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Whether Courts in India have jurisdiction to issue any writ to protect the welfare of its citizens beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the country.


Whether Courts in India have jurisdiction to issue any writ to protect the welfare of its citizens beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the country.

we hold that the Courts in India have jurisdiction in the matter of protecting the best interest or welfare of a child or an incapable adult; if so warranted, in circumstances where the Court forms an opinion that the party who approached the Court has no legal remedy before that Court beyond Indian territory. 

2023:KER:80740

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SOPHY THOMAS

THURSDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2023 / 23RD AGRAHAYANA, 1945

WP(CRL.) NO.1206 OF 2022

PETITIONER/S:

‘X’

BY ADVS.

JOHNSON GOMEZ

S.BIJU (KIZHAKKANELA)

SANJAY JOHNSON

JOHN GOMEZ

ARUN JOHNY

RESPONDENTS:

1 UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO

GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN – 110001.

2 THE AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF INDIA,

ABU DHABI UAE, PLOT NO.10, SECTOR W-59/02, DIPLOMATIC

AREA EMBASSIES DISTRICT -

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

3 STATE POLICE CHIEF,

KERALA POLICE HEADQUARTERS, VAZHUTHAKKAD,

THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695010.

4 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF,

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS,

PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN – 689645.

5 STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KOIPURAM POLICE STATION,

PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN – 689548.

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:2:-

WP(CRL.) NO.1206 OF 2022

6 THE CHAIRPERSON, LOCAL LEVEL COMMITTEE,

CONSTITUTED UNDER THE NATIONAL TRUST FOR WELFARE OF

PERSONS WITH AUTISM, CEREBRAL PALSY, MENTAL

RETARDATION AND MULTIPLE DISABILITIES ACT, 1999,

PATHANAMTHITTA, COLLECTORATE OFFICE, PATHANAMTHITTA

DISTRICT, KERALA, PIN – 689645.

7 ‘Y’

8 XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX.

9 XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

BY ADVS.MANU S., DSG OF INDIA

N.M.MADHU

C.S.RAJANI(K/2275/1999)

SHRI.K.S.PRENJITH KUMAR, CGC

BY GOVERNMENT PLEADER, SRI.P.M.SHAMEER

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18.10.2023,

ALONG WITH WP(C).42320/2022, THE COURT ON 14.12.2023 DELIVERED THE

FOLLOWING:

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:3:-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SOPHY THOMAS

THURSDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2023 / 23RD AGRAHAYANA, 1945

WP(C) NO.42320 OF 2022

PETITIONER:

‘X’

BY ADVS.

JOHNSON GOMEZ

S.BIJU (KIZHAKKANELA)

SANJAY JOHNSON

JOHN GOMEZ

ARUN JOHNY

ANN MARIA SEBASTIAN

RESPONDENTS:

1 UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO

GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN – 110001.

2 THE AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF INDIA, ABU DHABI UAE, PLOT

NO.10, SECTOR W-59/02, DIPLOMATIC AREA EMBASSIES

DISTRICT - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:4:-

WP(C) NO.42320 OF 2022

3 THE CHAIRPERSON, LOCAL LEVEL COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTED

UNDER THE NATIONAL TRUST FOR WELFARE OF PERSONS WITH

AUTISM, CEREBRAL PALSY, MENTAL RETARDATION AND

MULTIPLE DISABILITIES ACT, 1999, PATHANAMTHITTA,

COLLECTORATE OFFICE, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, KERALA,

PIN – 689645.

4 ‘Y’

5 XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

6 XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

BY ADVS.

SRI.MANU S., DSG OF INDIA

SRI.N.M.MADHU

SRI. C.S.RAJANI(K/2275/1999)

SHI.K.S.PRENJITH KUMAR, CGC

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18/10/2023,

ALONG WITH WP(Crl.)NO.1206/2022, THE COURT ON 14/12/2023 DELIVERED

THE FOLLOWING:

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:5:-

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & SOPHY THOMAS, JJ.

-----------------------------------------

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022

& “C.R.”

W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-----------------------------------------

Dated this the 14th day of December, 2023

J U D G M E N T

A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.

These writ petitions are filed by the mother of XXXXX(

*)

(hereinafter referred to as the “incapable adult”) who is suffering from

autism spectrum disorder. W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 was filed for issuance

of a writ of habeas to produce the aforesaid incapable adult before this

Court. It proceeds on an allegation that the incapable adult has been

detained in illegal custody of his father against his wish and will in

Dubai. W.P.(C). No.42320/2022 was filed challenging an order of the

District Collector, Pathanamthitta, who is the Chairman of the Local

Level Committee constituted under the National Trust for the Welfare of

Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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Disabilities Act, 1999 (for short the “National Trust Act”), declining

the request made by the petitioner to appoint her as the legal guardian

of the incapable adult.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

2. The petitioner married ‘Y’(

*) on 2/2/1998 in

accordance with Christian personal law. In that wedlock, two male

children were born. The elder child has now crossed the age of 21 years.

The younger incapable adult was born on 31/1/2003. The parties were in

Dubai, UAE. It seems that the incapable adult was diagnosed with

pervasive developmental disorder when he was two and half years old. He

was treated at NIMHANS, Bangalore. Finally, he was diagnosed with autism

spectrum disorder. The incapable adult, XXXXX(

*) was in the company of

both his parents. Though it is stated that the married life of the

petitioner and husband was not happy from the initial phase of marital

life itself; as seen from various records, treatments were given to the

incapable adult and he was brought up in a family environment. The

matrimonial dispute never ended. The petitioner claims that she was

forced to travel back to India as she was subjected to domestic violence,

and she came back to India based on the orders passed by this Court to

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:7:-

obtain the passport from her estranged husband with the intervention of

the Indian Consulate. The petitioner approached the District Collector,

Pathanamthitta, to appoint her as a legal guardian under the National

Trust Act on 9/11/2021. Since it was not considered, the petitioner

approached this Court in W.P.(C).No.23474/2021. The said writ petition

was disposed of on 15/9/2022 directing the District Collector,

Pathanamthitta, to take a decision on the application filed by the

petitioner to appoint her as the legal guardian. This was considered

by the District Collector and on 29/9/2022 an order was passed rejecting

her request for the reason that the incapable adult is living in UAE and

holding that the National Trust Act cannot be applied beyond the

territorial jurisdiction of this country. While holding so, the District

Collector appreciated the requirement of the petitioner-mother to be the

legal guardian of the incapable adult. The petitioner, thereafter, filed

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 for issuance of a writ of habeas on 5/12/2022

alleging that the incapable adult is in the illegal custody of his

father. She filed the other writ petition challenging the order of the

District Collector, on 21/12/2022. Various orders were also passed by

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:8:-

this Court on 18/1/2023 and 23/12/2022 to allow interaction with the

incapable adult.

3. Taking note of the fact that this Court will have to decide

on a jurisdictional issue intertwined with the welfare of the autistic

person who is an international person and, currently a resident of

another foreign country, UAE, we appointed Adv.Anil Malhotra, a

Chandigarh-based lawyer to assist us. At the outset, we must state that

his assistance in this matter was immense. The notes of submission made

by him, based on research by Adv. Ankit Malhotra gave insight into the

law on the matter. We also heard Shri Johnson Gomez, learned counsel for

the petitioner and Shri N.M.Madhu, learned counsel for the respondent.

THE MAIN SUBMISSIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:

4. The learned counsel Adv.Johnson Gomez for the petitioner

submitted that when the father of the incapable adult is acting against

that son, it has to be presumed that the incapable adult is in illegal

custody. According to him, medical intervention alone would not be

sufficient to protect the welfare of the incapable adult and the

incapable adult is having every right to be in the company of his mother.

Thus, the denial of the father of the incapable adult, not allowing the

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:9:-

mother to be in the company of the incapable adult warrants interference

through the constitutional courts.

5. Whereas, the learned counsel for the father of the incapable

adult, namely, Shri N.M.Madhu argued that the incapable adult is

comfortable with the father. It is submitted that the cruel and

irresponsible behaviour of the petitioner to the incapable adult, as

well as to his father resulted in matrimonial disputes. He pointed out

various instances of the cruel behaviour of the petitioner. It is

further argued that the petitioner abandoned the family and the incapable

adult. According to him, any presence of the petitioner in Dubai would

alter the comfortable environment enjoyed by the incapable adult. The

learned counsel also submitted that when the father is competent and

capable of taking care of the incapable adult, and as no adverse

circumstances exist to protect the welfare of the incapable adult, this

Court need not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction. The learned counsel

elaborating the arguments submitted that, this Court has no jurisdiction

to grant any relief invoking writ remedy.

6. The learned Amicus Curiae appeared online and elaborated

submissions based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:10:-

Child (UNCRC), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2015, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with

Disabilities (UNCRPD), the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

and also with reference to the relevant provisions of National Trust

Act. He also requested this Court to make an amicable settlement of

disputes between parties through mediation. The learned Amicus Curiae

specifically addressed the question on jurisdiction and submitted that

the constitutional courts have jurisdiction to protect the welfare of

its citizens even in a foreign country.

WE FIND THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE MATTER:

7(i). Whether Courts in India have jurisdiction to issue any writ

to protect the welfare of its citizens beyond the territorial

jurisdiction of the country.

7(ii). In the circumstances of this case, whether the

petitioner is entitled to any relief in this matter.

JURISDICTION:

8. Jurisdiction in this matter has to be decided with reference

to the role of the State or the Court having responsibility for the

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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citizens of this country wherever they are, including extraterritorial

jurisdiction of the country. The children or incapable adults are deemed

to be vulnerable because of their incompetency to make decisions and to

protect their person or property. The origin of “parens patriae”

jurisdiction is traceable to the common law and the State has to act as

a substitute parent to protect the interest of the children or incapable

adults. On the advent of the Constitution, the State's power to further

the legitimate interest of its citizens, who are unable to care for

themselves is well recognized in its preamble and fundamental rights.

See the judgment of the Apex Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of

India, [(1990) 1 SCC 613]; para.35 therein reads as follows:

35. There is the concept known both in this country and abroad,

called parens patriae. Dr B.K. Mukherjea in his “Hindu Law of Religious

and Charitable Trust”, Tagore Law Lectures, Fifth Edition, at page 404,

referring to the concept of parens patriae, has noted that in English

law, the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector of all

property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially

matters of public concern. Thus the position is that according to Indian

concept parens patriae doctrine recognized King as the protector of all

citizens and as parent. In Budhkaran Chaukhani v. Thakur Prosad Shah [AIR

1942 Cal 331 : 46 CWN 425] the position was explained by the Calcutta

High Court at page 318 of the report. The same position was reiterated

by the said High Court in Banku Behary Mondal v. Banku Behary Hazra [AIR

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:12:-

1943 Cal 203 : 47 CWN 89] at page 205 of the report. The position was

further elaborated and explained by the Madras High Court in Medai Dalavoi

T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar v. Medai Dalavoi Rajammal [AIR 1957 Mad 563 :

(1957) 2 MLJ 211] at page 567 of the report. This Court also recognized

the concept of parens patriae relying on the observations of Dr Mukherjea

aforesaid in Ram Saroop v. S.P. Sahi [1959 Supp 2 SCR 583 : AIR 1959 SC

951] at pages 598 and 599. In the “Words and Phrases” Permanent Edition,

Vol. 33 at page 99, it is stated that parens patriae is the inherent

power and authority of a legislature to provide protection to the person

and property of persons non sui juris, such as minor, insane, and

incompetent persons, but the words parens patriae meaning thereby ‘the

father of the country’, were applied originally to the King and are used

to designate the State referring to its sovereign power of guardianship

over persons under disability. (emphasis supplied) Parens patriae

jurisdiction, it has been explained, is the right of the sovereign and

imposes a duty on sovereign, in public interest, to protect persons under

disability who have no rightful protector. The connotation of the term

parens patriae differs from country to country, for instance, in England

it is the King, in America it is the people, etc. The Government is

within its duty to protect and to control persons under disability.

Conceptually, the parens patriae theory is the obligation of the State

to protect and takes into custody the rights and the privileges of its

citizens for dischargings its obligations. Our Constitution makes it

imperative for the State to secure to all its citizens the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and where the citizens are not in a

position to assert and secure their rights, the State must come into

picture and protect and fight for the rights of the citizens. The Preamble

to the Constitution, read with the Directive Principles, Articles 38, 39

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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and 39-A enjoin the State to take up these responsibilities. It is the

protective measure to which the social welfare state is committed. It is

necessary for the State to ensure the fundamental rights in conjunction

with the Directive Principles of State Policy to effectively discharge

its obligation and for this purpose, if necessary, to deprive some rights

and privileges of the individual victims or their heirs to protect their

rights better and secure these further.

9. In State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas [(1976) 2 SCC 310], the

Apex Court opined that the Court also comes within the meaning of State

under Article 12 of the Constitution. In that sense, the State as well

as the Court are bound to protect the best interest of its citizens, who

are incapable of making decisions themselves. The State or the Court

in that process, assumes the role of a parent, who otherwise would have

been competent to make a decision. In a matrimonial dispute affecting

a child or an incapable adult, the scope of enquiry is not on the rights

and duties of such disputants, but on the best interest or welfare of

the subject of such dispute. In that sense, this Court is called upon

in these matters to protect the interest of the incapable adult who is

living abroad (in UAE). There are different theories on jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction in itself encompasses the power to adjudicate and the power

to enforce. The Court while giving relief must be in a position to

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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adjudicate and also in a position to enforce. In International Law, the

concept of jurisdiction is approached through various theories, and the

nationality principle is one such perspective. According to the

nationality principle of jurisdiction, “States possess an undisputed

right to extend the application of their laws to citizens (that is those

who have the nationality of the state), wherever they may be. This type

of jurisdiction has a longer history than jurisdiction based upon the

territorial principle. Rulers asserted jurisdiction over those who owed

allegiance to them even before the ruler's control over their land

territory was consolidated to the point where they could be said to

assert territorial jurisdiction”1. This nationality principle is also

incorporated specifically into our domestic law. Under the Indian Penal

Code (IPC), a sovereign State is entitled to regulate the conduct of its

citizens beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India. Sections 3 and 4

of IPC address the extraterritorial jurisdiction of our country.

10. According to Section 3 of IPC, any person liable, by any

Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India shall be

dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed

1 Malcolm D.Evans, International Law, First Edition (2003), Oxford University Press, Page No.339

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within

India.

11. Likewise, Section 75 of the Information Technology Act (IT

ACT) also incorporates provisions for extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Section 75 of the IT Act stipulates that the provisions of the IT Act

apply to offences committed outside India by any person, irrespective of

their nationality. This provision is based on nationality principle as

well as protective principle of jurisdiction.

12. In the matter of protecting the best interest of the child,

or the welfare of the incapable adult, the parens patriae rule would

apply and, on the same premise, the nationality principle would also

apply. This is based on the principles emanating from the statutory

provisions casting an obligation on the State to protect the best

interest of a child or the welfare of an incapable adult, as arising

from the obligations under the various United Nations Conventions made

into law such as, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, the

National Trust Act etc. The UN conventions and these statutory provisions

place an obligation on the State to ensure that the persons with

disability enjoy the right to equality and community life equally with

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:16:-

others. The preamble of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act and

the National Trust Act mentions that the enactment itself is to provide

protective and welfare measures to disabled persons and persons suffering

from mental disability. Since the parens patriae rule has to be read

into the statutory provision based on nationality principle, the State

is bound to take such measures as provided under the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities Act and the National Trust Act. If the provisions under

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act and the National Trust Act

are not read to put onus on the State to protect ‘persons’ covered under

the respective enactments, the very object of the law will be defeated.

Law on State responsibility to protect its subjects obliges the State

to act not only within territorial limits but also beyond its territory.

It is to be emphasized that these laws are premised to honour human

rights, social security and welfare principles having universal value.

13. The learned Amicus Curiae, pointing out the role of the State

and the Court, argued that the Courts in India are bound to protect the

rights of citizens, if the State fails to perform its duty. He placed

reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Gaurav Kumar Bansal v.

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:17:-

Union of India, [(2015) 2 SCC 130] wherein at para.9 it is held as

follows:

9. This Court is assigned the role of sentinel on the qui vive for

protection of rights of citizens and steps in, in exercise of power of

judicial review for protection of fundamental rights of the citizens, if

the State fails to perform its duty. At the same time, this Court cannot

assume the role of the executive to oversee the sensitive issue of

coordination with international agencies and bodies for securing release

of Indian citizens who are held hostages abroad, when it is shown that

the departments of the Government have not only taken cognizance of the

problem but also taken, in right earnest, whatever steps could be

possible. The issue of coordination at international level with foreign

countries and international bodies has to be left to the wisdom of experts

in the Government. It is not a case where the State has not shown any

concern for its citizens, but where unfortunate situation has come about

in spite of serious efforts. Handling of the situation requires expertise

and continuous efforts. It has not been pointed out as to what particular

direction can be issued in the circumstances. While safety and protection

of the lives and liberty of Indian citizens is also the concern of this

Court, the issue has to be dealt with at the level of the executive. From

the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, it is evident that

steps have been taken at various levels, though without complete success.

14. We already noted that this Court is now stepping into the

shoes of a parent, to protect the best interest and welfare of an

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:18:-

incapable adult who is an Indian citizen. It cannot be said that this

Court has no power to adjudicate.

15. India and UAE entered into a bilateral agreement on 25/10/1999

for judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters for service of

summons, judicial documents, commission, execution of judgments,

arbitral awards, etc. It is pursuant to such agreement that the Central

Government issued a notification dated 17/01/2020. This agreement

recognizes the execution of the decree of both the countries as though

it is a domestic decree. The notification issued by the Central

Government dated 17/01/2020 is a declaratory notification.

16. This Court invoking writ jurisdiction is capable of passing

further orders to ensure compliance with the order as the State continues

to have control over its citizens who are living abroad, even if there

is no such bilateral agreement with the country where such citizens

reside. However, the Court should be circumspect to exercise jurisdiction

when the Court finds that the law of the foreign country can be invoked

to protect the welfare or best interest of the child or incapable adult.

There may be different circumstances related to the cases. If parties

are ordinarily residing in a foreign country and can avail legal remedy

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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in that foreign country, the courts in India shall not invoke such

jurisdiction to regulate the affairs of its citizens living beyond

territorial jurisdiction of the country. The Court steps into the shoes

of a parent invoking parens patriae jurisdiction, only in those

circumstances where the Court forms an opinion that jurisdiction of the

foreign country cannot be availed by the party concerned, due to lack

of laws or incapability of having legal remedy, or if one party is

deprived of availing legal remedy due to issues of domicile or

residentiary rights. When an efficacious alternate remedy is available,

the Court shall refrain from invoking its jurisdiction over the affairs

of its citizens who are living outside its territorial jurisdiction.

17. In conclusion, we hold that the Courts in India have

jurisdiction in the matter of protecting the best interest or welfare

of a child or an incapable adult; if so warranted, in circumstances where

the Court forms an opinion that the party who approached the Court has

no legal remedy before that Court beyond Indian territory.

IN RE INCAPABLE ADULT LIVING OUTSIDE INDIA - RELIEFS:

18. It has come out from the facts that the petitioner came down

to India consequent upon matrimonial dispute with her husband, the father

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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of the incapable adult. She was living in UAE and was with the incapable

adult for a long time. According to her, due to domestic violence, she

could not continue in UAE. She approached this Court in

W.P.(C).No.25380/2020 through her power of attorney holder for release

of her passport by her husband. Pending the writ petition, her passport

was released by her husband. Accordingly, she came down to India. Her

stand before this Court is that she would be able to travel back to Dubai

and have the company of the incapable adult. She submits that medical

intervention would not be sufficient for the well-being of the incapable

adult. It is submitted that she cannot move the courts of Dubai for any

relief as she is not domiciled there. We do not see any negative factors

that would deprive either parents of the incapable adult from having the

company of the incapable adult. For us, the question is, how can the

well-being of such incapable adult be protected? Nothing has been

brought before us to show that such relief regarding the best interest

or welfare of the incapable adult can be secured through laws applicable

in UAE. In the absence of any such contentions of the parties, we have

to examine the matter based on the measures that are required to protect

the interest of the incapable adult.

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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19. In UNCRPD, ratified by India on 1/10/2007, it is the

obligation of the State to ensure that the children with disabilities

have equal rights with respect to family life with others and the State

is also bound to take measures to prevent concealment, abandonment,

neglect and segregation of children with disabilities [Article 23(3)].

In the same Convention, under Article 23(4), it mandates the State to

ensure that the child shall not be separated from his or her parents

against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial

review determine, in accordance with the applicable law and procedures

that such separation is necessary for the best interest of the child.

20. In tune with UNCRPD, the Indian Parliament enacted the Rights

of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. In this context Section 9 of the

above Act may be relevant, which reads as follows:

9. Home and family - (1) No child with disability shall be separated from

his or her parents on the ground of disability except on an order of

competent court, if required, in the best interest of the child.

21. Section 5 of the above Act also mandates that the persons

with disability shall have the right to live in the community. That

means, in the home, where he gets the care and protection of parents,

siblings etc. The Indian Courts by and large recognise joint parental

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

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care to protect the welfare of the children. The learned Amicus Curiae

placed reliance on the following judgments of the Apex Court and the

other Courts in India related to joint parenting and shared custody:

 PARTICULARS CITATION

1

Yashita Sahu Vs. State of

Rajasthan & Ors.

AIR 2020 SC 577 – Child Welfare,

Visitation, Paras 17 to 22.

2

Savitha Seetharam Vs. Rajiv

Vijayasarathy Rathnam

AIR 2020 (4) Karnataka R 372 - Shared

Parenting, Paras 9, 10, 11, 15 & 32.

3

Tushar Vishnu Ubale Vs. Archana

Tushar Ubale

AIR 2016 BOM 88 – Joint Custody &

Shared Parenting, Paras 15, 17, 18,

19 & 20

4

Inderbir Singh Vs. Amandeep

Bains

2019(3) HLR 204 – Joint Parenting &

Shared Custody, Paras 20-21

5

Rajnish Sharma Vs. Kamal Kumar

& Anr.

Order dated 20.12.2021 (FAO 1378 of

2021) (High Court of Punjab and

Haryana) – Shared Parenting & Joint

Custody at interim stage

6

Aditi Bakht Vs. Abhishek Ahuja 2022(292) DLT 106 – Shared Parenting

& Joint Custody at interim stage.

22. In Re C (Adult Patient) [1994] 1 FCR 705 (Fam(Eng)) (Access:

Jurisdiction), the High Court Family Division in England opined that one

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:23:-

parent restricting the access of another to their mentally disabled adult

child is illegal. It is further opined that access to a child was the

companionship of a parent and the question of access was inextricably

tied up with the question of the child’s welfare. Interestingly, the

High Court went on to hold that under common law, a parent had the right

of access to an adult child who was a patient and interference by

custodial parent with the other parent's access to the child was capable

of being remedied by habeas corpus.

23. The incapable adult has every right to have the company of

both the parents. A competent Court alone can deprive such company as

seen from Section 9 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act.

Indian Courts do not generally recognize issuance of habeas when custody

is with one of the parents; it only encourages interference with such

custody through orders of the Family Courts. The effective remedy

available under Indian law is to appoint a guardian under the National

Trust Act. Section 14 of the National Trust Act provides provisions for

appointment of a guardian for persons with disabilities. Section 15

enumerates the duties of guardian which includes taking care of such

persons with disabilities.

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:24:-

24. The respondent father filed I.A.No.1/2023 in

W.P.(C).42320/2022 for interaction with the incapable adult.

According to the father, the incapable adult is enjoying the

unchanged environmental ecosystem for more than 10 years, and any

alteration in the ecosystem and environment would be detrimental

to the interest of the incapable adult. We do not find that such

interaction is necessary. We had in fact, on an earlier occasion

interacted with the father online. The incapable adult also

appeared online. We are sure that the incapable adult will not be

in a position to express any opinion in regard to his wellbeing. We note that the mother’s presence was there all along from

the childhood of the incapable adult. Though she had dispute with

her husband, she never extended it to deprive the incapable adult

of enjoying the company of his mother. We also note that the

petitioner mother is trained to take care of such differently abled

person. Therefore, we decline the request made by the father of

the incapable adult.

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:25:-

25. The petitioner, in fact, approached the District Collector,

Pathanamthitta, to appoint her as a guardian. The District Collector

was convinced that the petitioner should be appointed as a guardian, but

refrained from passing an order noting that the incapable adult resides

in UAE and is beyond the jurisdiction of this country. We are of the

view that both parents be appointed as a joint guardian to take care of

the incapable adult till any competent court decides otherwise the

incompetency of either of the parents to take care of the incapable

adult. The incapable adult is having every right to be under the care

of his family and both parents. It may not be conducive for the

petitioner to reside along with her estranged husband to take care of

the incapable adult but nothing prevents her to have rotational custody

so as to allow the incapable adult to enjoy the care, love and protection

of both the parents. The separation of the petitioner from the incapable

adult in the light of law as above is illegal. Denial of access to one

parent is also illegal in the light of the statutory provisions under

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act. In such circumstances, we

are of the view that the following orders would subserve the interest

of the incapable adult:

2023:KER:80740

W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:26:-

i. The petitioner will be entitled to cyclical custody of the

incapable adult from 5 P.M. every Friday till the following Thursday

5 P.M. on a rotational weekly basis.

ii. The incapable adult shall be handed over from the residence of

her husband- ‘Y’(

*) in UAE. However, this right is available to the

petitioner whenever she is in UAE.

iii. In the event her husband and the incapable adult visit India

during vacation, the same pattern of custody shall be followed.

iv. In the event, ‘Y’(

*) travels abroad leaving the incapable

adult in UAE or in India, the mother will have custody during the period

of absence of ‘Y’(

*).

v. The parties are also free to make joint agreement varying the

above cyclical arrangements on mutually agreed terms. In that event,

such agreement shall be produced before the District Collector,

Pathanamthitta, for the purpose of record.

vi. The Indian Consulate in Dubai shall ensure that this order is

complied with by ‘Y’(

*).

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:27:-

vii. In the light of the reliefs granted as above, we find no scope

for issuing a writ of habeas and, accordingly, W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 is

dismissed. W.P.(C).No.42320/2022 is allowed.

We record our deepest appreciation to the learned Amicus Curiae

Shri Anil Malhotra ably assisted by Adv.Ankit Malhotra who have devoted

considerable time in assisting us and have made valuable suggestions

from time to time. Sd/-

 A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE

Sd/-

 SOPHY THOMAS, JUDGE

ms

(

*) parties’ details are masked.

2023:KER:80740

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-:28:-

APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE REFERENCE LETTER IN OP NO.

228134 DATED 10.06.2005 ISSUED BY DR SHEKHAR

SESHADRI CONSULTANT PSYCHIATRIST OF NIMHANS

BANGALORE, OUT PATIENT DEPARTMENT TO DR.

SRIDEVI HEGDE OF THE MANIPAL HOSPITAL.

EXHIBIT P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT REPORT DATED

30.05.2005 ISSUED BY DR JAYANTHINI ADDL.

PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY, MADRAS MEDICAL

COLLEGE AND SR. CIVIL SURGEON TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 03.08.2006

ISSUED BY V-EXCEL REMEDIAL CENTRE TO THE

DETENU.

EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF REPORT DATED 03.02.2007 ISSUED

BY NIPA BHUPTANI TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT REPORT DATED

30.02.2008 ISSUED BY SITRALAI CHARITABLE

EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY

ASSESSMENT DATED 23.10.2008 ISSUED BY MELWIN

ISAAC, OCCUPATIONAL THERAPIST TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 25.10.2008

ISSUED BY WE CAN CHENNAI TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED IN THE

YEAR 2010 - 2012 BY SILVER N SPRINGS NURSERY

AND PRIMARY SCHOOL, CHENNAI TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE DOCTORS NOTE SHEET DATED

03.02.2011 ISSUED BY DR PERUMAL RC OF SHRI

RAMACHANDRAN HOSPITAL, TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT BY OCCUPATION

THERAPIST MELVIN ISAAC DATED 15.02.2012 TO THE

DETENU.

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-:29:-

APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE REFERENCE LETTER DATED

25.06.2013 ISSUED BY ABU DHABI INTERNATIONAL

(PVT.) SCHOOL TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROGRESS REPORTS ISSUED BY

FUTURE CENTRE SCHOOL TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

REPORT DATED 24.11.2016 ISSUED FROM FUTURE

REHABILITATION CENTRE TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE SUMMARY DATED

08.08.2020 PREPARED BY DR. SREEKUMAR NAIR TO

THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE PEOPLE OF DETERMINATION ID

CARD ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT, UAE TO THE DETENU CERTIFYING

AUTISM.

EXHIBIT P16 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT NO.

MB992430656AE DATED 12.10.2019 BETWEEN THE ABU

DHABI COOPERATIVE SOCIETY AND THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

EXHIBIT P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19/11/2020 IN

WP(C) NO. 25380 OF 2020 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE

COURT.

EXHIBIT P18 A TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION FILED BY THE

PETITIONER BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS

MAGISTRATE COURT II, PATHANAMTHITTA.

EXHIBIT P19 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED

10/12/2020 AS PER COMMON ORDER IN CRL.MP NO.

3417/2020, CRL.MP NO.3420/2020 IN CRL.MP NO.

3416/2020 PASSED BY THE BEFORE THE JUDICIAL

FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT II,

PATHANAMTHITTA.

EXHIBIT P20 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOTS OF WHATSAPP

CHATS FROM MAY TO OCTOBER OF 2021 BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NO.7.

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P22 A TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION FILED BY THE

PETITIONER IN CRL MP NO. 2416/2020 BEFORE THE

JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT,

PATHNMTHITTA.

EXHIBIT P23 A TRUE COPY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF XXXXX TAKEN

ON 30/01/2021, 18/02/2021 AND ON 01.06.2021.

EXHIBIT P24 A TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT DATED

15/03/2021 ISSUED BY DR. SIVA PRAKSH OF THE

NEW MEDICAL CENTRE HEALTHCARE TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT24(A) A TRUE COPY OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

REPORT NO. MR NO. UD0400000157659 DATED

16/04/2021 ISSUED BY DR DANESH GOPALAN

CLINICAL PHYSIOLOGIST NMC ROYAL HOSPITAL UAE

TO THE DETENU.

EXHIBIT 24(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT DATED

22/12/2021 ISSUED BY DR. SHIVAPRASAD CHILD

PSYCHIATRIST, NEW MEDICAL CENTRE LLC.

EXHIBIT P25 A TRUE COPY OF FIR DATED 30/06/2021 IN CRIME

NO. 0732/2021 REGISTERED BY KOIPURAM POLICE

STATION, PATHANAMTHITTA.

EXHIBIT P26 A TRUE COPY OF THE OP TICKET DATED 04.02.2019

OF DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CHRISTIAN MEDICAL

COLLEGE, VELLORE.

EXHIBIT P27 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS

BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE OFFICE OF DR.

PAUL RUSSEL.

EXHIBIT P28 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED

08/11/2021 FILED BY THE PETITIONER UNDER

NATIONAL TRUST ACT BEFORE THE RESPONDENT NO.6.

EXHIBIT P29 THE TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. NORKAA3/365/2021-NORKA DATED 05.08.2021 ISSUED BY

THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,

GOVERNMENT OF KERALA TO THE AMBASSADOR,

EMBASSY OF INDIA, UAE.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P30 A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAILS STARTING FROM

19.07.2021 TO THE HON'BLE CHIEF MINISTER OF

KERALA.

EXHIBIT P31 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION TO THE

GRIEVANCE CELL DATED 29.07.2021 ON THE

CONSULAR SERVICE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF THE

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

EXHIBIT P32 A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION WITH

THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, NRI CELL

REGARDING REPRESENTATION SUBMITTED TO THEM

DATED 28.07.2021 AND 02.08.2021.

EXHIBIT P33 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL THREAD DATED

19.07.2021 AND 23.07.2021 TO THE DGP OF KERALA

POLICE.

EXHIBIT P34 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 20.07.2021 TO

THE HON'BLE MINISTER MR. MURALEEDHARAN, UNION

MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS &

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS.

EXHIBIT P35 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17TH NOVEMBER

2021 IN WP(C) NO. 23474 OF 2021 PASSED BY THIS

HON'BLE COURT.

EXHIBIT P36 A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO FILED BY THE

GOVERNMENT PLEADER AS PER THE DIRECTION OF

THIS HON'BLE COURT DATED 17.11.2021.

EXHIBIT P37 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED

25.01.2022 IN WP(C) NO. 23474 OF 2021 PASSED

BY THIS HON'BLE COURT.

EXHIBIT P38 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE

INDIAN EMBASSY FOLLOWING THE DIRECTIONS OF

THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WP(C) NO. 23474/2021.

EXHIBIT P39 A TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT DATED

28/02/2022 ISSUED BY UMESH CHANDRAN, MANAGER

MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION, AHALIA HOSPITAL TO MS.

RISHA OBERAI, SECOND SECRETARY, COMMUNITY

AFFAIRS & ECONOMIC, EMBASSY OF INDIA.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P40 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 15/09/2022

IN WP(C) NO. 23474/2021 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE

COURT.

EXHIBIT P41 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. DCPTA/4377/2021-

D2 DATED 29/11/2022 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT

NO. 6 TO THE PETITIONER.

EXHIBIT P42 A TRUE COPY OF THE INJUNCTION ORDER PASSED BY

THE FAMILY COURT PATHANMTHITTA PER ORDER DATED

16/07/2022 IN IA NO. 1/2022 IN OP NO. 802 OF

2022.

EXHIBIT P43 A TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE III ISSUED ON

22/06/2022 BY THE INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND

NURSING AUSTRALIA.

RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES:

ANNEXURE R7 (A) TRUE COPY OF THE SCREEN SHOTS OF THE WHATSAPP

MESSAGES SEND TO THE WARD'S PHONE BY THE WRIT

PETITIONER.

ANNEXURE R7 (B) TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT DATED

21.12.2020 ISSUED BY DR. SIVA PRAKASH,

CONSULTANT PSYCHIATRIST OF NEW MEDICAL CENTRE,

DUBAI.

EXT.R7(D) TRUE COPY OF THE RECENT MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

DATED 22.12.2021 ISSUED BY DR. SIVA PRAKASH,

NEW MEDICAL CENTRE, LLC -DUBAI.

EXT.R7(E) TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT DATED

21.01.2021 ISSUED BY THE DUBAI HEALTH CARE

AUTHORITY.

EXT.R7(F) TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER ISSUED BY THE

PETITIONER TO THE 7TH RESPONDENT.

EXT.R7(G) TRUE COPY OF THE LAWYER NOTICE DATED

12.10.2021.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXT.R7(H) TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION WITH ENGLISH

TRANSLATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE ABU

DHABI JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, FAMILY SECTION

113/2021.

EXT.R7(I) TRUE COPY OF THE DETAILED FINAL JUDGMENT WITH

ENGLISH TRANSLATION IN 658/2021 PASSED BY THE

ABU DHABI JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

EXT.R7(J) TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE DATED

21.12.2022 ISSUED BY DR. SIVA PRAKASH, NEW

MEDICAL CENTRE, LLC, DUBAI.

EXT.R7(K) TRUE COPY OF THE PROGRESS REPORT ISSUED BY

FUTURE REHABILITATION CENRE.

EXT.R7(C) TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SENT BY THE PETITIONER

TO THE EMPLOYER OF THE SEVENTH RESPONDENT.

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P 44 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS DATED 18/12/2022,

ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

EXHIBIT P 45 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY EMAIL DATED

20/12/2022 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE

RESPONDENT NO.7.

EXHIBIT P 46 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS DATED 31/12/2022,

ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7

EXHIBIT P 47 .A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS DATED 07/01/2023,

ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7

EXHIBIT P 48 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS DATED 08/01/2023,

ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

EXHIBIT P 49 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS DATED 14/01/2023,

ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P50 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREEN SHOTS OF THE

NOTIFICATIONS RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER IN

HER MOBILE THOUGHT 'ALHOSH APP' BETWEEN

22.01.2021 TO 08.06.2021 TO 14.10.2021.

RELATING TO COVID 19 TEST RESULT

EXHIBIT P51 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREEN SHOTS OF THE

NOTIFICATIONS RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER IN

HER MOBILE THOUGHT 'ALHOSH APP' BETWEEN

12.06.2021 TO 14.10.2021 RELATING TO COVID 19

TEST RESULT.

RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES:

ANNEXURE R2(A) THE RECORDS OF THE MEETING DATE AND TIME.

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P52 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION CRL M.P NO.

94025/2023 IN SLP (CRL) NO. 2205 OF 2023

BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA.

EXHIBIT P53 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 08/05/2023 SENT

BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT TO THE

HON'BLE SUPREME COURT.

EXHIBIT P54 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10/05/2023 IN

APPEAL (CRL.) NO.2205/2023 PASSED BY THE

HON'BLE SUPREME COURT.

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT R7(L) TRUE COPY OF THE RECENT PROGRESS REPORT DATED

20.06.2023 ISSUED BY THE FUTURE REHABILITATION

CENTRE, ABU DHABI.

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P55 A TRUE COPY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINT CMP NO.

2158 OF 2023 BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS

MAGISTRATE COURT, ERNAKULAM.

EXHIBIT P56 A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO. 1261 OF 2023 OF

PALARIVATTOM POLICE STATION REGISTERED AGAINST

THE RESPONDENT NO.7.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:

EXT.R7(M) PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VIDEO CONFERENCE OF SEVERAL

DAYS.

EXT. R7(N) TRUE COPY OF THE RECENT PROGRESS REPORT DATED

20.06.2023 ISSUED BY THE FUTURE REHABILITATION

CENTRE.

EXT. R7 (O) TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE

AFFIDAVIT DATED 10.05.2023 FILED BY THE POWER

OF ATTORNEY HOLDER OF THE PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P57 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED

17/02/2023 IN SLP (CRL) NO. 2205/2023 BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT.

EXHIBIT P58 A TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT REPORT DATED

16/03/2023, SUBMITTED BY THE CLINICAL

PSYCHOLOGIST AT ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL,

ERNAKULAM.

RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES:

ANNEXURE R2(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION DATED

02.08.2023 RECEIVED FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY,

COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, PRESS, INFORMATION.

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P59 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05/07/1442H

CORRESPONDING TO 17/02/2021 ISSUED BY THE ABU

DHABI COURT FOR FAMILY, CIVIL AND

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUITS/ PERSONAL STATUS

DEPARTMENT-2 IN FILE NO. 383 OF 2021 ALONG

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

EXHIBIT P60 A TRUE COPY OF THE TAX INVOICE NO. INV-OUT/301

DATED 31/12/2020 ISSUED BY ABDUL RAHIM AL

ZAROONI REAL ESTATE LLC TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

2023:KER:80740

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXHIBIT P61 A TRUE COPY OF THE CHEQUE DATED 14/01/2021 AND

3/03/2021 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.7 DRAWN ON

EMIRATES ISLAMIC BANK IN FAVOUR OF ABDUL RAHIM

AL ZAROONI REAL ESTATE LLC.

EXHIBIT P62 A TRUE COPY OF RECEIPT NO. RV000104-AZ-2020

DATED 31/12/2020 ISSUED BY ABDUL RAHIM AL

ZAROONI REAL ESTATE LLC TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

EXHIBIT P63 A TRUE COPY OF THE CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

(FINAL BILL) DATED 24/0221 ISSUED BY DUBAI

ELECTRICITY & WATER AUTHORITY TO THE

RESPONDENT NO.7.

EXHIBIT P64 A TRUE COPY OF THE TENANCY CONTRACT NO.

202100217885 ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT OF

MUNICIPALITIES AND TRANSPORT TO THE RESPONDENT

NO.7.

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:

EXT.R7 (P) TRUE COPY OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM

31.01.2003 TO 16.03.2023.

EXT.R7 (Q) TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL COMMUNICATION DATED

31.08.2020 SEND TO THE LANDLORD BY THE 7TH

RESPONDENT.

EXT.R7 (R) TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL COMMUNICATION DATED

24.01.2021 SENT TO THE LANDLORD BY THE 7TH

RESPONDENT.

EXT.R7 (S) TRUE COPY OF THE ATTESTED TENANCY CONTRACT

DATED 17.02.2021 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF

MUNICIPALITIES AND TRANSPORT.

EXT.R7 (T) TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 14.02.2021 FROM

NEW LANDLORD'S REPRESENTATIVE MS KATHERINE

DELIMA TO THE 7TH RESPONDENT.

EXT.R7 (U) TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 21.03.2021

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1206/2022

EXT.R7 (V) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 11.04.2021WITH

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

EXT.R7 (W) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 23.06.2021 IN

APPEAL NO.658/2021 WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

EXT.R7 (X) TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED 07.07.2021

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

EXT.R7 (Y) TRUE COPY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING THE

PRESENCE OF THE PETITIONER IN THE HOME ON

01.06.2021 AT 12.41 AM.

EXT.R7 (Z) TRUE COPY OF THE RESIDENCE CANCELLATION

CERTIFICATE DATE 13.07.2021 ISSUED BY THE

FEDERAL AUTHORITY OF IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP.

EXT.R7 (AA) TRUE COPY OF THE CASES NOTIFICATIONS DATED

16.11.2020 WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

EXT.R7 (AB) PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING THE PRESENCE OF THE

PETITIONER IN THE HOME ON 15.09.2021.

EXT.R7 (AC) TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE DATED 04.01.2023

ISSUED BY THE FUTURE REHABILITATION CENTRE.

EXT.R7 (AD) PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING SOME ACHIEVEMENTS AND

SKILLS OF XXXXX.

EXT.R7 (AE) PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING THE VIDEO CALLS AND

MESSAGES MADE BY THE PETITIONER TO XXXXX.

EXT.R7 (AF) TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF MINISTRY'S

SPONSORSHIP FROM 01.11.2022 TO 31.10.2023.

EXT.R7 (AG) TRUE COPY OF THE PROGRESS REPORT 2020-2021

ISSUED BY FUTURE REHABILITATION CENTRE.

2023:KER:80740

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-:38:-

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 42320/2022

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY THE

PETITIONER ALONG WITH HIS FATHER BEFORE THE

RESPONDENT NO.3.

EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT DATED 15/09/2022 IN

WP C NO. 23474//2020 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE

COURT.

EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT

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W.P.(Crl).No.1206/2022 & W.P.(C).No.42320/2022

-:39:-

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Application U/s 216 Cr.P.C. on behalf of the prosecution is maintainable in the eye of law.....


1
A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:242512
Reserved on 07.08.2023
Delivered on 22.12.2023
Court No. - 90
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 17003 of 2023
Applicant :- Om Prakash @ Jani
Opposite Party :- State of U.P.
Counsel for Applicant :- Chandrakesh Mishra,Abhishek
Kumar Mishra,Sr. Advocate
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Raj Kumar Kesari
Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak,J.
1. Heard Sri Daya Shankar Mishra, learned Senior Counsel
assisted by Sri Abhishek Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for
applicant and Sri Raj Kumar Kesari learned counsel for
opposite party No.2 as well as learned AGA for the State.
2. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 has refused to
file any counter affidavit in the instant matter, therefore, present
application is being decided on merits with the consent of
learned counsel for the parties.
3. The applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. assailing the order dated
23.11.2022 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Court No.3, Varanasi in Sessions Trial No. 651 of 2020 arising
out of Case Crime No. 300 of 2005, under Sections 372, 373
I.P.C. and Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act, 1956, Police Station Manduwadih, District Varanasi.
4. An FIR, being Case Crime No. 300 of 2005, under
Sections 373, 373 I.P.C. and under Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of
2
Immoral Traffick (Prevention) Act, 1956 has been lodged by the
Police Inspector. Some young girls have been recovered from
two different places. Charge sheet has been submitted against
two accused persons, however, present applicant was neither
named in the FIR nor arraigned in the charge sheet as an
accused. Ultimately, Sessions Trial No. 161 of 2006 was
concluded convicting both accused and the same was affirmed
by this Court in Crl. Appeal No. 5583 of 2016 vide order dated
05.08.2019. During this period an application dated 22.06.2010
(Annexure-2) has been moved under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to call
upon the eight persons including present applicant as an
accused for trial together with other co-accused. The said
application was rejected by the trial court vide order dated
24.05.2021. High Court, on application being filed under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 29267 of 2011, has relegated the parties
before the trial court with a direction to reconsider the
application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., vide order dated
14.09.2011. Learned trial court, after remand, has passed the
order dated 07.01.2012 with a direction that the matter may be
reinvestigated under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. In pursuance
thereof, after due investigation, Investigating Officer has
submitted the supplementary charge sheet dated 17.07.2020
(Annexure No.22) arraigning the present applicant under
Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,
1956 and under sections 372 and 373 I.P.C. Considering the
supplementary charge sheet dated 17.07.2020, learned trial
court has framed the charges against the present applicant vide
order dated 20.10.2020 (Annexure No.15). At later stage,
prosecution has moved an application dated 12.03.2021 (Paper
No.10 Kha) (Annexure-20) beseeching frame one additional
3
charge under Section 376 I.P.C. against the present applicant.
Learned trial court, vide order impugned dated 23.11.2022
(Anneuxre-21), has allowed the aforesaid application (Paper
No.10 Kha) and fix next date 18.12.2022 for framing of
additional charge against the present applicant. On the pointed
query raised to the learned counsel for the parties they have
stated that till date charge has not been framed under Section
376 I.P.C. Having been aggrieved, with order dated
23.11.2022, allowing the application (Paper No.10 Kha),
applicant (accused) has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court by moving the present application.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has advanced three fold
submissions before this Court. First relating to the
maintainability of the application dated 12.03.2021 (Paper
No.10 Kha) on the ground that the prosecution or any other
interested persons have no locus standi to move any application
before the court concerned for alteration or addition of charges
under Section 216 Cr.P.C. In support of this submission, learned
counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Kartiklakshmi Vs. Sri
Ganesh and Another reported in (2017) 3 SCC 347, Sushil
Dhameja and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another decided
by co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated
18.04.2023 passed in Application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 12344 of
2023 and Kuldeep Vs. State of U.P. decided by co-ordinate
Bench of this Court reported in 2019 2 ACR 1947. He has
placed reliance as well upon the judgment of Madras High
Court in the case of Krishnammal Vs. The Revenue Divisional
Officer and others reported in (2008) 0 CrLJ2845. Second
submission raised by learned counsel for applicant is that no
4
additional material is available on record to frame additional
charge indicting the present applicant under Section 376 I.P.C.
Thirdly, learned counsel for the applicant has tried to challenge
the sanctity and genuineness of statement made by victim u/s
161 Cr.P.C. during re-investigation and submits that the
statement of victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as referred in the
order dated 23.11.2022 was not recorded, in accordance with
law, during re-investigation. It is further submitted that from
perusal of the record, prima facie, it appears that alleged
statement of victim was got recorded by some lady Constable
namely, Poonam Verma. It was not recorded by Investigating
Officer, therefore, same cannot be treated to be part of the reinvestigation. It is next submitted that under Section 13(2) of
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, the Special Police
Officer shall not be below the rank of an Inspector of Police,
whereas instant matter statement was get recorded by the police
constable which has got no sanctity in the eye of law. In support
of his submission learned counsel for applicant has cited the
case of Delhi Administration Vs. Ram Singh 1962 0 AIR (SC)
63. It is further submitted that learned trial court has illegally
made an observation in its order dated 23.11.2022 that the
victim in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has
made allegations of rape against the present applicant.
However, in her initial statement recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. no such allegation was made by the victim against the
present applicant. Lastly, it is submitted that the order dated
23.11.2022 passed by learned trial court is liable to be quashed
being illegal, unwarranted under the law and tainted with
irregularities.
5
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 has
contended that in present application, applicant has not
challenged the entire criminal proceeding except an order
impugned dated 23.11.2022 by which application (Paper No.
10Kha) has been allowed for the purposes of indicting the
accused under Section 376 I.P.C. It is further contended that the
application (Paper No. 10Kha) cannot be treated to be an
independent application rather it is a piece of information given
to the court concerned for the irregularity in the proceedings
wherein statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has not properly
been appraised by the the Court concerned, consequently
offence under Section 376 I.P.C. has been left out to be
considered. It is further contended that the victim/ prosecutrix
being a lady has to be examined by the lady officer, therefore,
her statement has rightly been recorded by lady constable
namely, Poonam Verma on the instructions of the Investigating
Officer. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn attention
of the Court towards the second proviso to sub-section 3 of
Section 161 Cr.P.C. wherein lady police officer has been
entrusted to record the statement of a woman against whom
offence under several sections of I.P.C. including Section 376
I.P.C. has been committed. He has also placed reliance on the
provisions as enunciated under Section 15, sub-Section 6-A, of
the Immoral Traffic Act wherein victim is required to be
interrogated by the woman police officer. Lastly it is contended
that learned trial court has rightly passed order impugned dated
23.11.2022, which does not warrant any indulgence of this
Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C., therefore, the instant application is liable to be rejected
being misconceived and devoid of merits. 
6
7. In reply, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the
copy of statement of victim under section 161 Cr.P.C., as
referred in the order impugned, has not been supplied/given to
the present applicant (accused), therefore, he was not in a
position to go through the aforesaid statement. He has further
submitted that it appears that alleged statement under Section
161 Cr.P.C. dated 05.02.2020, as referred by the respondents in
his impleadment application has been planted subsequently for
the purpose of framing additional charge u/s 376 I.P.C. It is
further submitted that for the purposes of investigation under
the Immoral Traffic Act a Special Police Officer not below the
rank of Inspector of Police is authorised to investigate or record
the statement of the victim, therefore, in the instant matter
statement recorded by the concerned lady constable vitiates the
process of the entire statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
8. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by
learned counsel for parties and perusal of record, it manifested
that the name of the present applicant was emerged during reinvestigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and he has been
arraigned in the supplementary charge sheet dated 17.07.2020.
During re-investigation victim has made her statement under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. which is evident from the copy of the
supplementary charge sheet (Annexure No.5) wherein name of
victim has find placed at serial No.2. Having considered the
material on record filed along with the subsequent charge sheet
dated 17.07.2020, learned trial court has framed as many as
seven charges, vide order dated 20.10.2020, against the present
applicant. At later stage, prosecution has moved a miscellaneous
application to frame additional charge under Section 376 I.P.C.
inasmuch as same has been left to be considered whereas
7
specific allegations has been made by the victim in her
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in this regard.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant in his first submission
has raised question qua maintainability of the application (Paper
No.10 Kha) moved on behalf of the prosecution with a
submission that there is no provision under the law to move
such application before the trial court who himself competent to
subtract or addition of charges in exercise of power under
Section 216 Cr.P.C. On the contrary learned counsel for
opposite party No.2 has contended that application (Paper No.
10 Kha) under Section 216 Cr.P.C. moved by the prosecution
was nothing but a piece of information to bring the relevant fact
in the notice of learned trial court, which has been over cited by
the concerned court, to eliminate defect in framing of the
charge.
10. For analyzing the divergent submissions made by the
counsel for the rival parties it would be befitting to consider the
scope of Section 216 Cr.P.C., which is quoted herein below :-
"(1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time
before judgment is pronounced.
(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and
explained to the accused.
(3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that
proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the
opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or
the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its
discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made,
proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had
been the original charge.
(4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding
immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court,
to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the
Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for
such period as may be necessary. 
8
(5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one
for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary,
the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is
obtained, unless sanction had been already obtained for a
prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or
added charge is founded."
11. Bare perusal of Section 216 Cr.P.C. clearly denotes that
the court is empowered to alter charges at any stage of trial
before the delivery of judgment. Question with respect to the
maintainability of miscellaneous application (Paper No. Kha)
moved by prosecution or any other party for framing of
additional charges under Section 216 Cr.P.C. is relevant for the
purposes of deciding the instant matter. In the case of P.
Kartikalakshmi (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has
expounded that there is no right to any party to seek for a
subtraction or addition of charges by filing any miscellaneous
application as a matter of right. The relevant paragraph Nos. 6
and 7 of the judgment is quoted herein below :-
"6. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective
parties, we find force in the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel for Respondent No.1. Section 216 Cr.P.C. empowers
the Court to alter or add any charge at any time before the
judgment is pronounced. It is now well settled that the power
vested in the Court is exclusive to the Court and there is no
right in any party to seek for such addition or alteration by
filing any application as a matter of right. It may be that if
there was an omission in the framing of the charge and if it
comes to the knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the
power is always vested in the Court, as provided under Section
216 Cr.P.C. to either alter or add the charge and that such
power is available with the Court at any time before the
judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision for the
Court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which
comes to its notice or brought to its notice. In such a situation,
if it comes to the knowledge of the Court that a necessity has
arisen for the charge to be altered or added, it may do so on
its own and no order need to be passed for that purpose. After
such alteration or addition when the final decision is rendered,
it will be open for the parties to work out their remedies in
accordance with law.
9
7. We were taken through Sections 221 and 222 Cr.P.C. in this
context. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are
only concerned with Section 216 Cr.P.C. We, therefore, do not
propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to
the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the
invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of our
conclusion that the power of invocation of Section 216 Cr.P.C.
is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision
for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any
time before pronouncement of the judgment, we make it clear
that no party neither de facto complainant nor the accused or
for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any
addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided
under Section 216 Cr.P.C. If such a course to be adopted by
the parties is allowed, then it will be well-nigh impossible for
the criminal court to conclude its proceedings and the concept
of speedy trial will get jeopardised."
12. Hon'ble Supreme Court has further clarified in the case of
Anant Prakash Sinha @ Anant Sinha Vs. State of Haryana
and Another (2016) 6 SCC 105 that it is obligatory at the part
of the court to see that no prejudiced cause to the accused and
he is allowed to have a fair trial and court can change or alter
the charges if there is no defect or something is left out.
Relevant paragraph No.18 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted
herein below :-
"8. The controversy as raised rests on two aspects. The first
aspect that has emanated for consideration is whether without
evidence being adduced another charge could be added. In
this context, we may usefully refer to Section 216 CrPC which
reads as follows:-
"216. Court may alter charge.— (1) Any court may alter or
add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.
(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and
explained to the accused.
(3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that
proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the
opinion of the court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or
the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the court may, in its
discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made,
proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had
been the original charge. 
10
(4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding
immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the court,
to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the
court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such
period as may be necessary. (5) If the offence stated in the
altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which
previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded
with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been
already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those
on which the altered or added charge is founded."
13. In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court has
also examined the maintainability of the application moved by
the private party for alteration of charge. Parting with the matter
Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that by way of
application relevant fact has brought to the knowledge of
learned Magistrate about the defect in framing the charges,
therefore, Magistrate has not committed any error in
entertaining the said application. Relevant paragraph Nos. 21
and 22 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted herein below :-
"21. Presently to the second aspect. Submission of Mr. Sharan
is that the learned Magistrate could not have entertained the
application preferred by the informant, for such an application
is incompetent because it has to be filed by the public
prosecutor. In this regard, he has laid stress on the decision in
Shiv Kumar v. Jukam Chand and another23. In the said case,
the grievance of the appellant was that counsel engaged by
him was not allowed by the High Court to conduct the
prosecution in spite of obtaining a consent from the concerned
Public Prosecutor. The trial court had passed an order to the
extent that the advocate engaged by the informant shall
conduct the case under the supervision, guidance and control
of the Public Prosecutor. He had further directed that the
Public Prosecutor shall retain with himself the control over the
proceedings. The said order was challenged before the High
Court and the learned single Judge allowing the revision had
directed that the lawyer appointed by the complainant or
private person shall act under the directions from the Public
Prosecutor and may with the permission of the court submit
written arguments after evidence is closed and the Public
Prosecutor in-charge of the case shall conduct the
prosecution. This Court referred to Sections 301, 302(2), 225
CrPC and various other provisions and came to hold as
follows:- "
11
"13. From the scheme of the Code the legislative
intention is manifestly clear that prosecution in a
Sessions Court cannot be conducted by anyone
other than the Public Prosecutor. The legislature
reminds the State that the policy must strictly
conform to fairness in the trial of an accused in a
Sessions Court. A Public Prosecutor is not
expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the
conviction of the accused somehow or the other
irrespective of the true facts involved in the case.
The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor
while conducting prosecution must be couched in
fairness not only to the court and to the
investigating agencies but to the accused as well.
If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit
during trial the Public Prosecutor should not
scuttle/conceal it. On the contrary, it is the duty of
the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and
make it available to the accused. Even if the
defence counsel overlooked it, the Public
Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it
to the notice of the court if it comes to his
knowledge. A private counsel, if allowed a free
hand to conduct prosecution would focus on
bringing the case to conviction even if it is not a fit
case to be so convicted. That is the reason why
Parliament applied a bridle on him and subjected
his role strictly to the instructions given by the
Public Prosecutor.
14. It is not merely an overall supervision which
the Public Prosecutor is expected to perform in
such cases when a privately engaged counsel is
permitted to act on his behalf. The role which a
private counsel in such a situation can play is,
perhaps, comparable with that of a junior
advocate conducting the case of his senior in a
court. The private counsel is to act on behalf of the
Public Prosecutor albeit the fact that he is
engaged in the case by a private party. If the role
of the Public Prosecutor is allowed to shrink to a
mere supervisory role the trial would become a
combat between the private party and the accused
which would render the legislative mandate in
Section 225 of the Code a dead letter."
22. Being of this view, this Court upheld the order passed by
the High Court. The said decision in Shiv Kumar v. Jukam
Chand and another23 is, in our opinion, is distinguishable on
facts. The instant case does not pertain to trial or any area by
which a private lawyer takes control of the proceedings. As is
evident, an application was filed by the informant to add a
charge under Section 406 IPC as there were allegations
12
against the husband about the criminal breach of trust as far
as her stridhan is concerned. It was, in a way, bringing to the
notice of the learned Magistrate about the defect in framing of
the charge. The court could have done it suo motu. In such a
situation, we do not find any fault on the part of learned
Magistrate in entertaining the said application. It may be
stated that the learned Magistrate has referred to the materials
and recorded his prima facie satisfaction. There is no error in
the said prima facie view. We also do not perceive any error in
the revisional order by which it has set aside the charge
framed against the mother-in-law. Accordingly, we affirm the
order of the High Court in expressing its disinclination to
interfere with the order passed in revision. We may clarify that
the entire scrutiny is only for the purpose of framing of charge
and nothing else. The learned Magistrate will proceed with the
trial and decide the matter as per the evidence brought on
record and shall not be influenced by any observations made
as the same have to be restricted for the purpose of testing the
legal defensibility of the impugned order."
14. Discussing the wide power of the trial court under
Section 216 Cr.P.C. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the
matter of Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy Vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and Others (2020) 12 SCC 467, that the
court has immense power to change or altering the charges at
any stage. The relevant paragraph No.21 of the aforesaid
judgment is quoted herein below :-
"21. From the above line of precedents, it is clear that Section
216 provides the court an exclusive and wide-ranging power
to change or alter any charge. The use of the words "at any
time before judgment is pronounced" in Sub-Section (1)
empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or
adding charges even after the completion of evidence,
arguments and reserving of the judgment. The alteration or
addition of a charge may be done if in the opinion of the court
there was an omission in the framing of charge or if upon
prima facie examination of the material brought on record, it
leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the
existence of the factual ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. The test to be adopted by the court while deciding
upon an addition or alteration of a charge is that the material
brought on record needs to have a direct link or nexus with the
ingredients of the alleged offence. Addition of a charge merely
commences the trial for the additional charges, whereupon,
based on the evidence, it is to be determined whether the
accused may be convicted for the additional charges. The
13
court must exercise its powers under Section 216 judiciously
and ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused and that
he is allowed to have a fair trial. The only constraint on the
court's power is the prejudice likely to be caused to the
accused by the addition or alteration of charges. Sub-Section
(4) accordingly prescribes the approach to be adopted by the
courts where prejudice may be caused."
15. Learned counsel for the applicant has emphasized the
judgment passed by coordinate Bench of this Court in the
matter of Sushil Dhameja and Another (Supra) wherein this
Court has quashed order passed by the trial court by which
miscellaneous application u/s 216 Cr.P.C. moved on behalf of
the prosecution has been entertained and allowed. While
passing the order, coordinate Bench of this Court has referred
the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.
Kartikalakshmi (Supra) and in the light of the said judgment
quashed the order passed by the court below and granted liberty
to the trial court to pass fresh order in the light of the provisions
as enunciated under Section 216 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for
applicant has also placed reliance upon the case of Kuldeep
(Supra) decided by coordinate Bench of this Court. The facts of
the cited case are distinguishable in the given circumstances of
the present case. In the cited case application to alter the
charges was moved on 30.01.2018 under Section 216 Cr.P.C.
and the same was kept pending which lead to file an application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for a direction to expeditious disposal
of the said application. Hon'ble Judge has dismissed the
application with an observation that separate application under
Section 216 Cr.P.C. for substraction or addition of charges is not
maintainable in the eye of law, accordingly, refused to issue
direction for expeditious disposal of said application. In the
recent judgment of Soundarajan Vs. State Rep. by Inspector
of Vigilance Anti Corruption Dindigul, 2023 SCC Online SC
14
242. Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that even a public
prosecutor has a duty to be vigilant and if a proper charge is not
framed it is his duty to apply to the court to frame an
appropriate charge. Relevant paragraph No.16 of the said
judgment is quoted herein below :-
"We find that, in this case, the charge has been framed very
casually. The Trial Courts ought to be very meticulous
Criminal Appeal No.1592 of 2022 when it comes to the
framing of charges. In a given case, any such error or
omission may lead to acquittal and/or a long delay in trial
due to an order of remand which can be passed under subsection (2) of Section 464 of CrPC. Apart from the duty of the
Trial Court, even the public prosecutor has a duty to be
vigilant, and if a proper charge is not framed, it is his duty to
apply to the Court to frame an appropriate charge."
16. Having considered the matter in hand, in light of the
guidelines of Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, I am
of the considered opinion that learned trial court has rightly
entertained the Misc. Application (Paper No.10Kha) as a piece
of information moved on behalf of prosecution. While deciding
the said application, learned trial court has specifically
considered the allegation of forceful sexual assault made by
victim which was left to be noticed at the time of framing
charges. In her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. she has made specific
allegation, as highlighted by learned trial court, of rape.
Statement of victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded by
the Investigating Officer during re-investigation under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C. The right of accused to have a fair trial and no
prejudiced beget to him while conducting the trial is an
obligatory at the part of the court, however, said right of the
15
accused cannot be seen in isolation and same would be
considered in conjunction with the provisions as enunciated
under Section 216 Cr.P.C., Therefore, any defect in framing
charges which begot due to lack of proper consideration of the
material on record can be rectified at any stage of trial even
before the delivery of judgment in exercise of power under
Section 216 Cr.P.C. It might possible that court misled in
framing of charges, the Public Prosecutor has a duty to be
vigilant and apprise the court qua correct facts of the case in the
light of the material on record and, accordingly, take an
appropriate steps for substraction or addition of charges under
the provisions of law as enunciated under Section 216 Cr.P.C. In
this respect Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held in the
matter Soundarajan (Supra) that the Public Prosecutor is
entrusted with duty to apprise the court qua defect, if any, in
framing charges. In the matter in hand, ADGC (Public
Prosecutor) has moved application dated 15.03.2021 (Paper
No.10Kha) to frame additional charge under Section 376 I.P.C.
against the present applicant. Learned trial court, vide order
impugned dated 10.11.2022, has entertained the said application
as a piece of information and acknowledg the defect in framing
of charges, wherein allegation of rape made by the victim under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. has been left to be considered. Learned trial
court by order impugned has simply allowed the application and
deferred the hearing of the case for the next date to frame
additional charge and, accordingly, accused has been directed to
be present on the next date. It is admitted position to both the
parties that till date additional charge under Section 376 I.P.C.
has not been framed by the trial court in pursuance of the order
impugned dated 23.11.2022.
16
17. As discussed above, there is no iota of doubt qua wide
power of the courts for substraction or addition of charges under
Section 216 Cr.P.C. Miscellaneous application dated 12.3.2021
(Paper no.10Kha) moved on behalf of the prosecution cannot be
treated to be an independent initiation rather than a piece of
information which is pious duty of the prosecution (Public
Prosecutor) to bring the correct fact to the notice of the court
concerned so that correct charges could be framed for the
purposes of fair trial sans begetting prejudiced to any party.
Even assuming for the sake of argument, as raised by learned
counsel for the applicant, that no party has vested right to seek
any addition or alteration of charge by moving an application,
the power vested in the court would not be affected owing to
entertaining such application as a piece of information to alter
the charges, in case, there is any omission or defect in framing
of charges due to ignorance of the relevant event which is
already on the record. Once the defect has been brought to the
knowledge of the court it would not be befitting for him
oblivious to the allegation as levelled by the victim against the
present applicant. Even otherwise, having considered the
material on record learned court is competent enough to pass an
order suo moto to substract or addition of the charges.
Therefore, in my considered opinion learned trial court has not
committed any error in entertaining the application (Paper
No.10Kha) and fixed dated for framing of charge in the light of
the fact which has been brought to his knowledge in the said
application.
18. Second submission raised by learned counsel for the
applicant questioning the availability of inadequate material for
framing of additional charge u/s 376 I.P.C. is unfounded at this
17
stage. Statement of victim u/s 161 Cr.P.C., priam facie, is
suficient to alter the charges in exercise of jurisdiction u/s 216
Cr.P.C. Trial court by order impugned has simply allowed the
application acknowledging the relevant fact for the purposes of
framing of charge, however, he has deferred the matter for
framing of charge on the next date fixed. Therefore, in may
opinion opportunity is still open for the applicant to raise
question qua adequate material on record with respect to the
framing of additional charge, if any.
19. Third submission raised by learned counsel for the
applicant questioning the genuineness and sanctity of the
statement dated 05.02.2020 made by victim under Section 161
Cr.P.C. is unfounded as well. At this juncture, wherein trial
commenced after framing of charges vide order dated
20.10.2020 and, at later stage, next date fixed for addition of
charge under Section 376 I.P.C. it would not be befitting for this
Court to examine the sanctity, genuineness and correctness of
the statement made by the victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
during reinvestigation, whereas same can be examined by the
trial court at the appropriate stage of trial. So far as the
allegation made by the applicant in his rejoinder affidavit that
the statement made by victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during
reinvestigation has not been supplied to him, same can be raised
before the trial court as well at the relevant stage. At this stage
of trial, for the procedural glitch, if any, this Court cannot
assume inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings.
Genuineness and sanctity of the statement made by victim
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in the light of the provision as
enunciated under Section 13(2) Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act, 1956 and not recording her statement by the authority
18
competent, as pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant,
is a matter of scrutiny which can more appropriately be
adjudicated upon by the trial court while examining the
relevance and admissibility of the evidence during trial. At this
juncture, this Court, in exercise of it’s inherent jurisdiction,
cannot assume the power to examine the correctness and
validity of the statement of witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in
the light of procedural glitch, if any, more particularly for want
of recording the statement by authority competent as allegedly
required under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
20. In this conspectus, as above, I do not find any justifiable
ground to entertain the instant application at this juncture. There
is no illegality, perversity, ambiguity or infirmity in the order
under challenge. I found neither any abuse of process of court in
the order impugned dated 23.11.2022 nor is there any valid
ground to interfere in said order to secure the ends of justice.
There is nothing on record to demonstrate as to how present
applicant is prejudiced, or if there is any likelihood of causing
miscarriage of justice to him, owing to the order under
challenge by which application u/s 216 Cr.P.C. for framing
additional charge has simply been allowed acknowledging the
relevant fact which has been left to be considered at the time of
framing of charges.
21. Resultantly, instant application being, misconceived and
devoid of merits is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 22.12.2023
Md Faisal 

The promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/liabilities under the RERA Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding effect ...........


The promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/liabilities under the RERA Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding effect ........... Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:76514

Page 1 of 94

A.F.R.

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:76514

RESERVED

Court No. - 30

(1) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 67 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lucknow Thru.

Its Executive Engineer Construction Division

Respondent :- Dhruv Kumar Chaturvedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Connected With

(2) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 68 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Thru. Housing

Commissioner, Lucknow

Respondent :- Arun Kumar Dwivedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Shikhar Srivastava

With

(3) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 69 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Pramod Kumar

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(4) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 70 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Add.

Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Mahendra Yadav

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(5) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 71 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Smt. Pooja Maurya

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(6) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 72 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 2 of 94

Respondent :- Dinesh Kumar Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(7) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 73 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Ku. Anju Prajapati

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(8) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 74 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Ashish Kumar Verma

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(9) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 75 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Navin Prakash Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(10) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 76 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Mahesh Tiwari

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(11) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 77 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Anant Kumar

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(12) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 78 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 3 of 94

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Vivek Srivastava

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(13) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 79 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Ajitabh Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(14) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 80 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Smt. Sunita Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(15) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 81 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(16) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 82 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Vinay Kumar Patel

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(17) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 83 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/Secy.

Respondent :- Amit Kumar Pandey

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(18) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 84 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 4 of 94

Respondent :- Abhishek Kr. Gupta

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(19) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 85 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/Secy.

Respondent :- Hanumant Prasad

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(20) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 86 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Thru. Housing

Commissioner Lko.

Respondent :- Satya Narayan Agnihotri

Counsel for Appellant :- Shikhar Srivastava

Counsel for Respondent :- Lalta Prasad Misra,Dwijendra

Mishra

With

(21) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 87 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Parishad,Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/ Secy.

Respondent :- Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(22) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 88 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorized Singnatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal,

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(23) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 89 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate.

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

Counsel for Respondent :- Pradeep Kumar Singh

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 5 of 94

(24) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 90 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(25) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 91 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Auth.

Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(26) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 92 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 3 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(27) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 93 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko.Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(28) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 94 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla Addl. Housing Commissioner

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(29) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 95 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla, Addl. Housing Commissioner

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 6 of 94

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(30) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 96 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authority, Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(31) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 97 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Offcer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(32) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 98 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. Thru. Secy. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(33) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 99 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(34) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 100 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 7 of 94

(35) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 101 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(36) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 102 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Its

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(37) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 103 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(38) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 104 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(39) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 105 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

Counsel for Respondent :- Santosh Kumar Bhatt

With

(40) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 106 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 8 of 94

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(41) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 107 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr.Neerj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunla

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(42) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 108 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(43) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 109 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(44) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 110 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Authorized Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(45) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 111 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Authorized Singnatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 9 of 94

(46) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 112 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Paris. Lko. Thru. Its Auth.

Singna. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Offic. Real Estate Appel. Trib. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(47) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 113 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(48) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 114 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Author. Signa. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presid. Offfi. Real Estate Appell. Tribu. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(49) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 115 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Autho.

Sign. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(50) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 116 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Author. Signa. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presid. Offic. Real Eatate Appell. Trib. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(51) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 117 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Autho.

Sign. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 10 of 94

Tribunallko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

Hon’ble Om Prakash Shukla, J.

(1) At the outset, this Court deem it apt to divide the judgment into

sections to facilitate analysis, which are as follows :-

INDEX PAGE NO

A. Introduction 11

B. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70,

71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82,

83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023

12

C. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 68 of 2023 54

D Decision in RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 56

E. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 58

F. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 88, 89, 90,

91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,

104 of 2023

61

G. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 66

H. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 69

I. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 73

J. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 76

K. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 106 of 2023 79

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 11 of 94

L. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 81

M. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 108, 109 of

2023

85

N. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 110, 111,

112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 of 2023

89

A. Introduction

(2) Heard Shri Anurag Singh, Shri Umesh Chandra Pandey and

Shri Shikhar Srivastava, learned Counsel representing the

appellant and Shri Pradeep Kumar Singh and Shri Santosh

Kumar Bhatt, learned Counsel representing the respondent.

(3) The above-captioned appeals have been filed by the appellant-

“U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad” under Section 58 of the Real

Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter

referred to as “RERA Act, 2016”), wherein by virtue of the

impugned order, the learned U.P. Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’)

has dismissed appeals filed by the appellant and it has been

directed that the amount deposited in terms of Section 43 (5) of

the RERA Act, 2016 by the appellant to be transferred to the

concerned account of the Regulatory Authority for disposal as

per the provisions of the Act.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 12 of 94

(4) Due to reasons recorded by this Court in its earlier order dated

28.1.2023, the delay in filing of these appeals has already been

condoned and as such these bunch of appeals were heard

together for their disposal on merits.

B. RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,

80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023

(5) These appeals arise out of the common judgment/order dated

25.11.2022 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal.

(6) Since common question of law has been raised by the appellant

in all these appeals, it would be in the interest of justice that all

these appeals are consolidated and taken together for hearing

and disposal. However, before this Court deals with the

question of law raised in these appeals, the brief facts

culminating into these appeals be narrated to appreciate the law

in its proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead

matter being RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (complainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) is taken into consideration.

Factual Matrix

(7) It has been submitted that the appellant is a public institution

constituted under the provisions of U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Adhiniyam,

1973’) and is an instrumentality of State which works on ‘no

profit and no loss’ basis. The appellant had been constituted for

the welfare of the public and is engaged in providing planned

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 13 of 94

development of the city and answering to the residential needs

of the public at large in a regularised manner.

(8) It is claimed that the appellant has acquired the land for

development of housing projects under the provisions of U.P

Awas Evam Vikas Adhiniyam and the provisions of Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 as provided under law. It is the case of

the appellant that a Scheme was launched in Vrindavan Yojna

and after delivery of possession made by the Land Acquisition

in the year 2011 and during the project was to be in progress, a

new Act, namely, “The Right of Fair Compensation &

Rehabilitation Act, 2013” came into force, which caused

various hindrances in meaningful acquisition of the land and as

such some delay has occurred in the said project, which was

beyond the control of the appellant.

(9) It appears that registration for allotments of flats were opened

by the appellant for Vrindavan Yojna, Nilgiri Enclave under

self-finance scheme for a housing colony of 640 flats in March,

2013 and, as such, on an application by the respondent

(complainant before the authority), the appellant allotted a Flat

to the respondent on 31.08.2013 for an estimated sale

consideration of Rs. 20,88,000/-. As per the respondent, the

said amount of sale consideration was payable in installments

and the possession was to be given by the appellant within 24

months. However, the appellant failed to offer for possession to

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 14 of 94

the respondent within the said stipulated time period, which

resulted in increase in the Flat price and additional burden of

GST was made applicable to him. It was the case of the

respondent before the Authority that although he had regularly

paid all the installments, however. as per the registration

booklet, no windows in the Flat, no car parking, no sewage and

no other facilities were made available to him and most

importantly the possession was delayed.

(10) Admittedly, the sale deed for the said Flat was executed on

08.12.2017 and possession was given on 27.01.2018 and the

complaint was filed almost after one year of taking possession

by the respondent on various grounds including delay of

delivering possession of the flats, no windows in flats, parking

issue etc.

(11) On the other hand, the appellant took a ground before the

authority that the price of the flat was not fixed and was merely

tentative and similarly 24 months of possession was a tentative

date. According to them, construction was delayed because of

pendency of litigation in the High Court being Writ Petition No.

110 of 11 and 3869 of 11. Further delay was because of dharna

pradarshan of farmer’s union, for which a report/complaint was

also filed by the appellant. According to the appellant, the

registration booklet also mentions that in case the

respondent/allottee pays the last installment and still is not

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given the possession of the flat, he was well within his right to

demand for refund of money, which in this case has not been

done by the respondent/allottee, meaning thereby that they have

volunteered to waive off their right to award of any

compensation. The appellant also stated before the authority

that the claim for compensation for delay under Section 12, 14,

18 and 19 of the Adhiniyam, 1973 was not maintainable.

According to them, window has been provided and car parking

has also been given.

(12) An objection was raised by the appellant before the Authority

as to the maintainability of the complaint, wherein the

Authority transferred the said compliant to the Adjudicating

Officer under Section 71 of the Act, 1973 for determination of

compensation for delay and other issues etc.

(13) The Adjudicating Authority, after discussing the contention of

both the parties in great detail, returned a finding dated

11.02.2021 that there had been a delay in giving the possession

of flat by the appellant. Thus, the authority, while accepting the

complaint of the respondent, directed the appellant to pay

interest as compensation on the amount of Flat i.e Rs.

20,88,000/- for the period of delay between 31.08.2015 to

18.08.2017 at the rate of MCLR+1% per annum within 45 days

of the passing of orders. Further direction was that in case the

said amount of compensation in the form of Interest is not paid

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within the said 45 days, the respondent would be entitled for

interest at the same rate till the receipt of actual amount from

appellant.

(14) The appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the

Adjudicating Authority filed an appeal under Section 44 of the

RERA Act, 2016 before the Appellate Tribunal.

(15) The said appeal was taken for hearing along with 22 other

appeals, lead matter being Appeal No. 245 of 2020 (U.P Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad V/s Sangeeta Singh), wherein the

Appellate Tribunal painstakingly prepared a tabular chart of the

pending 23 appeals, giving brief description of the flat allotted,

date of allotment, total price paid, date of impugned order, date

of filing of appeal and the relief sought in each appeal.

(16) The Appellate Tribunal having recorded the facts of each appeal

in a tabular form, went on to narrate the brief facts of the lead

appeal and the grounds preferred by the appellant along with

the relief sought. Further, the objection against the appeal by

the respondent was also noted by the Appellate Tribunal along

with the relevant judgments. Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal

after discussing the various issues raised by the appellant as

well as the respondent, rejected the appeal vide the common

impugned order dated 25.11.2022 along with almost 22 other

appeals on the same issue. It is this order which is subject

matter of challenge in these appeals.

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Contention of the parties

(17) The learned Counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued

that the impugned order has been passed without considering

the fact that any claim under the RERA Act can be raised or

compensation can be granted only on the basis of contract

existing between the parties. According to him, after execution

of the sale deed, the prior contract of year 2013 having been

extinguished, the complaint itself was not maintainable and as

such he has argued that the impugned order has been passed

without any jurisdiction. The learned Counsel as an extension

of his argument has cited judgments of the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) to suggest that the

complaint before the RERA was not maintainable of the

respondent/allottee, in case he had taken possession with an

open eye and without raising any objection. Further, grounds

were agitated relating to non-applicability of Section 18 of the

RERA Act, 2016 relating to grant of interest or compensation as

there existed no privity of contract between the parties. Further

thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant

were on the issue that when the allotment was made at a

tentative rate subject to calculation of final cost, there could not

had been any question about revised higher rates.

(18) Thus, the learned Counsel has attacked the impugned order

from all four corners and has also buttressed to frame almost six

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substantial question of law, as could also be found in the memo

of appeals.

(19) Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent/allotee has

supported the impugned judgment. According to him, there is

no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal

and as such he has prayed for dismissal of the present appeal.

Discussion & Findings

(20) Before this Court embarks on to the onerous path of deciding

the present bunch of appeals, it would be apt to consider the

scope and purport of the provision of law under which these

appeals have been sought to be preferred by the appellant.

Admittedly, these appeals have been filed under section 58 of

the RERA Act, 2016, which inter-alia states :-

"58. Appeal to High Court-(1) Any

person aggrieved by any decision or order of

the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal

to the High Court, within a period of sixty

days from the date of communication of the

decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal,

to him, on any one or more of the grounds

specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908:

Provided that the High Court may entertain

the appeal after the expiry of the said period

of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the

appellant was prevented by sufficient cause

from preferring the appeal in time.

Explanation-The expression "High Court"

means the High Court of a State or Union

territory where the real estate project is

situated.

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(2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

(21) A plain reading of the aforesaid provision although sufficiently

provides for an appeal against the decision or order of the

Appellate Tribunal on any one and more grounds specified in

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, the word

“Second Appeal” is missing from the aforesaid Section 58 of

the Act. In any case, the very mention of the availability of

grounds as specified in Section 100 of CPC makes the said

provision of the CPC relevant for consideration of any appeal

under Section 58 of the RERA Act, especially when technically

it is an appeal against an Appellate Tribunal’s decision or order

and in that sense is virtually a second appeal. It would be

profitable at this stage to quote Section 100 C.P.C, which reads

as under:

"100.Second appeal-(1) Save as otherwise

expressly provided in the body of this Code

or by any other law for the time being in

force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court

from every decree passed in appeal by any

Court subordinate to the High Court, if the

High Court is satisfied that the case

involves a substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section

from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the

memorandum of appeal shall precisely

state the substantial question of law

involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a

substantial question of law is involved in

any case, it shall formulate that question.

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(5) The appeal shall be heard on the

question so formulated and the respondent

shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be

allowed to argue that the case does not

involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section

shall be deemed to take away or abridge

the power of the Court to hear, for reasons

to be recorded, the appeal on any other

substantial question of law, not formulated

by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves

such question.]”

(22) There is no gainsaying that a right to appeal is always conferred

by the statute and any party does not have an inherent right to

appeal. In the present case, it has been mentioned that an appeal

under Section 58 of the RERA Act can be preferred on one or

more grounds specified in Section 100 CPC. Apparently,

Section 100 CPC provides for an appeal to the High Court, if it

is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

Thus, it can be safely deduced that the existence of substantial

question of law is sine quo non for the exercise of jurisdiction

under Section 100 of the CPC as well as Section 58 of the

RERA Act.

(23) The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a

substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a

Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta

& Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd : AIR 1962 SC

1314 wherein it was held :-

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“The proper test for determining whether a

question of law raised in the case is

substantial would, in our opinion, be

whether it is of general public importance

or whether it directly and substantially

affects the rights of the parties and if so

whether it is either an open question in the

sense that it is not finally settled by this

Court or by the Privy Council or by the

Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or

calls for discussion of alternative views. If

the question is settled by the highest court

or the general principles to be applied in

determining the question are well settled

and there is a mere question of applying

those principles or that the plea raised is

palpably absurd the question would not be

a substantial question of law.”

(24) Although, under Section 58 of the RERA Act, the jurisdiction

of this Court is confined to substantial question of law, which as

a corollary means that a finding of fact is not open to challenge

in this proceeding, even if the appreciation of evidence is

palpably erroneous and the finding of fact is incorrect as has

been held by the Apex Court in Ramchandra Vs.

Ramalingam: AIR 1963 SC 302, however the same is always

to the exceptions that (i) the conclusions drawn by the court

below do not have a basis in the evidence led or (ii) the

appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity”.

(25) Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Nazir Mohamed V/s J.

Kamala and Ors. : (2020) 19 SCC 57 at paragraph 37

formulated the principles relating to Section 100 CPC as to how

and in what circumstances the substantial question of law can

be framed in the following words :-

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“37. The principles relating to Section 100

CPC relevant for this case may be

summarised thus:

An inference of fact from the recitals or

contents of a document is a question of

fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a

document is a question of law.

Construction of a document, involving the

application of any principle of law, is also a

question of law. Therefore, when there is

misconstruction of a document or wrong

application of a principle of law in

construing a document, it gives rise to a

question of law.

The High Court should be satisfied that the

case involves a substantial question of law,

and not a mere question of law. A question

of law having a material bearing on the

decision of the case (that is, a question,

answer to which affects the rights of parties

to the suit) will be a substantial question of

law, if it is not covered by any specific

provisions of law or settled legal principle

emerging from binding precedents, and,

involves a debatable legal issue.

A substantial question of law will also arise

in a contrary situation, where the legal

position is clear, either on account of

express provisions of law or binding

precedents, but the Court below has

decided the matter, either ignoring or acting

contrary to such legal principle. In the

second type of cases, the substantial

question of law arises not because the law

is still debatable, but because the decision

rendered on a material question, violates

the settled position of law.

The general rule is, that High Court will not

interfere with the concurrent findings of the

Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule.

Some of the well-recognised exceptions

are where (i) the courts below have ignored

material evidence or acted on no evidence;

(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences

from proved facts by applying the law

erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly

cast the burden of proof. A decision based

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on no evidence, does not refer only to

cases where there is a total dearth of

evidence, but also refers to case, where

the evidence, taken as a whole, is not

reasonably capable of supporting the

finding.”

(26) Having traced the scope and power of interference by this Court

under Section 58 of the RERA Act, 2016 to an order passed by

the Appellate Tribunal, this Court finds it profitable to quote the

various question of law as mentioned by the appellant in the

memo of appeal, so as to examine its relevance keeping in view

the limited scope of provisions of Section 58 of the RERA Act,

2016. The question of law framed by the appellant are thus :-

“ (a) Whether the order and judgment

impugned suffers from illegality on account

of improper consideration of material and

law as well as exercising the jurisdiction not

vested in it?

(b) Whether the order of the tribunal

upholding the order of adjudicating officer

can be just, legal and proper ignoring that

the complaint itself was not maintainable as

was filed much before to the RERA Act

came into force and was not an ongoing

project in view to rule 2(h)?

(c) Whether the impugned judgment and

order about awarding the interest of

compensation for delayed period, ignoring

that it was not due to fault of the appellant

can be just and liable to be set aside in

view of principles of force majeure?

(d) Whether after dismissal of complaint

by authority vide order dated 19.10.2019

the compensation or interest can be

awarded in view to section 12, 14 & 18 of

the Act and the order be held to be just and

proper.

(e) Whether in deciding all 18 appeals by

common order without considering the fact

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of each cases or appreciating the points

involved and argument made, the finding

can be held to be a speaking order and not

in violation to principles of natural Justice?

(f) Whether the finding of the impugned

judgment and order specially awarding

interest on delayed possession is being

contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court

is totally illegal arbitrary and is otherwise

not valid in the eyes of law hence liable to

be set-aside.”

(27) The aforesaid issues framed by the appellant apparently seems

to have been already decided by the Appellate Tribunal,

wherein the issues framed by the Tribunal subsumes the

question of law framed by the appellant in the present petitions.

Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal applauding the main aim of

the RERA Act is to protect the home buyers and also to make

sure that the investments in the field of the real estate industry

get uplifted with time had proceeded to answer these questions,

keeping in view that the RERA Act was brought in the scenario

to see to the fact that the sale to a Home buyer whether it be an

apartment or a plot transparently takes place between the

promoter/developer and the allotee/Home buyers.

(28) Now the Court proceeds to see whether the six ''substantial

questions of law”, as have been framed by the appellants, are

invoked ''substantially' or not, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of

this Court. A three Bench Judge of the Apex Court some more

than a decade ago in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam

Tiwari: (2001) 3 SCC 179, which was also reiterated and

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followed in Chandrabhan v. Saraswati : 2022 SCC Online SC

1273 and Government of Kerala Vs Joseph : 2023 SCC

Online SC 961 had held that to constitute a substantial question

of law, (i) the issue should not be previously settled by law of

land or a binding precedent, (ii) the said issue should have

material bearing on the decision of the case and (iii) the issue

raised should not be a fresh point raised for the first time before

the High Court, unless it goes to the root of the matter.

(29) Although, this Court exercising its Jurisdiction under Section

58 of the RERA Act is not enthroned as a Second Appellate

body, however, a fiction has been created by the Section itself,

which cast a duty and somewhat provide an embargo on the

appellant to file an appeal under the said section on any one or

more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. Thus, a restriction has been cast upon

the appellant to prefer the appeal on a limited ground of

“substantial question of law” and in that sense this Court could

be held to have exercising its power of Second Appeal under

Section 58 of the RERA as envisioned under Section 100 of the

Civil Procedure Code. Pertinently, no such restriction is

attributable to this Court of considering the present appeal only

on the point of substantial question of law.

(30) From perusal of the bunch of appeals being decided by this

common order, it comes out that the respondents in each of the

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cases have booked a flat with the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas

Parishad and paid a booking amount in terms of scheme floated

by the Parishad. Apparently, the respondents were allotted a flat

in Neelgiri Enclave (Vrindavan Yojna) during the period 2013-

2014. The Parishad, thereafter, demanded certain amount

towards allotted flats. The respondent claims to have submitted

the aforesaid amount as and when the demands were raised by

the Parishad. It is admitted that the possession of the flat was

supposed to be given within 30 months from the date of

allotment as per Clause 9.1 of the brochure. However, it was

only in 2017, that the respondents were asked to deposit the

final amount, so that the sale deed can be registered of the Flats

and it was subsequently only that the possession of these Flats

were given to the respondents. It is after having received the

possession and after registration of the sale deed, the

respondents filed a Complaint Case before the U.P. Real Estate

Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to as ''Authority')

claiming refund of certain excess amount, refund of interest,

compensation for delayed possession and other ancillary noncompliance of the RERA provisions relating to construction and

parking. Apparently, the complaint was allowed by the

Authority, wherein the Parishad was directed to pay interest on

the total amount of sale consideration paid till the date of

possession of the apartment at the rate of MCLR + 1% as

compensation. Subsequently, the Parishad filed various appeals

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before the Appellate Tribunal, which came to be decided by the

impugned common order dated 25.11.2022, by virtue of which

the order of the Authority was upheld and hence the present

second appeals.

(31) This Court has gone through the appeals filed by the Parishad

with assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the

appellant and the alleged substantial questions of law.

(32) Having traced the principles of law for consideration of the

present appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act, it is apparent

that none of the ''substantial' questions of law” as have been

framed by the appellant fall within the ambit of being

''substantial” questions of law. The reason for the same is that

the ''substantial” questions of law as have been framed by the

appellant are specifically covered by the specific provisions of

law as per the interpretation given to them and do not involve

any debatable legal issue as has been also held in Nazir

Mohamed Vs J. Kamala and Ors.: (2020) 19 SCC 57 at

paragraph 32, which inter-alia observes :-

“32. To be “substantial”, a question of law

must be debatable, not previously settled

by the law of the land or any binding

precedent, and must have a material

bearing on the decision of the case and/or

the rights of the parties before it, if

answered either way.”

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(33) The learned Counsel for the appellant has during the course of

his argument emphatically stressed on a recent order of the

learned RERA Appellate Tribunal passed in Appeal No. 70 of

2023 (GNIDA Vs. Ranjan Mishra) and two other connected

matters to argue that the RERA Tribunal has itself vide the said

judgment dated 20.04.2023 has held that the Adjudicating

Officer does not have the jurisdiction to grant interest in the

form of compensation under section 18(1) of the RERA Act and

that according to the learned Counsel, the Appellate Tribunal

has itself recorded in the said order that the competence and

jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Officer was being examined by

the Appellate Tribunal for the first time in the said case. While

the order of an Appellate Tribunal is not binding on this Court,

which has been designated as a Court of Second Appeal under

the scheme of RERA Act and even the judicial proprietary does

not permit this Court to consider the said order for adjudication

of these appeals, however, as is being discussed hereinafter, the

issue raised and decided in both the cases are at stark

differences.

(34) This Court on the specific query having put to the learned

Counsel for the appellant as to whether any ground had been

taken by him before the RERA Appellate Tribunal or before this

Hon’ble Court relating to the competence or jurisdiction of the

Adjudicating Authority for grant of interest as compensation

under Section 18(1) of the RERA Act, learned Counsel has

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neither admitted nor denied the said query and has instead

relied on the following judgments to buttress his submission

that a pure question of law, not dependent upon any question of

facts can be allowed to be raised for the first time even before

the Appellate Court.

(I) Chittoori Subbanna Vs Kudappa

Subbanna, AIR 1965 SC 1325,

(II) State of Punjab Vs Dr. R.N.

Bhatnagar & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 330,

(III) T.C. Appanda Mudaliar Vs State of

Madras, (1976) 4 SCC 821,

(IV) Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs Dir. of

Health Services, (2013) 10 SCC 136,

(V) Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kr.

Chadha (1984) 4 SCC 90,

(VI) State of Uttar Pradesh & others Vs

Dr. Anupam Gupta & Ors. (1993)

Suppl(1) SCC 594,

(VII) Lakshmi Shankar Mehrotra

& Ors. Vs S.M. Sengupta & Ors, (1995)

Suppl(4) SCC 40.

(35) There could not be any doubt about the aforesaid legal

precedent, however, as held in various judgment that a decision

is an authority for the questions of law determined by it and

while applying the ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or a

sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which

the said question arose for consideration. Thus Court finds that

there is no quarrel about the proposition of law argued by the

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learned Counsel for the appellant, however, the fact of the

matter remains that jurisdiction is an issue, which ought to have

been decided at a preliminary stage itself.

(36) At this juncture, it would be apt to quote the question of

determination formulated by the learned RERA Appellate

Tribunal, which inter-alia enumerates as follows:

“ I. Whether the complaint filed before

the Adjudicating officer is maintainable as

cause of action arose in year, 2013 before

RERA Act, 2016 came into force as

pleaded by appellant- UP Avas evam Vikas

Parishad, Lucknow in its Appeal ? .

II. Whether the project in question of the

appellant- UP Avas evam Vikas Parishad,

Lucknow is delayed ?

III. Whether the judgment and order

dated 13.03.2020 passed by the

Adjudicating Officer awarding the interest in

terms of compensation to the respondent/

complainant for delayed period from

30.07.2016 to 24.09.2019 is liable to be set

aside for the reasons mentioned in

appeal?”

(37) Thus, apparently the issue of competence and jurisdiction was

neither raised by the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal,

nor the same has been raised in the present memo of appeals

filed in this Court.

(38) Moreover, there is another aspect of the matter. This Court de

hors the aforesaid belated challenge to the Jurisdiction by the

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appellant would had entertained the said challenge even at this

stage, however, a plain reading of the facts of the present case

leads one to the conclusion that both the matters are

distinguishable on facts.

(39) Apparently, it is available from the impugned order of the

Adjudicating Officer that the allottee had filed a complaint

seeking compensation for various reasons, including (i) relating

to delay in possession, (ii) there being no windows in the flat

and (iii) non-providing of parking area etc., wherein the RERA

Authority vide an order dated 19.10.2019 marked the said case

for adjudication to the said Adjudicating Officer because

Section 18 of the Act related to grant of interest as well as

compensation. The learned Adjudicating Officer after hearing

the parties and recording the findings came to a conclusion that

there had been a delay in providing possession to the allottee

during the period from 31.08.2015 to 18.08.2017 and as such

for that period granted compensation to be calculated as an

interest at the rate of SBI Home loan rate MCLR+ 1%

calculated annually. The Adjudicating Officer held that interest

amount would be the compensation granted.

(40) Thus, this Court finds that the Adjudicating Officer has awarded

compensation in the form of interest, which in this case is “SBI

Home loan rate MCLR+ 1% calculated annually”. This Court

needs not burden this judgement any further in explaining the

meaning of compensation, which may be both monetary as well

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as non-monetary, direct or indirect etc. In the present case,

apparently, it seems that the appellant is so engrossed with the

word “Interest” that it is not able to visualize interest and

compensation separately. Needless to say, interest is a sub-set

of compensation and not vice-versa. Further, a Division bench

of the Bombay High Court in the case of Neelkamal Realtors

Suburban Pvt. Ltd. And others Vs. Union of India : AIR

2018 (NOC) 398 (BOM.), while deciding the constitutionality

of various provisions of RERA, observed as follows :-

“Section 18(1)(b) lays down that if the

promoter fails to complete or is unable to

give possession of an apartment due to

discontinuance of his business as a

developer on account of suspension or

revocation of the registration under the Act

or for any other reason, he is liable on

demand to the allottees, in case the allottee

wishes to withdraw from the project, without

prejudice to any other remedy available, to

return the amount received by him in

respect of that apartment with interest at

such rate as may be prescribed in this

behalf including compensation. If the

allottee does not intend to withdraw from

the project he shall be paid by the promoter

interest for every month's delay till handing

over of the possession. The requirement to

pay interest is not a penalty as the payment

of interest is compensatory in nature in the

light of the delay suffered by the allottee

who has paid for his apartment but has not

received possession of it. The obligation

imposed on the promoter to pay interest till

such time as the apartment is handed over

to him is not unreasonable. The interest is

merely compensation for use of money.”

(41) In any case, the point being raised by the learned Counsel for

the appellant in challenging the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating

Authority vis-à-vis the RERA Authority for grant of interest for

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an allottee who wishes to remain invested with the project and

eventually takes the possession, is not under challenge, as

proviso to Section 18(1) clearly mandates that where an allottee

does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid

by the promoter, interest for every month of delay, till the

handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be

prescribed. Therefore, by raising the point of jurisdiction, the

learned Counsel has waived to certain extent the grant of

interest, as the resurrected challenge is as to who can grant

interest, whether the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer. This

Court finds that the aforesaid challenge has been already

answered by the Apex Court at paragraph 86 of the judgment

reported as M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt.

Ltd. Vs. State of U.P (Civil Appeal No. 6745-6749 of 2021)

decided on 11.11.2021, which inter-alia states;

“86. From the scheme of the Act of which

a detailed reference has been made and

taking note of power of adjudication

delineated with the regulatory authority and

adjudicating officer, what finally culls out is

that although the Act indicates the distinct

expressions like ‘refund’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’

and ‘compensation’, a conjoint reading of

Sections 18 and 19 clearly manifests that

when it comes to refund of the amount,

and interest on the refund amount,

or directing payment of interest for delayed

delivery of possession, or penalty and

interest thereon, it is the regulatory

authority which has the power to

examine and determine the outcome

of a complaint. At the same time, when

it comes to a question of seeking the relief

of adjudging compensation and interest

thereon under Sections 12, 14, 18

and 19, the adjudicating officer

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exclusively has the power to

determine, keeping in view the

collective reading of Section 71 read with

Section 72 of the Act. If the adjudication

under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 other

than compensation as envisaged, if

extended to the adjudicating officer as

prayed that, in our view, may intend to

expand the ambit and scope of the powers

and functions of the adjudicating officer

under Section 71 and that would be against

the mandate of the Act 2016.”

(42) It is no gain saying that both RERA Authority and Adjudicating

Authority operates in different hemisphere, inasmuch as RERA

Authority is empowered to grant interest whereas Adjudicating

Authority is empowered to adjudge compensation and interest

and thus the jurisdiction of grant of Interest in the form of

compensation by the Adjudicating Authority for and in place of

the RERA Authority cannot be faulted with.

(43) Further, there is another aspect of the matter. An examination of

Section 71 of the Act reveals that an Adjudicating Officer is to

be appointed by the Regulatory Authority in consultation with

the Government. The Adjudicating Officer alone has the power

to deal with the application for adjudging compensation under

Section 71 read with Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act as

could be well deduced on a simple reading of section 71(1) and

71(2) of the Act. However, Section 71(3) of the Act provides

that the Adjudicating Officer has powers to direct to pay such

compensation or interest, as the case may be, if he is satisfied

that the person has failed to comply with the provisions of any

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of the section as provided in subsection (1) i.e section 12, 14,

18 & 19 of the Act. as the case may, as much as subsection (3)

of section 18 of the Act, 2016 signifies that if the promoter fails

to discharge any other obligations imposed on him under this

Act or the rules or regulations, made thereunder or in

accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for

sale, he shall be liable to pay such compensation to the allottee,

in the manner as provided under the Act, 2016. Moreover,

section 71 relating to factors to be taken into account by

adjudicating officer signifies various factors which are to be

taken into consideration by the Adjudicating Officer, while

adjudging the quantum of compensation or Interest as the case

may be under section 71 of the Act. Thus, the provisions of

RERA are wide enough to empower the adjudicating Officer to

adjudicate the quantum of compensation and grant the same in

the form of Interest as has been done in the present case.

(44) According to this Court, the challenge to the competence and

jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in the present set of facts

is wholly misplaced as the Adjudicating Officer has awarded

compensation in the form of interest and not interest simplicitor

as is being construed by the appellant, which according to him

is the prerogative of the RERA Authority. This Court also finds

that the Apex Court in the aforesaid M/s Newtech Promoters

and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has nowhere discussed the

form of compensation to be awarded to the allottee. Therefore,

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in the present case, in case the Adjudicating Officer has

awarded compensation in the form of Interest, nothing illegal or

infirmity could be found in the competence or Jurisdiction of

the Adjudicating Officer. The said finding also is being given

keeping in view the beneficial legislation for which RERA Act

was enacted by the legislation for safeguarding the interest of

Home Buyers by ensuring fair practice, providing timely

information and resolving disputes between an allottee and the

Developers.

(45) Having perused the records, this Court is of the view that no

substantial question of law arises in these petitions. In any case,

a perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the

Appellate Tribunal has not missed the woods of the tree and has

dealt all the issues which are being raised herein by the

Appellant in a very elaborate manner by following the

provisions of the Act 2016 and the various judgment of the

Apex Court in the said subject.

(46) Notwithstanding the above, as the memo of appeal has been

preferred and since the counsel for the appellant has strenuously

urged this Court to decide on the substantial question of law

framed by him in the appeal, this Court finds its bounden duty

to deal with these question (which has been termed by the

Appellant as substantial question of law) as has been

enumerated in the memo of appeal.

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(47) Having regard to the question No. 1 i.e. “ (a)Whether the order

and judgment impugned suffers from illegality on account of

improper consideration of material and law as well as

exercising the jurisdiction not vested in it?, learned counsel for

the appellant is unable to show from records as to how the

impugned judgment suffers from any illegality and as to which

specific material or law has been improperly considered by the

Appellate Tribunal. Learned Counsel has drawn attention of this

Court to the provisions of Section 44 of the RERA Act in

general which bestows the jurisdiction of appeal to the

Appellate Tribunal and specifically Section 44(6) of the Act,

which inter-alia gives sweeping power of jurisdiction vested in

it as it says as under:-

“(6) The Appellate Tribunal may, for the

purpose of examining the legality or

propriety or correctness of any order or

decision of the Authority or the adjudicating

officer, on its own motion or otherwise, call

for the records relevant to deposing of such

appeal and make such orders as it thinks

fit.”

(48) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal after narrating the

facts and grounds of the contesting parties, went on to

formulate the following points for determination:

“(I) whether the complaint filed before the

Adjudicating Officer is maintainable as

cause of action arose in year, 2013 before

RERA Act, 2016 came into force as

pleaded by appellant- U.P Avas evam Vikas

Parishad, Lukcknow in its Appeal?

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(II) Whether the project in question of the

Appellant- U.P Avas evam Vikas Parishad,

Lukcknow is delayed?

(III) Whether the judgment and order

dated 13.03.2020 passed by the

Adjudicating Officer awarding the interest in

terms of compensation to the respondent/

complainant for delayed period from

30.07.2016 to 24.09.2019 is liable to be set

aside for the reasons mentioned in

appeal?”

(49) As far as the first issue is concerned, the Appellate Tribunal

extensively recorded the facts and returned a finding that

although the scheme was floated by the appellant in 2013 and

the respondent booked a flat in the same year and the RERA

Act, 2016 came into force on 1st May, 2016, however the

project being an “Ongoing project” before 24.09.2019 i.e the

date when Antim Pradeshan Patra was issued by the Appellant

for delivery of possession by them to the Respondent, the

provisions of RERA were applicable to the project in view of

Rule 2(h) of the U.P Real Estate ( Regulation & Development)

Rules, 2016.

(50) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has returned the

aforesaid finding, after examining the expression and meaning

of “ongoing project” as is to be found in Rule 2(h) of U.P Real

Estate ( Regulation & Development) Rules, 2016, Completion

certificate as is defined in section 2(q) of the RERA Act, 2016,

section 4(5) of the U.P Apartment (promotion of construction,

Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 relating to the

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requirement of “Completion Certificate” and “Occupancy

certificate” as defined in section 2(zf) of the RERA Act, 2016.

(51) Further, as far as the second issue relating to the delay in the

project, the Appellate Tribunal examined the provisions of

clause 2.1 of the Registration Booklet relating to the date of

possession proposed by the Appellant and the actual date of

possession and after referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in M/s Fortune(now known as HICON

Infrastructure) and Anr. V/s Trevor D’lima & Ors. : (2018)

5 SCC 442, wherein it was held that a person cannot be made to

wait indefinitely, concluded that the project of the Appellant

was delayed.

(52) The Appellate Tribunal, while deciding the third point for

determination, cited the provisions of Clauses 2.1 and 9.1 of the

Registration Booklet along with Clauses 4.5 and 4.6 of the

Registration Booklet. Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal after

examining the various judgment including Lucknow

Development Authority Vs M.K. Gupta, 1994 (91) SCC 243,

Ghaziabad Development Authority V/s Balbir Singh, 2004

(5) SCC 65, Haryana Development Authority V/s Darsh

Kumar, 2005 (9) SCC 449 and also Ghaziabad Development

Authority V/s Union of India, 2000 (6) SCC 113 along with

Bangalore Development Authority V/s Syndicate Bank

reported in II (2007) CPJ 17 (SC) arrived at a conclusion that

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the tentative period or proposed period for construction of the

flat does not mean a “unreasonable period”. The Appellate

Tribunal also recording that the possession of the flat was not

given as per the proposed timeline of possession as mentioned

in the Registration Booklet and the possession came to be given

by the appellant much later. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal

upheld the finding of the Adjudicating Authority by holding that

the Authority had adopted a moderate view and has considered

the delay from the proposed expiry of the date of possession to

the date of issuance of Antim pradeshan patra by the Appellant

and not the execution of the sale deed, which ought to have

been the actual date of delivery of possession and as such held

the calculation for delay in possession by the Authority to be

not for an unreasonable period.

(53) As far as the other issues relating to failure of the appellant to

rectify the structural defects and common facilities, in violation

of Section 14 of the RERA Act, 2016 and the entitlement of

compensation by the respondent in addition to the delay in

possession as contended by the Respondent, the Appellant

argued that in case of delay in giving possession of the flat,

within prescribed period, the option was open to the

allottee/respondent to claim refund of the deposited amount at

the prescribed rate of interest and if despite the delay the

allottee preferred for possession of the flat rather than refund of

the deposited amount, the allottee’s right to claim

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interest/compensation did not existed, especially when after

execution of sale deed in favour of the allottee/respondent, the

question of any structural defect does not arise.

(54) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has extensively

dealt with the aforesaid issue in the impugned order and while

referring to Chapter III of the RERA Act, 2016 comprising of

Sections 12 to 18 dealing with functions and duties of

promoters has recorded a finding that Section 71 of the Act

entails that in contravention of the provisions of section 12, 14,

18 and 19(4) by the promoter, the allottee is well within his

rights to get refund of his/her entire deposited amount along

interest “ as such rate as may be prescribed” and “compensation

in the manner provided under the Act”.

(55) The Appellate Tribunal also upheld the findings of the

Adjudicating Authority to the effect that if the amount of

interest was not paid within a period of 45 days, the respondent

was entitled to get interest at the same rate till the date of actual

payment, to be a means of check upon the appellant to honour

the time-line within which the awarded amount of interest had

been directed to be paid to the respondent/allottee. Even the last

submission of the appellant related to financial crisis and

running of the project on “no loss and no profit basis” to justify

that the interest was not payable for delayed period was rejected

on the ground that the same was immaterial and the award of

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interest in the case of delayed possession was as per the

provision of the RERA Act.

(56) Thus, a well-reasoned and detailed judgment was passed by the

Appellate Tribunal, wherein all the Appeals filed by the

Appellant was dismissed.

(57) The Appellate Tribunal examined the evidence on record at

length, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion, that there was a

delay in handing over of the possession of the project to the

respondent. This finding is based on cogent and binding

documents of Registration Document, occupation certificate,

including the registered sale deeds by which the respective

allottees have taken possession of the flats. There was no

erroneous inference from any proved fact.

(58) The learned Counsel was not able to produce any judgment to

espouse its cause of challenging the jurisdiction allegedly not

having been vested with the Appellate Tribunal.

(59) In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the order and

judgment impugned does not suffers from any illegality or

infirmity. There is no alleged improper consideration of

material and law nor the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction

not specifically vested by the provisions of RERA Act.

(60) As far as Question No.2 i.e. “(b) Whether the order of the

tribunal upholding the order of adjudicating officer can be just,

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legal and proper ignoring that the complaint itself was not

maintainable as was filed much before to the RERA Act came

into force and was not an ongoing project in view to rule 2(h)?

is concerned, this Court finds that admittedly, the completion

certificate has been issued to the Project after the

commencement of the RERA Act, 2016 and the sale deed and

possession has been granted in the year 2017-2018. Besides the

fact that the said issue has been extensively dealt with and

decided by the Appellate Tribunal as issue No.1, this court finds

that the said issue has already been settled by the Apex Court in

various judgments including in the case of M/s. Newtech

Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of UP & Ors.

(supra). The Apex Court, while deciding the issue as to

whether the RERA Act has retroactive or retrospective effect,

held that the Act is not retrospective in nature because it affects

the existing rights of the persons mentioned in the Act like

promoters, allotees etc. and the intent of the legislature was to

bring all "ongoing projects"2 which commenced prior to the Act

and for which the completion certificate had not been issued,

under the ambit of the Act. The relevant observation could be

found at paragraph 34 to 40, which are being curled out for

ready reference :-

“34. The term “ongoing project” has not

been so defined under the Act while the

expression “real estate project” is defined

under Section 2 (zn) of the Act which reads

as under:

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“2(zn) “real estate project” means the

development of a building or a building

consisting of apartments, or converting an

existing building or a part thereof into

apartments, or the development of land

into plots or apartments, as the case may

be, for the purpose of selling all or some of

the said apartments or plots or building, as

the case may be, and includes the

common areas, the development works, all

improvements and structures thereon, and

all easement, rights and appurtenances

belonging thereto;”

35. The Act is intended to comply even to

the ongoing real estate project. The

expression “ongoing project” has been

defined under Rule 2(h) of the Uttar

Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and

Development) Rules, 2016 which reads as

under:-

“2(h) “Ongoing project” means a

project where development is going

on and for which completion

certificate has not been issued but

excludes such projects which fulfil

any of the following criteria on the

date of notification of these rules:

(i) Where services have been

handed over to the Local Authority

for maintenance.

(ii) where common areas and

facilities have been handed over to

the Association for the Residents'

Welfare Association for maintenance.

(iii) where all development work have

been completed and sale/lease

deeds of sixty percent of the

apartment/houses/plots have been

executed.

(iv) where all development works

have been completed and

application has been filed with the

competent authority for issue of

completion certificate.”

36. The expression “completion

certification” has been defined under

Section 2(q) and “occupancy certificate”

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under Section 2(zf) of the Act which reads

as under :-

“2(q) “completion certificate” means

the completion certificate, or such

other certificate, by whatever name

called, issued by the competent

authority certifying that the real

estate project has been developed

according to the sanctioned plan,

layout plan and specifications, as

approved by the competent authority

under the local laws;

2(zf). “occupancy certificate”

means the occupancy certificate, or

such other certificate, by whatever

name called, issued by the

competent authority permitting

occupation of any building, as

provided under local laws, which has

provision for civic infrastructure such

as water, sanitation and electricity;”

37. Looking to the scheme of Act 2016

and Section 3 in particular of which a

detailed discussion has been made, all

“ongoing projects” that commence prior to

the Act and in respect to which completion

certificate has not been issued are covered

under the Act. It manifests that the

legislative intent is to make the Act

applicable not only to the projects which

were yet to commence after the Act

became operational but also to bring under

its fold the ongoing projects and to protect

from its inception the inter se rights of the

stake holders, including allottees/home

buyers, promoters and real estate agents

while imposing certain duties and

responsibilities on each of them and to

regulate, administer and supervise the

unregulated real estate sector within the

fold of the real estate authority.

38. The emphasis of Mr. Kapil Sibal,

learned senior counsel for the appellant is

that the agreement of sale was executed in

the year 201011, i.e. much before the

coming into force of the Act and the

present Act has retrospective application

and registration of ongoing project under

the Act would be in contravention to the

contractual rights established between the

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promoter and allottee under the agreement

for sale executed which is impermissible in

law and further submits that Sections 13,

18(1), 19(4) of the Act 2016 to the extent of

their retrospective application is in violation

of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution

of India.

39. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor

General, on the other hand, submits that a

bare perusal of the object and reasons

manifest that the Act does not take away

the substantive jurisdiction, rather it

protects the interest of homebuyers where

project/possession is delayed and further

submits that the scheme of the Act has

retroactive application, which is permissible

under the law. The provisions make it clear

that it operates in future, however, its

operation is based upon the character and

status which have been done earlier and

the presumption against retrospectively in

this case is ex-facie rebuttable. The literal

interpretation of the statute manifest that it

has not made any distinction between the

“existing” real estate projects and “new”

real estate projects as has been defined

under Section 2(zn) of the Act.

40. Learned counsel further submits that

the key word, i.e., “ongoing on the date of

the commencement of this Act” by

necessary implication, exfacie and without

any ambiguity, means and includes those

projects which were ongoing and in cases

where only issuance of completion

certificate remained pending, legislature

intended that even those projects have to

be registered under the Act. Therefore, the

ambit of Act is to bring all projects under its

fold, provided that completion certificate

has not been issued. The case of the

appellant is based on “occupancy

certificate” and not of “completion

certificate”. In this context, learned counsel

submits that the said proviso ought to be

read with Section 3(2)(b), which specifically

excludes projects where completion

certificate has been received prior to the

commencement of the Act. Thus, those

projects under Section 3(2) need not be

registered under the Act and, therefore, the

intent of the Act hinges on whether or not a

project has received a completion

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certificate on the date of commencement of

the Act.”

(61) Since the Authority and the Appellate Authority have returned a

finding of fact that the completion certificate was issued on

20.12.2018, i.e much later than the date of commencement of

the RERA Act, 2016 and there is no contrary argument by the

learned Counsel for the appellant, the Appellate Tribunal was

right in holding that the present project was an “ongoing

project” and the complaint filed by the respondent was

maintainable. Thus, no substantial question of law arises as

neither the issue raised is debatable nor the same has not been

decided by a binding principle of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

(62) As far as the Question No.3 raised by the appellant is

concerned, which inter-alia states that “(c) Whether the

impugned judgment and order about awarding the interest of

compensation for delayed period, ignoring that it was not due

to fault of the appellant can be just and liable to be set aside in

view of principles of force majeure?, this Court finds that the

aforesaid is essentially a question of fact and there are two

concurrent findings against the appellant. The Appellate

Authority have elaborately dealt with the said aspect and while

deciding issue No.2 has returned a finding that the project was

delayed. Further, this court finds that the factum of farmer

agitation to be construed as force majeure was also considered

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by the Appellate Tribunal in extenso and has also discussed the

principles of force majeure.

(63) The Tribunal also discussed the issue as to whether famers

agitation would be termed as “Force Majeure” or not and while

citing the explanation appended to section 6 of the RERA Act,

2016 and discussing the expression “ Act of God” or “Vis

Major” and the Judgment of Ramalinga Nadar V/s Narayan

Reddiar, AIR 1971 Kerala 197 which dealt with the term “VisMajor”, returned a finding that the case at hand and situation

narrated by the Appellant could not be covered under the

meaning of “Force majeure”

(64) This court also does not find any reason to interfere with the

findings arrived by the Appellate Tribunal, which are based on

precedent and sound legal principles. Thus, the present question

does not give rise to any debatable point nor the issue being

raised is in the nature of substantial question of law.

(65) Having regard to question No. 4 raised by the Appellant i.e. (d)

whether after dismissal of complaint by authority vide order

dated 19.10.2019 the compensation or interest can be awarded

in view to section 12, 14 & 18 of the Act and the order be held

to be just and proper, this court finds that the aforesaid issue is

a misconceived perception of the Appellant. Apparently, the

respondent had filed a cumulative complaint relating to delay in

possession, no window in flat and no parking having been

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provided to him and as such has sought for compensation. The

authority vide order dated 19.10.2019 has partially rejected the

contention of the respondent relating to car parking and window

not having been provided in the Flat taking cognizance of

section 12 and 14 of RERA Act, however the Authority finding

a delay in giving of possession to the respondent had referred

the complaint for award of compensation & disposal under

section 71 of the RERA Act to the Adjudicating Authority.

(66) The Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that section 12 to

18 deals with “Functions and Duties of Promoter” and

invariably relates to duties which have been imposed upon the

promoter. Further, section 71 of the Act clearly says that in

contravention of the provisions of section 12, 14, 18 and 19(4)

by the promoter, the allottee is well within his right to get

refund of his/her entire deposited amount along with interest “at

such rate as may be prescribed” and “compensation in the

manner provided under the Act”. It goes without saying that

Section 18(1) of the Act provides as under :-

“18(1) If the promoter fails to complete or is

unable to give possession of an apartment,

plot or building,—

(a) in accordance with the terms of the

agreement for sale or, as the case may be,

duly completed by the date specified

therein; or

(b) due to discontinuance of his business

as a developer on account of suspension or

revocation of the registration under this Act

or for any other reason, he shall be liable

on demand to the allottees, in case the

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allottee wishes to withdraw from the

project, without prejudice to any other

remedy available, to return the amount

received by him in respect of that

apartment, plot, building, as the case may

be, with interest at such rate as may be

prescribed in this behalf including

compensation in the manner as provided

under this Act:

Provided that where an allottee does not

intend to withdraw from the project, he shall

be paid, by the promoter, interest for every

month of delay, till the handing over of the

possession, at such rate as may be

prescribed.”

(67) Thus, the said Section consists of two parts. Here this Court is

concerned with the second part, which invariably gives an

indefeasible right to the allottee in the case he does not intent to

withdraw from the project. The second part in clear and loud

terms say that the allottee in such a situation would be entitled

for interest for every month of delay, till the handing over of the

possession, at such rate as may be prescribed. Further, this court

finds that in order to determine the point of compensation the

power has been bestowed upon the adjudicating officer in terms

of section 71 & 72 of the RERA Act read with rule 34(1) of the

U.P RERA Rules, 2016. Thus, this also being a loosely

connection of fact and law does not qualify to be termed as

substantial question of law and as such needs no further

interference from this court.

(68) As far as question No. 5 i.e. (e) Whether in deciding all 18

appeals by common order without considering the fact of each

cases or appreciating the points involved and argument made,

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the finding can be held to be a speaking order and not in

violation to principles of natural Justice?, is concerned, this

Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has painstakingly

recorded the facts of each case in a tabular chart at paragraph

No1 and has briefly given details of all the cases in the said

chart. Further, this court finds that although the facts relating to

flat no, sale consideration, project, allotment letter, final letter,

date of sale deed or date of possession might have been

different, but it is not the case of the Appellant that the

completion certificate in any of the case was not 20.12.2018 or

for that matter prior to the coming of force of the RERA Act. It

is also not the case of the Appellant that the duration of

completion of project was not 24/30 months but something

more or that the possession was given by them during the said

duration as provided in the registration booklet or that the

possession was not delayed. Apparently, the appellant has taken

a common defence in all the complaints filed by the respondent

and as such this court does not find any error of the Appellate

Tribunal in deciding these cases vide the present common

impugned order. In any case, this also does not qualify to be a

substantial question of law as has been projected by the

Appellant.

(69) The last question No. 6 as framed by the appellant i.e. (f)

whether the finding of the impugned judgment and order

specially awarding interest on delayed possession is being

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contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court is totally illegal

arbitrary and is otherwise not valid in the eyes of law hence

liable to be set-aside.” is concerned, a perusal of the order

passed by the Authority as well as the Tribunal would

sufficiently indicate that they have proceeded to grant

compensation in terms of provisions contained in Section 71

read with Section 72 of the RERA Act 2016.

(70) The learned Appellate Tribunal has also recorded in the

impugned order that the Adjudicating Officer has passed the

impugned order by exercising his power under section 71 and

71 of the Act read along with Rule 34(1) of the Rules, 2016.

Thus, the Tribunal while referring to the case reported as M/s

Imperia Structures Ltd. V/s Anil Patni and Another, Civil

Appeal Nos. 3581-3590 of 2020 decided on 02.11.2020 relating

to the choice available to an allottee to seek for refund along

with interest in terms of section 18(1) in case he chooses to not

withdraw from the project and alternative remedy to seek

interest for every month of delay till handing over of the

possession in terms of proviso to section 18(1) of the RERA

Act, 2016, in case he chooses to not to withdraw from the

project. The judgment of LIC of India and Anr. V/s

Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. : (1995) 5

SCC 482 was cited to hold that the terms & conditions of the

agreement must be reasonable. Further, Judgment passed in

Pioneer urban land and Infrastructure Ltd. V/s Govindan

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Raghavan, II (2019) CPJ 34(SC) was cited to refer that the

Hon’ble Apex court did not accept the plea of the builder that it

should not be directed to pay interest at the rate of 10.7% as the

agreement provided for 6% interest. Moreover, the judgment of

Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan & Others V/s DLF Southern

Homes Pvt. Ltd. (2020) SCC Online 667 was cited to hold that

given the one-sided nature of the Apartment Buyer’s

Agreement, the consumer for a had the Jurisdiction to award

just and reasonable compensation as an incident of the power to

direct removal of deficiency in service.

(71) The contention of the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal

that as per clause 4.5 and clause 4.6 of the registration booklet/

Brochure there is no mention of any specific date of possession

or that as to whether any interest being payable, in case the

project is delayed or what amount of interest would be payable

by the Appellant, was held to be an omission against the

provisions of section 4(2) (b) of the U.P Apartment Act, 2010.

The Tribunal also recorded the judgment of HUDA and

another V/s Shakuntala Devi, (2017) 2 SCC 301 to hold that

even in cases, where the delivery of possession had been

directed there would be compensation for harassment/loss in a

consumer protection case and thus concluded that sicne the

possession of the allotted flat was delayed, the respondent was

entitled for interest/compensation as per the legal norms. The

Tribunal cited the judgment of M/s Newtech Promoters and

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Page 54 of 94

Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s State of U.P (supra) to ratify the

proposition that contractual terms do not have overriding effect

over the provisions of the Act.

(72) This Court does not find any reasons as to how the awarding of

interest on delayed possession by the Appellate Tribunal is in

any manner contrary to law as laid down by Apex Court. The

Learned Counsel for the appellant could not place nor refer to

any judgment of the Apex court to show any contrary view as

has been deduced by the Appellate Tribunal in arriving at the

impugned conclusion. In any case, the findings returned by the

Appellate Tribunal is based on sound principles of law &

precedents and as such, this Court does not find any substantial

question of law involved for the present question framed by the

Appellant.

(73) As a sequel to above, this Court does not find any merit in

RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,

80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023 and the same are hereby

dismissed.

C. RERA Appeal No. 68 of 2023 (U.P Ewas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs. Arun Kumar Dwivedi)

(74) It is seen from the records that the aforesaid appeal has been

filed by the appellant- “U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad” under

Section 58 of the RERA Act, 2016, against an order dated

05.09.2022 passed by the UP Real Estate Appellate Tribunal at

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Page 55 of 94

Lucknow. Apparently, by virtue of the impugned order, the

learned Appellate Tribunal with the consent of the parties has

directed the Parishad to pay interest from (30.10.2015 to

11.02.2000) instead of interest for the period from (30.06.2015

to 11.02.2000) as directed by the Adjudicating Authority. The

Appellate Authority has also directed both the parties to move

release Application regarding withdrawal of amount deposited

under Section 43(5) of the Act.

(75) This appeal has been filed under Section 58 of the RERA, 2016,

which inter-alia states :-

"58. Appeal to High Court-(1) Any

person aggrieved by any decision or order

of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an

appeal to the High Court, within a period of

sixty days from the date of communication

of the decision or order of the Appellate

Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the

grounds specified in Section 100 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Provided that the High Court may entertain

the appeal after the expiry of the said

period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the

appellant was prevented by sufficient

cause from preferring the appeal in time.

Explanation-The expression "High Court"

means the High Court of a State or Union

territory where the real estate project is

situated.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

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Page 56 of 94

(76) The learned Counsel for the appellant was requested to refer

section 58(2) of the RERA Act, 2016, which bars any appeal

against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal

with the consent of the parties. The learned Counsel was asked

to address his arguments on the said point.

(77) The learned Counsel for the appellant raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

were addressed on the point of maintainability of the present

Appeal on the point of section 58(2) of the RERA Act. Also

there was no argument denying or disputing the consensual

order passed by the Appellate tribunal vide the impugned order

dated 05.09.2022.

(78) Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the

findings returned in the aforesaid appeals lead being “RERA

Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi),

no substantial question of law arises in RERA APPEAL No. 68

of 2023 and as such the same is dismissed.

D. RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and others).

(79) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 13.08.2021 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Somyata

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Zaidi. The complainant in that case, i.e Somyata Zaidi was

allotted flat in Vrindvan Yojna, Part-4, sector-17, Niligiri

Enclave, wherein the sale deed was executed on 12.10.2017 and

the possession was granted on 17.10.2017. It was the case of

the complainant/ allottee therein that the possession was

delayed and he was entitled for compensation. Accordingly,

compensation was awarded by the adjudicating officer vide

order dated 20.09.2019 in the form of Interest.

(80) On perusal of the impugned judgment dated 13.08.2021, this

court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has framed three

question for determination as has been done by the Appellate

Tribunal in similar other matters, which were decided by this

court in the lead matter “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(81) Thus, this Court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the appellant and as such RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 is

also decided in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA

Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 58 of 94

E. RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Satya Narain Agnihotri)

(82) This appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the

impugned order dated 30.06.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Satya Narain

Agnihotri at the rate of MCLR + 1% per annum for the delay

period from 30.03.2016 to 13.10.2017. The complainant in that

case, i.e Satya Narain Agnihotri was initially allotted a 3BHK

flat in Bhagirathi Enclave on 13.09.2013. However, the

Appellant failed to deliver possession of the allotted flat within

the stipulated date i. 30.03.2016 as mentioned in the Brochure

and demand letter dated 30.09.2013. The complainant being in

acute need of the flat as early as possible as he was to

superannuate on 29.04.2018, approached the promotor for

delivering the possession of the allotted flat so that he may shift

prior to demitting his office. The officials of the Appellant in

the month of October 2017 informed the complainant that he

may get his flat changed from 3 BHK to 3 BHK + Servant and

then the Appellant would be in a position to deliver the flat at

the time. The complainant, having no option except to agree

with oral offer of the promoter gave consent for 3 BHK +

Servant flat for which an extra payment of Rs. 11,50,000/- was

further required. Thereafter the complainant was allotted flat

no. 2B/T-1/306 vide letter dated 13.10.2017 at an additional

amount of Rs. 11,86,127/- along with the miscellaneous

expenses of Rs. 1,53,885/- by the appellant. The complainant

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deposited the said amount under protest and got the sale deed

executed on 25.11.2017 in respect of Flat No. 2B/T-1/306.

There has been considerable delay of 20 months’ delivery of

possession of the flat as mentioned in the Brochure issued in the

year 2013. However, the Adjudicating officer awarded interest

for delay in delivery of possession for the period from

30.03.2016 to 13.10.2017 at the rate of MCLR +1% per annum.

Accordingly, compensation was awarded by the adjudicating

officer vide order dated 20.11.2020 in the form of Interest.

(83) This Court finds that both the complainant Satya Narain

Agnihotri and the appellant (Avas Evam Vikas Parishad) filed

cross-Appeals, which was eventually decided by the impugned

order. On perusal of the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2022,

this court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has framed almost

Nine question for determination. The Appellate Tribunal in

deciding these issues arrived at a decision that the Act of 2016

provided a mechanism for determination of interest and/or

compensation for the delay in handing over possession of the

unto to the allottee, if the allottee wishes to stay with the

project. The Tribunal also held that in view the Newtech

Promoter’s case, the promoter cannot shirk from the

responsibilities/ liabilities under the Act and the contractual

terms do not have an overriding effect to the retrospective

applicability of the authority under the provisions of the Act. In

the facts of the case, the Tribunal held that there was delay of

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more than 18 months in delivery of possession by the Appellant

to the complainant. The Tribunal also held that a home buyer

does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the delay

in possession even after execution of the conveyance deed and

taking of possession of the unit/Apartment/Fat booked by him.

The Appellate Tribunal while deciding the 5th point of

determination concluded that the rate of interest i.e MCLR +

1% granted by the Adjudication officer, as compensation for

delayed possession, if fair, just and reasonable as it balances the

equities between the parties and the Adjudicating Officer’s

action is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The

learned Appellate Tribunal also held that as per the provisions

of the U.P Apartments (Promotion of construction, ownership

and Maintenacne Act, 2010 read with the provisions of the Act,

2016 a promoter is required to offer legal and habitable

possession to the allottees only after obtaining C.C/O.C and ask

for clearing dues by raising the final demand. The Tribunal also

affirmatively held that the amenities, facilities and services

advertised by the appellant in its Brochure are required to be

fulfilled and provided to the allottees of the project. The

Appellate authority after examining the facts in great detail and

considering the various Judgement, held that there was no

illegality or perversity in the impugned order of the

Adjudicating officer of the regulatory authority in awarding

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interest as compensation to the allottee/complaint for delay in

possession of the flat by the appellant.

(84) This Court finds that the appellant has primarily challenged the

aforesaid impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal primarily

on the ground, which has been a subject matter of challenge in

similar other matters, which were decided by this court in the

lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (ComplainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(85) Thus, this court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the appellant and as such the present Appeal is also decided

in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(86) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s Satya Narain Agnihotri) is dismissed.

F. RERA Appeals No. 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,

102, 103, 104 of 2023

(87) These appeals have been filed against the impugned common

order dated 21.01.2022 passed by the learned UP Real Estate

Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow.

(88) Since, common question of law has been raised by the

Appellant in all these appeals, which are all directed towards a

common order dated 21.01.2022, it would be in the interest of

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justice that all these appeals are consolidated and taken together

for hearing and disposal. However, before this court deals with

the question of law raised in these appeals, the brief facts

culminating into these appeals be narrated to appreciate the law

in its proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead

mater being RERA Appeal No. 88 of 2023 (ComplainantKunwar Bahadur Singh) is taken into consideration.

(89) Succinctly, it is available from records that the complainant

(Kunwar Bahadur Singh) filed a complaint for compensation in

delay in offering possession, no window in the flat offered and

no parking allotted by the Appellant/ Promoter. The said

complaint was marked/referred to the Adjudicating Officer vide

order dated 25.11.2019 of the Authority. As per the complaint,

the complainant was allotted a flat in Vrindavan Yojna in

Nillgiri Enclave on 30.08.2013 for an amount of Rs.

20,88,000/-. The possession of the said flat was to be given in

24 months, however the same was not offered by the Promoter,

which resulted in increase in the price of the flat, levy of GST

etc. It was the case of the complainant that although he had

regularly paid the instalments, however the promoter failed to

provide window in the flat as well as the parking as promised in

Brochure. However, the appellant defended the said complaint

by stating that the price of the flat was never fixed, nor the date

of possession had been fixed and the same were only proposed.

They also took ground of certain litigation relating to

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acquisition of land pending before this court for the delay. They

also submitted that the complaint was not maintainable for

compensation under section 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(90) This Court finds that the Adjudicating Officer after recording

the submission of the parties and dealing with the provisions of

the RERA Act gave a detailed Judgment vide order dated

13/08/2020, thereby returning a finding that the complainant

inspite of taking the possession of the flat is entitled for

compensation for delay in offering of possession and as such

the Adjudicating Officer awarded compensation in the form of

interest @ MCLR+ 1% on the total amount of consideration

for the period of delay between 30.08.2015 to 18.08.2017.

(91) This Court finds that the aforesaid order of the Adjudicating

officer was a subject matter of challenge by the Appellant

before the Appellate Tribunal in terms of section-44 of the

RERA Act. The said Appeal filed by the Appellant was decided

along with 25 other matters vide the impugned common order

dated 22.01.2022. On a perusal of the impugned judgment of

the Appellate Tribunal it is seen that the Tribunal has

painstakingly recorded details of facts of each Appeal in a

tabular chart and framed the following questions for

determination:

“ i. Whether the Adjudicating officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of agreed

terms and conditions mentioned in the

Registration Booklet, read with allotment

letter.

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ii. Whether there is any delay in handing

over of the possession to the allottee, and if

yes, on whose account?

iii. Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession of the flat and agreed

to pay the final cost of the flat?”

(92) This Court finds that the Appellate tribunal has exhaustively

dealt with each of the aforesaid issue and after recording

various precedents, arrived at a decision that as far as the first

issue is concerned, in terms of the Newtech Promoter’s case, the

promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/ liabilities under

the Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding

effect to the retrospective applicability of the authority under

the provisions of the Act. On the facts, the Appellate Tribunal

returned a finding that the project was delayed by 2 years and 4

months in giving of the possession and that the Appellant/

Promoter was solely responsible for the said delay. Further, as

far as the third issue is concerned, the Tribunal after considering

various judgements including that of W. Cdr. Arifur Rahman

Khan and Aleya Sultan and others V/s DLF Southern Homes

Pvt. Ltd, held that a home buyer does not lose his/her right to

claim compensation for the delay in possession even after

execution of the conveyance deed and taking possession of the

unit/ Apartment/ flat booked by him. Thus, the Appellate

Tribunal did not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned

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Page 65 of 94

order of the Adjudicating Officer and as such dismissed all the

Appeals.

(93) This Court finds that the appellant has filed an Appeal against

the aforesaid impugned order dated 22.01.2022, which are

largely premised on the same grounds and question of law as

has been decided by this court in “RERA Appeal No. 67 of

2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi). The fulcrum of the

Appeal hinges on the determination of question as to whether

the adjudicating officer appointed under Section 72 of the

RERA Act can grant compensation in form of interest in case

where allottee does not exit the project under Section 18 of the

RERA Act.

(94) This Court finds that the aforesaid ground has been a subject

matter of challenge in similar other matters, which were

decided by this court in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi), wherein this

court held that compensation in the form of interest can be

awarded by the Adjudicating Officer and as such has rejected

the said contention and dismissed the appeal of the Parishad.

(95) Thus, this Court does not find any new issue being raised in the

present bunch of Appeals by the Ld. counsel for the Appellant,

which requires any separate considerations either on facts or on

law and as such the present bunch of appeals are also decided in

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Page 66 of 94

terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(96) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 88 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

89 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 90 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

91 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 93 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

96 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 97 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

98 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 99 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

100 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 101 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 102 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 103 of 2023 and RERA

Appeal No. 104 of 2023 are also dismissed.

G. RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others).

(97) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 07.07.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Abhai Verma

& Anju Verma. The complainant in that case, i.e Abhai Verma

& Anju Verma was allotted flat in Himalaya Enclave,

Vrindavan Yojna, Part-4, Sector-17, Nilgiri Enclave, wherein

the sale deed was executed on 12.10.2017 and the possession

was granted on 02.04.2019. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession and other

issues. The regulatory authority vide an order dated 10.05.2019

after holding that the project was delayed and the delay period

was fixed as 25.08.2014 to 30.04.2018, marked the case to the

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Adjudicating Officer for determination of entitlement of

compensation. Accordingly, the Adjudicating Officer, vide

order dated 29.08.2019 allowed the complaint and directed the

promoter to pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI

MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for the

delayed period within 45 days of the order.

(98) The complainant filed an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal

limited to the extent of granting of interest as provided under

section 2(za)(i) of the RERA Act. As per the said provisions, the

complainant claimed interest at the rate of 13.05% per annum

and sought parity with another case passed by the Tribunal in

Upasana Duggal Vs LDA.

(99) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 07.07.2022, which

has been interdicted in the present proceedings before this

court, has directed the Parishad/promoter for payment of

interest at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with

other reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 07.07.2022, this court finds that interestingly,

there is no Appeal u/s 44 of the Act by the Appellant against the

order dated 29.08.2019 of the Adjudicating Officer. It is only

the order of the Appellate Tribunal, which has reduced the

interest rate and other reliefs that the Appellant are aggrieved

and as such has filed the present Appeal before this court. A

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Page 68 of 94

glimpse of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal would

reveal that the Appellate Tribunal has recorded the Appeal,

reply and rejoinder field by the parties exhaustively in the said

impugned order and has framed the following three question for

determination:

“ (i) Whether appellants are entitled to get

interest @ 13.5% per annum for the

delayed period i.e from 24.08.2014 to the

actual date of realization ?

(ii) Whether respondent- U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad is liable to pay Rs. 5 Lakhs

as compensation for mental harassment

and agony and Rs. 7,61,052/- for house

rent allowances to appellants.?

(iii) whether appellants are entitled to get

Rs. 50,000/- as cost of litigation.?”

(100) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that the delay

was to be fixed for a period from 25.08.2014 to 28.02.2019 and

not to be kept open. Further, as far as the rate of interest, the

Appellate Tribunal keeping in view Rule 9.2(ii) & 9.3(1) of the

“Uttar Pradesh Real Estate (Regulations and Development)

Rules, 2018, which came into effect from 17.10.2018 awarded

compensation in the form of interest at the rate of SBI

MCLR+1% to balance the equities and in line of the spirit of

the Act, which uses the phrase “interest at such rate as may be

prescribed” in section 12, 18 and 19(4) of the Act. The

Appellate Tribunal as far as the second issue formulated held

that the observation of the Adjudicating officer had legal

backing and did not interfere in the payment of compensation to

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the complainant. Similarly, as far as the third issue is

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal reduced the cost of litigation

from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 40,000/-.

(101) The Appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal filed by the

Appellant lies on the issue, which were decided by this court in

the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (ComplainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(102) Thus, this Court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the Appellant and as such the present Appeal is also decided

in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(103) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

H. RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(104) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 08.09.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Shobit

Chaturvedi. The complainant in that case, i.e Shobit Chaturvedi

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Page 70 of 94

was allotted flat in Neelgiri Enclave, a project of the appellant

located at Sector-17, Vrindavan Yojna, Lucknow. The

conveyance deed was executed on 08.03.2018 and the physical

possession was handed over to the complainant on 05.06.2018.

It was the case of the complainant/ allottee therein that the

possession was delayed and he was entitled for compensation

for delayed possession and other issues like not providing

window as per the registration booklet, car parking etc. were

also raised in the said complaint. The regulatory authority vide

an order dated 16.09.2020 marked the case to the Adjudicating

Officer for determination of entitlement of compensation.

Accordingly, the Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated

18.12.2020 allowed the complaint and directed the promoter to

pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per

annum on the deposited amount for the delayed period of

30.08.2015 to 21.07.2017, within 45 days of the order.

(105) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(106) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 08.09.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

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Page 71 of 94

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 08.09.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following three

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Adjudicating Officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of the

agreed terms and conditions mentioned in

the Registration Booklet, read with

allotment letter.

(ii) Whether there is any delay in handing

over of the possession to the allottee, and if

yes, on whose account?

(iii) Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession, even if the allottee has

already taken possession of the flat and

sale deed has been executed after the

allottees agreed to pay the final cost of the

flat.?

(iv) Whether there is any illegality or

perversity in the impugned order dated

16.07.2021 of the Adjudicating officer in

granting interest as compensation to the

respondent for delay in providing

possession of the flat by the Appellant?”

(107) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that tin view of

the observation of the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding

the terms of the contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk

from the responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the

contractual terms do not have an overriding effect to the

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Page 72 of 94

retrospective applicability of the authority under the provisions

of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.2

returned a finding of fact that the project was delayed by 1 year

and 11 months in offering of possession to the complainant and

that the Appellant was solely responsible for the same. As

regards the third issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that a home

buyer does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the

delay in possession even after execution of the conveyance

deed and taking possession of the unit/ Apartment/ Flat booked

by him. The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various

provisions of RERA as well as the binding precedents

concluded that there was no illegality or perversity in the order

of the Adjudicating officer in awarding interest as compensation

to the complainant for delay in possession of the flat.

(108) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(109) Thus, this Court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

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the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(110) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 is also dismissed.

I. RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(111) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 28.09.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Atul Kumar.

The complainant in that case, i.e Atul Kumar was allotted flat in

Neelgiri Enclave, a project of the Appellant located at Sector17, Vrindavan Yojna, Lucknow. The sale deed was executed on

08.03.2018 and the physical possession was handed over to the

complainant on 05.06.2018. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession as well as for

other issues like not providing window as per the registration

booklet, car parking etc. The regulatory authority vide an order

dated 19.10.2019 marked the case to the Adjudicating Officer

for determination of entitlement of compensation. Accordingly,

the Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated 11.02.2021 allowed

the complaint and directed the promoter to pay interest as

compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on the

deposited amount for the delayed period of 30.08.2015 to

01.11.2017, within 45 days of the order.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 74 of 94

(112) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in appeal under Section 44 of the Act,

before the Appellate Tribunal.

(113) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 08.09.2022, has

dismissed the appeal of the Parishad/promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 08.09.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following four

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Adjudicating Officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of the

agreed terms and conditions mentioned in

the Registration Booklet, read with

allotment letter.

(ii) Whether there is any delay in

handing over of the possession to the

allottee, and if yes, on whose account?

(iii) Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession, even if the allottee

has already taken possession of the flat

and sale deed has been executed after the

allottees agreed to pay the final cost of the

flat.?

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 75 of 94

(iv) Whether there is any illegality or

perversity in the impugned order dated

11.02.2021 of the Adjudicating officer in

granting interest as compensation to the

respondent for delay in providing

possession of the flat by the Appellant?”

(114) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that tin view of

the observation of the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding

the terms of the contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk

from the responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the

contractual terms do not have an overriding effect to the

retrospective applicability of the authority under the provisions

of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.2

returned a finding of fact that the project was delayed by 1 year

and 5 months in offering of possession to the complainant and

that the Appellant was solely responsible for the same. As

regards the third issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that a home

buyer does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the

delay in possession even after execution of the conveyance

deed and taking possession of the unit/ Apartment/ Flat booked

by him. The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various

provisions of RERA as well as the binding precedents

concluded that there was no illegality or perversity in the order

of the Adjudicating officer in awarding interest as compensation

to the complainant for delay in possession of the flat.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 76 of 94

(115) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(116) Thus, this Court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(117) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 is also dismissed.

J. RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs. Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(118) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 24.05.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee. The

allottee/complainant in that case, i.e Jitendera Kumar

Madheshiya was allotted flat in Himalaya Enclave, a project of

the Appellant. The sale deed was executed on 08.03.2018 and

the physical possession was handed over to the complainant on

05.06.2018. It was the case of the complainant/ allottee therein

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 77 of 94

that the possession was delayed and he was entitled for

compensation for delayed possession. The Adjudicating Officer,

vide order dated 04.08.2021 allowed the complaint and directed

the promoter to pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI

MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for the

delayed period of 31.12.2014 to 30.08.2018, within 45 days of

the order.

(119) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(120) However, at the time of hearing, the appellant at the outset

stated that though in the relief clause he had challenged the

entire impugned order dated 04.08.2021 of the Adjudicating

Officer, whereby the adjudicating authority directed the

opposite party/appellant to pay interest @ MCLR+ 1% as

compensation to the complainant/respondent for the delay

period from 31.12.2014 to 30.08.2018, but he confined his

prayer only to the correction of amount from Rs. 16,60,000/- to

Rs. 15,75,000/- and the date of starting interest from

31.12.2014 to 28.02.2015. The Tribunal vide the impugned

order dated 04.08.2021, has recorded the no objection of the

complainant/respondent and on the basis of the said statement

of the parties, the the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter was

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 78 of 94

disposed of by holding that the appellant/promoter shall be

liable to pay interest at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum

as compensation on the amount of Rs. 15,75,000 ( deposited in

the year 2012) for delayed period from 01.03.2015 to

30.08.2018”.

(121) The present Appeal has been filed under section 58 of the

RERA, 2016. However, section 58(2) of the said Act, inter-alia

states:

“58 (2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

(122) The learned Counsel for the appellant was requested to refer

section 58(2) of the RERA Act, 2016, which bars any appeal

against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal

with the consent of the parties. The learned Counsel was asked

to address his arguments on the said point.

(123) The learned Counsel for the Appellant raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

were addressed on the point of maintainability of the present

Appeal on the point of section 58(2) of the RERA Act. Also

there was no argument denying or disputing the consensual

order passed by the Appellate tribunal vide the impugned order

dated 24.05.2022. According, this court in view of the findings

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 79 of 94

returned in the aforesaid Appeals lead being “RERA Appeal

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) does not

find any substantial question of law raised in the present Appeal

and as such RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others is dismissed.

K. RERA Appeal No. 106 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(124) This appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the

impugned order dated 28.03.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee. The

allottee/complainant in that case, i.e Charan Singh was allotted

flat in Brahmaputra Enclave, a project of the Appellant. On the

date of filing of the complaint, neither the sale deed was

executed in his favour nor the physical possession was handed

over to the complainant and as such a cumulative complaint

was filed for execution of sale deed, giving of possession and

delay compensation against the Appellant. The Adjudicating

Officer, vide order dated 22/01/2020 allowed the complaint

with various reliefs including a direction to the promoter to (i)

give possession along with all facilities till 29.02.2020, (ii) pay

interest as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per

annum on the deposited amount for the delayed period of

31.01.2018 till the date of possession.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 80 of 94

(125) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(126) During the course of hearing, the Appellate Tribunal recorded

that the completion certificate was obtained by the Appellant on

31.12.2018 and the possession was offered to the complainant

on 06.12.2018 and in fact the physical possession was granted

to the complainant/respondent on 24.02.2020. Although the

Appellant tried to urge a point that the delay in possession was

due to non-submission of certain papers by the

complainant/respondent, which was opposed by the respondent,

however, the Appellate Tribunal noting that there had been a

delay in giving of possession by the appellant, without

considering other point, upheld order dated 22/01/2020 of the

Adjudicating Officer, whereby the adjudicating authority

directed the opposite party/appellant to pay interest @ MCLR+

1% as compensation to the complainant/respondent for the

delay period from 01.01.2018 to 31.12.2018.

(127) The learned Counsel for the appellant interdicting the impugned

order of the Appellate Tribunal has raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 81 of 94

were addressed on the point of decision of the Appellate

Tribunal on merits. However, this court took that pain to go

through the memo of Appeal filed by the Appellant and as such

is of the considered view that the findings returned in the

aforesaid Appeals lead being “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) is squarely applicable to

the present case. Thus, this court does not find any substantial

question of law raised in the present Appeal and as such RERA

Appeal No. 106 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad V/s

Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

L. RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(128) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 23.06.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Vandana

Sharma. The complainant in that case, i.e Vandana Sharma was

allotted flat in Ganga, Yamuna & Hindon Enclave, a project of

the Appellant. On the date of filing of the complaint, neither the

sale deed was executed in his favour nor the physical

possession was handed over to the complainant and as such a

cumulative complaint was filed for execution of sale deed,

giving of possession and delay compensation against the

Appellant. The Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated

29/09/2020 allowed the complaint with various reliefs including

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 82 of 94

a direction to the promoter to (i) give possession along with all

facilities till 31.10.2020 (ii) pay interest as compensation at the

rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for

the delayed period of 17.04.2018 to 28.02.2019.

(129) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal under Section 44 of the Act,

before the Appellate Tribunal.

(130) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 30.06.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 30.06.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following five

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether under the scheme of the Act,

2016 and rules 2016 any mechanism has

been provided for determination of the

interest or the compensation for delay in

handing over possession of the

flat/apartment/ plot to the allottee and/or

refund with interest, if allottee does nto

want to continue/wish to withdraw from the

project?

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 83 of 94

(ii) Whether the Regulatory Auhtority

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of agreed

terms and conditions mentioned in the

registration Booklet read with allotment

letter.

(iii) Whether the project of the

appellant/promoter is delayed?

(iv) Whether an allottee is entitled for

interest for the delay in completion of the

project under the scheme of Act, 2016 if

yes, what rate of interest is required to be

paid by the promoter to the allottee?

(v) Whether it is necessary and

mandatory for the promoter to have first

completion certificate (CC) and occupation

certificate (OC) under the provisions of the

Act 2016 and Rules of 2016 read with the

UP Apartment (promotion of construction,

ownership and maintenance) Act, 2010

before offering possession as well as

asking the allottee to settle the account and

satisfy the final demand?.”

(131) The learned Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid

point of determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that the

Act, 2016 provides a mechanism for determination of interest

andor compensation for the delay in handing over possession of

the unit to the allottee, if the allottee wishes to stay with the

project and/or refund with interest, if allotee wants to withdraw

from the project. As far as the aforesaid second issue is

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal in view of the observation of

the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding the terms of the

contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk from the

responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the contractual

terms do not have an overriding effect to the retrospective

applicability of the authority under the provisions of the Act

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 84 of 94

and held that the regulatory authority is required to examine a

complaint as per the provisions of the Act, rules and regulations

and not merely on the basis of the terms and conditions of the

registration booklet or as provided in the demand letter only.

The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.3 returned a

finding of fact that the project was delayed by 11 months in

offering of possession to the complainant and that the Appellant

was solely responsible for the same. As regards the fourth issue

relating to entitlement of interest on account of delay in

completion of the project, the Appellate Tribunal returned a

finding in affirmative. As far as the last issue is concerned, the

Tribunal held that a promoter is required to offer legal and

habitable possession to the allottees only after obtaining CC/OC

and ask for clearing dues by raising a final demand. The

Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various provisions of

RERA as well as the binding precedents concluded that there

was no illegality or perversity in the order of the Adjudicating

officer in awarding interest as compensation to the complainant

for delay in possession of the flat.

(132) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matterRERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 85 of 94

“RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(133) Thus, this Court does not find any irresistible reasons to differ

with the findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid

matter. Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in

terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(134) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above, the

present Appeal being RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 (U.P Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad V/s U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

and others) is also dismissed.

M. RERA Appeals No. 108, 109 of 2023

(135) These appeals have been filed by the appellant against the

impugned common order dated 30.12.2022 relating to relief of

interest in the form of compensation granted to the allottees,

Indranath Agnihotri & Rajesh Kumar Singh. Both the original

complaints had been filed by the aforesaid complainant for (i)

Giving of possession, (ii) interest for delayed compensation and

(iii) mental harassment etc. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession as well as for

other issues like not providing of possession, mental harassment

etc. The Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated 26.11.2019

allowed the complaint and directed the promoter to pay interest

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 86 of 94

as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on

the deposited amount for the delayed period of01.05.2018 to

19.08.2019, within 45 days of the order.

(136) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(137) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 30.12.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 30.12.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following four

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Regulatory Authority has

jurisdiction to pass the impugned order

dated 26.11.2019 directing the appellantU.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow

to handover possession of the flat to the

complainant within 45 days from the date of

order after taking the legal charges from

the complainant and the opposite party is

also directed to pay interest at the rate of

MCLR+1% per annum to the complainant

for the delayed period from 31.08.2018 till

date of offer of possession i.e 09.09.2019,

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 87 of 94

… as the matter is covered under sections

12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(ii) Whether the project of the appellantUP Avas Evma Vikas parishad, Lucknow is

delayed as stated by respondent in reply to

the Appeal.

(iii) Whether respondent/complainant is

entitled to get interest for the delayed

period, if so on what rate?

(iv) Whether the impugned judgment and

order dated 26.11.2019 is liable to set

aside?.”

(138) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that when it

comes to a question of seeking the relief of adjudging

compensation and interest thereon under section 12, 14, 18 and

19, the adjudicating officer exclusively has the power to

determine, keeping in view the collective reading of section 71

read with section 72 of the Act. If the adjudication under

sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 other than compensation as

envisaged, if extended to the adjudicating officer, it may intend

to expand the ambit and scope of the powers and function of the

adjudicating officer under section 71 and that would be against

the mandate of the Act, 2016. The Appellate Tribunal in answer

to issue No.2 returned a finding of fact that the project was

delayed from 31.08.2015 to 09.09.2019. As regards the third

issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that in view of “Uttar Pradesh

Real Estate (Regulation and development) Rules, 2018, it

would be just to award rate of interest MCLR + 1% per annum

as directed by the Authority. As far as the last issue is

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 88 of 94

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal decided to not interfere with

the Adjudicating officer order and as such confirmed the same.

The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various provisions

of RERA as well as the binding precedents concluded that there

was no illegality or perversity in the order of the Adjudicating

officer in awarding interest as compensation to the complainant

for delay in possession of the flat.

(139) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(140) Thus, this court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

the analogy & discussion in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(141) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal Nos. 108 of 2023 and 109 of 2023 are also

dismissed.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 89 of 94

N. RERA Appeals No. 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 of

2023

(142) These appeals have been filed against the impugned common

order dated 14.03.2022 passed by the learned UP Real Estate

Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow.

(143) Since, common question of law has been raised by the appellant

in all these appeals, which are all directed towards a common

order dated 14.03.2022, it would be in the interest of justice that

all these appeals are consolidated and taken together for hearing

and disposal. However, before this court deals with the question

of law raised in these Appeals, the brief facts culminating into

the present Appeal be narrated to appreciate the law in its

proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead mater

being RERA Appeal No. 110 of 2023 (Complainant- Ms. Arifa

Khatoon) is taken into consideration.

(144) Succinctly, it is available from records that the complainant

(Ms. Arifa Khatoon) filed a complaint for compensation in

delay in offering possession, no window in the flat offered and

no parking allotted by the Appellant/ Promoter. The said

complaint was marked/referred to the Adjudicating Officer vide

order dated 25.11.2019 of the Authority. As per the complaint,

the complainant was allotted a flat in Vrindavan Yojna in

Nillgiri Enclave on 31.08.2013 for an amount of Rs.

20,88,000/-. The possession of the said flat was to be given in

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 90 of 94

24 months, however the same was not offered by the Promoter,

which resulted in increase in the price of the flat, levy of GST

etc. It was the case of the complainant that although she had

regularly paid the instalments, however the promoter failed to

provide window in the flat as well as the parking as promised in

Brochure. However, the appellant defended the said complaint

by stating that the price of the flat was never fixed, nor the date

of possession had been fixed and the same were only proposed.

They also took ground of certain litigation relating to

acquisition of land pending before this court for the delay. They

also submitted that the complaint was not maintainable for

compensation under section 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(145) This court finds that the Adjudicating Officer after recording

the submission of the parties and dealing with the provisions of

the RERA Act gave a detailed Judgment vide order dated

26/06/2020, thereby returning a finding that the complainant

inspite of taking the possession of the flat is entitled for

compensation for delay in offering of possession and as such

the Adjudicating Officer awarded compensation in the form of

interest @ MCLR+ 1% on the total amount of consideration

for the period of delay between 31.08.2015 to 25.07.2017.

(146) This Court finds that the aforesaid order of the Adjudicating

officer was a subject matter of challenge by the Appellant

before the Appellate Tribunal in terms of section-44 of the

RERA Act. The said Appeal filed by the Appellant was decided

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 91 of 94

along with 9 other matters vide the impugned common order

dated 14.03.2022. On a perusal of the impugned judgment of

the Appellate Tribunal it is seen that the Tribunal has

painstakingly recorded details of facts of each Appeal in a

tabular chart and framed the following questions for

determination:

“ i. Whether the Adjudicating officer

ought to have examined the complaint of the

respondent only on the basis of agreed terms

and conditions mentioned in the Registration

Booklet, read with allotment letter.

ii.Whether there is any delay in handing over

of the possession to the allottee, and if yes,

on whose account?

iii. Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession of the flat and sale deed

has been executed after the allottees agreed

to pay the final cost of the flat?

iv. Whether the respondent is entitled for

interest and/or compensation on account of

delayed possession under the scheme of the

Act, 2016 and whether the rate of interest

granted by the Adjudicating officer is in

accordance with the provisions of the Act,

2016, Rules 2016?”

(147) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has exhaustively

dealt with each of the aforesaid issue and after recording

various precedents, arrived at a decision that as far as the first

issue is concerned, in terms of the Newtech Promoter’s case, the

promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/ liabilities under

the Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding

effect to the retrospective applicability of the authority under

the provisions of the Act. On the facts, the Appellate Tribunal

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 92 of 94

returned a finding that the project was delayed by 2 years and 4

months in giving of the possession and that the Appellant/

Promoter was solely responsible for the said delay. Further, as

far as the third issue is concerned, the Tribunal after considering

various judgments including that of W. Cdr. Arifur Rahman

Khan and Aleya Sultan and others Vs. DLF Southern Homes

Pvt. Ltd, held that a home buyer does not lose his/her right to

claim compensation for the delay in possession even after

execution of the conveyance deed and taking possession of the

unit/ Apartment/ flat booked by him. The Appellate Tribunal

also returned a finding that the complainant was entitled for

interest on account of delayed possession and that the rate of

interest awarded i.e MCLR + 1% by the regulatory authority

was fair, just and reasonable. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal did

not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the

Adjudicating Officer and as such dismissed all the Appeals.

(148) This Court finds that the Appellant has filed an Appeal against

the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.03.2022, which are

largely premised on the same grounds and question of law as

has been decided by this court in “RERA Appeal (Defective)

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi). The

fulcrum of the Appeal hinges on the determination of question

as to whether the adjudicating officer appointed under the

RERA section 72 can grant compensation in form of interest in

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 93 of 94

case where allottee does not exit the project under section 18 of

the RERA Act.

(149) This Court finds that the aforesaid ground has been a subject

matter of challenge in similar other matters, which were

decided by this court in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi), wherein this

court held that compensation in the form of interest can be

awarded by the Adjudicating Officer and as such has rejected

the said contention and dismissed the appeal of the Parishad.

(150) Thus, this Court does not find any new issue being raised in the

present bunch of appeals by the learned counsel for the

Appellant, which requires any separate considerations either on

facts or on law and as such the present bunch of Appeals are

also decided in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA

Appeal (Defective) No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(151) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 110 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 111 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 112 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 113 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 114 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 115 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 116 of 2023 & RERA

Appeal No. 117 of 2023 are also dismissed.

(152) As a priori, all these appeals are dismissed and interim orders,

if any, stands vacated.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 94 of 94

(153) Office is directed to place a copy of this order in each of the

above-captioned appeals.

(154) There shall be no order as to cost.

(Om Prakash Shukla, J.)

Order Date : 18th November, 2023

Ajit/-

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals