Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026. Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

 Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026.

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Interpretation of penal provision — Strict interpretation — Strict construction does not mean strict literalism — Penal provisions must be construed according to the legislative intent and the true construction of the statute — Where literal interpretation produces absurdity or defeats legislative intent, the Court is not required to adopt such literalism — At the same time, where statutory language is unambiguous, the Court cannot enlarge its scope merely because a wider construction appears desirable. [Paras 6, 7; 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Purposive interpretation — “Husband” — Void or voidable marriage and relationship in the nature of marriage — Protective object of legislation — The expression “husband” cannot be construed in a manner that permits a person who assumes the status and attributes of a marital relationship to evade the statutory protection merely by relying upon the invalidity of the relationship — However, the purposive interpretation adopted by the Court is specifically confined to S. 498A IPC. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Essential requirement — Intention to marry — Every live-in relationship does not fall within the protective scope of S. 498A — The relationship must qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the intention to marry must form an intrinsic part of the relationship — Protection is confined to relationships between consenting adults. [Para 23(i), (ii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Limited interpretation — Effect on other statutory provisions — The extended meaning attributed to “husband” for purposes of S. 498A cannot automatically be imported into other provisions of the IPC or other statutes — The proposition of law is expressly limited to S. 498A IPC. [Para 23(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Arrest — Accused in live-in relationship in the nature of marriage — Safeguards — Strict compliance with safeguards governing arrest — No person in a relationship in the nature of marriage, whether the live-in partner or his relative, accused of cruelty against a woman, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiry, in accordance with the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar. [Para 23(iv)]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Prima facie allegations — Scope — At the stage of considering quashing, where the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie constitute a cognizable offence, the Court should not conduct a trial on the disputed facts or quash the proceedings merely because the accused disputes the allegations — Whether the alleged suppression of prior marriage, dowry harassment and physical injury actually occurred is a matter for trial. [Para 22]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — S. 498A IPC — Live-in relationship — Allegation of cruelty — Quashing — Where the FIR alleged suppression of prior marriage, harassment for dowry and physical injury to the woman, and the allegations taken at face value disclosed a prima facie cognizable offence, the proceedings could not be quashed — Trial Court permitted to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 22, 24(i)]

A conviction for murder under Sections 302/34 cannot be restored merely because the High Court's reasoning for reducing the conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. The Supreme Court must independently assess the evidence; where material inconsistencies exist concerning the place of occurrence, presence of the accused, removal of the injured and reliability of the dying declaration, and the evidence is insufficient to establish murder beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be restored. [Paras 16–17]

 State of Andhra Pradesh, Home Department v. Ponthati Siva Rami Reddy, 2026 INSC 820, decided on 10-08-2026.

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Part II read with S. 34 — Murder — Alteration of conviction from S. 302/34 to S. 304 Part II — Material inconsistencies in prosecution evidence — Doubt regarding place of occurrence, presence of accused and manner in which injured was taken to hospital — Conviction under S. 302/34 not restored — Where the evidence on record contained material inconsistencies creating doubt regarding the prosecution case, interference with the High Court's alteration of conviction from S. 302/34 to S. 304 Part II was not warranted, particularly when the modified conviction had not been challenged by the accused who had already undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court. [Paras 11, 16, 17]

Evidence — Dying declaration — Reliability — Seriously injured victim — Detailed narration of assault — Medical evidence showing twenty-two injuries, several of them grievous — Doubt regarding timing of medical intimation and recording of statement — Corrections and overwriting in medical intimation — Possibility of effect of tranquilizers not ruled out — Detailed “blow by blow” account by seriously injured victim raising serious doubt as to its reliability — Conviction could not safely be restored on such statement. [Paras 12–14]

Evidence — Appreciation of evidence — Prosecution witnesses — Material contradictions regarding place of occurrence and removal of injured — PW1 stating that assault occurred in the fields and that victim was thereafter taken to the graveyard and then to his residence; PW3 stating that assault occurred at the graveyard and that victim was shifted directly to hospital in a jeep — Versions not reconcilable — Doubt created regarding the place of occurrence and actual presence of accused immediately after assault — Such material inconsistencies rendered the prosecution evidence insufficient to restore conviction under S. 302/34. [Paras 8–11, 16]

Criminal trial — Appreciation of evidence — Conviction — Court cannot substitute conjecture or surmise for evidence — High Court had itself noticed that no witness had deposed to the circumstances relied upon by it for inferring absence of intention to kill — Its further observations that persons armed with deadly weapons would ordinarily remain at the scene until confirming the victim's death were based purely on surmises and conjectures — Such reasoning could not constitute a valid basis for modifying conviction — However, in the absence of sufficient evidence to restore conviction under S. 302/34, Supreme Court declined to interfere with the modified conviction under S. 304 Part II. [Para 17]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Part II and 34 — Appeal against alteration of conviction — Scope of interference — Although High Court's reasoning for altering conviction was found unsustainable to the extent it rested on conjectures, the Supreme Court, on independent reappreciation of the entire evidence, found material inconsistencies in the prosecution case and insufficient evidence to restore conviction under S. 302/34 — Criminal appeal dismissed. [Paras 16, 17]

Core ratio

A conviction for murder under Sections 302/34 cannot be restored merely because the High Court's reasoning for reducing the conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. The Supreme Court must independently assess the evidence; where material inconsistencies exist concerning the place of occurrence, presence of the accused, removal of the injured and reliability of the dying declaration, and the evidence is insufficient to establish murder beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be restored. [Paras 16–17]

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenanc...2026 INSC 822, decided on 10-08-2026.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenanc...: advocatemmmohan Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance — Quantum — Determination of disposable income — Deductions towards Prov...

2026 INSC 822, decided on 10-08-2026.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance — Quantum — Determination of disposable income — Deductions towards Provident Fund and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme (ESPPs) — Whether such deductions could be treated on the same footing as mandatory deductions such as income-tax and professional tax — Held, No — Provident Fund and ESPPs ultimately accrue to the employee and constitute benefits capable of being withdrawn in future; they are not permanent compulsory charges in the nature of income-tax or professional tax — While determining maintenance, the Court is required to consider the actual financial capacity of the earning spouse and the legitimate expenses and circumstances of the spouse having custody of the children. [Paras 19, 20]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 26 — Maintenance of minor children — Quantum — Standard of living — Children entitled to appropriate financial support consistent with the facilities and circumstances enjoyed by their parents — Where the material on record showed substantial monthly expenditure towards education and other requirements of two minor children, maintenance enhanced from Rs.1,25,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/- per month, i.e. Rs.75,000/- per child, with effect from 1-1-2025 — Enhancement made without prejudice to the right of the appellant to seek further enhancement upon change in circumstances. [Paras 18, 21, 23]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance of wife and minor children — Medical expenses — Wife suffering from serious illness and having custody of minor children — Effect — Where the wife was undergoing treatment and was also looking after both children residing with her, her medical expenses and diminished capacity to meet the children's financial requirements were relevant circumstances in determining maintenance — Maintenance payable to wife enhanced from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.30,000/- per month. [Paras 21, 22]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 26 — Maintenance — Enhancement — Change in circumstances — Maintenance awarded by Court is not immutable — Subsequent change in circumstances may justify further enhancement — Enhancement of maintenance to Rs.1,50,000/- per month for two children did not preclude the appellant from seeking further enhancement if circumstances subsequently changed. [Para 23]

My Book on Hindu Succession Act

Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138, Explanation — Dishonour of Cheque — Post-dated cheque issued as advance payment for purchase of goods — Non-supply of goods and cancellation of purchase order — Criminal liability thereunder — Drawal of cheque in discharge of an existing or past adjudicated liability is a sine qua non to attract Section 138. [Paras 12 & 13] — To attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a legally enforceable debt or other liability must be subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. Where a post-dated cheque is issued as an advance payment for the supply of goods under a purchase order, and the order is subsequently cancelled without the goods being supplied, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt or liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of the cheque, no existing liability had accrued.

 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 — Section 138 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Dishonour of Cheque — Advance Payment for Purchase Order — Absence of subsisting debt or liability — Non-applicability of Section 138.

(A) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138, Explanation — Dishonour of Cheque — Post-dated cheque issued as advance payment for purchase of goods — Non-supply of goods and cancellation of purchase order — Criminal liability thereunder — Drawal of cheque in discharge of an existing or past adjudicated liability is a sine qua non to attract Section 138.

• [Paras 12 & 13] — To attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a legally enforceable debt or other liability must be subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. Where a post-dated cheque is issued as an advance payment for the supply of goods under a purchase order, and the order is subsequently cancelled without the goods being supplied, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt or liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of the cheque, no existing liability had accrued.

(B) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Civil Liability vs. Criminal Liability — Breach of contract condition requiring advance payment — Distinction.

• [Para 19] — A condition in a contract requiring advance payment creates a contractual obligation, and a breach thereof may give rise to civil liability to make good any losses incurred by the seller. However, breach of such a condition does not create criminal liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. For criminal liability to arise under Section 138, there must be a legally enforceable debt or liability subsisting on the date the cheque is drawn. The High Court erred in expanding the scope of Section 138 by equating contractual breach with criminal liability.

(C) Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974), S. 482 — Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Quashing of summons order — High Court improperly setting aside Sessions Court's order quashing process.

• [Paras 18, 19, 21 & 22] — The Delhi High Court erred in setting aside the Sessions Judge's order that had quashed the summons issued by the Magistrate. Where no goods were supplied pursuant to purchase orders and the orders were cancelled prior to presentation of advance cheques, no offence under Section 138 is made out. Impugned High Court judgment set aside and the Sessions Court order quashing the process restored.

Judicial Outcome:

• Appeal allowed. Judgment of the Delhi High Court set aside. Order of the Additional Sessions Judge quashing the process/summons restored.

Cases Approved / Followed:

1. Swastik Coaters Pvt. Ltd. v. Deepak Brothers, 1997 Cri LJ 1942 (AP) — Approved

2. Shanku Concretes Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2000 Cri LJ 1988 (Guj) — Approved

3. Balaji Seafoods Exports (India) Ltd. v. Mac Industries Ltd., 1999 (1) CTC 6 (Mad) — Approved

4. Supply House v. Ullas, 2006 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker) — Approved

Cases Overruled / Disapproved:

1. Mojj Engineering Systems Ltd. v. A.B. Sugars Ltd., 154 (2008) DLT 579 (Del) — Overruled