ASKARI HUSSAIN AND ORS. v. DINESH KUMAR AND ORS.
2026 INSC 929 — Civil Appeal No. 11988 of 2026
Supreme Court of India — Judgment dated 24 August 2026
Dipankar Datta, J. and Sheel Nagu, J.
HEADNOTES
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 — Section 58(3) — Difference of opinion between members of NCDRC — Reference to third member — Scope of reference — Third member ordinarily required to answer only the point(s) referred and return the matter to the referring Bench for disposal in accordance with majority opinion. [Paras 14, 16–18]
Consumer Protection Act — Section 58(3) — Reference — Referring Bench failing to state the specific point(s) of difference and instead framing questions requiring examination of facts and evidence — Third member considering the entire material and deciding the appeal on merits — Such course, though ordinarily impermissible, not treated as jurisdictional illegality in the peculiar facts of the case. [Paras 17–19]
Reference to larger Bench — Jurisdiction — Referee Bench — Larger Bench cannot ordinarily adjudicate an issue not referred to it — After answering the reference, matter should normally be remitted to the original/referring Bench for decision on merits — Exception where subsidiary question logically and unavoidably arises, permitting a common-sense approach. [Para 13]
Reference — Scope determined by terms of reference — Word “matter” cannot automatically be construed as referring the entire case where context demonstrates that only specified questions were referred. [Para 13]
Consumer proceedings — Difference of opinion — Section 58(3) — Statutory scheme differs from ordinary CPC reference — Where members are equally divided, points of difference are to be referred to the President/other member and decided according to the majority opinion of all members who heard the case, including original members. [Para 16]
Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Procedural irregularity in reference — High Court ought not interfere where the third member's procedure, in the peculiar circumstances, does not constitute such illegality as warrants supervisory intervention. [Paras 19–20]
Article 227 — Merits not examined by High Court — Where High Court interferes only on procedural ground and does not examine the substantive findings, Supreme Court may set aside the High Court order and remand the Article 227 application for decision on merits. [Paras 21–23]
I. FACTS
1. Consumer complaint and compensation
Para 3: The appellants had instituted Complaint No. 13 of 2006 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Uttar Pradesh. The State Commission allowed the complaint by order dated 4 December 2012 and awarded compensation of ₹95 lakh with 15% interest.
2. Appeal before NCDRC
Para 3: The first respondent preferred First Appeal No. 156 of 2013 before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
3. Difference between two members
Para 4: The two members of the NCDRC Bench differed:
the Presiding Member allowed the appeal and dismissed the complaint;
the companion member modified the State Commission's order by reducing compensation to ₹93 lakh and interest to 12%.
[Para 4]
4. Reference to third member
Para 5: Since the members were divided, a reference was made under Section 58(3) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The third member disagreed with the Presiding Member and agreed with the companion member.
5. Five questions referred
Para 9: Instead of stating the precise points on which the original members differed, the referring Bench formulated five questions dealing with:
evidence linking the appellant doctor with Surya Medical Centre;
proof that the complainant's wife was admitted/operated there;
whether oral explanations not contained in the original complaint could be considered;
alleged withholding/non-production of medical records; and
whether an uncontroverted affidavit could be accepted in a summary proceeding.
[Para 9]
6. Third member decided the appeal itself
Paras 5, 10: After answering the questions, the third member went further and disposed of the appeal itself, modifying the compensation and interest and issuing directions concerning payment of the compensation to the complainants.
7. Challenge before High Court
Para 6: The first respondent approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 227. The Single Judge held that the third member had exceeded the jurisdiction conferred by the reference and quashed the order, directing the matter to be heard afresh by the third member.
II. ISSUE
8. Question before Supreme Court
Para 7: The precise issue was:
Whether the third member was justified in deciding the appeal itself after concurring with the companion member, or whether he was required merely to answer the questions referred and return the matter to the original referring Bench for appropriate orders based on the majority opinion.
[Para 7]
III. LAW
A. GENERAL LAW GOVERNING REFERENCES
9. Normal rule
Para 14: The law is well settled that, ordinarily, a referee Bench must:
answer the question(s) referred;
return the reference with those answers; and
leave the original/referring Bench to decide the remaining issues in accordance with the answers and majority opinion.
[Para 14]
10. Larger Bench cannot exceed reference
Para 13: In State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, the Court reiterated that a larger Bench ordinarily cannot expand the scope of the reference or frame additional questions beyond those referred.
11. Reference is not transfer of entire case
Para 13: Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. was relied upon for the proposition that where a specific issue is referred to a larger Bench, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue that was not referred.
12. Matter ordinarily goes back
Para 13: T.A. Hameed v. M. Viswanathan and Saquib Abdul Hameed Nachan v. State of Maharashtra were cited for the principle that after answering a reference, the matter normally has to be remitted to the referring Bench for decision on merits.
IV. EXCEPTION — COMMON-SENSE APPROACH
13. Subsidiary questions may be answered
Para 13: The rule is not absolute. Where a subsidiary question logically and unavoidably arises from the questions referred, the larger Bench may answer it by adopting a common-sense approach.
14. Scope depends upon actual reference
Para 13: The Court emphasised that everything depends upon the terms of the reference. A reference of the “matter” does not necessarily mean that the entire case has been transferred for adjudication. The word must be understood in its contextual setting.
V. SPECIAL STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER SECTION 58(3)
15. Section 58(3)
Para 16: Section 58(3) specifically provides that where members of a NCDRC Bench differ:
the point(s) are decided according to majority if there is a majority;
if the members are equally divided, they state the point(s) on which they differ;
those point(s) are referred to the President or another member;
the point(s) are then decided according to the opinion of the majority of all members who heard the case, including the original members.
16. Statutory distinction from ordinary civil references
Para 15: In ordinary CPC proceedings there is no provision corresponding to Section 392 CrPC or Section 433 BNSS concerning references. Therefore, CPC references are governed principally by judicial precedent. In consumer proceedings, however, Section 58(3) directly supplies the governing mechanism.
VI. APPLICATION OF LAW
17. Prima facie excess by third member
Para 17: On a plain reading of Section 58(3), it appeared that the third member had exceeded jurisdiction by deciding the appeal instead of merely answering the points referred.
18. But reference itself was defective
Para 17: The Supreme Court identified the decisive circumstance: the original members did not state the points on which they differed.
Instead, five questions were formulated which required consideration of:
factual allegations;
rebuttals;
evidence; and
the merits of the complaint.
[Paras 17–18]
19. Questions went to the root of the dispute
Para 18: The five questions were inseparable from the evidence and went to the root of the complaint. Consequently, the third member necessarily had to examine the entire material and rival contentions to answer them.
20. Common-sense exception applied
Para 18: In those peculiar circumstances, the Supreme Court considered the third member's decision to dispose of the appeal along with answering the questions to be a common-sense approach of the kind recognised in Salil Sabhlok.
VII. ARTICLE 227
21. No jurisdictional illegality warranting interference
Para 19: The Supreme Court held that, in the particular circumstances, the third member's failure to return the reference and instead deciding the appeal did not constitute such an illegality as warranted interference under Article 227.
22. High Court's reliance on Kesho Nath distinguished
Para 20: The High Court had correctly found support in Kesho Nath Khurana for the general proposition that a referee Bench should return the matter after answering the reference. However, the Supreme Court held that the present case was materially different because of:
Section 58(3);
the defective/faltering reference; and
the nature of the five questions referred.
[Para 20]
23. Merits never examined by High Court
Para 21: The High Court had not questioned the substantive answers given by the third member. Its objection was confined entirely to the procedure adopted. Therefore, the merits remained unexamined.
VIII. RATIO DECIDENDI
Ratio 1
Ordinarily, a referee Bench must confine itself to the question(s) referred to it and, after answering them, return the matter to the referring Bench for disposal in accordance with the majority opinion.
[Para 14]
Ratio 2
The larger/referee Bench cannot ordinarily adjudicate upon matters outside the scope of the reference. The scope of reference is determined by the terms and context of the referring order.
[Para 13]
Ratio 3
The rule is subject to a limited exception: where a subsidiary issue logically and unavoidably arises from the questions referred, the referee Bench may adopt a common-sense approach and deal with such issue.
[Para 13]
Ratio 4
Under Section 58(3) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, where members of an NCDRC Bench differ, the statutory mechanism is to identify the point(s) of difference and have those points decided by the additional member together with the original members for purposes of majority.
[Para 16]
Ratio 5
Where the referring Bench fails to identify the actual points of difference and instead frames questions which necessarily require examination of the evidence and go to the root of the dispute, the third member's consideration of the entire material and disposal of the appeal on the basis of the resulting majority opinion may, in the peculiar circumstances, be treated as a permissible common-sense approach rather than a jurisdictional illegality warranting Article 227 interference.
[Paras 17–19]
IX. CONCLUSION
24. High Court order set aside
Para 23: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court.
25. Article 227 application remanded
The application under Article 227 was remanded to the High Court for consideration afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law.
26. All factual and legal issues left open
The Court expressly left all questions of fact and law open to be raised before the appropriate roster Bench of the High Court.
27. NCDRC restrained from proceeding
Para 25: The Supreme Court directed that the NCDRC should not proceed further until the High Court finally decides the Article 227 application in accordance with the Supreme Court's order.
28. Expeditious disposal
Para 24: Considering the passage of time, the High Court was requested to decide the Article 227 application at an early date.
CONCISE RATIO
Reference to a larger Bench — Scope — Ordinarily, the referee Bench must answer only the questions referred and remit the matter to the referring Bench. However, where the referring Bench itself fails to identify the points of difference and formulates questions which necessarily require examination of the entire evidence and go to the root of the dispute, the referee Bench may, in exceptional circumstances, adopt a common-sense approach and decide the matter on the basis of the majority opinion. Such course, in the peculiar facts of the present case, did not constitute an illegality warranting interference under Article 227. [Paras 13–20]
