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Wednesday, June 3, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...: advocatemmmohan DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Right...



DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Rights crystallise under DLR Act.

Where succession to agricultural land opened upon the death of a Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005, succession is governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and not by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Rights of successors become crystallised on the date of death and cannot be disturbed by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005. Paras 19–22, 27–33.

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – Section 50(a) – Male Bhumidhar – Succession by male lineal descendants.

Under Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, where a male Bhumidhar dies leaving male lineal descendants, the agricultural holding devolves upon such male descendants in the male line of descent. Other heirs can succeed only in the absence of heirs falling within the superior category prescribed by the statute. Paras 19, 20, 21.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 4(2) (prior to omission) – Agricultural holdings – Exclusion of HSA.

Prior to its omission by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 4(2) preserved special laws governing devolution of agricultural holdings. Consequently, succession to Bhumidhari rights was governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and not by the Hindu Succession Act. Paras 22–25.

Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Prospective operation – Agricultural land.

The omission of Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act by the 2005 Amendment operates prospectively. The amendment applies only to successions opening on or after 09.09.2005 and does not reopen or alter successions that had already vested prior thereto. Paras 28–33.

Agricultural Land – Succession completed prior to 2005 Amendment – Rights not affected by subsequent urbanisation.

Where succession to agricultural land had already taken place under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, subsequent acquisition of the land or urbanisation of the village does not create or revive rights in favour of persons who had no inheritable interest at the time succession opened. Para 48.

ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Rejection of plaint – Agricultural land – Plaintiff having no inheritable right under governing succession law.

Where the averments in the plaint itself establish that the property was agricultural land, that the deceased Bhumidhar died in 2002 and that succession stood governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the suit claiming partition on the basis of equal inheritance is barred by law and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 16–21, 33, 49.

ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Scope of enquiry – Court confined to plaint and documents filed therewith.

For deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to examine the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. If on a meaningful reading thereof the suit appears barred by law or discloses no cause of action, the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold. Paras 12, 41, 49.

HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY (HUF) – Mere assertion of existence of HUF – Insufficient.

A bare or bald averment that a property belongs to an HUF or that a deceased ancestor was Karta of an HUF does not create a cause of action. Specific pleadings must disclose when and how the HUF came into existence and how each property acquired the character of HUF property. Paras 35, 37, 38, 40.

HUF Property – Post-1956 position – No presumption of HUF from ancestral inheritance.

After enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there is no presumption that inherited ancestral property automatically assumes the character of HUF property. Detailed pleadings are necessary to establish creation or existence of an HUF and the manner in which the property became HUF property. Paras 35, 45.

Cause of Action – HUF Claim – Material facts mandatory.

A plaint asserting HUF rights must contain material facts constituting the cause of action, including particulars regarding creation of the HUF, source of acquisition, and circumstances by which the property became HUF property. Omission of such material facts renders the plaint devoid of a cause of action. Paras 39, 40.

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Clever drafting – Illusory cause of action.

A plaint cannot be permitted to survive merely because it contains a cleverly drafted assertion intended to create an illusion of a cause of action. Courts must examine whether a real right to sue is disclosed and reject plaints founded upon vague, unsupported or illusory pleadings. Paras 42, 43, 44.

HUF – Absence of documentary support – Claim liable to rejection.

Where no document evidencing existence of an HUF is produced, the revenue records do not record any HUF, and the plaint contains only a bald assertion regarding HUF status, the plea of HUF cannot furnish a valid cause of action for a partition suit. Paras 38, 46.

Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – Applicability.

The principles relating to coparcenary rights of daughters under amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act apply only where coparcenary/HUF property is established. In the absence of pleadings and material establishing existence of an HUF, reliance upon Vineeta Sharma is misconceived. Paras 45, 47.

Ratio Decidendi

Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

Cases Referred

  1. Nathu v. Hukam Singh – followed – Paras 23, 25.
  2. Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan – followed – Paras 24, 25.
  3. Nirmala v. Government of NCT of Delhi – followed – Paras 29, 30.
  4. Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 31.
  5. Surender Kumar v. Dhani Ram – followed – Paras 35, 45.
  6. Kuldeep Mansukhani v. Indira Jhangiani – followed – Para 36.
  7. Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association – relied upon – Paras 39, 40.
  8. ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal – relied upon – Para 42.
  9. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal – relied upon – Para 43.
  10. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – distinguished – Paras 45, 47.
  11. CWT v. Chander Sen – referred – Para 35.
  12. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – referred – Paras 35, 36.

Santra Devi v. Santosh Kaushik & Ors., CS(OS) 188/2024, decided on 30.05.2026, Delhi High Court (Mini Pushkarna, J.).

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NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985 – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Grant of Bail – Mandatory satisfaction of twin conditions. In cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, satisfaction of the twin conditions prescribed under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non for grant of bail. The Court must record its satisfaction that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Paras 13, 14, 15, 17.

 

NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985 – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Grant of Bail – Mandatory satisfaction of twin conditions.

In cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, satisfaction of the twin conditions prescribed under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non for grant of bail. The Court must record its satisfaction that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Paras 13, 14, 15, 17.

NDPS Act – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Liberal approach in bail matters impermissible.

Where the offence involves commercial quantity, a liberal approach ordinarily applicable to bail jurisprudence cannot be adopted by ignoring the statutory restrictions contained in Section 37. The legislative mandate must be strictly complied with before releasing an accused on bail. Paras 14, 15, 17.

Bail – NDPS Act – Failure to consider twin conditions under Section 37 – Order granting bail liable to be set aside.

An order granting bail in a case involving commercial quantity, without any discussion or satisfaction regarding the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), is legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Para 17.

NDPS Act – Commercial Quantity – Meaning of “reasonable grounds”.

The expression “reasonable grounds” occurring in Section 37 contemplates something more than a prima facie case. It requires substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty and necessitates existence of facts and circumstances sufficient to justify such satisfaction. Para 14.

Bail – NDPS Act – Criminal antecedents – Relevance.

Where the accused has antecedents involving offences of a similar nature under the NDPS Act, it cannot readily be concluded that he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. Such antecedents are a relevant consideration while applying the second limb of Section 37(1)(b)(ii). Para 18.

NDPS Act – Commercial Quantity – Bail – Mere completion of investigation or filing of charge-sheet not sufficient.

In offences involving commercial quantity, completion of investigation, filing of charge-sheet, or absence of recovery from the accused by themselves do not dilute the mandatory requirements of Section 37. The statutory conditions continue to govern the exercise of bail jurisdiction. Paras 17, 18.

Article 21 – Personal Liberty – Prolonged incarceration – NDPS offences.

Though prolonged incarceration may in appropriate cases justify grant of bail on constitutional grounds under Article 21, such principle is not of universal application and must be balanced against the restrictions imposed by special statutes and the nature of the offence involved. Paras 19, 20.

NDPS Act – Bail – Incarceration of one year and seven months – Not prolonged incarceration.

Where the accused had undergone custody for only one year and seven months and the offence carried a punishment extending up to twenty years' imprisonment, such custody could not be regarded as prolonged incarceration warranting relaxation of the rigours of Section 37 on Article 21 considerations. Para 19.

Bail Jurisprudence – Special Statutes – Need for uniformity.

The Supreme Court noted that application of the principle of prolonged incarceration in bail matters under special statutes has not been uniform and similarly situated accused persons have received differing outcomes. The issue concerning the intersection of Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions has been referred for authoritative consideration in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Paras 20, 21, 22.

NDPS Act – Drug Trafficking – Threat to national interest.

Drug trafficking constitutes a serious threat affecting public health and the national economy. In balancing competing considerations, the interest of society and the nation assumes paramount importance, particularly in offences involving organised drug networks. Para 22.

Ratio Decidendi

In prosecutions under the NDPS Act involving commercial quantity, grant of bail is governed by the stringent restrictions contained in Section 37. Unless the Court records satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, release on bail is impermissible. Failure to consider and record satisfaction regarding these statutory twin conditions renders the bail order unsustainable. Criminal antecedents and the gravity of organised drug trafficking are relevant factors while applying Section 37. Paras 13–18.

Important Legal Principles

  1. Section 37 creates additional restrictions over ordinary bail principles. Paras 13, 15.
  2. Recording satisfaction regarding the twin conditions is mandatory. Paras 14, 17.
  3. “Reasonable grounds” means more than a prima facie view. Para 14.
  4. Criminal antecedents are relevant while assessing likelihood of reoffending. Para 18.
  5. One year and seven months' custody is not prolonged incarceration in a case punishable up to twenty years. Para 19.
  6. Drug trafficking poses a serious threat to society, public health and national interest. Para 22.

Cases Referred

  1. State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo – followed and relied upon – Paras 10, 14.
  2. Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh – followed – Paras 10, 15.
  3. Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) – referred – Para 12.
  4. State by Inspector of Police v. B. Ramu – relied upon – Para 15.
  5. Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade – relied upon – Paras 16, 21.
  6. Collector of Customs v. Ahmadalieva Nodira – referred regarding meaning of “reasonable grounds” – Para 14.
  7. Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha – referred – Para 21.
  8. Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh – referred – Para 21.
  9. Narcotic Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh – referred – Para 21.
  10. Badsha Sk. v. State of West Bengal – referred – Para 21.
  11. Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi – reference noticed – Para 22.

State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.896 of 2026, decided on 02.06.2026 (Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.). 

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Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Pensionary Benefits – Entitlement despite absence of formal regularisation. A temporary status casual labourer who, after conferment of temporary status, completed three years of continuous service and became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in the absence of a formal order of regularisation. Paras 75, 76.

 

SERVICE LAW – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Pensionary Benefits – Entitlement despite absence of formal regularisation.

A temporary status casual labourer who, after conferment of temporary status, completed three years of continuous service and became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in the absence of a formal order of regularisation. Paras 75, 76.

Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Beneficial Scheme – Liberal Interpretation.

The 1991 Scheme is a beneficial and progressive framework intended to gradually integrate casual labourers into the regular service structure by extending service conditions and benefits associated with Group ‘D’ employees. The Scheme cannot be interpreted restrictively so as to defeat its object. Paras 52, 55.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Completion of three years’ service – Parity with temporary Group ‘D’ employees.

Upon completion of three years of continuous service after conferment of temporary status, casual labourers are to be treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employees and become entitled to all benefits admissible to such employees. The parity contemplated is parity of benefits and service conditions, though not identity of service status. Paras 49, 65, 68, 69.

Pension – Not dependent upon regularisation – Formal regularisation not a condition precedent.

Pensionary entitlement of temporary status casual labourers flows independently from the Scheme and the departmental circular dated 30.11.1992. Formal regularisation is not a condition precedent for entitlement to pension. Paras 57, 75, 76.

Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Clause 6 – Interpretation.

Clause 6, which provides for counting 50% of temporary status service for retirement benefits after regularisation, does not create pensionary entitlement. It merely confers an additional benefit in cases where regularisation occurs. Absence of regularisation cannot extinguish the underlying entitlement to pension. Paras 56, 57.

Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Expression “such as” – Scope.

The expression “benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees such as” employed in the circular dated 30.11.1992 is illustrative and not exhaustive. The benefits listed therein cannot be treated as a closed category. Pensionary benefits available to temporary Group ‘D’ employees are also covered by the parity contemplated under the Scheme. Paras 54, 55.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Long and uninterrupted service – Social security benefits.

Employees who have rendered long, continuous and uninterrupted service, have been conferred temporary status and have discharged duties identical to regular employees, cannot be denied pensionary and social security benefits merely because the employer failed to issue formal orders of regularisation. Paras 38, 40, 42.

Article 14 – Equality – State as model employer.

The State cannot continue to extract services of a permanent and continuous nature from employees while denying corresponding service benefits. Such action is contrary to the constitutional mandate of equality and the obligation of the State as a model employer. Paras 39, 40.

Pension – Constitutional status – Property under Article 300A.

Pension is not a bounty or gratuitous payment. It is a vested constitutional right and constitutes property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution. Such right cannot be defeated by administrative inaction or denied on the plea of financial burden. Paras 41, 42, 74.

CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Rule 10(1-B) – Temporary Government Servants – Pension.

Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 recognises entitlement of temporary Government servants who have rendered not less than ten years of service to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity and family pension under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Paras 71, 72.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Distinction between status and benefits.

Conferment of temporary status does not convert a casual labourer into a temporary Government servant. Nevertheless, after completion of three years’ service under temporary status, the employee becomes entitled to all benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees. The distinction that survives is one of nomenclature and mode of regularisation, not of service benefits. Paras 67, 68.

Delay and Laches – Pension claims – Continuing cause of action.

A claim relating to pension constitutes a continuing cause of action and cannot be rejected solely on the ground of delay. However, arrears may be restricted in accordance with settled principles governing service jurisprudence. Para 81.

Pension – Arrears – Limitation.

Though entitlement to pension survives notwithstanding delay, arrears shall ordinarily be confined to three years and two months preceding the institution of proceedings before the Tribunal. Para 81.

Ratio Decidendi

A temporary status casual labourer under the Department of Posts, who after conferment of temporary status completed three years of continuous service and thereby became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary and retiral benefits under Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 even in the absence of formal regularisation. The beneficial Scheme of 1991 and the departmental circular dated 30.11.1992 must be interpreted liberally to extend all benefits available to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, including pension. Administrative failure to regularise an employee cannot defeat a vested pensionary right earned through long years of service. Paras 55–57, 67–75, 76.

Important Principles Summarised

  1. Pension is a constitutional and statutory right, not a bounty. Paras 41, 42.
  2. Temporary status employees completing three years' service acquire parity of benefits with temporary Group ‘D’ employees. Paras 49, 65.
  3. Formal regularisation is not a prerequisite for pension. Paras 57, 75, 76.
  4. Clause 6 of the Scheme grants an additional benefit and does not restrict pensionary entitlement. Paras 56, 57.
  5. Pension claims constitute a continuing cause of action. Para 81.
  6. State cannot rely upon its own failure to regularise employees to deny pensionary benefits. Paras 40, 42, 75.

Cases Referred

  1. Jagrit Mazdoor Union v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. – followed and relied upon – Paras 34, 43, 55, 56.
  2. Vinod Kumar v. Union of India – relied upon – Paras 35, 23.
  3. Jaggo v. Union of India – relied upon – Paras 36, 23.
  4. Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 37.
  5. State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava – relied upon – Paras 41, 74.
  6. M.L. Patil v. State of Goa – relied upon regarding continuing cause of action – Para 18, 81.
  7. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Santosh – distinguished/not accepted – Para 30.

Bhikhani Devi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28802-28804 of 2019, decided on 01.06.2026 (Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, JJ.).

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Fair Price Shop Dealership – Compassionate/Dependent Quota – Exclusion of married daughter from definition of “family” – Constitutional validity. Exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of “family” for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, solely on the basis of marital status, is constitutionally impermissible. Dependency, financial need, residence and ability to run the dealership are the relevant considerations. Marital status bears no rational nexus with the object of the scheme. Paras 18, 19, 22,

 

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA – Articles 14, 15(1), 21 and 39(a) – Fair Price Shop Dealership – Compassionate/Dependent Quota – Exclusion of married daughter from definition of “family” – Constitutional validity.

Exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of “family” for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, solely on the basis of marital status, is constitutionally impermissible. Dependency, financial need, residence and ability to run the dealership are the relevant considerations. Marital status bears no rational nexus with the object of the scheme. Paras 18, 19, 22, 23.

Article 14 – Reasonable Classification – Married daughter excluded while married son included – Gender stereotype – Invalid classification.

A classification which treats a married daughter differently from a married son and proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to belong to her parental family is founded upon gender stereotypes and historical notions of inequality. Such classification lacks an intelligible differentia having rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. Paras 19, 20, 23.

Dependency – Question of fact – Cannot be determined solely by marital status.

Dependency is a factual issue which must be determined on the basis of actual circumstances. It cannot be conclusively presumed that a married daughter is not dependent upon her parents merely because she is married. Equally, inclusion of a son cannot automatically establish dependency. Para 19.

Compassionate/Dependent Allotment Scheme – Object of scheme.

The purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota is not to create a right of inheritance or succession in the dealership but to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of the deceased dealer and to ensure continuity of the public distribution system. Paras 15, 22.

Local Residence Requirement – Married daughter – Blanket exclusion impermissible.

Whether a married daughter satisfies the requirement of local residence is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case. A blanket exclusion of all married daughters on the speculative assumption that they necessarily reside in their matrimonial homes is constitutionally unsustainable. Para 21.

Doctrine of Purposive Construction – Welfare legislation – Interpretation consistent with constitutional values.

Where literal interpretation of a provision produces a result inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination, the Court must adopt a purposive interpretation which advances the object of the scheme and avoids arbitrary or unjust consequences. Paras 24, 25.

Purposive Interpretation – Expression ‘unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters’ – Inclusion of married daughters.

The expression “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” occurring in the definition of family is illustrative and not exhaustive. In the context of a welfare-oriented scheme, the expression must be construed to include married daughters who establish dependency and satisfy all other eligibility requirements. Paras 25, 26.

Welfare Schemes – Constitutional Interpretation – Gender Equality.

Welfare schemes must be interpreted in a manner consistent with constitutional commitments to substantive equality and social justice. Marital status cannot constitute a valid ground to deny benefits to an otherwise eligible daughter where dependency remains established. Paras 14, 23, 25, 27.

Public Distribution System – Fair Price Shop – Married daughter residing with deceased dealer and assisting in shop operations – Entitlement.

Where a married daughter continued to reside with her mother even after marriage, actively assisted in operating the fair price shop, remained dependent upon the family and assumed responsibility of maintaining other dependent sisters after the mother's death, rejection of her claim solely on the ground of marriage was arbitrary and illegal. Paras 28, 29.

Constitutional Law – Manifest Arbitrariness – Gender-based presumptions.

State action founded upon presumptions that a married daughter automatically ceases to be part of her parental family and loses all dependency upon it is manifestly arbitrary and violative of constitutional guarantees of equality. Paras 19, 20, 23.

Ratio Decidendi

For the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, dependency and fulfilment of eligibility conditions are the governing considerations. Exclusion of a married daughter solely on the basis of marital status is founded upon impermissible gender stereotypes, violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution and frustrates the object of the welfare scheme. The expression “daughter” in Clause 2(p) of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Control Order, 2016 includes a married daughter who establishes dependency, local residence and satisfies other prescribed eligibility conditions. Paras 18–26.

Principles of Law Declared

  1. Marital status is not a valid criterion to determine dependency. Para 19.
  2. Married daughters cannot be excluded from welfare benefits solely because of marriage. Paras 20, 23.
  3. Dependency is a factual issue requiring individual determination. Paras 19, 21.
  4. Welfare schemes must be interpreted consistently with Articles 14 and 15. Paras 14, 24, 25.
  5. Purposive interpretation must prevail where literal interpretation produces unconstitutional results. Paras 24, 25.
  6. The expression “daughter” includes married daughters if dependency and other eligibility conditions are established. Paras 25, 26.

Cases Referred

  1. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar – relied upon – Para 17.
  2. Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar – relied upon – Para 17.
  3. Shayara Bano v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  4. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  5. Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  6. Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla – relied upon – Para 24.
  7. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. – approved – Para 27.
  8. Saida Begum v. State of U.P. – overruled – Para 27.
  9. Smt. Kusumlata v. State of U.P. – overruled – Para 27.

Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P. & Ors., Civil Appeal No.7667 of 2025, decided on 02-06-2026 (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.). 

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Development Agreement – Minor’s undivided share in land – Exchange for built-up area and monetary consideration – Whether beneficial. Where the minor held only an undivided share in jointly owned undeveloped land and the proposed development agreement entitled him to a share in a constructed residential flat together with monetary consideration, such arrangement constituted a tangible, enforceable and beneficial improvement over a passive and difficult-to-enjoy ownership interest. Paras 15, 16.

 

HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 1956 – Section 8 – Permission to alienate minor's immovable property – Nature and scope of judicial scrutiny.

Section 8 embodies an ex ante protective mechanism requiring prior judicial scrutiny before a natural guardian alienates a minor’s immovable property. The provision seeks to balance managerial powers of the guardian with judicial oversight to ensure that the welfare and proprietary interests of the minor remain paramount. Paras 6, 7, 14.

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(4) – “Necessity or evident advantage to the minor” – Meaning.

While considering an application under Section 8(2), the Court must determine whether the proposed transaction is necessary or demonstrably beneficial to the minor. The test is not the convenience of adult co-owners or guardian but whether the transaction secures a tangible, measurable and enforceable benefit to the minor. Paras 7, 14.

Minor’s Property – Natural guardian – Fiduciary capacity.

A natural guardian does not possess absolute authority over a minor’s property. The guardian holds the property in a fiduciary capacity and any proposed alienation must be justified by reference to the welfare, protection and advancement of the minor's interests. Paras 7, 14.

Doctrine of Parens Patriae – Judicial oversight of minor's property – Welfare principle.

The requirement of prior court permission under Section 8 is founded upon the doctrine of parens patriae. Courts act as protectors of vulnerable persons and are duty-bound to independently examine whether a proposed transaction safeguards the present and future interests of the minor. Paras 9–12, 14.

Minor’s Property – Court approval – Guardian’s consent not conclusive.

Even where the guardian consents to a transaction, the Court must undertake an independent assessment of the advantages and risks involved. Judicial approval cannot be granted merely on the basis of familial consensus and must be based upon the welfare and best interests of the minor. Para 14.

Development Agreement – Minor’s undivided share in land – Exchange for built-up area and monetary consideration – Whether beneficial.

Where the minor held only an undivided share in jointly owned undeveloped land and the proposed development agreement entitled him to a share in a constructed residential flat together with monetary consideration, such arrangement constituted a tangible, enforceable and beneficial improvement over a passive and difficult-to-enjoy ownership interest. Paras 15, 16.

Minor’s Welfare – Comparison between undeveloped land and developed property.

An undivided share in undeveloped land may remain merely a notional interest yielding little practical benefit. Conversion of such interest into a combination of residential property and liquid monetary assets may enhance the welfare of the minor by providing security, utility, liquidity and future economic advantage. Para 16.

Section 8 HMGA – Assessment of benefit to minor – Fact-specific exercise.

Whether a transaction involving a minor’s property is advantageous cannot be determined through any rigid formula. The determination must be made on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case after evaluating the relative benefits and disadvantages of the proposed arrangement. Para 16.

Minor's Property – Rights of adult co-owners – Reconciliation of competing interests.

While protecting the minor’s share, the Court must also recognise that adult co-owners possess legitimate rights to derive reasonable economic benefit from the property. Judicial scrutiny must reconcile both interests without compromising the minor’s security and future proprietary rights. Para 14.

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8 – Development Agreement approved subject to safeguards.

Permission to act upon a development agreement involving a minor’s share may be granted subject to protective conditions, including deposit of monetary consideration in a nationalised bank till the minor attains majority, restriction on alteration of the development agreement without court approval, and requirement of court permission before any sale of the minor’s share. Para 18.

Property Law – Unauthorized alienation by guardian – Principles reiterated.

An alienation by a natural guardian without prior permission under Section 8(2) is not void ab initio but voidable at the instance of the minor. The right to avoid such transaction accrues upon attainment of majority and must be exercised within the prescribed period of limitation. Para 8.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act acts as parens patriae and must independently assess whether the proposed alienation of a minor’s immovable property is necessary or evidently advantageous to the minor. Where an undivided interest in undeveloped land is proposed to be converted into a definite share in a constructed residential unit together with monetary consideration and appropriate safeguards are imposed, such transaction may constitute an evident advantage to the minor warranting judicial approval. Paras 14–18.

Principles Summarised by the Supreme Court

The Court summarised the following settled principles regarding Section 8 HMGA:

  1. Prior court permission is a statutory safeguard against alienation of a minor’s immovable property. Para 8.
  2. Unauthorized alienation is voidable, not void. Para 8.
  3. Right of avoidance accrues upon majority. Para 8.
  4. Avoidance need not always be through a formal declaratory suit. Para 8.
  5. Recovery and title claims depend upon prior avoidance of the transaction. Para 8.
  6. Section 8 applies to separate property and not to valid alienation of undivided coparcenary property. Para 8.
  7. Welfare and benefit of the minor remain the governing consideration. Para 8.
  8. The provision balances protection of minors with certainty of property transactions. Para 8.

Cases Referred

  1. Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan – relied upon – Para 8.
  2. Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair – relied upon – Para 8.
  3. K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma – relied upon – Para 8.
  4. Murugan v. Kesava Gounder – relied upon – Para 8.
  5. Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar – relied upon – Para 8.
  6. G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer – referred – Para 8.
  7. Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree – referred – Para 14.
  8. Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah – referred – Para 10.
  9. McKee v. McKee – referred – Para 10.

Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.25053 of 2025, decided on 03-06-2026 (Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.).

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HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Persistent denial of sexual relations without reasonable cause – Ground for divorce. Persistent refusal of sexual intercourse and denial of conjugal relations without any justifiable reason strikes at the foundation of marital life and constitutes mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Where the wife continuously denied sexual relations and the parties lived separately even during the brief period of cohabitation, grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty was justified. Paras 18, 19.

 

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Persistent denial of sexual relations without reasonable cause – Ground for divorce.

Persistent refusal of sexual intercourse and denial of conjugal relations without any justifiable reason strikes at the foundation of marital life and constitutes mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Where the wife continuously denied sexual relations and the parties lived separately even during the brief period of cohabitation, grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty was justified. Paras 18, 19.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Long period of separation – Relevant consideration.

Long and continuous separation between spouses, resulting in complete emotional alienation and absence of marital companionship, may itself amount to mental cruelty. When matrimonial ties have become a mere legal fiction and there is no possibility of restoration of cohabitation, continuation of such relationship may amount to cruelty to both parties. Paras 16, 24, 25, 26.

Marriage – Conjugal Rights and Conjugal Duties – Reciprocal obligations of spouses.

Marriage is not merely a bundle of enforceable rights but a partnership founded upon mutual respect, emotional support, fidelity, companionship and shared responsibility. Conjugal rights cannot be claimed while abandoning corresponding matrimonial duties. Persistent withdrawal from the foundational obligations of marriage may constitute mental cruelty. Para 22.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Appellate Court – Consideration of subsequent events.

An appellate court is entitled to take into consideration subsequent events occurring during pendency of litigation, including prolonged separation, cessation of cohabitation, failure of reconciliation efforts and conduct of parties, while determining whether cruelty stands established. Appeal being a continuation of the original proceedings, such subsequent developments may support or negate the pleaded matrimonial ground. Para 25.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Desertion not specifically pleaded – Long separation and continued non-cohabitation – Relevance.

Even where statutory desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) is not specifically pleaded, prolonged separation, absence of cohabitation and failure of both parties to make efforts for reunion may be considered while evaluating mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia). Paras 21, 25, 27, 28.

Marriage – Mutual failure to accommodate each other – Mental Cruelty.

Where spouses hold irreconcilable views regarding matrimonial life and refuse to accommodate each other over a prolonged period, such conduct itself may amount to cruelty. In matrimonial disputes, the Court is not concerned with determining which spouse is correct; the focus is whether the conduct and incompatibility have rendered continuation of marriage impossible. Para 23.

Article 142 of the Constitution – Divorce on ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Scope.

The Supreme Court, in exercise of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, may dissolve a marriage where it is satisfied that the matrimonial bond has completely failed, reconciliation is impossible, cohabitation has ceased for a sufficiently long period and continuation of the legal relationship would serve no useful purpose. Paras 29, 32, 34, 37.

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Factors for consideration.

Relevant factors include duration of cohabitation, length of separation, attempts at reconciliation, mediation efforts, emotional alienation, pendency of litigation, existence of children, financial dependence and overall possibility of restoring matrimonial life. Paras 13, 30, 32.

Article 142 – Dissolution of marriage – Parties living separately for more than fifteen years – No children – Both financially independent.

Where spouses cohabited only for a few months, lived separately for more than fifteen years, mediation failed, there was no possibility of reunion, no children were born from the wedlock and both parties were financially independent professionals, the marriage was held to have broken down irretrievably warranting dissolution under Article 142. Paras 13, 30, 34, 35, 37.

Matrimonial Litigation – Long pendency – Continuation of marriage merely on paper – Undesirable.

Prolonged matrimonial litigation perpetuates a dead relationship and results in psychological, emotional and social stagnation. Courts should not permit parties to remain trapped indefinitely in a marriage which has ceased to exist in substance and reality. Para 36.

Ratio Decidendi

Persistent denial of conjugal relations, prolonged separation, absence of cohabitation, failure of reconciliation efforts and complete emotional breakdown of the marital relationship constitute mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Additionally, where parties have lived apart for over fifteen years and the marriage has become emotionally dead and beyond salvage, the Supreme Court may invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown in order to do complete justice between the parties. Paras 18–19, 24–30, 32–37.


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Arbitration – Limitation – Dismissal of application under Section 33 – Whether benefit of Section 34(3) lost – No. The fact that an application under Section 33 is eventually dismissed or found without merit does not deprive a party of the benefit available under Section 34(3). The commencement of limitation depends upon disposal of the Section 33 proceedings and not upon their outcome. Paras 13, 15.

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ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 – Sections 33 and 34(3) – Limitation for application to set aside arbitral award – Starting point of limitation where application under Section 33 is filed.

Where a request under Section 33 is made and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, limitation under Section 34(3) for filing an application to set aside the award commences from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Tribunal and not from the date of the original award. Paras 13, 14, 18.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34(3) – Interpretation of statutory limitation provision – Court cannot add words to statute.

Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 which are allowed, dismissed, maintainable or otherwise. Where the legislature has not imposed any such restriction, the Court cannot read into the provision a condition that only a maintainable or successful application under Section 33 would postpone commencement of limitation. Para 13.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 33 – Formal invocation of jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal – Effect on limitation under Section 34(3).

For the purpose of Section 34(3), the relevant consideration is whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 has been formally invoked and proceedings remained pending before the Tribunal. The ultimate success or failure of the application is immaterial. Paras 14, 15.

Arbitration – Limitation – Pendency of proceedings under Section 33 – Parties cannot be compelled to simultaneously pursue remedy under Section 34.

Once proceedings under Section 33 are pending, the award remains subject to the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal for correction, interpretation or supplementation. Parties cannot be compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 merely by way of abundant caution during pendency of Section 33 proceedings. Para 14.

Arbitration – Limitation – Dismissal of application under Section 33 – Whether benefit of Section 34(3) lost – No.

The fact that an application under Section 33 is eventually dismissed or found without merit does not deprive a party of the benefit available under Section 34(3). The commencement of limitation depends upon disposal of the Section 33 proceedings and not upon their outcome. Paras 13, 15.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 33 – Formal application distinguished from correspondence seeking review.

Where a party formally invokes Section 33 and the Arbitral Tribunal entertains and adjudicates the application, limitation under Section 34(3) runs from disposal of such application. Decision in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. distinguished, as that case involved only a letter substantially seeking review and not a formal application under Section 33. Para 16.

Arbitration – Interpretation advancing object of Act – Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings.

An interpretation requiring parties to file proceedings under Section 34 during pendency of Section 33 proceedings would result in multiplicity of litigation and procedural uncertainty and would defeat the scheme and object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Para 17.

Arbitration – Abuse of process – Frivolous or mala fide applications under Section 33 – Consequences.

Though filing of an application under Section 33 postpones commencement of limitation under Section 34(3), courts are empowered to impose exemplary and punitive costs where such applications are found to be sham, frivolous, mala fide or filed solely for defeating limitation. Para 17.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 33 and 34(3) – Computation of limitation – Certified copy of order disposing Section 33 applications received on 15.09.2022 – Section 34 applications filed on 07.11.2022 – Held, within limitation.

Since both parties had filed applications under Section 33 which were disposed of by common order dated 04.07.2022 and the certified copy thereof was received on 15.09.2022, the applications under Section 34 filed on 07.11.2022 were within the period prescribed by Section 34(3). Paras 19, 20.

Ratio Decidendi

A formal request under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, once entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, postpones commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) until disposal of such request. The benefit is available irrespective of whether the Section 33 application is ultimately allowed or dismissed, provided the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33 was duly invoked. Paras 13–18.

Cases Referred

  1. State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. – distinguished – Para 16.
  2. Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav – followed – Paras 9, 18.
  3. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 18.
  4. USS Alliance v. State of U.P. – relied upon – Para 18.

National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.7570 of 2024, decided on 02.06.2026 (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.)


Section 34 “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. (…) (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

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Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

Where a male Hindu dies intestate leaving separate/self-acquired property, succession opens under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The widow and daughters succeed simultaneously as Class-I heirs and take definite shares in the property. By virtue of Section 19, they hold the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Consequently, the doctrine of survivorship has no application and each heir acquires a distinct and identifiable share. Paras 5, 6, 8.

Joint Tenancy and Tenancy-in-Common – Distinction explained.

In joint tenancy, ownership is joint and indivisible, governed by survivorship, and no co-owner possesses a separately inheritable share. In tenancy-in-common, each co-owner possesses a distinct though undivided share, which devolves upon his or her own heirs by succession. Hindu law generally recognizes joint tenancy only in the context of coparcenary, whereas succession under the Hindu Succession Act creates tenancy-in-common. Paras 7.

Hindu Law – Coparcenary – Property inherited under Section 8 – Whether becomes HUF property – No.

Property devolving upon an heir under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act is inherited in the heir's individual capacity and does not automatically acquire the character of coparcenary or Hindu Undivided Family property. Descendants do not obtain rights in such property by birth. The principles laid down in CWT v. Chander Sen, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar and M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal reaffirmed. Paras 7.

Karta – Alienation for legal necessity – Pre-condition – Existence of coparcenary/joint family property.

The power of a karta to alienate family property for legal necessity arises only in relation to joint family/coparcenary property. Where heirs succeed under Section 8 and hold the property as tenants-in-common with separate shares, no heir can claim authority as karta over the shares belonging to the others. Paras 7, 8.

Widow succeeding to intestate property – Extent of authority.

Upon intestate succession, the widow acquires only her own statutory share. She is competent to deal with or alienate only that share and has no authority to alienate the shares vested in other heirs on the plea of legal necessity. Para 8.

Partition Suit – Sale executed by widow claiming to act as karta for marriage expenses of daughter – Validity.

Where the deceased's separate property devolved equally upon widow and four daughters, each acquiring 1/5th share as tenants-in-common, the widow could not validly alienate the property as karta for meeting marriage expenses or any alleged legal necessity. Such alienation could operate, if at all, only to the extent of her own 1/5th share. Para 8.

Ratio Decidendi

Upon the death of Dajiba, his widow and four daughters succeeded to his separate property under Sections 8 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act and became tenants-in-common under Section 19, each holding a distinct 1/5th share. Since the property was not coparcenary property and the heirs did not constitute a joint tenancy, the widow could not act as karta nor alienate the shares of the other heirs on the ground of legal necessity. The High Court rightly restored the trial court decree and the appeal was dismissed. Paras 5–9.

Cases Referred

  1. Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt – referred – Para 7.
  2. Nawab Nisar Ali Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan – referred – Para 7.
  3. Azizun Nisa v. Assistant Custodian – referred – Para 7.
  4. In re Schar Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. v. Damer – referred – Para 7.
  5. CWT v. Chander Sen – relied on – Para 7.
  6. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – relied on – Para 7.
  7. M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal – relied on – Para 7.

Darubai & Anr. v. Kamalabai & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.13232 of 2022, decided on 01-06-2026, Supreme Court of India (Sanjay Karol & Augustine George Masih, JJ.)

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