Sunday, October 31, 2010
INQUIRIES AND TRIALS
177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.— Every offence shall ordinary be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial.— (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and party in another, or
(c) Where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local area has one, or
(d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, It may be inquired to or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. the court at sangareddy , would got jurisdiction. since there is no pleadings as per sec.178, the sangareddy court has no territorial jurisdiction. ---2009  ALD Cri. A.P. 349.
Exception.—This Section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declare void by a Court of competent jurisdiction,
Nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.======SO, the mere admission of second marriage by accused not sufficient to sustain conviction and complainant has to prove that accused married another person according to Hindu law during subsistence of first marriage - 2009  ALD Cri. AP 450 229. Conviction on plea of guilty.—If the accused pleads guilty; the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. THIS SECTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE NOT APPLY AS THE ACCUSED NOT ADMITTED DIRECTLY WHILE ANSWERING THE CHARGE . THE ALLEGED ADMISSION BY WAY OF COUNTER IN M.C., IS NOT AND NOT AT ALL BE CONSIDERED AS PLEADED GUILTY UNDER SEC.229 OF Cr.P.C.- HOPE THAT THE DOUBTS ARE CLEARED.
First.—His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;
Secondly.—The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief for criminal trespass.
98. Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.—When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
99. Act against which there is no right of private defence.—There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonable cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonable cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
Extent to which the right may be exercised.—The right to private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm that it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded.
100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.—The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding Section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely—
First.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Secondly.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Thirdly.—An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly.—An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
Fifthly.—An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
Sixthly.—An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release. BURDEN OF PROOF THOUGH ON ACCUSED, NOT AS ONEROUS AS THE ONE WHICH LIES WITH PROSECUTION. ACCUSED MAY DISCHARGE HIS ONUS BY ESTABLISHING A MERE PREPONDENRANCE OF PROBABILITIES EITHER BY LAYING BASIS FOR THAT PLEA IN CROSS EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS OR BY ADDUCING DEFENCE EVIDNEC - 2009  ALD Cri. SC 233.
Friday, October 29, 2010
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, with an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: -
(1) When it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person s’ death comes into question.
Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.
(2) Or is made in course of business.—When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him.
(3) Or against interest of maker.—When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.
(4) Or gives opinion as to public right or custom, or matters of general interests.—When the statement gives the opinion of any such person, as to the existence of any public right or custom or matter of public or general interest, of the existence of which, if it existed he would have been likely to be aware, and when such statement was made before any controversy as to such right, custom or matter had arisen.
(5) Or relates to existence of relationship.—When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship 1[by blood, marriage or adoption] between persons as to whose relationship 1[by blood, marriage or adoption] the person making the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the question in dispute was raised.
(6) Or is made in will or deed relating to family affairs.—When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship 1[by blood, marriage or adoption] between persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of the family to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family portrait, or other thing on which such statement are usually made, and when such statement was made before the question in dispute was raised.
(7) Or is document relating to transaction mentioned in Section 13, clause (a).—When the statement is contained in any deed, will or other document which relates to any such transaction as is mentioned in Section 13, clause (a).
(8) Or is made by several persons and expressed feelings relevant to matter in question.—When the statement was made by a number of persons, and expressed feelings or impressions on their part relevant to the matter in question.
(a) The question is, whether A was murdered by B, or
A dies of injuries received in a transaction the course of which she was ravished. The quest is whether she was ravished by B; or
The question is, whether A was killed by B under such circumstances that a suit would lie against B by A’s widow.
Statements made by A as to the cause of his or her death, referring respectively to the murder, the rape and the actionable wrong under consideration, are relevant facts.
(b) The question is as to the date of A’s birth.
An entry in the diary of a deceased surgeon regularly kept in the course of business, stating that, on a given day he attended A’s mother and delivered her of a son, is a relevant fact.
(c) The question is, whether A was in Calcutta on a given day.
A statement in the diary of a deceased solicitor, regularly kept in the course of business, that on a given day the solicitor attended A at a place mentioned in Calcutta, for the purpose of conferring with him upon specified business, is a relevant fact.
(d) The question is, whether a ship sailed from Bombay harbour on a given day.
A letter written by a deceased member of a merchants firm, by which she was chartered to their correspondents in London, to whom the cargo was consigned, stating that the ship sailed on a given day from Bombay harbour, is a relevant fact.
(e) The question is, whether rent was paid to A for certain land.
A letter from A’s deceased agent to A, saying that he had received the rent on A’s account and held it at A’s orders is a relevant fact.
(f) The question is, whether A and B were legally married.
The statement of a deceased clergyman that he married them under circumstances that the celebration would be a crime is relevant.
(g) The question is, whether A, a person who cannot be found, wrote a letter on a certain day. The fact that a letter written by him is dated on that day is relevant.
(h) The question is, what was the cause of the wreck of a ship.
A protest made by the Captain, whose attendance cannot be procured, is a relevant fact.
(i) The question is, whether a given road is a public way.
A statement by A, a deceased headman of the village, that the road was public, is a relevant fact.
(j) The question is, what was the price of grain on a certain day in a particular market.
A statement of the price, made by a deceased baniya in the ordinary course of his business is a relevant fact.
(k) The question is, whether A, who is dead, was the father of B.
A statement by A that B was his son, is a relevant fact.
(l) The question is, what was the date of birth of A.
A letter from A has deceased father to a friend, announcing the birth of A on a given day, is a relevant fact.
(m) The question is, whether, and when, A and B were married.
An entry in a memorandum book by C, the deceased father of B, of his daughter’s marriage with A on a given date, is a relevant fact.
(n) A sues B for a libel expressed in a painted caricature exposed in a shop window. The question is as to the similarity of the caricature and its libellous character. The remarks of a crowd of spectators on these points may be proved. 2010 SAR CRI. 748. STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER SEC. 161 CAN ALSO BE TREATED AS A DYING DECLARATION AFTER HIS DEATH - FIRST ON THE DATE OF INCIDENT, ANOTHER ON THE SECON D DAY AND LAST ONE IS ON THIRD DAY. FIRST BY MAGISTRATE AND SECOND BY POLICE AND THIRD BY HUSBAND OF DECEASED WIFE.2010 SAR CRI 758.
Monday, October 25, 2010
OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY
299. Culpable homicide.—Who ever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of there by causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it A, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is behind a bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
Explanation 1.—A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or.—
3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or.—
4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of heath, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he d8id not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Exception I.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos .—
First.—That the provocations not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocations not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills, Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of a to prevent him form doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting or the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.—If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.
Where the accused persons armed with deadly weapons, attacked the deceased, caused forearm injuries resulting in the death of the deceased, the accused were convicted under Section 302. [R. V. Badiger v. State of Karnakata, 1995 Cr LJ 1535 (SC).]
Where the two accused inflicted injuries on the witnesses, the evidence of injured witness was found reliable, the accused were convicted under Section 324, I.P.C. [Shivan v. State, 1999 Cr LJ 4153 (DB) (Mad).]
1. Subs.by Act 26 of 1955, Sec. 117and Sch. for “transportation for life”(w .e. f.1.1.1956).
1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, Sec.117 and Sch., for “transportation for life” (w.e.f..1-1-1956).
304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life ],or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, Sec.117 and Sch., for “transportation for life” (w.e.f.1-1-1956).
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death ,but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Saturday, October 23, 2010
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Monday, October 18, 2010
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Saturday, October 16, 2010
(2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under subsection (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against persons from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Sec. 14-A forward, in Such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of ‘receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.
(2-A) When an application is made to the Court under sub-section (2), the Court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the parts of the sample kept by the said Authority and upon such requisition being made, the said Authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the Court within a period of five days from the date o receipt of such requisition.
(2-B) On receipt of the part or parts of the sample from the Local (Health) Authority under sub-section (2-A), the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and sea] or fastening as provided in Cl. (b) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 11 are intact and the signature or thumb impression, as the ease may be, is not tampered with, and despatch the part or, as the case 1-nav be, one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the part of the sample specifying the result of the analysis.
(2-C) Where two parts of ‘the sample have been sent to the Court and only one part of- the sample has been sent by the Court to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under subsection (2-B), the Court shall, as soon as practicable, return the remaining part to the Local (Health) Authority and that Authority shall destroy that part after the certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory has been received by the Court:
Provided that where the part of the sample sent by the Court to Director of the Central Food Laboratory is lost or damaged, the Court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part of the sample, if any, retained by it to the Court and on receipt thereof the Court shall proceed in the manner provided in sub-section (2-B).
(2-D) Until the receipt of the certificate of the result of the analysis from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, the Court shall not continue with the proceedings pending before it in relation to the prosecution.
(2-E) It, after considering the report, if any, of the Food Inspector or otherwise, the Local (Health) Authority is of the opinion that the report delivered by the public analyst under sub-section (1) is erroneous, the said Authority shall forward one of the parts of the sample kept by it to any other public analyst for analysis and if the report of the result of the analysis of that part of the sample by that other public analyst is to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the provisions of sub-sections(2) to (2-D)) shall, so far as may be, apply.]
(3) The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory 1[under sub-section (2-B)] shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under subsection (1).
(4) Where a certificate obtained from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory 1[under sub- section (2-B)] is produced in any proceeding under this Act or under Sees. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), it shall not be necessary in such proceeding to produce any part of the sample of food taken for analysis.
(5) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-section (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act or under Sees. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code:
1[Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory [not being a certificate with respect to the analysis of the part of the sample of any article of food referred to in the proviso to sub- section (I -A) of Sec. 161 shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.]
2[Explanation-In this section, and in Cl. (9 of sub-section (1) of Sec. 16, “Director of the Central Food Laboratory” shall include the officer I or the time being in charge of any Food Laboratory (by whatever designation he is known) recognised by the Central Government for the purposes of this section.] ----2010  ALD Cri. AP 73 AND CHILLI POWDER 447.
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
1[CHAPTER XXA1. Ins. by Act 46 of 1983, sec. 2.
OF CRUELTY BY HUSBAND OR RELATIVES OF HUSBAND
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Sunday, October 10, 2010
(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informants and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
(3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer Subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.
Section 304B. Dowery death
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.PASS PORT ACT
12. Offences and penalties. (1) Whoever–
(a) contravenes the provisions of section 3; or
(b) knowingly furnishes any false information or suppresses any material information with a view to obtaining a passport or travel document under this Act or without lawful authority alters or attempts to alter or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or travel document; or
(c) fails to produce for inspection his passport or travel document (whether issued under this Act or not) when called upon to do so by the prescribed authority; or
(d) knowingly uses a passport or travel document issued to another person; or
(e) knowingly allows another person to use a passport or travel document issued to him,
1. Subs. by Act 35 of 1993, s. 5 (w.e.f. 1-7-1993)
34.shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
1*[two years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees]
or with both.
1*[(1A) Whoever, not being a citizen of India,-
(a) makes an application for a passport or obtains a passport by suppressing information about his nationality, or
(b) holds a forged passport or any travel document,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years and with fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to fifty thousand rupees.]
(2) Whoever abets any offence punishable under 1*[Sub-section (1)
or sub-section (1A)] shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, be punishable with the punishment provided in that sub-section for that offence.
(3) Whoever contravenes any condition of a passport or travel document or any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder for which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both.
(4) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence under this Act, is again convicted of an offence under this Act shall be punishable with double the penalty provided for the latter offence.