The central ratio of the decision is that Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, apply to appeals filed under Section 74. Accordingly, the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown. A further ratio is that the Collector, at the pre-reference stage, is not a court and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before him once the statutory outer limit expires. However, once the matter reaches the appellate stage before the High Court, which is an indisputably judicial forum, the Limitation Act becomes applicable in the absence of express exclusion. Additionally, in cases governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, only provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act apply when the award is passed after its commencement; rehabilitation and resettlement provisions do not automatically extend to such cases unless specifically provided. The impugned judgments holding that Section 5 stood excluded were therefore set aside, and the delays in filing appeals were condoned in the interest of justice.

Land Acquisition — Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act — Applicability where award passed after commencement — Scope confined to determination of compensation — Rehabilitation and resettlement not retrospectively attracted.
Where acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but the award was passed after the commencement of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, Section 24(1)(a) mandates that the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply. However, the provisions concerning rehabilitation and resettlement do not automatically apply in such cases. (Paras 14–19, 97(i), 97(ii)). Relied on: Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal; Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd v Deepak Agarwal.

Land Acquisition — Nature of Collector’s role — Collector not a Court — Limitation Act not applicable at reference stage.
The Collector, while facilitating acquisition and determining compensation, acts either in an executive or quasi-judicial capacity and does not function as a “court” within the meaning of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the stage of reference under Section 64 of the 2013 Act beyond the outer statutory limit prescribed therein. Once the maximum period expires, the right to seek reference stands extinguished. (Paras 21–24, 30, 74). Relied on: Sakuru v Tanaji; Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v Shah Manilal Chandulal; M.P. Steel Corporation v Commissioner of Central Excise.

Land Acquisition — Status of Authority under Chapter VIII — Judicial character — Award deemed decree.
The Authority constituted under Chapter VIII is presided over by a legally trained person and exercises powers akin to a Civil Court. The award passed by the Authority is deemed to be a decree. Proceedings before the Authority are original judicial proceedings between contesting parties. (Paras 25–33, 74).

Limitation — Section 74 of the 2013 Act — Single period of limitation — Proviso does not create separate limitation.
Section 74 prescribes a period of sixty days for filing an appeal before the High Court. The proviso permitting filing within a further sixty days does not create an independent second period of limitation but merely facilitates delayed filing within the statutory framework. There exists only one limitation regime under Section 74. (Paras 35, 75–77). Relied on: Dwarka Prasad v Dwarka Das Saraf.

Limitation — Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act — Express exclusion mandatory — Mere prescription of limitation insufficient.
Section 29(2) mandates that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply to special or local laws unless expressly excluded. The mere prescription of a specific period of limitation under a special statute does not amount to exclusion. Section 74 of the 2013 Act contains no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. (Paras 59–62, 76–79).

Interpretation — Section 103 of the 2013 Act — “In addition to and not in derogation of” — Coexistence with other laws.
Section 103 clarifies that the provisions of the 2013 Act are in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force. The 2013 Act, though a special legislation and largely a complete code, is not insulated from borrowing from other enactments. Excluding the Limitation Act would render Section 103 redundant. (Paras 37–41, 78–79). Relied on: KSL and Industries Ltd v Arihant Threads Ltd; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v Union of India.

Limitation — Section 5 applicability to Section 74 appeals — High Court empowered to condone delay.
Since Section 74 does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 applies to appeals filed thereunder. The High Court is competent to condone delay on showing sufficient cause. A liberal approach is warranted in matters involving determination of just and fair compensation. (Paras 74–82, 97(iv)–(vi)).

Administrative Accountability — Delay by State instrumentalities — Pragmatic approach.
Repeated delays in filing appeals reflect administrative negligence and possible collusion. High Courts are directed to adopt a pragmatic rather than pedantic approach in condonation matters. State Governments are directed to ensure proper monitoring mechanisms. (Paras 84–85, 97(vii), 97(viii)). Relied on: Sheo Raj Singh v Union of India.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The central ratio of the decision is that Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, apply to appeals filed under Section 74. Accordingly, the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown.

A further ratio is that the Collector, at the pre-reference stage, is not a court and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before him once the statutory outer limit expires. However, once the matter reaches the appellate stage before the High Court, which is an indisputably judicial forum, the Limitation Act becomes applicable in the absence of express exclusion.

Additionally, in cases governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, only provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act apply when the award is passed after its commencement; rehabilitation and resettlement provisions do not automatically extend to such cases unless specifically provided.

The impugned judgments holding that Section 5 stood excluded were therefore set aside, and the delays in filing appeals were condoned in the interest of justice.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 166 and 168 – “Just compensation” – Determination – Foundational principles reiterated. Compensation under Sections 166 and 168 is intended to place dependants of a deceased victim in a position approximating the financial status they would have enjoyed had the deceased lived his natural span. It is neither a windfall nor a bonanza. Determination is based on fairness, reasonableness and accepted legal standards, keeping in view imponderables and contingencies. Award must be “just” – not arbitrary, not niggardly. (Paras 12–14)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 166 and 168 – “Just compensation” – Determination – Foundational principles reiterated.

Compensation under Sections 166 and 168 is intended to place dependants of a deceased victim in a position approximating the financial status they would have enjoyed had the deceased lived his natural span. It is neither a windfall nor a bonanza. Determination is based on fairness, reasonableness and accepted legal standards, keeping in view imponderables and contingencies. Award must be “just” – not arbitrary, not niggardly. (Paras 12–14)

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Income assessment – Documentary proof – Salary certificate and employer’s testimony – Income cannot be reduced on conjecture.

Where salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and affidavit of employer established that deceased was earning ₹10,000 per month as a driver, and such evidence was not impeached by insurer, it was impermissible to assess income at a lower figure. Determination of income must rest on proved material and not assumptions divorced from evidence. Monthly income fixed at ₹10,000. (Paras 16)

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Future prospects – Fixed salary employee below 40 years – Mandatory addition – Constitution Bench binding – Error of High Court.

Victim aged 37 years and on fixed monthly salary. In view of Constitution Bench decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, addition of 40% towards future prospects is mandatory. Grant of future prospects is not discretionary but structured by binding precedent under Article 141. High Court’s omission to add future prospects constituted manifest error of law. (Paras 17–20)

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Loss of dependency – Re-computation – Application of multiplier method.

Monthly income ₹10,000 + 40% future prospects = ₹14,000. After deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses, contribution assessed at ₹10,500 per month. Applying multiplier of 15 (age 37 years), loss of dependency computed at ₹18,90,000 (₹10,500 × 12 × 15). (Para 20)

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Conventional heads – Loss of love and affection – Not a separate head – Harmonisation of Pranay Sethi, Magma General Insurance and Satinder Kaur.

Though Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh recognised “loss of love and affection” as a distinct head, Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi confined compensation to loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. Subsequent decisions in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur clarified that consortium is a compendious concept encompassing spousal, parental and filial consortium. Loss of love and affection stands subsumed within consortium and cannot be awarded separately. No separate award under that head permissible. (Paras 22–29)

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Consortium – Scope – Spousal, parental and filial consortium – Award structured.

Consortium includes spousal consortium, parental consortium to children, and filial consortium to parents. In present case, ₹50,000 awarded as spousal consortium; ₹40,000 each to two minor children as parental consortium (₹80,000); and ₹40,000 as filial consortium to mother (father having died). (Paras 26, 30)

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Interest – Enhancement – Long pendency.

Considering that accident occurred in 2011 and dependants were litigating for 15 years, interest enhanced to 9% per annum from date of claim petition till realisation. (Paras 32)

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Result – Compensation enhanced.

Total compensation determined at ₹20,80,000 with interest @ 9% per annum from date of claim petition till realisation. Insurer directed to pay balance within twelve weeks. (Paras 30–33)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In a claim under Sections 166 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, once the income of the deceased is established through unimpeached documentary evidence, courts cannot reduce it on conjecture. Where the deceased was below 40 years of age and on fixed salary, addition of 40% towards future prospects is mandatory in terms of the Constitution Bench decision in Pranay Sethi. Determination of loss of dependency must follow the structured multiplier method laid down in Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi.

Compensation under conventional heads is confined to loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. “Loss of love and affection” is not an independent head of compensation and stands subsumed within consortium, which includes spousal, parental and filial consortium, as clarified in Magma General Insurance and Satinder Kaur. (Paras 16–20, 22–29)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Consumer Protection – Deficiency in service – Quan..Consumer Protection – Deficiency in service – Quantum of compensation – Requirement of proof – Remand limited to quantification – Award of ₹2 crores set aside. In earlier round of litigation, deficiency in service stood upheld by this Court and matter was remitted only on question of quantum with specific direction that quantification must be based on material evidence and not on mere asking. After remand, complainant filed affidavit producing photocopies of documents to substantiate enhanced claim. Commission again awarded ₹2 crores with interest. Held, once remand was confined to computation based on evidence, burden lay on complainant to produce reliable and cogent material establishing actual loss suffered. In absence of such proof, award of ₹2 crores was unjustified. Compensation restricted to ₹25 lakhs already released. (Paras 7, 18, 22, 23, 24)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Consumer Protection – Deficiency in service – Quan...: advocatemmmohan Consumer Protection – Deficiency in service – Quantum of compensation – Requirement of proof – Remand limited to quantificat...

Consumer Protection – Deficiency in service – Quantum of compensation – Requirement of proof – Remand limited to quantification – Award of ₹2 crores set aside.

In earlier round of litigation, deficiency in service stood upheld by this Court and matter was remitted only on question of quantum with specific direction that quantification must be based on material evidence and not on mere asking. After remand, complainant filed affidavit producing photocopies of documents to substantiate enhanced claim. Commission again awarded ₹2 crores with interest. Held, once remand was confined to computation based on evidence, burden lay on complainant to produce reliable and cogent material establishing actual loss suffered. In absence of such proof, award of ₹2 crores was unjustified. Compensation restricted to ₹25 lakhs already released. (Paras 7, 18, 22, 23, 24)

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Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Procedure before Commission – Applicability of Evidence Act – Principles of natural justice – High-value claims require credible proof.

Though strict provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable to proceedings under the 1986 Act, the Commission is bound to follow principles of natural justice. Where claim for compensation runs into crores of rupees, authenticity and reliability of material produced must be established. Mere filing of photocopies, especially when specifically denied by opposite party, without examining authors or proving genuineness, is insufficient to sustain award of substantial damages. (Paras 16, 17, 19, 20, 22)

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Damages – Requirement of causal nexus – Haircut on 12.04.2018 – Alleged loss of employment, modelling assignments and film offers – No proof of linkage.

Complainant relied on photocopies of emails, modelling certificates, alleged film proposals and medical certificate to claim loss of corporate employment and modelling opportunities. Some documents were prior to date of alleged deficiency; others did not disclose financial particulars; payslips showed continued employment before and after incident. No material established that haircut dated 12.04.2018 resulted in loss of job, assignments or income. Causal connection between deficiency and claimed financial loss not proved. (Paras 19, 20, 21, 22)

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Damages – Award cannot be based on conjectures – Multi-crore claim – Requirement of trustworthy and reliable evidence.

Compensation cannot be awarded on presumptions, conjectures or general discussion. For claim running into crores, trustworthy and reliable evidence quantifying actual loss is essential. Commission failed to assess how complainant suffered loss to extent of ₹2 crores. General observations regarding trauma cannot substitute proof. (Paras 22, 23)

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Result – Appeal partly allowed – Compensation reduced.

Impugned order modified. Amount of compensation restricted to ₹25 lakhs already released pursuant to earlier direction of this Court. (Paras 23.1, 24)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where deficiency in service is established but the matter is remitted solely for quantification of compensation, the complainant must substantiate the claim by reliable, credible and legally sustainable evidence demonstrating actual loss and a clear causal nexus between the deficiency and the alleged damage. Even though consumer fora are not strictly bound by the Evidence Act, they are obligated to adhere to principles of natural justice and cannot award substantial or multi-crore compensation on the basis of unproved photocopies, speculative assertions or generalized claims of trauma. In absence of cogent proof of financial loss attributable to the deficiency, the award must be confined to a reasonable amount supported by the material on record. (Paras 7, 18–23)

Hindu Law — Joint Hindu Family — Coparcenary — Existence of ancestral nucleus — Burden of proof — Once income-yielding ancestral property is established, burden shifts to party asserting self-acquisition. Alienation by Karta — Sale in favour of one coparcener — Legal necessity must be strictly proved — Vague recitals insufficient. Guardian’s sale of minor’s property — Court permission not conclusive — Surrounding circumstances can be scrutinised. Will — Suspicious circumstances — Thumb impression though testator habitually signed — Execution 72 hours before death — Failure to dispel suspicion — Will invalid. Concurrent findings of fact — Supreme Court reluctant to interfere — Limited modification upheld.

Hindu Law – Joint Hindu Family – Partition – Nucleus – Burden of Proof

Joint family property – Existence of income-yielding ancestral property – Shift of burden – Self-acquisition not proved – Concurrent findings affirmed.

Where existence of ancestral properties (Item Nos. 14 & 15) was admitted and revenue records (Exs. B-201 to B-206) evidenced continuous cultivation and irrigation facilities, the Court held that a joint family nucleus capable of yielding income stood established. Acquisitions made during subsistence of joint status would be presumed joint unless the person asserting self-acquisition proves independent source. Mere proof of some independent earnings is insufficient without clear nexus between such earnings and specific acquisitions.
(Paras 29–31)

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Hindu Law – Coparcenary – Partition – No prior severance in status

Separate enjoyment, installation of irrigation facilities, and independent borrowings do not by themselves establish partition. Clear intention to sever joint status must be proved. In absence of mutation entries, division in status, or documentary evidence of partition, joint status continues.
(Para 32)

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Hindu Law – Alienation by Karta – Legal Necessity – Item-wise scrutiny

Alienations by Karta in favour of one coparcener must be justified by proof of legal necessity. General recitals are insufficient. Courts must undertake item-wise examination. Alienations supported by evidence of necessity upheld; others not binding on coparceners. Protection granted to establish actual medical expenses at final decree stage.
(Para 33)

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Guardian’s Sale – Court Permission – Validity examined

Sale of minor’s property pursuant to court permission requires scrutiny of surrounding circumstances and application of sale consideration. Where inconsistencies found in recitals and discharge of debts not satisfactorily proved, alienation not binding. First Appellate Court’s correction justified.
(Para 34)

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Will – Suspicious Circumstances – Thumb impression instead of signature – Execution shortly before death – Finality

Will dated 24.11.1989 executed three days prior to death held surrounded by suspicious circumstances:

• Testator accustomed to signing but affixed thumb impression,

• Execution 72 hours prior to death,

• Scribed by close relative,

• Scribe’s presence doubtful.

Rejection of Will by Trial Court having attained finality, Appellant cannot reopen issue.
(Para 35)

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Civil Procedure – Impleadment at belated stage – Procedural discipline

Where share already represented and no evidence of collusion shown, impleadment at belated stage rightly refused to prevent unsettling proceedings which had otherwise attained finality.
(Para 36)

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Appellate Jurisdiction – Concurrent findings – Limited interference

High Court exercised restraint; excluded Item Nos. 66, 74 and portion of Item 36 from partition as exclusive property of D2. Except to limited modification, concurrent findings upheld. No ground for interference under Article 136.
(Paras 37–39)

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Result

Civil Appeals dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Para 39)

 Hindu Law — Joint Hindu Family — Coparcenary — Existence of ancestral nucleus — Burden of proof — Once income-yielding ancestral property is established, burden shifts to party asserting self-acquisition.

Alienation by Karta — Sale in favour of one coparcener — Legal necessity must be strictly proved — Vague recitals insufficient.

Guardian’s sale of minor’s property — Court permission not conclusive — Surrounding circumstances can be scrutinised.

Will — Suspicious circumstances — Thumb impression though testator habitually signed — Execution 72 hours before death — Failure to dispel suspicion — Will invalid.

Concurrent findings of fact — Supreme Court reluctant to interfere — Limited modification upheld.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The dispute concerned 79 items of agricultural properties situated in Perambalur Taluk, Tiruchirappalli District.

Genealogy (Admitted)

Common ancestor: Pallikoodathan
Three sons:

• Chidambaram

• Sengan

• Natesan

The core dispute arose between:

• Duraisamy (Plaintiff)

• Dorairaj (D2/Appellant)
  Sons of Sengan.

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PLAINTIFF’S CASE

• Suit O.S. No. 99 of 1987 for partition.

• Claimed 1/4th share.

• Pleaded properties were:

  • Ancestral, or

  • Acquired from income of ancestral lands (joint family nucleus).

• Alleged no prior partition.

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DEFENCE OF APPELLANT (D2)

• Majority of properties were:

  • Self-acquisitions of Sengan, or

  • His own independent purchases.

• Claimed independent income as contractor/businessman.

• Asserted alienations by Sengan were valid and binding.

• Relied upon alleged Will dated 24.11.1989.

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COURTS BELOW

Trial Court (1992)

• Granted 1/4th share with exclusions.

First Appellate Court (1995)

• Modified decree — Plaintiff entitled to 5/16th share.

High Court (2009)

• Confirmed 5/16th share.

• Excluded:

  • Item 74,

  • Item 66,

  • 4 cents in Item 36.

• Rejected Will.

• Scrutinised alienations item-wise.

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CORE ISSUES 

1. Whether suit properties were joint family properties?

2. Whether existence of ancestral nucleus was proved?

3. Whether alienations by Karta were binding?

4. Whether Will dated 24.11.1989 was valid?

5. Whether concurrent findings warranted interference?

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 ANALYSIS

1️⃣ Joint Family Nucleus & Burden of Proof

The Court relied on:

• Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango

• Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal (1976 MLJ)

Principle reaffirmed:

Mere existence of joint family is insufficient.
However, once ancestral property yielding income is shown, burden shifts to person asserting self-acquisition.

Here:

• Items 14 & 15 admitted ancestral.

• Revenue records showed cultivation, wells, pump sets.

• Income-yielding nucleus established.

• Appellant failed to discharge burden of proving exclusive source.

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2️⃣ Independent Income of Sengan & D2

Court observed:

• Sengan had some independent earnings.

• But mere existence of income does not negate joint family contribution.

• D2 was student till 1966 — claim of substantial savings doubtful.

Findings were factual and well-reasoned.

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3️⃣ Alienations by Karta

Legal position:

• Alienation must be for legal necessity or benefit of estate.

• Sales in favour of one coparcener scrutinised strictly.

Courts below:

• Upheld some sales.

• Rejected others lacking proof of necessity.

• Allowed D2 to establish medical expenses in final decree stage.

Supreme Court approved this calibrated approach.

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4️⃣ Guardian Sale (Ex. B-2)

Though court permission existed:

• High Court examined surrounding inconsistencies.

• Found Trial Court had accepted transaction mechanically.

• First Appellate Court correction upheld.

Principle: Court permission is not conclusive if circumstances suspicious.

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5️⃣ Will dated 24.11.1989 (Ex. B-200)

Suspicious circumstances noted:

• Executed 3 days before death.

• Thumb impression though testator habitually signed.

• Scribe was close relative.

• Doubts regarding presence of scribe (election duty).

Additionally:

• Rejection of Will not properly challenged earlier.

• Attained finality.

Supreme Court upheld rejection.

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6️⃣ Prior Partition — Not Established

Separate enjoyment, borrowings, irrigation facilities:

• Do not amount to partition.

• Clear intention to sever required.

No such evidence existed.

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7️⃣ Limited Relief Granted by High Court

Properties purchased from third parties:

• Item 66

• Item 74

• Part of Item 36

Rightly excluded from partition.

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PRINCIPLES REAFFIRMED

1. Existence of income-yielding ancestral property shifts burden.

2. Self-acquisition must be clearly proved.

3. Alienation by Karta to coparcener strictly scrutinised.

4. Suspicious Will must be proved beyond doubt.

5. Concurrent factual findings rarely disturbed.

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CONCLUSION

Supreme Court held:

• High Court judgment well-reasoned.

• No perversity or legal error.

• Civil Appeals dismissed.

• No costs.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Scope — Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact at threshold — Prima facie cause of action sufficient. Section 47 CPC — Scope of objections in execution — Executing Court cannot decide independent challenge to underlying family arrangement/partition deed. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Part III (Sections 61–74) — Conciliation Award — Requirements — Authentication under Section 73(4) — Whether document qualifies as Award is triable issue. Constructive Res Judicata — Not attracted where earlier proceedings expressly reserved liberty to pursue remedies in accordance with law. Fraud, coercion, undue influence in family arrangements — Cannot be dismissed summarily without trial.

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Scope — Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact at threshold — Prima facie cause of action sufficient.

Section 47 CPC — Scope of objections in execution — Executing Court cannot decide independent challenge to underlying family arrangement/partition deed.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Part III (Sections 61–74) — Conciliation Award — Requirements — Authentication under Section 73(4) — Whether document qualifies as Award is triable issue.

Constructive Res Judicata — Not attracted where earlier proceedings expressly reserved liberty to pursue remedies in accordance with law.

Fraud, coercion, undue influence in family arrangements — Cannot be dismissed summarily without trial.

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FACTUAL MATRIX

Two branches of a wealthy business family fell into dispute regarding partition of vast assets.

• A document styled as “Kaithadi Baga Pirivinai Pathiram” (KBPP) dated 31.12.2018 recorded division of assets.

• A subsequent document dated 02.01.2019 was projected by one group as a Conciliation Award under the:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The opposing group alleged:

• KBPP executed under coercion, undue influence and misrepresentation.

• The 02.01.2019 document was fabricated later to give the KBPP the status of an Award.

• No conciliation under Part III (Sections 61–74) was ever conducted.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Attempt to initiate arbitration under Section 11 failed.

2. Execution proceedings initiated treating 02.01.2019 as Award executable under Section 36.

3. Objections filed under Section 47 CPC.

4. Separate civil suit filed challenging:

   • Validity of KBPP.

   • Alleged Conciliation Award.

5. Trial Court rejected plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

6. High Court affirmed rejection.

7. Present appeals before Supreme Court.

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CORE QUESTIONS

1. Whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action?

2. Whether suit was barred by law, abuse of process, or constructive res judicata?

3. Whether objections under Section 47 CPC barred independent civil suit?

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SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS

1️⃣ Distinction Between KBPP and Alleged Award

The Court held:

• Challenge to KBPP (coercion, undue influence, inequity) is distinct from challenge to Award (fraud, fabrication).

• These issues require evidence and cannot be summarily rejected.

The High Court erred in:

• Treating KBPP and 02.01.2019 document together as automatically constituting a Conciliation Award.

• Assuming waiver of statutory requirements under Part III of the Act.

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2️⃣ Requirements Under Part III of 1996 Act

Under Sections 61–74:

• Settlement must follow statutory conciliation procedure.

• Settlement Agreement must be authenticated by Conciliator (Section 73(4)).

• Only then does it attain status under Section 74.

The Court noted serious factual disputes:

• Some parties were allegedly abroad at time of execution.

• Alleged Conciliation Award signed only by conciliator.

• No documentary substantiation of conciliation process.

These issues require trial.

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3️⃣ Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Scope

Under:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order VII Rule 11 permits rejection only if:

• No cause of action.

• Suit barred by law.

• Other statutory defects.

The Court held:

Allegations of coercion, undue influence and misrepresentation in family partition cannot be brushed aside at threshold.

Trial Court wrongly reasoned that coercion requires “threat at knifepoint”.

Family dynamics may involve subtle dominance and influence — matters requiring evidence.

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4️⃣ Section 47 CPC — Limited Scope

Executing Court can determine:

• Whether decree is executable.

It cannot determine:

• Independent challenge to validity of underlying family arrangement/partition deed.

Hence, filing suit alongside Section 47 objection was not abuse of process.

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5️⃣ Constructive Res Judicata — Not Applicable

Earlier proceedings:

• Rejected arbitration.

• Rejected strike-off of execution.

• Expressly reserved liberty to pursue remedies “in accordance with law”.

Therefore:

No bar of constructive res judicata.

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FINDINGS

The Court held:

• Plaint discloses real cause of action.

• Issues raised are triable.

• Rejection under Order VII Rule 11 was “egregiously erroneous”.

• Suit must proceed to trial.

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DIRECTIONS

• Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside.

• Plaint restored.

• Suit to be tried along with Section 47 objections before Principal District Court, Tirunelveli.

• Observations are prima facie and will not bind final adjudication.

• Plea of constructive res judicata cannot be raised again.

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IMPORTANT OBSERVATION ON ARBITRATION

The Court suggested:

If respondents withdraw reliance on KBPP and 02.01.2019 documents, parties may agree to fresh arbitration de hors the contentious documents.

Court clarified:

• Arbitration possible.

• Not mediation (which earlier failed).

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LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment clarifies:

1. Courts must be cautious in rejecting plaints in complex family partition disputes.

2. Family arrangements alleging coercion require trial.

3. Conciliation Award status under Part III cannot be presumed.

4. Section 47 CPC is not a substitute for independent civil remedy.

5. Constructive res judicata cannot override express liberty granted earlier.