Once the prosecution establishes that a married woman died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies in witness testimony do not warrant rejection of the entire prosecution case; the evidence must be scrutinised as a whole and its material portions separated from exaggerations or peripheral discrepancies.

 

STATE OF U.P. v. AJMAL BEG ETC.

2025 INSC 1435

Criminal Appeal Nos. 132–133 of 2017
Supreme Court of India — Sanjay Karol, J.

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

1. Dowry Death — Section 304-B IPC — Essential ingredients

[Para 14.1] — For constituting a dowry death under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution must establish: (i) death of a woman by burns, bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) within seven years of marriage; (iii) cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative; (iv) such cruelty or harassment being for or in connection with a demand for dowry; and (v) such cruelty or harassment having occurred soon before her death.

2. Dowry Death — “Soon before her death” — Reasonable time and causal nexus

[Para 14.1] — The expression “soon before her death” cannot be given a narrow or restricted meaning. It requires a reasonable proximity between the dowry-related cruelty or harassment and the death, so that there is a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between the two.

3. Dowry Death — Section 113-B Evidence Act — Presumption

[Paras 14.2, 20] — Once the prosecution establishes that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand soon before her death, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption is rebuttable by the accused.

4. Section 113-B — Presumption — Failure of defence to rebut

[Para 20] — Where the prosecution proves dowry-related cruelty soon before death and the defence leads no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, the presumption under Section 113-B operates against the accused and remains unrebutted.

5. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 2 — Demand before or after marriage

[Para 23] — The definition of “dowry” under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not confined to property or valuable security given before or at the marriage. It includes property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or at any time after marriage, where it is in connection with the marriage.

6. Dowry — Muslim marriage — Dower/Mahr distinguished from dowry

[Para 23] — Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act expressly excludes dower or mahr applicable under Muslim Personal Law from the statutory definition of dowry. This exclusion does not prevent other property or valuable security demanded in connection with the marriage from constituting dowry.

7. Dowry demand — Colour television, motorcycle and cash — Clearly constitutes dowry

[Para 23] — A demand by the husband or his family for a colour TV, motorcycle and Rs.15,000/- cash in connection with the marriage unquestionably constitutes a demand for dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

8. Section 498-A IPC — Cruelty — Scope

[Para 14.3] — Section 498-A covers both:
(i) wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health; and
(ii) harassment intended to coerce the woman or persons related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security. Dowry-related harassment is therefore not the sole form of cruelty contemplated by the provision.

9. Criminal trial — Contradictions and discrepancies in evidence — Entire prosecution case not to be discarded

[Para 19.1] — Mere discrepancies, contradictions or embellishments in the testimony of witnesses do not require rejection of the entire prosecution case. The Court must cautiously sift the evidence, separating truth from exaggeration, embellishment and improvement, and determine whether the material and salient portions implicate the accused.

10. Criminal evidence — Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus — Not a sound rule

[Para 19.1] — The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule of evidence. A witness may exaggerate or make mistakes regarding peripheral matters, but that does not automatically destroy the credibility of the material portions of the testimony.

11. Evidence — Court cannot reconstruct a new prosecution story

[Para 19.1] — While separating truth from exaggeration and contradictions, the Court may accept credible portions of evidence after cautious scrutiny; however, where the substratum or material part of the prosecution case is disbelieved, the Court cannot reconstruct an entirely new story from the remaining evidence.

12. Evidence — Witness credibility — Contradiction regarding whether witness actually saw the occurrence

[Para 21] — A discrepancy as to whether PW2 was an eyewitness did not materially affect his testimony where PW2 himself consistently stated that, upon reaching the scene, he saw the deceased ablaze and the accused fleeing, but did not claim to have witnessed the actual act of setting her on fire.

13. Evidence — Unshaken testimony — Cannot be rejected on conjectures and surmises

[Para 21] — Where a witness's material statement remains unshaken in cross-examination, the Court should not reject it merely because another witness has not independently mentioned the same fact. Rejection based merely on conjecture or surmise is impermissible.

14. Evidence — Isolated use of word “happily” — Cannot override entire testimony

[Para 22] — A statement by a witness that the deceased lived in her matrimonial home “happily” cannot be read in isolation so as to negate otherwise consistent evidence of dowry demands and harassment. Evidence must be assessed in its entirety and in context, rather than by attaching decisive significance to a single word.

15. Dowry death — Demand one day before death — Strong evidence satisfying “soon before”

[Para 20] — Where the husband himself reiterated the demand for dowry one day before the deceased's death, and the evidence establishes continuing harassment, the requirement of cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” is satisfied.

16. Dowry death — Defence evidence — Absence of rebuttal

[Para 20] — Once the prosecution establishes the statutory ingredients and the Section 113-B presumption arises, the accused must rebut the presumption. Where the defence leads no evidence, the statutory presumption remains unrebutted.

17. High Court — Acquittal — Appellate interference — Article 136

[Paras 15–15.2] — Although the Supreme Court ordinarily exercises restraint in reappreciating evidence in criminal appeals under Article 136, particularly where there are concurrent findings, such restraint is not an inflexible rule. Where the Trial Court and High Court have reached opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court may analyse the evidence to determine the correct conclusion.

18. Article 136 — Interference with findings — Exceptional circumstances

[Para 15.1] — The Supreme Court ordinarily refrains from interfering with factual findings unless the assessment suffers from an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or is inconsistent with the evidence so as to result in a perverse finding.

19. High Court — Reversal of Trial Court findings — Reasons necessary

[Para 23] — While reversing findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, the High Court must adequately deal with the evidence and assign reasons demonstrating why the findings are erroneous, perverse or illegal. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had not expressly established such infirmity before reversing the Trial Court's findings.

20. Dowry demand — Poverty of accused — Cannot be basis for rejecting prosecution case

[Para 23] — The High Court's reasoning that the accused were poor and therefore could not realistically have demanded a colour TV, motorcycle and cash was held unsustainable. The economic status of the accused does not logically negate the factum of a dowry demand.

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

Nasrin, aged about twenty, was married to Ajmal Beg and had been married for just over a year when she died. Ajmal, his mother Jamila and other family members repeatedly demanded a colour television, motorcycle and Rs.15,000/- from Nasrin and her father.

The demand was reiterated by Ajmal on 4 June 2001. On 5 June 2001, Nasrin was allegedly assaulted and threatened with death. She was thereafter set on fire after kerosene was poured on her.

The Trial Court convicted Ajmal and Jamila under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Allahabad High Court reversed the convictions and acquitted them, principally questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and reasoning, inter alia, that the accused were poor and could not have demanded the articles alleged.

---

IMPORTANT EVIDENTIARY FINDING

The Supreme Court distinguished material inconsistencies from discrepancies relating to peripheral matters.

It found that the central prosecution case remained intact:

• consistent demand for motorcycle, colour TV and Rs.15,000/-;
• repeated complaints of harassment;
• threats to kill the deceased for non-fulfilment of demands; and
• reiteration of the demand by Ajmal one day before death.

The Court therefore held that the contradictions identified by the High Court did not destroy the prosecution case.

---

CENTRAL RATIO DECIDENDI

Once the prosecution establishes that a married woman died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies in witness testimony do not warrant rejection of the entire prosecution case; the evidence must be scrutinised as a whole and its material portions separated from exaggerations or peripheral discrepancies.

The Court found that the demand had been proved beyond reasonable doubt and had been reiterated only one day before the death. Consequently, the “soon before her death” requirement was satisfied and the Section 113-B presumption arose and remained unrebutted because the defence led no evidence. [Para 20]

FINAL DECISION

The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, set aside the High Court's acquittal and restored the Trial Court's conviction of Ajmal and Jamila under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

However, although Jamila's conviction was restored, the Court refrained from incarcerating her because she was 94 years old, taking into account humanitarian considerations relating to advanced age and imprisonment. Ajmal was directed to surrender to serve the sentence imposed by the Trial Court.

Under Mohammedan Law, a prospective heir has no vested interest in the property of a living ancestor; consequently, partition between the owner and his prospective heirs during the owner's lifetime is impermissible. A Muslim owner may instead transfer property during his lifetime by hiba. For a valid hiba, clear and unequivocal declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee and delivery of possession are indispensable and cumulative requirements; registration is not necessary. A mutation entry recording “partition” cannot, merely by alteration of nomenclature, be treated as evidence of a gift, particularly when the entry itself contains no indication of an intention to gift and mutation does not confer title.

 

MANSOOR SAHEB (DEAD) & ORS. v. SALIMA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

2024 INSC 1006
Civil Appeal Nos. 4211 & 4213 of 2009
Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated: 19 December 2024
Bench: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

1. Mohammedan Law — Succession — Heir-apparent — No vested right during lifetime of ancestor.

[Paras 14–17] — Under Mohammedan Law, the doctrine of janmswatvavada or right by birth is unknown. So long as the owner is alive, he remains the absolute owner of his property and an heir-apparent has no vested or enforceable interest therein. Rights of heirs arise only upon the death of the ancestor.

2. Mohammedan Law — Partition — Lifetime of owner — Partition between owner and prospective heirs impermissible.

[Paras 15, 17, 19–21] — Partition is a redistribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights among co-owners. Since prospective heirs under Mohammedan Law have no right or interest in the property during the lifetime of the owner, there can be no partition between the owner and his heirs during his lifetime.

3. Mohammedan Law — Concept of joint family, coparcenary and partition — Foreign to Muslim Law.

[Paras 14, 17] — The concepts of ancestral property, joint or undivided family, coparcenary, karta, survivorship and partition, as understood in classical Hindu law, have no place in Mohammedan Law. Heirs succeed as tenants-in-common to definite shares upon the death of the ancestor.

4. Mohammedan Law — Owner wishing to transfer property during lifetime — Gift (hiba) is permissible mode.

[Paras 15, 21] — Though partition with prospective heirs is impermissible during the owner's lifetime, the owner is free to transfer his property during his lifetime, primarily by way of hiba (gift), subject to the requirements of Mohammedan Law.

5. Hiba — Oral gift — Validity — Registration not necessary.

[Paras 23–28] — A Muslim may make a valid gift orally. Registration of a gift is not required under Mohammedan Law. An oral or unregistered gift is valid if the essential requirements prescribed by Mohammedan Law are fulfilled. Conversely, even a registered instrument cannot validate a gift where those essential requirements are absent.

6. Hiba — Three essential requisites — Declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession.

[Paras 23, 25–28] — A valid Muslim gift requires three essential elements: (i) clear and unequivocal declaration of gift by the donor; (ii) acceptance by or on behalf of the donee, express or implied; and (iii) delivery of possession, actual or constructive, to the donee. All three requisites are cumulative and sequential.

7. Hiba — Declaration, acceptance and possession — All mandatory — Failure of one requisite renders gift invalid.

[Para 26] — The three conditions are sequential. If declaration is absent, acceptance and possession cannot cure the defect; similarly, declaration and possession without acceptance are insufficient. All three conditions must be satisfied for a valid gift.

8. Hiba — Form — Oral or written — Nature of gift not altered merely because reduced to writing.

[Paras 27–28] — The validity of a Muslim gift depends upon satisfaction of the substantive requirements of Mohammedan Law, not upon the form of the transaction. A gift may be oral or reduced to writing, and the mere fact that it is written does not necessarily make registration mandatory.

9. Hiba — Written instrument — Registration — Not necessary where Muslim-law requisites fulfilled.

[Paras 27–28] — A contemporaneous writing evidencing a Muslim gift does not become invalid merely because it is unregistered, provided declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession are proved in accordance with Mohammedan Law. The form is immaterial; the three essential requisites are decisive.

10. Mutation entry — Revenue record — Does not create or extinguish title.

[Para 35] — Mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title and has no presumptive value regarding title. Its purpose is limited to enabling collection of land revenue.

11. Mutation entry — Nomenclature — Substance rather than mere label relevant, but nature of transaction cannot be altered contrary to its expressed contents.

[Paras 29–34] — Although the substance of a transaction is generally more important than nomenclature, partition and gift are legally distinct transactions with different requisites and consequences. Where the mutation entry expressly records a partition and contains no indication of an intention to make a gift, the Court cannot simply substitute “gift” for “partition”.

12. Interpretation of document — Intention of executant — Intention gathered from words used.

[Paras 32–33] — The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intention expressed through the words employed in the document. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and cannot substitute an unexpressed intention for the expressed intention.

13. Mutation entry — Alleged oral gift — Entry recording “partition” — Cannot by itself establish hiba.

[Paras 29–35] — The mutation entry in the present case expressly recorded a partition in favour of the two sons. It contained no indication of a gift. Further, mutation does not confer title. The entry therefore could neither be re-characterised as a gift nor establish title in favour of the appellants.

14. Hiba — Failure to prove clear and unequivocal declaration — Gift invalid notwithstanding proof of acceptance and possession.

[Para 36] — Even assuming acceptance and possession were established, the essential requirement of a clear and unequivocal declaration of gift was not proved. The evidence of the defence witnesses was vague and did not establish the requisite intention and declaration by the donor. Consequently, the alleged oral gift was invalid.

---

CASE FACTS

Sultan Saheb was the owner of the suit agricultural land and house property. He had one daughter, Ajamunisa, from his first marriage and two sons, Mansoorsaheb and Sikandar, and a daughter Rabiyabi, from his second marriage. The plaintiffs were the children of Rabiyabi.

After Sultan Saheb's death on 09.01.1978, Mansoorsaheb had the names of himself, Sikandar and Ajamunisa mutated in the revenue records, excluding Rabiyabi, who was also a successor-in-interest. The plaintiffs therefore instituted O.S. No.140/1988, claiming 1/6th share in the suit properties.

The defendants contended that Sultan Saheb had, during his lifetime, divided one property into three portions, allegedly giving one portion each to his two sons and retaining the third. They further claimed that in September 1980 the retained portion was partitioned among his four children. Reliance was placed upon Mutation Entry No.8258 dated 21.01.1973.

The defendants subsequently characterised the transaction reflected in the mutation entry as an oral gift (hiba) rather than a partition, contending that Sultan Saheb had:

• declared the gift;

• the sons had accepted it; and

• possession had been delivered.

The Trial Court rejected the plea because the essential requirements of an oral gift had not been conclusively established and also rejected the plea of lifetime partition. It decreed the plaintiffs' 1/6th share. [Para 7]

The High Court affirmed the Trial Court's findings. [Para 8]

---

QUESTIONS OF LAW

The Supreme Court formulated two principal questions:

(a)

Whether an owner of property can, during his lifetime, transfer the property to his heirs by way of partition?

(b)

Whether the requisites of a valid gift were satisfied and whether the nomenclature used in the Mutation Entry could be treated as indicative of the donor's intention? [Para 2]

---

LAW APPLIED

I. Lifetime partition under Mohammedan Law

The Supreme Court held that under Mohammedan Law, an heir-apparent has no present proprietary interest in the property of a living ancestor. Succession opens only upon the death of the ancestor. [Paras 14, 17]

Consequently, partition—which necessarily presupposes pre-existing rights—cannot take place between a living owner and his prospective heirs. [Paras 16–21]

The appropriate legal method by which Sultan Saheb could have transferred portions of his property to his sons during his lifetime was therefore hiba, not partition. [Para 21]

---

II. Valid Muslim gift

The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that a Muslim gift may be oral and need not be registered.

The three essential requisites are:

1. Declaration — clear and unequivocal intention of the donor to make the gift;

2. Acceptance — express or implied acceptance by the donee; and

3. Delivery of possession — actual or constructive.

[Paras 23–28]

The requirements are cumulative. Failure to establish even one of them invalidates the gift. [Para 26]

---

III. Mutation entry and nomenclature

The appellants argued that although Mutation Entry No.8258 described the transaction as “partition”, the Court should read it as an oral gift.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument.

While substance rather than nomenclature is ordinarily relevant, partition and gift are fundamentally different transactions. Partition involves division of pre-existing rights among persons having an interest; a gift is a voluntary transfer of existing property without consideration. Their legal requisites are therefore different. [Para 31]

Further, the mutation entry itself expressly stated that Sultan Saheb had effected a partition in favour of his sons and gave no indication of an intention to make a gift. [Para 34]

---

IV. Mutation does not confer title

The Court reiterated that mutation entries are maintained for revenue purposes and do not create, extinguish or conclusively establish title. [Para 35]

Therefore, even apart from the incorrect description of the transaction as partition, the mutation entry could not itself establish title in favour of the appellants.

---

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

The Supreme Court found that the defence failed to establish the first and fundamental requirement of hiba, namely a clear and unequivocal declaration by Sultan Saheb that he intended to gift the property to his sons.

The defence witnesses, DW2 and DW3, did not provide reliable evidence establishing such declaration or intention. Their evidence was vague, and the mutation entry itself did not support the alleged gift. [Para 36]

The Court therefore held that even if acceptance and possession were assumed to have been established, the absence of proof of declaration was fatal to the alleged gift.

Thus:

No valid lifetime partition + no proved valid hiba = no valid transfer of the disputed property to the sons during Sultan Saheb's lifetime.

---

CONCLUSION / FINAL DECISION

The Supreme Court answered the questions of law in favour of the plaintiffs and held:

1. A Muslim owner cannot partition his property during his lifetime between himself and his prospective heirs, because the prospective heirs have no vested interest during his lifetime. [Paras 19–21, 37]

2. A Muslim owner may, however, transfer property during his lifetime by way of hiba, provided all the essential requirements of a valid gift are satisfied.

3. A Muslim gift may be oral and unregistered.

4. The three mandatory requirements of hiba are declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession.

5. In the present case, the essential requirement of a clear and unequivocal declaration of gift was not proved.

6. Mutation Entry No.8258, which expressly described the transaction as partition, could not be converted into an oral gift merely by changing its nomenclature.

7. Mutation entry does not confer title. [Paras 34–38]

Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals and confirmed the decree passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court. [Para 38]

RATIO DECIDENDI

Under Mohammedan Law, a prospective heir has no vested interest in the property of a living ancestor; consequently, partition between the owner and his prospective heirs during the owner's lifetime is impermissible. A Muslim owner may instead transfer property during his lifetime by hiba. For a valid hiba, clear and unequivocal declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee and delivery of possession are indispensable and cumulative requirements; registration is not necessary. A mutation entry recording “partition” cannot, merely by alteration of nomenclature, be treated as evidence of a gift, particularly when the entry itself contains no indication of an intention to gift and mutation does not confer title.

Where parties to a matrimonial dispute amicably settle all their disputes and the settlement comprehensively provides for divorce, maintenance/alimony, withdrawal or quashing of connected proceedings and abandonment of further claims, the Supreme Court may give effect to the settlement in its entirety, affirm the agreed decree of divorce, quash the consequential matrimonial proceedings and bring the entire litigation to a final quietus.

 

ASMA K. v. RAHIM MOGRAL @ ABDUL RAHEEM

SLP (C) No. 5109/2023
Supreme Court of India — Order dated 20 January 2025
Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

1. Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Decree of divorce — Parties agreeing to accept decree — Supreme Court setting aside appellate judgment and affirming Family Court decree.

[Paras 2–6] — Where the divorced spouses amicably resolve their matrimonial disputes through a settlement deed and the husband expressly accepts the decree of divorce already granted by the Family Court, the Supreme Court may give effect to the settlement. The High Court judgment was set aside and the Family Court judgment and decree dated 30.11.2021 granting divorce was affirmed.

2. Muslim divorced wife — Maintenance and fair provision — Settlement — Payment of ₹4 lakhs towards claims under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act and matrimonial maintenance proceedings.

[Para 4(b)–(d)] — The husband agreed to pay ₹4,00,000/- to the petitioner-wife towards reasonable and fair provision, maintenance and other benefits claimed by her as his divorced wife under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, as well as in full settlement of the claims in M.C. No.60/2017.

3. Settlement — Part payment and amount already deposited before Magistrate — Wife entitled to withdraw deposited amount — No further claim after receipt of settled amount.

[Para 4(c)–(d), Paras 7–8] — Of the agreed ₹4 lakhs, ₹1.50 lakhs was paid to the wife and ₹2.50 lakhs had already been deposited before the Judicial First Class Magistrate. The husband consented to release of the deposited amount to the wife. Upon receipt of the entire settled amount and confirmation of the divorce decree, the wife agreed not to make any further claim against the respondents.

4. Criminal proceedings — Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Maintenance complaint — Quashing in terms of settlement.

[Para 7] — In view of the comprehensive settlement between the parties and receipt of the agreed alimony and maintenance by the wife, M.C. No.60/2017 pending before the First Class Magistrate-II, Kasaragod, Kerala, was quashed.

5. Matrimonial settlement — All matrimonial issues resolved — Settlement given complete effect.

[Para 6] — The Supreme Court recorded the parties' agreement that all matrimonial issues between them stood resolved and disposed of the SLP in terms of the settlement.

6. Civil proceedings — Settlement — Husband agreeing not to pursue suit — Effect.

[Para 4(e)] — As part of the settlement, the husband agreed to file a memo not pressing the further prosecution of O.S. No.352/2022 pending before the Principal Munsiff, Kasaragod.

7. Supreme Court — Settlement in matrimonial dispute — Complete quietus — Proceedings disposed of in settlement terms.

[Paras 5–9] — The Court gave effect to the comprehensive settlement covering divorce, maintenance/alimony, criminal proceedings and civil litigation, thereby bringing the matrimonial dispute to a final conclusion.

---

CASE FACTS

The petitioner-wife, Asma K., and respondent-husband, Rahim Mogral @ Abdul Raheem, were involved in matrimonial litigation.

During the pendency of SLP (C) No.5109/2023, the parties amicably resolved their disputes through a deed of settlement dated 8 April 2024, which had been recorded in proceedings in Crl. Appeal No.100/2020 before the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kasaragod. [Para 2]

Under the settlement:

1. The husband accepted the divorce decree dated 30.11.2021 passed by the Family Court, Kasaragod, in O.P. No.469/2020.

2. He acknowledged that the petitioner was his divorced wife.

3. He agreed to pay ₹4 lakhs towards reasonable and fair provision, maintenance and other benefits under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act and towards settlement of the wife's claims in M.C. No.60/2017.

4. ₹1.50 lakhs was paid to the wife and ₹2.50 lakhs had already been deposited before the Magistrate.

5. The husband gave his no objection to the wife withdrawing the deposited ₹2.50 lakhs.

6. On receipt of the full ₹4 lakhs and confirmation of the divorce decree by the Supreme Court, the wife agreed not to make any further claim against the respondents.

7. The husband agreed not to press O.S. No.352/2022 pending before the Principal Munsiff, Kasaragod.

---

LAW / LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Effect of matrimonial settlement

The Court treated the settlement as a complete resolution of the matrimonial disputes and gave effect to the agreed terms.

The important feature is that the settlement did not concern merely the divorce. It comprehensively dealt with:

• the divorce decree;

• maintenance and alimony;

• the wife's claim under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act;

• the criminal maintenance proceeding;

• the amount deposited before the Magistrate; and

• the husband's pending civil suit.

2. Existing decree of divorce

The husband expressly accepted the Family Court decree dated 30.11.2021 granting divorce. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the contrary judgment of the Kerala High Court and affirmed the Family Court decree. [Para 5]

3. Settlement of maintenance claim

The agreed ₹4 lakhs represented settlement of the wife's claims for reasonable and fair provision and maintenance and her other benefits as a divorced Muslim wife, together with the claims in M.C. No.60/2017. [Para 4(b)–(d)]

4. Finality of settlement

The settlement contained a finality clause: after receipt of the entire agreed amount and confirmation of the divorce decree, the wife would have no further claim against the respondents. [Para 4(d)]

---

CONCLUSION / FINAL ORDER

The Supreme Court:

1. Set aside the Kerala High Court judgment dated 06.02.2023 in Mat. Appeal No.559/2022.

2. Affirmed the Family Court decree dated 30.11.2021 in O.P. No.469/2020 granting divorce.

3. Recorded that all matrimonial issues stood resolved.

4. Recorded receipt of the agreed alimony and maintenance by the wife.

5. Quashed M.C. No.60/2017 pending before the First Class Magistrate-II, Kasaragod.

6. Permitted the wife to withdraw the ₹2.50 lakhs deposited by the husband.

7. Gave effect to the settlement concerning the husband's civil suit, O.S. No.352/2022.

8. Disposed of the SLP in terms of the settlement.

9. Disposed of pending applications. [Paras 5–10]

RATIO / LEGAL PROPOSITION

Where parties to a matrimonial dispute amicably settle all their disputes and the settlement comprehensively provides for divorce, maintenance/alimony, withdrawal or quashing of connected proceedings and abandonment of further claims, the Supreme Court may give effect to the settlement in its entirety, affirm the agreed decree of divorce, quash the consequential matrimonial proceedings and bring the entire litigation to a final quietus.

Proved impotence of the husband, resulting in his inability to discharge marital obligations, constitutes legal and mental cruelty and is a “just ground” within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with him. Such refusal does not disentitle her from claiming maintenance according to the husband's means. The concept of “just ground” is illustrative and includes circumstances of physical, mental or legal cruelty; Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable irrespective of the parties' personal law.

 1981 AIR 1972 : 1981 SCC (4) 250 : 1982 SCR (1) 695

Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1981
Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated: 14 September 1981
Bench: Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali and A.P. Sen, JJ.

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

1. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 125(3), second proviso — Maintenance — Wife refusing to live with husband — “Just ground” — Scope.

[Paras 5–6, 11–12] — Where the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition that she lives with him, the Magistrate is required to consider the grounds of her refusal and may grant maintenance notwithstanding such offer if satisfied that she has a just ground for refusing to live with him. The expression “just ground” is not exhaustive and includes circumstances of a similar nature to those specifically contemplated by the statutory provision.

2. Husband's impotence — Inability to discharge marital obligations — Just ground for wife to live separately and claim maintenance.

[Para 15] — Where it is proved that the husband is impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations, such impotence constitutes both legal and mental cruelty and is undoubtedly a just ground for the wife to refuse to live with him. She is consequently entitled to maintenance according to the husband's means.

3. Impotence — Conjugal relationship — Relevance under Section 125 CrPC — Maintenance provision not confined merely to food, clothing and shelter.

[Paras 7–10, 12] — The statutory remedy of maintenance cannot be divorced from the existence and nature of the marital relationship. The earlier view that Section 488 of the old Code, corresponding to Section 125 of the 1973 Code, was concerned only with food, clothing and lodging and had nothing to do with ordinary conjugal rights was held to be legally unsound and outdated.

4. Impotence — Sexual relationship — Marriage — Mental and physical well-being of wife.

[Para 14] — Sexual relationship is an important component of marriage. Persistent inability or refusal resulting in deprivation of marital intercourse may cause mental, psychological and physical harm and may amount to cruelty. The Court accepted that the concept of cruelty does not materially differ merely because the proceeding is one under criminal law rather than matrimonial/civil law.

5. Cruelty — Meaning — Same principles applicable in civil and criminal proceedings.

[Paras 12, 14] — The concept of legal or mental cruelty remains substantially the same whether considered in civil matrimonial proceedings or proceedings under Section 125 CrPC. General principles governing conduct amounting to cruelty cannot vary merely because the forum or statutory proceeding is different.

6. Section 125 CrPC — “Just ground” — Provision beneficial to neglected wife — Progressive interpretation.

[Paras 8–11] — The second proviso to Section 125(3), read with its Explanation, was intended to widen the circumstances in which a wife may justifiably refuse to live with her husband while still claiming maintenance. The provision is beneficial and should not be interpreted in an archaic manner which reduces the wife's entitlement merely to food, clothing and shelter.

7. Second marriage or mistress — Statutory illustration of “just ground” — Provision illustrative, not exhaustive.

[Paras 11–12] — The statutory provision treating the husband's contracting another marriage or keeping a mistress as a just ground for the wife's refusal to live with him is illustrative and not exhaustive. Other circumstances involving physical, mental or legal cruelty may also constitute just grounds, including proved impotence.

8. Dowry-related apprehension — Reasonable apprehension of physical harm — Just ground for separate residence.

[Para 12] — A wife's reasonable apprehension, arising from the husband's conduct, that she may suffer physical harm because of persistent dowry demands by the husband's parents or relatives may itself constitute a reasonable justification for refusing to live with the husband.

9. Muslim marriage — Section 125 CrPC — Personal law — Summary maintenance remedy applicable irrespective of religion.

[Para 5] — The remedy under Section 125 CrPC is a statutory summary remedy applicable to persons belonging to all religions and is not controlled by the personal law of the parties. The fact that the parties were married according to Sunni Muslim rites did not exclude the wife's claim under Section 125.

10. Contrary High Court decisions — Impotence not a just ground — Overruled.

[Paras 6–11, 15] — The earlier decisions of various High Courts which had taken the view that the husband's impotence was not a just ground enabling the wife to live separately and claim maintenance were held to be no longer good law and were overruled.

---

CASE FACTS

The respondent-wife was married to the appellant-husband on 27 May 1978 according to Sunni Muslim rites. She lived with the husband until July 1978.

During that period, the wife alleged that she discovered that her husband was physically incapable of having sexual relations with her and that he had himself admitted that he was impotent. She further alleged that she was maltreated and ultimately driven out of the matrimonial home on 11 July 1978.

The husband subsequently sent a registered notice dated 17 November 1978, asserting that he had no physical disability and expressing his willingness to keep the wife with him and discharge his marital obligations.

The wife had already instituted proceedings on 28 October 1978 seeking maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.

Both the Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court found as a matter of fact that the husband was physically incapable of having sexual relations with the wife, i.e. that he was impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations.

However, the Magistrate held that impotence was not a “just cause” for the wife to refuse to live with the husband and dismissed her maintenance application.

The Gujarat High Court, in revision, took the contrary view. It held that the husband's proved impotence constituted a just ground for the wife to refuse to live with him and consequently awarded her ₹150 per month maintenance, having regard to the husband's means.

The husband appealed to the Supreme Court.

---

QUESTIONS OF LAW

The principal question before the Supreme Court was:

Whether a husband's proved impotence and consequent inability to discharge his marital obligations constitute a “just ground” under the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC enabling the wife to refuse to live with him and claim maintenance?

A connected question was whether the earlier decisions holding that impotence was not a sufficient ground for separate residence and maintenance represented the correct law.

---

LAW CONSIDERED

1. Section 125(3) CrPC

The second proviso permits the Magistrate to consider the wife's grounds for refusing to live with her husband and grant maintenance notwithstanding the husband's offer to maintain her, if the Court is satisfied that there is a just ground for such refusal. [Para 5]

2. Scope of “just ground”

The Court held that the provision is not exhaustive. The statutory illustration relating to a second marriage or mistress was intended to widen the scope of “just ground”; it did not limit the expression to those two circumstances. Physical, mental and legal cruelty of a similar nature could also constitute just grounds. [Paras 11–12]

3. Impotence as cruelty

The Court reasoned that where the husband is impotent and unable to discharge the fundamental marital obligation of sexual relations, compelling the wife to continue living with him may subject her to a life of mental and psychological suffering. The Court therefore treated proved impotence as legal as well as mental cruelty. [Para 14]

4. Conjugal relationship and maintenance

The Court rejected the narrow proposition that Section 125 is concerned merely with providing food, clothing and shelter. The statutory remedy is founded upon the marital relationship, and the Court can consider the husband's conduct and the nature of the conjugal relationship when determining whether the wife's refusal to live with him is justified. [Paras 7–10]

5. Personal law

The parties' marriage was according to Sunni Muslim rites, but Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable to persons of all religions. Personal law does not exclude the wife from invoking the statutory remedy. [Para 5]

---

APPLICATION OF LAW

The Supreme Court noted that the finding of impotence was concurrent: both the Magistrate and High Court had found the husband physically incapable of sexual relations and unable to discharge his marital obligations. Therefore, the principal issue was purely one of law—whether that proved condition constituted a “just ground” under Section 125(3).

The Court held that it would be unjust to compel a wife to live with a husband who is incapable of marital intercourse and thereby subject her to continuing mental and psychological suffering.

The Court also rejected the older judicial approach which treated maintenance as merely a provision for food, clothing and lodging, holding such an approach to be outdated and inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the provision.

---

CONCLUSION / FINAL DECISION

The Supreme Court dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the Gujarat High Court's order granting maintenance to the wife.

The Court authoritatively held:

Where it is proved that the husband is impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations, such impotence amounts to both legal and mental cruelty and constitutes a just ground under the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with her husband. The wife is consequently entitled to maintenance according to the husband's means.

The Court further declared that the contrary decisions of the High Courts, including the authorities relied upon by the husband, were no longer good law and stood overruled.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Proved impotence of the husband, resulting in his inability to discharge marital obligations, constitutes legal and mental cruelty and is a “just ground” within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with him. Such refusal does not disentitle her from claiming maintenance according to the husband's means. The concept of “just ground” is illustrative and includes circumstances of physical, mental or legal cruelty; Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable irrespective of the parties' personal law.

Where spouses have amicably and comprehensively settled their matrimonial disputes through mediation, have agreed to discontinue their marital relationship, and have been living separately for a substantial period, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage by decree of divorce and bring to an end the connected criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings so as to give complete and effective quietus to the dispute.

 

ANJUM ARA BEGUM & ORS. v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 317/2025 (@ Diary No. 16766/2025)
Supreme Court of India
Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.
Order dated: 29 April 2026

HEADNOTES

1. Matrimonial dispute — Settlement through Supreme Court Mediation Centre — Settlement acted upon — Continuing multiple proceedings would serve no useful purpose — Proceedings quashed/disposed of in terms of settlement.

[Order] — During pendency of the transfer petition, the parties were referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and successfully settled their differences. The terms were reduced into a Settlement Agreement dated 24.02.2026. In view of the settlement, the Court held that no purpose would be served in keeping alive the various proceedings initiated by the parties against each other and accordingly quashed/disposed of the proceedings specified in the settlement.

2. Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Payment of ₹31 lakhs to wife — Demand draft handed over in Court — Settlement acted upon.

[Order] — In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the husband handed over a demand draft dated 07.02.2026 for ₹31,00,000/- to the respondent-wife, who was personally present before the Court.

3. Criminal proceedings — Matrimonial offences — Settlement between husband and wife — Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction to bring proceedings to an end.

[Order] — In view of the parties having amicably settled their disputes, the Court ordered that FIR No. 622/2020 under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, together with all consequential proceedings including C.R. Case No. 7306/2024, stand quashed/disposed of in terms of the settlement.

4. Criminal proceedings instituted by husband against wife and her family — Settlement — Proceedings quashed/disposed of.

[Order] — FIR No. 606/2024 dated 06.12.2024, registered at P.S. Arariya, District Arariya, Bihar, under the provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and all consequential proceedings were ordered to stand quashed/disposed of in view of the settlement.

5. Civil proceedings — Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Pending civil proceedings brought to an end.

[Order] — Civil Suit No. CS/14/2025 and Misc. DJ/54/2025, pending before Family Court No.2, District East, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, were ordered to stand disposed of in terms of the settlement.

6. Departmental proceedings — Complaint by spouse — Matrimonial settlement — Proceedings discontinued.

[Order] — Departmental proceedings initiated against the husband on the complaint of the wife before North Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. were ordered to stand disposed of in view of the settlement between the parties.

7. Writ proceedings — Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Proceedings rendered unnecessary.

[Order] — Writ Petition No. 1263/2021, Minhaz Ahmad v. Govt. of NCT, pending before the High Court of Delhi, was also ordered to stand disposed of in terms of the settlement.

8. Divorce — Marriage irretrievably broken down — Parties living separately since 2016 — Article 142 Constitution of India — Supreme Court empowered to dissolve marriage by decree of divorce.

[Order] — Since the parties were no longer desirous of continuing their marital relationship and had been living separately since 2016, the Supreme Court considered it appropriate to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution and dissolved the marriage by granting a decree of divorce.

9. Article 142 — Matrimonial settlement — Complete resolution of disputes — Power to do complete justice.

[Order] — Where matrimonial disputes have been comprehensively settled and the parties have decided not to continue the marital relationship, the Supreme Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 to give complete effect to the settlement, including dissolution of marriage and termination of connected proceedings.

10. Transfer Petition — Settlement — Disposal in terms of Settlement Agreement.

[Order] — I.A. No.108198/2026 seeking appropriate directions in terms of the settlement was allowed and the Transfer Petition was disposed of in the terms recorded by the Court.

---

CASE FACTS

The marriage between Minhaz Ahmed (petitioner No.3) and Ruana Rahman (respondent No.2) took place on 24.07.2016. The parties separated shortly thereafter and had been living separately since 2016. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were the parents of petitioner No.3.

Various proceedings had been instituted by the parties against each other arising out of their matrimonial dispute.

During the pendency of the Transfer Petition, the Supreme Court referred the parties to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre. The parties successfully settled their differences with the assistance of the learned Mediator.

The settlement was reduced into writing in a Settlement Agreement dated 24.02.2026.

Pursuant to the settlement, the parties filed I.A. No.108198/2026 seeking appropriate directions.

Under the settlement, the husband handed over to the wife, who was present personally in Court, a demand draft for ₹31,00,000/- dated 07.02.2026 drawn on State Bank of India, New Delhi Main Branch.

The parties also agreed that the various criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings arising out of their disputes should not be continued.

---

PROCEEDINGS ORDERED TO BE QUASHED / DISPOSED OF

(a) Wife's criminal case

FIR No. 622/2020, P.S. Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, under:

• Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC; and
• Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019,

together with consequential proceedings including C.R. Case No. 7306/2024, pending before JMFC, Mahila Court, East Karkardooma, Delhi.

(b) Husband's criminal case

FIR No. 606/2024 dated 06.12.2024, P.S. Arariya, District Arariya, Bihar, registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 308(3), 74, 303(2), 352, 351(2) and 3(5) BNS, 2023, and consequential proceedings.

(c) Civil proceedings

Civil Suit No. CS/14/2025 and Misc. DJ/54/2025, pending before Family Court No.2, District East, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

(d) Departmental proceedings

Departmental proceedings against the husband initiated on the complaint of the wife by North Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd., vide Resolution No.205 dated 08.04.2022.

(e) Writ proceedings

W.P. No.1263/2021, Minhaz Ahmad v. Govt. of NCT, pending before the Delhi High Court.

---

LAW

1. Settlement of matrimonial disputes

The Supreme Court recognised that the parties had voluntarily and successfully settled their differences through mediation. Once the settlement comprehensively resolved the disputes and the parties themselves requested appropriate orders, continuation of the multiple proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

The Court therefore gave effect to the Settlement Agreement and brought the pending litigation to an end.

2. Exercise of Article 142 jurisdiction

The important legal aspect of the order is the exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution.

The parties were no longer desirous of continuing their marital relationship and had remained separated since 2016. Taking these circumstances into account, the Supreme Court exercised its constitutional power and ordered that:

the marriage between Minhaz Ahmed and Ruana Rahman shall stand dissolved by way of a decree of divorce.

Thus, the Court did not merely dispose of the Transfer Petition; it also granted substantive matrimonial relief by dissolving the marriage.

3. Effect of settlement on connected proceedings

The settlement covered proceedings of different kinds—criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings. The Supreme Court gave comprehensive effect to the settlement by directing that all the identified proceedings stand quashed/disposed of in terms of the settlement.

The order therefore demonstrates the Court's approach to achieving a complete and final quietus to a matrimonial dispute where the parties have genuinely resolved their differences.

---

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court held that, in view of the successful mediation and comprehensive settlement, there was no purpose in keeping alive the various proceedings between the parties.

Accordingly:

1. I.A. No.108198/2026 was allowed.
2. The specified criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, departmental proceedings and writ petition were quashed/disposed of in terms of the Settlement Agreement.
3. The parties having decided not to continue their marital relationship and having lived separately since 2016, the Supreme Court exercised Article 142 jurisdiction.
4. The marriage between Minhaz Ahmed and Ruana Rahman was dissolved by decree of divorce.
5. The Registry was directed to prepare the decree of divorce in terms of the order.
6. The Transfer Petition was accordingly disposed of and pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.

CORE RATIO / PROPOSITION

Where spouses have amicably and comprehensively settled their matrimonial disputes through mediation, have agreed to discontinue their marital relationship, and have been living separately for a substantial period, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage by decree of divorce and bring to an end the connected criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings so as to give complete and effective quietus to the dispute.