* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 558 : 2024 INSC 299
Ravishankar Tandon
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023)
10 April 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
In a case based on circumstantial evidence wherein the appellantsaccused persons were convicted u/s.302 r/w s.34, ss.120B and 201,
s.302 r/w ss.34 and 120B, IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for
life, whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the
pond was on the basis of the information given by the appellants
in the statement recorded u/s.27, Evidence Act, 1872.
Headnotes
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Prosecution relied on the
memorandum of the appellants-accused u/s.27 and the
subsequent recovery of the dead body of the deceased from
the pond at Bhatgaon – Correctness:
Held: For bringing the case u/s.27, it will be necessary for the
prosecution to establish that, based on the information given by
the accused while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of
the fact, which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker
of the said statement – It will have to establish that before the
information given by the accused persons on the basis of which
the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge about
the existence of the dead body at the place from where it was
recovered – Insofar as the memorandum u/s.27 is concerned, the
prosecution relied on the depositions of PW-5 (brother-in-law of
the deceased) and PW-18 (another witness of the memorandum)
– Evidence of PW-2 (brother of the deceased) read with that of
PW-5 revealed that the police as well as these witnesses knew
about the death of the deceased occurring and the dead body
being found at village Bhatgaon prior to the statements of the
accused persons being recorded u/s.27 – All the statements were
recorded after 10:00 am whereas PW-2 stated that at around
08:00 am, police informed him about the accused persons killing
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 559
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
the deceased and thereafter they going to Bhatgaon – PW-5
admitted that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he
was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew (PW-2) about
the murder of the deceased – His evidence showed that though
his statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed
at Bhatgaon – As such, the possibility of these documents being
created to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out – PW18 also admitted that he had signed the papers without reading
them and that too on the instructions of the police – Furthermore,
insofar as the statement of accused No.3 is concerned, even the
statement recorded u/s.27 was not at all related to the discovery of
the dead body of the deceased – Prosecution failed to prove that
the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at
Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made
by the accused persons u/s.27 and that nobody knew about the
same before that – It utterly failed to prove any of the incriminating
circumstances against the appellants – Chain of circumstances not
so complete leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the
accused persons – Impugned judgment as well as the judgment
of the trial court, quashed and set aside – Appellants acquitted.
[Paras13-15, 21-23, 26, 27]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Law as regards
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Discussed.
Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC
121; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan
Guru [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 :
2005 INSC 333; Asar Mohammad and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC
253 : 2018 INSC 985; Boby v. State of Kerala [2023] 1
SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; Beyond reasonable doubt; Disclosure
statement made by accused persons; Subsequent recovery of
dead body; Information given by accused while in police custody;
560 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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Discovery of fact distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of
the statement; Documents created to rope in accused persons;
Incriminating circumstances not proved; Chain of circumstances
not complete.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3869
of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2023 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 194 of 2013
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 2046
And 2047 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Ananya Tyagi, Chandrika Prasad Mishra,
Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, Ms. Prashasti Singh, Ms. Swati Surbhi,
Upendra Narayan Mishra, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Prashant Kumar Umrao,
V. Ramasubbu, Rishesh Sikarwar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Praneet Pranav, Dy. A.G., Prashant Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted in SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024.
2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 2nd January,
2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh
at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal Nos. 194, 232 and 277 of 2013 wherein
the Division Bench dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the
appellants, namely Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1), Umend
Prasad Dhrutlahre (accused No.2), Dinesh Chandrakar (accused
No.3) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) and upheld the
order of conviction and sentence dated 5th February, 2013 as recorded
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2012.
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals are as under:-
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 561
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
3.1 On 2nd December 2011, Ramavtar (PW-1) lodged a missing
person report being Missing Person Serial No. 10/11 at Police
Station Kunda after his son Dharmendra Satnami (deceased)
went missing. While an extensive search was being conducted,
on the basis of suspicion, the police interrogated the appellants.
During the interrogation, the appellants disclosed that they
had strangulated the deceased to death on the Bhatgaon
Canal Road and had thereafter thrown his body into a pond at
Village Bhatgaon. Thereafter, on 3rd December 2011, the police
recorded the memorandum statements of accused Nos.1 to
3 at about 10:00 am, 10:30 am and 11:00 am, respectively,
whereas the memorandum statement of accused No.4 came to
be recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. On the basis
of the aforesaid memorandum statements, the police recovered
the dead body of the deceased from the pond at Bhatgaon on
3rd December 2011 at about 04:05 pm and the dead body was
identified. Thereafter, on the very same day, a First Information
Report (‘FIR’ for short) being No. 402 of 2011 was registered at
Police Station Mungeli, District Bilaspur wherein it is recorded
that the aforesaid offences were committed between the days
of 30th November 2011 and 3rd December 2011. According to
the Post-Mortem Report (Ext. P-22), the cause of death of the
deceased was asphyxia due to strangulation and the nature
of death was homicidal.
3.2 The prosecution case stems from the memorandum statements
of the appellants wherein the appellants had admitted that
Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No.3) had instructed Ravishankar
Tandon (accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused
No.4) to murder the deceased in exchange for Rs.90,000/-,
which was to be paid upon the execution of the said murder.
Upon receiving the aforesaid instruction, Ravishankar Tandon
(accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4)
along with Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) hatched
a criminal conspiracy to kill the deceased and worked out a
plan to execute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid three
accused persons called the deceased to Mungeli on 30th
November 2011 under the ruse of purchasing silver. While
Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) and Satyendra
Kumar Patre (accused No.4) reached Datgaon which fell
562 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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within the ambit of Police Station Mungeli, on a motorcycle
belonging to a relative of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused
No.4), Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and the deceased
reached Datgaon by a bus. Thereafter, the three accused
persons along with the deceased went to visit the house of
the brother-in-law of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4),
namely, Sunil. On that same night, after taking the dinner, they
left Sunil’s house on the pretext of returning to their homes.
However, when they reached near Bhatgaon, Ravishankar
Tandon (accused No.1), Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused
No.2) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) strangulated
the deceased to death and in order to screen themselves from
the said act of murder, the accused persons tied the dead body
of the deceased with his own clothes and stuffed it into a jute
sack which had been procured from Sunil’s house. Thereafter,
the appellants transported the dead body of the deceased to
a pond at Village Bhatgaon, on the motorcycle of Satyendra
Kumar Patre (accused No.4), and threw the dead body into
the said pond, wherefrom it was subsequently recovered.
3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came
to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Mungeli, Chhattisgarh, wherein accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 had
been charged for the offences punishable under Sections 302
read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (‘IPC’ for short) whereas accused No.3 had been charged
for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34
and 120B of the IPC. Since the case was exclusively triable
by the Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the
Sessions Court.
3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court for the aforesaid
offences. The accused/appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried.
3.5 The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 37
documents to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellants.
The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witness
or exhibit any document.
3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that the
prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 563
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted accused Nos. 1, 2
and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with
34, Sections 120B and 201 of the IPC and convicted accused
No. 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with
34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced all of them to undergo
imprisonment for life along with fine.
3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred three
Criminal Appeals before the High Court. The High Court vide
the impugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeals and
affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the
trial Court.
4. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.
5. We have heard Shri Manish Kumar Saran, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023, Shri
Chandrika Prasad Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023, appeals arising out of
SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024, and Shri Praneet Pranav,
learned Deputy Advocate General (‘Dy. AG’ for short) appearing on
behalf of the respondent-State at length.
6. Shri Saran and Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellants, submitted that the present case rests on circumstantial
evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove any
of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. It is
submitted that, in any case, the prosecution has failed to establish
the chain of proven circumstances which leads to no other conclusion
than the guilt of the accused persons. They therefore submitted that
the appeals deserve to be allowed and the judgments and orders of
conviction need to be quashed and set aside.
7. Shri Pranav, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the respondentState, on the contrary, submitted that both the High Court and
the trial court have concurrently held that the prosecution has
proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that
the findings of the trial court and the High Court are based upon
cogent appreciation of evidence and as such, no interference is
warranted.
8. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence.
The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial
564 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court
in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1
,
wherein this Court held thus:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
character and essential proof required in a criminal case
which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case
has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,
the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC
343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
1 [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 565
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should
be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973
SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before
a court can convict and the mental distance
between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence.”
566 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution
that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. The Court held that it is a primary
principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved
guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that
the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of
the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been
held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that
there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act
must have been done by the accused.
10. It is settled law that suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take
the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be
convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An
accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
11. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine the
present case.
12. The prosecution case basically relies on the circumstance of the
memorandum of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (for short “Evidence Act”) and the subsequent recovery of
the dead body from the pond at Bhatgaon. The learned Judges of the
High Court have relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru2
. The High
Court has relied on the following observations of the said judgment:
“121. The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27
in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating
police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in
consequence of the information received from an accused
person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery
2 [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 INSC 333
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 567
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a
consequence of information received. Of course, it is
axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free
from any element of compulsion. The next component of
Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information
that can be proved. It is only so much of the information
as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that
can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in
the section that there is no taboo against receiving such
information in evidence merely because it amounts to a
confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it
clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible
but it is only such information or part of it, which relates
distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information
furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement
to the police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to
admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the
section. The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact
is actually discovered in consequence of the information
supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is
true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in
evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. As
pointed out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR 1947
PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“clearly the extent of the information admissible
must depend on the exact nature of the fact
discovered”
and the information must distinctly relate to that fact.
Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council
speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70,
para 10)
“Normally the section is brought into operation
when a person in police custody produces from
some place of concealment some object, such
as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said
to be connected with the crime of which the
informant is accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
568 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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We have emphasised the word “normally” because the
illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive.
The next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected
the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that
the fact discovered is the physical object produced and
that any and every information which relates distinctly to
that object can be proved. Upon this view, the information
given by a person that the weapon produced is the one
used by him in the commission of the murder will be
admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the Crown’s
counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words:
(AIR p. 70, para 10)
“If this be the effect of Section 27, little
substance would remain in the ban imposed
by the two preceding sections on confessions
made to the police, or by persons in police
custody. That ban was presumably inspired by
the fear of the legislature that a person under
police influence might be induced to confess
by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all
that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion
in the confession of information relating to
an object subsequently produced, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the persuasive
powers of the police will prove equal to the
occasion, and that in practice the ban will
lose its effect.”
Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition
of the expression “fact discovered” in the following passage,
which is quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70,
para 10)
“In Their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to
treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section
as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the
object is produced and the knowledge of the
accused as to this, and the information given
must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 569
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
to past user, or the past history, of the object
produced is not related to its discovery in the
setting in which it is discovered. Information
supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will
produce a knife concealed in the roof of my
house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
knives were discovered many years ago. It
leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is
concealed in the house of the informant to his
knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have
been used in the commission of the offence,
the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to
the statement the words be added ‘with which
I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible since
they do not relate to the discovery of the knife
in the house of the informant.”
(emphasis supplied)
128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962 Supp (2)
SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251] J.L.
Kapur, J. after referring to Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC
67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] stated the legal position as
follows: (SCR p. 837)
“A discovery of a fact includes the object found,
the place from which it is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to its existence.”
The above statement of law does not run counter to the
contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the factum of
discovery combines both the physical object as well as
the mental consciousness of the informant accused in
relation thereto. However, what would be the position if
the physical object was not recovered at the instance of
the accused was not discussed in any of these cases.”
13. As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that, based
on the information given by the accused while in police custody, it
had led to the discovery of the fact, which was distinctly within the
knowledge of the maker of the said statement. It is only so much of
the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
570 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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would be admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this
provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the
information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is
true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence
as an incriminating factor against the accused.
14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of the
dead body was on the basis of the information given by the
accused persons in the statement recorded under Section 27
of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to establish that,
before the information given by the accused persons on the basis
of which the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge
about the existence of the dead body at the place from where it
was recovered.
15. The prosecution, insofar as the memorandum under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is concerned, has relied on the depositions of Ramkumar
(PW-5) and Ajab Singh (PW-18). According to the prosecution, the
statement of Ravishankar Tandon (accused No. 1) was recorded on
3rd December 2011 at 10:00 am. On the same day, the statement of
Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) was recorded at 10:30
am, and that of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) at 11:00 am.
Whereas the statement of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No. 4)
was recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. It will be relevant
to refer to the relevant part of the evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5),
which reads thus:
“2. In front of me, accused Ravishankar have told to the
police that at the behest of accused Dinesh, they have
killed Dharmender for Rs. 90,000 and made a plan and
Ravishankar called Dharmender called him to buy silver
and killed him in Bhatgaon stuffed his dead body in a sack
and threw it in the pond. On being shown the memorandum
statement of Exhibit P- l0 have told to be his signature
on Part A to A.
3. Umed had also told the police in front of me that Sattu
along with Ravi Shankar had killed Dharmendra and threw
him in Bhatagaon’s lake on the advice of Dinesh. Witness
Memo statement is Exhibit P-11 and accepts his signature
on part A to A.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 571
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
4. Dinesh had told in front of me that 6 months back
he had made a deal with Ravishankar and sattu to kill
Dharmender for 90 thousand rupees. Dinesh also told
that Shankar had said that the work is done, give him the
money. On being shown Exhibit P-12, accepted to have
his signature on Part A to A. Witness states that it was
seized from the pond in front of me.
5. Village Kunda is 16 km away from my village. It is
correct that Dharmendra had come to know about the
murder on 3rd. Witness states that it was informed by
the police. On that other morning, at about 7 -8 o’clock
in the morning, it is correct that on my arrival in village
Kunda, my brother-in-law and nephew Narendra had told
me about the murder which was done by the accused. By
that time we did not reach the spot that’s why whether it
was Dharmender’s body or not I cannot.”
6. I went from Kunda to Bhatgaon on 2nd with the police,
then he says that at that time it was about two and a half
o’clock in the evening. It is correct that when I reached
Bhatgaon there were many people of the village. It is correct
that because of dead body there were many people there.
It is correct to say that police have brought the dead body
to Mungeli police station where PM was done.
7. It is correct that accused were brought to Mungeli police
station. It is incorrect that I had taken the signature of
accused at Mungeli police station. Accused have given
the statement at Kunda police station, in front of me. Apart
from the accused we were 5-6 other family members in
the Police station Kunda. The police took the statement
at around 12 o’clock.
…………..
14. We have reached Bhatgaon at 4.30-5. And reached
Mungeli before sunset. It is incorrect to· say that the police
have taken my signature Witness itself states that I have
signed in Bhatgaon. It is incorrect to say that I did not
read the papers before signing them. Witness says that
the I have read the main part. It is incorrect to say that I
572 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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am seeing accused for the first time today. It is incorrect
to say that I know accused by name only, witness states
that I know him by face also. It is incorrect to say that the
name of the accused was revealed by my brother-in-:law
and Narendra it was told by the police.”
16. It is to be noted that Ramkumar (PW-5) is the brother-in-law of the
deceased. A perusal of his evidence would reveal that he has admitted
that, on his arrival in village Kunda, he was informed by his brotherin-law and nephew Narendra Kumar (PW-2) about the murder of the
deceased which was done by the accused persons. He stated that,
by that time they had not reached the spot and that is why they were
not aware as to whether it was the body of Dharmendra or not. He
further admitted that when they reached Bhatgaon, many people of
the village were there. He has also admitted that because of the
dead body, many people were there. He has further admitted that the
accused persons had given their statements at Kunda police station.
He has further admitted that they had reached Bhatgaon at around
04:30 pm to 05:00 pm and had reached Mungeli before sunset. He
has also stated that he had signed the panchnama at Bhatgaon.
17. It could thus be seen that, according to this witness (PW-5), though
the statement was taken at Kunda, it was signed at Bhatgaon.
18. Ajab Singh (PW-18) is another witness on the memorandum recorded
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the subsequent recovery
of the dead body. He states that Ravishankar informed the police
that Dharmendra had been killed and thrown into the pond. However,
he states in examination-in-chief that Umend and Dinesh did not tell
anything to the police in front of him. It will be relevant to refer to
his cross-examination, which reads thus:
“4. It is true that I used to work as Kotwari. It is true that
I did not have read the paper. It is true that I had signed
3-4 papers on the instructions of the police. It is true that
due to being Kotwar had to visit police station regularly. It
is true that I signed on documents on the instructions of
the police. It is wrong to say that I signed in police station,
Kunda. Witnesses say that it was signed in Dandaon.”
19. It could thus be seen that Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted
that he did not read the papers before putting his signature on them.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 573
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
He has admitted that he had signed 3-4 papers on the instructions
of the police. He has also stated that he had signed the statement
at Dandaon.
20. Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is the brother of the deceased. He has stated
that, after his brother went missing; on the next day at around 08:00
o’clock in the morning, the police came to his place and informed that
his brother Dharmendra had been killed by Ravishankar, Satnami,
Umend and Satyendra. After that, they went to Bhatgaon with the
police. The extract of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is
as under:
“3. At around 8 in morning the police came to my place
and informed that my brother Dharmendra was killed by
Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and Satyendra. After that
we went to Bhatgaon with the police. Ramkumar, Krishna,
Banshee had gone with me.”
21. A perusal of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) read with that
of Ramkumar (PW-5) would clearly reveal that the police as well
as these witnesses knew about the death of Dharmendra Satnami
occurring and the dead body being found at Bhatgaon prior to the
statements of the accused persons being recorded under Section 27
of the Evidence Act. All the statements are recorded after 10:00 am
whereas Ramkumar (PW-2) stated that at around 08:00 am, police
informed him about the accused persons killing the deceased and
thereafter they going to Bhatgaon. Ramkumar (PW-5) also admitted
that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he was informed
by his brother-in-law and nephew about the murder which was done
by the accused persons.
22. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that
the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at
Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made by
the accused persons under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that
nobody knew about the same before that. It is further to be noted that
Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted that he had signed the papers
without reading them and that too on the instructions of the police.
23. The evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5) would show that though his
statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed at
Bhatgaon. As such, the possibility of these documents being created
574 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out. In any case,
insofar as the statement of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) is
concerned, even the statement recorded under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is not at all related to the discovery of the dead body of
the deceased. As a matter of fact, nothing in his statement recorded
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has led to discovery of any
incriminating fact.
24. Another aspect that needs to be noted is that, the only evidence
with regard to recording of the memorandum of accused persons
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned, is that of B.R.
Singh, the then Investigating Officer (IO) (PW-16). The relevant part
thereof reads thus:
“1. ….I wrote the statement of accused Ravi Shankar as
per memorandum Ex. P-10 after taking him into custody in
which my signature is on part B to B. I wrote the statement
of accused· Um end as per his memorandum Ex. P-11
and accused Dinesh as per his memorandum Ex. P-12
in which my signature is on part B to B.”
25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to state as
to what information was given by the accused persons which led
to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is also totally
silent as to how the dead body was discovered and subsequently
recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence of the IO (PW-16)
would also not bring the case at hand under the purview of Section
27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this respect could be placed on
the judgments of this Court in the cases of Asar Mohammad and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh3
and Boby v. State of Kerala4
.
26. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any
of the incriminating circumstances against the appellants herein. In
any case, the chain of circumstances must be so complete that it
leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused persons,
which is not so in the present case.
27. In the result, we pass the following order:
3 [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC 253 : 2018 INSC 985
4 [2023] 1 SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 575
Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh
(i) The appeals are allowed;
(ii) The judgment dated 2nd January 2023 passed by the High Court
and the judgment dated 5th February 2013 passed by the trial
court are quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The appellants are directed to be acquitted of all the charges
charged with and are directed to be released forthwith, if not
required in any other case.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeals allowed.
