decreed the Respondents’ suit and declared Narain Dass (Defendant No. 1/Dfdt. 1) as only a bhondedar but not the owner of the shamlatdeh land (land reserved & used for common purpose in villages). It was held that the Dfdt. No. 1 had been granted limited possessory rights, to the shamlatdeh land, in lieu of service rendered to the village temple and when he, as the bhondedar, ceased to render such service, the land would automatically revert back to the common village pool.
2023 INSC 1091
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2835-2836/2011
LAJJA RAM & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RATI CHAND & ORS.ETC. RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Heard Mr. Shubham Seth, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants. Also, heard Mr. Sujit Kumar Mishra, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.
2. The present appeals have been preferred challenging the
judgement and order dated 12.08.2009 in RSAs No. 4041/2007 &
2552/2008, passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.
Under the impugned order, the High Court upheld the decision
dated 15.10.2007 of the Additional District Judge, Faridabad
(‘First Appellate Court’), reversing the Civil Judge (Jr. Division),
Palwal (‘Trial Court’) order dated 28.02.2003, and thereby, decreed
the Respondents’ suit and declared Narain Dass (Defendant No.
1/Dfdt. 1) as only a bhondedar but not the owner of the
shamlatdeh land (land reserved & used for common purpose in
villages). It was held that the Dfdt. No. 1 had been granted limited
Page 1 of 12
possessory rights, to the shamlatdeh land, in lieu of service
rendered to the village temple and when he, as the bhondedar,
ceased to render such service, the land would automatically revert
back to the common village pool.
3. In the year 1982, Narain Dass (Dfdt. No. 1) initiated an earlier
proceeding for declaration and occupancy rights, before Asst.
Collector (Grade-I), Faridabad against the Gram Panchayat, Palwal.
The Asst. Collector while disposing the said proceeding observed in
the order dated 06.03.1986 that Narain Dass was entitled to
hereditary rights, under Sections 5 & 8 of the Punjab Mujara Act,
1887 (also referred to as the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887) and the
Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953.
This arises from the longstanding service of Narain Dass’ ancestors
as mujaras (tenants) relating to the shamlatdeh land, for over 60
years. Additionally, it was held that the land did not vest in the
Gram Panchayat.
4. Subsequently, Narain Dass sold the shamlatdeh land to Lajja Ram
& his sons (Defendant Nos. 2-5) through multiple sale deeds on
24.07.1987, 31.08.1987 and 07.06.1988, respectively.
5. Aggrieved by the above alienation of the common village land, the
inhabitants of the village & biswedars (proprietors) of the land
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(‘Respondents’) filed the Suit No. 878/1996 for declaration,
possession & injunction before the Civil Judge (Jr.), Palwal.
However, the Trial Court dismissed the suit on 28.02.2003 as nonmaintainable on the grounds that it was time-barred and also that
the plaintiffs had no locus standi to file the suit. It was also held
that the sale deeds transferring ownership rights from Narain Dass
(Dfdt. 1) to Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. 2-5) were valid. The Court
noted that Narain Dass, while serving as the bhondedar of the
shamlatdeh land, continued to provide service to the landlord, and
such service would be considered equivalent to payment of rent,
thereby making Narain Dass also a tenant of the suit land.
6. Displeased with the Trial Court’s decision favouring Dfdt. No. 1,
the Respondents approached the Additional District Judge,
Faridabad by filing the Civil Appeal No. 17 on 01.04.2003.
Simultaneously, Respondents (Defendant Nos. 5-12) also filed a
separate Civil Appeal No. 25. The First Appellate Court with the
common judgment dated 15.10.2007 decreed the suit for
declaration, injunction, and possession of land measuring 33
kanals 5 marlas. Simultaneously, the Court negated Narain Dass’
(Dfdt. 1) claim, since he had limited right and was not competent
to alienate the suit property. The Court also found that Dfdt. 1 had
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taken recourse to self-contradictory pleas asserting ownership
rights as well as occupancy rights. Thus, the annulment of sale
deeds to Dfdts No. 2-5 with a directive to restore the suit land
possession to the common village pool was ordered.
7. The transferee Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. No. 2-5) then filed the
RSA No. 4041 of 2007 and RSA No. 2552 of 2008 before the High
Court. In the impugned order dated 12.08.2009, the High Court
noted that the prior decree granted by the Asst. Collector against
the Gram Panchayat could not have been used against the
biswedars of the village given their absence as parties in the
previous proceedings. Additionally, it was found that the
ownership of the shamlatdeh land did not vest with the Gram
Panchayat.
8. The High Court particularly noted that Narain Dass had no title or
authority to sell the suit land to Dfdts. No. 2-5. The sale, executed
by an incompetent party without a valid title, was deemed by the
High Court as insufficient to confer valid title to Dfdts. No. 2-5.
Moreover, the sale by a vendor without any title could be
disregarded even in a collateral proceeding, i.e., the present suit by
the proprietors. The High Court deemed the later suit to be within
the period of limitation since reckoning time would not commence
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from the date of sale deed's registration but from the date of
knowledge of the sales, by the biswedars. Consequently, the High
Court upheld the First Appellate Court's decision decreeing the
suit against Dfdts. No. 2-5, and dismissed the second appeal
under the impugned judgment.
9. In order to adjudicate the present lis, we need to briefly refer to the
concept of a bhondedar, and the nature & extent of rights that a
bhondedar exercises with respect to shamlatdeh lands.
10. The term ‘bhondedar’ has no statutory or legislative definition. But
over a period of time, the term is equated with limited grant of land
for service to be rendered by the grantee. It is a customary practice
in the Punjab region (present-day areas comprising largely in the
states of Punjab & Haryana)1
for proprietors of land as well as the
larger village community, to set apart a parcel of land to be held
rent-free towards a temple, mosque or shrines, or granted on
favourable terms to a saint, pandit or any other person belonging
to a religious order. As long as such grant (also known as a ‘dholi’
in erstwhile Punjab) was being used for the assigned purpose, the
person assigned such dholi (referred to as a ‘dholidar’ in erstwhile
Punjab), could not be asked to vacate the same. The terms
1 Gurgaon District Gazetteer, Gurgaon DG – Administrative Section A to C, 1910,
pg. 177.
Page 5 of 12
dholidar and bhondedar are often interchangeably used albeit with
minor variance. While a dholi is granted in lieu of a service directly
connected with religion, a bhonda would ordinarily be granted
towards rendering secular services like that of a village messenger
or watchman, towards the proprietors of the said land.2
The
bhondedar could be ejected upon failure to fulfil the conditions of
such grant or even at the will of the proprietors. Essentially, it was
a method of compensation for certain services, by granting rentfree land.
11. A bhondedar typically possesses the following characteristic
features:
(i) He renders secular services towards the village community
as well as the biswedars (proprietors),
(ii) He is granted a parcel of land rent-free, within a village by
the biswedars in lieu of payment for services rendered, and
(iii) A bhondedar can be ejected from such piece of land in case
of failure to render assigned services or fulfil conditions of
such grant.
12. The aforementioned characteristic features suggest that the rights
available to Dfdt. No. 1 as the bhondedar, were conditional and not
boundless. He could exercise limited rights as long as he rendered
2 Mamala & Ors. vs. ISA & Anr., 1983 Punjab Law Journal 231; Gurgaon District
Gazetteer, Gurgaon DG – Administrative Section A to C, 1910, pg. 177.
Page 6 of 12
service towards the village in his capacity as the bhondedar.
13. Proceeding with the above understanding, let us now examine the
nature & extent of a bhondedar’s right over a shamlatdeh property
and also whether the bhondedar can exercise ownership rights
over the granted land. The conditional and limited rights a dholi or
a bhonda can exercise over the granted land, can be culled out
from the decision in Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram vs. Udegir3
where the following was expressed
“…… in the revenue records the proprietary body are
recorded as the owners of the property, and the grantee is
recorded as a tenant in the column of cultivation. So long as
the purpose, for which the grant is made, is carried out, it
cannot be resumed, but should the holder fail to carry out
the duties of his office, the proprietors can eject him and put
in someone else under a like tenure……. …….. It is beyond
dispute that tenure of this kind cannot be alienated by sale
or mortgage, and there can be little doubt that any
alienation of that character, if made by the Dohlidar, would
be absolutely void……… As the transaction was altogether
void, we consider that even the alienor could have
successfully pleaded in answer to the plaintiff's suit that the
latter could not enforce it in a Court of law……. For the
foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the Dohlidar had
no right to make the alienation relied upon by the plaintiff,
and that the defendant is not precluded from impeaching its
validity………”
14. The above would suggest that a bhondedar had only limited right
and should he fail to carry out his assigned duties, even this
limited right becomes unavailable to the grantee of the property.
3 1921 SCC OnLine Lah 237.
Page 7 of 12
The very nature of the tenure(s) does not bestow upon the holder,
any right to alienate the granted land, by sale or mortgage.
Consequently, all alienation made by the limited holder of property,
would be manifestly void. This is because bhondedar or dholidar do
not possess title or ownership right of the property that is granted
to him, as a bhonda or dholi.
15. The inter-play of claims over shamlatdeh category land vis-à-vis the
bhondedar, the Gram Panchayat and the proprietors of such land,
may now be seen. The ownership to such lands rested in
proportion to other lands of the village. For instance, an individual
owning some land in the village also possessed additional
proprietary rights and interest over shamlatdeh lands.4
However,
with the enactment of the Punjab Village Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1961, the nature of vesting of such lands with the
village community was somewhat altered. The following discussion
in State of Haryana vs. Jai Singh & Ors.5
would assist us in
understanding the implication for community lands in the village:
Ҧ24. Shamilat land in terms of Section 4 of the 1961
Act vested in the Gram Panchayat of the village. The
vesting of shamilat land in a village panchayat brought
about a paradigm shift in the ownership of rights in
‘ shamilat deh’. The proprietary rights of the proprietary
body of the village in shamilat land were extinguished
4 Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur vs. Malwinder Singh, (1985) 3 SCC 661.
5 2022 SCC OnLine SC 418.
Page 8 of 12
by a statutory declaration. The proprietary and
possessory rights of proprietors and non-proprietors
in shamilat deh were to henceforth vest in a Gram
Panchayat and used for common purposes of the entire
village community, under the aegis of the Gram
Panchayat. The shamilat deh lands as defined under
Section 2 (g) of the 1961 Act now vest completely, that
is, with ownership and title, in the Panchayat of the
village concerned. The vesting of the shamilat deh lands
or the village common lands in the Panchayat has been
for agrarian reforms and such vesting is protected by
Article 31A of the Constitution.”
16. While such lands owned by the proprietors came to be vested in
the Gram Panchayat, the Section 4 of the Punjab Village Common
Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, noted certain important exceptions.
The existing rights, title or interest of persons, who though not
entered as occupancy tenants in the revenue records are accorded
a similar status by custom like a bhondedar, dholidar, etc. and
those would not be affected by such vesting of lands in the Gram
Panchayat.
17. In the present matter, the Dfdt. No.1 (Narain Dass) held conditional
and limited possessory rights as a bhondedar, subject to services
being rendered towards the village community, as recorded in the
jamabandi. Such limited right remains unaffected and unaltered
as long as the bhondedar fulfills their service obligations toward
the village. The facts in this case however indicates that the Dfdt.
No. 1 not only ceased to render the required services but also
Page 9 of 12
relocated to a different place soon after unauthorisedly selling the
suit land to Dfdts. 2-5. Consequently, the bhondedar Narain Dass
can have no legitimate claim whatsoever, over the suit land.
18. Addressing the issue of limitation on account of the decision of
Asst. Collector favouring Narain Dass in the previous proceeding,
the High Court observed that the biswedars or other inhabitants of
the village were not parties in the proceedings before Asst.
Collector. It was therefore held that the decree obtained from the
Asst. Collector against the Gram Panchayat, could not be invoked
to argue that the biswedars had relinquished their rights, title,
and/or interest in the land.
19. Observing that the sale deeds were executed by an individual
lacking valid title, the High Court opined that those could also be
disregarded in collateral proceedings as well. It was also found that
the decision in the previous proceeding cannot extinguish the
rights of the plaintiffs and the Gram Panchayat in the suit simply
because the biswedars were unaware of the Asst. Collector’s order.
As soon as the biswedars learnt of such decree in Narain Dass’
favour against the Gram Panchayat, they filed Suit No.878/1996
before the Trial Court and as such the suit was found to be in
order. In our assessment, the High Court has rightly held that
Page 10 of 12
the suit was filed within time as the biswedars' right to challenge
the sales by the bhondedar would commence only from the date on
which they became aware of such sales.
20. The upshot of the aforementioned discussion is that when the
services were ceased to be rendered towards the management,
maintenance and upkeep of the shamlatdeh land, the limited grant
so made to the bhondedar, by the proprietors i.e., the biswedars, in
lieu of such services, stood extinguished.
21. No specific material is produced before us to show the precise
terms of arrangement between the biswedars and the bhondedar.
However, it is evident that Narain Dass could have retained
possession of the land only till such time that he continued to
discharge the services tied to the limited grant. Moreover, by
relocating to Nangli Gurdhana, i.e., a different village over 50 years
ago (around 1970-71), he obviously ceased rendering services to
the village temple. By the very nature of the conditional grant, the
grantee was naturally incompetent to alienate the shamlatdeh land
to any third parties, including the Dfdts. Nos. 2-5.
22. The limited right available to Narain Dass to continue to avail the
rent-free land would be extinguished immediately upon cessation
of service. To attract the exception, Narain Dass could not prove
that the suit land was gifted by the biswedars. The only
Page 11 of 12
exceptional circumstance that could have possibly validated
ownership and subsequent sales to the Appellants is also not
applicable here.
23. The oft-quoted statement full of wisdom – “Before the reward, there
must be labour. You plant before you harvest. You sow in tears before
you reap joy.” – attributed to author Ralph Ransom perfectly
encapsulates the current situation, emphasising upon the inherent
connection between effort and reward. As soon as the bhondedar
had ceased rendering services, the concerned land should have
returned to the common village pool. The bhondedar could not
have transferred his limited possessory rights or alienated the said
property to the Appellants. In turn, the Appellants, as transferees,
could not have derived any legal right over the suit land either.
24. Therefore, the High Court’s decision in favour of the plaintiffs and
the Gram Panchayat is consistent with the above opinion of this
Court. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed without any
imposition of costs.
..............................J.
[ HRISHIKESH ROY ]
..............................J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 9, 2023
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