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Thursday, May 2, 2024

Constitution of India – Art 226 – Exercise of discretionary powers under – Delay or laches, effect – On facts, four years after the allotment of LPG distributorship in favour of the appellant, and on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant and permitting him to construct the godown and the showroom, the unsuccessful bidder challenged the decision of the Corporation – High Court dismissed the writ petition, however, in appeal the allotment made in favour of the appellant was set aside – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 506 : 2024 INSC 314

Mrinmoy Maity

v.

Chhanda Koley and Others

(Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024)

18 April 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Writ court, if justified in entertaining the writ petition filed by the

respondent No.1 challenging the approval granted in favour of the

appellant for starting LPG distributorship.

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Art 226 – Exercise of discretionary

powers under – Delay or laches, effect – On facts, four years

after the allotment of LPG distributorship in favour of the

appellant, and on acceptance of the alternate land offered

by the appellant and permitting him to construct the godown

and the showroom, the unsuccessful bidder challenged the

decision of the Corporation – High Court dismissed the writ

petition, however, in appeal the allotment made in favour of

the appellant was set aside – Correctness:

Held: Delay defeats equity – Delay or laches is one of the factors

which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising

discretionary powers u/Art. 226 – Applicant who approaches the

court belatedly ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief

by the writ courts – In a given case, the High Court may refuse

to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the

applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to

drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the

lapsed cause of action – Discretion to be exercised would be

with care and caution, depending upon the facts of the case –

Though, for filing of a writ petition, no fixed period of limitation

is prescribed, however, it has to be filed within a reasonable

time – If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and

laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole

ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge

in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 507

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

wrong – On facts, writ petition ought to have been dismissed

on the ground of delay and laches itself – Writ petitioner was

aware of all the developments including that of the allotment of

distributorship having been made in favour of the appellant way

back in 2014, yet did not challenge and only on acceptance of

the alternate land offered by the appellant in 2017 and permitting

him to construct the godown and the showroom, the same was

challenged and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right

if at all if any to be drifted away or acquiesced in the acts of the

Corporation – Also, the appropriate government felt the need of

permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be more flexible and

as such modification to the guidelines had been brought about

whereby the applicants were permitted to offer alternate land

where the land initially offered by them was found deficient or

not suitable or change of the land, subject to specifications laid

down in the advertisement being met – Thus, the order of the

Division Bench of the High Court is set aside, and that of the

Single Judge is restored. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited

Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and

others. [2008] 15 SCR 194 : (2009) 1 SCC 768;

Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K.

Thangappan and another [2006] 3 SCR 783 : (2006)

4 SCC 322; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &

Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu [2014]

1 SCR 987 : (2014) 4 SCC 108 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India.

List of Keywords

LPG distributorship; Exercise of discretionary powers; Delay or

laches; Extraordinary relief; Cause of action; Period of limitation;

Acquiescence.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2018 of the High Court

at Calcutta in CAN No. 809 of 2018

508 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties

Pijush K. Roy, Sr. Adv., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali Roy, Asit Roy, Rajan

K. Chourasia, Advs. for the Appellant.

Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Asha Gopalan

Nair, Sandeep Narain, Ms. Nivedita Nair, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The short point that arises for consideration in this appeal is:

“Whether the writ court was justified in entertaining the writ

petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein challenging

the approval dated 03.06.2014 granted in favour of

the appellant herein for starting LPG distributorship at

Jamalpur, District Burdwan?”

3. The facts in brief which has led to filing of the present appeal are

as under:

4. An advertisement came to be issued on 09.09.2012 calling for

application for distributors to grant LPG distributorship under

GP Category at Jamalpur, District Burdwan. From amongst the

applications so received, the application submitted by the appellant

as well as respondent No.1 were found to be in order. Since both

the appellant and the respondent No.1 were held to be eligible from

amongst the six (6) candidates, draw of lots was held on 11.05.2013

and appellant was found successful candidate and was selected

for verification of the documents. A letter of intent was issued to

the appellant on 24.02.2014 and on 03.06.2014 the approval was

granted by the BPCL in favour of the appellant for starting LPG

distributorship at the notified place.

5. After a lapse of 4 years, the respondent No.1 filed a complaint with

the BPCL alleging that land offered by the appellant was a Barga land

and same cannot be considered. Subsequently application having

been filed by the appellant offering an alternate land, the Corporation

allowed the prayer of the appellant to construct the godown and

showroom on the alternate land offered by the appellant.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 509

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

6. The respondent No.1 being a rival applicant for grant of distributorship,

having participated in submitting the application and being

unsuccessful in the draw of lots held way back in the year 2013

and being aggrieved by the decision of the Corporation to permit the

appellant to commence the construction of godown and showroom

on the alternate land offered, filed a writ petition in the year 2017

i.e., on 10.04.2017. Initially, there was an order of status quo passed

by the Learned Single Judge and on receiving the report from

the Corporation the writ petition came to be dismissed vide order

dated 18.01.2018 on the ground that the writ petitioner (respondent

No.1 herein) had no locus standi since she had participated in the

selection process. Being aggrieved by the same the intra-court appeal

came to be filed and the appellate court by the impugned judgment

allowed the appeal on the ground (a) that the successful applicant

had not offered unencumbered land for construction of godown and

showroom; (b) the land offered by the appellant was in contravention

of clause 7.1(vi) and (vii) of the guidelines for selection of regular

LPG Distributors; (c) the amendment of the said guidelines brought

about subsequently, cannot be made applicable retrospectively. The

allotment made in favour of the (appellant herein) was set aside by

the impugned order and as a consequence of it, the letter of intent,

the letter of approval accepting the alternate land offered by the

(appellant herein) and all subsequent permissions, licences and no

objections issued in his favour were held to be of no effect. Hence,

this appeal.

7. We have heard Shri Pijush K. Roy, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the appellant and Shri Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.1 and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior

Counsel for the Corporation. Learned counsel for the appellant

would vehemently contend that Learned Single Judge had rightly

dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of locus standi of

the writ petitioner and had dissolved the interim order granted earlier.

It is also contended that by the time the interim order of status quo

came to be passed by the Learned Single Judge on 20.07.2017, the

appellant herein had already submitted an application for accepting

the alternate land offered and which request came to be processed

and the applicant (appellant herein) had been allowed to construct

the godown and showroom on the alternate land so offered. These

facts though being available, the Division Bench ignoring the same 

510 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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had proceeded on tangent in accepting the plea of the writ petitioner

without examining the aspect of delay and giving a complete go by

for laches exhibited on the part of the writ petitioner and extended

the olive branch on surmises and conjectures and as such the

impugned order is liable to be set-aside and consequently, writ

petition which came to be dismissed by the Learned Single Judge

has to be upheld. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Corporation has fairly submitted that in

the light of the appellant herein being successful in the allotment

by draw of lots, had been issued with the letter of intent and the

prayer for offering the alternate land was also accepted and having

regard to the subsequent development namely the subsequent

notification dated 30.04.2015 issued by the appropriate government

directing the Oil Marketing Companies to provide flexibility in the

selection guidelines by providing an “opportunity to offer alternate

land in response to the advertisement” which clarified the position

with regard to alternative land offered had been acted upon by the

Corporation in the instant case and being satisfied with the bona

fides of the applicant/appellant, the Corporation had permitted the

construction, and accordingly the construction has been put up along

with building, the godown and the showroom and as such he has

prayed for suitable orders being passed.

8. On the contrary, Shri Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel appearing for

the respondent No.1 vehemently opposed the prayer of the appellant

herein and supported the order passed by the Division Bench. He

would contend that issue of delay in filing the Writ Petition has been

rightly ignored by the Division Bench and same has to recede to

background in the facts obtained in the present case, in as much

as the blatant violation of the guidelines would go to the root of the

matter and the inherent defect cannot be allowed to be rectified,

that too by relying upon an amendment to the guidelines which has

come into force subsequent to the advertisement in question or in

other words rules of the game could not have been changed after

the commencement of the game which was exactly the exercise

undertaken by the Learned Single Judge and rightly found to be

improper by the Division Bench. Hence, he prays for dismissal of

the appeal.

9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts

obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 511

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ

petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and

laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or

in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of

time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the

extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has

held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors

which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising

discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In

a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary

powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has

allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made

subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If

the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is

explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in

such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party

that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There

may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the

extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances

of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula

with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised

by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the

terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of

limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction

of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within

a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of

memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the

cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances

on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be

dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that

the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought

to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the

writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take

advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver

of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into

consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in 

512 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar

Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768

has held to the following effect:

“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt

true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But

while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,

226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into

account certain factors and one of such considerations is

delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching

a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is

discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under

Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner

is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a

writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest

reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making

the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for

refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The

underlying object of this principle is not to encourage

agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have

already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of

third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of

M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR

261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450]

and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 :

(1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle

applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental

right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1

SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports

& Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v.

Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to

when a person can approach a court. The question is one

of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts

before the court depending on and varying from case to

case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental

right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the

delay arose.”

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 513

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in

Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan

and another, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that

the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if

there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert

his right. It has been further held thereunder:

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be

borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their

discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke

its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or

omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right

as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other

circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.

Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is

still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in

Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports

[(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the

discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in

Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874)

5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by

this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC

1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular

Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .

Sir Barnes had stated:

“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not

an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be

practically unjust to give a remedy either because the

party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be

regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his

conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving

that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which

it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were

afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse

of time and delay are most material. But in every case,

if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be

just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not 

514 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity

of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially

equitable. Two circumstances always important in such

cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the

acts done during the interval which might affect either party

and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the

one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”

8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this

Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to

Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has

been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori,

to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v.

Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that

no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any

reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article

32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article

32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this

that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that

this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief

in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986)

4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in

exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy

and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If

there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and

such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court

may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its

writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on

a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily

permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because

it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and

bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is

exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect

of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also

injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ

jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the

creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important

factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding

whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 515

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the

discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai

Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T.

Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:

“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not

be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh

the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same.

The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an

extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional

court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens

but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary

principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate

reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,

the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise

whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained

or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In

certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal

but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only

invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors

of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the

part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic

norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of

time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and

rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes

injury to the lis.”

14. Having regard to the afore-stated principles of law enunciated

herein above, when we turn our attention to facts on hand, it would

not detain us for too long for accepting the plea of the appellant

in affirming the order of the Learned Single Judge and dismissing

the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. We say so for

reasons more than one, firstly, it requires to be noticed that the writ

petitioner was a rival applicant along with the appellant herein for

grant of LPG distributorship and she along with the appellant herein,

were found to be eligible and the appellant herein was held to be

successful by virtue of draw of lots. This factual aspect would reflect

that the writ petitioner was aware of all the developments including

that of the allotment of distributorship having been made in favour

of the appellant herein way back in 2014, yet did not challenge and

only on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant in 

516 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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March, 2017 and permitting him to construct the godown and the

showroom. Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the

writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away or

in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such

on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed. Secondly,

another fact which has swayed in our mind to accept the plea of the

appellant herein is that, undisputedly the appropriate government

had felt the need of permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be

more flexible and as such modification to the guidelines had been

brought about on 15.04.2015 whereby the applicants were permitted

to offer alternate land where the land initially offered by them was

found deficient or not suitable or change of the land, subject to

specifications as laid down in the advertisement being met. There

being no stiff opposition or strong resistance to the alternate land

offered by the appellant herein not being as per the specifications

indicated in the advertisement, we see no reason to substitute the

court’s view to that of the experts namely, the Corporation which

has in its wisdom has exercised its discretion as is evident from the

report filed in the form of affidavit by the territory manager (LPG)/

BPCL whereunder it has been stated:

“13. On the basis of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to nonagricultural. In his application form the said Respondent

no. 9 had provided the Land for godown at Plot No 3732,

Khatian No LR 2585, 2586, 2587 JL No 34, Mouza Kolera,

Jamalpur, Distt Burdwan admeasuring 33 decimal. The

same was cleared based on Registered Lease Deed,

which was found to have been genuine in all respects as

confirmed by the ADSR Jamalpur.

16. The land offered by the successful candidate, namely

the Respondent no.9 was found to be eligible by relying

on the abovementioned clauses, which determine eligibility

of the land based on the status of ownership. The fact

that the said land was a “Barga” land is not a material

condition on the basis of which the Respondent no. 9’s

candidature could be cancelled.

24. Subsequently, FVC of the said newly offered land by

the LOI holder, Respondent no. 9 was conducted and the

same was found suitable for construction of LPG Godown. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 517

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

A letter being DGP:LPG OMP: Jamalpur dated 21.03.2017

was provided to the said LOI holder informing him that

the alternate land provided is found suitable and therefore

his request to construct LPG Godown in the said alternate

land has been approved. A copy of the said letter dated

21.03.2017 is annexed hereto and is marked as “R-5”.

25. It is therefore submitted that the steps taken by the

Respondent no. 3 in allowing the LOI holder, Respondent

no. 9, to provide alternate land for construction of godown,

have been in consonance. with the change in policies and

no favoritism or nepotism, as suggested by the petitioner

has been in play.

32. It is further clarified that the FVC conducted on the

original land offered by the Respondent no. 9 was found to

be satisfactory on all counts, and only on the basis of this,

his request for provision of alternate land wall accepted.”

15. Hence, we are of the considered view that the order of the Learned

Division Bench is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set

aside. The order of the Learned Single Judge stands restored for the

reasons indicated herein above and the appeal is allowed accordingly

with no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.