* Author
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 74 : 2024 INSC 324
Parteek Bansal
v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2167 of 2024)
19 April 2024
[Vikram Nath* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in not quashing FIR under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in a complaint alleging
offences under Sections 498A, 406, 384, 420, and 120(B), Indian
Penal Code, 1860, on the ground that the second FIR was on the
same set of allegations.
Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Abuse of process
of law – Subsequent FIR in Udaipur, Rajasthan on the same set
of allegations by the complainant after two weeks of lodging
the first FIR under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC in
Hisar, Haryana was an abuse of process of law.
Held: The inaction of the complainant in withdrawing the first
complaint or allowing the investigating agency in Hisar to continue
its investigation without taking steps to transfer the first complaint
to Udaipur on the ground of commission of offence in Udaipur i.e.,
where the second FIR was filed constitutes an abuse of process
of law. [Paras 7, 11]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Non-application of
mind by High Court – Findings of the High Court contradictory
to the record and admitted facts.
Held: The record clearly shows that the subsequent complaint
lodged at Udaipur contained the same allegations as in the first
FIR at Hisar and additionally it was stated therein about the
earlier complaint lodged at Hisar – Thus, the High Court erred in
dismissing the quashing petition of the Appellant on the ground
that the complaint in Udaipur was prior in point of time than the
complaint in Hisar and the Rajasthan Police was unaware of the
earlier proceedings. [Paras 7-12]
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 75
Parteek Bansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Abuse of Process of Law – Misuse of State machinery for
ulterior motives – The complainants’ conduct of neither
appearing before the trial court at Hisar nor withdrawing their
complaint shows their intention to harass the appellant.
Held: The Court noticed that the Respondent No. 3 wife as a
gazetted police officer at the relevant time and being well aware
of the laws, in particular, CrPC, misused her position for filing
one complaint after the other through her father (complainant) –
Further, the conduct of the Complainant and Respondent wife of
neither appearing before the Trial Court at Hisar nor withdrawing
the complaint shows their intention to harass the Appellant by first
making him face a trial in Hisar, which ultimately acquitted the
Appellant, and then again at Udaipur – Accordingly, impugned FIR
quashed with costs. [Paras 4, 11]
Case Law Cited
Prem Chand Singh v. State of UP (2020) 3 SCC 54;
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala & Ors. [2001] 3 SCR 942;
Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai
& Anr. [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 604 – relied on.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Another complaint; Same allegations; Abuse of process; Intention
to harass; Quashing; Criminal proceedings; Conduct; Failure to
withdraw; Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.2167
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.03.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SBCRM No. 3259 of 2015
Appearances for Parties
Rishi Malhotra, Jaydip Pati, Utkarsh Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Manish Singhvi, Uday Gupta, Sr. Advs., Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal,
Apurv Singhvi, Anuj Gupta, Shailesh Joshi, D. K. Devesh, Ms. Shivani
76 [2024] 5 S.C.R.
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Lal, Gaurav Dave, M. K. Tripathi, Ms. Sanam Singh, Harish Dasan,
Rajiv Ranjan, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, Ms. Yogamaya M. G., Hiren
Dasan, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal assails the correctness of the judgement and order dated
06.03.2017 passed by the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Criminal
Misc. (Pet.) No. 3259 of 2015 dismissing the said petition filed under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
for quashing
the FIR No. 156 of 2015, Women Police Station, Udaipur under
Sections 498A, 406, 384, 420 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code, 18602
.
3. At the outset, it would be relevant to mention that the sole ground
on which the quashing was sought was that this was a second FIR
on the same set of allegations made by the complainant after two
weeks of lodging the first FIR being FIR No. 19 of 2015 under Section
498A read with Section 34 IPC, Police Station, Hisar, Haryana.
4. The relevant facts are briefly stated hereunder:
(i). The appellant and respondent No.3 came in contact with each
other in June, 2014 through internet.
(ii). The complainant (respondent No.2) who is the father of
respondent No.3 had visited the appellant in Udaipur, who is a
Chartered Accountant based in Hisar, for proposal of marriage
of his daughter (respondent No.3) who was at that time posted
as Deputy Superintendent of Police at Udaipur, Rajasthan.
(iii). On 18.02.2015 engagement took place and thereafter on
21.03.2015, the marriage was solemnised at Udaipur. On
10.10.2015, the respondent No.2 filed a complaint at Police Station,
Hisar, Haryana under Section 498A IPC etc. The said complaint
was registered at Police Station Hisar on 17.10.2015 as FIR No.
19 of 2015 under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC.
1 In short, “Cr.P.C.”
2 In short, “IPC”
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 77
Parteek Bansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(iv). In the meantime, respondent No.2 submitted another complaint
on 15.10.2015 i.e. five days after the first complaint at the Police
Station, Udaipur in the State of Rajasthan on the same set of
allegations as in the previous complaint. This complaint came
to be registered on 01.11.2015 as FIR No. 156 under Section
498A/506 IPC etc.
(v). In the first FIR No. 19 of 2015 along with the appellant other
family members were also roped in. However, after further
investigation, a Police Report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.
was submitted in December, 2015 only against the appellant
under Section 498A IPC. Based on the said Police Report, the
Magistrate took cognizance and the trial proceeded and a case
was registered as Crl. Case No. 232-I of 2015, in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Hisar.
(vi). In the meantime, the appellant filed a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. before the Rajasthan High Court for quashing of
the second FIR No. 156 of 2015 registered at Udaipur. By
the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the said
petition on 06.03.2017 primarily on two grounds. Firstly, that
the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of time than the
complaint in Hisar. The second ground was that the Rajasthan
Police was not aware of the earlier proceedings/complaint before
the Hisar Police and as such the Udaipur Police should be at
liberty to investigate the said complaint made at Udaipur.
(vii). Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present petition was
preferred before this Court on which notice was issued on
03.04.2017, and this Court also stayed further investigation in
the FIR No. 156 dated 01.11.2015 P.S. Women Police Station,
Udaipur, until further orders. As such the said FIR has not been
investigated so far.
(viii). After the impugned order was passed, the trial at Hisar was
concluded, and the Trial Court vide judgement dated 02.08.2017
acquitted the appellant. Copy of the said judgment has been
placed along with additional documents (I.A. No. 118201 of 2021).
(ix). A perusal of the judgment and order of acquittal reflects that
the prosecution examined ASI Sheela Devi Investigating Officer
as PW-1 who proved the Police Papers, Head Constable Raja
78 [2024] 5 S.C.R.
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Ram as PW-2, who proved the documents relating to marriage
etc., Jaipal Singh, DSP as PW-3, who also proved some of the
police papers, and Sub Inspector Mane Devi as PW-4, who
had prepared the Challan upon completion of the investigation.
(x). The Trial Court further records that prosecution tried its best
to secure the presence of the complainant and the victim but
they did not turn up to depose before the Court. Left with no
alternative, the Trial Court proceeded to close the evidence of
the prosecution and after recording the statement of the appellant
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., proceeded to hear the counsel for
the parties and record the finding of acquittal.
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to both the
complaints, the judgement of acquittal as also the errors apparent on
the face of record in the impugned order regarding both the grounds,
that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of time than that at
Hisar, and secondly that the Rajasthan Police had no knowledge of
the proceedings at Hisar.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, both the State of Rajasthan
as also the complainant, have vehemently argued that the Court at
Hisar had no territorial jurisdiction as the offence had been committed
at Udaipur, and therefore, the judgment of acquittal delivered by the
Hisar Court was void. The complaint ought to have been examined
and investigated by Rajasthan Police, but owing to the interim
order passed by this Court the investigation has not proceeded as
such the petition deserves to be dismissed. We have also been
taken through the relevant statutory provisions under the Cr.P.C. in
particular Sections 300, 177, 461 and Article 22 of the Constitution
of India by the counsel for the parties and further reliance has also
been placed on the following judgements:
(i). Prem Chand Singh vs. State of UP3
(ii). T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala & Ors.4
(iii). Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai
& Anr.5
3 (2020) 3 SCC 54
4 [2001] 3 SCR 942 : (2001) 6 SCC 181
5 [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 604 : (2004) 8 SCC 100
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 79
Parteek Bansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
The first two have been relied upon by the counsel for the appellant
and the third by the counsel for the respondents.
7. Without going into these statutory provisions and the case laws
relied upon by the parties, we are convinced that the impugned
proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is
not denied by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that they did not lodge
complaint at Hisar. They also did not file an application withdrawing
their complaint on the ground that it was wrongly filed here or that
the said complaint may be transferred to Udaipur for investigation as
the offence was committed at Udaipur. They allowed the investigating
agency to continue to investigate in which their statements were also
recorded. The respondent No.3 was a gazetted Police Officer at
the relevant time and was also well aware of the laws, in particular
the Cr.P.C. and the provisions thereto. Neither the complainant nor
the victim entered the witness box before the Hisar Court allowing
total wastage of the valuable time of the Court and the investigating
agency. Merely because she was a Police Officer, she first managed
to get an FIR lodged at Hisar through her father, and thereafter she
moved to her hometown at Udaipur and got another complaint lodged
by her father within a week.
8. The following admitted dates would be relevant to upset the finding
of the High Court that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point
of time:
(i). Complaint at Hisar is dated 10.10.2015.
(ii). Complaint at Udaipur is dated 15.10.2015.
(iii). FIR registered at Hisar is dated 17.10.2015
(iv). FIR registered at Udaipur is dated 01.11.2015.
On what basis the High Court recorded the finding that the complaint
at Udaipur was prior in point of time is not discernible from the above
dates and is contrary to the records and the admitted facts.
9. It is also not in dispute that in the complaint lodged at Udaipur, the
allegations were the same as in the complaint at Hisar and additionally
it was stated in the complaint at Udaipur that the complainant had
earlier lodged a complaint at Hisar. Thus, the investigating agency at
Udaipur was well aware of the complaint on similar allegations being
lodged at Hisar. The High Court again fell in error in observing that
80 [2024] 5 S.C.R.
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the Rajasthan Police was not aware about the earlier proceedings
initiated at Hisar. The High Court and the Rajasthan Police were
expected to at least read the complaint carefully.
10. Thus, on both the counts, we find that the High Court fell in error in
dismissing the petition of the appellant.
11. In the facts and circumstances as recorded above, we are of the
view that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had been misusing their official
position by lodging complaints one after the other. Further, their
conduct of neither appearing before the Trial Court at Hisar nor
withdrawing their complaint at Hisar, would show that their only
intention was to harass the appellant by first making him face a trial
at Hisar and then again at Udaipur. It would also be relevant to note
that the appellant had been arrested and thereafter granted bail.
And now before this Court, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been
vehemently opposing the quashing of the FIR at Udaipur. We may
also note that in the complaint made at Hisar, there are allegations
to the effect that when respondent No.2 visited the appellant at Hisar,
he had made a demand of Rs. 50,00,000/- and also an Innova Car.
Thus, the argument that no offence was committed in Hisar but only
at Udaipur was also not correct. We thus deprecate this practice of
state machinery being misused for ulterior motives and for causing
harassment to the other side, we are thus inclined to impose cost
on the respondent No.2 in order to compensate the appellant.
12. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned proceeding
passed by the High Court is quashed, and the impugned proceedings
registered as FIR No. 156 of 2015 dated 01.11.2015, Women Police
Station, Udaipur are quashed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs.
Five Lacs Only) which shall be deposited with the Registrar of this
Court within four weeks and upon deposit of the same, 50% may
be transmitted in the account of Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee and the remaining 50% to the appellant.
Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:
Ankitesh Ojha, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)
