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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

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Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Earlier recall application – Already allowed Complainant had earlier availed recall under Section 311; subsequent application after recording of accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC and at stage of final arguments unjustified. (Paras 8–9) Invoices – Not automatically admissible Production of invoices alone insufficient; complainant would need to re‑examine himself to prove them, leading to retrial and delay. (Para 10) Fair trial vs delay Recall permissible only if fairness of trial demonstrably suffers; mere convenience or filling lacunae not grounds. Delay in trial is relevant factor. (Paras 9–10)

  Bombay High Court ruling in Niketan Dilip Paldhe v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 3369 of 2022, decided 29 November 2022):

Headnotes 

  1. Section 311 CrPC – Recall of witness Power under Section 311 CrPC is discretionary, exercised only when recall is essential to secure a just decision; not a matter of course. (Paras 9–10)

  2. Cross‑examination statement – No right created Complainant’s willingness in cross‑examination to produce invoices does not confer a right to file recall application under Section 311. (Paras 2, 9)

  3. Earlier recall application – Already allowed Complainant had earlier availed recall under Section 311; subsequent application after recording of accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC and at stage of final arguments unjustified. (Paras 8–9)

  4. Invoices – Not automatically admissible Production of invoices alone insufficient; complainant would need to re‑examine himself to prove them, leading to retrial and delay. (Para 10)

  5. Fair trial vs delay Recall permissible only if fairness of trial demonstrably suffers; mere convenience or filling lacunae not grounds. Delay in trial is relevant factor. (Paras 9–10)

  6. Varsha Garg case – Distinguished SC ruling in Varsha Garg v. State of M.P. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 986) distinguished; in that case documents were crucial and no prior recall had been allowed. (Para 11)

  7. Impugned order quashed Magistrate’s order dated 01.08.2022 allowing recall for production of invoices set aside; writ petition allowed. (Paras 12–13)

Principles for exercise of Section 311 Court must consider: Whether new evidence is needed for just decision. Power should not be used to fill lacunae. Recall only if essential to ascertain truth. Fair trial entails interests of accused, victim, and society. (Paras 14–23)

 the Supreme Court of India ruling in Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2013 AIR SCW 4179, decided 4 July 2013):

Headnotes 

  1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Section 311 CrPC confers widest powers on courts to summon, recall, or re‑examine witnesses at any stage, but exercise must be judicial, cautious, and only when evidence is essential for just decision. (Paras 13–14, 23)

  2. Section 138 Evidence Act – Order of examination Re‑examination must be directed to explanation of matters referred to in cross‑examination; if new matter introduced, adverse party may further cross‑examine. (Para 13)

  3. Principles for exercise of Section 311 Court must consider:

  • Whether new evidence is needed for just decision.

  • Power should not be used to fill lacunae.

  • Recall only if essential to ascertain truth.

  • Fair trial entails interests of accused, victim, and society. (Paras 14–23)

  1. Case facts – PW‑9’s contradictory testimony PW‑9 initially alleged firearm injury but later testified he fell into latrine pit and was not shot; sons were absent. Subsequent application for re‑examination filed months later. (Paras 4–7, 25–26)

  2. Trial Court vs High Court orders Trial Court rejected recall application with reasons; High Court allowed re‑examination by cryptic order without impleading appellant. SC held High Court erred in interfering. (Paras 3, 11–12, 24)

  3. Fair trial – Liberal approach but limits SC acknowledged fairness requires opportunity to accused, but improper or capricious recall causes prejudice and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 20–23)

  4. Final holding – Recall unjustified SC set aside High Court order; upheld Trial Court’s rejection of recall of PW‑9, as application was belated, intended to overcome earlier testimony, and not essential for just decision. (Paras 24–26)

Cross‑examination already conducted Complainant/respondent was cross‑examined on three occasions (03.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 07.03.2023); petitioner had ample opportunity to put relevant questions. (Paras 13, 18) Delay in application – Prejudice Application for recall filed in 2024, long after closure of complainant’s evidence; belated stage recall would prejudice respondent and derail proceedings. (Paras 9, 15) Misuse of Section 311 – Prevented Court held Section 311 cannot be misused to fill lacunae or prolong trial; repeated recall causes undue hardship to witnesses and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 19)

 Delhi High Court ruling in Sh. Vimal Ghai v. Sh. M.P. Sharma (CRL.M.C. 4782/2024, decided 5 January 2026):

Headnotes 

  1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Section 311 CrPC empowers court to summon or recall witnesses at any stage to prevent failure of justice; power is discretionary, exercised only for strong and valid reasons, with caution and circumspection. (Paras 11–12)

  2. Change of counsel – Not a ground Engagement of new counsel does not confer right to recall witnesses; otherwise trials would be endlessly delayed by successive applications. (Paras 16, citing Govind Mandal v. State of NCT of Delhi)

  3. Fair trial – Balanced perspective Fair trial under Article 21 must be seen from perspective of accused, victim, and society; recall cannot be allowed merely on convenience or vague plea of fairness. (Para 17, citing Shiv Kumar Yadav, 2016)

  4. Cross‑examination already conducted Complainant/respondent was cross‑examined on three occasions (03.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 07.03.2023); petitioner had ample opportunity to put relevant questions. (Paras 13, 18)

  5. Delay in application – Prejudice Application for recall filed in 2024, long after closure of complainant’s evidence; belated stage recall would prejudice respondent and derail proceedings. (Paras 9, 15)

  6. Misuse of Section 311 – Prevented Court held Section 311 cannot be misused to fill lacunae or prolong trial; repeated recall causes undue hardship to witnesses and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 19)

  7. Petition dismissed – No merit

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summ...: advocatemmmohan Delhi High Court ruling in Hippocampus Infotech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr. (decided 17 April 202...

Delhi High Court ruling in Hippocampus Infotech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr. (decided 17 April 2025):

Headnotes 

  1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summon or recall witnesses under Section 311 CrPC is discretionary, exercised only for strong and valid reasons, with caution and circumspection. Recall is not a matter of course. (Paras 8–9)

  2. Cross‑examination – Closure due to counsel’s absence Petitioners’ right to cross‑examine complainant closed after repeated adjournments and non‑appearance; plea of counsel’s illness unsupported by medical records. (Paras 6–7, 10)

  3. Delay in application – Relevant factor Application for recall filed belatedly after closure of defence evidence; unexplained delay militates against exercise of Section 311 discretion. (Paras 7, 21)

  4. Supreme Court precedents – Recall principles Court cited Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. (2011), Shiv Kumar Yadav (2016), Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat (2017), Manju Devi (2019), Swapan Kumar Chatterjee (2019), and Satbir Singh (2023) to emphasize recall only when essential for just decision. (Paras 9–10)

  5. Conduct of petitioners – Dilatory tactics Petitioners repeatedly defaulted, NBWs issued and cancelled, adjournments granted liberally; trial court observed intent to delay proceedings. (Para 10)

  6. Change of complainant’s name – No fresh right Mere change of complainant company’s name did not confer fresh right of cross‑examination. (Para 10)

  7. Petition dismissed – No infirmity High Court upheld trial court’s order dated 20.07.2024 dismissing recall application; petition found devoid of merit. (Paras 11–12)

Tuesday, August 11, 2026

Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026. Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

 Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026.

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Interpretation of penal provision — Strict interpretation — Strict construction does not mean strict literalism — Penal provisions must be construed according to the legislative intent and the true construction of the statute — Where literal interpretation produces absurdity or defeats legislative intent, the Court is not required to adopt such literalism — At the same time, where statutory language is unambiguous, the Court cannot enlarge its scope merely because a wider construction appears desirable. [Paras 6, 7; 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Purposive interpretation — “Husband” — Void or voidable marriage and relationship in the nature of marriage — Protective object of legislation — The expression “husband” cannot be construed in a manner that permits a person who assumes the status and attributes of a marital relationship to evade the statutory protection merely by relying upon the invalidity of the relationship — However, the purposive interpretation adopted by the Court is specifically confined to S. 498A IPC. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Essential requirement — Intention to marry — Every live-in relationship does not fall within the protective scope of S. 498A — The relationship must qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the intention to marry must form an intrinsic part of the relationship — Protection is confined to relationships between consenting adults. [Para 23(i), (ii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Limited interpretation — Effect on other statutory provisions — The extended meaning attributed to “husband” for purposes of S. 498A cannot automatically be imported into other provisions of the IPC or other statutes — The proposition of law is expressly limited to S. 498A IPC. [Para 23(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Arrest — Accused in live-in relationship in the nature of marriage — Safeguards — Strict compliance with safeguards governing arrest — No person in a relationship in the nature of marriage, whether the live-in partner or his relative, accused of cruelty against a woman, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiry, in accordance with the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar. [Para 23(iv)]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Prima facie allegations — Scope — At the stage of considering quashing, where the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie constitute a cognizable offence, the Court should not conduct a trial on the disputed facts or quash the proceedings merely because the accused disputes the allegations — Whether the alleged suppression of prior marriage, dowry harassment and physical injury actually occurred is a matter for trial. [Para 22]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — S. 498A IPC — Live-in relationship — Allegation of cruelty — Quashing — Where the FIR alleged suppression of prior marriage, harassment for dowry and physical injury to the woman, and the allegations taken at face value disclosed a prima facie cognizable offence, the proceedings could not be quashed — Trial Court permitted to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 22, 24(i)]