* Author
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 767 : 2024 INSC 211
Ravinder Kumar
v.
State of NCT of Delhi
(Criminal Appeal No. 918 of 2024)
06 March 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
1) Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict the
accused; 2) Whether burden of proof u/s. 106 Evidence Act can
be on accused before the prosecution proves its case; 3) Whether
recovery pursuant to statement made u/s. 27 Evidence Act can
be admissible, when recovery was from a place known to all and
not exclusively within knowledge of maker.
Headnotes
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 - Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss. 106, 27 – Appellant’s wife
found dead with throat slit – Appellant convicted by trial court for
offences punishable under ss. 302, 304B/34, 498A/34 IPC – High
Court set aside conviction under ss. 304B/34 but sustained under
ss. 302, 498A/34 IPC – Prosecution relying on circumstantial
evidence to sustain conviction under s. 302 – Courts below
found: (i) plea of alibi without substance (ii) bloodstained clothes
recovered at Appellant’s parental home (iii) English calendar with
Appellant’s name found in the house (iv) Appellant created a
scene in the house so as to make it seem like robbery.
Held: (1) When prosecution case relies on circumstantial evidence,
circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established – Accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’
guilty – Facts so established should be consistent only with guilt
of accused, not explainable on any another hypothesis – Chain of
evidence must be so complete to show beyond reasonable doubt
that act was committed by accused – (2) Before burden shifts on
accused under s. 106 Evidence Act, prosecution has to establish
before death occurred, deceased and accused were seen in the
house- more so when accused raises specific plea of alibi – (3)
For recovery to be admissible on statement made under S. 27
768 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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Evidence Act, recovery must be from place exclusively within
knowledge of maker – In present case, recovery was from place
accessible to all [Paras 8, 9, 10 11, 13, 17].
Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC
121 – relied on.
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006]
Suppl. 7 SCR 156 : (2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC
691 – relied on.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Principles of Circumstantial evidence; S. 106 Evidence Act; Burden of
proof – Alibi; Recovery under S. 27 Evidence Act, when admissible.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 918
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2015 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.287 of 2015
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Neha Kapoor, Kaushal Mehta, Pulkit Srivastava, Ankit Bhutani,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Nachiketa Joshi, P
V Yogeshvaran, Udai Khanna, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Sachin Sharma,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. This appeal arises against the judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on 12th
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 769
Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi
October, 2015 in Criminal Appeal No.287 of 2015, thereby dismissing
the appeal filed by the appellant herein.
2. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the present appeal are as
under:
2.1 Deceased-Meena, daughter of Mani Ram (PW.3) and Gyanwati
(PW.6), got married to the appellant-Ravinder Kumar (accused
No.1) on 20.06.1999. A male child named Harry was born out of
the said wedlock on 26.08.2000. On 27.04.2001, at 0055 hours,
a First Information Report (“FIR” for short) bearing No.129/2001
(Ext. PW-9/A) was registered at the instance of deceased-Meena
in the Police Station Civil Lines, Delhi for investigation into the
offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short. ‘IPC’). In the said FIR, deceased-Meena made allegations
with regard to cruelty made by her husband-Ravinder Kumar
(accused No.1) and his two brothers, namely, Pushpender Singh
(accused No.2) and R. Harshinder (accused No.4) during her
stay at the matrimonial home at H.No.252, Old Chandrawal, Civil
Line, Delhi. In the said FIR, after completion of the investigation
a Report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) was submitted. However, it appears
that there was a compromise between the parties and she
made a statement before the Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila
Court), Delhi that she does not want to proceed with the case
any further. She further stated that she has no grievance against
the accused persons and that the complaint had been made
by her out of frustration and anger. She had also stated that
she was living separately with her husband and child happily,
as such criminal proceedings were terminated and the accused
were discharged vide judgment dated 21.10.2003.
2.2 On the morning of 29.05.2004, dead body of Meena was
discovered at about 0820 hours lying in a pool of blood on the
floor of the room on the ground floor, her throat slit with a sharp
edged weapon and her son Harry aged about three and a half
years was found sitting nearby.
2.3 The FIR No.211/04 (Ext. PW-1/A) came to be registered for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC on the basis
of rukka (Ex.PW-15/B) sent by Sub Inspector Ram Chander
(PW.15). The FIR was later converted into a case involving for
offence punishable under Section 304-B/498-A/34 of the IPC
770 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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on the basis of the statements made by Mani Ram (PW.3),
Shiv Kumar (PW.4) and Gyanwati (PW.6), father, brother and
mother of deceased Meena respectively.
2.4 On conclusion of the investigation, charges were framed
against Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1), the husband of the
deceased, Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law
of the deceased, Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the motherin-law of the deceased and Pushpender (accused No.2) and
R. Harshinder (accused No.5), who are the brothers-in-law
of the deceased. At the conclusion of the trial, by judgment
and order dated 25.11.2014/08.01.2015, the Addl. Sessions
Judge-02, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as “trial court”) convicted the appellant herein for the
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him
to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/-. All the
accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
ten years with fine of Rs.20,000/- for the offences punishable
under Section 304B/34 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three
years with fine of Rs.25,000/- each for offence under Section
498A/34 IPC with further direction that in case of default in
payment of fine they would undergo rigorous imprisonment for
six months and three months respectively.
2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, two criminal appeals came to be
preferred by the convicted persons. Mani Ram (PW.3), the father
of the deceased also filed an independent appeal being Criminal
Appeal No.569 of 2015, being aggrieved by the acquittal of
accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences punishable under Section
302/34 IPC. The appeals were heard together. The High Court,
vide impugned judgment and order dated 12th October 2015,
held the appellant herein and Pushpender (accused No.2)
guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 IPC. The conviction and sentence of the appellant
herein and Pushpender (accused No.2) was set aside for the
offence punishable under Section 304B read with Section 34
IPC while maintaining the sentence awarded by the trial court to
the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302/34
IPC. The High Court also sentenced Pushpinder (accused
No.2) to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- for
the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. In case of
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 771
Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi
default in payment of fine, he was directed to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three months. The conviction of Phoolwati
(accused No.3), Babu Lal (accused No.4) and R. Harshinder
(accused No.5) for the offence punishable under Section 304-
B read with Section 34 IPC and conviction of all accused for
offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and
sentences awarded thereagainst were maintained.
2.6 Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law of the
deceased had preferred Criminal Appeal No.2025 of 2017
before this Court. Since Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the
mother-in-law of the deceased died during the pendency of
the appeal, the appeal came to be abated against her. In the
said appeal, insofar as Babu Lal (accused No.4) is concerned,
though this Court did not find any ground to interfere with
the conviction passed by the trial court and the High Court,
it reduced the sentence for the period already undergone by
accused No.4-Babu Lal.
2.7 Pushpender (accused No.2) had preferred Criminal Appeal
Nos.938-939 of 2016. This Court, vide order dated 15th February
2022 partly allowed the appeals and set aside the conviction
and sentence recorded against Pushpender (accused No.2) for
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, however it restored
the conviction and sentence in respect of offences under
Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34 IPC.
2.8 Insofar as R. Harshinder (accused No.5) is concerned, he had
preferred Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2022. His appeal was also
partly allowed by reducing the sentence to the period already
undergone by him, vide order dated 15th February 2022.
2.9 After the aforesaid appeals were decided, the appellant herein
has preferred the present appeal in October, 2023. Leave was
granted in this matter on 13.02.2024.
3. We have heard Ms. Neha Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel for the respondent.
4. Ms. Kapoor submits that the conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence. She further submits that no incriminating circumstances
have been proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
She submits that insofar as recovery of the bloodstained clothes is
772 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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concerned, it is found at a place accessible to one and all and she
further submits that the recovery panchnama also does not mention
the date of recovery. She therefore submits that, the conviction under
Section 302 IPC is not at all tenable.
5. Ms. Kapoor further submits that even the conviction under Section
304B and 498A would not be tenable. She submits that the matter
was compromised between the deceased and the accused. It is
submitted that taking into consideration the above aspect, the
amended charge came to be framed on 14.03.2007, restricting the
claim with regard to cruelty only for the period between 21.10.2003
and 29.05.2004 i.e. from the date of the discharge by the learned
Magistrate in the earlier proceedings till the date on which Meena
was found dead. Ms. Kapoor further submits that during this period
there is no allegation against the appellant herein, which would
attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC. It is submitted that the
prosecution fails to prove the guilt. The conviction under Section
304B IPC would also not be tenable.
6. Shri Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, on the contrary, submits that both the Courts, upon correct
appreciation of evidence, have concurrently found the appellant
herein guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. It
is, therefore, submitted that no interference is warranted with the
conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC. It is submitted that insofar
as conviction under Section 498A and 304B IPC are concerned, the
same has been affirmed by this Court in the case of three co-accused
persons, as such the said finding has attained finality.
7. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have
scrutinized the evidence.
8. Undoubtedly, the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial
evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment
of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra1
, wherein this Court held thus:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 773
Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi
character and essential proof required in a criminal case
which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case
has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,
the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has
laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
774 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence.”
9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution
that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to
be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a
primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may
be’ guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held
that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between
‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 775
Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi
held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable
on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has
further been held that the circumstances should be such that they
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It
has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.
10. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot
take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot
be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.
An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
11. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, we have examined the present
case. In the present case, the trial court and the High Court have
basically convicted and affirmed the conviction under Section 302
IPC, finding the plea of the alibi to be without substance. It is a settled
proposition of law that before the burden shifts on the accused under
Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the prosecution will have to prove
its case. No doubt that in view of the law laid down by this Court
in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra2
,
which is a case like the present one, where husband and wife reside
together in a house and the crime is committed inside the house, it
will be for the husband to explain how the death occurred in the house
where they cohabited together. However, even in such a case, the
prosecution will have to first establish that before the death occurred,
the deceased and the accused were seen in the said house. In the
present case, the incident had occurred on the intervening night of
28th/29th May, 2004. It was necessary for the prosecution to lead
some evidence to establish that on the night of 28th/29th May 2004,
deceased and accused were together in the house. This will be
more necessary in view of the specific plea of the defence of alibi.
12. We will have to consider as to whether the prosecution has established
other circumstances beyond reasonable doubts, which led to no
other conclusion than the guilt of the accused.
2 (2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC 691
776 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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13. The prosecution has relied upon the CDRs with regard to mobile
phone of the Saroj, Pushpender (accused No.2) and Ravinder
Kumar (accused No.1). However, both the Courts found the said
evidence to be inadmissible as it was not proved in terms of
Section 65A of the Evidence Act. The circumstances relied upon
by the prosecution is with regard to the seizure of the bloodstained
clothes allegedly used by the appellant at the time of commission
of the crime beneath the double bed from his parental home at
Chandrawal. We find that the said recovery cannot be relied for
more than one reasons. For a recovery to be admissible on the
statement made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be
from such a place which is exclusively within the knowledge of the
maker thereof. Indisputably, the recovery is from a place accessible
to one and all and the recovery panchnama also does not mention
the date regarding such a recovery. Apart from that, there is no
entry in malkhana register with regard to the deposit of the said
articles and sending them to the FSL for chemical examination.
We, therefore, find that the said circumstances cannot be said to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
14. Apart from that, the prosecution has not been in a position to prove
any other circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
and the High Court have heavily relied on the circumstance that
an English calendar (Ex. PX) was found to be hanged in the room.
On one side, two sheets of paper both similar computer print outs
has been pasted. On one of the sheets, on the left top corner, the
name Ravinder followed by mobile telephone number 9818419048
preceded by a drawing of mobile phone with arrow sign, all written
in hand can be noticed. On the other sheet pasted on the top, above
the calendar, it was printed thus:-
“In-Laws: 2791 3334
Self: 9818419048
My Home: 55153285”
15. It has been held that the appellant had hung calendar (Ex.PX) on
the wall of the house, where he was residing and the calendar (Ex.
PX) would catch the attention of anybody entering the house. It was
held that it was deliberate and had an objective. It was also held
that Chandrawal house was qualified by the expression “my home”
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 777
Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi
and the house where the other phone was functional as that of his
“in-laws”. The High Court observed thus:-
“...The phone number of Chandrawal house was qualified
by the expression “my home” and the house where the other
phone (27913334) was functional as that of his “In-laws”
16. With this finding and coupled with the finding that in the house the
appellant has created a scene so as to make it seem like a robbery, it
was held that it was only the appellant who was guilty for commission
of murder of his wife.
17. We are of the considered view that the High Court has failed to
draw a distinction between the “may have committed the crime” or
“must have committed the crime”, as held by this Court in the case
of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). As held by this Court, the
suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. We, therefore, find that the prosecution
has failed to prove any incrimination circumstance beyond reasonable
doubt and in any case failed to establish a chain of events intertwined
with each other, which leads to no other conclusion than the guilt
of the accused.
18. Considering the facts and circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed
and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant herein for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside. However,
the conviction and sentence in respect of the offences punishable
under Sections 304B, 498A read with Section 34 IPC are restored.
19. In the present case, the appellant has undergone incarceration for
a period of more than fifteen years. In that view of the matter, we
direct that it will not be necessary for the appellant to deposit the
fine amount. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith,
if not required in any other case.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:
Aandrita Deb, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal partly allowed.
(Verified by: Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv.)
