Thursday, August 27, 2026

𝓜𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓵𝓲 𝓜𝓸𝓱𝓪𝓷 .𝓜.(ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్): THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT

𝓜𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓵𝓲 𝓜𝓸𝓱𝓪𝓷 .𝓜.(ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్): THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT: 🌺 मनोदर्पणवर्तनमाला THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT A Seven-Śloka Foundational Treatise on Upstream Cognitive Regulation and ...

Wednesday, August 26, 2026

Municipal Corporation Act — Encroachment notices — Sections 405 & 406: Notices issued under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, calling upon alleged encroachers to remove unauthorized constructions within seven days, cannot be sustained where the authorities have not first followed the required procedure of issuing a proper show-cause notice. [Para 1, 4–6]

Headnotes — Kongi Chinnaiah & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

W.P. No.24200 of 2026 — Harinath N., J. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34870

Municipal Corporation Act — Encroachment notices — Sections 405 & 406:
Notices issued under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, calling upon alleged encroachers to remove unauthorized constructions within seven days, cannot be sustained where the authorities have not first followed the required procedure of issuing a proper show-cause notice. [Para 1, 4–6]
Natural justice — Prior show-cause notice mandatory:
Where the authorities propose action against alleged unauthorized occupants/encroachers, the affected persons must first be called upon to submit their explanation and produce relevant title/possession documents, before any adverse action is taken. [Paras 4–6]
Encroachment proceedings — Opportunity to produce documents:
Affected occupants must be given an opportunity to place before the authorities documents supporting their claim concerning possession and enjoyment of the property. A notice directly requiring removal of the structure, without first calling for such documents, does not satisfy this requirement. [Paras 4–5]
Encroachment notice — Cannot be treated as show-cause notice:
A notice requiring removal of an alleged unauthorized construction cannot be retrospectively treated as a show-cause notice merely because the occupants could have submitted documents in response to it. The notice must itself afford an opportunity to explain the claim and produce supporting documents. [Para 4]
Previous judicial directions — Binding procedure:
Where, in an earlier round of litigation, the High Court had directed the municipal authority to issue a fresh show-cause notice, call for relevant documents and thereafter pass appropriate orders after due notice and hearing, the authorities were required to comply with that procedure before taking further action. [Para 3]
Personal hearing — Required before adverse action:
The authorities were required to afford the petitioners an opportunity of personal hearing before proceeding against them as alleged unauthorized occupants/encroachers. [Para 6]
Natural justice — Violation vitiates subsequent action:
Any action taken by the respondents without issuing show-cause notices and affording an opportunity of hearing would be contrary to the principles of natural justice and the directions of the High Court. [Para 6]
Encroachment — Authorities' claim regarding documents does not cure procedural defect:
The respondents contended that plot owners in the layout had produced documents whereas persons occupying the canal-side area had not produced patta certificates. The Court nevertheless held that the petitioners themselves had not been issued show-cause notices calling upon them to produce documents, and therefore the procedural defect remained. [Paras 4–5]
Long possession — Allegation of residence for 50 years:
The petitioners asserted that they had been residing in the subject property for more than 50 years after constructing residential houses thereon. The Court did not finally adjudicate their title or possession; instead, it directed that their claims and documents be considered through the prescribed show-cause and hearing process. [Para 2]

Core Ratio

Before taking coercive action against alleged unauthorized occupants or encroachers under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, the municipal authorities must issue a proper show-cause notice calling upon the affected persons to submit their explanation and produce the relevant documents concerning their possession or title, and must afford them an opportunity of hearing. A direct encroachment/removal notice cannot be treated as a substitute for such show-cause notice. Action taken without following this procedure violates the principles of natural justice and the binding directions of the High Court. [Paras 4–6]

Final Order

W.P.No.24200 of 2026 — Disposed of.
The impugned Encroachment Notices dated 17.08.2026 — Set aside.
The respondents were left at liberty to proceed in accordance with the directions of the Division Bench in W.P.(PIL) No.140 of 2022 and batch.
Respondents must issue show-cause notices to the petitioners and afford them an opportunity of hearing before taking further action.
Any action without following that procedure would be contrary to natural justice and the Court's directions.
No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stood closed. [Paras 6–7]

Suppression of material facts — Allegation requiring adjudication: An allegation that the plaintiffs suppressed an earlier partition and alienations concerning the suit property was a matter requiring adjudication on evidence and could not appropriately be conclusively determined in an appeal against the ex parte decree without affording the defendant an opportunity to contest. [Paras 14–16]

Headnotes — Shaik Jaina Vali v. Shaik Abida Khatoon & Ors.

A.S. No.254 of 2023 — D. Ramesh & Alapati Giridhar, JJ. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34733

Ex parte decree — Appeal under Section 96(2) CPC — Maintainability:
An appeal lies against an ex parte decree under Section 96(2) CPC. The plaintiffs' counsel ultimately conceded the maintainability of the appeal. [Para 21]
Ex parte decree — Defendant did not adduce evidence:
Where the defendant had entered appearance through counsel but subsequently did not adduce evidence, and the suit was ultimately decreed ex parte, the appellate Court may treat the decree as an ex parte decree for purposes of Section 96(2) CPC. [Paras 13, 17–19]
Ex parte decree — Final opportunity to contest on merits:
Where the plaintiff and his witnesses were not cross-examined and the decree was passed ex parte, the appellate Court may, in the interests of justice, afford the defendant a final opportunity to contest the suit and have the matter adjudicated on merits, subject to appropriate terms. [Para 23]
Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Additional evidence — Appeal not to be decided without considering application:
The appellant had filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to adduce several registered documents which allegedly had a direct bearing on the dispute. The Court noted that the appeal was still pending and had not been decided by refusing the application for additional evidence; therefore, the appellant could not rely upon the proposition in Satish Chand Surana concerning miscarriage of justice from dismissal of an appeal without deciding an Order XLI Rule 27 application. [Paras 3, 18]
Title dispute — Rival registered documents — Requires trial on merits:
Where the appellant relied upon several registered documents, including prior sale deeds and partition deeds, alleging suppression of an earlier partition and alienations, while the plaintiffs disputed their validity and effect, the truth of the rival claims required determination on the basis of oral and documentary evidence at trial. [Paras 14–16]
Suppression of material facts — Allegation requiring adjudication:
An allegation that the plaintiffs suppressed an earlier partition and alienations concerning the suit property was a matter requiring adjudication on evidence and could not appropriately be conclusively determined in an appeal against the ex parte decree without affording the defendant an opportunity to contest. [Paras 14–16]
Ex parte decree — Natural justice — Opportunity of contest:
In the circumstances of the case, particularly where the plaintiffs and their witnesses had not been subjected to cross-examination, the Court considered it just to restore the matter to the trial stage so that the defendant could contest the claim and invite a decision on merits. [Para 23]
Costs — Condition for remand:
The indulgence of setting aside the ex parte decree and remanding the suit was granted subject to payment of Rs.50,000/- as costs to the plaintiffs, representing the delay and circumstances attributable to the appellant. [Para 24]
Conditional order — Default in payment of costs:
The order setting aside the ex parte decree and remanding the suit was expressly made conditional upon payment of Rs.50,000/- within three weeks. In default, the appeal would stand dismissed without further reference to the Court. [Para 24]
Remand — Expeditious disposal:
Upon payment of costs, the parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 15.09.2026, and the Trial Court was directed to proceed with the evidence and dispose of the suit afresh, preferably within four months from 15.09.2026. [Para 24]
Party cooperation — Protraction of proceedings:
Both parties were directed to assist the Trial Court in completing the trial within the stipulated period. If either party failed to cooperate or attempted to protract the proceedings, the Trial Court was authorised to take the next appropriate procedural step or impose costs according to the stage and circumstances of the case. [Para 24]

Core Ratio

An appeal lies under Section 96(2) CPC against an ex parte decree. Where the defendant had entered appearance but did not adduce evidence, and the plaintiff and his witnesses were not cross-examined, the appellate Court, in the interests of justice, may set aside the ex parte decree and afford the defendant a final opportunity to contest the suit on merits, particularly where the defendant raises substantial questions concerning prior partitions, registered documents and suppression of material facts. Such relief may be granted on terms, including payment of costs and a time-bound remand. [Paras 21–24]

Final Order

A.S.No.254 of 2023 — Allowed on terms.
Ex parte judgment and decree dated 05.01.2023 in O.S.No.59 of 2015 — Set aside.
Suit remanded to the Trial Court for fresh disposal.
Appellant directed to pay Rs.50,000/- costs within three weeks.
On payment, parties to appear before the Trial Court on 15.09.2026.
Trial Court directed to dispose of the suit preferably within four months from 15.09.2026.
Failure to pay the stipulated costs within three weeks would result in the appeal standing dismissed.
Pending miscellaneous applications closed. [Para 24]

Compassionate appointment — Right stands exhausted upon acceptance of appointment: Once a dependent of a deceased employee is offered and accepts compassionate appointment and joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment stands consummated. Thereafter, the dependent cannot claim appointment to a higher post merely on the ground that he/she subsequently satisfies the qualifications for that higher post. [Para 12]

Headnotes — Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams v. Assistant/Shroff Staff & Ors.

W.A. No.609 of 2022 — D. Ramesh & Alapati Giridhar, JJ. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34623

Compassionate appointment — Right stands exhausted upon acceptance of appointment:
Once a dependent of a deceased employee is offered and accepts compassionate appointment and joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment stands consummated. Thereafter, the dependent cannot claim appointment to a higher post merely on the ground that he/she subsequently satisfies the qualifications for that higher post. [Para 12]
Compassionate appointment — No second consideration for higher post:
Compassionate appointment is intended to provide immediate relief to the family of a deceased employee. Once that relief has been granted and accepted, a subsequent claim for a higher post would amount to “endless compassion” and is impermissible. [Para 12]
Compassionate appointment — Eligibility for higher post distinct from selection/appointment:
Mere eligibility or acquisition of the qualification prescribed for a higher post does not create a right to compassionate appointment to that post. Eligibility to be appointed is distinct from the process of selection/appointment. [Para 12, referring to State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh]
Compassionate appointment — Cannot be used as a ladder for career advancement:
Compassionate appointment is an exceptional measure intended to relieve the family from financial hardship caused by the death of its earning member. It cannot subsequently be used as a mechanism for climbing to a higher post or gaining seniority merely because the employee later becomes qualified for that post. [Para 12]
Negative equality — Illegal benefit cannot be claimed as precedent:
A person cannot claim a higher post merely because a similarly situated employee was wrongly granted such benefit. An illegality committed in favour of one employee cannot be validated or perpetuated by extending the same illegality to others. [Para 12]
Article 14 — No equality in illegality:
A wrong or illegal order passed in favour of a similarly situated person does not confer a corresponding enforceable right upon another person on the ground of discrimination. Authorities cannot be compelled to perpetuate an earlier wrong. [Para 12]
Compassionate appointment — Subsequent circular cannot reopen concluded appointment:
Where employees accepted appointment as Assistant/Shroff under the circular applicable at the time of their appointment and continued in that post for several years without challenging either their appointments or the governing circular, they could not subsequently claim the benefit of a later Board Resolution or circular providing a route to appointment as Junior Assistant. [Para 8]
Service law — Applicable conditions at time of appointment:
Respondent Nos.1 to 10 had been appointed as Assistant/Shroff under the TTD Executive Officer's Circular dated 28.12.2010, which was in force when their appointments were made. Having accepted those appointments and continued without protest, they could not retrospectively invoke the subsequent Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and Circular dated 05.10.2018. [Para 8]
Compassionate appointment — Higher qualification acquired subsequently:
The fact that some employees subsequently acquired graduation or other qualifications required for Junior Assistant did not, by itself, entitle them to appointment to the higher post after they had already accepted compassionate appointment to another post. [Para 12]
TTD Board Resolution No.364 — Cannot confer retrospective entitlement:
Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and the consequential TTD Circular dated 05.10.2018 could not be invoked by persons who had already accepted compassionate appointments as Assistant/Shroff under the earlier regime. [Para 13]
Government Circular dated 12.08.2003 — Validity not adjudicated:
The Division Bench expressly declined to examine the validity of the Government Circular Memo dated 12.08.2003 or the appointments made pursuant thereto, observing that the issue had been implemented throughout the State and the present controversy could be resolved on the narrower question concerning the subsequent claim for a higher post. [Para 11]
Writ appeal — Single Judge's direction for Junior Assistant appointment set aside:
The learned Single Judge had directed appointment of the writ petitioners as Junior Assistants with consequential benefits by applying Board Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and TTD Circular dated 05.10.2018. The Division Bench set aside that order. [Paras 5 & 13]

Important governing proposition

Once compassionate appointment is accepted and the appointee joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment is exhausted. Subsequent acquisition of qualification for a higher post does not create a fresh right to compassionate appointment to that higher post; otherwise, it would result in “endless compassion.” [Para 12]

Negative equality — Particularly important

“An illegality committed by an authority cannot be validated and further perpetuated by its extension to other similarly placed persons.” Thus, even if another employee was granted appointment to a higher post in similar circumstances, that erroneous benefit cannot be demanded by others under Article 14. [Para 12]

Final Order

W.A.No.609 of 2022 — Allowed.
Order dated 26.04.2022 in W.P.No.7490 of 2019 — Set aside.
Respondent Nos.1–10 were held not entitled to any benefits under Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and Circular dated 05.10.2018.
The notices issued to Respondent Nos.13–64 were set aside.
The reversion order dated 25.12.2023 concerning Respondent No.12 was set aside.
The Division Bench expressly stated that it was not deciding the validity of Circular Memo dated 12.08.2003 or the appointments made thereunder.
No order as to costs. [Para 13]

Vernacular resolution versus translation — Material discrepancy: Where the Telugu/vernacular version of a resolution merely indicated that a Grama Sabha was conducted, while its translation conveyed that a decision had been taken to merge the Gram Panchayat into the Municipality, the discrepancy undermined reliance upon the translated resolution. [Para 23]

Headnotes — Sri Thubati Purnachandra Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

W.P. Nos.19692 of 2020 & 7523 of 2026 — Harinath N., J. — 25.08.2026
2026:APHC:34853

Merger/De-merger of Gram Panchayat — Government power subject to statutory procedure:
The Government has power to merge or de-merge a village or area into or from a Municipality, but such power is subject to the procedure established by law and compliance with the relevant Rules governing Grama Sabha meetings. [Para 24]
Grama Sabha — Mandatory two clear days' notice:
Rule 4 of the Rules relating to holding of Grama Sabha meetings requires notice of the place, date and time of the meeting to be given at least two clear days before the meeting. The prescribed modes include beat of drum in the village, affixture at three conspicuous places and affixture on the Gram Panchayat notice board. [Para 9]
Grama Sabha — Attendance register mandatory:
Rule 9 requires maintenance of an attendance register containing the signature or thumb impression of every member present. Where the holding of the Grama Sabha itself is disputed, production merely of a resolution signed by the Special Officer and Panchayat Secretary, without notices and attendance records, is insufficient to establish a valid meeting. [Para 9]
Defective Dandora — Grama Sabha proceedings invalid:
A Dandora issued on 11.01.2020 calling the Grama Sabha for 12.01.2020 did not satisfy the mandatory two-clear-days requirement under Rule 4 and therefore could not be treated as a valid Dandora. [Para 22]
Resolution — Interpolation/overwriting — Genuineness doubtful:
The Court found that copies of the resolutions allegedly passed by the Grama Sabhas of Pasumarru and Manukonduvaripalem contained apparent interpolations when compared with the colour photocopies placed before the Court. [Para 22]
Vernacular resolution versus translation — Material discrepancy:
Where the Telugu/vernacular version of a resolution merely indicated that a Grama Sabha was conducted, while its translation conveyed that a decision had been taken to merge the Gram Panchayat into the Municipality, the discrepancy undermined reliance upon the translated resolution. [Para 23]
Government action based on invalid Grama Sabha — Cannot be sustained:
The Government could not act upon resolutions which were initiated at the behest of the then MLA without the Grama Sabha actually being conducted in accordance with the governing Rules. [Para 23]
Interim order — Suspension continued:
The order dated 22.10.2020 suspended G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83. The subsequent order dated 09.03.2021, which permitted the election process to proceed subject to the outcome of the writ petition, did not vacate or unsettle that suspension. [Paras 20–21]
Gram Panchayat — Continued existence during suspension:
Since the merger Government Orders continued to remain suspended, the concerned Gram Panchayats continued to exist. The Court also noted that Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat collected taxes during 2023 and 2024. [Para 21]
Election — Subject to writ outcome:
The election of representatives from the erstwhile Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat wards was expressly subject to the outcome of W.P.No.19692 of 2020. However, the Court declined to retrospectively undo the completed tenure of those elected representatives. [Para 25]
Completed electoral tenure — Does not validate illegal merger:
The completion of the elected members' tenure could not be treated as a precedent for upholding G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83. The Court expressly held that, notwithstanding the completed tenure, it could set aside the Government Orders because they had been passed in violation of the relevant Rules and laws. [Para 25]
Merger/de-merger — Fundamental right:
The Government's consideration of merger or de-merger of an area into/from a Municipality cannot be challenged as a fundamental right where the prescribed Rules and regulations are followed and public interest is kept in view. Individual rights cannot override the broader public interest in the area. [Para 24]
De-merger — Subsequent procedure upheld:
Once G.O.Ms.Nos.83 and 260 were set aside, the procedure adopted by the respondents for de-notification and de-merger of the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted. The resolutions subsequently passed by the Grama Sabhas and Municipal Council were not interfered with. [Para 27]

Core Ratio

The power of the Government to merge or de-merge a village into or from a Municipality is not absolute. It must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statutory procedure and the Rules governing Grama Sabha meetings. Where the foundational Grama Sabha proceedings are vitiated by violation of mandatory notice requirements, absence of attendance records, interpolation in resolutions, or material discrepancies between vernacular resolutions and translations, the Government cannot lawfully act upon such resolutions. [Paras 22–24]

Final Order

W.P.No.19692 of 2020 — Allowed.
G.O.Ms.No.83 dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside.
G.O.Ms.No.260 dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside.
W.P.No.7523 of 2026 — Dismissed.
The Court held that the subsequent procedure for de-notification/de-merger of the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted.
No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications stood closed. [Paras 26–28]

Bail — Investigation at nascent stage — Nature of injuries not yet ascertained: Where the de-facto complainant alleged that Accused Nos.1 and 2 attacked him with a sickle and caused grievous injuries, and the wound certificate had not yet been received to ascertain the nature of the injuries, the High Court declined to grant bail at that stage, particularly when the investigation was still pending. [Para 7]

Headnotes — Gounipalli Adi Narayana & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Crl.P. Nos. 7332 & 7333 of 2026 — Dr. Y. Lakshmana Rao, J. — 25.08.2026
2026:APHC:34861

Bail — Investigation at nascent stage — Nature of injuries not yet ascertained:
Where the de-facto complainant alleged that Accused Nos.1 and 2 attacked him with a sickle and caused grievous injuries, and the wound certificate had not yet been received to ascertain the nature of the injuries, the High Court declined to grant bail at that stage, particularly when the investigation was still pending. [Para 7]
Bail — Serious allegation of assault — Pending investigation:
The pendency of investigation, coupled with the allegation of an attack with a sickle causing grievous injuries and the absence of the wound certificate, was considered sufficient to decline bail to Accused Nos.1 and 2. [Para 7]
Pre-arrest bail — Accused No.3 — Distinct consideration:
Though bail was declined to Accused Nos.1 and 2, the Court considered the nature of the allegations against Accused No.3 separately and, having regard to the facts and circumstances, found it appropriate to grant her pre-arrest bail subject to stringent conditions. [Para 8]
Anticipatory bail — Conditions:
Grant of pre-arrest bail was made conditional upon execution of a bond of Rs.10,000/- with two sureties each for the like sum, to the satisfaction of the arresting police officials. [Para 9(i)]
Anticipatory bail — Cooperation with investigation:
The beneficiary of pre-arrest bail must make herself available for investigation whenever required by the Investigating Officer. [Para 9(ii)]
Anticipatory bail — Periodic appearance before police:
Accused No.3 was directed to appear before the concerned Station House Officer every Saturday between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., once a week, until filing of the charge-sheet. [Para 9(iii)]
Anticipatory bail — Restriction on travel:
Accused No.3 was prohibited from leaving the territorial limits of Andhra Pradesh without the express permission of the concerned Station House Officer. [Para 9(iv)]
Anticipatory bail — Protection of witnesses/investigation:
Accused No.3 was restrained from directly or indirectly making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade such person from disclosing those facts to the Court. [Para 9(v)]
Anticipatory bail — Passport surrender:
Accused No.3 was directed to surrender her passport, if any, to the Investigating Officer. If she claimed that she had no passport, she was required to submit an affidavit to that effect. [Para 9(vi)]

Core ratio

Where the nature of injuries alleged to have been caused in an assault is yet to be ascertained because the wound certificate is pending, and investigation is still underway, the Court may decline regular bail at that stage. However, the entitlement to pre-arrest bail of a co-accused must be independently considered having regard to the nature of the allegations against that accused, and anticipatory bail may be granted subject to stringent conditions. [Paras 7–9]

Final Order

Crl.P.No.7332 of 2026 — Dismissed insofar as Accused Nos.1 and 2 are concerned.
Crl.P.No.7333 of 2026 — Allowed and Accused No.3 granted pre-arrest bail subject to the six conditions stipulated by the Court.
The order does not lay down a general proposition that pendency of investigation alone bars bail; the decision turned on the pending wound certificate, allegation of grievous injury by use of a sickle, and the stage of investigation. [Para 7]

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Gram Panchayat — Merger into Municipality — Statut...### Headnotes — Sri Thubati Purnachandra Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. W.P. Nos.19692 of 2020 & 7523 of 2026 — Harinath N., J. — 25.08.2026 2026:APHC:34854 1. Gram Panchayat — Merger into Municipality — Statutory procedure mandatory: Though the Government possesses power to merge or de-merge a village or area into/from a Municipality, such power is subject to compliance with the procedure established by law and conduct of the requisite Grama Sabha meetings in accordance with the governing Rules. [Para 24] 2. Grama Sabha — Mandatory notice — Rule 4: Under Rule 4 of the Rules relating to holding of Grama Sabha meetings, at least two clear days' notice of the place, date and time of the meeting is mandatory. Notice is required by beat of drum in the village, affixture at three conspicuous places and affixture on the notice board of the Gram Panchayat office. [Para 9, relying on W.P.No.1198 of 2020] 3. Grama Sabha — Attendance register — Rule 9: Rule 9 requires maintenance of an attendance register containing the signatures or thumb impressions of all members present at the Grama Sabha. Compliance with Rule 9 assumes that the Grama Sabha itself was conducted in accordance with the prescribed Rules. [Para 9] 4. Grama Sabha — Mere resolution insufficient: Where the holding of a Grama Sabha is specifically disputed, production of a resolution signed by the Special Officer and Panchayat Secretary, without supporting material such as notices and attendance register, is insufficient to establish that the meeting was validly conducted. [Para 9] 5. Mandatory notice — Defective Dandora invalidates Grama Sabha: A Dandora issued on 11.01.2020 calling a Grama Sabha on 12.01.2020 did not satisfy the mandatory requirement of two clear days' notice under Rule 4. Consequently, it could not be treated as a valid Dandora. [Para 22] 6. Interpolated resolutions — Evidentiary defect: Where copies of resolutions allegedly passed by Grama Sabhas contain apparent interpolations when compared with contemporaneous colour photocopies, such discrepancies materially undermine their authenticity. [Para 22] 7. Translation of vernacular resolutions — Material discrepancy: Where the vernacular version of a Grama Sabha resolution does not support the meaning attributed to it in the translated version, and there is no satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy, the Government cannot safely rely upon such resolution for taking consequential administrative action. [Paras 7, 23] 8. Government Orders — Merger based on non-compliant Grama Sabha — Invalid: Government Orders effecting merger of Gram Panchayats into a Municipality cannot be sustained where the underlying Grama Sabha proceedings were conducted in violation of the mandatory Rules. The Government could not act upon resolutions initiated at the behest of the then MLA without validly conducting the Grama Sabha. [Para 23] 9. Interim order — Suspension of Government Orders — Effect: The interim order dated 22.10.2020 had suspended the operation of G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83 dated 28.01.2020. The subsequent order dated 09.03.2021, while permitting the election process to proceed subject to the result of the writ petition, did not unsettle the suspension of those Government Orders. [Paras 20–21] 10. Gram Panchayat — Continued existence during suspension of merger G.Os.: Since the merger Government Orders remained under suspension, the concerned Gram Panchayats continued to exist. The Court also noted that Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat had collected taxes in 2023 and 2024. [Para 21] 11. Election — Subject to outcome of writ petition: The elected representatives of the erstwhile Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat wards had been elected subject to the outcome of W.P.No.19692 of 2020. The Court declined to undo their completed tenure merely because the merger Government Orders were ultimately set aside. [Para 25] 12. Government's power of merger/de-merger — Not a fundamental right issue: The power of the Government to merge or de-merge a village or area into/from a Municipality is not, by itself, challengeable as a fundamental right. However, the exercise of that power must comply with the prevailing Rules and regulations and take public interest into consideration. [Para 24] 13. Public interest versus individual rights: In matters concerning merger or de-merger of local areas, individual rights cannot prevail over the broader public interest where the statutory procedure has been duly followed. [Para 24] 14. De-merger proceedings — Valid after setting aside merger G.Os.: Once G.O.Ms.Nos.83 and 260 were set aside for violation of the governing Rules and laws, the consequential procedure adopted by the respondents for de-notifying and de-merging the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted. [Para 27] ### Core ratio > The Government has power to merge or de-merge villages into or from a Municipality, but that power must be exercised in accordance with the statutory procedure and mandatory Grama Sabha Rules. Where the foundational Grama Sabha proceedings suffer from violation of mandatory notice requirements, absence of supporting attendance records, interpolation in resolutions, or material discrepancies between vernacular resolutions and their translations, the Government cannot lawfully act upon such resolutions. [Paras 22–24] ### Final Order * W.P.No.19692 of 2020 — Allowed. * G.O.Ms.No.83, Municipal Administration & Urban Development (G) Department, dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside. * G.O.Ms.No.260, PR & RD (E&R) Department, dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside. * W.P.No.7523 of 2026 — Dismissed. * The Court held that, consequent upon allowing W.P.No.19692 of 2020, the procedure adopted for de-notification/de-merger of the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted. * No order as to costs. [Paras 26–28] Particularly important proposition: A completed election does not validate an otherwise illegal merger Government Order. The elected representatives' tenure was not retrospectively undone, but the Court expressly retained the power to set aside G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83 because they were passed in violation of the relevant Rules and laws. [Para 25]

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Gram Panchayat — Merger into Municipality — Statut...: advocatemmmohan Headnotes — Sri Thubati Purnachandra Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. W.P. Nos.19692 of 2020 & 7523 ...

Headnotes — Sri Thubati Purnachandra Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

W.P. Nos.19692 of 2020 & 7523 of 2026 — Harinath N., J. — 25.08.2026
2026:APHC:34854

Gram Panchayat — Merger into Municipality — Statutory procedure mandatory:
Though the Government possesses power to merge or de-merge a village or area into/from a Municipality, such power is subject to compliance with the procedure established by law and conduct of the requisite Grama Sabha meetings in accordance with the governing Rules. [Para 24]
Grama Sabha — Mandatory notice — Rule 4:
Under Rule 4 of the Rules relating to holding of Grama Sabha meetings, at least two clear days' notice of the place, date and time of the meeting is mandatory. Notice is required by beat of drum in the village, affixture at three conspicuous places and affixture on the notice board of the Gram Panchayat office. [Para 9, relying on W.P.No.1198 of 2020]
Grama Sabha — Attendance register — Rule 9:
Rule 9 requires maintenance of an attendance register containing the signatures or thumb impressions of all members present at the Grama Sabha. Compliance with Rule 9 assumes that the Grama Sabha itself was conducted in accordance with the prescribed Rules. [Para 9]
Grama Sabha — Mere resolution insufficient:
Where the holding of a Grama Sabha is specifically disputed, production of a resolution signed by the Special Officer and Panchayat Secretary, without supporting material such as notices and attendance register, is insufficient to establish that the meeting was validly conducted. [Para 9]
Mandatory notice — Defective Dandora invalidates Grama Sabha:
A Dandora issued on 11.01.2020 calling a Grama Sabha on 12.01.2020 did not satisfy the mandatory requirement of two clear days' notice under Rule 4. Consequently, it could not be treated as a valid Dandora. [Para 22]
Interpolated resolutions — Evidentiary defect:
Where copies of resolutions allegedly passed by Grama Sabhas contain apparent interpolations when compared with contemporaneous colour photocopies, such discrepancies materially undermine their authenticity. [Para 22]
Translation of vernacular resolutions — Material discrepancy:
Where the vernacular version of a Grama Sabha resolution does not support the meaning attributed to it in the translated version, and there is no satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy, the Government cannot safely rely upon such resolution for taking consequential administrative action. [Paras 7, 23]
Government Orders — Merger based on non-compliant Grama Sabha — Invalid:
Government Orders effecting merger of Gram Panchayats into a Municipality cannot be sustained where the underlying Grama Sabha proceedings were conducted in violation of the mandatory Rules. The Government could not act upon resolutions initiated at the behest of the then MLA without validly conducting the Grama Sabha. [Para 23]
Interim order — Suspension of Government Orders — Effect:
The interim order dated 22.10.2020 had suspended the operation of G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83 dated 28.01.2020. The subsequent order dated 09.03.2021, while permitting the election process to proceed subject to the result of the writ petition, did not unsettle the suspension of those Government Orders. [Paras 20–21]
Gram Panchayat — Continued existence during suspension of merger G.Os.:
Since the merger Government Orders remained under suspension, the concerned Gram Panchayats continued to exist. The Court also noted that Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat had collected taxes in 2023 and 2024. [Para 21]
Election — Subject to outcome of writ petition:
The elected representatives of the erstwhile Ganapavaram Gram Panchayat wards had been elected subject to the outcome of W.P.No.19692 of 2020. The Court declined to undo their completed tenure merely because the merger Government Orders were ultimately set aside. [Para 25]
Government's power of merger/de-merger — Not a fundamental right issue:
The power of the Government to merge or de-merge a village or area into/from a Municipality is not, by itself, challengeable as a fundamental right. However, the exercise of that power must comply with the prevailing Rules and regulations and take public interest into consideration. [Para 24]
Public interest versus individual rights:
In matters concerning merger or de-merger of local areas, individual rights cannot prevail over the broader public interest where the statutory procedure has been duly followed. [Para 24]
De-merger proceedings — Valid after setting aside merger G.Os.:
Once G.O.Ms.Nos.83 and 260 were set aside for violation of the governing Rules and laws, the consequential procedure adopted by the respondents for de-notifying and de-merging the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted. [Para 27]

Core ratio

The Government has power to merge or de-merge villages into or from a Municipality, but that power must be exercised in accordance with the statutory procedure and mandatory Grama Sabha Rules. Where the foundational Grama Sabha proceedings suffer from violation of mandatory notice requirements, absence of supporting attendance records, interpolation in resolutions, or material discrepancies between vernacular resolutions and their translations, the Government cannot lawfully act upon such resolutions. [Paras 22–24]

Final Order

W.P.No.19692 of 2020 — Allowed.
G.O.Ms.No.83, Municipal Administration & Urban Development (G) Department, dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside.
G.O.Ms.No.260, PR & RD (E&R) Department, dated 28.01.2020 — Set aside.
W.P.No.7523 of 2026 — Dismissed.
The Court held that, consequent upon allowing W.P.No.19692 of 2020, the procedure adopted for de-notification/de-merger of the three Gram Panchayats could not be faulted.
No order as to costs. [Paras 26–28]

Particularly important proposition: A completed election does not validate an otherwise illegal merger Government Order. The elected representatives' tenure was not retrospectively undone, but the Court expressly retained the power to set aside G.O.Ms.Nos.260 and 83 because they were passed in violation of the relevant Rules and laws. [Para 25]

Rent Control — Eviction — Bona fide requirement — Co-owner/co-landlord — Entitlement to maintain eviction proceedings — Paras 36–46 In an eviction proceeding under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the landlord must plead and prove the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory ground on which eviction is sought. A co-owner who is entitled to receive rent falls within the statutory definition of “landlord” under Section 5(3) of the Act. Paras 36–46. 2. Pleadings — Order VI Rules 1 and 2 CPC — Material facts and evidence — Distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia — Paras 26–34 Pleadings must contain the material facts constituting the cause of action or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be established. The Court distinguished: Facta probanda — material facts which must be pleaded and proved; and Facta probantia — facts or material by which the pleaded facts are proved, which need not themselves be pleaded. A defect in pleading cannot ordinarily be cured by evidence; equally, evidence which merely proves a sufficiently pleaded material fact need not have been expressly incorporated in the pleading. Paras 26–34.

2026 INSC 496

Marietta D’ Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda & Ors.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.31012 of 2025
Supreme Court of India — 15.05.2026
Coram: Manoj Misra and Manmohan, JJ.
Reportable

HEAD NOTES

1. Rent Control — Eviction — Bona fide requirement — Co-owner/co-landlord — Entitlement to maintain eviction proceedings — Paras 36–46

In an eviction proceeding under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the landlord must plead and prove the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory ground on which eviction is sought. A co-owner who is entitled to receive rent falls within the statutory definition of “landlord” under Section 5(3) of the Act. Paras 36–46.

2. Pleadings — Order VI Rules 1 and 2 CPC — Material facts and evidence — Distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia — Paras 26–34

Pleadings must contain the material facts constituting the cause of action or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be established.

The Court distinguished:

Facta probanda — material facts which must be pleaded and proved; and
Facta probantia — facts or material by which the pleaded facts are proved, which need not themselves be pleaded.

A defect in pleading cannot ordinarily be cured by evidence; equally, evidence which merely proves a sufficiently pleaded material fact need not have been expressly incorporated in the pleading. Paras 26–34.

3. Pleading and proof — Substance rather than technical form — Parties proceeding to trial with knowledge of the case — Paras 40–41

Where the substance of the pleadings sufficiently discloses the case, and the parties understood the issue, went to trial on that basis and produced evidence, a party cannot ordinarily raise the alleged deficiency in pleadings for the first time in appeal.

The Court relied upon Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College and Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal. Paras 40–41.

4. Co-ownership — Share certificate relating to land — Building attached to land — Interest extends to building — Paras 42–46

Under Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, an interest in land ordinarily carries with it the legal incidents attached to the land, including things attached to the earth such as buildings, unless a contrary intention appears.

Since the appellant's name appeared in the share certificates relating to the land and the building was constructed by her father, the Court held that she had established an interest in the land and was a co-owner of the suit building. Paras 42–44.

5. Co-owner as landlord — Section 5(3), Bombay Rent Act — Para 46

The statutory definition of “landlord” includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent.

The appellant, being a co-owner of the building and having also deposed that she received rent on behalf of her mother, fell within the statutory definition.

Therefore, she was a co-landlord at the time of institution of the eviction suit. Para 46.

6. Subsequent events — Bona fide requirement — Court may take cautious cognisance — Paras 47–48

Although the right to relief is ordinarily determined with reference to the date of institution of proceedings, courts may take cautious cognisance of subsequent events where such events are necessary to make the relief effective and consistent with prevailing factual circumstances, provided fairness to both sides is maintained.

Paras 47–48.

7. Oral family arrangement — Validity — Can be relied upon even without registered document or decree of partition — Paras 49–50

A family arrangement may be entered into through an unregistered oral agreement and can be recognised and enforced by courts under the principles of family settlement.

Technical considerations should give way to preservation of family peace and harmony.

Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to rely upon the oral family arrangement/settlement as a subsequent development, even though there was no formal decree of partition among the siblings. Paras 49–50.

8. Bona fide requirement — Temporary occupation of another premises does not necessarily defeat genuine need — Paras 51–53

The appellant's temporary occupation of Flats 5 and 6 during the pendency of the eviction proceedings did not destroy her bona fide requirement.

The Court considered the size and composition of the family, the occupation of the available flats by other family members, the appellant's children's education and the circumstances concerning her husband's postings.

A tenant cannot dictate to the landlord which premises should be used or insist that the landlord utilise another property where the landlord establishes a genuine requirement for the tenanted premises. Paras 51–53.

9. Comparative hardship — Alternative accommodation — Section 13(1)(l) — Paras 54–60

Where the tenants had suitable alternative accommodation available to them, while the landlord continued to lack suitable accommodation for herself and her family, the comparative hardship test favoured the landlord.

The Court examined the actual accommodation available to the tenants and their family circumstances, rather than merely considering formal ownership. Paras 54–60.

I. FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Lease and construction of the suit building — Para 3

A 99-year lease of land was granted by St. Anthony's Homes Cooperative Society Ltd. in favour of the parents of Appellant-Plaintiff No.1.

The appellant's parents constructed the Memorare Building, situated at 16th Road, Chembur, Bombay, consisting of six flats, numbered 1 to 6.

Five share certificates dated 06.06.1959 were issued by the cooperative society in favour of the appellant's parents. Para 3.

2. Tenancy of Flat No.2 — Para 4

A sub-tenancy agreement dated 06.06.1962 was executed in respect of Flat No.2 in favour of Augustine Lacerda.

Upon his death on 07.12.1969, the sub-tenancy devolved upon his widow, Virginia Lacerda. Para 4.

3. Transfer of share certificates — Para 5

On 05.07.1987, the five share certificates were transferred into the joint names of the appellant, her sister and other family members.

The appellant consequently claimed co-ownership in the building. Para 5.

4. Eviction proceedings — Para 6

Approximately three months after Virginia Lacerda's death, an eviction suit was instituted in July 1993 by the appellant and Respondent No.2 against her legal heirs.

The eviction claim was founded on:

Section 13(1)(g) — bona fide requirement;
Section 13(2) — greater hardship;
Section 13(1)(l) — acquisition of alternative accommodation; and
Section 13(1)(k) — change of user.

Para 6.

II. APPELLANT'S BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT

5. Family circumstances — Paras 7–8

At the time of filing the suit, Flats 5 and 6 were the only flats available to the landlord family and were occupied by the appellant's parents.

The appellant's father died on 24.02.1994, after institution of the suit.

The appellant's case was that there was an oral family arrangement under which:

all six flats continued to be jointly owned;
Flats 5 and 6 were earmarked for the exclusive use of two brothers; and
Flat No.2, the suit premises, was intended for the appellant's exclusive use after eviction of the tenants.

Para 7.

During the pendency of the suit, the appellant shifted to Mumbai and temporarily resided with her mother in Flats 5 and 6 because she had no other accommodation in Mumbai. Para 8.

III. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

6. Bona fide requirement established — Para 9

The Small Causes Court decreed the eviction suit on 14.09.2007.

It found that:

the appellant had established bona fide requirement;
suitable alternative accommodation was available to the tenants;
comparative hardship favoured the appellant.

The claim of Plaintiff No.2 was rejected because she was residing in Goa.

The ground of change of user was rejected. Para 9.

The Trial Court particularly relied upon admissions regarding the tenants' alternative flats and the sale of one such property during the pendency of the suit.

IV. APPELLATE HISTORY

7. First appeal

The tenants challenged the decree before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court.

The appeal was dismissed on 25.07.2017. Para 10.

8. Bombay High Court

Respondent No.1 thereafter instituted a Civil Revision Application before the Bombay High Court.

By judgment dated 23.06.2025, the High Court interfered with the concurrent findings of the courts below, set them aside and directed restoration of possession to Respondent No.1.

Para 11.

The appellant therefore approached the Supreme Court. Para 12.

V. CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents' central objection was that the appellant had not adequately pleaded her status as landlord.

They argued that:

the plaint did not specifically explain how the appellant became landlord;
the relationship of landlord and tenant had been denied;
the appellant subsequently attempted to establish her status through evidence;
the alleged family arrangement was not pleaded;
the share certificates did not establish ownership of individual flats;
subsequent events could not retrospectively establish her locus; and
her occupation of Flats 5 and 6 defeated her plea of bona fide requirement.

Paras 19–24.

The respondents relied particularly upon Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, contending that evidence cannot establish an unpleaded case. Para 21.

VI. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court identified substantial questions of law concerning:

(1) What constitutes a pleading?

(2) What is the distinction between pleading and proof?

(3) Whether the requirements of pleading and proof were satisfied in the present case?

Para 25.

VII. LAW ON PLEADINGS

1. Meaning of pleading — Paras 26–31

A pleading is the formal document in which a party sets out the allegations, claims, denials or defences relied upon.

Under Order VI Rule 1 CPC, pleading means:

plaint; or
written statement.

Order VI Rule 2 requires pleadings to contain:

facts and not law;
all material facts and only material facts;
facts relied upon, not evidence by which they are proved; and
facts stated concisely, precisely and clearly.

Paras 26–31.

VIII. PLEADING ≠ PROOF

2. Facta probanda and facta probantia — Paras 32–34

The judgment makes an important doctrinal distinction.

Facta probanda

These are the material facts which must be pleaded.

Facta probantia

These are the facts, documents and other evidentiary material through which the material facts are proved.

The latter need not ordinarily be set out in the pleading.

Therefore:

The pleading must disclose the material fact; the evidence establishes that fact.

Para 32.

The Court nevertheless reiterated that evidence cannot be led on a plea completely absent from the pleadings, and no amount of evidence ordinarily cures a fundamental defect in pleadings. Para 33.

IX. APPLICATION OF THE PLEADING PRINCIPLE TO THIS CASE

3. The plaint was sufficient — Paras 35–40

The Supreme Court held that the nature and extent of pleading required depends upon the nature of the proceeding.

In an eviction suit, the landlord must plead and prove:

landlord-tenant relationship; and
statutory ground for eviction.

Para 36.

The appellant's plaint specifically asserted that she and Plaintiff No.2, together with Defendants 4–8, were the landlords of the building and sought possession on statutory grounds including bona fide requirement, comparative hardship and alternative accommodation.

Therefore, the material facts constituting the cause of action were present in the plaint.

Paras 37–39.

The detailed evidence concerning:

family circumstances;
share certificates;
family arrangement; and
actual accommodation

was evidence supporting those pleaded material facts.

It was not necessary that every piece of evidence be reproduced in the plaint.

Para 40.

X. DEFICIENCY IN PLEADING CANNOT BE RAISED TECHNICALLY AFTER TRIAL

The Court relied upon Ram Sarup Gupta and Bachhaj Nahar.

The relevant principle is that the Court must examine substance rather than merely form.

Where:

the parties understood the case;
the relevant issues were framed;
both sides went to trial on those issues; and
evidence was adduced,

a party cannot ordinarily resurrect a technical objection regarding lack of pleading for the first time in appeal.

Para 41.

XI. SHARE CERTIFICATES — LAND AND BUILDING

4. Section 8, Transfer of Property Act — Paras 42–44

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the share certificates related merely to land and not to the building.

Section 8 TPA provides that transfer of property carries all interests which the transferor is capable of passing and, in the case of land, includes things attached to the earth.

A building is a thing attached to the earth.

The building was admittedly constructed by the appellant's father.

The appellant's name appeared in the share certificates after their transfer in 1987, and this evidence remained unchallenged in cross-examination.

Therefore, the Court held:

The appellant had proved her interest in the land and her co-ownership of the suit building.

Paras 42–44.

XII. APPELLANT WAS A CO-LANDLORD WHEN SUIT WAS FILED

5. Section 5(3), Bombay Rent Act — Para 46

Section 5(3) defines “landlord” as a person who is receiving, or is entitled to receive, rent.

The appellant was:

a co-owner;
a holder of the relevant share certificates; and
a person who had deposed that she received rent on behalf of her mother.

Consequently, she satisfied the statutory definition.

The Court therefore held:

The appellant was a co-landlord as well as co-owner at the time of filing the eviction suit.

Para 46.

XIII. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

6. Subsequent developments can be considered — Paras 47–48

The High Court had attached importance to developments occurring after institution of the suit.

The Supreme Court clarified the law.

Ordinarily, rights are tested as on the date of institution.

But subsequent developments may be considered where necessary to ensure that the relief remains:

just;
meaningful;
legally appropriate; and
factually consistent with current realities.

This must be done while preserving procedural fairness to both sides.

Paras 47–48.

XIV. ORAL FAMILY ARRANGEMENT

7. No formal partition necessary — Paras 49–50

The Supreme Court recognised that a family arrangement can be entered into orally.

It relied upon Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Hari Shankar Singhania v. Gaur Hari Singhania.

The purpose of family arrangements is to preserve peace and harmony, and technical considerations should not defeat genuine family settlements.

Therefore, the appellant could rely upon the oral family arrangement even though there was no formal partition decree.

Paras 49–50.

XV. BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT

8. Appellant established genuine requirement — Paras 51–53

The appellant established that:

she had no independent accommodation in Mumbai;
her husband had been posted at different places;
her children were studying;
Flats 5 and 6 were occupied by the family;
the available accommodation was insufficient for the entire family;
her brothers had rights/use over those flats under the family arrangement; and
the appellant's occupation of those flats was temporary.

The Court held that her temporary occupation of Flats 5 and 6 did not extinguish her bona fide need for the suit premises.

Para 53.

The Court also reaffirmed:

A tenant cannot dictate to the landlord how the landlord should arrange or utilise his/her accommodation.

Para 52.

XVI. COMPARATIVE HARDSHIP AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION

9. Tenants had alternative accommodation — Paras 54–57

At the time of institution, the landlord family had only Flats 5 and 6 available.

The remaining flats were occupied by tenants.

The Court found that the original defendants had alternative accommodation:

Defendant No.1 owned Flat F-129;
Defendant No.2 owned Flat D-82;
Defendant No.3 occupied another flat.

Defendant No.2 subsequently sold D-82 during the pendency of the litigation for ₹12 lakhs and another flat was acquired.

The Court considered this conduct significant because it indicated that the sale was intended to avoid the consequences of the eviction proceeding.

Paras 54–57.

XVII. PRESENT POSITION OF RESPONDENT NO.1

The Court also considered subsequent circumstances.

Respondent No.1:

resided and worked in Pune;
owned property there;
his wife resided in Norway; and
had no demonstrated genuine requirement for the Chembur premises.

His contention that he might seek a better job in Mumbai if affordable accommodation became available was not accepted.

Paras 58–59.

XVIII. FINAL CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant's hardship was greater.

She remained without suitable accommodation in Mumbai, whereas the respondents had alternative accommodation and the present respondent had no established genuine requirement for the Chembur premises.

The Court therefore held:

The appellant had proved her bona fide requirement and greater hardship would result to her if eviction were refused.

Para 60.

FINAL ORDER

Para 61

The appeal was allowed.

The Supreme Court:

set aside the Bombay High Court judgment dated 23.06.2025 in Civil Revision Application No.308 of 2019; and
restored the judgment and decree dated 14.09.2007 of the Small Causes Court in Rent and Eviction Suit No.411/861 of 1996.

Para 61.

Pending applications were disposed of. Para 62.

CORE RATIO — IN PRECISE FORM

The judgment is important for four connected propositions:

I. Pleading

A party must plead the material facts constituting the cause of action, but need not plead the evidence by which those facts will be proved.

II. Proof

Once the material facts are pleaded, evidence may establish those facts. Facta probanda must be pleaded; facta probantia need not be.

III. Co-owner = Landlord

A co-owner who is entitled to receive rent falls within the statutory definition of landlord under Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act and can maintain an eviction proceeding.

IV. Bona fide requirement

Temporary occupation of another family premises does not, by itself, defeat bona fide requirement. The Court may consider the actual family arrangement, subsequent developments, available accommodation and comparative hardship to determine whether eviction should be granted.

The decisive point in this case was therefore not merely the existence of a family arrangement. It was the combination of adequate pleading, proof of co-ownership/co-landlordship, established bona fide requirement, availability of alternative accommodation to the tenants, and greater hardship to the landlord.

Motor Vehicles Act — Compensation — Permanently paralysed five-year-old child — Further enhancement — Paras 2–9 A five-year-old child sustained grievous spinal injuries in a motor accident caused by rash and negligent driving and was rendered permanently paralysed. The Tribunal awarded ₹14,84,233/-, which was enhanced by ₹6,00,000/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court further enhanced the compensation to ₹87,15,137/-, applying the principles laid down in Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon. Paras 2–9. 2. Permanent disability of child — Functional disability — Disability certificate showing 80% — Lifetime paralysis — Disability assessed at 100% — Para 5 Although the medical certificates reflected 80% disability, the examining doctor categorically stated that the disability would continue throughout the lifetime of the child. Considering the permanent nature and consequences of the paralysis, the Supreme Court held that the child's disability had to be taken as 100% for purposes of compensation. Para 5.

2026 INSC 676

Ku. Chetna Sharma v. Pawan Sharma & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 8809 of 2026
Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated 08.07.2026
Coram: N. Kotiswar Singh and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

HEAD NOTES

1. Motor Vehicles Act — Compensation — Permanently paralysed five-year-old child — Further enhancement — Paras 2–9

A five-year-old child sustained grievous spinal injuries in a motor accident caused by rash and negligent driving and was rendered permanently paralysed. The Tribunal awarded ₹14,84,233/-, which was enhanced by ₹6,00,000/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court further enhanced the compensation to ₹87,15,137/-, applying the principles laid down in Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon. Paras 2–9.

2. Permanent disability of child — Functional disability — Disability certificate showing 80% — Lifetime paralysis — Disability assessed at 100% — Para 5

Although the medical certificates reflected 80% disability, the examining doctor categorically stated that the disability would continue throughout the lifetime of the child.

Considering the permanent nature and consequences of the paralysis, the Supreme Court held that the child's disability had to be taken as 100% for purposes of compensation. Para 5.

3. Notional earning capacity — Minimum wages of skilled labourer — Future prospects — Multiplier of 18 — Para 5

For determining loss of earning capacity of the five-year-old child, the Court adopted the minimum wages applicable to a skilled labourer in 2018, amounting to ₹9,560/- per month.

The Court:

added 40% towards future prospects; and
applied a multiplier of 18.

The resulting compensation for loss of earning capacity was ₹28,90,944/-. Para 5 and Para 8.

4. Paraplegic/paralysed child — Skilled attendant required — Attendant expenses based on skilled minimum wages — Paras 4, 7–8

A permanently paralysed child cannot reasonably be treated as requiring ordinary attendant assistance. The Court held that a skilled attendant would be necessary to care for the child and meet her continuing needs.

Accordingly, attendant expenses were calculated on the basis of skilled minimum wages:

₹9,560 × 12 × 18 = ₹20,64,960/-.

Paras 4, 7–8.

5. Future medical and care expenses — Recurring expenditure — Incontinence — Diapers and catheter — Para 7

The Court recognised that permanent paralysis creates a continuing financial burden upon the parents/caregivers.

The child suffered from incontinence and would require recurring expenditure towards:

diapers;
occasional catheter use;
physiotherapy; and
continuing care.

Although ₹10,000/- per month was claimed, the Court considered ₹5,000/- per month reasonable and capitalised it using the multiplier of 18.

The amount awarded under this head was ₹10,80,000/-. Para 7.

6. Pain and suffering — Serious lifelong consequences of childhood paralysis — Para 8

The Court awarded ₹15,00,000/- towards pain and suffering, having regard to the grave and permanent consequences of the injuries sustained by a five-year-old child.

Para 8.

7. Loss of marriage prospects — Permanent disability from childhood — Para 8

The Court awarded ₹5,00,000/- towards loss of marriage prospects, recognising the long-term consequences of permanent paralysis suffered from childhood. Para 8.

8. Discomfort and inconvenience — Included within pain and suffering — Para 6

The Tribunal had awarded ₹25,000/- towards discomfort and inconvenience.

The Supreme Court held that this amount was already covered by the compensation awarded under pain and suffering and consequently deleted the separate amount of ₹25,000/- under that head. Para 6.

9. Medical expenditure — 58 days' hospitalisation — Incidental expenses — Paras 3 and 8

The Court retained ₹5,54,233/- towards medical expenditure and awarded ₹25,000/- towards incidental expenses during the 58 days of hospitalisation. Para 8.

10. Transportation and special diet — Para 8

The Court awarded ₹1,00,000/- towards transportation and special diet. Para 8.

I. FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Accident involving a five-year-old child — Para 2

On 23.06.2018, the five-year-old appellant was travelling with her mother and grandmother when the vehicle met with an accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of a car.

The child suffered grievous spinal injuries and was rendered permanently paralysed. Para 2.

2. Award by Tribunal

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded:

₹14,84,233/-

as compensation.

The claimant appealed to the High Court seeking enhancement.

The High Court enhanced the award by a further:

₹6,00,000/-

The child thereafter approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement. Para 2.

II. BASIS OF THE APPEAL BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

The appellant relied principally upon:

Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon & Anr.

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3692

That case concerned a seven-year-old child who had been paralysed in a motor accident.

The appellant contended that the principles used in that case should be applied to the present case, with suitable enhancement because the accident here occurred in 2018, whereas the accident in Baby Sakshi Greola occurred in 2009.

Para 3–4.

III. PRINCIPLE ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court expressly found that Baby Sakshi Greola applied squarely to the present case.

However, the Court considered it appropriate to make a reasonable upward adjustment because of the increase in the cost of living between 2009 and 2018.

Para 4.

This is important because the Court did not mechanically reproduce the earlier award. It used the earlier decision as the governing framework and adjusted the figures to the circumstances of the present accident.

IV. EVIDENCE AND MEDICAL BASIS

The medical material consisted principally of:

disability certificates; and
the deposition of the examining doctor.

The certificates showed 80% disability.

However, the doctor categorically stated that the disability would remain for the lifetime of the child.

The Supreme Court therefore looked beyond the numerical percentage appearing in the certificate and considered the actual functional and lifelong consequence of the spinal injury.

The result was an assessment of:

100% disability for compensation purposes.

Para 5.

V. COMPUTATION OF LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY

The Court adopted:

Minimum wages of skilled labourer in 2018 = ₹9,560/- per month

Then:

₹9,560 × 140% × 12 × 18

This resulted in:

₹28,90,944/-

towards loss of earning capacity.

The 140% figure represents:

100% of the base income; plus
40% towards future prospects.

Para 5 and Item 1 of Para 8.

VI. ATTENDANT EXPENSES

The Court recognised a significant distinction between an ordinary injured person and a permanently paralysed child.

A child in such condition would require continuing and specialised assistance.

Therefore, attendant charges were not assessed on an ordinary or nominal basis.

The Court treated the appropriate attendant as a skilled attendant and adopted the same skilled minimum wage:

₹9,560 × 12 × 18

₹20,64,960/-

was awarded towards attendant expenses.

Paras 4 and 8.

VII. FUTURE CARE — PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE

This is another significant aspect of the judgment.

The appellant specifically pleaded that the child would incur continuing expenditure because of her permanent condition and incontinence.

The claim included expenses towards:

physiotherapy;
diapers; and
occasional catheter use.

The Court accepted the underlying principle that such expenses would continue throughout the child's life.

Although the claim was:

₹10,000/- per month,

the Court considered:

₹5,000/- per month

to be appropriate.

Applying the multiplier of 18:

₹5,000 × 12 × 18 = ₹10,80,000/-

was awarded towards future care.

Para 7.

VIII. HEAD-WISE COMPUTATION

Sl. No.	Head of Compensation	Computation / Basis	Amount
1	Loss of earning capacity	₹9,560 × 140% × 12 × 18	₹28,90,944
2	Medical expenditure	As established	₹5,54,233
3	Incidental expenses during 58 days' hospitalisation	Reasonable amount	₹25,000
4	Attendant expenses	₹9,560 × 12 × 18	₹20,64,960
5	Pain and suffering	Having regard to lifelong paralysis	₹15,00,000
6	Loss of marriage prospects	Permanent disability from childhood	₹5,00,000
7	Future care	₹5,000 × 12 × 18	₹10,80,000
8	Transportation and special diet	Reasonable amount	₹1,00,000
	TOTAL		₹87,15,137

Para 8.

IX. DISCOMFORT AND INCONVENIENCE

The Court specifically considered the separate award of ₹25,000/- for discomfort and inconvenience.

It concluded that this was already encompassed within the compensation for pain and suffering.

Accordingly, the separate ₹25,000/- under that head was deleted.

Para 6.

This avoids duplication between overlapping heads of compensation.

X. FINAL COMPENSATION

The Supreme Court ultimately fixed the compensation at:

₹87,15,137/-

This was the compensation further enhanced from the amount awarded by the Tribunal and subsequently modified by the High Court.

The amount was directed to carry interest at the rate already awarded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court.

Any amount already paid was to be deducted.

The balance was directed to be paid within two months from the date of the Supreme Court's order.

Para 9.

XI. FINAL CONCLUSION

The appeal was allowed.

The Supreme Court substantially enhanced the compensation by recognising the true economic consequences of a child's lifelong paralysis, rather than confining compensation to immediate medical expenditure.

The decisive considerations were:

the claimant was only five years old;
the spinal injury resulted in permanent paralysis;
although the medical certificate recorded 80% disability, the doctor's evidence established that the condition was lifelong;
the functional disability was therefore assessed at 100%;
skilled minimum wages were adopted for assessing loss of earning capacity;
40% future prospects were added;
multiplier 18 was applied;
a skilled attendant was considered necessary;
continuing expenditure for diapers, catheter and care was recognised;
compensation for pain and suffering and loss of marriage prospects was substantially enhanced; and
the earlier decision in Baby Sakshi Greola was applied with an adjustment for the increased cost of living.

Final award: ₹87,15,137/- with applicable interest, after deduction of amounts already paid.

Result: Appeal allowed.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Customary Law — Proof of custom — Burden lies on t...Customary Law — Proof of custom — Burden lies on the person asserting the custom — Paras 5–6, 10–13 A person who asserts the existence of a customary right must establish: that the custom exists; that the party is governed by that custom; its long, continuous and established usage; its prevalence among the concerned tribe, family or community; and that the custom is certain, reasonable and not opposed to public policy. A mere absence of evidence establishing the contrary proposition does not amount to proof of the asserted custom. The burden cannot be discharged by saying that no prohibition against the alleged custom has been proved. Paras 6, 12–13.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Customary Law — Proof of custom — Burden lies on t...: advocatemmmohan 2026 INSC 672 Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 8780 of 2026 Supreme Court of India — 09.07.2026 Cor...

2026 INSC 672

Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 8780 of 2026
Supreme Court of India — 09.07.2026
Coram: Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

HEAD NOTES

1. Customary Law — Proof of custom — Burden lies on the person asserting the custom — Paras 5–6, 10–13

A person who asserts the existence of a customary right must establish:

that the custom exists;
that the party is governed by that custom;
its long, continuous and established usage;
its prevalence among the concerned tribe, family or community; and
that the custom is certain, reasonable and not opposed to public policy.

A mere absence of evidence establishing the contrary proposition does not amount to proof of the asserted custom. The burden cannot be discharged by saying that no prohibition against the alleged custom has been proved. Paras 6, 12–13.

2. Customary Law — Ghardamad — Uncle-in-law adopting niece's husband — Custom not proved — Paras 11–13

The evidence established, as a customary practice, that a ghardamad/son-in-law could acquire rights in the property of his father-in-law.

However, that did not establish the distinct proposition that an uncle-in-law could adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad and thereby confer upon him rights in the uncle-in-law's property.

The Supreme Court held that this specific custom was nowhere established by evidence. Para 11.

3. Substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC — Once framed, must be answered — Para 11

The High Court had framed the question concerning the ability of an uncle-in-law to adopt the niece's husband as a ghardamad but did not answer it merely because the courts below had recorded concurrent findings.

The Supreme Court held that ordinarily, once a substantial question of law is framed, the parties must be heard on that question and the question must be decided. If the High Court intended not to examine the question because of concurrent findings, there was no reason to formulate it in the first place. Para 11.

4. Concurrent findings of fact — Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 — Paras 8–9

Ordinarily, concurrent findings of fact are not interfered with in an appeal under Article 136. Interference is justified in exceptional circumstances, including where the findings:

are unsupported by evidence;
are perverse;
disregard material evidence;
rest upon inadmissible or irrelevant evidence;
are contrary to law;
do not arise from the pleadings;
are arbitrary or such that no reasonable judicial mind could have reached them; or
cause grave injustice or undue hardship.

Paras 8.1–8.4.

5. Customary inheritance among Oraons/Udaons — Daughters' right in landed property — Evidence accepted — Para 10.2

The plaintiff's witnesses consistently stated that daughters did not acquire a share in landed property under the applicable Udaon/Oraon custom.

The defence evidence was materially inconsistent. The Supreme Court therefore accepted the plaintiff's evidence and held that, as proved in the case, daughters did not acquire a right or share in the property. Para 10.2.

6. Ghardamad — Right in father-in-law's property established, but limited to the proved custom — Para 10.3

The testimony of the parties was sufficient to establish the custom that a son-in-law/ghardamad could acquire a right in the property of his father-in-law.

However, proof of that custom could not be extended to establish the separate and wider proposition that an uncle-in-law could adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad. Para 10.3 read with Para 11.

7. Succession of issueless Udaon — Nearest male agnate — Para 10.4 and 10.5

The evidence concerning succession to an issueless Udaon was inconsistent on the question whether the property devolved upon a nephew, niece, or both.

The Court therefore did not accept the alleged custom merely on the basis of isolated testimony. Instead, it relied upon the acknowledged customary-law sources governing the community, particularly the principle that, in the absence of a ghardamad or another directly related male heir, the nearest male agnate succeeds to the property. Paras 10.4–10.5 and 13.

8. Lease/partition deed — Document cannot create title where executant had no transferable share — Para 10.6

The Court found uncertainty as to whether the disputed document was a lease deed or partition deed. That distinction did not affect the result.

A lease deed does not itself confer title, while partition can operate only between persons having shares in the property. Since Budhen did not establish the necessary share against Ledura, the document could not confer title upon her merely by being characterised as a partition. Para 10.6.

I. FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Origin of the dispute — Para 3

Sukhu Oraon had three sons:

Dhungru;
Ledura; and
Bhoula.

The plaintiff, Sukhu, was the second son of Dhungru and claimed ownership over the lands originally belonging to his grandfather, Sukhu.

The claim was resisted by Budhain, daughter of Bhoula, and her husband Punai.

2. Basis of defendants' claim

The defendants relied upon the alleged fact that Ledura, who had no children, had taken Punai as his ghardamad.

They asserted that Ledura's property had consequently devolved upon Punai.

The plaintiff disputed this and maintained that the defendants had no title and that the subsequent deed relied upon by them was legally ineffective. Para 3.

3. Applicable community custom

It was undisputed that the parties belonged to the Oraon/Udaon community and were governed by its relevant customary law.

One important feature of the alleged custom was that daughters did not ordinarily inherit landed property.

The precise questions concerning ghardamadship, succession and the disputed property, however, were matters requiring proof.

II. QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court organised the evidence around six principal factual questions:

Whether partition took place between Sukhu's branch and Ledura/Bhola;
Whether daughters acquired rights in Udaon caste property;
Whether a son-in-law/ghardamad acquired rights in property;
Who succeeded to the property of an issueless Udaon — nephew or daughter;
Who became entitled to the property after the deaths of Bhola, Ledura and Buranga; and
Whether the disputed lease/partition deed was validly executed or secretly obtained.

Para 9.

III. EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

A. Partition — Para 10.1

The evidence substantially established that no partition had taken place among the relevant branches of the family.

The only material suggesting otherwise came from DW-4, who stated that Ledura had "written land" to Budhen.

But the evidence did not establish:

the legal/customary authority for Ledura to do so;
the extent of property allegedly transferred;
the property retained by Ledura; or
whether the prevailing custom permitted such transfer.

The Court therefore held that the alleged partition was not proved. Para 10.1.

B. Daughters' inheritance — Para 10.2

The plaintiff's witnesses were consistent that women and daughters did not acquire title to landed property under the relevant custom.

The defence witnesses, however, contradicted one another.

Some suggested that a daughter could receive property through a written instrument; another denied the right; another was unable to state the position.

Because the plaintiff's evidence survived cross-examination and the defence evidence was internally inconsistent, the Court accepted the plaintiff's version.

Finding: As proved in the case, daughters did not possess a customary right or share in the landed property. Para 10.2.

C. Ghardamad's right — Para 10.3

The evidence from the parties established that the custom of a son-in-law/ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law's property existed.

This finding, however, was not equivalent to establishing that every person claiming ghardamad status acquired property rights.

The precise identity of the person adopting the ghardamad and the relationship between the parties remained critical. Para 10.3.

D. Succession of an issueless Udaon — Para 10.4

The evidence became substantially inconsistent.

Different defence witnesses gave different versions:

one said nephew and niece would inherit;
others said nephew alone;
another contradicted that proposition.

The Court specifically cautioned that a customary rule cannot be established merely through the isolated testimony of one witness where the alleged custom requires proof of long and continuous usage. Para 10.4.

E. Entitlement after deaths of family members — Para 10.5

The plaintiff's witnesses consistently asserted that the plaintiff became entitled after the deaths of Bhola, Ledura and Buranga.

The defence witnesses again produced inconsistent versions.

The Court also noted that:

Punai had died;
there were no surviving male descendants through the relevant line; and
the acknowledged customary source relied upon by the courts stated that, in such circumstances, the nearest male agnate would succeed.

The plaintiff therefore succeeded on this issue. Para 10.5.

IV. THE GHARDAMAD ISSUE — CENTRAL FINDING

This is the core of the judgment.

The trial court relied upon the work of Sarat Chandra Roy, The Oraons of Chotanagpur concerning the custom of ghardamadship.

The material relied upon by the trial court recognised circumstances where a male owner without a son could take a prospective son-in-law into his household as ghardamad.

But the Supreme Court identified a critical distinction.

The record showed that:

Ledura, the uncle-in-law, was said to have adopted Punai.

Yet the material relied upon did not establish that an uncle-in-law was competent under the prevailing custom to adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad.

Para 11.

The Supreme Court therefore refused to extend the proved custom beyond what the evidence actually established.

V. WHY THE HIGH COURT'S APPROACH WAS REJECTED

The High Court had framed the question concerning the uncle-in-law's ability to adopt the niece's husband as ghardamad.

But it did not decide that question.

Instead, it proceeded on the basis that because there was no established bar against such adoption, an adverse inference could not be drawn.

The Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach.

The correct principle is:

The person asserting the custom must prove the custom.

It is not sufficient to say:

“There is no evidence proving that the custom is prohibited.”

That reverses the burden of proof.

The absence of proof of a prohibition cannot substitute for affirmative proof of the alleged custom. Para 12.

VI. PROOF OF CUSTOM — LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court distilled the law at Para 6.

A person asserting custom must prove:

1. Applicability
He must establish that he is governed by the alleged custom.

2. Long usage
The practice must have existed for a sufficiently long period.

3. Prevalence
Its practice within the relevant tribe or family must be established.

4. Certainty and reasonableness
The custom must be certain and reasonable and cannot be immoral, optional or contrary to public policy.

5. General evidence
Evidence from members of the relevant community may establish the practice.

6. Public records
Where supported by public records, the custom may safely be acted upon.

7. Judicial notice
Once a court has taken judicial notice of a particular custom, it need not necessarily be proved afresh in every proceeding.

8. Statutory recognition
A custom may acquire legal force through judicial confirmation or statutory recognition.

9. Custom once disallowed
A custom once judicially disallowed cannot simply be revived.

10. Persons acquainted with custom
Under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, the opinions of persons likely to know about the existence of the custom are relevant. Para 6.

VII. CONCURRENT FINDINGS — WHY SUPREME COURT INTERFERED

Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact.

The judgment carefully recognises that principle through Srinivas Ram Kumar, Bharwada Bhoginbhai, Mithilesh Kumari and Ramachandran. Paras 8.1–8.4.

But that restraint is not absolute.

Interference can occur where, inter alia:

material evidence has been ignored;
findings are contrary to law;
findings are unsupported by the pleadings;
irrelevant or extraneous evidence has been relied upon;
findings are perverse;
the conclusion is one which a reasonable judicial mind could not reach; or
grave injustice or undue hardship results.

Para 8.4.

Here, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had proceeded upon an incorrect approach to the proof of custom and had accepted a customary relationship which had not been established in the form asserted.

That justified interference notwithstanding the concurrent findings.

VIII. DISPUTED DOCUMENT — WHY IT DID NOT SAVE THE DEFENDANTS

The Court found it unnecessary to finally characterise the document as either a lease deed or partition deed.

The result was the same.

If it was a lease:

A lease does not confer title.

If it was a partition:

Partition presupposes the existence of shares in the persons between whom the partition is effected.

The evidence did not establish Budhen's share in the property in the first place.

Therefore, the document could not create title where the underlying customary entitlement had not been established.

Para 10.6.

IX. FINAL CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court took a cumulative view of the evidence and customary law.

It held that:

the custom permitting a ghardamad to obtain rights in the property of his father-in-law was proved;
the distinct custom permitting an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as ghardamad was not proved;
the defendants could not discharge their burden merely by showing absence of an express prohibition;
the alleged partition/transfer in favour of Budhen was not established as conferring title;
the disputed document could not create title in the absence of a legally or customarily established share;
in the absence of a ghardamad or another directly related male heir, the recognised customary rule entitled the nearest male agnate to the property.

Accordingly, the judgments of the courts below were set aside and the plaintiff's suit was decreed.

Appeal allowed. Costs to be borne by the parties themselves. Paras 13–14.

MOST IMPORTANT LEGAL PROPOSITION

The judgment can be reduced to one particularly important proposition:

A customary right must be affirmatively proved by the person who asserts it. The absence of proof of a prohibition against the claimed custom is not proof of the custom itself.

And, more specifically:

Proof that a son-in-law may become a ghardamad of his father-in-law does not, without further evidence, prove a custom under which an uncle-in-law may adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad and thereby confer upon him inheritance rights in the uncle-in-law's property.

That distinction between the custom actually proved and the wider custom asserted is the decisive feature of Bejla Oraon.

LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

Thursday, August 27, 2026

Wednesday, August 26, 2026

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2026 INSC 496

Marietta D’ Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda & Ors.

HEAD NOTES

1. Rent Control — Eviction — Bona fide requirement — Co-owner/co-landlord — Entitlement to maintain eviction proceedings — Paras 36–46

2. Pleadings — Order VI Rules 1 and 2 CPC — Material facts and evidence — Distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia — Paras 26–34

3. Pleading and proof — Substance rather than technical form — Parties proceeding to trial with knowledge of the case — Paras 40–41

4. Co-ownership — Share certificate relating to land — Building attached to land — Interest extends to building — Paras 42–46

5. Co-owner as landlord — Section 5(3), Bombay Rent Act — Para 46

6. Subsequent events — Bona fide requirement — Court may take cautious cognisance — Paras 47–48

7. Oral family arrangement — Validity — Can be relied upon even without registered document or decree of partition — Paras 49–50

8. Bona fide requirement — Temporary occupation of another premises does not necessarily defeat genuine need — Paras 51–53

9. Comparative hardship — Alternative accommodation — Section 13(1)(l) — Paras 54–60

I. FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Lease and construction of the suit building — Para 3

2. Tenancy of Flat No.2 — Para 4

3. Transfer of share certificates — Para 5

4. Eviction proceedings — Para 6

II. APPELLANT'S BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT

5. Family circumstances — Paras 7–8

III. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

6. Bona fide requirement established — Para 9

IV. APPELLATE HISTORY

7. First appeal

8. Bombay High Court

V. CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

VI. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE SUPREME COURT

(1) What constitutes a pleading?

(2) What is the distinction between pleading and proof?

(3) Whether the requirements of pleading and proof were satisfied in the present case?

VII. LAW ON PLEADINGS

1. Meaning of pleading — Paras 26–31

VIII. PLEADING ≠ PROOF

2. Facta probanda and facta probantia — Paras 32–34

Facta probanda

Facta probantia

IX. APPLICATION OF THE PLEADING PRINCIPLE TO THIS CASE

3. The plaint was sufficient — Paras 35–40

X. DEFICIENCY IN PLEADING CANNOT BE RAISED TECHNICALLY AFTER TRIAL

XI. SHARE CERTIFICATES — LAND AND BUILDING

4. Section 8, Transfer of Property Act — Paras 42–44

The appellant had proved her interest in the land and her co-ownership of the suit building.

XII. APPELLANT WAS A CO-LANDLORD WHEN SUIT WAS FILED

5. Section 5(3), Bombay Rent Act — Para 46

The appellant was a co-landlord as well as co-owner at the time of filing the eviction suit.

XIII. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

6. Subsequent developments can be considered — Paras 47–48

XIV. ORAL FAMILY ARRANGEMENT

7. No formal partition necessary — Paras 49–50

XV. BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT

8. Appellant established genuine requirement — Paras 51–53

A tenant cannot dictate to the landlord how the landlord should arrange or utilise his/her accommodation.

XVI. COMPARATIVE HARDSHIP AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION

9. Tenants had alternative accommodation — Paras 54–57

XVII. PRESENT POSITION OF RESPONDENT NO.1

XVIII. FINAL CONCLUSION

The appellant had proved her bona fide requirement and greater hardship would result to her if eviction were refused.