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Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 376 (2)(n) and 506 – Punishment for committing rape repeatedly on the same woman – Punishment for Criminal intimidation – Complainant’s case against the appellant alleging rape on false pretext of marriage; and that the appellant assured that he would marry her and take care of her daughter if she divorced her husband – However, the appellant refused to marry – Registration of FIR u/ss. 376 (2) (n) and 506 – Petition for quashing of FIR by the appellant – Dismissed by the High Court – Correctness :

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 309 : 2024 INSC 181

XXXX

v.

State of Madhya Pradesh & Another

(Criminal Appeal No. 3431 of 2023)

06 March 2024

[C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

High Court, if justified in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant

u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR registered against him u/ss.

376 (2)(n) and 506 IPC.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 376 (2)(n) and 506 – Punishment for

committing rape repeatedly on the same woman – Punishment

for Criminal intimidation – Complainant’s case against the

appellant alleging rape on false pretext of marriage; and that

the appellant assured that he would marry her and take care

of her daughter if she divorced her husband – However, the

appellant refused to marry – Registration of FIR u/ss. 376 (2)

(n) and 506 – Petition for quashing of FIR by the appellant –

Dismissed by the High Court – Correctness :

Held: From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR

was registered and the statement recorded by the complainant, it is

evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations

between the parties started – In any case, even on the dates when

the complainant alleges that the parties had physical relations, she

was already married – She falsely claimed that divorce from her

earlier marriage took place in 2018 – However, the fact remains that

decree of divorce was passed two years later – Complainant was

a grown up lady about ten years elder to the appellant – She was

matured and intelligent enough to understand the consequences

of the moral and immoral acts for which she consented during

subsistence of her earlier marriage – In fact, it was a case of

betraying her husband – Furthermore, the prosecutrix admitted that

even after the appellant shifted to other State for his job, he used

to come and stay with the family and they were living as husband

and wife – Also appellant’s stand that he had advanced loan to the

prosecutrix which was not returned back – Thus, not a case where

the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship with 

310 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the appellant under misconception – Impugned order passed by

the High Court set aside – FIR registered u/s. 376(2)(n) and 506

and all subsequent proceedings thereto quashed. [Paras 8, 9.1, 10]

Case Law Cited

Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2023] 1 SCR

1061 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 89 – relied on.

Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2013] 1 SCR

504 : (2013) 9 SCC 293 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Rape of a woman on false pretext of marriage; Quashing of FIR;

Consequences of the moral and immoral acts; Consent for sexual

relationship under misconception.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3431

of 2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 01.08.2022 of the High Court of

M.P. Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No.15992 of 2021

Appearances for Parties

Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Adv. for the Appellant.

D. S. Parmar, AAG, Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Santosh

Narayan Singh, Mohd. Faisal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Rajesh Bindal, J.

1. The appellant in the present case is aggrieved of the order1

 passed

by the High Court2

 whereby a petition3

 filed by him under Section

482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR4

 was dismissed.

1 Order dated 01.08.2022

2 High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur

3 M.CR.C. No. 15992 of 2021

4 FIR No. 52 dated 11.12.2020 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Dist. Satna, (M.P.) under Sections

376(2)(n) and 506 IPC

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 311

XXXX v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Another

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the FIR in the

case in hand, which was got registered by respondent No.2/

complainant is nothing else but an abuse of process of law. The

complainant was a married lady having a grown up daughter of

15 years of age living with her parents. Claiming that in the same

house, the appellant was having physical relations with her with the

consent of her parents and daughter will be hard to believe that too

when she was already married. There could not be any question

of promise to marry given by the appellant to her at that stage.

There are large discrepancies in the complaint made to the police

on the basis of which the FIR was registered if considered in the

light of the statement which the complainant got recorded under

Section 164 Cr.P.C. The relations between the parties are shown

to be consensual, if any. The mis-statement by the complainant is

evident from the fact that she claimed to have got divorce from the

earlier marriage on 10.12. 2018 and married with the appellant in

a temple in January 2019 but it is belied from the fact that decree

of divorce from the earlier marriage of the complainant was passed

only on 13.01.2021. There was no question of any marriage prior

thereto. The initiation of proceedings against the appellant being an

abuse of process of law deserve to be quashed. In support of the

arguments, reliance was placed upon the decisions of this Court

in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi)5 and Prashant Bharti

v. State (NCT of Delhi)6

.

3. Learned counsel for the State submitted that after investigation,

charge-sheet has already been filed. The Courts are normally slow

to quash the FIR at that stage. In the case in hand, allegation of

rape on false promise to marry is clearly made out. At the stage of

quashing, only the contents in the FIR could be seen. On a perusal

thereof, a clear case is made out against the appellant.

4. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that on account of

dispute with her husband from the earlier marriage, the complainant

was living with her parents. She, at that time, was having a grown

up daughter aged 15 years. The appellant was living in their house

as a tenant. Finding that the complainant in disturbed matrimonial

5 [2023] 1 SCR 1061 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89

6 [2013] 1 SCR 504 : (2013) 9 SCC 293

312 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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life, from the advances made by the appellant, the complainant fell

in the trap. On a false promise to marry, both had started having

physical relations. They had even solemnized marriage in a temple

in January 2019. Even her family also knew about their relations

and marriage. It was all in good faith on the promise made by the

appellant as the appellant had even shown the complainant as a

nominee in an insurance policy purchased by him. With these facts

on record, a clear case of rape on false promise to marry is made

out against the appellant. The FIR does not deserve to be quashed

at the initial stage.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book.

6. Firstly, we refer to the stand taken by the complainant in the FIR

and the statement she got recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. There

are discrepancies therein.

6.1 In the FIR, she stated that she was managing her own cloth

shop. As there was a dispute with her husband, she was living

separately. On 10.12.2018, she got divorce from her husband.

She has a daughter aged 15 years. In 2017, Sadbhav Company

had taken first floor of their house on rent in which the appellant,

who was working with the company, stayed. During spare time,

he would come and sit on her shop. Gradually, the relations

developed. As she was living separate from her husband, the

appellant proposed that in case she takes divorce, he will

marry her. After the divorce of the complainant, on 10.01.2019,

at about 11.00 PM, the appellant came to her room and had

physical relations. He did not stop even when she said that

they were yet to be married. Further, on a promise to marry,

he had relations with her on 06.06.2020. When she insisted for

marriage, the appellant said that his family was not agreeing.

Finally, he refused on 11.12.2020. Thereafter, the FIR was got

recorded on 11.12.2020.

6.2 While getting her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,

she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017. On account

of dispute with her husband, she was living with her parents.

As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In

2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job. However,

he used to visit her home and take care of the complainant

as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 313

XXXX v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Another

complainant that he will marry her in case she takes divorce

from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For this

reason, she divorced her husband and solemnized marriage

with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter,

they started living together with her daughter born from the

previous marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did not

solemnize court marriage. After marriage was solemnized in

temple, treating the appellant as her husband, they both started

leading a married life having physical relations from January

2019 till June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as

his wife. Thereafter, the appellant refused to respond to her

calls and even marry her.

6.3 There was complete change in the stand of the complainant

in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The fact

remains that the parties admittedly were in relations from 2017

onwards. Some alleged promise to marry came in January

2019, from where they started having physical relations. It

has also come on record that it is not only the consent of the

complainant which is clearly evident but also of the parents and

daughter of the complainant as they were living in the same

house, where allegedly the appellant and the complainant were

having physical relations.

7. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she got divorce from

her earlier husband on 10.12.2018. In the statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C., she stated that marriage between the appellant and the

complainant was solemnized in a temple in January 2019. However,

the date of divorce as claimed by the complainant is belied from

the copy of the decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9,

where divorce by mutual consent was granted to the complainant

and her husband vide judgment dated 13.01.2021. The aforesaid fact

could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant besides

the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under Section 164

Cr.P.C. regarding her divorce from the earlier marriage, sought to

claim that she had re-married with the appellant during subsistence

of her earlier marriage.

8. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR was

got registered and the statement got recorded by the complainant,

it is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the 

314 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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relations between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case,

even on the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties

had physical relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed

that divorce from her earlier marriage took place on 10.12.2018.

However, the fact remains that decree of divorce was passed only

on 13.01.2021. It is not a case where the complainant was of an

immature age who could not foresee her welfare and take right

decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder to the

appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to understand the

consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she consented

during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of

betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that

even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used

to come and stay with the family and they were living as husband

and wife. It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had

advanced loan of ₹1,00,000/- to the prosecutrix through banking

channel which was not returned back.

9. Similar issue was considered by this Court in Naim Ahamed’s case

(supra) on almost identical facts where the prosecutrix herself was

already a married woman having three children. The complaint of

alleged rape on false promise of marriage was made five years

after they had started having relations. She even got pregnant from

the loins of the accused. Therein she got divorce from her existing

marriage much after the relations between the parties started. This

Court found that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that

the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under

misconception. The accused was not held to be guilty. Relevant

paragraph 21 thereof is extracted below:

“21. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was

a married woman having three children, could not be said

to have acted under the alleged false promise given by

the appellant or under the misconception of fact while

giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the

appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such

relationship with him at least for about five years till she

gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations

made by her in her deposition before the court, are

taken on their face value, then also to construe such 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 315

XXXX v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Another

allegations as ‘rape’ by the appellant, would be stretching

the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman

and the mother of three children was matured and

intelligent enough to understand the significance and the

consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she

was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct

during the course of such relationship with the accused,

is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her

husband and three children by having relationship with

the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him.

She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of

her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with

the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the

accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male

child through the loin of the accused, she did not have

any complaint against the accused of he having given

false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She

also visited the native place of the accused in the year

2012 and came to know that he was a married man having

children also, still she continued to live with the accused

at another premises without any grievance. She even

obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent

in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It

was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must

have taken place between them, that she filed the

present complaint. The accused in his further statement

recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. had stated that

she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfill her

demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard

to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not

be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix

had given her consent for the sexual relationship with

the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to

hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within

the meaning of Section 375 of IPC.”

9.1 The aforesaid arguments squarely cover the legal issue raised

by the appellant.

10. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order passed by

the High Court is set aside. FIR No.52 dated 11.12.2020, registered 

316 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC at Police Station, Mahila Thana,

District Satna (M.P.) and all subsequent proceedings thereto are

quashed.

11. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.