IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7603 2012
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3487 of 2011)
K. Suresh ….. Appellant
Versus
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and another .… Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J
Leave granted.
2. Despite many a pronouncement in the field, it still remains a
challenging situation warranting sensitive as well as dispassionate
exercise how to determine the incalculable sum in calculable terms of money
in cases of personal injuries. In such assessment neither sentiments nor
emotions have any role. It has been stated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn
Associate Collieries Ltd.[1] that it is a matter of Pounds, Shillings and
Pence. There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for
mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic
computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic
approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for
brevity ‘the Act’) stipulates that there should be grant of “just
compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to
determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall,
and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.
3. In Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh and others[2], a three-Judge Bench of
this Court, while considering the assessment of damages in personal-injury-
actions, reproduced the following passage from the decision by the House of
Lords in H.West & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard[3] : -
“My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded for a tort are
those which ‘so far as money can compensate, will give the
injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the
natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act’ [Admiralty
Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The Susquehanna[4]]. The words
‘so far as money can compensate’ point to the impossibility of
equating money with human suffering or personal deprivations. A
money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial
loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be
procured to replace something else of like nature which has been
destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that
has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can
do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable
compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to
secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By
common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed
with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so
far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by
comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that
amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent
conventional.”
In the said case reference was made to a passage from Clerk and Lindsell on
Torts (16th Edn.) which is apposite to reproduce as it relates to the
awards for non-pecuniary losses: -
“In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of personal
injury suffers two distinct kinds of damage which may be classed
respectively as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. By pecuniary damage
is meant that which is susceptible of direct translation into
money terms and includes such matters as loss of earnings,
actual and prospective, and out-of-pocket expenses, while non-
pecuniary damage includes such immeasurable elements as pain and
suffering and loss of amenity or enjoyment of life. In respect
of the former, it is submitted, the court should and usually
does seek to achieve restitutio in integrum in the sense
described above, while for the latter it seeks to award ‘fair
compensation’. This distinction between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage by no means corresponds to the traditional
pleading distinction between ‘special’ and ‘general’ damages,
for while the former is necessarily concerned solely with
pecuniary losses — notably accrued loss of earnings and out-of-
pocket expenses — the latter comprises not only non-pecuniary
losses but also prospective loss of earnings and other future
pecuniary damage.”
4. In this regard, we may refer with profit the decision of this Court
in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others[5] wherein the observations of
Lord Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health
Authority[6] were quoted with approval. They read thus: -
“The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid that, in
personal injury cases, the award of damages is assessed under
four main heads: first, special damages in the shape of money
actually expended; second, cost of future nursing and attendance
and medical expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of
amenities; fourth, loss of future earnings.”
5. While having respect for the conventional determination there has
been evolution of a pattern and the same, from time to time, has been kept
in accord with the changes in the value of money. Therefore, in the case
of Ward v. James[7] it has been expressed thus: -
“Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his
‘lost years’, you can, however, compensate him for his loss
during his shortened span, that is, during his expected ‘years
of survival’. You can compensate him for his loss of earnings
during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and
attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a
helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered
unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to a back
injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything
that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges
and juries have to do the best they can and give him what they
think is fair. No wonder they find it well nigh insoluble. They
are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is
bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The judges
have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the
changes in the value of money.”
6. While assessing the damages there is a command to exclude
considerations which are in the realm of speculation or fancy though some
guess work or some conjecture to a limited extent is inevitable. That is
what has been stated in C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair[8].
Thus, some guess work, some hypothetical considerations and some sympathy
come into play but, a significant one, the ultimate determination is to be
viewed with some objective standards. To elaborate, neither the tribunal
nor a court can take a flight in fancy and award an exorbitant sum, for the
concept of conventional sum, fall of money value and reasonableness are to
be kept in view. Ergo, in conceptual eventuality “just compensation” plays
a dominant role.
7. The conception of “just compensation” is fundamentally concretized on
certain well established principles and accepted legal parameters as well
as principles of equity and good conscience. In Yadav Kumar v. Divisional
Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and another[9], a two-Judge
Bench, while dealing with the facet of “just compensation”, has stated
thus: -
“It goes without saying that in matters of determination of
compensation both the tribunal and the court are statutorily
charged with a responsibility of fixing a “just compensation”.
It is obviously true that determination of just compensation
cannot be equated to a bonanza. At the same time the concept of
“just compensation” obviously suggests application of fair and
equitable principles and a reasonable approach on the part of the
tribunals and the courts. This reasonableness on the part of the
tribunal and the court must be on a large peripheral field.”
8. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi[10] this Court
has expressed thus: -
“The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly
since the law values life and limb in free country in generous
scales.”
9. In Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corpn. and another[11], while dealing with concept of “just
compensation”, it has been ruled that the word ‘just’, as its nomenclature,
denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having large peripheral
field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the
conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is
termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just. The field of wider
discretion of the tribunal has to be within the said limitations. It is
required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which in
turn appears to be “just and reasonable”, for compensation for loss of
limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales as has been stated in
“State of Haryana and another v. Jasbir Kaur and others”[12].
10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while
determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the sufferings of
the injured person which would include his inability to lead a full life,
his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed
but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or
could have earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the
tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would
involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a
precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination
of compensation the fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be
inhered.
11. Keeping in view the aforesaid aspects we shall proceed to state the
factual score. The factual matrix as unfurled, exposits that on 11.3.2002
about 4.00 p.m. the claimant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
claimant) was hit from the behind by an auto bearing registration number TN-
9 C 7755 which was driven in a rash and negligent manner and in the
accident he sustained triple fracture in spinal cord, fracture in left leg
neck of femur, fracture in right hand shoulder, deep cut and degloving
injury over right left thigh bone and multiple injuries all over the body.
12. After the accident the claimant was admitted in M.R. Hospital where
he availed treatment. After the treatment, the dislocation of the bones
got reduced, pedical screws were inserted into pedicles of D11 vertebra and
pedicle screws were passed into pedicles of L1 vertebra. Two screws on
left thigh were fixed using a rod each. That apart, decompression of D12
vertebra was done and bone chips were placed in the intertransverse area on
both sides. He was hospitalized for 28 days. The victim had numbness
below the knee joint and was facing difficulty to stand and sit
comfortably. As the evidence on record would reveal he has been constantly
availing physiotherapy treatment facing difficulty in carrying out his
normal activities. A disability certificate contained as Ex.P4 was filed
before the tribunal which showed permanent disability at 75%.
13. The tribunal, as it appears from the award, had also assessed the
permanent disability at 75% as fixed by PW-4, Dr. Thiagarajan. It had
awarded Rs.25,00,000/- under various heads, namely, transport charges,
extra nourishment, medical expenses, additional medical expenses, pain and
sufferings suffered by family members of the claimant, mental agony,
additional transport charges, inability of the appellant to participate in
public functions, loss of marital life, pain and suffering, permanent
disability and loss of earning capacity.
14. Before the High Court as serious objections were raised pertaining to
percentage of disability, the claimant was referred to the Medical Board
and it was found that he had compression fracture which had healed with
persistence of pain in the back with root involvement causing grade IV
power in left lower limb and, accordingly, the Board fixed the permanent
disability at 40%. The High Court adverted to the concept of “just
compensation” and opined that the quantum of damages fixed should be in
proportionate to the injuries caused. It referred to certain authorities
and opined that Rs.2,00,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.5,000/- each for
transport charges and extra nourishment, Rs.2,50,000/- towards pain and
suffering, Rs.50,000/- for medical expenses and Rs.4,68,000/- towards loss
of earning capacity would be the just amount of compensation. Thus, the
total amount as determined by the High Court came to Rs.9,78,000/-. The
High Court reduced the interest to 7.5% from 9% as granted by the tribunal.
Be it noted, the said judgment and order dated 27.1.2010 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1989
of 2005 whereby the High Court has reduced the compensation granted by the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II Small Causes Court), Chennai, on an
application being moved under Section 166 of the Act is the subject-matter
of challenge herein.
15. Mr. Vipin Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has
contended that the High Court has erroneously held that there cannot be
grant of compensation under two heads, namely, “permanent disability” and
“loss of earning power”. It is urged by him that the tribunal had
correctly appreciated the evidence on record and fixed certain sum under
various heads but the High Court on unacceptable reasons has deleted the
same. It is also canvassed by him that the High Court without ascribing
any cogent reasons has reduced the expenses for continuous treatment from
Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/- as a result of which the amount had been
substantially reduced and the concept of “just compensation” has lost its
real characteristics.
16. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.
1, supported the order passed by the High Court contending, inter alia,
that the analysis made by the learned single Judge is absolutely flawless
and the interference in the quantum cannot be faulted inasmuch as the
tribunal has awarded a large sum on certain heads which are totally
impermissible in law. It is also urged by her that certain sums had been
allowed by the tribunal without any material on record and, therefore, the
High Court has correctly interfered with the award.
17. The seminal issues that really emanate for consideration are whether
the analysis made by the High Court in not granting compensation under
certain heads and further reduing the amount on certain scores, are
justified. Regard being had to the fundamental essence of “just
compensation”, we shall presently deal with the manner in which the High
Court has dwelled upon various heads in respect of which the tribunal had
granted certain sums towards compensation. On a perusal of the order
passed by the High Court, it is manifest that the High Court relying on
certain authorities of the said court has expressed the view that once a
particular amount has been awarded towards `permanent disability’, no
further amount can be awarded relating to `loss of earning capacity’. The
learned counsel for the appellant has commended us to the pronouncement of
this Court in B. Kothandapani v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation
Ltd.[13], wherein the High Court had placed reliance on the Full Bench
decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi[14]. This
Court referred to the pronouncement in Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh[15],
wherein it has been stated thus: -
“With regard to ground 19 covering the question that the sum
awarded for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, etc.
termed as general damages should be taken to be covered by
damages granted for loss of earnings is concerned that too is
misplaced and without any basis. The pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life which is a resultant and permanent fact
occasioned by the nature of injuries received by the claimant and
the ordeal he had to undergo.”
18. In Ramesh Chandra (supra) the learned Judges proceeded to address the
issue of difficulty or incapacity to earn and how it stands on a different
footing than pain and suffering affecting enjoyment of life and stated as
under: -
“The inability to earn livelihood on the basis of incapacity or
disability which is quite different. The incapacity or disability
to earn a livelihood would have to be viewed not only in
praesenti but in futuro on reasonable expectancies and taking
into account deprival of earnings of a conceivable period. This
head being totally different cannot in our view overlap the grant
of compensation under the head of pain, suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life. One head relates to the impairment of person’s
capacity to earn, the other relates to the pain and suffering and
loss of enjoyment of life by the person himself.”
19. After referring to the said passage, the Bench proceeded to state
that it is true that compensation for loss of earning power/capacity has to
be determined based on various aspects including permanent
injury/disability, but at the same time, it cannot be construed that that
compensation cannot be granted for permanent disability of any nature. It
has been mentioned by way of an example that in a case of a non-earning
member of a family who has been injured in an accident and sustained
permanent disability due to amputation of leg or hand, it cannot be
construed that no amount needs to be granted for permanent disability. It
cannot be disputed that apart from the fact that the permanent disability
affects the earning capacity of the person concerned, undoubtedly, one has
to forego other personal comforts and even for normal avocation they have
to depend on others.
20. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the view of the High
Court that no compensation can be granted towards permanent disability once
compensation is computed for the loss of earning capacity and loss of
future earnings is unsustainable. As is perceivable, the High Court has
computed the loss of earning power at Rs.4,68,000/- instead of Rs.5,00,000/-
as determined by the tribunal and deleted sum of Rs.3,00,000/- that was
awarded by the tribunal towards permanent disability. In our considered
opinion, total deletion is absolutely unjustified and, in fact, runs
counter to the principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh Chandra (supra)
and B. Kothandapani (supra).
21. At this juncture, we think it seemly to state that it is a case where
the victim has suffered serious injuries. As far as the injuries are
concerned, there is concurrence of opinion by the tribunal as well as by
the High Court. The High Court has only reduced the percentage of
permanent disability on the basis of assessment made by the Medical Board
as there was a serious cavil with regard to the said percentage. While
determining compensation payable to a victim of an accident the parameters
which are to be kept in view have been succinctly stated in R.D. Hattangadi
v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others[16]: -
“9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation
payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be
assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages.
Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually
incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of
money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are
incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In
order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include
expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii)
loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other
material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they
may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and
suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future;
(ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life
which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury
the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages
for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury
the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv)
inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration
and mental stress in life.”
22. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited and
another[17] a two-Judge Bench referred to the authority in Kerala SRTC v.
Susamma Thomas[18] and applied the principle of multiplier for future
earnings in a case of permanent disability. We have referred to this
decision solely for the purpose that multiplier principle has been made
applicable to an application preferred under Section 166 of the Act.
23. In this context it is useful to refer to Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and
Another[19], wherein a two-Judge Bench after referring to the award of
compensation in personal injury cases reiterated the concepts of pecuniary
damages (special damages) and non-pecuniary damages (general damages). The
Bench referred to the decisions in C.K. Subramania Iyer (supra), R.D.
Hattangadi (supra) and Baker v. Willoughby[20] and expressed the view that
it is obligatory on the part of the court or the tribunal to assess the
damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or
fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability
and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be
compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he
suffered as a result of such injury. He is to be compensated for his
inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal
amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his
inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned.
24. It is worthy noting that the Bench referred to the pecuniary damages
and non-pecuniary damages and opined thus: -
“Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines,
transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would
have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of
the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
longevity).”
25. After so stating the Bench proceeded to opine that assessment of
pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item (ii)(a) do not pose much
difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily
ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical
expenses—Item (iii)—depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need
for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary
damages—Items (iv), (v) and (vi)—involves determination of lump sum amounts
with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of
injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect
thereof on the future life of the claimant. It has been observed therein
that what usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of
future earnings on account of permanent disability—Item (ii)(a).
Thereafter, the Bench adverted to the features which are necessary while
assessing the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
In the said case it has been opined that permanent disability can be either
partial or total and the assessment of compensation under the heads of loss
of future earnings would depend upon the factum and impact of such
permanent disability on his earning capacity. It has been laid down that
the tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent
disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity.
It has been further observed that in most of the cases, the percentage of
economic loss, i.e., the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising
from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of
permanent disability. However, in some cases on appreciation of evidence
and assessment the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of
the permanent disability would be approximately the same as the percentage
of permanent disability in which case, of course, the court or tribunal
would adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. To
arrive at the said conclusion reliance was placed on Arvind Kumar Mishra
(supra) and Yadav Kumar (supra).
26. In the case at hand the High Court has determined the loss of earning
capacity on the base of multiplier method and reduced the quantum awarded
by the tribunal from Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.4,68,000/-. Applying the ratio in
Yadav Kumar (supra) and Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and also Raj Kumar
(supra) and regard being had to the serious nature of injury we do not find
any error in the said method of calculation and, accordingly, we uphold the
method of computation as well as the quantum.
27. Presently to the grant of compensation on other scores. It is
noticeable that the High Court has reduced the additional medical expenses
from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. In our considered opinion, the same is
not correct as there is ample evidence on record as regards the necessity
for treatment in future. It is demonstrable that pedicle screws were
passed into pedicles of D11 vertebra; pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of L1 vertebra; and two screws on left thigh were connected using
a rod each. That may be required to be removed or scanned from time to
time depending upon other aspects. That apart, there is persistent pain
and as medically advised physiotherapy is necessary and hence, continuous
treatment has to be availed of. Thus, the High Court was not justified in
reducing the said amount.
28. The High Court has maintained the award in respect of transport
charges, extra nourishment, medical expenses and, accordingly, they are
maintained. It has enhanced the award from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.2,50,000 on
the head of pain and suffering, but has deleted the amount awarded on
permanent disability from the total compensation awarded by the tribunal by
relying on the decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation Ltd. (supra). As
has been stated earlier, the said decision has been considered in B.
Kothandapani (supra) and is not accepted, and this Court has expressed the
view that grant of compensation towards permanent disability is
permissible. Regard been had to the totality of the facts and
circumstances, we are inclined to think that compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-
should be granted towards permanent disability and Rs.2,00,000/- towards
pain and suffering. We have so held as the injury is of serious nature and
under the heading of non-pecuniary damages compensation is awardable under
the headings of pain and suffering and damages for loss of amenities of
life on account of injury. In the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra) this
Court has granted compensation under two heads, namely, “pain and
suffering” and “loss of amenities of life”. Quite apart from that
compensation was granted towards future earnings. In Laxman v. Divisional
Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another[21] it has been ruled
thus: -
“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim of
an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then
efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not
only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the
pain, suffering and trauma caused due to accident, loss of
earnings and victim’s inability to lead a normal life and enjoy
amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability
caused due to the accident.”
Thus, the deletion by the High Court was not justified. However, we have
restricted to the amount as stated hereinbefore.
29. The High Court has deleted the additional transport charges. We are
disposed to think that while availing treatment the said expenses would be
imperative. Hence, there was no justification to reduce the same and,
accordingly, we restore it.
30. It is perceptible that the High Court has deleted the amount awarded
under the head of pain and suffering by family members of the claimant and
the amount granted towards loss of marital life. There is no iota of
evidence with regard to loss of marital life, hence, we do not find any
error in the said deletion. As far as grant of compensation on the score
of pain and suffering suffered by the family members of claimant is
concerned, the same is not permissible and, accordingly, we hold that that
has been correctly deleted.
31. The High Court has deleted an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- and a sum of
Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and inability on the part of the
claimant to participate in public functions respectively. We have already
determined Rs.2,00,000/- under the heading of pain and suffering already
suffered and to be suffered and Rs.2,50,000/- under the heading of
permanent disability and hence, no different sum need be awarded under the
heading of mental agony. As far as participation in public functions is
concerned, there is no evidence in that regard and, therefore, we are
disposed to think that the finding of the High Court on that score is
totally justified and does not call for any interference.
32. Calculated on the aforesaid base, the compensation would be payable
on the headings, namely, transport charges, extra-nourishment, medical
expenses, additional medical expenses, additional transport charges, pain
and suffering, loss of earning capacity and permanent disability and the
amount on the aforesaid scores would be, in toto, Rs.13,48,000/-. The said
amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of
application till the date of payment. The same shall be deposited before
the tribunal within a period of two months and the tribunal shall disburse
50% of the amount in favour of the claimant and the rest of the amount
shall be deposited in a nationalized bank for a period of three years. Be
it clarified if the earlier awarded sum has been deposited, the
differential sum shall be deposited within the stipulated time as mentioned
hereinabove and the disbursement shall take place accordingly.
32. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part leaving the parties to
bear their respective costs.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
October 19, 2012.
-----------------------
[1] 1942 AC 601
[2] (1994) 5 SCC 5
[3] (1963) 2 All ER 625
[4] (1926) All ER 124 : 1926 AC 655
[5] (2003) 2 SCC 274
[6] (1979) 1 All ER 332
[7] (1965) 1 All ER 563
[8] AIR 1970 SC 376
[9] (2010) 10 SCC 341
[10] (1979) 4 SCC 365
[11] AIR 1998 SC 3191
[12] (2003) 7 SCC 484
[13] (2011) 6 SCC 420
[14] (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad)
[15] (1990) 3 SCC 723
[16] (1995) 1 SCC 551
[17] (2010) 10 SCC 254
[18] (1994) 2 SCC 176
[19] (2011) 1 SCC 343
[20] 1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 : (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)
[21] 2012 ACJ 191
