Earlier recall application – Already allowed Complainant had earlier availed recall under Section 311; subsequent application after recording of accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC and at stage of final arguments unjustified. (Paras 8–9) Invoices – Not automatically admissible Production of invoices alone insufficient; complainant would need to re‑examine himself to prove them, leading to retrial and delay. (Para 10) Fair trial vs delay Recall permissible only if fairness of trial demonstrably suffers; mere convenience or filling lacunae not grounds. Delay in trial is relevant factor. (Paras 9–10)

  Bombay High Court ruling in Niketan Dilip Paldhe v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 3369 of 2022, decided 29 November 2022):

Headnotes 

1. Section 311 CrPC – Recall of witness Power under Section 311 CrPC is discretionary, exercised only when recall is essential to secure a just decision; not a matter of course. (Paras 9–10)

2. Cross‑examination statement – No right created Complainant’s willingness in cross‑examination to produce invoices does not confer a right to file recall application under Section 311. (Paras 2, 9)

3. Earlier recall application – Already allowed Complainant had earlier availed recall under Section 311; subsequent application after recording of accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC and at stage of final arguments unjustified. (Paras 8–9)

4. Invoices – Not automatically admissible Production of invoices alone insufficient; complainant would need to re‑examine himself to prove them, leading to retrial and delay. (Para 10)

5. Fair trial vs delay Recall permissible only if fairness of trial demonstrably suffers; mere convenience or filling lacunae not grounds. Delay in trial is relevant factor. (Paras 9–10)

6. Varsha Garg case – Distinguished SC ruling in Varsha Garg v. State of M.P. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 986) distinguished; in that case documents were crucial and no prior recall had been allowed. (Para 11)

7. Impugned order quashed Magistrate’s order dated 01.08.2022 allowing recall for production of invoices set aside; writ petition allowed. (Paras 12–13)

Principles for exercise of Section 311 Court must consider: Whether new evidence is needed for just decision. Power should not be used to fill lacunae. Recall only if essential to ascertain truth. Fair trial entails interests of accused, victim, and society. (Paras 14–23)

 the Supreme Court of India ruling in Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2013 AIR SCW 4179, decided 4 July 2013):

Headnotes 

1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Section 311 CrPC confers widest powers on courts to summon, recall, or re‑examine witnesses at any stage, but exercise must be judicial, cautious, and only when evidence is essential for just decision. (Paras 13–14, 23)

2. Section 138 Evidence Act – Order of examination Re‑examination must be directed to explanation of matters referred to in cross‑examination; if new matter introduced, adverse party may further cross‑examine. (Para 13)

3. Principles for exercise of Section 311 Court must consider:

• Whether new evidence is needed for just decision.

• Power should not be used to fill lacunae.

• Recall only if essential to ascertain truth.

• Fair trial entails interests of accused, victim, and society. (Paras 14–23)

4. Case facts – PW‑9’s contradictory testimony PW‑9 initially alleged firearm injury but later testified he fell into latrine pit and was not shot; sons were absent. Subsequent application for re‑examination filed months later. (Paras 4–7, 25–26)

5. Trial Court vs High Court orders Trial Court rejected recall application with reasons; High Court allowed re‑examination by cryptic order without impleading appellant. SC held High Court erred in interfering. (Paras 3, 11–12, 24)

6. Fair trial – Liberal approach but limits SC acknowledged fairness requires opportunity to accused, but improper or capricious recall causes prejudice and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 20–23)

7. Final holding – Recall unjustified SC set aside High Court order; upheld Trial Court’s rejection of recall of PW‑9, as application was belated, intended to overcome earlier testimony, and not essential for just decision. (Paras 24–26)

Cross‑examination already conducted Complainant/respondent was cross‑examined on three occasions (03.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 07.03.2023); petitioner had ample opportunity to put relevant questions. (Paras 13, 18) Delay in application – Prejudice Application for recall filed in 2024, long after closure of complainant’s evidence; belated stage recall would prejudice respondent and derail proceedings. (Paras 9, 15) Misuse of Section 311 – Prevented Court held Section 311 cannot be misused to fill lacunae or prolong trial; repeated recall causes undue hardship to witnesses and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 19)

 Delhi High Court ruling in Sh. Vimal Ghai v. Sh. M.P. Sharma (CRL.M.C. 4782/2024, decided 5 January 2026):

Headnotes 

1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Section 311 CrPC empowers court to summon or recall witnesses at any stage to prevent failure of justice; power is discretionary, exercised only for strong and valid reasons, with caution and circumspection. (Paras 11–12)

2. Change of counsel – Not a ground Engagement of new counsel does not confer right to recall witnesses; otherwise trials would be endlessly delayed by successive applications. (Paras 16, citing Govind Mandal v. State of NCT of Delhi)

3. Fair trial – Balanced perspective Fair trial under Article 21 must be seen from perspective of accused, victim, and society; recall cannot be allowed merely on convenience or vague plea of fairness. (Para 17, citing Shiv Kumar Yadav, 2016)

4. Cross‑examination already conducted Complainant/respondent was cross‑examined on three occasions (03.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 07.03.2023); petitioner had ample opportunity to put relevant questions. (Paras 13, 18)

5. Delay in application – Prejudice Application for recall filed in 2024, long after closure of complainant’s evidence; belated stage recall would prejudice respondent and derail proceedings. (Paras 9, 15)

6. Misuse of Section 311 – Prevented Court held Section 311 cannot be misused to fill lacunae or prolong trial; repeated recall causes undue hardship to witnesses and miscarriage of justice. (Paras 19)

7. Petition dismissed – No merit

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summ...: advocatemmmohan Delhi High Court ruling in Hippocampus Infotech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr. (decided 17 April 202...

Delhi High Court ruling in Hippocampus Infotech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr. (decided 17 April 2025):

Headnotes 

1. Section 311 CrPC – Scope of recall Power to summon or recall witnesses under Section 311 CrPC is discretionary, exercised only for strong and valid reasons, with caution and circumspection. Recall is not a matter of course. (Paras 8–9)

2. Cross‑examination – Closure due to counsel’s absence Petitioners’ right to cross‑examine complainant closed after repeated adjournments and non‑appearance; plea of counsel’s illness unsupported by medical records. (Paras 6–7, 10)

3. Delay in application – Relevant factor Application for recall filed belatedly after closure of defence evidence; unexplained delay militates against exercise of Section 311 discretion. (Paras 7, 21)

4. Supreme Court precedents – Recall principles Court cited Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. (2011), Shiv Kumar Yadav (2016), Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat (2017), Manju Devi (2019), Swapan Kumar Chatterjee (2019), and Satbir Singh (2023) to emphasize recall only when essential for just decision. (Paras 9–10)

5. Conduct of petitioners – Dilatory tactics Petitioners repeatedly defaulted, NBWs issued and cancelled, adjournments granted liberally; trial court observed intent to delay proceedings. (Para 10)

6. Change of complainant’s name – No fresh right Mere change of complainant company’s name did not confer fresh right of cross‑examination. (Para 10)

7. Petition dismissed – No infirmity High Court upheld trial court’s order dated 20.07.2024 dismissing recall application; petition found devoid of merit. (Paras 11–12)

Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026. Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

 Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026.

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — “Husband” — Live-in relationship — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Applicability of S. 498A — Held, Yes, subject to conditions — Section 498A applies to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, where the intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship — The protection is confined to relationships between two consenting adult individuals — The extended interpretation is limited to S. 498A IPC and does not govern the construction of “husband” under any other statutory provision. [Para 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Interpretation of penal provision — Strict interpretation — Strict construction does not mean strict literalism — Penal provisions must be construed according to the legislative intent and the true construction of the statute — Where literal interpretation produces absurdity or defeats legislative intent, the Court is not required to adopt such literalism — At the same time, where statutory language is unambiguous, the Court cannot enlarge its scope merely because a wider construction appears desirable. [Paras 6, 7; 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Purposive interpretation — “Husband” — Void or voidable marriage and relationship in the nature of marriage — Protective object of legislation — The expression “husband” cannot be construed in a manner that permits a person who assumes the status and attributes of a marital relationship to evade the statutory protection merely by relying upon the invalidity of the relationship — However, the purposive interpretation adopted by the Court is specifically confined to S. 498A IPC. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 23(i)–(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Essential requirement — Intention to marry — Every live-in relationship does not fall within the protective scope of S. 498A — The relationship must qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the intention to marry must form an intrinsic part of the relationship — Protection is confined to relationships between consenting adults. [Para 23(i), (ii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Relationship in the nature of marriage — Limited interpretation — Effect on other statutory provisions — The extended meaning attributed to “husband” for purposes of S. 498A cannot automatically be imported into other provisions of the IPC or other statutes — The proposition of law is expressly limited to S. 498A IPC. [Para 23(iii)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498A — Arrest — Accused in live-in relationship in the nature of marriage — Safeguards — Strict compliance with safeguards governing arrest — No person in a relationship in the nature of marriage, whether the live-in partner or his relative, accused of cruelty against a woman, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiry, in accordance with the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar. [Para 23(iv)]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Prima facie allegations — Scope — At the stage of considering quashing, where the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie constitute a cognizable offence, the Court should not conduct a trial on the disputed facts or quash the proceedings merely because the accused disputes the allegations — Whether the alleged suppression of prior marriage, dowry harassment and physical injury actually occurred is a matter for trial. [Para 22]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 482 — S. 498A IPC — Live-in relationship — Allegation of cruelty — Quashing — Where the FIR alleged suppression of prior marriage, harassment for dowry and physical injury to the woman, and the allegations taken at face value disclosed a prima facie cognizable offence, the proceedings could not be quashed — Trial Court permitted to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 22, 24(i)]

A conviction for murder under Sections 302/34 cannot be restored merely because the High Court's reasoning for reducing the conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. The Supreme Court must independently assess the evidence; where material inconsistencies exist concerning the place of occurrence, presence of the accused, removal of the injured and reliability of the dying declaration, and the evidence is insufficient to establish murder beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be restored. [Paras 16–17]

 State of Andhra Pradesh, Home Department v. Ponthati Siva Rami Reddy, 2026 INSC 820, decided on 10-08-2026.

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Part II read with S. 34 — Murder — Alteration of conviction from S. 302/34 to S. 304 Part II — Material inconsistencies in prosecution evidence — Doubt regarding place of occurrence, presence of accused and manner in which injured was taken to hospital — Conviction under S. 302/34 not restored — Where the evidence on record contained material inconsistencies creating doubt regarding the prosecution case, interference with the High Court's alteration of conviction from S. 302/34 to S. 304 Part II was not warranted, particularly when the modified conviction had not been challenged by the accused who had already undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court. [Paras 11, 16, 17]

Evidence — Dying declaration — Reliability — Seriously injured victim — Detailed narration of assault — Medical evidence showing twenty-two injuries, several of them grievous — Doubt regarding timing of medical intimation and recording of statement — Corrections and overwriting in medical intimation — Possibility of effect of tranquilizers not ruled out — Detailed “blow by blow” account by seriously injured victim raising serious doubt as to its reliability — Conviction could not safely be restored on such statement. [Paras 12–14]

Evidence — Appreciation of evidence — Prosecution witnesses — Material contradictions regarding place of occurrence and removal of injured — PW1 stating that assault occurred in the fields and that victim was thereafter taken to the graveyard and then to his residence; PW3 stating that assault occurred at the graveyard and that victim was shifted directly to hospital in a jeep — Versions not reconcilable — Doubt created regarding the place of occurrence and actual presence of accused immediately after assault — Such material inconsistencies rendered the prosecution evidence insufficient to restore conviction under S. 302/34. [Paras 8–11, 16]

Criminal trial — Appreciation of evidence — Conviction — Court cannot substitute conjecture or surmise for evidence — High Court had itself noticed that no witness had deposed to the circumstances relied upon by it for inferring absence of intention to kill — Its further observations that persons armed with deadly weapons would ordinarily remain at the scene until confirming the victim's death were based purely on surmises and conjectures — Such reasoning could not constitute a valid basis for modifying conviction — However, in the absence of sufficient evidence to restore conviction under S. 302/34, Supreme Court declined to interfere with the modified conviction under S. 304 Part II. [Para 17]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Part II and 34 — Appeal against alteration of conviction — Scope of interference — Although High Court's reasoning for altering conviction was found unsustainable to the extent it rested on conjectures, the Supreme Court, on independent reappreciation of the entire evidence, found material inconsistencies in the prosecution case and insufficient evidence to restore conviction under S. 302/34 — Criminal appeal dismissed. [Paras 16, 17]

Core ratio

A conviction for murder under Sections 302/34 cannot be restored merely because the High Court's reasoning for reducing the conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. The Supreme Court must independently assess the evidence; where material inconsistencies exist concerning the place of occurrence, presence of the accused, removal of the injured and reliability of the dying declaration, and the evidence is insufficient to establish murder beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be restored. [Paras 16–17]

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenanc...2026 INSC 822, decided on 10-08-2026.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenanc...: advocatemmmohan Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance — Quantum — Determination of disposable income — Deductions towards Prov...

2026 INSC 822, decided on 10-08-2026.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance — Quantum — Determination of disposable income — Deductions towards Provident Fund and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme (ESPPs) — Whether such deductions could be treated on the same footing as mandatory deductions such as income-tax and professional tax — Held, No — Provident Fund and ESPPs ultimately accrue to the employee and constitute benefits capable of being withdrawn in future; they are not permanent compulsory charges in the nature of income-tax or professional tax — While determining maintenance, the Court is required to consider the actual financial capacity of the earning spouse and the legitimate expenses and circumstances of the spouse having custody of the children. [Paras 19, 20]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 26 — Maintenance of minor children — Quantum — Standard of living — Children entitled to appropriate financial support consistent with the facilities and circumstances enjoyed by their parents — Where the material on record showed substantial monthly expenditure towards education and other requirements of two minor children, maintenance enhanced from Rs.1,25,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/- per month, i.e. Rs.75,000/- per child, with effect from 1-1-2025 — Enhancement made without prejudice to the right of the appellant to seek further enhancement upon change in circumstances. [Paras 18, 21, 23]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24, 26 — Maintenance of wife and minor children — Medical expenses — Wife suffering from serious illness and having custody of minor children — Effect — Where the wife was undergoing treatment and was also looking after both children residing with her, her medical expenses and diminished capacity to meet the children's financial requirements were relevant circumstances in determining maintenance — Maintenance payable to wife enhanced from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.30,000/- per month. [Paras 21, 22]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 26 — Maintenance — Enhancement — Change in circumstances — Maintenance awarded by Court is not immutable — Subsequent change in circumstances may justify further enhancement — Enhancement of maintenance to Rs.1,50,000/- per month for two children did not preclude the appellant from seeking further enhancement if circumstances subsequently changed. [Para 23]

My Book on Hindu Succession Act

Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138, Explanation — Dishonour of Cheque — Post-dated cheque issued as advance payment for purchase of goods — Non-supply of goods and cancellation of purchase order — Criminal liability thereunder — Drawal of cheque in discharge of an existing or past adjudicated liability is a sine qua non to attract Section 138. [Paras 12 & 13] — To attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a legally enforceable debt or other liability must be subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. Where a post-dated cheque is issued as an advance payment for the supply of goods under a purchase order, and the order is subsequently cancelled without the goods being supplied, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt or liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of the cheque, no existing liability had accrued.

 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 — Section 138 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Dishonour of Cheque — Advance Payment for Purchase Order — Absence of subsisting debt or liability — Non-applicability of Section 138.

(A) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138, Explanation — Dishonour of Cheque — Post-dated cheque issued as advance payment for purchase of goods — Non-supply of goods and cancellation of purchase order — Criminal liability thereunder — Drawal of cheque in discharge of an existing or past adjudicated liability is a sine qua non to attract Section 138.

• [Paras 12 & 13] — To attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a legally enforceable debt or other liability must be subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. Where a post-dated cheque is issued as an advance payment for the supply of goods under a purchase order, and the order is subsequently cancelled without the goods being supplied, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt or liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of the cheque, no existing liability had accrued.

(B) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Civil Liability vs. Criminal Liability — Breach of contract condition requiring advance payment — Distinction.

• [Para 19] — A condition in a contract requiring advance payment creates a contractual obligation, and a breach thereof may give rise to civil liability to make good any losses incurred by the seller. However, breach of such a condition does not create criminal liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. For criminal liability to arise under Section 138, there must be a legally enforceable debt or liability subsisting on the date the cheque is drawn. The High Court erred in expanding the scope of Section 138 by equating contractual breach with criminal liability.

(C) Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974), S. 482 — Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Quashing of summons order — High Court improperly setting aside Sessions Court's order quashing process.

• [Paras 18, 19, 21 & 22] — The Delhi High Court erred in setting aside the Sessions Judge's order that had quashed the summons issued by the Magistrate. Where no goods were supplied pursuant to purchase orders and the orders were cancelled prior to presentation of advance cheques, no offence under Section 138 is made out. Impugned High Court judgment set aside and the Sessions Court order quashing the process restored.

Judicial Outcome:

• Appeal allowed. Judgment of the Delhi High Court set aside. Order of the Additional Sessions Judge quashing the process/summons restored.

Cases Approved / Followed:

1. Swastik Coaters Pvt. Ltd. v. Deepak Brothers, 1997 Cri LJ 1942 (AP) — Approved

2. Shanku Concretes Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2000 Cri LJ 1988 (Guj) — Approved

3. Balaji Seafoods Exports (India) Ltd. v. Mac Industries Ltd., 1999 (1) CTC 6 (Mad) — Approved

4. Supply House v. Ullas, 2006 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker) — Approved

Cases Overruled / Disapproved:

1. Mojj Engineering Systems Ltd. v. A.B. Sugars Ltd., 154 (2008) DLT 579 (Del) — Overruled

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Supreme Court of India Sripati Singh (Since Deceas...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Supreme Court of India Sripati Singh (Since Deceas...: advocatemmmohan NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 — Section 138 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 420 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — ...

AIR HEADNOTES

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 — Section 138 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 420 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Dishonour of cheque issued as "Security" — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Scope and Permissibility.

(A) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Dishonour of Cheque — Cheque issued as "Security" — Liability thereunder — Maturity of Instrument — A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction is not a worthless piece of paper.

• [Para 16] — Security in its true sense is something given as a pledge for payment to ensure the fulfillment of an obligation. Where a loan is advanced and the borrower issues a cheque as security to repay the amount within a specified timeframe, such cheque matures for presentation if the loan is not repaid in any other mode before the due date. On presentation and subsequent dishonour, the consequences under Section 138 of the N.I. Act automatically follow.
  
  
• [Para 17] — Treating a cheque as "security" ensures only that it cannot be presented prior to the loan or instalment maturing for repayment. There is no hard and fast rule that a cheque issued as security can never be presented by the drawee. Prior discharge of the loan or an altered agreement between parties are defenses to be set up by the drawer during trial, but they do not bar the maintainability of Section 138 proceedings.
  
  
• [Paras 19 & 21] — Presentation of a security cheque after the agreed due date for repayment, when the debt has become due and payable, creates a valid cause of action upon dishonour. The drawer cannot contend that the cheque should be held as security even after the debt has matured.
  
  

(B) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), S. 420 — Cheating — Breach of Contract vs. Criminal Offence — Dishonour of loan repayment cheque — Absence of mens rea at inception.

• [Paras 10, 11 & 12] — Mere inability to refund an advanced loan or failure to keep up a promise of repayment arising out of a business transaction does not automatically amount to the offence of cheating. Disagreements stemming from a civil breach of contract lack criminal mens rea unless fraudulent/deceitful intention is demonstrated right at the inception of the transaction. Proceedings under Section 420 IPC are not maintainable for a simple case of non-refunding of a loan.
  
  

(C) Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974), S. 482 — Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S. 138 — Quashing of Section 138 complaint — Erroneous exercise of power by High Court — Quashing based on "Security Cheque" tag unsustainable.

• [Paras 18 & 22] — High Court committed an error in quashing Section 138 proceedings on the ground that the cheques were issued as security. Whether the loan was discharged or whether the security cheque remained invalid for presentation are matters of defense to be established during trial, not grounds for refusal to take cognizance or for discharging the accused at the threshold.
  
  

Judicial Outcome:

• Appeals allowed in part. Order of High Court set aside to the extent of quashing Section 138 proceedings.
  
  
• Complaint limited to Section 138 of the N.I. Act restored before the Judicial Magistrate.
  
  
• Quashing of proceedings under Section 420 IPC affirmed.
  
  

Cases Cited & Discussed in Judgment:

1. Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. IREDA, (2016) 10 SCC 458 — Followed
   
   
2. M/s Womb Laboratory Pvt. Ltd. v. Vijay Ahuja, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 2086 — Followed
   
   
3. Sudhir Kumar Bhalla v. Jagdish Chand, (2008) 7 SCC 137 — Distinguished
   
   
4. Indus Airways Pvt. Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation Pvt. Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539 — Distinguished