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Thursday, May 16, 2024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 439 – Discretion to grant bail ought not to be used arbitrarily, capriciously, and injudiciously – Appeal allowed – High Court ought not to have been granted bail on account of (i) seriousness of the crime; (ii) conduct of accused persons; and (iii) overall impact of crime on the society.

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 686 : 2024 INSC 323

Ramayan Singh

v.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2168 of 2024)

19 April 2024

[Sanjay Karol and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court appropriately exercised its discretion under

Section 439 of the CrPC while granting bail to the accused persons.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 439 – Discretion to

grant bail ought not to be used arbitrarily, capriciously, and

injudiciously – Appeal allowed – High Court ought not to have

been granted bail on account of (i) seriousness of the crime;

(ii) conduct of accused persons; and (iii) overall impact of

crime on the society.

Held: Accused persons charged under s. 147, 148, 149, 323, 504,

506, 427, 394, 411, 302 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code along with

s. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 – In relation to FIR

lodged by Appellant stating that persons including Respondent No.

2 and a co-accused attacked him, his uncle (the deceased) and

another person – Bail applications of both accused persons rejected

by trial court – Appeals against trial court orders allowed – Bail

granted by High Court – Appellant challenged correctness of High

Court’s orders – Appeal allowed – Grant of bail involves exercise

of discretionary power which ought not to be used arbitrarily,

capriciously; and injudiciously – Bail ought not to have been

granted on account of (i) seriousness of the crime; (ii) conduct of

accused person(s); and (iii) overall impact of the crime on society

at large as the accused persons had overwhelming influence in

the area. [Paras 15, 19]

Case Law Cited

Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [2014] 12 SCR 453 :

(2014) 16 SCC 508; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis

Chatterjee [2010] 12 SCR 1165 : (2010) 14 SCC 496;

Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [2019] 14 SCR 529 : (2020)

2 SCC 118 – relied on.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 687

Ramayan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Grant of bail; Exercise of discretion under Section 439 CrPC;

Parameters for granting bail.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2168

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.04.2023 of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in CRMBA No. 11828 of 2023

With

Criminal Appeal No. 2169 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

Devvrat, Sanjay Kumar Yadav, Prithvi Pal, Manoj Jain, Advs. for the

Appellant.

Sudhir Kumar Saxena, Sr. Adv., Lokesh Kumar Choudhary, Ms. Tulika

Mukherjee, Ajay Singh, Ms. Sneh Suman, Beenu Sharma, Venkat

Narayan, Subodh S. Patil, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal i.e., arising out of SLP(Crl.) No 14988 of 2023,

seeks to assail the correctness of a judgment of the Learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (the “High Court”)

dated 24.04.2023 wherein, the High Court allowed Vivek Pal @ Vikki

Pal’s / Respondent No. 2’s bail application under Section 439 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) and accordingly enlarged

Respondent No. 2 on bail subject to certain conditions contained

therein (the “Impugned Order”).

3. By an order dated 31.10.2023, a co-accused i.e., Punit Pal was

enlarged on bail by a coordinate bench of the High Court. The appeal 

688 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

filed by the Appellant against that order has been tagged with the

present appeal vide an order dated 02.01.2024 in SLP (Crl) No. 355

of 2024. Moreover, as the facts and the questions involved in the

present appeal(s) are similar, they have been heard together and

are being disposed of by this common judgment.

4. The facts of the case reveal that a First Information Report (the

“FIR”) was lodged by the Appellant i.e., the Original Complainant,

on 03.01.2022 stating that on 02.01.2022 at around 3:30 PM, the

Appellant along with his uncle i.e., Jitendra Singh (the “Deceased”)

and his driver i.e., Rahul were returning from Bankati Bazar when their

vehicle was stopped by the accused person(s) including inter alia (i)

Respondent No. 2; and (ii) Punit Pal. The accused persons verbally

abused the Deceased and proceeded to shatter the windows of the

vehicle with iron rods. Subsequently they dragged the Deceased

out of the vehicle – and physically assaulted the Deceased with

iron rods, hockey sticks and bats with an intention to kill him. It was

also alleged that although the Appellant and Rahul i.e., the Driver

attempted to intervene, they were injured by the accused persons.

The accused persons snatched the mobile phones of the Deceased

and the driver; as well as a gold chain belonging to the Deceased

and ran away from the spot of the incident. The Deceased was

initially rushed to the Primary Health Centre, Bankati, however, due

to the serious nature of the injuries he was referred to the District

Hospital, Basti and thereafter to Sahara Hospital in Lucknow where

he eventually succumbed to his injuries on 10.02.2022.

5. On the same day i.e., 10.02.2022, (i) an inquest report of the person

of the Deceased was prepared wherein injuries were recorded on the

head, hand and knee; and (ii) a post-mortem was conducted which

revealed 4 (four) major ante mortem head injuries on the person

of the Deceased. Pertinently, the cause of death was identified as

coma due to ante mortem head injuries.

6. Notably, Respondent No. 2 came to be apprehended in relation to

the FIR on 05.01.2022 and the murder weapon i.e., a bat used in

the assault of the Deceased was also recovered at his instance. On

the other hand, Punit Pal came to be apprehended on 07.01.2022.

A chargesheet came to be filed in relation to the FIR on 14.03.2022

under Section(s) 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506, 427, 394, 411,

302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 (“IPC”) read with

Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 (the “Act”) (the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 689

Ramayan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

“Chargesheet”). Pursuant to the filing of the Chargesheet, committal

proceedings ensued and thereafter charges were framed against the

accused person(s) vide an order dated 19.04.2023.

7. Respondent No. 2 preferred an application seeking the grant of bail

in relation to the proceeding(s) emanating from the FIR before the

Learned Sessions Judge, Basti (the “Trial Court”). Vide an order

dated 15.03.2022, the aforesaid bail application came to be rejected

by the Trial Court. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 filed an application

seeking the grant of bail which came to be allowed by the High Court

vide the Impugned Order.

8. On the other hand, Punit Pal preferred an application seeking the

grant of bail in relation to the proceeding(s) emanating from the FIR

before the Trial Cour. Vide an order dated 29.03.2022, the aforesaid

bail application came to be rejected by the Trial Court. Thereafter,

Punit Pal filed an application seeking the grant of bail which came

to be allowed by the High Court vide an order dated 31.10.2023.

9. The Appellant herein i.e., the Original Complainant filed the present

appeals assailing the correctness of the order(s) passed by the High

Court enlarging (i) Respondent No. 2; and (ii) Punit Pal on bail in

relation to the FIR.

10. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, urged

the following:

(a) The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction to

grant Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal bail in light of the fact

that (i) charges had been framed against the accused person(s);

(ii) recovery of the weapon used in the assault of the Deceased

has been effected from Respondent No. 2; (iii) well-reasoned

order(s)had been passed by the Trial Court declining the grant

of bail to Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal;

(b) That there is a real and probable threat qua the ability to

influence witnesses in light of the overwhelming influence

exercised in the area by the accused person(s) including inter

alia Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal i.e., after the incident all

shops near the place of occurrence remained shut for a period

of 10 (ten) days; and

(c) That Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal have misused their

liberty i.e., an identified witness had previously sought police 

690 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

protection from the Trial Court on account of threats having

been extended to him during the pendency of the trial; and it

was specifically contended that threats were extended to the

Appellant himself by to Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal.

11. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent State

of Uttar Pradesh supported the stand of the Appellant. Moreover, it

was brought to our attention that both Respondent No. 2; and Punit

Pal were also being prosecuted under the provisions of the Uttar

Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.

12. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhir Kumar Saxena, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal has

vehemently contended as under:

(a) That Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal have been cooperating

with the trial, however, the Appellant has stalled proceedings

before the Trial Court; and

(b) That the allegation levelled against Respondent No. 2; and Punit

Pal vis-à-vis extension of threats to the Appellant was wholly

erroneous and is in fact, a part of a calculated effort to paint

Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal in bad light; and

13. We have heard the learned counsel(s) appearing on behalf of the

parties and perused the materials on record.

14. The fulcrum of the dispute before this Court is whether the High

Court appropriately exercised its discretion under Section 439 of

the CrPC to grant Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal bail in relation

to the proceeding(s) emanating out of the FIR?

15. It is well settled that the grant of bail involves the exercise of a

discretionary power which ought not to be used arbitrarily, capriciously;

and injudiciously.1 In the aforesaid prism we must assess the

correctness of the order(s) of the High Court granting Respondent

No. 2; and Punit Pal bail in relation to the proceeding(s) emanating

out of the FIR.

16. This Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14

SCC 496, enunciated certain parameters on which the correctness of

1 Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [2014] 12 SCR 453 : (2014) 16 SCC 508

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 691

Ramayan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

an order granting bail must be evaluated. The relevant paragraph(s)

are reproduced as under:

“9. …It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere

with an order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM

No. 272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by

the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.

However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to

exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly

in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a

plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well

settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be

borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground

to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if

released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing

of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being

influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant

of bail.

***

10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to

these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail,

the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application

of mind, rendering it to be illegal.”

17. Furthermore, this Court in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2

SCC 118, followed Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (Supra) and succinctly

summarised the position qua interference by this Court vis-à-vis an

order granting bail. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under: 

692 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

“14. The provision for an accused to be released on bail

touches upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this

reason that this Court does not ordinarily interfere with an

order of the High Court granting bail. However, where the

discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised

without the due application of mind or in contravention of

the directions of this Court, such an order granting bail

is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to factor,

amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused

had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the

offence and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the

proceedings of the trial in any manner or evading the

course of justice. The provision for being released on bail

draws an appropriate balance between public interest in

the administration of justice and the protection of individual

liberty pending adjudication of the case. However, the grant

of bail is to be secured within the bounds of the law and

in compliance with the conditions laid down by this Court.

It is for this reason that a court must balance numerous

factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power

to grant bail on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in this

determination is whether, on an analysis of the record, it

appears that there is a prima facie or reasonable cause

to believe that the accused had committed the crime. It is

not relevant at this stage for the court to examine in detail

the evidence on record to come to a conclusive finding.”

18. Turning to the issue at hand, we note that Respondent No. 2; and

Punit Pal have been charged under inter alia Section(s) 147, 148,

149, 323, 504, 506, 427, 394, 411, 302 and 120B IPC on the basis

of the materials on record including but not limited to the postmortem report; and statements of witnesses. Furthermore, on 2 (two)

occasions there have been allegations levelled against Respondent

No. 2; and Punit Pal alleging inter alia that the accused persons have

attempted to intimidate the Appellant i.e., the Original Complainant

and another identified witnesses in an effort to de-rail the trial in the

present case.

19. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the High Court ought not

to have granted Respondent No. 2; and Punit Pal bail in relation

to the proceedings emanating from the FIR on account of (i) the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 693

Ramayan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

seriousness of the crime; (ii) the conduct of the accused person(s);

and (iii) the overall impact of the crime on society at large i.e., the

accused person(s) were involved in a broad day-light murder which

led to the closure of a market for a prolonged period of 10 (ten) days

due to their overwhelming influence in the area.

20. In the aforementioned context, the impugned orders dated 24.04.2023

and 31.10.2023 granting bail to accused Vivek Pal @ Vikki Pal and

Punit Pal, respectively, cannot be sustained and are, accordingly,

set aside.

21. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. The bail bond(s) of

accused Vivek Pal @ Vikki Pal and Punit Pal shall stand cancelled.

The aforenoted person(s) shall be taken into custody forthwith. A copy

of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Trial Court and PS Lalganj,

Basti, Uttar Pradesh for onward action and necessary compliance. The

Trial Court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously preferably

within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of this

judgment.

22. It is clarified that any observations made in this judgment shall not be

treated as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case at trial.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Gaurav Upadhyay, Hony. Associate Editor Appeals allowed.

(Verified by: Shibani Ghosh, Adv.)