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Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 – The miscellaneous applications were filed by the respondent-Custodian in the year 2008 seeking to recover the amounts of Rs.50 lakhs from appellant-S towards the dues of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 and amount of Rs.25 lakhs from appellant-L towards the dues of respondent No.8 – The Income Tax Department, vide letter dated 05.05.1998 informed the Custodian about respondent No. 2 being the benami owner of the companies (respondent Nos. 4 to 8 herein) – Special Court in its separate judgments directed appellants to pay the respective amounts due to the respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, being benami companies of respondent No. 2 – Propriety:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 294 : 2024 INSC 170

Suman L. Shah

v.

The Custodian & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No(s). 4577 of 2011)

05 March 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

There were questionable transactions between the appellants

and respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, the alleged benami companies

of respondent No. 2 (notified party). Whether the Special Court

committed manifest error in facts as well as in law in holding that

the appellants herein were the garnishees of respondent No. 2.

Whether the conclusions and findings passed by the Special Court,

that the appellant herein failed to prove the fact that amounts

had been repaid to the benami companies of the notified personrespondent No.2, can be sustained.

Headnotes

Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in

Securities) Act, 1992 – The miscellaneous applications were

filed by the respondent-Custodian in the year 2008 seeking to

recover the amounts of Rs.50 lakhs from appellant-S towards

the dues of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 and amount of Rs.25 lakhs

from appellant-L towards the dues of respondent No.8 – The

Income Tax Department, vide letter dated 05.05.1998 informed

the Custodian about respondent No. 2 being the benami owner

of the companies (respondent Nos. 4 to 8 herein) – Special

Court in its separate judgments directed appellants to pay

the respective amounts due to the respondent Nos. 6, 7 and

8, being benami companies of respondent No. 2 – Propriety:

Held: Respondent No. 2 was notified under the Act of 1992 on

06.10.2001 and thus, by virtue of s.3(3) of the Act of 1992, all

properties belonging to him stood automatically attached from the

date of such notification – The appellants herein had borrowed the

amounts in question from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, way back in

the years 1996-1997 – By that date, there could not have existed

any justifiable reason for the appellants herein to have entertained 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 295

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

a belief that these were the benami companies of respondent No.

2 or that there was any breach of the provisions of the Act of 1992

by respondent no.2 or the respondent companies – The foundation

behind the assertion made by the Custodian that the appellants herein

were garnishees of respondent No. 2 through respondent Nos. 6,

7 and 8 is based entirely on a communication dated 05.05.1998

purportedly issued by the Income Tax Department – No witness from

the Income Tax Department was examined in evidence before the

Special Court in miscellaneous applications for recovery – Even the

communication forwarded by the Income Tax Department and relied

upon by the Custodian was not proved by proper evidence – Also, a

bare perusal of ss.3 and 9A, it would become clear that the properties

of the person notified u/s. 3(2) would stand attached automatically

with effect from the date of notification by virtue of s.3(3) – Since

respondent No.2 was notified (as being a debtor of the originally

notified company FFSL) with effect from 06.10.2001, a fortiori, his

properties would be deemed to be attached with effect from that date

and not prior thereto – The applications for recovery having been

filed by the Custodian with the allegation that the appellants herein

were the debtors of the benami companies of the notified person,

the primary onus of proving this assertion would be on the Custodian

by virtue of s.101 of Evidence Act – It is only after the Custodian

discharged this primary burden and established the existence of

the debt, then by virtue of s.102 of the Evidence Act, perhaps, the

onus could be shifted on to the appellants to rebut the same – The

appellants herein took a categoric stand in their depositions that

they had returned the amounts borrowed from respondent Nos. 6,

7 and 8, but the books of accounts were not available because of

lapse of time – It was neither a requirement in law nor could it be

expected from the appellants herein to retain the books of accounts

after more than a decade of the alleged suspicious transactions –

Therefore, the conclusions drawn and the findings recorded in the

impugned judgments passed by the Special Court that the appellants

herein failed to prove the fact that the amounts had been repaid to

the benami companies of the notified person-respondent no.2 do

not stand to scrutiny and cannot be sustained as being contrary to

facts and law. [Paras 32-39]

List of Acts

Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in

Securities) Act, 1992; Evidence Act, 1872.

296 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

List of Keywords

Recovery of money; Benami; Benami owner of companies;

Attachment of property; Garnishee; Debtors of the benami

companies; Primary burden of proof; Shift of burden of proof;

Books of account; Lapse of time.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4577 of 2011

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2011 of the Special Court

Constituted under the Provisions of Special Court (Trial of Offences

Relating to Transaction in Securities), Act, 1992 in Miscellaneous

Application Nos.162 of 2008, 343 of 1994 and 193 of 1993

With

Civil Appeal No.4583 of 2011

Appearances for Parties

Anirudh Joshi, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Ms.

S. Lakshmi Iyer, Ms. Sukriti Bhatnagar, Ms. Chitra Agarwal, Ms.

Manavi Agarwal, Ms. Divya Singh, Sunil, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for

the Appellant.

Arvind Kumar Tewari, Ms. Yosha Dutt, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. The factual and legal issues involved in these appeals are common

and hence the same have been heard together and are being decided

by this common judgment.

2. The instant appeals under Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial of

Offences relating to transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter

being referred to as the ‘Act of 1992’) arise out of the final judgments

passed by the Special Court, Bombay constituted under the Act of

1992 of even date i.e. 11th March, 2011, in MA Nos. 162 and 184 of

2008 in MA No.343 of 1994 in MA No. 193 of 1993.

3. Before proceeding to consider the appeals on merits, it would be

apposite to consider the broad scheme of the Act of 1992.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 297

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

4. The Act was promulgated as large-scale irregularities committed

by some share brokers in collusion with the employees of Banks

and Financial Institutions(in short ‘FIs’) came to light in relation to

transaction in Government/other securities leading to diversion of

funds from the banks/FIs to the individual accounts of certain brokers.

5. The Act provided a mechanism to deal with the above situations

and in particular, to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amounts

illegally diverted, punish the guilty and restore the confidence of

public at large in the security transactions and also to uphold and

maintain the basic integrity and credibility of banks and FIs. The

period of transactions in securities under the purview was from

1st April, 1991 to 6th June, 1992. A Special Court headed by a

sitting Judge of the High Court was established for speedy trial

of offences relating to transactions in securities and disposal of

properties attached. The Act also provided for appointment of one

or more custodians under Section 3 so as to attach the property/

properties of the offenders with a view to preventing diversion of

such properties by the offenders.

6. Section 3(2) stipulates that the Custodian may, on being satisfied

on information received that any person has been found involved in

any offence relating to transactions in securities after 1st April, 1991

and on or before 6th June, 1992, notify the name of such person

in Official Gazette.

7. Section 3(3) provides that any property, movable or immovable

or both, belonging to the notified persons would stand attached

simultaneously with the date of issuance of the notification.

8. Section 3(4) mandates the Custodian to deal with the attached

properties in such manner as the Special Court may direct.

9. Section 11(1) empowers the Special Court to pass appropriate

order(s) directing the Custodian for disposal of the attached property.

10. Under Section 11(2), liabilities of notified persons are required to

be paid or discharged in full by distributing monies so realized after

disposal of the attached assets.

11. Having taken into account the relevant provisions of the statute, the

brief facts arising for consideration in the present appeals may be

noted as below:-

298 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(i) On 2nd July, 1992, Fairgrowth Financial Services Limited

(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘FFSL’) was notified under

Section 3(2) of the Act and all its properties stood attached. In

1993, the Custodian filed Miscellaneous Application No. 193

of 93 in the Special Court for the recovery of various sums of

money belonging to FFSL from respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth.

(ii) The Special Court passed a consent decree on 24th February,

1994 directing respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth to pay a sum

of Rs.51,49,07,417.92/- to the Custodian on behalf of FFSL.

Respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth committed default and as a

consequence, the Custodian initiated attachment of his assets

to recover the decretal amount.

(iii) During the years 1996-1997, the appellant-Suman L. Shah

had borrowed a sum of Rs.50 lakhs from respondent No.

6-Klar Chemicals(P) Ltd. and a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs from

respondent No. 7-Malika Foods (P) Ltd. (original respondent

Nos. 5 and 6 before the Special Court) whereas appellantLaxmichand Shah had borrowed Rs.45 lakhs from respondent

No. 8-Jainam Securities(P) Ltd. (original respondent No.7

before the Special Court). As per the case set up by the

Custodian before the Special Court, these were the benami

companies of respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth who had illegally

parked the tainted money received from FFSL, the notified

company in these benami companies (respondent Nos.6, 7

and 8) created by himself.

(iv) The Custodian notified respondent No.2-Pallav Sheth under

Section 3(2) of the Act on 6th October, 2001. He was declared

insolvent on 5th November, 2003 and as a consequence, all

his assets and properties got vested in the Official Assignee i.e.

respondent No.9 herein. As respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth failed

to pay the decretal amount, the Custodian sought information

from respondent No. 3- Income Tax Department regarding the

assets of respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth. In turn, the Income

Tax Department, vide letter dated 5th May, 1998 informed the

Custodian about respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth being the

benami owner of the companies (respondent Nos. 4 to 8 herein).

(v) The Special Court, by an order passed in miscellaneous

application registered for initiating contempt proceedings 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 299

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

against respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth observed that

respondent Nos. 4 to 8 were benami companies of respondent

No.2-Pallav Sheth.

12. The Custodian claims to have acquired knowledge/information that

the appellant Suman L. Shah had received an amount of Rs. 50

lakhs from respondent No. 6(out of which Rs. 25 lakhs were repaid

by cheque and the entry dated 5th May, 1997 is available in the

passbook) and Rs. 25 lakhs from respondent No.7 and that the

appellant-Laxmichand Shah had received an amount of Rs.25 lakhs

from respondent No.8.

13. Accordingly, Miscellaneous Application Nos. 162 of 2008 and 184

of 2008 were filed by the Custodian before the Special Court for

recovery of Rs. Rs. 50 lakhs from the appellant Suman L. Shah (Civil

Appeal No.4577 of 2011) and for recovery of Rs. 25 lakhs from the

appellant/Laxmichand Shah (Civil Appeal No. 4583 of 2011), both

being garnishees of respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth i.e. the owner

of the benami companies (respondent Nos.4 to 8).

14. The Special Court, vide judgment dated 11th March, 2011 passed

in Miscellaneous Application No. 162 of 2008 directed the appellant

Suman L. Shah to pay a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs(Rs. 25 lakhs each due

to respondent Nos. 6 and 7) being benami companies of respondent

No. 2-Pallav Sheth, to the Custodian with interest @ 12% per annum

from 1st April, 1997 till realisation of the amount.

15. Vide another judgment of even date passed in Miscellaneous

Application No. 184 of 2008, the Special Court directed appellantLaxmichand Shah to pay a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs due to respondent

No. 8, benami company of respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth, to the

Custodian with interest @ 12% per annum from 1st April, 1997 till

realisation of the amount.

16. The Special Court further directed that the appellants shall deposit

the amounts with the Custodian within a period of two months from

the date of the judgment failing which the Custodian would be free

to execute the orders as decrees of the Civil Court. Upon recovery,

the amounts were directed to be paid to respondent No. 9-Official

Assignee whereafter the appellants would stand discharged of their

liabilities towards the benami companies of respondent No.2 Pallav

Sheth.

300 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

17. Aggrieved by the judgments dated 11th March, 2011, Suman L.

Shah and Laxmichand Shah have instituted Civil Appeal Nos. 4577

of 2011 and 4583 of 2011 before this Court.

18. While entertaining the appeals, vide order dated 13th May, 2011, this

Court directed appellant-Suman L. Shah to deposit Rs.50 lakhs and

appellant-Laxmichand Shah to deposit Rs. 25 lakhs with the Officer

on Special Duty attached with the Special Court and to furnish a

bank guarantee to the Custodian towards the balance amount, i.e.,

interest.

19. Both the appeals were dismissed by this Court vide order dated

23rd April, 2012 on account of non-compliance of the order dated

13th May, 2011.

20. The IAs seeking restoration of these Civil Appeals were accepted

vide order dated 14th March, 2014, subject to deposit of a total sum

to the tune of Rs. 2.20 crores by the appellants with the Officer on

Special Duty, Special Court. The amount has been deposited and

accordingly the appeals were taken on board.

21. Learned counsel representing the appellants contended that the

Special Court committed manifest error in facts as well as in law in

holding that the appellants herein were the garnishees of respondent

No. 2-Pallav Sheth. It was contended that the questionable

transactions between the appellants and respondent Nos. 6, 7 and

8, the alleged benami companies of respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth

(notified party) and judgment debtor of FFSL(notified party) were

13-14 years old and as no documentary proof relating to these

transactions was provided by the Custodian on the record of the

proceedings before the Special Court, the statement of appellants

that the entire amounts of loan taken from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and

8 were repaid ought not to have been brushed aside.

22. It was contended that the appellants herein had taken the loans

from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in the years 1996-1997, i.e., long

before respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth came to be notified under

Section 3(2) of the Act of 1992, i.e., 6th October, 2001 and thus, the

burden of proof regarding the existence of liability could not have

been shifted on to the appellants and the onus essentially lay upon

the Custodian to prove that these amounts had not been repaid and

were still recoverable.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 301

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

23. It was contended that the specific assertion made by the appellants

in their deposition affidavits that the amounts in question borrowed

from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 had been repaid partly by cheque

and partly by material supplied to these respondents could not

be unsettled by the Custodian in crossexamination. Only a bald

suggestion was given to the appellants in cross-examination that

they did not have any document in the form of vouchers, receipts,

invoices or entries in the book accounts to show the adjustment of

the remaining amount.

24. It was urged that the letter dated 5th May, 1998 issued by respondent

No. 3-Income Tax Department was referred to in the cross-examination

of the appellants. However, the said letter was not proved by exhibiting

the same in the proceeding before the Special Court. Learned

counsel urged that the since the Custodian failed to bring the letter

of the Income Tax Department on record, either by summoning the

income tax officials or by producing any other admissible evidence,

the Special Court committed a grave error on placing implicit reliance

on such communication.

25. It was contended that the appellants herein being respondent Nos.

8 before the Special Court were not cross-examined either by

respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth or on behalf of the benami companies

i.e. respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 and thus it could not be said with

any degree of certainty that the amounts borrowed remained unpaid.

26. The pertinent assertion of learned counsel for the appellants was

that since the appellants were never notified under the Act of 1992,

the burden of proof could not have been shifted upon them so as

to require them to disprove the case set up by the Custodian in

the applications for recovery. In this regard, learned counsel for the

appellants referred to the following observations made by the Special

Court in the impugned order:-

“7. It is true that oral evidence cannot be ignored, but at

the same time, it has to be borne in mind that the Official

Assignee - respondent No.9 has to recover the properties

and assets of respondent No.1 for satisfaction of the decree

against him. For the reasons best known to respondent

No.1 or respondent Nos. 5 and 6, neither they filed any

reply nor cross-examined respondent No.8. At the same

time, it cannot be forgotten that the respondent No.8 is a 

302 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

businessman and he was expected to maintain accounts

of his business. It is impossible to believe that he would

not have maintained accounts of his business. According to

him, he had partly repaid these amounts to respondent Nos.

5 and 6 by cheques and partly the amounts were adjusted

against the purchases made by respondent Nos. 5 and 6

from Shree Jalaram Timber Depot Pvt. Ltd. He has shown

payment of Rs.25 lakh by cheque to respondent No.5 and

that is reflected in his passbook. Whenever any payment is

made by cheque and the cheque is encashed, naturally the

debit entry is taken in the account of the person, who has

issued the cheque. For a moment, if it is believed that other

documents were not available, at least respondent No.8

could produce the passbook of his account showing the

debit entries indicating payment by cheque to respondent

Nos. 5 and 6. However, respondent No.8 did not produce

any such passbook to show that certain payments were

made by cheque and those cheques were encashed

and the amounts were debited in his account. If Shree

Jalaram Timber Depot Pvt. Ltd belonging to respondent

No.8 had supplied certain material to respondents Nos.

5 and 6 and that amount was adjusted against the dues

payable to respondents Nos. 5 and 6, there must have

been some documents in the form of bill books, vouchers,

receipts, entries in the account books. However, no such

document was produced. It is true that respondent No.8

was not crossexamined by respondent No.1 or respondent

Nos.5 and 6. Still, it is to be noted that best evidence in

the form of documentary evidence was available with the

respondent No.8, but he chose not to produce the best

evidence and relied only on his oral testimony. Even though

respondent No.8 contended that the documents are not

traceable he has nowhere stated that the records were

lost or destroyed. There is no satisfactory clarification

as to why the records are not traceable. When the best

evidence, which is expected to be available with him, has

not been produced, the Court may draw an inference that

if such record would be produced, it would go against his

claim. Therefore, his contention that the amount of Rs.25

lakh each payable to respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has been 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 303

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

actually repaid partly by cheque and partly by adjustment of

the price of material supplied to them cannot be accepted.

Therefore, I hold that the respondent No.8 is liable to pay

amount of Rs.25 lakh to respondent No.5 and Rs.25 lakh

to respondent No.6.

27. It was fervently contended by learned counsel for the appellants

that the impugned judgments do not stand to scrutiny inasmuch as

the onus of proof has been shifted on to the appellants without any

justification and contrary to the principles enshrined in the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘Evidence

Act’). He thus, implored the Court to accept the appeals and set

aside the judgments passed by the Special Court.

28. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the

bald statements of the appellants herein in their affidavits that the

amount borrowed from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 i.e. the benami

companies of the notified person i.e. respondent No.2- Pallav Sheth

had been returned by way of adjustment towards material supplied

was rightly discarded by the Special Court because such statements

were not supported by any tangible proof, either oral or documentary.

He urged that the appellants claim to be reputed businessmen and

thus, it is wholly unbelievable that accounts of business had not been

maintained by them so as to substantiate the plea of repayment

being made to respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 by way of adjustment of

material supplied. He thus, implored the Court to affirm the impugned

judgments and dismiss the instant appeals.

29. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions

advanced at the bar and have perused the material available on

record.

30. For adjudicating the issues raised in these appeals, few admitted

facts need to be noted. The miscellaneous applications were filed

by the respondent-Custodian in the year 2008 seeking to recover

the amounts of Rs.50 lakhs from appellant Suman L. Shah towards

the dues of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 and amount of Rs.25 lakhs

from appellant Laxmichand Shah towards the dues of respondent

No.8. The respondent Nos.6, 7 and 8 are alleged to be the benami

companies of the respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth.

31. Respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth is the judgment debtor of FFSL which

was a company notified under the provisions of the Act of 1992. 

304 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Respondent No. 2-Pallav Sheth was notified under the Act of 1992

on 6th October, 2001 and thus, by virtue of Section 3(3) of the Act of

1992, all properties belonging to him stood automatically attached

from the date of such notification. The appellants herein had borrowed

the amounts in question from respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, way back

in the years 1996-1997. By that date, there could not have existed

any justifiable reason for the appellants herein to have entertained

a belief that these were the benami companies of respondent No.

2-Pallav Sheth or that there was any breach of the provisions of the

Act of 1992 by Pallav Sheth or the respondent companies.

32. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that respondent

Nos. 4 to 8 were the benami companies of respondent No. 2-Pallav

Sheth, he not having been notified under the Act of 1992 by the time

the amounts were borrowed, the appellants could not be expected

to entertain any doubt regarding the operation of the Act of 1992

either against these companies or even against respondent No.

2-Pallav Sheth or that the companies were the benami companies

of Pallav Sheth.

33. The foundation behind the assertion made by the Custodian that

the appellants herein were garnishees of respondent No. 2- Pallav

Sheth through respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 is based entirely on a

communication dated 5th May, 1998 purportedly issued by the Income

Tax Department. An affidavit was filed on behalf of the Department in

the proceedings before the Special Court but in such affidavit, there

is no reference whatsoever to the outstanding dues of respondent

Nos. 6, 7 and 8 or that the appellants were its debtors. Furthermore,

there is no reference whatsoever in this affidavit with regard to letter

dated 5th May, 1998 which was annexed with the affidavit filed on

behalf of the Custodian and was heavily relied upon by the Special

Court. No witness from the Income Tax Department was examined

in evidence before the Special Court in miscellaneous applications

for recovery.

34. While initiating recoveries, the Custodian relied upon the provisions

of Sections 3 and 9A of the Act of 1992 which are reproduced

hereinbelow:-

“3. Appointment and functions of Custodian. —

(1) The Central Government may appoint one or more

Custodians as it may deem fit for the purposes of this Act.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 305

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

(2) The Custodian may, on being satisfied on information

received that any person has been involved in any offence

relating to transactions insecurities after the 1st day of

April, 1991 and on and before the 6th June, 1992, notify

the name of such person in the Official Gazette.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any

other law for the time being in force, on and from the date

of notification under sub-section (2), any property, movable

or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified

under that subsection shall stand attached simultaneously

with the issue of the notification.

(4) The property attached under sub-section (3) shall be dealt

with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special

Court may direct.

(5) The Custodian may take assistance of any person while

exercising his powers or for discharging his duties under

this section and section 4.

9A. Jurisdiction, powers, authority and procedure of Special

Court in civil matters. —

(1) On and from the commencement of the Special Court

(Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities)

Amendment Act, 1994 (24 of 1994) the Special Court shall

exercise all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were

exercisable, immediately before such commencement, by

any civil court in relation to any matter or claim—

(a) relating to any property standing attached under

sub-section (3) of section 3;

(b) arising out of transactions in securities entered

into after the 1st day of April, 1991, and on or

before the 6th day of June, 1992, in which a

person notified under subsection (2) of section

3 is involved as a party, broker, intermediary or

in any other manner.

(2) Every suit, claim or other legal proceeding (other than

an appeal) pending before any court immediately

before the commencement of the Special Court (Trial 

306 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities)

Amendment Act, 1994 (24 of 1994), being a suit, claim

or proceeding, the cause of action whereon it is based is

such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such

commencement, within the jurisdiction of the Special

Court under sub-section (1), shall stand transferred on

such commencement to the Special Court and the Special

Court may, on receipt of the records of such suit, claim

or other legal proceeding, proceed to deal with it, so far

as may be, in the same manner as a suit, claim or legal

proceeding from the stage which was reached before

such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the

Special Court may deem fit.

(3) On and from the commencement of the Special Court

(Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities)

Amendment Act, 1994 (24 of 1994), no court other than

the Special Court shall have, or be entitled to exercise,

any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to any matter

or claim referred to in sub-section (1).

(4) While dealing with cases relating to any matter or claim

under this section, the Special Court shall not be bound by

the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of

natural justice, and subject to the other provisions of this

Act and of any rules, the Special Court shall have power

to regulate its own procedure.

(5) Without prejudice to the other powers conferred under

this Act, the Special Court shall have, for the purposes

of discharging its functions under this section, the same

powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in

respect of the following matters, namely: —

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any

person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of

documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 307

Suman L. Shah v. The Custodian & Ors.

(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),

requisitioning any public record or document or

copy of such record or document from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of

witnesses or documents;

(f) reviewing its decisions;

(g) dismissing a case for default or deciding it ex

parte;

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any case

for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and

(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by

the Central Government under sub-section (1)

of section 14.”

35. From a bare perusal of these provisions, it would become clear

that the properties of the person notified under Section 3(2) would

stand attached automatically with effect from the date of notification

by virtue of Section 3(3). Since respondent No.2- Pallav Sheth was

notified (as being a debtor of the originally notified company FFSL)

with effect from 6th October, 2001, a fortiori, his properties would be

deemed to be attached with effect from that date and not prior thereto.

36. The appellants herein took a pertinent plea before the Special Court

that the dues towards respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, generated from

borrowings made in the years 1996-1997 stood repaid and closed

because the amounts had been repaid by cheque(s) and by way

of adjustments towards materials supplied. The applications for

recovery having been filed by the Custodian with the allegation that

the appellants herein were the debtors of the benami companies

of the notified person, the primary onus of proving this assertion

would be on the Custodian by virtue of Section 101 of Evidence

Act. It is only after the Custodian discharged this primary burden

and established the existence of the debt, then by virtue of Section

102 of the Evidence Act, perhaps, the onus could be shifted on to

the appellants to rebut the same.

37. The entire case of the Custodian regarding subsisting debts of

the appellant towards respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 was based on 

308 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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a communication received from the Income Tax Department. The

appropriate witness to prove such communication would be the

official concerned from the Income Tax Department. However, as has

been mentioned above, no witness from the Income Tax Department

was examined in support of the recovery application. Even the

communication forwarded by the Income Tax Department and relied

upon by the Custodian was not proved by proper evidence.

38. The appellants herein took a categoric stand in their depositions that

they had returned the amounts borrowed from respondent Nos. 6, 7

and 8, but the books of accounts were not available because of lapse

of time. The said plea of the appellants herein could not be treated

as unnatural or an afterthought because once the transactions were

completed and the loans were repaid, there was no reason for the

appellants to have entertained a belief that after a period of about 13

years, they would be required to present the account books pertaining

to transactions. It was neither a requirement in law nor could it be

expected from the appellants herein to retain the books of accounts

after more than a decade of the alleged suspicious transactions.

39. Resultantly, the conclusions drawn and the findings recorded in the

impugned judgments passed by the Special Court that the appellants

herein failed to prove the fact that the amounts had been repaid to

the benami companies of the notified person, namely, Pallav Sheth

do not stand to scrutiny and cannot be sustained as being contrary

to facts and law.

40. As an upshot of the above discussion, the impugned judgments are

hereby quashed and set aside.

41. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

42. The amounts deposited by the appellants in furtherance of the order

dated 14th March, 2014 shall be reimbursed to them forthwith.

43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.