Reference to a larger Bench — Scope — Ordinarily, the referee Bench must answer only the questions referred and remit the matter to the referring Bench. However, where the referring Bench itself fails to identify the points of difference and formulates questions which necessarily require examination of the entire evidence and go to the root of the dispute, the referee Bench may, in exceptional circumstances, adopt a common-sense approach and decide the matter on the basis of the majority opinion. Such course, in the peculiar facts of the present case, did not constitute an illegality warranting interference under Article 227. [Paras 13–20]

 

ASKARI HUSSAIN AND ORS. v. DINESH KUMAR AND ORS.

2026 INSC 929 — Civil Appeal No. 11988 of 2026
Supreme Court of India — Judgment dated 24 August 2026
Dipankar Datta, J. and Sheel Nagu, J.

HEADNOTES

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 — Section 58(3) — Difference of opinion between members of NCDRC — Reference to third member — Scope of reference — Third member ordinarily required to answer only the point(s) referred and return the matter to the referring Bench for disposal in accordance with majority opinion. [Paras 14, 16–18]

Consumer Protection Act — Section 58(3) — Reference — Referring Bench failing to state the specific point(s) of difference and instead framing questions requiring examination of facts and evidence — Third member considering the entire material and deciding the appeal on merits — Such course, though ordinarily impermissible, not treated as jurisdictional illegality in the peculiar facts of the case. [Paras 17–19]

Reference to larger Bench — Jurisdiction — Referee Bench — Larger Bench cannot ordinarily adjudicate an issue not referred to it — After answering the reference, matter should normally be remitted to the original/referring Bench for decision on merits — Exception where subsidiary question logically and unavoidably arises, permitting a common-sense approach. [Para 13]

Reference — Scope determined by terms of reference — Word “matter” cannot automatically be construed as referring the entire case where context demonstrates that only specified questions were referred. [Para 13]

Consumer proceedings — Difference of opinion — Section 58(3) — Statutory scheme differs from ordinary CPC reference — Where members are equally divided, points of difference are to be referred to the President/other member and decided according to the majority opinion of all members who heard the case, including original members. [Para 16]

Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Procedural irregularity in reference — High Court ought not interfere where the third member's procedure, in the peculiar circumstances, does not constitute such illegality as warrants supervisory intervention. [Paras 19–20]

Article 227 — Merits not examined by High Court — Where High Court interferes only on procedural ground and does not examine the substantive findings, Supreme Court may set aside the High Court order and remand the Article 227 application for decision on merits. [Paras 21–23]

---

I. FACTS

1. Consumer complaint and compensation

Para 3: The appellants had instituted Complaint No. 13 of 2006 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Uttar Pradesh. The State Commission allowed the complaint by order dated 4 December 2012 and awarded compensation of ₹95 lakh with 15% interest.

2. Appeal before NCDRC

Para 3: The first respondent preferred First Appeal No. 156 of 2013 before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.

3. Difference between two members

Para 4: The two members of the NCDRC Bench differed:

• the Presiding Member allowed the appeal and dismissed the complaint;

• the companion member modified the State Commission's order by reducing compensation to ₹93 lakh and interest to 12%.

[Para 4]

4. Reference to third member

Para 5: Since the members were divided, a reference was made under Section 58(3) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The third member disagreed with the Presiding Member and agreed with the companion member.

5. Five questions referred

Para 9: Instead of stating the precise points on which the original members differed, the referring Bench formulated five questions dealing with:

1. evidence linking the appellant doctor with Surya Medical Centre;

2. proof that the complainant's wife was admitted/operated there;

3. whether oral explanations not contained in the original complaint could be considered;

4. alleged withholding/non-production of medical records; and

5. whether an uncontroverted affidavit could be accepted in a summary proceeding.

[Para 9]

6. Third member decided the appeal itself

Paras 5, 10: After answering the questions, the third member went further and disposed of the appeal itself, modifying the compensation and interest and issuing directions concerning payment of the compensation to the complainants.

7. Challenge before High Court

Para 6: The first respondent approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 227. The Single Judge held that the third member had exceeded the jurisdiction conferred by the reference and quashed the order, directing the matter to be heard afresh by the third member.

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II. ISSUE

8. Question before Supreme Court

Para 7: The precise issue was:

Whether the third member was justified in deciding the appeal itself after concurring with the companion member, or whether he was required merely to answer the questions referred and return the matter to the original referring Bench for appropriate orders based on the majority opinion.

[Para 7]

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III. LAW

A. GENERAL LAW GOVERNING REFERENCES

9. Normal rule

Para 14: The law is well settled that, ordinarily, a referee Bench must:

1. answer the question(s) referred;

2. return the reference with those answers; and

3. leave the original/referring Bench to decide the remaining issues in accordance with the answers and majority opinion.

[Para 14]

10. Larger Bench cannot exceed reference

Para 13: In State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, the Court reiterated that a larger Bench ordinarily cannot expand the scope of the reference or frame additional questions beyond those referred.

11. Reference is not transfer of entire case

Para 13: Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. was relied upon for the proposition that where a specific issue is referred to a larger Bench, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue that was not referred.

12. Matter ordinarily goes back

Para 13: T.A. Hameed v. M. Viswanathan and Saquib Abdul Hameed Nachan v. State of Maharashtra were cited for the principle that after answering a reference, the matter normally has to be remitted to the referring Bench for decision on merits.

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IV. EXCEPTION — COMMON-SENSE APPROACH

13. Subsidiary questions may be answered

Para 13: The rule is not absolute. Where a subsidiary question logically and unavoidably arises from the questions referred, the larger Bench may answer it by adopting a common-sense approach.

14. Scope depends upon actual reference

Para 13: The Court emphasised that everything depends upon the terms of the reference. A reference of the “matter” does not necessarily mean that the entire case has been transferred for adjudication. The word must be understood in its contextual setting.

---

V. SPECIAL STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER SECTION 58(3)

15. Section 58(3)

Para 16: Section 58(3) specifically provides that where members of a NCDRC Bench differ:

• the point(s) are decided according to majority if there is a majority;

• if the members are equally divided, they state the point(s) on which they differ;

• those point(s) are referred to the President or another member;

• the point(s) are then decided according to the opinion of the majority of all members who heard the case, including the original members.

16. Statutory distinction from ordinary civil references

Para 15: In ordinary CPC proceedings there is no provision corresponding to Section 392 CrPC or Section 433 BNSS concerning references. Therefore, CPC references are governed principally by judicial precedent. In consumer proceedings, however, Section 58(3) directly supplies the governing mechanism.

---

VI. APPLICATION OF LAW

17. Prima facie excess by third member

Para 17: On a plain reading of Section 58(3), it appeared that the third member had exceeded jurisdiction by deciding the appeal instead of merely answering the points referred.

18. But reference itself was defective

Para 17: The Supreme Court identified the decisive circumstance: the original members did not state the points on which they differed.

Instead, five questions were formulated which required consideration of:

• factual allegations;

• rebuttals;

• evidence; and

• the merits of the complaint.

[Paras 17–18]

19. Questions went to the root of the dispute

Para 18: The five questions were inseparable from the evidence and went to the root of the complaint. Consequently, the third member necessarily had to examine the entire material and rival contentions to answer them.

20. Common-sense exception applied

Para 18: In those peculiar circumstances, the Supreme Court considered the third member's decision to dispose of the appeal along with answering the questions to be a common-sense approach of the kind recognised in Salil Sabhlok.

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VII. ARTICLE 227

21. No jurisdictional illegality warranting interference

Para 19: The Supreme Court held that, in the particular circumstances, the third member's failure to return the reference and instead deciding the appeal did not constitute such an illegality as warranted interference under Article 227.

22. High Court's reliance on Kesho Nath distinguished

Para 20: The High Court had correctly found support in Kesho Nath Khurana for the general proposition that a referee Bench should return the matter after answering the reference. However, the Supreme Court held that the present case was materially different because of:

• Section 58(3);

• the defective/faltering reference; and

• the nature of the five questions referred.

[Para 20]

23. Merits never examined by High Court

Para 21: The High Court had not questioned the substantive answers given by the third member. Its objection was confined entirely to the procedure adopted. Therefore, the merits remained unexamined.

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VIII. RATIO DECIDENDI

Ratio 1

Ordinarily, a referee Bench must confine itself to the question(s) referred to it and, after answering them, return the matter to the referring Bench for disposal in accordance with the majority opinion.

[Para 14]

Ratio 2

The larger/referee Bench cannot ordinarily adjudicate upon matters outside the scope of the reference. The scope of reference is determined by the terms and context of the referring order.

[Para 13]

Ratio 3

The rule is subject to a limited exception: where a subsidiary issue logically and unavoidably arises from the questions referred, the referee Bench may adopt a common-sense approach and deal with such issue.

[Para 13]

Ratio 4

Under Section 58(3) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, where members of an NCDRC Bench differ, the statutory mechanism is to identify the point(s) of difference and have those points decided by the additional member together with the original members for purposes of majority.

[Para 16]

Ratio 5

Where the referring Bench fails to identify the actual points of difference and instead frames questions which necessarily require examination of the evidence and go to the root of the dispute, the third member's consideration of the entire material and disposal of the appeal on the basis of the resulting majority opinion may, in the peculiar circumstances, be treated as a permissible common-sense approach rather than a jurisdictional illegality warranting Article 227 interference.

[Paras 17–19]

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IX. CONCLUSION

24. High Court order set aside

Para 23: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court.

25. Article 227 application remanded

The application under Article 227 was remanded to the High Court for consideration afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law.

26. All factual and legal issues left open

The Court expressly left all questions of fact and law open to be raised before the appropriate roster Bench of the High Court.

27. NCDRC restrained from proceeding

Para 25: The Supreme Court directed that the NCDRC should not proceed further until the High Court finally decides the Article 227 application in accordance with the Supreme Court's order.

28. Expeditious disposal

Para 24: Considering the passage of time, the High Court was requested to decide the Article 227 application at an early date.

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CONCISE RATIO

Reference to a larger Bench — Scope — Ordinarily, the referee Bench must answer only the questions referred and remit the matter to the referring Bench. However, where the referring Bench itself fails to identify the points of difference and formulates questions which necessarily require examination of the entire evidence and go to the root of the dispute, the referee Bench may, in exceptional circumstances, adopt a common-sense approach and decide the matter on the basis of the majority opinion. Such course, in the peculiar facts of the present case, did not constitute an illegality warranting interference under Article 227. [Paras 13–20]

Where the person who actually suffered the alleged loss or injury settles with the accused and unequivocally withdraws his grievance, the fact that the criminal case was instituted by another person who describes himself as the complainant does not, by itself, prevent quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The Court must distinguish the “victim” from the “informant”, examine the real nature of the dispute, assess the likelihood of conviction, and determine whether continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process. Where the dispute is predominantly private, civil or commercial, the alleged victim is no longer supporting the prosecution, and the informant's independent victim-status is unsupported, continuation of proceedings may properly be quashed. [Paras 28–48]

 

ANAND KUMAR @ SANJAY LALWANI v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

2026 INSC 928 — Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated 31 August 2026 — K.V. Viswanathan, J. and Arun Palli, J.

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I. HEADNOTES

1. Criminal proceedings — Quashing on settlement — Compounding and quashing on the basis of settlement are distinct concepts — Section 359 BNSS / erstwhile Section 320 CrPC governs compounding — Section 482 CrPC inherent jurisdiction governed by whether continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process and whether conviction is likely.

[Paras 28–30]

2. Criminal proceedings — Settlement between accused and victim — Non-compoundable offence — High Court may nevertheless quash proceedings under inherent jurisdiction where the dispute is predominantly private/civil/commercial in character, the victim has settled with the accused, chances of conviction are bleak and continuation would defeat the ends of justice.

[Paras 29–30, 37–38, 42–43]

3. Criminal proceedings — “Victim” and “complainant/informant” — Distinct concepts — A person who sets the criminal law in motion need not necessarily be the person who suffered the loss or injury.

[Para 31]

4. Settlement — Who can authorize settlement — Where quashing is sought on the ground of settlement, it is the real victim, and not merely an informant who has suffered no loss or injury, who can authorize such settlement.

[Paras 33–36]

5. Victim — Definition — Victim means a person who has suffered loss or injury by reason of the act or omission constituting the offence — Guardian/legal heir included.

[Para 35]

6. Compounding — Person competent to compound — The statutory scheme itself demonstrates that the person entitled to compound is the person who suffered the loss or injury.

[Para 36]

7. Criminal proceedings — Settlement — Public interest limitation — Even where victim and accused settle, offences having serious harmful effects on society, heinous offences, offences involving mental depravity, moral turpitude, corruption or acts by public servants in official capacity cannot ordinarily be quashed merely on the basis of settlement.

[Paras 30, 36–38]

8. Criminal proceedings — Civil/commercial flavour — Property/partnership dispute — Where the criminal allegations arise substantially out of a private dispute with commercial or civil overtones and the actual victim settles, continuation may constitute abuse of process.

[Paras 37–38, 42–43]

9. Criminal proceedings — Informant who is not victim — Lack of settlement with informant does not necessarily prevent quashing where the informant has no legally established loss or injury and the real victim has settled with the accused.

[Paras 39–48]

10. Criminal proceedings — Alleged ownership/interest in immovable property — Mere oral assertion, unsupported by documentary evidence, may be insufficient to establish the informant's legal interest for purposes of continuing prosecution where earlier judicial findings also cast doubt upon such interest.

[Paras 14, 44–47]

11. Criminal proceedings — Forged Power of Attorney — Partnership deed and mutation — Allegations of forgery initially sufficient to sustain proceedings — Subsequent categorical affidavit by the actual owner acknowledging the partnership, mutation and appellant's authority, and withdrawing grievance, materially alters the basis for continuation.

[Paras 40–41, 47]

12. Section 482 CrPC — Abuse of process — Continuing prosecution after the real victim has settled, has no grievance against the accused, and the principal witness would not support the prosecution, particularly in a private civil/commercial dispute, would amount to abuse of process and wastage of judicial time.

[Paras 41–43, 47–48]

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II. FACTS

A. Origin of the dispute

13. Land owned by Pradeep Singh Mehta

Para 4: Pradeep Singh Mehta owned 54.48 acres of agricultural land at Village Kanasaiya, Tehsil Huzur, District Bhopal. Out of 15.18 acres in Khasra No. 562, the complainant alleged that 7.50 acres had been given to him by Pradeep Singh Mehta.

14. Alleged forged GPA

Paras 5–6: The prosecution case was that the appellant and other accused conspired to usurp the land and fabricated a General Power of Attorney dated 31 March 1997, purportedly executed by Pradeep Singh Mehta. The GPA allegedly authorized the appellant to deal with the land.

15. Partnership and mutation

A Partnership Deed dated 16 March 2000 allegedly made the entire 54.48 acres the property of M/s Paradise Farms. Mutation in favour of the partnership firm was subsequently obtained on 7 June 2000. [Paras 6, 8–9]

16. Criminal complaint

Para 10: The complainant alleged that the entire transaction was designed to grab the land and invoked Sections 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406 and 120-B IPC.

17. Statement of original owner

Para 11: Pradeep Singh Mehta, in his sworn statement dated 9 February 2012, stated that the signature on the Power of Attorney was forged. He also stated that he had given 7.50 acres to the complainant.

18. Cognizance

Para 12: The Magistrate took cognizance on 28 May 2012 of Sections 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406 and 120-B IPC. The revision against cognizance was dismissed as time-barred.

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III. FIRST ROUND BEFORE THE HIGH COURT

19. Section 482 petition

Paras 13–15: The appellant and other accused approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court refused to quash the proceedings against the appellant.

20. Important finding concerning complainant's title

The High Court specifically found that there was no documentary evidence showing transfer of the 7.50 acres to the complainant. It held that mere oral assertions could not establish an interest in immovable property which had originally belonged to Pradeep Singh Mehta. [Para 14]

This finding later became important to the Supreme Court's assessment of whether Respondent No. 3 was actually a victim.

---

IV. COMPROMISE AND SECOND ROUND

21. Settlement with Pradeep Singh Mehta

Para 17: In 2019, the appellant approached the High Court for quashing on the basis of a compromise with Pradeep Singh Mehta. Pradeep Singh Mehta filed an affidavit stating, inter alia, that:

• he owned the 54.48 acres;
• he had contributed the land to Paradise Farms;
• the partnership had been formed with his authority;
• mutation formalities had been carried out by the appellant under his instructions;
• the firm had been functioning for years;
• he had no grievance against the accused; and
• he did not want the criminal proceedings to continue.

22. Compromise verified as genuine

Para 18: The High Court Registrar verified the compromise and reported that it was genuine, voluntary and free from threat, inducement or coercion.

23. High Court nevertheless refused quashing

Paras 20–21: The High Court treated the matter as one of compounding under Section 320 CrPC and held that Respondent No. 3, being the complainant, had not joined the settlement. It therefore declined to quash.

---

V. QUESTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

24. Core question

Para 27: The Supreme Court framed the issue:

Whether, in light of the compromise between the appellant and Respondent No. 2, continuation of the criminal proceedings amounted to an abuse of process warranting quashing?

---

VI. LAW

A. COMPOUNDING ≠ QUASHING

25. Distinction between the two powers

Para 28: The Court made the distinction expressly:

Compounding of offence is governed by the statutory compounding provision.

Quashing pursuant to settlement is an exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and depends upon:

1. likelihood of conviction; and
2. whether continuation of proceedings would constitute abuse of process.

26. Gian Singh principle

Paras 29–30: Relying upon Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reiterated that quashing and compounding are not interchangeable.

The High Court may quash even a non-compoundable offence where the dispute is predominantly:

• civil;
• commercial;
• mercantile;
• financial;
• partnership; or
• otherwise overwhelmingly private,

provided the circumstances justify the conclusion that continuation would defeat the ends of justice.

---

VII. VICTIM AND INFORMANT

27. Distinct legal concepts

Para 31: The Court relied upon Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra and held that “victim” and “complainant/informant” are distinct concepts. A stranger may set the criminal law in motion without himself being the person who suffered the loss or injury.

28. Only victim can authorize settlement

Paras 32–34: The Court gave a categorical answer:

“It will only be the victim who can authorize a settlement.”

The reason is obvious: otherwise an informant who is not the victim could compromise away the interests of the actual victim.

29. Statutory definition

Para 35: Under Section 2(wa) CrPC and Section 2(y) BNSS, a victim is the person who suffered loss or injury caused by the act or omission constituting the offence.

---

VIII. APPLICATION — WHO WAS THE VICTIM?

A. Pradeep Singh Mehta

30. Original owner was the victim

Paras 39–40: The Court found no manner of doubt that Pradeep Singh Mehta was the victim.

The very foundation of the complaint was that:

• his signature on the GPA had been forged;
• the partnership had been created on that basis; and
• mutation had consequently been obtained.

Therefore, he was the person who allegedly suffered the loss or injury. [Para 40]

31. Subsequent affidavit changed the evidentiary position

Para 41: The Court considered his earlier sworn statement alongside the subsequent affidavit.

The later affidavit categorically accepted:

• the partnership;
• contribution of land;
• mutation;
• appellant's authority to complete formalities;
• functioning of the firm; and
• absence of grievance against the accused.

The Court concluded that the original owner, who was also the principal witness, would no longer support the prosecution.

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IX. WHETHER SUBHASH CHANDRA LALWANI WAS ALSO A VICTIM

32. Court considered the possibility in his favour

Paras 44–45: The Supreme Court did not simply rely upon the earlier High Court finding. It proceeded on the assumption that Respondent No. 3 was also a victim and then examined whether he nevertheless had a sustainable case.

33. His alleged 7.50-acre interest was unsupported

The complaint itself contained inconsistencies concerning the alleged transfer of 7.50 acres. Earlier, the High Court had found no documentary evidence establishing such transfer. [Paras 44–45]

34. Original owner's subsequent position destroyed the foundation

Paras 46–47: Pradeep Singh Mehta had:

• accepted the partnership;
• accepted the mutation;
• withdrawn grievance concerning the Power of Attorney; and
• expressly stated that he had no grievance against the accused.

The complaint also did not allege that the appellant knew of any prior transfer of 7.50 acres to Respondent No. 3.

35. Result

The Court held that, on the totality of circumstances, permitting Respondent No. 3 to continue prosecution would amount to abuse of process. [Para 47]

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X. CIVIL/COMMERCIAL FLAVOUR

36. Private dispute

Paras 42–43: The Court held that the dispute was essentially personal and had no repercussions on society in general.

The alleged offences possessed a civil flavour with commercial overtones.

37. Chances of conviction bleak

In view of the settlement and the position taken by Pradeep Singh Mehta, who was the star witness and alleged victim, the chances of conviction were considered extremely bleak. Continuing the proceedings would merely clog the judicial system. [Paras 41–43]

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XI. RATIO DECIDENDI

Ratio 1 — Compounding and quashing are fundamentally different

The statutory power of compounding is distinct from the High Court's inherent power to quash criminal proceedings. A non-compoundable offence may nevertheless be quashed under Section 482 where the settlement, the nature of the dispute, likelihood of conviction and ends of justice justify such exercise.

[Paras 28–30]

Ratio 2 — Victim, not informant, controls settlement

For purposes of quashing on settlement, it is the real victim — the person who has suffered loss or injury — who must authorize the settlement. The mere fact that a person lodged the complaint does not make him the victim.

[Paras 31–36]

Ratio 3 — Private/civil/commercial disputes may be quashed

Where criminal proceedings arise from a predominantly private dispute having civil or commercial overtones, and the actual victim settles with the accused, continuation of proceedings may constitute abuse of process where conviction is unlikely and the dispute has no significant public ramifications.

[Paras 37–38, 42–43]

Ratio 4 — Informant cannot perpetuate prosecution without a sustainable victim-interest

Where the alleged victim has withdrawn his grievance and the informant's own alleged interest in the property is unsupported, permitting the informant to continue prosecution may itself amount to abuse of process.

[Paras 44–47]

Ratio 5 — Principal witness becoming unavailable to prosecution is relevant

Where the person who allegedly suffered the injury is the principal/star witness and, following settlement, categorically states that he has no grievance and does not wish to support the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction becomes a relevant consideration in determining whether continuation of proceedings would be an abuse of process.

[Para 41]

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XII. CONCLUSION

38. High Court order set aside

Para 49: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order dated 19 September 2024.

39. Entire criminal proceedings quashed

The proceedings in ST No. 459 of 2018 pending before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, were quashed against all accused.

40. Revision became infructuous

The pending criminal revision seeking additional charges also ceased to survive and was dismissed.

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CORE PROPOSITION FOR YOUR CASE-LAW COLLECTION

The judgment can be reduced to the following proposition:

Where the person who actually suffered the alleged loss or injury settles with the accused and unequivocally withdraws his grievance, the fact that the criminal case was instituted by another person who describes himself as the complainant does not, by itself, prevent quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The Court must distinguish the “victim” from the “informant”, examine the real nature of the dispute, assess the likelihood of conviction, and determine whether continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process. Where the dispute is predominantly private, civil or commercial, the alleged victim is no longer supporting the prosecution, and the informant's independent victim-status is unsupported, continuation of proceedings may properly be quashed. [Paras 28–48]

Foreign decree — Execution in India — Section 44A CPC — Decree of superior court of reciprocating territory — Foreign decree of Ras Al Khaimah Court — Prima facie executable in India — Principle of comity of courts — Indian courts must give due weight to a foreign decree while protecting its efficacy pending execution. [Paras 62, 65] Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Undertaking — Statement made in counter-affidavit — Mere statement of present intention not an undertaking — Undertaking must be clear, express and intended to bind the party — Court cannot infer an implied undertaking where none exists on record. [Paras 56–59]

 

RAS AL KHAIMAH INVESTMENT AUTHORITY v. MATRIX PHARMACORP PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

2026 INSC 932 — Civil Appeal Nos. 12993–12994 of 2025 and connected appeals
Supreme Court of India — Judgment dated 1 September 2026
Bench: Surya Kant, CJI; Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ.

HEADNOTES

Foreign decree — Execution in India — Section 44A CPC — Decree of superior court of reciprocating territory — Foreign decree of Ras Al Khaimah Court — Prima facie executable in India — Principle of comity of courts — Indian courts must give due weight to a foreign decree while protecting its efficacy pending execution. [Paras 62, 65]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Undertaking — Statement made in counter-affidavit — Mere statement of present intention not an undertaking — Undertaking must be clear, express and intended to bind the party — Court cannot infer an implied undertaking where none exists on record. [Paras 56–59]

Contempt — Standard for establishing undertaking — Whether statement constitutes undertaking depends upon the language used and surrounding circumstances — Contempt jurisdiction must be exercised with great care and circumspection and not casually or lightly. [Paras 57–59]

Corporate personality — Alter ego — Piercing corporate veil — Family control over companies — Mere apprehension or prima facie material does not finally establish that corporate entities are unified with the judgment debtor — Question whether family-controlled entities' assets can be reached in execution left open for determination by the executing Commercial Courts upon pleadings and evidence. [Paras 64, 66, 74–75(iv)–(v)]

Execution of foreign decree — Asset dissipation — Corporate restructuring during pendency of execution — Series of transactions, changes in control, family involvement and timing of corporate transactions may constitute a genuine apprehension that the decree-holder may be left with a paper decree — Protective orders justified to preserve efficacy of decree. [Paras 61–69]

Interim protection — Security — Foreign decree substantially unsatisfied — Status quo should not be vacated without adequate security where decree-holder establishes genuine apprehension of dissipation — Additional security of ₹200 crores directed pending execution. [Paras 71–73]

NCLT/NCLAT — Merger — Protective directions — NCLT had protected decree-holder by restraining alienation/creation of charge over post-merger assets without intimation/approval — NCLAT erred in disturbing such protection in the circumstances — Protective order restored/continued through Supreme Court's directions. [Paras 68–73]

Contempt — Liability of entities not parties to undertaking — Where no enforceable undertaking existed against IQuest and Matrix, Viatris and Moschip were not shown to have committed contempt merely through connected transactions — High Court's finding of no contempt upheld. [Paras 59–60]

Execution proceedings — Questions of corporate veil, unified structure and reachability of assets — Not finally decided by Supreme Court — Matters left to Commercial Courts — Supreme Court's prima facie observations not to bind executing courts. [Paras 64, 74–75]

Held: The statement made by IQuest before the Commercial Court was only a clarificatory statement, not an unconditional undertaking capable of founding contempt. Nevertheless, the sequence of corporate transactions and pervasive family involvement created a genuine apprehension of possible asset dissipation and frustration of the foreign decree. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the finding of no contempt, but directed the judgment debtor/respondents to furnish an additional ₹200 crore security and directed expeditious disposal of the execution proceedings. [Paras 59–75]

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I. FACTS

1. RAKIA and VANPIC Project

Paras 4–5: Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (“RAKIA”) is a public entity affiliated with the Government of Ras Al Khaimah. The Governments of Andhra Pradesh and Ras Al Khaimah entered into a government-to-government arrangement concerning the VANPIC Project. RAKIA entrusted funds to Nimmagadda Prasad (“NP”) for investment in the project and alleged misappropriation.

2. Foreign decree

Para 6: The Ras Al Khaimah Court of First Instance found RAKIA to be the victim of a fraudulent scheme and directed NP to pay AED 267,941,374, with interest at 6% per annum. The decree was upheld by the superior court in cassation.

3. Execution in India

Paras 7–9: RAKIA contended that the UAE is a reciprocating territory under Section 44A CPC and initiated execution proceedings before the Commercial Courts at Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy. Attachments were obtained over NP's movable and immovable assets.

4. IQuest proceedings

Paras 10–12: RAKIA sought to implead IQuest and restrain its assets. The Commercial Court closed the injunction application after IQuest stated that it had initially been interested in acquiring Viatris but had subsequently decided not to proceed. RAKIA treated this statement as an undertaking.

5. Matrix–Tianish transaction

Paras 12–13: RAKIA alleged that the transaction was subsequently routed through Matrix, a related entity. Matrix acquired Tianish, and the merger was approved by the NCLT and subsequently confirmed by the NCLAT. RAKIA then sought to implead Matrix and Tianish and restrain their assets in the execution proceedings.

6. Contempt proceedings

Paras 15–18: RAKIA initiated contempt proceedings before the Telangana High Court alleging breach of the statement/undertaking and seeking to extend liability through the alter ego theory. The High Court ultimately dismissed the contempt proceedings, holding that the statement was merely clarificatory and that contempt proceedings were not the proper forum for piercing the corporate veil or deciding complex questions of control and financial independence.

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II. ISSUE RELATING TO UNDERTAKING AND CONTEMPT

7. Whether IQuest's statement was an undertaking

The central contempt question was whether the statement recorded in the Commercial Court's order dated 1 May 2024 amounted to a legally enforceable undertaking.

The statement was that IQuest had initially been interested in acquiring Viatris but had subsequently decided not to go ahead. [Paras 11, 56–59]

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III. LAW RELATING TO UNDERTAKINGS

8. Undertaking must be clear and binding

Para 57: The Supreme Court relied upon Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and held that the Court must carefully construe the language used to determine the extent and nature of an alleged undertaking. An implied undertaking cannot be assumed when none exists on the record.

9. Contempt jurisdiction requires caution

The power to punish contempt must not be exercised casually or lightly. It is to be exercised only where necessary to uphold the majesty of law and dignity of the courts. [Para 57]

10. Substance rather than label

Para 58: At the same time, the Court recognised that an undertaking need not necessarily use the literal word “undertaking.”

A party may be bound where the language and circumstances convey a firm conviction that an undertaking was actually being given. [Para 58]

Thus:

Absence of the word “undertaking” ≠ automatically no undertaking.

But:

A mere statement of intention ≠ an undertaking.

11. Application to IQuest's statement

Para 59: The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that IQuest's statement did not amount to a firm and unconditional undertaking. It was merely a clarification that at that point in time IQuest had decided not to proceed with the acquisition.

12. Contempt finding upheld

Para 60: Since no clear undertaking existed, contempt could not be established against IQuest. Consequently, contempt could not be extended to Matrix, Viatris or Moschip either. The High Court's finding of no contempt was therefore upheld.

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IV. FOREIGN DECREE AND COMITY OF COURTS

13. Foreign decree prima facie executable

Para 62: The Supreme Court recorded that the RAK Foreign Decree was a decree of a superior court of a reciprocating territory and was therefore prima facie executable in India.

14. Principle of comity

The principle of comity of nations/courts required due respect to the foreign decree. The Court observed that if appropriate protective conditions were not imposed, the decree could effectively become incapable of execution, undermining the reciprocal enforcement regime. [Para 62]

15. Execution proceedings remained pending

Para 64: The execution proceedings had been pending before the Commercial Courts for approximately three years, along with several interlocutory applications. The Supreme Court therefore directed RAKIA to pursue its remedies before those courts while ensuring interim protection of its interests.

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V. ASSET DISSIPATION — PRIMA FACIE FINDING

16. Genuine apprehension of dissipation

Paras 61–63: Although the Court found no contempt, it distinguished contemptuous conduct from conduct creating a genuine apprehension of dissipation.

The sequence of corporate transactions demonstrated sufficient circumstances to support RAKIA's apprehension that assets might be camouflaged or dissipated so that the decree-holder would ultimately be left with a paper decree.

17. Family and corporate structure

Para 66: The Court found a prima facie case that NP and his immediate family members exercised pervasive control over several business entities. The timing of changes in control, modification of active control, and formation of new companies gave rise to a genuine apprehension that the decree might be frustrated.

18. Important distinction

The Court did not finally hold that the corporate entities were the alter egos of NP.

It only held that the circumstances justified protective measures while leaving the substantive question to the executing courts. [Paras 64, 74]

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VI. NCLT/NCLAT PROTECTION

19. NCLT's protective directions

Para 20: When approving the Matrix–Tianish merger, the NCLT directed that post-merger assets should not be alienated without prior intimation and approval of the High Court and imposed similar safeguards regarding creation of charges.

20. NCLAT removed the protection

Paras 21–23: NCLAT dismissed RAKIA's appeals and separately allowed the respondents' cross-appeal, thereby expunging the protective directions granted by the NCLT.

21. Supreme Court's conclusion

Para 69: Considering the transactions during the pendency of execution and the genuine apprehension of the decree-holder, the Supreme Court held that the protective order granted by the NCLT ought not to have been disturbed by the NCLAT.

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VII. SECURITY

22. Existing security

Para 72: The decree value including interest as on 23 July 2026 was approximately ₹949.96 crores. Security already furnished was approximately ₹231.70 crores, besides title deeds of the Medchal Land. The Court provisionally valued that land at ₹250 crores for the purposes of the proceedings, subject to proper valuation by the executing court.

23. Additional ₹200 crore security

Para 73: The Supreme Court directed the respondents to furnish additional security of ₹200 crores within two weeks. Encashment of the security was made subject to the outcome of the pending execution proceedings.

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VIII. CORPORATE VEIL — QUESTION LEFT OPEN

24. No final adjudication

Para 74: The Court expressly left open the question whether NP's family-controlled entities constituted a unified structure whose assets could be reached for satisfaction of the foreign decree. The question of lifting the corporate veil was also expressly left to the Commercial Courts.

25. Prima facie observations not binding

The Commercial Courts were expressly declared not bound by the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court's order or by the impugned orders of the High Court, NCLT and NCLAT on these questions.

This is important: the Supreme Court's observations concerning pervasive control and possible dissipation were protective/interlocutory, not a final finding piercing the corporate veil.

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IX. RATIO DECIDENDI

Ratio 1 — Undertaking

A statement made before a court constitutes an undertaking capable of founding contempt only where, on a proper construction of its language and surrounding circumstances, it conveys a clear and binding commitment. A mere statement of present intention or clarification cannot be converted into an implied undertaking.

[Paras 57–59]

Ratio 2 — Contempt

Contempt jurisdiction must be exercised with great care and circumspection. Where the alleged undertaking is ambiguous or absent, contempt cannot be founded upon an assumed or implied obligation.

[Paras 57–60]

Ratio 3 — Foreign decree

A decree of a superior court of a reciprocating territory is prima facie executable under Section 44A CPC, and the principle of comity of courts requires Indian courts to give due weight to such decree while ensuring that its execution is not rendered illusory.

[Paras 62, 65]

Ratio 4 — Protective jurisdiction

Even where contempt is not established, the surrounding conduct may justify protective interim measures if it creates a genuine apprehension that the decree-holder may otherwise be left with a paper decree.

[Paras 61–63, 66–71]

Ratio 5 — Corporate veil

A prima facie apprehension of pervasive family control and asset dissipation may justify interim protection, but the ultimate question whether separate corporate personality should be disregarded and the assets of related companies reached in execution must be decided by the executing court on pleadings and evidence.

[Paras 64, 66, 74]

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X. CONCLUSION

26. Contempt appeal

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that no contempt was made out because IQuest's statement was not an unconditional undertaking. Consequently, contempt could not be imposed upon the other respondent entities on that basis. [Paras 59–60]

27. Protection of decree-holder

At the same time, the Court found the decree-holder's apprehension of asset dissipation to be genuine enough to warrant continued protection. The status quo was therefore not to be vacated without adequate security. [Paras 63, 69, 71]

28. Additional security

The respondents were directed to furnish ₹200 crores additional security within two weeks, over and above the security/assets already deposited. [Para 73]

29. Corporate veil left open

The question whether NP's family-controlled entities form a unified structure and whether their assets can ultimately be reached in execution was expressly left open for the Commercial Courts. [Para 74]

30. Expeditious execution

The Commercial Courts at Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy were directed to take up the main execution petitions and pending applications and decide them at the earliest and, in any event, within four months. [Para 75(vii)]

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FINAL LEGAL PROPOSITION

The judgment is best understood as drawing a clear line between contempt and protective execution jurisdiction:

No clear undertaking → no contempt.

But:

No contempt does not mean no protective jurisdiction.

Where the foreign decree is prima facie executable, remains substantially unsatisfied, and the surrounding corporate transactions create a genuine apprehension of asset dissipation, the Court may preserve the efficacy of the decree through security and protective orders, without finally piercing the corporate veil or determining the substantive rights of the parties. [Paras 59–75]

Externment — Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 — Section 5 — Section 8 — Natural justice — Notice and hearing — Mandatory condition precedent — Ex parte externment order passed upon reopening of closed proceedings without notice or hearing — Order vitiated. [Paras 13–14, 18–24] Externment — Section 8(5) — Ex parte proceedings — Statutory exceptions specifically confined to failure to execute security bond or failure to appear during inquiry — District Magistrate cannot dispense with notice and hearing on any other ground. [Paras 21–22] Natural justice — Statutory hearing requirement — Where hearing is expressly mandated before an order affecting fundamental rights, compliance constitutes a condition controlling the jurisdiction of the authority — Failure to comply renders the order void ab initio. [Para 23] Externment — Reopening of closed proceedings — Administrative authority — No inherent power of review/recall — Closure order cannot be reopened suo motu in the absence of statutory authority. [Para 25] Externment — Fresh material/supervening events — Even where a fresh report is received after closure of proceedings, the competent authority is required to recommence the procedure prescribed by Section 8 — Previous hearing in the earlier proceedings does not dispense with a fresh hearing on the fresh material. [Para 25]

 

VIJAY KUMAR RAJPOOT @ VIJJU v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.

Criminal Appeal No. 4083 of 2026 — 2026 INSC 926 — Supreme Court of India — Judgment dated 31 August 2026

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

Externment — Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 — Section 5 — Section 8 — Natural justice — Notice and hearing — Mandatory condition precedent — Ex parte externment order passed upon reopening of closed proceedings without notice or hearing — Order vitiated. [Paras 13–14, 18–24]

Externment — Section 8(5) — Ex parte proceedings — Statutory exceptions specifically confined to failure to execute security bond or failure to appear during inquiry — District Magistrate cannot dispense with notice and hearing on any other ground. [Paras 21–22]

Natural justice — Statutory hearing requirement — Where hearing is expressly mandated before an order affecting fundamental rights, compliance constitutes a condition controlling the jurisdiction of the authority — Failure to comply renders the order void ab initio. [Para 23]

Externment — Reopening of closed proceedings — Administrative authority — No inherent power of review/recall — Closure order cannot be reopened suo motu in the absence of statutory authority. [Para 25]

Externment — Fresh material/supervening events — Even where a fresh report is received after closure of proceedings, the competent authority is required to recommence the procedure prescribed by Section 8 — Previous hearing in the earlier proceedings does not dispense with a fresh hearing on the fresh material. [Para 25]

Alternative statutory remedy — Article 226 — Rule of exhaustion — Exceptions — Availability of appeal does not bar writ jurisdiction where the impugned order suffers from violation of natural justice or want of jurisdiction. [Paras 16, 26–27]

Externment — Section 5(b) — Conditions precedent — Mere registration of criminal cases insufficient — Provision requires reasonable grounds for believing that the person is engaged or about to be engaged in specified offences involving force or violence or offences falling within the statutory categories — Where alleged offences do not satisfy those requirements, invocation of Section 5(b) is misconceived. [Paras 29–30]

Externment — Section 5(a) — Fundamental rights — Extraordinary preventive power — Multiple criminal cases, by themselves, do not ipso facto justify externment — Competent authority must reach bona fide and informed subjective satisfaction based upon objective material having a discernible nexus with the conclusion. [Para 31]

Externment — Subjective satisfaction — Judicial review — Authority need not write a judgment like a court, but order must disclose, at least broadly, the reasons for satisfaction — Court may examine existence and consideration of relevant material, mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. [Paras 31–33]

Externment — Extraordinary measure — Article 19(1)(d) — Restriction on freedom of movement — Power must be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances; objective material and statutory safeguards are indispensable. [Paras 31, 33]

Held: The externment order was unsustainable on multiple independent grounds: (i) breach of the mandatory hearing requirement under Section 8; (ii) want of jurisdiction to reopen the closed proceedings; (iii) misconceived invocation of Section 5(b); and (iv) absence of cogent material and reasons supporting subjective satisfaction under Section 5(a). The High Court also erred in mechanically relegating the appellant to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 9. [Paras 24–27, 29–36]

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I. FACTS

1. Original externment proceedings

Paras 2–4: Proceedings were initiated in 2019 on the basis of ten criminal cases registered between 2009 and 2019. The competent authority subsequently closed the proceedings on 6 October 2025, noting that the appellant had been acquitted in the earlier cases, no fresh police report had been submitted after 2019, and externment on the basis of those cases was not justified. The appellant was merely warned to refrain from future criminal activity.

2. Fresh criminal cases

Two subsequent developments occurred:

• FIR No. 117/2023 concerning alleged unauthorised development; and
• FIR No. 483/2025 concerning alleged abusive remarks against Baba Guru Ghasidas.

[Para 5]

3. Revival of the closed proceedings

A fresh police report dated 3 November 2025 was submitted. The District Magistrate recalled the earlier closure order and proceeded to extern the appellant for one year from Raigarh and contiguous districts.

4. Crucial procedural defect

The externment order was passed ex parte, while the appellant was in judicial custody, without prior notice or opportunity of hearing. [Para 11]

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II. SECTION 8 — HEARING IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT

5. Statutory command

Section 8(1) requires the District Magistrate, before passing an order under Sections 3 to 6, to:

1. inform the person in writing of the general nature of the material allegations; and
2. give him a reasonable opportunity to explain them.

[Para 13]

6. Further procedural safeguards

Section 8 also permits:

• examination of witnesses;
• filing of written statements;
• representation through a legal practitioner; and
• procedures to secure attendance during inquiry.

[Para 13]

7. Ex parte power is narrowly confined

Section 8(5) permits ex parte proceedings only where the person:

• fails to execute the required security bond; or
• fails to appear before the District Magistrate during the inquiry.

No general power exists to dispense with notice or hearing. [Paras 21–22]

8. Supreme Court's decisive conclusion

The Court held that notice and reasonable opportunity of hearing under Section 8 are conditions precedent to exercise of the externment power. An order made contrary to those mandatory requirements is vitiated and liable to be declared void ab initio. [Para 19]

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III. NATURAL JUSTICE

9. Audi alteram partem

The Court expressly characterised the defect as not merely procedural but as a breach of the audi alteram partem rule. [Para 24]

10. Nawabkhan Abbaskhan principle

Relying upon Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, the Court reiterated that where a statute requires hearing before administrative action restricting a fundamental right, the duty to hear assumes constitutional significance. Failure to comply can render the order void ab initio. [Para 23]

This is a particularly strong formulation for your jurisprudence collection:

Statutory hearing + fundamental right + administrative power = jurisdictional safeguard, not an empty procedural formality.

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IV. POWER OF REVIEW — ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY

11. Closed case could not simply be recalled

The District Magistrate had expressly closed the earlier proceedings.

The Supreme Court held:

An administrative authority has no power to review its earlier order unless the statute confers such power.

[Para 25]

12. Fresh report does not create review jurisdiction

The fact that a fresh police report was received did not retrospectively confer power upon the District Magistrate to revive the closed proceeding as though exercising a power of review.

Instead, the authority was required to follow the statutory procedure afresh, including Section 8. [Para 25]

13. Previous hearing is not enough

This directly rejects the respondents' argument that the appellant had already received a hearing in the earlier proceedings.

Fresh material → fresh proceedings → fresh statutory hearing.

That is the practical effect of Para 25.

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V. ARTICLE 226 — ALTERNATIVE REMEDY

14. High Court's approach was erroneous

The High Court declined to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction merely because Section 9 provided an appeal to the State Government. [Para 16]

15. Natural justice and jurisdiction are recognised exceptions

The Supreme Court held that this was precisely a case where the High Court ought to have entertained the writ petition because the challenge disclosed:

• breach of natural justice; and
• want of jurisdiction.

[Paras 26–27]

16. Important formulation

The Court characterised the High Court's refusal as an “abject failure to exercise a jurisdiction vested in the High Court.” [Para 27]

Thus, the judgment reinforces the distinction between:

existence of alternative remedy
and
availability of a remedy capable of curing a jurisdictional/natural-justice defect.

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VI. SECTION 5(b) — STATUTORY CONDITIONS NOT SATISFIED

17. Section 5(b) is not triggered by every criminal case

Section 5(b) requires reasonable grounds for believing that the person is engaged or about to be engaged in:

• an offence involving force or violence; or
• specified categories of offences identified by the provision.

It additionally contains a statutory requirement concerning unwillingness of witnesses to come forward because of apprehension regarding their safety or property. [Para 12]

18. Offences relied upon did not satisfy Section 5(b)

The Court examined the offences relied upon and found that they did not involve force or violence and did not fall within the categories contemplated by Section 5(b). The alleged offences concerning religion corresponded to Chapter XV IPC rather than the statutory categories specified in Section 5(b). [Para 30]

19. Result

The conditions precedent for exercise of Section 5(b) power were absent. Its invocation was therefore wholly misconceived. [Para 30]

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VII. SECTION 5(a) — SUBJECTIVE SATISFACTION

20. Wide power, but not unfettered power

Section 5(a) uses wide language concerning acts causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property. Nevertheless, the seriousness of externment requires corresponding safeguards. [Para 31]

21. Multiple criminal cases are not enough

The Court expressly held:

Mere registration of multiple criminal cases does not ipso facto justify externment. [Para 31]

22. Objective material + subjective satisfaction

Before exercising the power, the District Magistrate must have:

Objective material

↓

Bona fide and informed subjective satisfaction

↓

Discernible nexus between material and conclusion

↓

Externment, if genuinely necessary

[Para 31]

23. Reasons need not be elaborate

The authority need not write a judgment comparable to a judicial order. But the order must disclose, at least broadly, the reasons that produced the subjective satisfaction. [Para 31]

24. Judicial review remains available

The Court can examine:

• whether material existed;
• whether relevant material was considered;
• whether there was application of mind;
• mala fides;
• unreasonableness; and
• arbitrariness.

The Court does not substitute its own view merely because another view might be possible. [Para 33]

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VIII. EXTERNMENT AS AN EXTRAORDINARY MEASURE

25. Article 19(1)(d)

Externment directly interferes with the citizen's fundamental right to move freely throughout India. It may prevent a person from residing in his own home and may affect livelihood. [Para 33]

26. Therefore, power must be exercised sparingly

The Court reiterated that externment is an extraordinary measure and requires objective material sufficient to support the competent authority's subjective satisfaction. [Para 33]

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IX. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT ORDER

27. Failure to disclose cogent material

The externment order merely referred to resentment and public outrage among certain communities. It did not identify the material establishing such conclusions or explain why externment was necessary. [Para 32]

28. No meaningful opportunity to answer

The appellant had not been served with notice and had no opportunity to explain the fresh allegations. [Para 32]

29. Cumulative defects

The order therefore failed both procedurally and substantively:

No notice/hearing

• no jurisdiction to reopen
• Section 5(b) conditions absent
• insufficient material/reasons under Section 5(a)
  = Externment order legally unsustainable.

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X. FINAL HOLDING

30. Externment order quashed

The Supreme Court quashed both:

1. the externment order; and
2. the High Court order refusing to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction.

[Para 36]

31. Appellant free to return

The appellant was declared free to enter the districts from which he had been externed. [Para 37]

32. No finding on pending criminal cases

The Court expressly clarified that its observations were not findings on the merits of the pending criminal cases in which the appellant was an accused. [Para 38]

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RATIO DECIDENDI — COMPACT FORM

1. Where Section 8 expressly requires notice and hearing before externment, such hearing is a condition precedent to jurisdiction; an externment order passed without it is vitiated.

2. The statutory power to proceed ex parte under Section 8(5) is confined to the contingencies expressly specified in that subsection; it cannot be expanded by administrative convenience or apprehension.

3. An administrative authority cannot review or recall its own concluded order unless the statute confers such power. Receipt of fresh material does not create an implied power of review.

4. Where fresh material leads the authority to reopen externment action, the authority must comply afresh with the statutory hearing requirement.

5. The rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative statutory remedy does not ordinarily bar Article 226 where the impugned action suffers from violation of natural justice or want of jurisdiction.

6. Section 5(b) cannot be invoked merely because criminal cases have been registered; the offences and other statutory conditions must fall within the precise requirements of the provision.

7. Under Section 5(a), externment requires objective material, a bona fide and informed subjective satisfaction, and a discernible nexus between the material and the necessity for externment.

8. Because externment seriously restricts Article 19(1)(d), it is an extraordinary measure and cannot rest upon ipse dixit, conjecture, or mere registration of criminal cases.

9. The authority need not write a judicial judgment, but its order must demonstrate sufficient application of mind to the material relied upon.

10. The externment order in the present case failed on each of these fundamental safeguards and was therefore quashed.