ANAND KUMAR @ SANJAY LALWANI v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
2026 INSC 928 — Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated 31 August 2026 — K.V. Viswanathan, J. and Arun Palli, J.
I. HEADNOTES
1. Criminal proceedings — Quashing on settlement — Compounding and quashing on the basis of settlement are distinct concepts — Section 359 BNSS / erstwhile Section 320 CrPC governs compounding — Section 482 CrPC inherent jurisdiction governed by whether continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process and whether conviction is likely.
[Paras 28–30]
2. Criminal proceedings — Settlement between accused and victim — Non-compoundable offence — High Court may nevertheless quash proceedings under inherent jurisdiction where the dispute is predominantly private/civil/commercial in character, the victim has settled with the accused, chances of conviction are bleak and continuation would defeat the ends of justice.
[Paras 29–30, 37–38, 42–43]
3. Criminal proceedings — “Victim” and “complainant/informant” — Distinct concepts — A person who sets the criminal law in motion need not necessarily be the person who suffered the loss or injury.
[Para 31]
4. Settlement — Who can authorize settlement — Where quashing is sought on the ground of settlement, it is the real victim, and not merely an informant who has suffered no loss or injury, who can authorize such settlement.
[Paras 33–36]
5. Victim — Definition — Victim means a person who has suffered loss or injury by reason of the act or omission constituting the offence — Guardian/legal heir included.
[Para 35]
6. Compounding — Person competent to compound — The statutory scheme itself demonstrates that the person entitled to compound is the person who suffered the loss or injury.
[Para 36]
7. Criminal proceedings — Settlement — Public interest limitation — Even where victim and accused settle, offences having serious harmful effects on society, heinous offences, offences involving mental depravity, moral turpitude, corruption or acts by public servants in official capacity cannot ordinarily be quashed merely on the basis of settlement.
[Paras 30, 36–38]
8. Criminal proceedings — Civil/commercial flavour — Property/partnership dispute — Where the criminal allegations arise substantially out of a private dispute with commercial or civil overtones and the actual victim settles, continuation may constitute abuse of process.
[Paras 37–38, 42–43]
9. Criminal proceedings — Informant who is not victim — Lack of settlement with informant does not necessarily prevent quashing where the informant has no legally established loss or injury and the real victim has settled with the accused.
[Paras 39–48]
10. Criminal proceedings — Alleged ownership/interest in immovable property — Mere oral assertion, unsupported by documentary evidence, may be insufficient to establish the informant's legal interest for purposes of continuing prosecution where earlier judicial findings also cast doubt upon such interest.
[Paras 14, 44–47]
11. Criminal proceedings — Forged Power of Attorney — Partnership deed and mutation — Allegations of forgery initially sufficient to sustain proceedings — Subsequent categorical affidavit by the actual owner acknowledging the partnership, mutation and appellant's authority, and withdrawing grievance, materially alters the basis for continuation.
[Paras 40–41, 47]
12. Section 482 CrPC — Abuse of process — Continuing prosecution after the real victim has settled, has no grievance against the accused, and the principal witness would not support the prosecution, particularly in a private civil/commercial dispute, would amount to abuse of process and wastage of judicial time.
[Paras 41–43, 47–48]
II. FACTS
A. Origin of the dispute
13. Land owned by Pradeep Singh Mehta
Para 4: Pradeep Singh Mehta owned 54.48 acres of agricultural land at Village Kanasaiya, Tehsil Huzur, District Bhopal. Out of 15.18 acres in Khasra No. 562, the complainant alleged that 7.50 acres had been given to him by Pradeep Singh Mehta.
14. Alleged forged GPA
Paras 5–6: The prosecution case was that the appellant and other accused conspired to usurp the land and fabricated a General Power of Attorney dated 31 March 1997, purportedly executed by Pradeep Singh Mehta. The GPA allegedly authorized the appellant to deal with the land.
15. Partnership and mutation
A Partnership Deed dated 16 March 2000 allegedly made the entire 54.48 acres the property of M/s Paradise Farms. Mutation in favour of the partnership firm was subsequently obtained on 7 June 2000. [Paras 6, 8–9]
16. Criminal complaint
Para 10: The complainant alleged that the entire transaction was designed to grab the land and invoked Sections 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406 and 120-B IPC.
17. Statement of original owner
Para 11: Pradeep Singh Mehta, in his sworn statement dated 9 February 2012, stated that the signature on the Power of Attorney was forged. He also stated that he had given 7.50 acres to the complainant.
18. Cognizance
Para 12: The Magistrate took cognizance on 28 May 2012 of Sections 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406 and 120-B IPC. The revision against cognizance was dismissed as time-barred.
III. FIRST ROUND BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
19. Section 482 petition
Paras 13–15: The appellant and other accused approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court refused to quash the proceedings against the appellant.
20. Important finding concerning complainant's title
The High Court specifically found that there was no documentary evidence showing transfer of the 7.50 acres to the complainant. It held that mere oral assertions could not establish an interest in immovable property which had originally belonged to Pradeep Singh Mehta. [Para 14]
This finding later became important to the Supreme Court's assessment of whether Respondent No. 3 was actually a victim.
IV. COMPROMISE AND SECOND ROUND
21. Settlement with Pradeep Singh Mehta
Para 17: In 2019, the appellant approached the High Court for quashing on the basis of a compromise with Pradeep Singh Mehta. Pradeep Singh Mehta filed an affidavit stating, inter alia, that:
- he owned the 54.48 acres;
- he had contributed the land to Paradise Farms;
- the partnership had been formed with his authority;
- mutation formalities had been carried out by the appellant under his instructions;
- the firm had been functioning for years;
- he had no grievance against the accused; and
- he did not want the criminal proceedings to continue.
22. Compromise verified as genuine
Para 18: The High Court Registrar verified the compromise and reported that it was genuine, voluntary and free from threat, inducement or coercion.
23. High Court nevertheless refused quashing
Paras 20–21: The High Court treated the matter as one of compounding under Section 320 CrPC and held that Respondent No. 3, being the complainant, had not joined the settlement. It therefore declined to quash.
V. QUESTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
24. Core question
Para 27: The Supreme Court framed the issue:
Whether, in light of the compromise between the appellant and Respondent No. 2, continuation of the criminal proceedings amounted to an abuse of process warranting quashing?
VI. LAW
A. COMPOUNDING ≠ QUASHING
25. Distinction between the two powers
Para 28: The Court made the distinction expressly:
Compounding of offence is governed by the statutory compounding provision.
Quashing pursuant to settlement is an exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and depends upon:
- likelihood of conviction; and
- whether continuation of proceedings would constitute abuse of process.
26. Gian Singh principle
Paras 29–30: Relying upon Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reiterated that quashing and compounding are not interchangeable.
The High Court may quash even a non-compoundable offence where the dispute is predominantly:
- civil;
- commercial;
- mercantile;
- financial;
- partnership; or
- otherwise overwhelmingly private,
provided the circumstances justify the conclusion that continuation would defeat the ends of justice.
VII. VICTIM AND INFORMANT
27. Distinct legal concepts
Para 31: The Court relied upon Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra and held that “victim” and “complainant/informant” are distinct concepts. A stranger may set the criminal law in motion without himself being the person who suffered the loss or injury.
28. Only victim can authorize settlement
Paras 32–34: The Court gave a categorical answer:
“It will only be the victim who can authorize a settlement.”
The reason is obvious: otherwise an informant who is not the victim could compromise away the interests of the actual victim.
29. Statutory definition
Para 35: Under Section 2(wa) CrPC and Section 2(y) BNSS, a victim is the person who suffered loss or injury caused by the act or omission constituting the offence.
VIII. APPLICATION — WHO WAS THE VICTIM?
A. Pradeep Singh Mehta
30. Original owner was the victim
Paras 39–40: The Court found no manner of doubt that Pradeep Singh Mehta was the victim.
The very foundation of the complaint was that:
- his signature on the GPA had been forged;
- the partnership had been created on that basis; and
- mutation had consequently been obtained.
Therefore, he was the person who allegedly suffered the loss or injury. [Para 40]
31. Subsequent affidavit changed the evidentiary position
Para 41: The Court considered his earlier sworn statement alongside the subsequent affidavit.
The later affidavit categorically accepted:
- the partnership;
- contribution of land;
- mutation;
- appellant's authority to complete formalities;
- functioning of the firm; and
- absence of grievance against the accused.
The Court concluded that the original owner, who was also the principal witness, would no longer support the prosecution.
IX. WHETHER SUBHASH CHANDRA LALWANI WAS ALSO A VICTIM
32. Court considered the possibility in his favour
Paras 44–45: The Supreme Court did not simply rely upon the earlier High Court finding. It proceeded on the assumption that Respondent No. 3 was also a victim and then examined whether he nevertheless had a sustainable case.
33. His alleged 7.50-acre interest was unsupported
The complaint itself contained inconsistencies concerning the alleged transfer of 7.50 acres. Earlier, the High Court had found no documentary evidence establishing such transfer. [Paras 44–45]
34. Original owner's subsequent position destroyed the foundation
Paras 46–47: Pradeep Singh Mehta had:
- accepted the partnership;
- accepted the mutation;
- withdrawn grievance concerning the Power of Attorney; and
- expressly stated that he had no grievance against the accused.
The complaint also did not allege that the appellant knew of any prior transfer of 7.50 acres to Respondent No. 3.
35. Result
The Court held that, on the totality of circumstances, permitting Respondent No. 3 to continue prosecution would amount to abuse of process. [Para 47]
X. CIVIL/COMMERCIAL FLAVOUR
36. Private dispute
Paras 42–43: The Court held that the dispute was essentially personal and had no repercussions on society in general.
The alleged offences possessed a civil flavour with commercial overtones.
37. Chances of conviction bleak
In view of the settlement and the position taken by Pradeep Singh Mehta, who was the star witness and alleged victim, the chances of conviction were considered extremely bleak. Continuing the proceedings would merely clog the judicial system. [Paras 41–43]
XI. RATIO DECIDENDI
Ratio 1 — Compounding and quashing are fundamentally different
The statutory power of compounding is distinct from the High Court's inherent power to quash criminal proceedings. A non-compoundable offence may nevertheless be quashed under Section 482 where the settlement, the nature of the dispute, likelihood of conviction and ends of justice justify such exercise.
[Paras 28–30]
Ratio 2 — Victim, not informant, controls settlement
For purposes of quashing on settlement, it is the real victim — the person who has suffered loss or injury — who must authorize the settlement. The mere fact that a person lodged the complaint does not make him the victim.
[Paras 31–36]
Ratio 3 — Private/civil/commercial disputes may be quashed
Where criminal proceedings arise from a predominantly private dispute having civil or commercial overtones, and the actual victim settles with the accused, continuation of proceedings may constitute abuse of process where conviction is unlikely and the dispute has no significant public ramifications.
[Paras 37–38, 42–43]
Ratio 4 — Informant cannot perpetuate prosecution without a sustainable victim-interest
Where the alleged victim has withdrawn his grievance and the informant's own alleged interest in the property is unsupported, permitting the informant to continue prosecution may itself amount to abuse of process.
[Paras 44–47]
Ratio 5 — Principal witness becoming unavailable to prosecution is relevant
Where the person who allegedly suffered the injury is the principal/star witness and, following settlement, categorically states that he has no grievance and does not wish to support the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction becomes a relevant consideration in determining whether continuation of proceedings would be an abuse of process.
[Para 41]
XII. CONCLUSION
38. High Court order set aside
Para 49: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order dated 19 September 2024.
39. Entire criminal proceedings quashed
The proceedings in ST No. 459 of 2018 pending before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, were quashed against all accused.
40. Revision became infructuous
The pending criminal revision seeking additional charges also ceased to survive and was dismissed.
CORE PROPOSITION FOR YOUR CASE-LAW COLLECTION
The judgment can be reduced to the following proposition:
Where the person who actually suffered the alleged loss or injury settles with the accused and unequivocally withdraws his grievance, the fact that the criminal case was instituted by another person who describes himself as the complainant does not, by itself, prevent quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The Court must distinguish the “victim” from the “informant”, examine the real nature of the dispute, assess the likelihood of conviction, and determine whether continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process. Where the dispute is predominantly private, civil or commercial, the alleged victim is no longer supporting the prosecution, and the informant's independent victim-status is unsupported, continuation of proceedings may properly be quashed. [Paras 28–48]
