* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1090 : 2024 INSC 73
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik,
A Registered Society
v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
(Civil Appeal No. 1405-1406 of 2024)
30 January 2024
[Aniruddha Bose And Sanjay Kumar*, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Scope and extent of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by a High
Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Headnotes
Contempt – Constitution of India – Article 215 – Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 – Exercise of contempt jurisdiction by High
Court – Scope – Suit filed by Trust against Society, decreed
by Trial Court directing delivery of possession of the suit
premises to the Trust – Execution proceedings initiated by the
Trust– In appeal by Society, order passed staying execution
proceedings – Contempt proceedings initiatiated by the Trust
alleging violation of the condition set out in the stay order
stating that the Society had resorted to letting out the suit
premises – High Court found the contemnor-appellant guilty
of willfully violating the status quo condition in the stay order
however, instead of initiating contempt proceedings, it vacated
the stay order passed in the appeal in exercise of contempt
jurisdiction – Propriety:
Held: Directions which are explicit in the judgment or ‘are plainly
self-evident’ can be taken into account for the purpose of considering
whether there is any disobedience or willful violation – Court has
a duty to issue appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying
the things done in violation of the Court order and in that regard,
the Court may even take restitutive measures at any stage of the
proceedings – In addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying
its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does
not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely
suffering the punishment meted out to him – In the present case,
vacating of the stay order in the appeal by the High Court in
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1091
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
exercise of contempt jurisdiction did not assume either a restitutive
or a remedying character – Violation of the status quo condition in
the stay order stood complete, even as per the High Court, and
vacating of the stay order did not have the effect of restoring the
parties to their original position or deny the contemnor the benefit
of the disobedience which already stood concluded – Violation of
a conditional stay order would entail vacating thereof in a properly
constituted proceeding – High Court erred by resorting to such a
step while exercising contempt jurisdiction – The concluded act in
violation of the status quo order in relation to possession of the suit
premises amounted to ‘civil contempt’ u/s.2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act and warranted appropriate consequences – However,
without taking recourse to such a step, the High Court thought it fit
to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to enable the Trust to
execute the decree – This action of the High Court transgressed
the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction and cannot be
sustained – Impugned order set aside to that extent – However,
as the High Court desisted from exercising contempt jurisdiction,
despite finding the contemnor guilty of willfully violating the status
quo condition in the stay order, matter remanded to the High Court
for continuing with that exercise. [Paras 14-17]
Case Law Cited
Sudhir Vasudeva vs. M.George Ravishekaran [2014] 4
SCR 27 : (2014) 3 SCC 373; Baranagore Jute Factory
PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) vs. Baranagore Jute
Factory PLC [2017] 4 SCR 700 : (2017) 5 SCC 506;
Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction
Co. (P) Ltd. [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC
622; Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir Babuji [1985]
1 SCR 598 : (1984) 4 SCC 216 – relied on.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
List of Keywords
Contempt; Contempt jurisdiction of High Court; Execution
proceedings stayed; Contemnor guilty; Willful violation
of status quo condition; Disobedience or willful violation;
Restitutive measures; Remedying character; Stay order
vacated; Benefit of the disobedience; Restoring parties to
their original position; Civil contempt.
1092 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.1405-1406 of
2024.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2014 of the High Court at
Calcutta in CPAN No.2113 of 2013 and FA No.229 of 2010.
Appearances for Parties
Jayanta Mitra, Sr. Adv., Ajay Gaggar, Amarjit Singh Bedi, Varun
Chandiok, Ms. Riya Seth, Yashwant Gaggar, Uttiyo Mallick, Ms.
Anubhi Goyal, Robin Sirohi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Harin P Raval, Sr. Adv., Anando Mukherjee, Ms. Shrestha Narayan,
Ms. Shreya Bansal, Shwetank Singh, Ms. Urmi H. Raval, Siddharth
H. Raval, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Kumar, J
1. Leave granted.
2. Focus in this appeal is on the scope and extent of the contempt
jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
3. By judgment dated 12.11.2014 passed in C.P.A.N. 2113 of 2013
in F.A. No. 229 of 2010, a Division Bench of the High Court at
Calcutta held that the act of the contemnor therein was in willful
disobedience to the stay order passed in the first appeal and was
not only contemptuous but also illegal and invalid. However, instead
of initiating proceedings for contempt, the Division Bench opined
that justice would be subserved by vacating the stay order passed
in the first appeal. Aggrieved by this turn of events, the contemnor
is before this Court.
4. By order dated 27.01.2015, this Court stayed the operation of the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
5. Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, Kolkata (for brevity,
‘the Trust’), was the plaintiff in T. Suit No. 164 of 2004, filed for
declaration of title, recovery of possession and for damages, before
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1093
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore. This suit was
instituted by it against Baitanik, a registered society (for brevity, ‘the
Society’), which was in occupation of the premises, detailed in suit
schedules A and B, situated at 4B, Elgin Road (now, Lala Lajpat Rai
Sarani), Bhawanipore, Kolkata. The Trial Court decreed the suit by
its judgment dated 25.02.2009 and directed delivery of possession of
the suit premises to the Trust within 30 days. Execution proceedings
were initiated by the Trust on 30.07.2009.
6. While so, the Society preferred an appeal in F.A.T. No. 321 of
2009 against the judgment dated 25.02.2009, which was thereafter
renumbered as F.A. No. 229 of 2009, before the High Court at
Calcutta. Therein, an interim order was passed on 03.03.2010 in
CAN 7021 of 2009 (application for stay) in the following terms: -
“……. We, therefore, dispose of the application for stay
with the following directions: -
1) There shall be an unconditional order of stay of all
further proceedings in title execution case pending in
the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Third Court at Alipore, for a period of eight weeks.
2) The appellant is directed to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/-
(Rupees Ten Lac only) with the learned Registrar
General of this Court by eight weeks without prejudice
to the rights and contentions of the parties and subject
to the result of the appeal.
3) The appellant must go on depositing current
occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 35,000/-
(Rupees thirty five thousand) only per month for the
suit premises during the pendency of the appeal with
the learned Registrar General of this Court. First of
such deposit for the month of March, 2010 is to be
made by April 16, 2010. All subsequent deposits are
to be made by fifteenth of each succeeding month
for which the same is due and payable.
4) All these deposits are to be made by the defendant
no. 1-appellant without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties and subject to the result
of the appeal.
1094 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL
5) If the defendant no.1-appellant deposits Rs.10,00,000/-
(Rupees ten lac), only and goes on paying the monthly
occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 35,000/-
(Rupees thirty five thousand) only, the interim order
of stay shall continue till the disposal of the appeal.
6) The learned Registrar General is requested to invest
the amounts that may be deposited by the appellant in;
short term renewable interest bearing fixed deposits
scheme with any nationalized bank of his choice. He
is, further, requested to see that such fixed deposits
are renewed from time to time during the pendency
of this appeal subject, however, to any order that
may be passed in this appeal.
7) In default of the deposits, as aforesaid, the interim
order of stay shall stand vacated and the decree
shall be executed at once.
However, we clarify that pendency of this appeal shall not
prevent the plaintiffs-respondents-decree holders from
initiating proceedings for recovery of mesne profit under
Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
learned trial judge shall be at liberty to proceed with such
proceedings in accordance with law.
However, the learned trial judge shall not pass any final
order without the leave of this Court.
The defendant no. 1 appellant is, also, directed to maintain
status quo, as regards possession, nature and character,
as of to (sic.) today, in relation to the property in suit
during the pendency of the appeal. We, further, restrain
the defendant no.1 appellant from creating any third
party interest in relation to the property-in-suit including
granting of any licence in favour of any third party during
the pendency of this appeal.
With the aforesaid directions, the application for stay, filed
under C.A.N. 7021 of 2009, is, thus, disposed of.
We make no order as to costs
Let the hearing of the appeal be expedited……”
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1095
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
7. By order dated 10.08.2010, the High Court is stated to have extended
the time to deposit the sum of ₹10 lakh by a period of two months,
but it is an admitted fact that the said deposit was made only on
22.12.2010.
8. Pertinent to note, the Society also filed CAN. 8838 of 2010 in its appeal
seeking leave to let out a portion of the suit premises. However, by
order dated 07.03.2011, the High Court rejected the said application.
9. Developments thereafter led to initiation of contempt proceedings by
the Trust, in C.P.A.N. 2113 of 2013, alleging violation of the condition
set out in the stay order dated 03.03.2010. More particularly, it was
alleged that the Society had resorted to letting out the suit premises
for holding exhibitions. While considering this allegation, a Division
Bench of the High Court at Calcutta took note of the Report dated
06.06.2013 of the Sub-Inspector of Bhawanipore Police Station,
confirming that Ms. Sofia Khatoon and Ms. Roommee Bhattacharya
had jointly held an exhibition from 13.05.2013 to 19.05.2013 on the
ground floor of the suit premises after paying a sum of ₹6,000/- to the
Society towards rent. The Division Bench also noted that a receipt
had been issued by the contemnor, viz., Amit Kumar Das, the Joint
Secretary of the Society, as if it was a donation instead of rent for
use of the suit premises. On his behalf, it was contended that the
very purpose of the Society was to promote and spread the culture
of Tagore amongst the public, through songs, dramas, dances and
literary discussions, and even if any such events were held in the
suit premises, there was no change in the character of the property.
The Division Bench further noted that the inquiring officer had learnt
that, after the order of the High Court, the Society was collecting
rent in the garb of donations by letting out the suit premises for
holding exhibitions.
10. Observing that one of the conditions of the stay order dated
03.03.2010 was that the Society must maintain status quo as regards
possession of the suit premises pending the appeal and refrain from
creating any third-party interest in relation thereto, including by way
of grant of a licence, the Division Bench concluded that the Society
had, in fact, granted licences for short terms to third parties for the
purpose of exhibitions, dances and other functions on payment of
donations. Further, the Division Bench noted that all the functions
which were being held at the suit premises, in lieu of donations, were
1096 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL
not organized by the Society itself, and such acts on its part amounted
to willful and deliberate violation of the order dated 03.03.2010 passed
in the first appeal. The Division Bench also took note of the fact that
the application filed by the Society seeking leave to let out a portion
of the suit premises had already been rejected. As the execution
proceedings initiated by the Trust, the decree holder, stood stayed
by virtue of the order dated 03.03.2010, the Division Bench opined
that justice would be subserved by vacating the said order of stay of
execution proceedings without initiating a proceeding for contempt.
The Bench accordingly allowed C.P.A.N.2113 of 2013 and vacated
the order of stay granted in F.A. No. 229 of 2009. The Bench held
that the decree would be executable at once, subject to the result
of the pending appeal.
11. The appellant before us, viz., the contemnor, would contend that
it was not open to the High Court to vacate the stay order passed
in the appeal in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. He would point
out that no steps were taken by the Trust to seek such relief in the
appeal and the High Court ought not to have resorted to such action
in the contempt case.
12. On the contrary, the Trust would argue that the impugned order does
not warrant interference at this stage as the order of stay dated
03.03.2010 in the appeal stood vacated automatically in terms of
clause 7 thereof, as there was a default in the making of deposits as
directed in the earlier clauses. It would point out that the Society was
required to deposit a sum of ₹10 lakh with the Registrar General of
the High Court within the stipulated time but such deposit was made
only on 22.12.2010, well after the expiry thereof. It would also point
out that the Society was required to deposit occupation charges @
₹35,000/- per month during the pendency of the appeal and assert
that the Society stopped making such deposits since February, 2020.
It is however admitted by the Trust that no steps were taken to revive
the execution proceedings on these grounds.
13. Now, a look at caselaw on the point. In Sudhir Vasudeva vs.
M.George Ravishekaran1
, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed
as under, in the context of exercise of contempt jurisdiction: -
1 [2014] 4 SCR 27 : (2014) 3 SCC 373
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1097
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as
this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare
power available both under the Constitution as well as
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.…… The very nature
of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise
the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is
also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of
a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination
of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect
of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not,
therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which
is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions
that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment
or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such
directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are
plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the
purpose of consideration as to whether there has been
any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided
issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities
be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while
considering a contempt plea the power available to the
Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal
is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental
to what has been already expressed should be issued by
the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the
contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other
jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above…..”
14. However, in Baranagore Jute Factory PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)
vs. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC.2
, considering the aforestated
precedent, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the 3-Judge
Bench had clarified therein that directions which are explicit in the
judgment or ‘are plainly self-evident’ can be taken into account for the
purpose of considering whether there is any disobedience or willful
violation. The Bench further held that the Court has a duty to issue
appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying the things done in
violation of the Court order and in that regard, the Court may even
take restitutive measures at any stage of the proceedings.
2 [2017] 4 SCR 700 : (2017) 5 SCC 506
1098 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL
15. Significantly, the 2-Judge Bench had merely echoed the affirmation
of the legal position by another 2-Judge Bench of this Court in Delhi
Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.3
.
The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/
or keep the fruits of his contempt was reiterated therein. Reference
was made by the Bench to Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir
Babuji4
, wherein it was held that undergoing punishment for contempt
would not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate
directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of
its orders. Therefore, the principle that stands crystallized by these
judgments is that, in addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying
its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does
not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely
suffering the punishment meted out to him.
16. This being the settled legal position, we find that the fact situation
in the present case is such, that vacating of the stay order in the
appeal by the High Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction did
not assume either a restitutive or a remedying character. Violation
of the status quo condition in the stay order stood complete, even
as per the High Court, and vacating of the stay order did not have
the effect of restoring the parties to their original position or deny
the contemnor the benefit of the disobedience which already stood
concluded. Violation of a conditional stay order, in the usual course,
would entail vacating thereof in a properly constituted proceeding. By
resorting to such a step while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the
High Court, in our considered opinion was not acting in furtherance
of the principle adumbrated in the above decisions.
17. No doubt, the concluded act in violation of the status quo order
in relation to possession of the suit premises amounted to ‘civil
contempt’ under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
and warranted appropriate consequences under the provisions
thereof. However, without taking recourse to such a step, the High
Court thought it fit to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to
enable the Trust to execute the decree. This action of the High Court
clearly transgressed the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction
3 [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC 622
4 [1985] 1 SCR 598 : (1984) 4 SCC 216
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1099
Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
and cannot be sustained. To that extent, the impugned order is set
aside. However, as the High Court desisted from exercising contempt
jurisdiction, owing to this misconceived measure, despite finding the
contemnor guilty of willfully violating the status quo condition in the
stay order, we consider it appropriate to remand the matter to the
High Court for continuing with that exercise as we have now set aside
the course of action adopted by the High Court in the alternative.
18. Further, as the Trust asserts that the stay order stood vacated
automatically owing to the default by the Society in making deposits,
it is for the Trust to take appropriate steps. The Trust would be at
liberty to take all such measures as are permissible in law in that
regard, be it before the High Court or the executing Court.
19. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, to the extent indicated
above.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeal partly allowed.
