Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for
the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.
Headnotes
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution
case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he
had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s
wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death
– Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment
– High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence
against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:
Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case
rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and
the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly
and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements
in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There
was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide,
which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313
CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of
prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at
the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot
be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house
– Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish
the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the
conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then
there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 249
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the
chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit
of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction
set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras
25, 30, 33, 36-38]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of
witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses
to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement
of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before
court during trial regarding involvement of that particular
accused – Reliance upon:
Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove
a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not
stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness
regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:
Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those
circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing
towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively
should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from
the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was
committed by the accused and they should be incapable of
explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]
Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:
Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be
treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be
subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/
illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be
certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition
– Witness. [Para 27]
* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 248 : 2024 INSC 19
Case Details
Darshan Singh
v.
State of Punjab
(Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 2010)
04 January 2024
[B. R. Gavai, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and
Aravind Kumar*, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for
the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.
Headnotes
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution
case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he
had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s
wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death
– Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment
– High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence
against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:
Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case
rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and
the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly
and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements
in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There
was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide,
which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313
CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of
prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at
the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot
be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house
– Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish
the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the
conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then
there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 249
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the
chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit
of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction
set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras
25, 30, 33, 36-38]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of
witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses
to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement
of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before
court during trial regarding involvement of that particular
accused – Reliance upon:
Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove
a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not
stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness
regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:
Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those
circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing
towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively
should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from
the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was
committed by the accused and they should be incapable of
explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]
Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:
Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be
treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be
subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/
illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be
certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition
– Witness. [Para 27]
List of Citations and Other References
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
[1985] 1 SCR 88: (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rohtash Vs. State
of Haryana [2012] 6 SCR 62: (2012) 6 SCC 589; Sunil
250 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra
2011 (72) ACC 699 (SC); Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur
Vs. State of Karnataka (2004) 7 SCC 422; Vimal Suresh
Kamble Vs. Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175;
Pramila vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 711; Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] 6
Suppl. SCR 757: (1996) 6 SCC 457; Bhimsingh Vs.
State of Uttarakhand (2015) 4 SCC 281 – relied on.
Jaipal V. State of Haryana [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 714:
(2003) 1 SCC 169; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of
Maharashtra [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156: (2006) 10 SCC
681; State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal [2011] 1 SCR 406:
AIR 2011 SC 697; Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv
Gupta [2007] 11 SCR 213: AIR 2008 SC 239; Sidhartha
Vashisht Vs. State of NCT of Delhi [2010] 4 SCR 103:
AIR 2010 SC 2352 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Keywords
Murder; Acquittal; Imprisonment for life; Homicide; Suicide; Motive;
Benefit of doubt; Circumstantial evidence; Onus of proof; Improved
fact; Minor contradictions or inconsistencies; Omissions and
improvements; Seen together; Rustic/illiterate witness; Reliable
witness; Chance witness; Chemical examiner’s report; Plea of alibi.
Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and
Appearances
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.163
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2009 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No.593-DB of 2000.
Appearances:
Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Siddhant Saroha, Tushar Bathija,
Praveer Singh, Parth Jain, Manav Bhalla, Advs. for the Appellant.
Prateek Chadha, DAG, Sreekar Aechuri, Pragya Ganjoo, Ms. Muskan
Singla, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 251
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar, J.
1. This appeal by special leave arises out of judgment and order dated
23.07.2009 passed in Criminal Appeal No.593-DB of 2000 by the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court has upheld the
order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the
appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No.
2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab has
not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave
petition. It is in this background that Darshan Singh had sought
special leave to appeal before us and leave came to be granted by
order dated 22.01.2010.
Case of the Prosecution:
2. The facts can be summed up in brief as follows:
The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh,
the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged
through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The
prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained
owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit
partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed
on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur,
but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and
Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the
fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening
night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999, Darshan Singh and Rani
Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered
poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.
3. On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted
for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court
convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302
r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.
252 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Findings of the Trial Court and High Court:
4. The Trial Court has concluded that it was a case of homicide and
not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive
to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant
and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening
night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 and therefore, the burden
lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who
was alive on the night of 18.05.1999 turned into a corpse’ the
next morning. The Court has completely disbelieved the theory
of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was
noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of
the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of
forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis
of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held
that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt
against the appellant and Rani Kaur.
5. In appeal, the High Court has agreed with the findings of the Trial
Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and has acquitted
Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that
there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4,
to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of
18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 at the appellant’s house.
ARGUMENTS OF MR. ABHIMANYU TEWARI, COUNSEL
APPEARING FOR APPELLANT:
6. PW3, Melo Kaur, is not a reliable witness. The presence of the
appellant, Darshan Singh, at the house on the intervening night
of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 is sought to be established based
on her testimony. She has made several improvements in her
version, and her testimony suffers from several contradictions, and
therefore, it is not safe to rely on such a witnesses’ uncorroborated
testimony. It would be prejudicial to the appellant to rely on only
a part of her testimony and exclude the rest. If her testimony is
ignored in toto, there is no other evidence to establish the key
circumstance of appellant’s presence at the spot of crime.
6.1 That aluminium phosphide is rather impossible to administer
in a deceitful manner owing to its pungent smell and odour.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 253
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
No injury marks have been found on the deceased, which
further establishes that there could not have been any forceful
administration of the poison. Therefore, it is submitted that it
is nothing but a case of suicide, the driving force for which,
was the confrontation with Melo Kaur. It is the appellants’ case
that Amrik Kaur was having an illicit affair with Melo Kaur’s
husband, Gurmel Singh PW4, and embarrassed with her sister
finding out, she self-administered the poisonous substance and
committed suicide. Counsel has submitted judgments to support
the proposition that aluminium phosphide has a pungent smell
similar to garlic.
6.2 Reliance has been placed on Jaipal V. State of Haryana –
(2003) 1 SCC 169 wherein the Apex Court discussed the nature
of aluminium phosphide. The relevant paragraphs have been
extracted below for reference:
“16. According to Modi, symptoms and signs of
poisoning by aluminium phosphide are similar to
poisoning by zinc phosphide (p. 197, ibid.). The chief
symptoms after the administration of zinc phosphide
are a vacant look, frequent vomiting with retching,
tremors and drowsiness followed by respiratory distress
at death. Zinc phosphide acts as a slow poison and is
decomposed by hydrochloric acid in the stomach with
the liberation of phosphine which acts as a respiratory
poison. Being a very fine powder zinc phosphide
adheres firmly to the crypts in the mucous membrane
of the stomach, and a very small quantity only in the
stomach even after vomiting is sufficient to cause death
by slow absorption.
17. Phosphine released from zinc phosphide (rat poison)
and from aluminium phosphide, is mainly used as a
fumigant to control insects and rodents in foodgrains
and fields. Liberated from the metal phosphides by the
action of water or acids, gaseous phosphine exerts
more potent pesticidal action, for it penetrates to all
areas otherwise inaccessible for pesticide application.
Pathological findings from phosphine inhalation are
254 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
pulmonary hyperaemia and oedema. It causes both
fatty degeneration and necrosis of liver (p. 174, ibid.).
18. Our attention was invited, as was done in the High
Court and the trial court, to a paper entitled “Toxicology
— Acute Aluminium Phosphide Poisoning in Northern
India” written by Dr Mitra Basu and Prof. S.B. Siwach,
Head, Department of Medicine, Postgraduate Institute
of Medical Sciences, Rohtak and published in Current
Medical Journal, Vol. I, No. 5, July 1995. The authenticity
of this article has not been doubted by the High Court nor
questioned either in the High Court or in this Court. The
learned authors have noticed the aluminium phosphide
having emerged as a major health problem in northern
India when these cases first started coming in 1984
and hardly any literature being available earlier on this
malady. In Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences,
Rohtak about 2000 cases were reported which were
all suicidal.
19. We may briefly sum up the opinion of the learned
authors from their published paper. Phosphine gas
(active ingredient of ALP) causes sudden cardiovascular
collapse; most patients die of shock, cardiac arrhythmia,
acidosis and adult respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS). Aluminium phosphide is available in the form
of chalky-white tablets. When these tablets are taken
out of the sealed container, they come in contact with
atmospheric moisture and the chemical reaction takes
place liberating Phosphine gas (PH3) which is the active
ingredient of ALP. This gas is highly toxic and effectively
kills all insects and thus preserves the stored grains.
When these tablets are swallowed, the chemical reaction
is accelerated by the presence of hydrochloric acid in the
stomach and within minutes phosphine gas dissipates
and spreads into the whole body. The gas is highly toxic
and damages almost every organ but maximal damage
is caused to heart and lungs. Sudden cardiovascular
collapse is the hallmark of acute poisoning. Patients
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 255
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
come with fast, thready or impalpable arterial pulses,
unrecordable or low blood pressure and icy-cold skin.
Somehow these patients remain conscious till the end
and continue to pass urine despite unrecordable blood
pressure. Vomiting is a prominent feature associated
with epigastric burning sensation. The patients will be
smelling foul (garlic-like) from their breath and vomitus.
Many of them will die within a few hours. Those who
survive for some time will show elevated jugular venous
pressure, may develop tender hepatomegaly and still
later adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),
renal shutdown and in a very few cases, toxic hepatic
jaundice. The active ingredient of ALP is phosphine
gas which causes extensive tissue damage. A spot
clinical diagnosis is possible in majority of cases of ALP
poisoning. However, ALP on account of its very pungent
smell (which can drive out all inmates from the house
if left open) cannot be taken accidentally.”
6.3 It was also argued that the courts below have failed to give
sufficient weight to the evidence led on behalf of the defence,
in particular, the testimony of DW3 and DW4.
6.4 Lastly, it was argued that Rani Kaur (A2) having been
extended benefit of doubt, it was rather anomalous to
exclude such benefit to A1- the appellant, when the case of
the prosecution was that both of them were present at the
scene of crime.
Arguments of Mr. Prateek Chaddha, learned counsel on behalf
of State of Punjab:
7. Melo Kaur was an illiterate person who cannot be expected to
be aware of the intricacies of law and cross examination and
therefore, it was rather natural for minor inconsistencies to creep
into the testimony of such a witness. The Trial Court has rightly
appreciated her testimony by excluding the uncorroborated parts
from the corroborated parts of her testimony. In that sense, the
Trial Court has separated the chaff from the grain, as is expected
to be done when it has to appreciate the evidence of a partly
256 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
reliable and partly unreliable witness. Moreover, the accused
himself has never denied his presence at the scene of crime.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he has
admitted his presence. This, coupled with the testimony of PW3,
4 and 5, is sufficient to prove the presence of the accused at the
spot of crime.
7.1 The case rests on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
has proved the circumstances from which an inference of
guilt is sought to be drawn, cogently and convincingly. The
circumstances relied on include -– (1) Motive; (2) Presence
of the appellant at the scene of crime; (3) Cause of Death: By
Poisoning (4) Opportunity to administer poison; (5) Conduct
(6) False explanation in 313 Statement.
7.2 He has further relied on the principle laid down in Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1
to contend that
the degree of evidence needed to prove the case resting
on circumstantial evidence in the given facts cannot be as
high as is normally the case. In view of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, the appellant was under a burden to explain the
circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. Merely
remaining quiet or offering a false explanation would provide
an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it
complete. Remaining quiet, or offering a false explanation
would therefore provide an additional link in the chain of
circumstances to make it complete. He has also sought to
distinguish the cases relied on behalf of the appellant.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and respondent
and perused the materials on record.
9. There is no eye-witness to the incident. The case of the prosecution
rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal approach in a case
based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from
which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently
1 (2006) 10 SCC 681
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 257
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of
a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the
accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion,
that within all human probability, the crime was committed by
the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on
any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and
inconsistent with his innocence. [See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
v. State of Maharashtra2
]
10. Let us, therefore, examine whether the prosecution had proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the entire chain of circumstances,
not leaving any link missing for the appellant to escape from the
clutches of law. The circumstances which are said to have been
proved on behalf of the prosecution is as follows:
1. Motive
2. Presence at the spot
3. False explanation in 313 statement
4. Death by Poisoning – Doctor’s opinion on cause of death
5. Conduct of the Appellant
6. Opportunity to administer poison.
11. According to the case of the prosecution, the illicit relationship
that existed between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur served as the
key motive for them to jointly eliminate the deceased. The fact
that they were in an illicit relationship has been sufficiently proved
from the testimony of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. This circumstance,
therefore, has been cogently established.
12. The most important circumstance, among all, must be the circumstance
of the appellant and Rani Kaur having been present in the appellant’s
house on the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99 and they
having been seen leaving the house in the early hours of the day.
For, the proof of presence has the effect of triggering into operation,
2 (1984) 4 SCC 116
258 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the principle laid down in the
case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra. Even the
circumstance that the appellant had the ‘opportunity’ to administer
poison was strongly linked to aspect of proving the presence of the
appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellants house.
13. In Trimukh’s case, it has been held:
i. “If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house
and in such circumstances where the assailants have
all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at
the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be
extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence
to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle
of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted
upon by the Courts……………………Where an offence
like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the
initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly
be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of
evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot
be of the same degree as is required in other cases
of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of
a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section
106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding
burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply
keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the
supposed premise that the burden to establish its
case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is
no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation”
14. In Trimukh (supra), this Court has pointed out that there are
two important consequences that play out when an offence is
said to have taken place in the privacy of a house, where the
accused is said to have been present. Firstly, the standard of
proof expected to prove such a case based on circumstantial
evidence is lesser than other cases of circumstantial evidence.
Secondly, the appellant would be under a duty to explain as to
the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased. In that
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 259
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
sense, there is a limited shifting of the onus of proof. If he remains
quiet or offers a false explanation, then such a response would
become an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
15. Both the Courts below have in fact applied the principle referred to
in Trimukh’s case. Their presence having been held to be proved,
the Court relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shifted
the onus of proof on the accused to explain the circumstances
which led to the unnatural death of the deceased.
16. Whereas the Trial Court found both the accused guilty, the High
Court has confirmed the order of conviction only against the
appellant and extended benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur. The appellant
having failed to give a proper and believable explanation was, in
fact, used as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The
proof of presence in that sense triggered the two consequences
as laid down in Trimukh’s case (supra)
17. In this case, the presence was sought to be proved by the
prosecution on the basis of the testimony of PW-3, PW-4, PW-5
and the statements of the accused at the 313 stage. The Courts
below had also relied on the testimony of PW 3 and PW 4 to
conclude that the appellant was present in the house. Therefore,
it becomes necessary to carefully evaluate this circumstance,
given the consequences that flow from proof of this circumstance.
18. PW-3 has deposed that her husband, Gurmel Singh (PW-4), on
his return home from work around 8 pm on 18.05.99, had informed
her that he saw the appellant along with Rani Kaur present in the
appellant’s house. He further informed her that it would not be
appropriate to visit their house at that time since he anticipated
the possibility of a flare up among the family members. He told
her that they could talk to the appellant in the morning. PW-3
stated that she visited the house of the appellant in the morning
at around 4:45 am, only to find her sister lying dead. She states
that she saw the appellant and Rani Kaur present in the house.
She further states that both of them pushed her aside and left
in a jeep, belonging to the appellant. She then states that she
called her husband (PW-4) to the spot.
260 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of the appellant, several
omissions have been brought on record by drawing her attention
to her previous statement given to the police under Section 161
CrPC. For instance, it has come out in the evidence that PW-3
had omitted to state in her Section 161 statement that: (a) her
husband had informed her that he saw the appellant and Rani
Kaur in the appellant’s house when he was returning back home
from work around 8 pm; (b) she had seen the appellant and Rani
Kaur in the early hours on 19.05.99 in the appellant’s house and
they pushed her aside before escaping in a jeep. (c) her husband
had advised her not to visit the deceased in the night. It had been
specifically suggested to her that she was falsely deposing and
that the appellant was being falsely implicated on account of him
having strained relations with PW-4, the husband of PW3.
20. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of Rani Kaur, it was
elicited that PW-3 had personally witnessed the appellant and Rani
Kaur putting poison in the mouth of the deceased. This, according
to PW-3, was seen by her through the chinks of the door.
21. PW-4 has stated that he met the appellant and Rani Kaur on his
way home, while he was returning from work around 7.00 PM
on 18.05.99. He stated that both of them went to the appellant’s
house. He informed his wife that it would not be appropriate to visit
their house at this time since there was a possibility of a quarrel
arising between Amrik Kaur and her husband, the appellant, since
he had brought Rani Kaur home. Instead, he asked her to go and
visit her sister on the next morning. In the morning, around 5.30
am, his wife left to visit her sister at the appellant’s house after
serving tea to him and his children. On having received a message
from his wife, he set about to reach the appellant’s house and
found Amrik Kaur lying dead and his wife, weeping and wailing.
22. Similarly, in the cross examination of PW-4, it has been brought
on record that PW-4 had omitted to state the following aspects
in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the
police – (a) that PW-4 had seen the appellant and Rani Kaur
entering the house of the appellant in a jeep; (b) PW-4 had told
PW-3 not to visit the appellant’s house since they were intoxicated
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 261
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
and there was a strong possibility of some dispute arising. (c)
PW-4’s statement that PW-3 had left for the appellant’s house
at 5.00 am in the morning on 19.05.99 after serving him tea.
It has been specifically suggested to this witness that he had
strained relations with the appellant, and owing to this fact, he
has falsely implicated the appellant. It was further suggested that
on account of the quarrel that occurred in the night on 18.05.99,
the deceased had committed suicide by taking poison.
23. PW 5 is an independent witness having no relationship with any
of the persons involved, either as an accused or as witnesses,
in this incident. He stated that on the morning of 19.05.99, at
about 6.00 am, he had gone to answer the call of nature. At that
time, he states that he saw the appellant and Rani Kaur were
going in a jeep to Hiro Kalan and that jeep was covered with
black cloth. He then returned to the bus stop and found a lot of
persons having gathered and there, he heard the news that the
appellant had murdered his wife.
24. PW-5’s deposition that he had heard from persons at the bus stop
that the appellant had murdered his wife, was an omission since
he had not stated as such in his statement before the police. It
has been elicited from him that the jeep came from behind and
then passed by his side. It has been further elicited that the black
cloth which was used to cover the jeep was opened on both sides.
25. In the face of the above evidence on record, can it be said that
the presence of the appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s
house in the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99, has been
firmly and cogently established? According to us, the answer must
be in the negative. There are several omissions that have been
brought out in the cross examination of PW-3 and PW-4, which
seriously dent the credibility of their testimony.
26. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC
about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement
before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular
accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove
a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not
stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness
262 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See :
(i) Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 (ii) Sunil
Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011
(72) ACC 699 (SC). (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur Vs. State
of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble Vs.
Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175]
27. Of course, PW-3 claims to be an illiterate witness and therefore,
her testimony must be interpreted in that light. We are cognizant
that the appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to
be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be
subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought
not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought
out in the evidence. This Court has held that the evidence of a
rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be
certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition.3
28. However, the testimony of PW-3 suffers not merely from technical
imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that
have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot
be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there
were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have
been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location
and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. However, such
is not the case here. PW-3 had only heard from her husband that
the appellant and Rani Kaur were seen together in the appellant’s
house on 18.05.99. To that extent, it is merely hearsay. Moreover,
PW-4 has omitted to state this fact to PW3 in his statement before
the police. He has also omitted to state that he advised his wife
(PW-3) against going to the appellant’s house in the night since
there may arise a quarrel between all of them. If these facts are
ignored from consideration, we only wonder as to why PW-3
would visit the house of the appellant in the wee hours of the
morning on 19.05.99. It seems quite unnatural for PW-3 to visit
the house of the appellant at 430 am in the morning without any
reason. If PW-3 was aware that the appellant and Rani Kaur
3 State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697 ;
Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv Gupta, AIR 2008 SC 239
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 263
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
were in an illicit relationship for a sufficiently long duration, there
was no reason to suspect all of a sudden that the two of them
would get together, administer poison and murder the deceased
on 19.05.1999, which fact, prompted her to visit the house of
the appellant at such odd hours in the morning. Both the Courts
have failed to take notice of the several significant omissions and
improvements in the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4.
29. Further, PW-5 is a chance witness. He was in his village, answering
the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen
the accused persons going in a jeep. It was elicited in his cross
examination that he had a side-on view since he stated the jeep
came from behind and he got a side-on glimpse. The side-on view
would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they
were travelling in a jeep. Therefore, it is not safe to rely on this
testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping along
with Rani Kaur after having murdered his wife.
30. The appellant had set up a defence that the deceased had
committed suicide. The Trial Court has disbelieved it on the
premise that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the
house, and if the deceased were to have committed suicide, it
was but natural for the appellant to take her to the hospital and
inform concerned persons/authorities. However, we have come
to the finding above that the circumstance of appellant and Rani
Kaur being present in the house has not been convincingly
proved beyond doubt. Therefore, the reasoning given by the Trial
Court loses its legs to stand on. In any case, we believe that the
appellant has raised a doubt in our minds as regards his defence
that the deceased had committed suicide. There appears to be
no dispute as to the fact that the death was caused by poisoning.
The doctor’s testimony on the basis of the chemical examiner’s
report that the cause of death was linked to aluminium phosphide
poisoning remains unchallenged. In fact, in his 313 statement,
even the appellant states that the deceased consumed poison
(aluminum phosphide) and committed suicide. In Jaipal’s case,
this Court has considered the characteristic features of death
caused by poisoning through aluminum phosphide. Review of
scholarly literature and research papers suggests that the nature
264 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of this substance (aluminum phosphide) is such that it is not
conducive for deceitful administration since it carries a pungent
garlic-like odour, which cannot go unmissed. It was suspected
that the substance was mixed in tea and served to the deceased
since 200ml brownish liquid was found in her stomach as per
the PMR. We find it doubtful that the deceased would have
been made to consume tea deceitfully given the nature of the
substance. Forceful administration of this substance also seems
doubtful since there are no injury marks suggestive of a scuffle.
In light of the evidence on record, even assuming for a moment
that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present, it still cannot be
said with certainty that it was a case of homicide and not suicide.
The main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must
be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with
his innocence- in other words, the circumstances should exclude
every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. In this
case, it cannot be said that the proved circumstances, even if
presence was proved, taken with other circumstances would lead
to an unfailing conclusion that the appellant and Rani Kaur were
guilty of murdering his wife. There was alive a strong hypothesis
that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was
led by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC,
and it is sufficient to create a doubt in our minds.
31. This Court has held that the standard of proof to be met by an
accused in support of the defence taken by him under Section
313 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not beyond all reasonable
doubt, as such, a burden lies on the prosecution to prove the
charge. The accused has merely to create a doubt and it is for
the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
no benefit can flow from the same to the accused. [See: Pramila
vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711]
32. Learned Counsel for the respondent-State has argued that no
specific plea of alibi was taken in the statement of the appellant
recorded under Section 313 CrPC. In fact, it is submitted that
there is an implicit admission as to his presence in the house. It
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 265
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
is too well settled that the statement of an accused under Section
313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and,
secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an
opportunity to cross examine the accused. [ Sidhartha Vashisht
Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 2352]
33. It is trite law that the statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot
form the sole basis of conviction. Therefore, the presence of
the appellant cannot be found solely based on his statement,
notwithstanding the lack of independent evidence led by the
prosecution. Further, this Court has previously considered the
consequences when a particular defence plea was not taken by
accused u/s 313 CrPC and held that mere omission to take a
specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not
enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out
otherwise. See: Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6
SCC 457
34. The case of the prosecution has, from the very start, been
that the appellant was seen jointly along with Rani Kaur in the
appellant’s house on 18.05.99 and they were seen leaving the
house together on 19.05.99. They were both tried together on
charges of having administered poison and killing the deceased
on the intervening night of 18.05.99 & 19.05.99. Though the
Trial Court has convicted both of them under Section 302, the
High Court has extended the benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur and
acquitted her of all criminal charges. According to the High Court,
‘apart from the evidence of Melo Kaur PW3 and Gurmel Singh
PW4, there is no other evidence to show that she was present
in the house on the fateful night’. However, even though it was
the very same evidence that was sought to be used to prove the
presence of the appellant in the house, the benefit of doubt has
not been similarly extended to him. The High Court reasoned that
the appellant, being the husband, it was only natural for him to
be present in the house.
35. It is important to notice that the respondent-State has not
challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur before this Court. It has
accepted the verdict and therefore, the acquittal has reached
266 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
finality. The State cannot on the one hand accept the verdict of
the Court that the presence of Rani Kaur along with the appellant
is doubtful and at the same time, maintain its case that the two
of them were jointly present, committed the offence together and
escaped together.
36. According to us, if the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 was not sufficient
to prove presence of Rani Kaur at the appellant’s house, as a
natural corollary, such evidence cannot be relied on to conclude
that the appellant was present in the house. The manner in which
the High Court has sought to distinguish the case of the appellant
from Rani Kaur is perverse and does not seem to impress us. The
case of the prosecution has consistently been that the accused
persons were seen present together in the house on the night
of 18.05.99 and seen leaving together in the wee hours of the
next morning. In fact, PW 5 has deposed that he had seen them
together in the jeep travelling towards Hiro Kurd. If the presence
of Rani Kaur in the house on the date of the alleged incident is
doubtful, then, the testimony of PW 5 that he had seen her along
with the appellant in the jeep, will also lose its strength.
37. Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider
the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by
the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance
cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances. There
cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction
is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there
should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is
a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If
some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any
other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to
the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand,
(2015) 4 SCC 281.]
38. Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent
findings of conviction.
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
