persons who later sought annulment of the sale had themselves participated in the original alienation transaction. In the present case, the sons of the original grantee, who initiated restoration proceedings, were parties to the first sale deed executed in 1997 after expiry of the 15-year non-alienation period. Such conduct disentitled them from seeking relief under the Act after substantial delay. (Paras 5, 7)

Karnataka Land Revenue Rules — Grant certificate under Schedule-E — Non-alienation period of 15 years — Transfer after expiry thereof.
The Court noted that the grant certificate issued under Schedule-E of the Karnataka Land Revenue framework prohibited alienation only for a period of fifteen years. Since the original grant was made in 1977 and grant certificate issued in 1981, the first transfer effected in 1997 occurred after expiry of the non-alienation period. (Para 5)

Delay and Laches — Distinction between proceedings initiated by unaware legal representatives/community members and proceedings initiated by participating transferors.
The Supreme Court drew a distinction between cases where legal representatives, unaware of prior grants or transfers, initiate proceedings after delay, or where villagers challenge illegal alienations in public interest, and cases where the applicants themselves were parties to the impugned transaction. In the latter category, equitable relief under the beneficial legislation may justifiably be denied. (Para 7)

Precedents — Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner distinguished on facts.
The Court distinguished Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner wherein delay of eight years in initiating proceedings was not treated as fatal because of the protective object of the legislation. In the present case, however, proceedings were initiated by persons who had themselves participated in the earlier alienation, thereby materially altering the equities involved. (Paras 4, 6, 7)

Result — Appeal allowed — Orders annulling sale set aside.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the authorities and the High Court which had declared the sale transaction void under the Act of 1978. (Paras 7, 8)

Medical Council of India (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 — Disciplinary proceedings against doctor — Punishment on charge different from original show cause notice — Violation of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that once a doctor had successfully explained and defended the original charge levelled in the show cause notice, the Ethics Committee and Executive Committee could not proceed to punish him on a different or altered charge without issuing a fresh show cause notice and without granting an opportunity to respond to the new allegation. Imposition of punishment on a charge not originally framed amounted to denial of fair hearing and violation of principles of natural justice. (Paras 11, 12)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT

Medical Council of India (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 — Disciplinary proceedings against doctor — Punishment on charge different from original show cause notice — Violation of principles of natural justice.
The Supreme Court held that once a doctor had successfully explained and defended the original charge levelled in the show cause notice, the Ethics Committee and Executive Committee could not proceed to punish him on a different or altered charge without issuing a fresh show cause notice and without granting an opportunity to respond to the new allegation. Imposition of punishment on a charge not originally framed amounted to denial of fair hearing and violation of principles of natural justice. (Paras 11, 12)

Disciplinary Proceedings — Distinction between original charge and altered charge — Delinquent cannot be punished on variance of charge.
The Court held that the original allegation against the appellant-doctor concerned submission of fake faculty declaration forms and simultaneous appearance in inspections of two medical colleges. However, after the doctor successfully demonstrated that he was abroad during one of the inspections, the Ethics Committee shifted the basis of liability to non-disclosure of prior service in another medical college in the declaration form. Such punishment on an altered charge, without notice, was impermissible in law. (Paras 10, 11, 12)

Principles of Natural Justice — Fresh show cause notice mandatory where disciplinary authority proposes to proceed on new charge.
Relying upon Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, the Supreme Court reiterated that once a delinquent employee or professional successfully rebuts the original charge, the disciplinary authority cannot punish the delinquent on a completely different allegation without issuance of a fresh show cause notice and affording reasonable opportunity of hearing. (Para 12)

Medical Ethics — Mis-declaration in faculty declaration form — Professional misconduct.
The Supreme Court observed that the appellant-doctor failed to satisfactorily explain the incorrect declaration stating that he had not presented himself before any other institution as faculty during the same academic year for purposes of MCI assessment. Such mis-declaration, by itself, constituted misconduct and could not be condoned by the regulatory body. (Paras 13, 16)

Medical Education — MCI/NMC inspections — Importance of faculty declaration forms.
The Court recognised the importance of surprise inspections conducted by the Medical Council of India/National Medical Commission to ensure maintenance of standards in medical education and observed that declarations submitted by faculty members play a crucial role in the approval process undertaken by the regulatory authority. (Paras 6.1, 6.3)

Constitution of India — Article 142 — Modification of punishment to do complete justice.
Though the Court found substance in the allegation of mis-declaration, it exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to modify the punishment considering the peculiar facts and circumstances, including the doctor’s advanced age, lapse of nearly a decade since initiation of proceedings, and prolonged pendency of litigation. The punishment of removal of the doctor’s name from the Indian Medical Register for three months was reduced to issuance of censure/warning. (Paras 14, 15, 16)

Administrative Law — Judicial review — Court may interfere with quantum of punishment in exceptional circumstances.
The Supreme Court held that although the process undertaken by the Medical Council of India was not entirely faulted and misconduct was established, interference with the quantum of punishment was warranted in exercise of extraordinary powers to ensure complete justice between the parties. (Para 16)

Result — Civil Appeal allowed partly — Penalty modified from removal from Indian Medical Register for three months to censure/warning.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and requested the National Medical Commission to substitute the punishment of removal of the doctor’s name from the Indian Medical Register for three months with a lesser penalty of censure/warning. (Paras 16, 17)