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i) Whether the Working President could have convened the election meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to the Objectors, it was only the Secretary or in the alternative the President who could have convened the meeting under the bye laws; ii) Whether the 7 Objectors were entitled to a notice for the meeting of 08.09.2002 in view of their disqualification u/s. 15 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860; iii) Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would vitiate the entire election meeting of 08.09.2002; iv) Whether invalid members had signed the requisition dated 20.08.2002 and had been elected to the Executive Committee; v) Whether the private respondents had the locus to be heard before any forum or to file an appeal/petition against the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner.

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1062 : 2024 INSC 52

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors.

v.

Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 10846 of 2018)

23 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* And Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

i) Whether the Working President could have convened the election

meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to the Objectors, it was only

the Secretary or in the alternative the President who could have

convened the meeting under the bye laws; ii) Whether the 7

Objectors were entitled to a notice for the meeting of 08.09.2002

in view of their disqualification u/s. 15 of the Societies Registration

Act, 1860; iii) Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would

vitiate the entire election meeting of 08.09.2002; iv) Whether invalid

members had signed the requisition dated 20.08.2002 and had

been elected to the Executive Committee; v) Whether the private

respondents had the locus to be heard before any forum or to file an

appeal/petition against the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner.

Headnotes

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – Whether the Working President could have convened the

election meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to the Objectors,

it was only the Secretary or in the alternative the President

who could have convened the meeting under the bye laws:

Held: The effective office bearers of the Society namely the

President, Vice-President and the Secretary of the Society had

expired – Prior to his death, the President due to his poor health,

the Executive Body under his presidentship passed a resolution

on 01.07.1997 empowering appellant no. 1 to be designated as

the Working President – He was recognised was by almost all the

members of the General Body – In the instant case, it was not only

appropriate but also legal for the surviving members to request

for convening a meeting – Further, as many as 16 members had

requested in writing for convening the meeting – If the submission

of the Objectors is to be accepted that the Working President could 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1063

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

not convene the meeting, then no alternative has been suggested

by the Objectors as to who could convene the meeting – Even

the Vice-President and the Joint-Secretary had also passed away

and they had also not been replaced by any fresh elections –

The only person who could be said to be managing the affairs

of the Society was the Working President and in particular, when

all the 16 surviving and valid members had made a request for

convening a meeting, no fault could be found with the decision of

the Working President to convene the meeting – The other option

could have been that all the 16 members could have themselves

nominated any one of the members to chair the meeting of the

Executive Body and thereafter they could have proceeded to take

appropriate decisions – In such situation, the convening of the

meeting for holding the elections on 08.09.2002 cannot be faulted

with. [Paras 4, 19, 20]

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – Whether the 7 Objectors were entitled to a notice for

the meeting of 08.09.2002 in view of their disqualification u/s.

15 of the Registration Act:

Held: It is not in dispute that all the Objectors were in arrears of

their membership fee for a period of more than three months – This

fact is admitted as is recorded by not only the High Court but all

the three authorities – The specific language used in s. 15 of the

Registration Act is that such members in default of membership

fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be counted as

members of the Society – If they were not entitled to vote and they

were not to be counted as members, there would be no illegality

or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing any

notice as the same would be an exercise in futility. [Para 22]

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would

vitiate the entire election meeting of 08.09.2002:

Held: It is true that in the bye-laws of the present Society or the

Rules of the Society, there is no provision of automatic cessation

of membership where a member goes in default of payment of

membership fee for more than three months – However, the effect

of the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act which admittedly

is applicable to the Society, the Objectors have to be treated as

suspended members and therefore, would not be entitled to any

notice as they had no right to vote or to be counted as members 

1064 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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– Once they are not to be counted as members, there was no

occasion to give them notice as such Non-issuance of notice to the

Objectors would not vitiate the proceeding of the special meeting

held on 08.09.2002. [Para 26]

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – Whether invalid members had signed the requisition

dated 20.08.2002 and had been elected to the Executive

Committee:

Held: The signatories at serial nos. 12 to 16 of the requisition

dated 20.08.2002, had been duly admitted in the General Body

Meeting on 11.11.2001 – The said resolution of the meeting was

never challenged – The same is on record as Exhibit 131 and one

of the Objectors DVS was a signatory in the said proceeding –

With respect to the objections relating to signatory nos. 4 to 7, the

explanation is that were of the category of Employee Members – In

due course they had retired from service – However, even after

their retirement, they had continued to pay their subscription – As

their membership(s) have continued, at this stage, objection(s)

with regard to the validity thereof is not being examined in detail,

given the lack of clarity and absence of material facts on this

aspect. [Para 27]

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – Whether the private respondents had the locus to be

heard before any forum or to file an appeal/petition against

the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner:

Held: During the pendency of the appeal before the Joint Charity

Commissioner all the seven objectors had died – The Joint Charity

Commissioner decided in favour of the appellants and directed for

accepting the Change Report – The contesting respondent preferred

a petition before the District Judge – He was neither an objector

before the Assistant Charity Commissioner nor a valid member

of the Society – He would have no locus to maintain the petition

before the District Judge – Although the contesting respondent

claimed himself to be the Vice-President of the Society but has

not been able to substantiate his claim – On this ground alone

the District Judge ought to have dismissed the petition. [Para 29]

Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,

1950 – There were four signatories (Members 4 to 7 from the

category of Employee Members) to the requisition calling a 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1065

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

General Body Meeting – From a perusal of the available record,

it transpires that they had retired from service and even after

that had continued to pay their subscription – Propriety:

Held: In this context, the question that arises is that once the

said Members were Employee Members, their categorisation as

such was dependent on them being in service – On retirement,

the said signatories would cease to be employees, come out of

the category of Employee Members and their membership in

the Society could not have continued – Upon superannuation or

cessation of their employment, such four signatories could very well

have been made members of the Society, but there is no indication

on the record that they were made members of the Society by a

specific resolution and thereafter continued as members and paid

the subscription fee(s) – Thus, they could not have continued as

members of the Society in the category of Employee Members

even upon their superannuation by merely paying the yearly

subscription fee thereby blocking the entry of the persons, who

were still employees. [Para 34]

Principles/Doctrines – Doctrine of Necessity – When an action

is required to be taken under compelling circumstances –

Applicability of the doctrine of necessity on the facts of the

instant case:

Held: There is a doctrine of necessity where under given

circumstances an action is required to be taken under compelling

circumstances – The use of the doctrine of necessity is to justify

actions that would otherwise be outside the norm due to the urgent

need to restore order – In the instant case, had the Working

President not convened the meeting, the elections of the executive

body would have been in limbo for an unreasonable amount of

time – The convening of the meeting by the Working President

upon the requests by the 16 surviving members was a “necessity”

at the time. [Paras 15, 18]

Case Law Cited

Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR

597: (1990) 1 SCC 613 – followed.

Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam Swamy

[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 637: (1996) 4 SCC 104 – relied on.

1066 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society v. Registrar

of Societies and Others [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 161 :

(2000) 1 SCC 566 – referred to.

Shri Bhaurao Versus Shri Dyaneshwar First Appeal No.

1435 of 2017; Ramesh Gangadhar Dongre and another

vs. Charity Commissioner, Mumbai and other 2020(5)

Mh.L.J.; Santosh vs. Purushottam 2017(6) Mh.L.J.; Shri

Sarbjit Singh & Others vs. All India fine Arts & Crafts

Society & Others ILR (1989) 2 Del 585 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited

“Commentaries on the Laws of England” Book 1 of the

Rights of Persons by William Blackstone.

List of Acts

Societies Registration Act, 1860; Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.

List of Keywords

Society; Members of Society; Trustees of Trust; Rules and

regulations of Society; Bye-laws; Life Members; Employee

Members; Ordinary Members; Donor Members; Executive

Body; Working President; Rights and duties of Working

President; Members of the General Body; Surviving

Members; Arrears of Membership; Notice; Change Report;

Requisition by Members; Meeting for Election; Defaulters;

Subscribers; Disqualification; Doctrine of Necessity.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.10846 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2017 of the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in FA No.811 of 2016.

Appearances for Parties

Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Gagan Sanghi, S.D Abhyankar, Ms.

Farah Hashmi, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Dr. Prashant Pratap, Rameshwar

Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Appellants.

Narender Hooda, Sr. Adv., Prashant Gode, Ms. Jayshree Satpute,

Nikhil Kirtane, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the Respondents.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1067

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. The present appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and

order dated 20.07.2017, passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay

High Court in First Appeal No. 811 of 2016, whereby the Appeal

was dismissed, thereby confirming the order passed by the District

Judge-IV, Chandrapur which confirmed the order passed by the

Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur rejecting the change report

filed by the appellants.

2. There is a society by the name of Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,

Mul1

 registered under the Societies Registration Act, 18602

 as a

charitable society since 1946. The Society in its turn framed its rules

and regulations. Later on, the Society was registered as a Public

Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 19503

. The rules and

regulations of the Society were incorporated as its bye-laws and

were duly registered under the Trusts Act.

3. As per the rules and regulations, the Society has four types of

members i.e. Life members, Employee members, Ordinary members

and Donor members. The members of each category were required

to pay an annual membership subscription of Rs. 11/- per year to

the Society.

4. The effective office bearers of the Society namely the President,

Vice-President and the Secretary of the Society expired. Even prior

to the death of the President due to his poor health, the Executive

Body under his presidentship passed a resolution on 01.07.1997

empowering Advocate Babasaheb Wasade (appellant No. 1) to be

designated as the Working President and he was required to look

after day-to-day affairs and management of the Society. This status

of Working President was given to the appellant No.1 at a time

when the President was suffering from serious illness and later on

succumbed due to ill health on 24.05.1998.

1 In short, “Society”

2 In short, Registration Act”

3 In short, “Trusts Act”

1068 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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5. As there was no elected President, Vice-President or the Secretary,

16 members of the Society requested appellant No.1 vide written

request dated 20.08.2002 to summon extraordinary meeting to hold

the elections. Pursuant to the receipt of the said request, the appellant

No.1 acting as Working President, issued notice on 03.09.2002 for

summoning a special meeting for the elections of new Executive

Body. The elections were held on 08.09.2002 and a new Executive

Committee was elected with appellant No.1 as the President and

appellant No.2 as the Secretary. Accordingly, a Change Report bearing

no. 668 of 2002 was submitted under Section 22 of the Trusts Act

before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Chandrapur.

6. Objections were filed by 7 persons alleging to be members of the

Society on the ground that notice dated 03.09.2002 had not been

served on them and that appellant No.1 had no authority to issue

notice to summon a meeting for election. It was also alleged in the

objections that the signatory nos. 12 to 16 to the request letter dated

20.08.2002, were not valid members of the Society and were yet to

be approved by the Executive Committee. Further signatory nos. 4

to 7 of the same objection had retired and hence, they ceased to

be members.

7. The elected Secretary filed his response to the said objections stating

therein that signatory nos. 4 to 7 and 12 to 16 are valid members of

the Society. Further that the 7 Objectors had not paid their annual

subscriptions for more than the prescribed period under Section 15

of the Registration Act as such they were barred from voting, and

therefore, even if notices were not sent to them, it would not make

any difference.

8. Before the Assistant Charity Commissioner parties led evidence. The

Assistant Charity Commissioner vide order dated 19.06.2010 allowed

the objections and accordingly rejected the Change Report. The

appellant preferred an appeal before the Joint Charity Commissioner,

Nagpur. The appeal was allowed by order dated 12.04.2016 and

the Change Report was accepted. Against this, Miscellaneous Civil

Application No. 50 of 2016 was filed by the Objectors before the

District Judge-4, Chandrapur, which was allowed vide judgment dated

29.07.2016. Aggrieved by the same, the First Appeal was preferred

before the Bombay High Court which has since been dismissed by

the impugned order, giving rise to the present appeal. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1069

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

9. Certain facts are not disputed by the parties. The same are being

recorded hereunder:

i) 7 Objectors who had filed objections against the Change

Report were admittedly defaulters in payment of their annual

subscriptions, and were covered by the second part of Section

15 of the Registration Act which stated that no person shall be

entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription

at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding

three months. The 7 Objectors admittedly fell under this category

of default.

ii) Notice for the meeting fixed for 08.09.2002 was not issued to

the 7 Objectors for the reason that they were in arrears and as

such would not have the right to vote or be counted as members.

iii) All the office bearers holding important posts like President,

Vice-President and Secretary had expired prior to request

dated 20.08.2002 and no election had been held till then to fill

up the said posts.

iv) The appellant No.1 was functioning as Working President since

1997 without there being any challenge to such assignment in

the Executive Body meeting dated 01.07.1997.

v) All the 7 Objectors who had filed objections to the Change

Report had died during the pendency of the appeal before

the Joint Charity Commissioner. The contesting respondents

applied before the Joint Charity Commissioner to be impleaded

as respondents. Said request was allowed, despite objections

by the appellants that they had no locus as they were neither

trustees or members of the Society or the Trust.

vi) The appellants are in effective control of the Society and the

Trust for the last more than two decades and are being elected

during fresh elections held in the last two decades.

10. We have heard Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel for

the Appellants and Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the private respondents.

11. The arguments of Shri Naphade on behalf of the appellants are

briefly summarised hereunder:

1070 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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i) Today none of the 7 Objectors are alive. The private respondents

to this appeal having not raised any objections to the Change

Report, cannot be heard because they are neither trustees or

members of any category of the Society.

ii) Consistent finding recorded by the Authorities, the District Judge

and the High Court is that the 7 Objectors were in default in

payment of their annual subscription and therefore, were not

entitled to any notice for the meeting of the elections as they

were prohibited from voting and being counted as member

under Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act. The Courts

below committed an error in holding that due to lack of service

of notice, the proceedings of meeting dated 08.09.2002 were

vitiated.

iii) The appellants are in effective control of the Society as also

the Trust and have been functioning in accordance with its

bye-laws for more than two decades and they are continuing

to hold elections from time to time, and should therefore, not

be disturbed.

iv) The reasoning given by the Courts below that as there was

no order of cancellation of membership or cessation of the

membership, the 7 Objectors would be entitled to notice and the

question whether they would be allowed to vote or not would

be a separate issue.

v) Reliance has been placed upon by Shri Naphade on a judgment

of this Court in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka Education

Society Versus Registrar of Societies and Others4

, where

a provision similar to Section 15 of the Registration Act was

being considered and this Court held that the provision was valid

and a member defaulting in payment of subscription would for

all practical purposes be deemed to not be a member entitled

to notice.

12. On the other hand, Mr. Hooda has strongly relied upon the reasoning

given by the High Court.

4 In [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 161 : (2000) 1 SCC 566

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1071

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

i) He has submitted that it suffers from no infirmity, warranting

any interference.

ii) The appellants are not entitled to any relief from this Court, as

they were not entitled to convene the meeting for the elections.

Appellant No.1 was neither Secretary nor President and under

the bye-laws, it is the Secretary who would convene the meeting.

iii) He further reiterated that the effect of Section 15 of the

Registration Act would not be of cancelling the membership of the

Objectors. Referring to the Hyderabad Karnataka Education

Society (supra) case, Mr. Hooda submitted that in the aforesaid

case under the bye-laws there was a provision that if there

was a default, the membership would stand cancelled, which

is not the case here as there is no such provision under the

bye-laws. According to him, the said judgment would be of no

help to the appellant as it would not apply to the present case.

iv) Lastly, it was submitted that a number of signatories to the

requisition dated 20.08.2002 and also elected as executive

members on 08.09.2002, were not members of the Society

at that time for the reason that either they had retired or were

never elected as per the bye-laws.

v) Mr. Hooda has further relied upon the following judgments as

part of his submissions:

i. Shri Bhaurao Versus Shri Dyaneshwar, in First Appeal

No. 1435 of 2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,

ii. Ramesh Gangadhar Dongre and another vs. Charity

Commissioner, Mumbai and others5

,

iii. Santosh vs. Purushottam6

,

iv. Shri Sarbjit Singh & Others vs. All India fine Arts &

Crafts Society & Others7

.

13. Having considered the respective submissions, the following questions

arise for consideration:

5 2020(5) Mh.L.J.

6 2017(6) Mh.L.J.

7 ILR (1989) 2 Del 585

1072 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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i) Whether the Working President Mr. Wasade could have

convened the election meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to

the Objectors, it was only the Secretary or in the alternative

the President who could have convened the meeting under

the bye-laws?

ii) Whether the 7 Objectors were entitled to a notice for the meeting

of 08.09.2002 in view of their disqualification under Section 15

of the Registration Act?

iii) Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would vitiate the

entire election meeting of 08.09.2002?

iv) Whether invalid members had signed the requisition dated

20.08.2002 and had been elected to the Executive Committee?

v) Whether the private respondents had the locus to be heard

before any forum or to file an appeal/petition against the order

of the Joint Charity Commissioner?

14. It is not in dispute that in the meeting of the Executive Body held on

01.07.1997, the then President on account of his ill health had got

a resolution passed that Mr. Wasade would thereon be the Working

President and will look after the day-to-day affairs and management

of the Society. The said resolution of 01.07.1997 was not put to any

challenge by any of the Trustees or the members of the General Body.

It is also not in dispute that before 20.08.2002, the President, the

Secretary, the Vice-President and the Joint-Secretary were not alive.

In the absence of the office bearers authorised under the bye-laws

who could convene the meeting, the only option left for convening

the meeting could either be with the Working President on his own

or upon the requisition made by the members to convene a meeting.

15. There is a doctrine of necessity where under given circumstances an

action is required to be taken under compelling circumstances. One

of the earlier proponents of the Doctrine of necessity in Common Law

was William Blackstone, who in his book, “Commentaries on the

Laws of England” Book 1 of the Rights of Persons, discusses

the meeting of the convention-parliament before Charles II’s return,

noting that it was an extraordinary measure taken out of necessity.

He describes the use of the doctrine of necessity to justify actions

that would otherwise be outside the norm due to the urgent need

to restore order. He describes another instance during the Glorious 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1073

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

Revolution when the lords and commons assembled and acted without

the usual royal summons, justified by the extraordinary circumstance

of a perceived vacant throne and the urgent need to address the

governance of the country.

“It is also true, that the convention-parliament, which

restored king Charles the second, met above a month

before his return; the lords by their own authority, and

the commons in pursuance of writs issued in the name

of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of

parliament: and that the said parliament sat till the twenty

ninth of December, full seven months after the restoration;

and enacted many laws, several of which are still in

force. But this was for the necessity of the thing, which

supersedes all law; for if they had not so met, it was

morally impossible that the kingdom should have been

settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king’s

return, was to pass an act declaring this to be a good

parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the king’s writs.

So that, as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded

by their so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone

had a right to object, consented to wave the objection,

this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the

rights of the crown. Besides we should also remember,

that it was at that time a great doubt among the lawyers,

whether even this healing act made it a good parliament;

and held by very many in the negative: though it seems

to have been too nice a scruple.

It is likewise true, that at the time of the revolution, A.D. 1688,

the lords and commons by their own authority, and upon

the summons of the prince of Orange, (afterwards king

William) met in a convention and therein disposed of the

crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that this

assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the

restoration; that is, upon an apprehension that king James

the second had abdicated the government, and that the

throne was thereby vacant: which apprehension of theirs

was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they

actually came together. An in such a case as the palpable

vacancy of a throne, it follows ex necessitate rei, that the 

1074 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no

parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another

possible case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that

the whole royal line should at any time fail, and become

extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne: in this

situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body

of the nation, consisting of lords and commons, would

have a right to meet and settle the government; otherwise

there must be no government at all. And upon this and

no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble.

The vacancy of the throne was precedent to their meeting

without any royal summons, not a consequence of it. They

did not assemble without writ, and then make the throne

vacant; but the throne being previously vacant by the king’s

abdication, they assembled without writ, as they must do

if they assembled at all. Had the throne been full, their

meeting would not have been regular; but, as it was really

empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And

accordingly it is declared by statute 1 W & M. st. 1. c. 1.

that this convention was really the two houses of parliament,

notwithstanding the want of writs or other defects of form.

So that, notwithstanding these two capital exceptions,

which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity,

(and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in

the government) the rule laid down is in general certain,

that the king, only, can convoke a parliament.”

16. The doctrine of necessity has been elucidated by a Constitution Bench

of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India8 as follows:

“The question whether there is scope for the Union of

India being responsible or liable as a joint tort-feasor is a

difficult and different question. But even assuming that it

was possible that the Central Government might be liable

in a case of this nature, the learned Attorney General was

right in contending that it was only proper that the Central

Government should be able and authorised to represent

the victims. In such a situation, there will be no scope

8 In [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 597 : (1990) 1 SCC 613 in para 105

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1075

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

of the violation of the principles of natural justice. The

doctrine of necessity would be applicable in a situation

of this nature. The doctrine has been elaborated, in

Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., page 89, paragraph

73, where it was reiterated that even if all the members

of the Tribunal competent to determine a matter were

subject to disqualification, they might be authorised and

obliged to hear that matter by virtue of the operation of

the common law doctrine of necessity. An adjudicator

who is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias

or interest in the matter which he has to decide may in

certain circumstances be required to adjudicate if there

is no other person who is competent or authorised to be

adjudicator or if a quorum cannot be formed without him

or if no other competent tribunal can be constituted. In the

circumstances of the case, as mentioned hereinbefore,

the Government of India is only capable to represent the

victims as a party. The adjudication, however, of the claims

would be done by the court. In those circumstances, we

are unable to accept the challenge on the ground of the

violation of principles of natural justice on this score. The

learned Attorney General, however, sought to advance,

as we have indicated before, his contention on the ground

of de facto validity. He referred to certain decisions. We

are of the opinion that this principle will not be applicable.

We are also not impressed by the plea of the doctrine of

bona fide representation of the interests of victims in all

these proceedings. We are of the opinion that the doctrine

of bona fide representation would not be quite relevant

and as such the decisions cited by the learned Attorney

General need not be considered.”

17. The applicability of the Doctrine of Necessity was further clarified by

this Court in Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam

Swamy reported in (1996) 4 SCC 104 as follows:

“16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It

is well settled that the law permits certain things to be

done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not

countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated

differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative 

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for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial

propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias

where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the

issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in

certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course

of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit

therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which

taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity

of such a provision is challenged who but the members of

the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified

on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would

benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such

cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the

choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to

stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of

the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making.

In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners

are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need

for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not

the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked.”

18. In the present case, had the Working President not convened the

meeting, the elections of the executive body would have been in

limbo for an unreasonable amount of time. The convening of the

meeting by the Working President upon the requests by the 16

surviving members was a “necessity” at the time.

19. There is one more aspect of the matter to be discussed here with

respect to the duties of the ‘Working President’. Clause 11 of the

Byelaws recognizes a Working President and also defines his rights

and duties. The same is reproduced below:

“11. “Working President” –

The Rights and Duties of Working President:

1. To complete the work as per the written instructions

of the President of the Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,

the executive body of the Mandal and the General

Body of the Mandal.

2. Make efforts from the point of extending the area of

operation of the Shikshan Prasarak Mandal.”

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1077

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

As per the above clause, the ‘Working President’ was to act on the

directions of the President, Executive Body and the General Body.

In the present case, the recognition was by almost all the members

of the General Body. He had no option but to call for a general body

meeting in accordance with the rights and duties conferred upon him.

20. In the present case, it was not only appropriate but also legal for the

surviving members to request for convening a meeting. Further in the

present case, as many as 16 members had requested in writing for

convening the meeting. If the submission of the Objectors is to be

accepted that the Working President could not convene the meeting,

then no alternative has been suggested by the Objectors as to who

could convene the meeting. Alternatively, the President and Secretary

who were authorized under the bye-laws had died and no election

had been held for replacing them. Even the Vice-President and the

Joint-Secretary had also passed away and they had also not been

replaced by any fresh elections. The only person who could be said

to be managing the affairs of the Society was the Working President

Mr. Wasade, and in particular, when all the 16 surviving and valid

members had made a request for convening a meeting, no fault could

be found with the decision of the Working President Mr. Wasade

to convene the meeting. The other option could have been that all

the 16 members could have themselves nominated any one of the

members to chair the meeting of the Executive Body and thereafter

they could have proceeded to take appropriate decisions. In such

situation, we are of the view that the convening of the meeting for

holding the elections on 08.09.2002 cannot be faulted with. Question

No.1 is answered accordingly in favour of the appellants.

21. Coming to the next question regarding notice to the objectors, at the

outset, Section 15 of the Registration Act is reproduced hereunder:

“Section 15 in The Societies Registration Act, 1860

15. Member defined.— Disqualified members - For the

purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person

who, having been admitted therein according to the rules

and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or

shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and

shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and

regulations; Disqualified members.—But in all proceedings 

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under this Act no person shall be entitled to vote or be

counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall

have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.”

The High Court, in the impugned order, has held that the said

provision is applicable.

22. It is not in dispute that all the Objectors were in arrears of their

membership fee for a period of more than three months. This fact

is admitted as is recorded by not only the High Court but all the

three authorities. In fact, these Objectors had gone to the extent of

saying that even if notices were issued to them, they will not receive

it. The question is what would be the effect of such non-payment in

the light of the proviso contained in Section 15 of the Registration

Act. The specific language used is that such members in default

of membership fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be

counted as members of the Society. If they were not entitled to vote

and they were not to be counted as members, there would be no

illegality or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing

any notice as the same would be an exercise in futility.

23. It is a fact that under the bye-laws of the Society, there was no

provision that a member defaulting in payment of membership fee

and duly covered by the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act,

would automatically lose his membership or in effect would cease to

be a member of the Society. Be that as it may the only limited status

left of such members would be that their name would continue to

be in the Roll of the Society and at best by clearing of the arrears

of the membership fee in addition to any penalty or fine liable to be

charged for being reinstated as valid members would survive to them.

Such defaulting members could have applied that they are ready and

willing to pay their arrears and upon such application and payment

being made, the effect of the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration

Act could be considered by the appropriate officer/Committee of the

Society. Till such time they would continue to remain as suspended

members having no right to participate in any meeting.

24. The Executive Body or any other body competent under the bye-laws

could take up their matter and give them a show cause notice and

opportunity to save their membership by fulfilling their obligations

failing which their membership would be terminated. When despite

the same, they would not fulfil their obligations their membership

would be declared to have been terminated.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1079

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

25. This Court in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society

(supra) was dealing with a similar provision under Rule 7-A of the

Rules framed by Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society, read with

Section 2(b) and Section 6(2) proviso of the Karnataka Societies

Registration Act, 1960. Section 2(b) of the said Act defined ‘member’

which provided that to be treated as a member of the Society for the

year concerned, he should have been admitted to that membership

in accordance with rules and regulations and shall have paid the

subscription as laid down therein. Section 6(2) of the said Act was

akin to the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act that in

default of payment of membership fee for more than three months,

the membership would cease. The validity of such rule 7-A was

challenged before the High Court which found the same to be very

harsh and accordingly had held it to be ultra vires of Section 6(2) of

the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. This Court disagreed

with the reasoning given by the High Court and accordingly set it

aside. This Court held that the said rule could not be said to be

harsh or unreasonable, rather it was in line and in tune if it is read

with Section 2(b) and Section 6(2) of the said Act.

26. It is true that in the bye-laws of the present Society or the Rules

of the Society, there is no such provision of automatic cessation

of membership where a member goes in default of payment of

membership fee for more than three months. However, the effect of

the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act which admittedly

is applicable to the Society, the Objectors have to be treated as

suspended members and therefore, would not be entitled to any notice

as they had no right to vote or to be counted as members. Once they

are not to be counted as members, there was no occasion to give

them notice as such Non-issuance of notice to the Objectors would

not vitiate the proceeding of the special meeting held on 08.09.2002.

The argument raised by Mr. Hooda is to the effect that Hyderabad

Karnataka Education Society (supra) judgment would not apply

to the present case and would be of no help to the appellant. This

submission same cannot be accepted in view of the discussion made

above and also for the reasoning given by this Court in the said

judgment. Even if we do not take into consideration the judgment of

this Court Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society (supra), we

may record that a clear reading and interpretation of the proviso to

Section 15 of the Registration Act would disentitle such defaulting 

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members from being given any notice even if their membership was

not terminated or ceased. Question nos. 2 and 3 are thus answered

in favour of the appellants.

27. In so far as the fourth question is concerned with regard to the

participation of invalid members in signing the requisition and being

elected in the executive is concerned, the same have been duly

explained by the appellants. The signatories at serial nos. 12 to 16

of the requisition dated 20.08.2002, had been duly admitted in the

General Body Meeting on 11.11.2001. The said resolution of the

meeting was never challenged. The same is on record as Exhibit

131 and one of the Objectors Dhanji Virji Shah was a signatory in the

said proceeding. With respect to the objections relating to signatory

nos. 4 to 7, the explanation is that were of the category of Employee

Members. In due course they had retired from service. However, even

after their retirement, they had continued to pay their subscription.

As their membership(s) have continued, at this stage, objection(s)

with regard to the validity thereof is not being examined in detail,

given the lack of clarity and absence of material facts on this aspect.

28. Coming to the last question regarding locus of the contesting

respondent which has been seriously pressed by Mr. Naphade,

learned Senior Counsel no material has been placed before us by

the respondent senior Counsel Mr. Hooda to establish their locus.

29. During the pendency of the appeal before the Joint Charity

Commissioner all the seven objectors had died. The Joint Charity

Commissioner decided in favour of the appellants and directed for

accepting the Change Report. The contesting respondent preferred

a petition before the District Judge. He was neither an objector

before the Assistant Charity Commissioner nor a valid member of the

Society. He would have no locus to maintain the petition before the

District Judge. Although the contesting respondent claimed himself

to be the Vice-President of the Society but has not been able to

substantiate his claim. On this ground alone the District Judge ought

to have dismissed the petition.

30. The judgments relied upon by Mr. Hooda referred to above are on

issue which were not argued before the High Court even otherwise

they relate to 15 days’ notice for convening a meeting which point

could have been raised by a valid member and not by a suspended

member.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1081

Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar

Muddeshwar & Ors.

31. For all the reasons recorded above, the impugned judgment of the

High Court and the other authorities adverse to the appellants cannot

be sustained. The Change Report No.668 of 2002 deserves to be

accepted. The Joint Charity Commissioner had rightly accepted it.

32. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and

order of the High Court as also the orders rejecting the Change

Report regarding General Body Meeting dated 08.09.2002 are set

aside and the Change Report is accepted.

33. However, having allowed the appeal, before parting, we would like to

address one grey area, which having been left unexplained cannot

be brushed aside. Insofar as it relates to four signatories to the

Requisition for calling a General Body Meeting, specifically being

Members 4 to 7 from the category of Employee Members, from a

perusal of the available record, it transpires that they had retired

from service. Yet even after this, they had continued to pay their

subscription and as such, their membership had continued.

34. In this context, the obvious question that arises is that once the said

Members were Employee Members, their categorisation as such

was dependent on them being in service. On retirement, the said

signatories would cease to be employees, come out of the category

of Employee Members and their membership in the Society could

not have continued. Upon superannuation or cessation of their

employment, such four signatories could very well have been made

members of the Society, but there is no indication on the record that

they were made members of the Society by a specific resolution and

thereafter continued as members and paid the subscription fee(s).

Thus, they could not have continued as members of the Society in

the category of Employee Members even upon their superannuation

by merely paying the yearly subscription fee thereby blocking the

entry of the persons, who were still employees.

35. Moreover, we find that the stalemate in the Society has continued

for a pretty long time, which does not bode well for any institution,

much less an institution which is running educational institutions and

is required to be run in a fair, transparent and legal manner. Thus,

we direct that fresh elections shall be held for the new Executive

Committee of the Society by the Charity Commissioner in accordance

with law within six months from the receipt of a copy of this Judgment.

It is left open for him to delve into all aspects of the matter for 

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ensuring that the issue of membership/members of the Society is

resolved in terms of the existing records of the Society, ascertaining

the factual position and status of the members at relevant point of

time as also their right to continue as members of the Society and

be on the electoral roll for conduct of fresh election for constitution

of a new Executive Committee.

36. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeal allowed.