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Wednesday, October 29, 2025

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Sections 147, 148, 148A, 151A, 144B – Faceless Reassessment – Jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) – Validity of notices issued outside Faceless Scheme – Held, notices and orders issued by JAO invalid After the introduction of Section 151A by the Finance Act, 2021 and the notification of the E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (Notification No. 18/2022, dated 29-03-2022), reassessment proceedings under Sections 147 and 148 are required to be conducted only in a faceless manner. Once the said Scheme was notified, issuance of notice under Section 148 and passing of orders under Section 148A(d) by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) stand excluded by operation of law. There is no concurrent jurisdiction between the JAO and the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). Notices issued by JAOs post 29-03-2022 are without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio. Faceless Scheme – Mandatory Nature – Section 151A read with Notification 18/2022 Section 151A expressly empowers the Central Government to frame a scheme for assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147 and issuance of notice under Section 148 in a faceless manner. The notification of 29-03-2022, being subordinate legislation, is mandatory and binds all Income-tax Authorities. The expression “issuance of notice shall be through automated allocation” is compulsory, not directory. The Department has no discretion to bypass the faceless system and proceed manually. Prejudice – Not necessary to prove When an authority acts contrary to statutory mandate, the action itself constitutes prejudice in law; the assessee need not demonstrate separate or additional prejudice. Precedents Followed Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [(2024) 464 ITR 430 (Bom)] Prakash Pandurang Patil v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Ors. (Bom HC, 12-08-2024) — affirmed by Supreme Court in SLP (C) Diary No. 39689/2025, dated 18-08-2025 Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy v. Income Tax Officer [(2023) 156 Taxmann.com 178 (Telangana)] Ram Narayan Sah v. Union of India [(2024) 156 Taxmann.com 478 (Gauhati)] Jatinder Singh Banngu v. Union of India [(2024) 165 Taxmann.com 115 (P&H)] Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax [(2024) 167 Taxmann.com 411 (Telangana)] Held: Impugned notices/orders issued under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d) and 148 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers are set aside. Consequential orders, if any, also quashed. Proceedings initiated outside the Faceless Mechanism are void ab initio. No order as to costs. Result: Writ Petitions Allowed. Notices and orders quashed.


Income Tax Act, 1961 – Sections 147, 148, 148A, 151A, 144B – Faceless Reassessment – Jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) – Validity of notices issued outside Faceless Scheme – Held, notices and orders issued by JAO invalid

After the introduction of Section 151A by the Finance Act, 2021 and the notification of the E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (Notification No. 18/2022, dated 29-03-2022), reassessment proceedings under Sections 147 and 148 are required to be conducted only in a faceless manner.

Once the said Scheme was notified, issuance of notice under Section 148 and passing of orders under Section 148A(d) by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) stand excluded by operation of law.

There is no concurrent jurisdiction between the JAO and the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). Notices issued by JAOs post 29-03-2022 are without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio.

Faceless Scheme – Mandatory Nature – Section 151A read with Notification 18/2022

Section 151A expressly empowers the Central Government to frame a scheme for assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147 and issuance of notice under Section 148 in a faceless manner.

The notification of 29-03-2022, being subordinate legislation, is mandatory and binds all Income-tax Authorities. The expression “issuance of notice shall be through automated allocation” is compulsory, not directory. The Department has no discretion to bypass the faceless system and proceed manually.

Prejudice – Not necessary to prove

When an authority acts contrary to statutory mandate, the action itself constitutes prejudice in law; the assessee need not demonstrate separate or additional prejudice.

Precedents Followed

Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [(2024) 464 ITR 430 (Bom)]

Prakash Pandurang Patil v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Ors. (Bom HC, 12-08-2024)

— affirmed by Supreme Court in SLP (C) Diary No. 39689/2025, dated 18-08-2025

Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy v. Income Tax Officer [(2023) 156 Taxmann.com 178 (Telangana)]

Ram Narayan Sah v. Union of India [(2024) 156 Taxmann.com 478 (Gauhati)]

Jatinder Singh Banngu v. Union of India [(2024) 165 Taxmann.com 115 (P&H)]

Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax [(2024) 167 Taxmann.com 411 (Telangana)]

Held:

Impugned notices/orders issued under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d) and 148 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers are set aside.

Consequential orders, if any, also quashed.

Proceedings initiated outside the Faceless Mechanism are void ab initio.

No order as to costs.

Result:

Writ Petitions Allowed. Notices and orders quashed.

Setty Prakash vs The Income Tax Officer on 28 October, 2025

                                        1

              THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

                                      AND

    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

WRIT PETITION Nos:

14681/2023; 112/2025; 158/2025; 211/2025; 337/2025; 660/2024; 1445/2025; 1485/2025;

1514/2025; 1537/2025; 1539/2025; 2056/2025; 2142/2025; 2390/2025; 2639/2025;

2947/2025; 3810/2025; 3940/2025; 4270/2024; 4285/2024; 4292/2024; 4296/2024;

4340/2024; 4341/2025; 4677/2025; 4780/2025; 4901/2024; 4991/2024; 5266/2024;

5385/2024; 5450/2025; 5452/2024; 5534/2025; 5538/2025; 5542/2025; 5543/2025;

5561/2025; 5564/2025; 5805/2025; 5866/2025; 5934/2025; 5936/2025; 6096/2025;

6161/2025; 6162/2025; 6304/2024; 6424/2024; 6605/2025; 6718/2025; 6731/2025;

7394/2024; 7694/2024; 7695/2024; 7704/2024; 7706/2024; 8129/2024; 8134/2024;

8164/2024; 8256/2024; 8266/2024; 8274/2024; 8281/2024; 8282/2024; 8283/2024;

8294/2024; 8295/2024; 8297/2024; 8372/2024; 8527/2024; 8649/2024; 8786/2025;

8795/2025; 8896/2025; 8944/2025; 8966/2025; 9006/2024; 9083/2024; 9128/2024;

9295/2024; 9476/2024; 9517/2024; 9657/2024; 9713/2024; 9726/2024; 9792/2024;

9794/2024; 9797/2024; 9801/2024; 9803/2024; 9805/2024; 9806/2024; 9944/2024;

10212/2024; 10349/2024; 10361/2024; 10367/2024; 10552/2024; 10579/2024; 10634/2024;

10635/2024; 10636/2024; 10651/2024; 10791/2024; 10807/2024; 11105/2024; 11168/2024;

11212/2024; 11214/2024; 11241/2024; 11254/2024; 11256/2024; 11341/2024; 11382/2024;

11391/2024;11401/2024;11582/2024;11605/2024; 11652/2024; 11751/2024; 12324/2024;

12426/2024; 12452/2024; 12560/2025; 12564/2025; 12567/2025; 12731/2025; 12734/2025;

12825/2023; 12870/2024; 12989/2024; 13045/2024; 13128/2024; 13177/2024; 13284/2024;

13324/2024; 13402/2025; 13419/2024; 13458/2024; 13460/2024; 13605/2024; 13624/2024;

13629/2024;13631/2024;13692/2025;13745/2024;13862/2024;13893/2024;13924/2024;139

25/2024; 14128/2024; 14135/2024; 14140/2024; 14142/2024; 14350/2025; 14508/2024;

14615/2024; 14616/2024; 14617/2024; 14623/2024; 14655/2025; 14668/2025; 14675/2025;

14678/2023; 14685/2025; 14713/2024; 14785/2024; 14792/2024; 14852/2023; 14855/2025;

15047/2024; 15238/2024; 15681/2024; 15794/2025; 15895/2025; 15902/2025; 15903/2025;

15966/2025; 16130/2024; 16178/2024; 16264/2025; 16301/2024; 16442/2024; 16443/2024;

16454/2024; 16842/2025; 16923/2024; 16977/2024; 17007/2024; 17295/2024; 17456/2022;

17850/2024; 17858/2024; 17895/2024; 17897/2024; 17902/2024; 18278/2025; 18390/2024;

18669/2024; 18722/2024; 19003/2025; 19008/2025; 19015/2025; 19048/2024; 19064/2024;

19075/2024; 19157/2025; 19371/2025; 19539/2025; 19684/2024; 19729/2024; 19938/2025;

20095/2024; 20104/2024; 20113/2024; 20410/2024; 20466/2025; 20629/2025; 20633/2024;

20725/2024; 20745/2025; 20950/2024; 21010/2024; 21046/2024; 21097/2024; 21111/2024;

21112/2024; 21113/2024; 21116/2024; 21117/2024; 21120/2024; 21121/2024; 21128/2024;

21129/2024;21130/2024;21599/2024;21879/2024; 21881/2024; 21883/2024; 22277/2024;

22339/2024; 22341/2024; 23385/2024; 23636/2024; 23639/2024; 23998/2024; 24907/2024;

24908/2024; 24909/2024; 24910/2024; 24916/2024; 24920/2024; 25305/2024; 25307/2024;

26168/2024; 27702/2024; 27717/2024; 27765/2024; 27875/2024; 27935/2024; 28282/2024;

28394/2024;28433/2024;28436/2024;28452/2024;28457/2024;28463/2024;28499/2023;285

00/2024; 28510/2024; 28520/2023; 28858/2024; 29219/2024; 29238/2024; 29250/2024;

29260/2024; 29345/2024; 29353/2024; 29443/2024; 29495/2024; 29768/2023; 29960/2023;

29980/2024; 30332/2024; 30334/2024; 30453/2024; 31418/2024; 31645/2023; 31762/2023;

31805/2023; 32028/2023; 32056/2023; 32074/2023; 32177/2023; 32179/2023; 32186/2023;

32364/2023; 32366/2023; 32368/2023; 32486/2023; 32489/2023; 32740/2023; 33047/2023;

33089/2023; 33219/2023; 33229/2023; 33232/2023; 33647/2023; 13747/2025; 16945/2025,

                                         2


18368/2025,18732/2025; 19422/2025; 20185/2025; 21533/2025; 21975/2025; 22201/2025;

22673/2025; 22866/2025; 23299/2025; 23301/2025; 23314/2025; 23930/2025; 23983/2025;

24016/2025;24334/2025;24339/2025;24536/2025; 25086/2025; 25482/2025; 26135/2025

and 26840/2025


                                       *****


COMMON ORDER:

(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand) Heard respective counsel appearing for the petitioners and the respondents in all Writ Petitions. Perused the material available on record.


2. As the issue involved in all these Writ Petitions is one and the same, all these Writ Petitions are disposed of by a common order.


3. All these Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the notices issued to the petitioners under Section 148-A(b) and orders passed under Section 140-(A)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the consequential notices issued under Section 148 by the respondents.


4. For proper adjudication, of these cases, it is desirable and relevant to look into the background of "Faceless Assessment Scheme" under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as herein under:


(i) The Finance Act, 2018 provides for making a Scheme to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating interface between the assessing officer and the assessee, optimizing the utilization of resources through economics of scale and functional specialization and introducing team-based assessment with dynamic jurisdiction for the purpose of making assessment. Accordingly, a Scheme namely ('E-Assessment Scheme, 2019) was formulated containing detailed procedure to be followed for the purpose of making assessment and the same was notified on 12.01.2019. Initially, this Scheme was made applicable to the assessment under Section 143(3). Later, the proceedings under Section 144 were also included in this Scheme. Subsequently, the said Scheme was modified into 'Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019' and the same was notified.

(ii) The Financial Act, 2021 introduced Section 144(B) in the Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 01.04.2021, incorporating the Faceless Assessment Scheme, directly into the Act with certain modifications. The said provision was amended by the Finance Act, 2022 to include proceedings under Section 147 of the Act also under the Scheme of Faceless Assessment. Thus, the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019 stands inapplicable with effect from 01.04.2021 after introduction of this Scheme under Section 144(B) of the Act.


(iii) With effect from 01.11.2020, introduced Section 151(a) in the Income Tax Act, 1961 for Faceless Assessment of Income Tax Escaping Assessment, vide the Taxation and other laws (relaxation and amendment of certain provisions) Act, 2020. The said provision contemplates a scheme to be made by the Government vide notification and the official gazette for the purpose of assessment, re-assessment or re-computation under Section 147 or issuance of notice(s) under Section 148, conducting of enquiries, issuance of show cause notices, passing of order(s) under Section 148 (a) and sanction for issue of notice under Section 151 of the Act so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating the interface between the income tax authority and the assessee or any other person to the extent technologically feasible. It is also sought to optimize utilization of resources through economics of scale and financial specialization and to introduce a team-based assessment, re-assessment or re-computation or issuance or sanction of notice with automatic jurisdiction.


(iv) Therefore, the Government of India notified the "E-Income Assessment Scheme, 2022" on 29.03.2022 for assessment, re-assessment or re-computation under Section 147 of the Act and for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act through automated allocation as referred to in Section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice and in a faceless manner to the extent in Section 144 (B) of the Act. Thus, re-allocation proceedings are brought into the faceless scheme with the incorporation of Section 151 (A) of the Income Tax Act.


(v) The procedure for the faceless assessment scheme has laid down in Section 144 (B) of the Act is as herein under:-


(a)The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) assigns case selected for faceless assessment through automated allocation system to assessment unit.

(b)The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) intimates the assessee that assessment shall be completed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 144 (B) of the Act.

(c)Notice is served to assessee through The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) under Section 143 (2) or 142 (1) of the Act and assessee may file his response within specified date mentioned in the notice to NFAC, which shall forward the same to the assessment unit.

(d)The detailed process for faceless by NFAC is as laid down in Section 144 (B)(1)(iv to XXXII) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

5. Contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners:


(i) It is the contention of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners that after introduction of the "E-Assessment of Income Tax Escape Scheme, 2022" which came into force from 29.03.2022, it has become mandatory for the revenue to conduct/initiate proceedings pertaining to re-

assessment under Section 147 and 148 of the Act in a faceless manner. As such, the impugned orders/notices issued under Section 148 (A)(D) of the Act as well as the notices under Section 148 of the Act which were issued by the jurisdictional assessment officer ("JAO"), are not in accordance with the procedure provided under the said scheme and accordingly, it is liable to be set-aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.


(ii) They further contend that the arbitrary action of revenue would frustrate the very object of the new re-assessment brought in the way of amendments in the Income Tax Act, 1961 through the Finance Act, 2021. They further contend that if the revenue is allotted to proceed further, despite the petitioner strictly abiding by law, it would cause great hardship to the petitioners and would result in sheer harassment.


(iii) The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 12.08.2024 in W.P.No.10749 of 2024, in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Others, to substantiate their stand and would submit that the said judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by its order, dated 18.08.2025 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 39689/2025. In the light of the said judgments, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the issue involved in the present Writ Petitions is squarely covered in the decisions stated supra and accordingly, sought to allow these Writ Petitions.


6. Contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents:


(i) On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the notification in S.O.1466 (E) dated 29.03.2022 does not state whether the notice is to be issued by the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) or the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (J.A.O)., the said notification speaks of the scope of the scheme with regard to the procedure covered by it and lays down the legal contours of how such procedures are to be carried out. It states that the issuances of notices under Section 148 of the Act, shall be through admitted allocation in accordance with the risk management strategy and that the assessment shall be in a faceless manner to the extent provided in Section 144 (B) of the Act.

(ii) The learned Standing Counsel would contend that it is apparent that in the process for re-assessment, as it exceeds as on today, both are being followed accordingly, they would contend that it will be in correct to state that the issuance of notice by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer is without jurisdiction. They further contend that since Section 144 (B) of the Act does not provide for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, there can be no ambiguity in the fact that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer still has the jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act. Accordingly, learned Standing Counsel submits that the notices/orders issued under Section 148 A/ 148 of the Act still hold good and cannot be termed as without jurisdiction and each case will have to be dealt with independently.


7. Discussion and findings:


(A). The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Others by following the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors 1 had considered the effect and interpretation of the Section 151 (A) of the Income Tax as extracted herein under:

"3. It is apparent that the impugned notice dated 5 April, 2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act and the order of the same date under Section 148A(d) of the Act are issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer ("JAO") and not under the mandatory faceless mechanism as per the provisions of Section 151 A of the Act. For a notice to be validly issued under Section 148 of the Act, the respondent No.2 would be required to comply with the provisions of Section 151A of the Act, so as to adhere to the faceless mechanism, as notified by the Central Government by notification dated 29 March 2022. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors 2 had considered the effect and interpretation of the said provision. The relevant extract of the said decision reads thus:-

35. Further, in our view, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and the FAO for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act or even for passing assessment or reassessment order. When specific jurisdiction has been assigned (2024) 464 ITR 430 (2024) 464 ITR 430 to either the JAO or the FAO in the scheme dated 29.03.2022, then it is to the exclusion of the other.

To take any other view in the matter, would not only result in chaos but also render the whole faceless proceedings redundant. If the argument of Revenue is to be accepted, then even when notices are issued by the FAO, it would be open to an assessee to make submission before the JAO and vice versa, which is clearly not contemplated in the Act.


Therefore, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of both FAO or the JAO with respect to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The Scheme dated 29th March 2022 in paragraph 3 clearly provides that the issuance of notice "shall be through automated allocation" which means that the same is mandatory and is required to be followed by the Department and does not give any discretion to the Department to choose whether to follow it or not. That automated allocation is defined in paragraph 2


(b) of the Scheme to mean an algorithm for randomised allocation of cases by using suitable technological tools including artificial intelligence and machine learning with a view to optimise the use of resources. Therefore, it means that the case can be allocated randomly to any officer who would then have jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148 of the Act, It is not the case of respondent No.1 that respondent No.1 was the random officer who had been allocated jurisdiction.


36. With respect to the argument of the Revenue, i.e., the notification dated 29th March, 2022 provides that the Scheme so framed is applicable only 'to the extent' provided in Section 144 B of the Act and Section 144 B of the Act does not refer to issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act and hence, the notice cannot be issued by the FAO as per the said Scheme, we express our view as follows:-


Section 151A of the Act itself contemplates formulation of Scheme for both assessment, reassessment or re-computation under Section 147 as well as for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. Therefore, the Scheme framed by the CBDT, which covers both the aforesaid aspect of the provisions of Section 151A of the Act cannot be said to be applicable only for one aspect, i.e., proceedings post the issue of notice under Section 148 of the Act being assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147 of the Act and inapplicable to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The Scheme is clearly applicable for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act and accordingly, it is only the FAO which can issue the notice under Section 148 of the Act and not the JAO. The argument advanced by respondent would render clause 3(b) of the Scheme otiose and to be ignored or contravened, as according to respondent, even though the Scheme specifically provides for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act in a faceless manner, no notice is required to be issued under Section 148 of the Act in a faceless manner. In such a situation, not only clause 3(b) but also the first two lines below clause 3(b) would be otiose, as it deals with the aspect of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. Respondents, being an authority subordinate to the CBDT, and which has been laid before both House of Parliament is partly otiose and inapplicable....."

37. When an authority acts contrary to law, the said act of the Authority is required to be quashed and set aside as invalid and bad in law and the person seeking to quash such an action is not required to establish prejudice from the said Act. An act which is done by an authority contrary to the provisions of the statue, itself causes prejudice to assessee. All assessees are entitled to be assessed as per law and by following the procedure prescribed by law.

Therefore, when the Income Tax Authority proposes to take action against an assessee without following the due process of law, the said action itself results in a prejudice to assessee. Therefore, there is no question of petitioner having to prove further prejudice before arguing the invalidity of the notice.


4. It is hence apparent that in the present case, the impugned order and the notices issued by respondent no.1 are not in compliance with the Scheme notified by the Central Government implementing the provisions of Section 151A of the Act. The Scheme, as tabled before the Parliament as per the requirements of the said provision, is in the nature of a subordinate legislation, which governs the conduct of proceedings under Section 148A as well as Section 148 of the Act. Thus, in view of the explicit declaration of the law in Hexaware Technologies Limited (supra), the grievance of the petitioner- assessee insofar as it relates to an invalid issuance of the impugned order and the notice is required to be accepted.


5. Learned Counsel for the parties agree that in this view of the matter, the proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act would not be sustainable and are rendered invalid in view of the judgment rendered in Hexaware Technologies Limited (supra)." (B). Further, it is very apt to refer the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in the case of Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy Vs. Income Tax Officer 3 , decided on 14.09.2023 whereby a batch of Writ Petitions were allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 148A as also under Section 148 of the Act were held to be bad with consequential reliefs on the ground of it being in violation of the provisions of Section 151 A of the Act read with Notification 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022.


(C). It is also to be noted that the same issue had also been decided by various High Courts in India i.e., Gauhati High Court in the case of Ram Narayan Sah Vs. Union of India 4, Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jatinder Singh Banngu Vs. Union of India5 and Telangana High Court in the case of Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax6. Some views have been taken by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Giridhar Gopal Dalmia Vs.Union of India Vs. Ors7, (2023) 156 taxmann.com 178 (Telangana) (2024) 156 taxmann.com 478 (Gauhati) (2024) 165 taxmann.com 115(Punjab & Haryana) (2024) 167 taxmann.com 411 (Telangana) M.A.T. 1690 of 2023 decided on 25.09.2024. In these decisions, the various High Courts allowed the Writ Petitions in favour of the assessee in so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned.


(D). Admittedly, the Supreme Court has upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5 Panvel & Ors in S.L.P.(Civil) Diary No.39689/2025, dated 18.08.2025, wherein, the Bombay High Court has allowed the said Writ Petition by following the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors. In view of the above factual position, we are of the considered view that the issue involved in the present batch of Writ Petitions is no more res integra.


(E). Considering the background in notifying the (E-Assessment Scheme of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022) notified by the Government of India on 29.03.2022, and in the light of the decisions of various High Courts stated supra and upon careful consideration of the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing on either side, we hold that the impugned notices and orders which have been issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer, or outside the faceless mechanism as provided under the provisions of Section 144 (b) read with Section 151 A and the "E-Assessment Scheme of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022" notified by the Government of India on 29.03.2022 under Section 151 A, is bad and illegal. It is made clear that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer ("JAO") had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned orders/notices.


(F). In view of the foregoing reasons, all these Writ Petitions are to be allowed in favour of the petitioners, by setting aside the impugned notices/orders.


8. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are allowed.


(i) Consequently, the impugned notices/orders issued under Sections 148-A(b), 148-A(d) and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all these Writ Petitions, are hereby set-aside.


(ii) The consequential orders, if any, shall stand set-aside.


9. There shall be no order as to costs.


As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.



__________________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND __________________________________ JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA Note: - Registry to issue C.C. separately in each case. [B/o] PKR Dated: 28 .10.2025 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA WRIT PETITION Nos. 14681/2023 and batch Dated: 28 .10.2025 PKR

Mandatory Faceless Mechanism: The E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (Notification No. 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022) issued under Section 151A mandates that issuance of notices under Section 148 and conduct of proceedings under Section 148A shall be through automated allocation in a faceless manner, as part of the scheme incorporated under Section 144B of the Act. No Concurrent Jurisdiction: Once the Central Government has notified the Scheme under Section 151A, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) and the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). The entire process of reassessment must be routed through the faceless system. Any notice issued or order passed by the JAO outside this mechanism is without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio. Section 151A — Subordinate Legislation: The Scheme notified under Section 151A is a form of subordinate legislation, binding on all authorities under the Act. Non-compliance with the statutory procedure prescribed therein vitiates the entire reassessment proceedings. Revenue’s Contention Rejected: Argument of the Revenue that Section 144B does not cover issuance of notices under Section 148 and hence JAOs can issue such notices independently, was rejected. The Court held that Section 151A itself expressly covers both issuance of notices under Section 148 and reassessments under Section 147. Supreme Court Approval: The issue is no longer res integra, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by order dated 18.08.2025 in SLP (C) Diary No. 39689/2025, has upheld the Bombay High Court’s decision in Prakash Pandurang Patil v. ITO, Ward-5, Panvel & Ors (W.P. No. 10749/2024), which followed Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT & Ors [(2024) 464 ITR 430 (Bom)]. Consistent Judicial View: The same interpretation has been taken by other High Courts — Telangana HC: Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy v. ITO (2023) 156 Taxmann.com 178 Gauhati HC: Ram Narayan Sah v. Union of India (2024) 156 Taxmann.com 478 Punjab & Haryana HC: Jatinder Singh Banngu v. UOI (2024) 165 Taxmann.com 115 Telangana HC: Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola v. DCIT (2024) 167 Taxmann.com 411 Calcutta HC: Giridhar Gopal Dalmia v. UOI (M.A.T. 1690/2023 decided 25.09.2024) Effect of Violation: Issuance of reassessment notice or passing of order under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d), or 148 by the JAO, after 29.03.2022, amounts to violation of the statutory scheme and is therefore void. Result: All Writ Petitions Allowed. Impugned notices and orders under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d), and 148 set aside. Consequential proceedings annulled.


  1. Mandatory Faceless Mechanism:
    The E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (Notification No. 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022) issued under Section 151A mandates that issuance of notices under Section 148 and conduct of proceedings under Section 148A shall be through automated allocation in a faceless manner, as part of the scheme incorporated under Section 144B of the Act.

  2. No Concurrent Jurisdiction:
    Once the Central Government has notified the Scheme under Section 151A, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) and the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). The entire process of reassessment must be routed through the faceless system.
    Any notice issued or order passed by the JAO outside this mechanism is without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio.

  3. Section 151A — Subordinate Legislation:
    The Scheme notified under Section 151A is a form of subordinate legislation, binding on all authorities under the Act. Non-compliance with the statutory procedure prescribed therein vitiates the entire reassessment proceedings.

  4. Revenue’s Contention Rejected:
    Argument of the Revenue that Section 144B does not cover issuance of notices under Section 148 and hence JAOs can issue such notices independently, was rejected. The Court held that Section 151A itself expressly covers both issuance of notices under Section 148 and reassessments under Section 147.

  5. Supreme Court Approval:
    The issue is no longer res integra, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by order dated 18.08.2025 in SLP (C) Diary No. 39689/2025, has upheld the Bombay High Court’s decision in Prakash Pandurang Patil v. ITO, Ward-5, Panvel & Ors (W.P. No. 10749/2024), which followed Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT & Ors [(2024) 464 ITR 430 (Bom)].

  6. Consistent Judicial View:
    The same interpretation has been taken by other High Courts —

    • Telangana HC: Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy v. ITO (2023) 156 Taxmann.com 178

    • Gauhati HC: Ram Narayan Sah v. Union of India (2024) 156 Taxmann.com 478

    • Punjab & Haryana HC: Jatinder Singh Banngu v. UOI (2024) 165 Taxmann.com 115

    • Telangana HC: Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola v. DCIT (2024) 167 Taxmann.com 411

    • Calcutta HC: Giridhar Gopal Dalmia v. UOI (M.A.T. 1690/2023 decided 25.09.2024)

  7. Effect of Violation:
    Issuance of reassessment notice or passing of order under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d), or 148 by the JAO, after 29.03.2022, amounts to violation of the statutory scheme and is therefore void.

Result:

  • All Writ Petitions Allowed.

  • Impugned notices and orders under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d), and 148 set aside.

  • Consequential proceedings annulled.

Ganga Eswar Kona vs The National Faceless Assessment ... on 28 October, 2025

                                        1

              THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

                                      AND

    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

WRIT PETITION Nos:

14681/2023; 112/2025; 158/2025; 211/2025; 337/2025; 660/2024; 1445/2025; 1485/2025;

1514/2025; 1537/2025; 1539/2025; 2056/2025; 2142/2025; 2390/2025; 2639/2025;

2947/2025; 3810/2025; 3940/2025; 4270/2024; 4285/2024; 4292/2024; 4296/2024;

4340/2024; 4341/2025; 4677/2025; 4780/2025; 4901/2024; 4991/2024; 5266/2024;

5385/2024; 5450/2025; 5452/2024; 5534/2025; 5538/2025; 5542/2025; 5543/2025;

5561/2025; 5564/2025; 5805/2025; 5866/2025; 5934/2025; 5936/2025; 6096/2025;

6161/2025; 6162/2025; 6304/2024; 6424/2024; 6605/2025; 6718/2025; 6731/2025;

7394/2024; 7694/2024; 7695/2024; 7704/2024; 7706/2024; 8129/2024; 8134/2024;

8164/2024; 8256/2024; 8266/2024; 8274/2024; 8281/2024; 8282/2024; 8283/2024;

8294/2024; 8295/2024; 8297/2024; 8372/2024; 8527/2024; 8649/2024; 8786/2025;

8795/2025; 8896/2025; 8944/2025; 8966/2025; 9006/2024; 9083/2024; 9128/2024;

9295/2024; 9476/2024; 9517/2024; 9657/2024; 9713/2024; 9726/2024; 9792/2024;

9794/2024; 9797/2024; 9801/2024; 9803/2024; 9805/2024; 9806/2024; 9944/2024;

10212/2024; 10349/2024; 10361/2024; 10367/2024; 10552/2024; 10579/2024; 10634/2024;

10635/2024; 10636/2024; 10651/2024; 10791/2024; 10807/2024; 11105/2024; 11168/2024;

11212/2024; 11214/2024; 11241/2024; 11254/2024; 11256/2024; 11341/2024; 11382/2024;

11391/2024;11401/2024;11582/2024;11605/2024; 11652/2024; 11751/2024; 12324/2024;

12426/2024; 12452/2024; 12560/2025; 12564/2025; 12567/2025; 12731/2025; 12734/2025;

12825/2023; 12870/2024; 12989/2024; 13045/2024; 13128/2024; 13177/2024; 13284/2024;

13324/2024; 13402/2025; 13419/2024; 13458/2024; 13460/2024; 13605/2024; 13624/2024;

13629/2024;13631/2024;13692/2025;13745/2024;13862/2024;13893/2024;13924/2024;139

25/2024; 14128/2024; 14135/2024; 14140/2024; 14142/2024; 14350/2025; 14508/2024;

14615/2024; 14616/2024; 14617/2024; 14623/2024; 14655/2025; 14668/2025; 14675/2025;

14678/2023; 14685/2025; 14713/2024; 14785/2024; 14792/2024; 14852/2023; 14855/2025;

15047/2024; 15238/2024; 15681/2024; 15794/2025; 15895/2025; 15902/2025; 15903/2025;

15966/2025; 16130/2024; 16178/2024; 16264/2025; 16301/2024; 16442/2024; 16443/2024;

16454/2024; 16842/2025; 16923/2024; 16977/2024; 17007/2024; 17295/2024; 17456/2022;

17850/2024; 17858/2024; 17895/2024; 17897/2024; 17902/2024; 18278/2025; 18390/2024;

18669/2024; 18722/2024; 19003/2025; 19008/2025; 19015/2025; 19048/2024; 19064/2024;

19075/2024; 19157/2025; 19371/2025; 19539/2025; 19684/2024; 19729/2024; 19938/2025;

20095/2024; 20104/2024; 20113/2024; 20410/2024; 20466/2025; 20629/2025; 20633/2024;

20725/2024; 20745/2025; 20950/2024; 21010/2024; 21046/2024; 21097/2024; 21111/2024;

21112/2024; 21113/2024; 21116/2024; 21117/2024; 21120/2024; 21121/2024; 21128/2024;

21129/2024;21130/2024;21599/2024;21879/2024; 21881/2024; 21883/2024; 22277/2024;

22339/2024; 22341/2024; 23385/2024; 23636/2024; 23639/2024; 23998/2024; 24907/2024;

24908/2024; 24909/2024; 24910/2024; 24916/2024; 24920/2024; 25305/2024; 25307/2024;

26168/2024; 27702/2024; 27717/2024; 27765/2024; 27875/2024; 27935/2024; 28282/2024;

28394/2024;28433/2024;28436/2024;28452/2024;28457/2024;28463/2024;28499/2023;285

00/2024; 28510/2024; 28520/2023; 28858/2024; 29219/2024; 29238/2024; 29250/2024;

29260/2024; 29345/2024; 29353/2024; 29443/2024; 29495/2024; 29768/2023; 29960/2023;

29980/2024; 30332/2024; 30334/2024; 30453/2024; 31418/2024; 31645/2023; 31762/2023;

31805/2023; 32028/2023; 32056/2023; 32074/2023; 32177/2023; 32179/2023; 32186/2023;

32364/2023; 32366/2023; 32368/2023; 32486/2023; 32489/2023; 32740/2023; 33047/2023;

33089/2023; 33219/2023; 33229/2023; 33232/2023; 33647/2023; 13747/2025; 16945/2025,

                                         2


18368/2025,18732/2025; 19422/2025; 20185/2025; 21533/2025; 21975/2025; 22201/2025;

22673/2025; 22866/2025; 23299/2025; 23301/2025; 23314/2025; 23930/2025; 23983/2025;

24016/2025;24334/2025;24339/2025;24536/2025; 25086/2025; 25482/2025; 26135/2025

and 26840/2025


                                       *****


COMMON ORDER:

(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand) Heard respective counsel appearing for the petitioners and the respondents in all Writ Petitions. Perused the material available on record.


2. As the issue involved in all these Writ Petitions is one and the same, all these Writ Petitions are disposed of by a common order.


3. All these Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the notices issued to the petitioners under Section 148-A(b) and orders passed under Section 140-(A)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the consequential notices issued under Section 148 by the respondents.


4. For proper adjudication, of these cases, it is desirable and relevant to look into the background of "Faceless Assessment Scheme" under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as herein under:


(i) The Finance Act, 2018 provides for making a Scheme to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating interface between the assessing officer and the assessee, optimizing the utilization of resources through economics of scale and functional specialization and introducing team-based assessment with dynamic jurisdiction for the purpose of making assessment. Accordingly, a Scheme namely ('E-Assessment Scheme, 2019) was formulated containing detailed procedure to be followed for the purpose of making assessment and the same was notified on 12.01.2019. Initially, this Scheme was made applicable to the assessment under Section 143(3). Later, the proceedings under Section 144 were also included in this Scheme. Subsequently, the said Scheme was modified into 'Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019' and the same was notified.

(ii) The Financial Act, 2021 introduced Section 144(B) in the Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 01.04.2021, incorporating the Faceless Assessment Scheme, directly into the Act with certain modifications. The said provision was amended by the Finance Act, 2022 to include proceedings under Section 147 of the Act also under the Scheme of Faceless Assessment. Thus, the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019 stands inapplicable with effect from 01.04.2021 after introduction of this Scheme under Section 144(B) of the Act.


(iii) With effect from 01.11.2020, introduced Section 151(a) in the Income Tax Act, 1961 for Faceless Assessment of Income Tax Escaping Assessment, vide the Taxation and other laws (relaxation and amendment of certain provisions) Act, 2020. The said provision contemplates a scheme to be made by the Government vide notification and the official gazette for the purpose of assessment, re-assessment or re-computation under Section 147 or issuance of notice(s) under Section 148, conducting of enquiries, issuance of show cause notices, passing of order(s) under Section 148 (a) and sanction for issue of notice under Section 151 of the Act so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating the interface between the income tax authority and the assessee or any other person to the extent technologically feasible. It is also sought to optimize utilization of resources through economics of scale and financial specialization and to introduce a team-based assessment, re-assessment or re-computation or issuance or sanction of notice with automatic jurisdiction.


(iv) Therefore, the Government of India notified the "E-Income Assessment Scheme, 2022" on 29.03.2022 for assessment, re-assessment or re-computation under Section 147 of the Act and for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act through automated allocation as referred to in Section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice and in a faceless manner to the extent in Section 144 (B) of the Act. Thus, re-allocation proceedings are brought into the faceless scheme with the incorporation of Section 151 (A) of the Income Tax Act.


(v) The procedure for the faceless assessment scheme has laid down in Section 144 (B) of the Act is as herein under:-


(a)The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) assigns case selected for faceless assessment through automated allocation system to assessment unit.

(b)The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) intimates the assessee that assessment shall be completed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 144 (B) of the Act.

(c)Notice is served to assessee through The National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) under Section 143 (2) or 142 (1) of the Act and assessee may file his response within specified date mentioned in the notice to NFAC, which shall forward the same to the assessment unit.

(d)The detailed process for faceless by NFAC is as laid down in Section 144 (B)(1)(iv to XXXII) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

5. Contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners:


(i) It is the contention of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners that after introduction of the "E-Assessment of Income Tax Escape Scheme, 2022" which came into force from 29.03.2022, it has become mandatory for the revenue to conduct/initiate proceedings pertaining to re-

assessment under Section 147 and 148 of the Act in a faceless manner. As such, the impugned orders/notices issued under Section 148 (A)(D) of the Act as well as the notices under Section 148 of the Act which were issued by the jurisdictional assessment officer ("JAO"), are not in accordance with the procedure provided under the said scheme and accordingly, it is liable to be set-aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.


(ii) They further contend that the arbitrary action of revenue would frustrate the very object of the new re-assessment brought in the way of amendments in the Income Tax Act, 1961 through the Finance Act, 2021. They further contend that if the revenue is allotted to proceed further, despite the petitioner strictly abiding by law, it would cause great hardship to the petitioners and would result in sheer harassment.


(iii) The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 12.08.2024 in W.P.No.10749 of 2024, in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Others, to substantiate their stand and would submit that the said judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by its order, dated 18.08.2025 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 39689/2025. In the light of the said judgments, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the issue involved in the present Writ Petitions is squarely covered in the decisions stated supra and accordingly, sought to allow these Writ Petitions.


6. Contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents:


(i) On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the notification in S.O.1466 (E) dated 29.03.2022 does not state whether the notice is to be issued by the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) or the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (J.A.O)., the said notification speaks of the scope of the scheme with regard to the procedure covered by it and lays down the legal contours of how such procedures are to be carried out. It states that the issuances of notices under Section 148 of the Act, shall be through admitted allocation in accordance with the risk management strategy and that the assessment shall be in a faceless manner to the extent provided in Section 144 (B) of the Act.

(ii) The learned Standing Counsel would contend that it is apparent that in the process for re-assessment, as it exceeds as on today, both are being followed accordingly, they would contend that it will be in correct to state that the issuance of notice by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer is without jurisdiction. They further contend that since Section 144 (B) of the Act does not provide for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, there can be no ambiguity in the fact that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer still has the jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act. Accordingly, learned Standing Counsel submits that the notices/orders issued under Section 148 A/ 148 of the Act still hold good and cannot be termed as without jurisdiction and each case will have to be dealt with independently.


7. Discussion and findings:


(A). The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5, Panvel & Others by following the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors 1 had considered the effect and interpretation of the Section 151 (A) of the Income Tax as extracted herein under:

"3. It is apparent that the impugned notice dated 5 April, 2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act and the order of the same date under Section 148A(d) of the Act are issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer ("JAO") and not under the mandatory faceless mechanism as per the provisions of Section 151 A of the Act. For a notice to be validly issued under Section 148 of the Act, the respondent No.2 would be required to comply with the provisions of Section 151A of the Act, so as to adhere to the faceless mechanism, as notified by the Central Government by notification dated 29 March 2022. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors 2 had considered the effect and interpretation of the said provision. The relevant extract of the said decision reads thus:-

35. Further, in our view, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and the FAO for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act or even for passing assessment or reassessment order. When specific jurisdiction has been assigned (2024) 464 ITR 430 (2024) 464 ITR 430 to either the JAO or the FAO in the scheme dated 29.03.2022, then it is to the exclusion of the other.

To take any other view in the matter, would not only result in chaos but also render the whole faceless proceedings redundant. If the argument of Revenue is to be accepted, then even when notices are issued by the FAO, it would be open to an assessee to make submission before the JAO and vice versa, which is clearly not contemplated in the Act.


Therefore, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of both FAO or the JAO with respect to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The Scheme dated 29th March 2022 in paragraph 3 clearly provides that the issuance of notice "shall be through automated allocation" which means that the same is mandatory and is required to be followed by the Department and does not give any discretion to the Department to choose whether to follow it or not. That automated allocation is defined in paragraph 2


(b) of the Scheme to mean an algorithm for randomised allocation of cases by using suitable technological tools including artificial intelligence and machine learning with a view to optimise the use of resources. Therefore, it means that the case can be allocated randomly to any officer who would then have jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148 of the Act, It is not the case of respondent No.1 that respondent No.1 was the random officer who had been allocated jurisdiction.


36. With respect to the argument of the Revenue, i.e., the notification dated 29th March, 2022 provides that the Scheme so framed is applicable only 'to the extent' provided in Section 144 B of the Act and Section 144 B of the Act does not refer to issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act and hence, the notice cannot be issued by the FAO as per the said Scheme, we express our view as follows:-


Section 151A of the Act itself contemplates formulation of Scheme for both assessment, reassessment or re-computation under Section 147 as well as for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. Therefore, the Scheme framed by the CBDT, which covers both the aforesaid aspect of the provisions of Section 151A of the Act cannot be said to be applicable only for one aspect, i.e., proceedings post the issue of notice under Section 148 of the Act being assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147 of the Act and inapplicable to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The Scheme is clearly applicable for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act and accordingly, it is only the FAO which can issue the notice under Section 148 of the Act and not the JAO. The argument advanced by respondent would render clause 3(b) of the Scheme otiose and to be ignored or contravened, as according to respondent, even though the Scheme specifically provides for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act in a faceless manner, no notice is required to be issued under Section 148 of the Act in a faceless manner. In such a situation, not only clause 3(b) but also the first two lines below clause 3(b) would be otiose, as it deals with the aspect of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. Respondents, being an authority subordinate to the CBDT, and which has been laid before both House of Parliament is partly otiose and inapplicable....."

37. When an authority acts contrary to law, the said act of the Authority is required to be quashed and set aside as invalid and bad in law and the person seeking to quash such an action is not required to establish prejudice from the said Act. An act which is done by an authority contrary to the provisions of the statue, itself causes prejudice to assessee. All assessees are entitled to be assessed as per law and by following the procedure prescribed by law.

Therefore, when the Income Tax Authority proposes to take action against an assessee without following the due process of law, the said action itself results in a prejudice to assessee. Therefore, there is no question of petitioner having to prove further prejudice before arguing the invalidity of the notice.


4. It is hence apparent that in the present case, the impugned order and the notices issued by respondent no.1 are not in compliance with the Scheme notified by the Central Government implementing the provisions of Section 151A of the Act. The Scheme, as tabled before the Parliament as per the requirements of the said provision, is in the nature of a subordinate legislation, which governs the conduct of proceedings under Section 148A as well as Section 148 of the Act. Thus, in view of the explicit declaration of the law in Hexaware Technologies Limited (supra), the grievance of the petitioner- assessee insofar as it relates to an invalid issuance of the impugned order and the notice is required to be accepted.


5. Learned Counsel for the parties agree that in this view of the matter, the proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act would not be sustainable and are rendered invalid in view of the judgment rendered in Hexaware Technologies Limited (supra)." (B). Further, it is very apt to refer the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in the case of Kanakanala Ravindra Reddy Vs. Income Tax Officer 3 , decided on 14.09.2023 whereby a batch of Writ Petitions were allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 148A as also under Section 148 of the Act were held to be bad with consequential reliefs on the ground of it being in violation of the provisions of Section 151 A of the Act read with Notification 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022.


(C). It is also to be noted that the same issue had also been decided by various High Courts in India i.e., Gauhati High Court in the case of Ram Narayan Sah Vs. Union of India 4, Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jatinder Singh Banngu Vs. Union of India5 and Telangana High Court in the case of Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax6. Some views have been taken by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Giridhar Gopal Dalmia Vs.Union of India Vs. Ors7, (2023) 156 taxmann.com 178 (Telangana) (2024) 156 taxmann.com 478 (Gauhati) (2024) 165 taxmann.com 115(Punjab & Haryana) (2024) 167 taxmann.com 411 (Telangana) M.A.T. 1690 of 2023 decided on 25.09.2024. In these decisions, the various High Courts allowed the Writ Petitions in favour of the assessee in so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned.


(D). Admittedly, the Supreme Court has upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash Pandurang Patil Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5 Panvel & Ors in S.L.P.(Civil) Diary No.39689/2025, dated 18.08.2025, wherein, the Bombay High Court has allowed the said Writ Petition by following the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors. In view of the above factual position, we are of the considered view that the issue involved in the present batch of Writ Petitions is no more res integra.


(E). Considering the background in notifying the (E-Assessment Scheme of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022) notified by the Government of India on 29.03.2022, and in the light of the decisions of various High Courts stated supra and upon careful consideration of the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing on either side, we hold that the impugned notices and orders which have been issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer, or outside the faceless mechanism as provided under the provisions of Section 144 (b) read with Section 151 A and the "E-Assessment Scheme of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022" notified by the Government of India on 29.03.2022 under Section 151 A, is bad and illegal. It is made clear that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer ("JAO") had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned orders/notices.


(F). In view of the foregoing reasons, all these Writ Petitions are to be allowed in favour of the petitioners, by setting aside the impugned notices/orders.


8. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are allowed.


(i) Consequently, the impugned notices/orders issued under Sections 148-A(b), 148-A(d) and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all these Writ Petitions, are hereby set-aside.


(ii) The consequential orders, if any, shall stand set-aside.


9. There shall be no order as to costs.


As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.



__________________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND __________________________________ JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA Note: - Registry to issue C.C. separately in each case. [B/o] PKR Dated: 28 .10.2025 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA WRIT PETITION Nos. 14681/2023 and batch Dated: 28 .10.2025 PKR

Tuesday, October 28, 2025

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 195A — Threatening any person to give false evidence — Nature of offence — Cognizable or non-cognizable — Procedure for prosecution. Held: The offence under Section 195A IPC is a distinct and cognizable offence, and not governed by Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Accordingly, the police are empowered to register an FIR and investigate such offence under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC. The insertion of Section 195A CrPC (2009) only provides an additional remedy enabling a witness or any other person to file a complaint before a Magistrate, but does not preclude police investigation. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 195(1)(b)(i), read with Sections 340 and 195A CrPC — Scope and applicability — Distinction between offences under Sections 193–196 IPC and Section 195A IPC. Held: Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC applies only to offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC (false evidence and offences against public justice) and not to Section 195A IPC, which was introduced later and specifically categorized as cognizable in the First Schedule to CrPC. Therefore, a complaint by the concerned Court is not a precondition for taking cognizance or initiating investigation for an offence under Section 195A IPC. Interpretation of Statutes — Harmonious construction — Legislative omission — Casus omissus — When not to be supplied by Court. Held: Courts cannot invoke the doctrine of casus omissus to fill in legislative gaps where the statutory language is clear. However, where legislative intent is discernible, provisions may be construed harmoniously to give full effect to the law. The absence of express exclusion of Section 195A IPC from Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC does not mean it is covered thereby — the scheme, context, and classification indicate a clear legislative intention to treat it separately as a cognizable offence. Practice and Procedure — FIR under Section 195A IPC — Validity — Complaint under Section 195A CrPC — Permissive, not mandatory. Held: The word “may” in Section 195A CrPC is permissive and not mandatory. A threatened witness or any other person may either: Give information to the police and initiate FIR (being a cognizable offence), or File a direct complaint before the Magistrate. Both routes are valid — the latter being an additional remedy, not an exclusive one. High Court Orders — Kerala and Karnataka High Courts — Erroneous view. Held: The High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka erred in holding that the offence under Section 195A IPC required compliance with Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC. Such interpretation is contrary to the statutory scheme and legislative intent. Their orders were accordingly set aside, and the proceedings restored. Result: Appeals allowed. Kerala High Court order dated 04.04.2023 (B.A. No. 556 of 2023) set aside; bail of accused cancelled (with liberty to reapply on other grounds). Karnataka High Court orders dated 22.01.2025 in Crl. Petition No. 11719/2023 and Crl. Revision No. 123/2023 set aside; cognizance and trial court orders restored.


Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 195A — Threatening any person to give false evidence — Nature of offence — Cognizable or non-cognizable — Procedure for prosecution.

Held:
The offence under Section 195A IPC is a distinct and cognizable offence, and not governed by Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
Accordingly, the police are empowered to register an FIR and investigate such offence under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC.
The insertion of Section 195A CrPC (2009) only provides an additional remedy enabling a witness or any other person to file a complaint before a Magistrate, but does not preclude police investigation.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 195(1)(b)(i), read with Sections 340 and 195A CrPC — Scope and applicability — Distinction between offences under Sections 193–196 IPC and Section 195A IPC.

Held:
Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC applies only to offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC (false evidence and offences against public justice) and not to Section 195A IPC, which was introduced later and specifically categorized as cognizable in the First Schedule to CrPC.
Therefore, a complaint by the concerned Court is not a precondition for taking cognizance or initiating investigation for an offence under Section 195A IPC.

Interpretation of Statutes — Harmonious construction — Legislative omission — Casus omissus — When not to be supplied by Court.

Held:
Courts cannot invoke the doctrine of casus omissus to fill in legislative gaps where the statutory language is clear.
However, where legislative intent is discernible, provisions may be construed harmoniously to give full effect to the law.
The absence of express exclusion of Section 195A IPC from Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC does not mean it is covered thereby — the scheme, context, and classification indicate a clear legislative intention to treat it separately as a cognizable offence.

Practice and Procedure — FIR under Section 195A IPC — Validity — Complaint under Section 195A CrPC — Permissive, not mandatory.

Held:
The word “may” in Section 195A CrPC is permissive and not mandatory.
A threatened witness or any other person may either:

  1. Give information to the police and initiate FIR (being a cognizable offence), or

  2. File a direct complaint before the Magistrate.

Both routes are valid — the latter being an additional remedy, not an exclusive one.


High Court Orders — Kerala and Karnataka High Courts — Erroneous view.

Held:
The High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka erred in holding that the offence under Section 195A IPC required compliance with Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC.
Such interpretation is contrary to the statutory scheme and legislative intent.
Their orders were accordingly set aside, and the proceedings restored.

Result:

Appeals allowed.
Kerala High Court order dated 04.04.2023 (B.A. No. 556 of 2023) set aside; bail of accused cancelled (with liberty to reapply on other grounds).

Karnataka High Court orders dated 22.01.2025 in Crl. Petition No. 11719/2023 and Crl. Revision No. 123/2023 set aside; cognizance and trial court orders restored.2025 INSC 1260

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ............... OF 2025

[@ SLP (Crl.) No. 6238 of 2024]

State of Kerala … Appellant

versus

Suni @ Sunil … Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. .................. OF 2025

[@ SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8223-8224 of 2025]

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. Leave granted.

2. In Maktool Singh vs. State of Punjab1

, this Court had observed

that precision and brevity are generally the hallmarks of legislative

draftsmanship. The cases on hand, however, bear testimony to how laxity

in such draftsmanship can generate and be a source of litigation.

3. The issue presently is as to how the offence under Section 195A of

the erstwhile Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), has to be construed and

dealt with. Section 195A IPC reads as follows: -

1 (1999) 3 SCC 321

2

‘Section 195A – Threatening any person to give false evidence. -

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or

property or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person

is interested, with intent to cause that person to give false evidence

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both;

and if innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence of

such false evidence, with death or imprisonment for more than seven

years, the person who threatens shall be punished with the same

punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same extent

such innocent person is punished and sentenced.’

4. This offence was introduced in the IPC with effect from 16.04.2006,

vide Act No. 2 of 2006. It found place in Chapter XI, titled ‘Of false

evidence and offences against public justice’. Section 191 was the first

provision in this chapter and was titled ‘Giving false evidence’. It stated

that, whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision

of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon

any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either

knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give

false evidence. Section 192 IPC defined ‘Fabricating false evidence’ and

Section 193 IPC provided the punishment therefor. It reads thus:

‘193. Punishment for false evidence. -

Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial

proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used

in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;

and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any

other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to

fine.’

3

5. The offences under paras 1 and 2 of Section 193 IPC were

both non-cognizable, as reflected in the First Schedule to the erstwhile

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The offence under para 1 was

triable by a Magistrate of First Class while the offence under para 2 thereof

was triable by any Magistrate. Both the offences were bailable.

6. Section 194 IPC dealt with ‘Giving or fabricating false evidence with

intent to procure conviction of capital offence’ and it reads as under: -

‘194. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure

conviction of capital offence. - Whoever gives or fabricates false

evidence, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he

will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which is

capital by the law for the time being in force in India shall be punished

with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term

which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;

if innocent person be thereby convicted and executed. - and if an

innocent person be convicted and executed in consequence of such

false evidence, the person who gives such false evidence shall be

punished either with death or the punishment hereinbefore described.’

The offences under para 1 and para 2 above were also

non-cognizable and they were both triable by a Court of Sessions. Further,

both offences were non-bailable.

7. Section 195 IPC dealt with giving or fabricating false evidence with

intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with imprisonment for

life or imprisonment for a term of seven years or upwards. This offence

was non-cognizable, non-bailable and was triable by a Court of Sessions.

8. Sections 196 to 200 IPC dealt with other facets of perjury, i.e., using

evidence known to be false; issuing or signing a false certificate; using as 

4

true a certificate known to be false; false statement made in declaration

which is by law receivable as evidence; and using as true such declaration

knowing it to be false. All these offences were punishable in the same

manner as if the person convicted therefor gave/fabricated false evidence.

All these offences were also non-cognizable.

9. Parallelly, Section 195 CrPC was titled ‘Prosecution for contempt of

lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and

for offences relating to documents given in evidence’. For the purposes of

these cases, Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is of relevance. It reads thus: -

‘195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public

servants, for offences against public justice and for offences

relating to documents given in evidence. –

(1) No Court shall take cognizance -

(a) …

(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections

of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193

to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive)

and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been

committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court,

or.........

 (ii) …

 (iii) …

except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the

Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some

other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

(2) ……..’

10. Therefore, as per the scheme of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, an

offence punishable under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive) could not

be taken cognizance of by a Court, when such offence was alleged to

have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court,

5

except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of that

Court, as may be authorized by that Court in writing in that behalf, or of

some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

11. The procedure to be followed in such cases was detailed in Section

340 CrPC. This provision reads as under: -

‘340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.-

(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise,

any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that

an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of

Sub-Section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed

in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be,

in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a

proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary

inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary;-

a. record a finding to that effect;

b. make a complaint thereof in writing;

c. send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;

d. take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before

such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court

thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such

Magistrate; and

e. bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such

Magistrate.

(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an

offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a

complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected

an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the

Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of

sub-section (4) of section 195.

(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed, -

(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such

officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such

officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.

(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195.”

6

12. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforestated provision that if,

upon receiving an application, any Court is of the opinion that an inquiry

should be made into the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b) CrPC,

which appear to have been committed in, or in relation to, a proceeding in

that Court or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a

proceeding in that Court it may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it

thinks fit, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in

writing to a jurisdictional Magistrate of First Class.

13. Now, a look at more general provisions which are also of relevance.

The word ‘Complaint’ was defined by Section 2(d) CrPC to mean any

allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking

action under the CrPC, that some person, whether known or unknown,

has committed an offence, but did not include a police report. The

Explanation appended thereto, however, clarified that a report made by a

police officer in a case which disclosed, after investigation, the

commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a

complaint; and the police officer by whom such report was made shall be

deemed to be the complainant.

14. ‘Cognizable offence’, as defined by Section 2(c) CrPC, meant an

offence for which, and ‘cognizable case’ meant a case in which, a police

officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule thereto or under any

other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. A 

7

‘non-cognizable offence’, as defined by Section 2(l) CrPC, meant an

offence for which, and ‘non-cognizable case’ meant a case in which, a

police officer had no authority to arrest without warrant.

15. Section 154 CrPC dealt with information being given of the

commission of a cognizable offence and how it was to be processed.

Section 155 CrPC dealt with how information as to commission of a

non-cognizable case was to be processed and investigated. Section 156

CrPC dealt with a police officer’s power to investigate a cognizable case.

These provisions, to the extent relevant, read as under: -

‘154. Information in cognizable cases. -

(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable

offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall

be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over

to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing

or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving

it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by

such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in

this behalf.

Provided that …… :

Provided further that -……

(2) A copy of the information as recorded under Sub-Section (1) shall

be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

(3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in

charge of a police station to record the information referred to in

Sub-Section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing

and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied

that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable

offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an

investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in

the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the

powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that

offence.

8

155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of

such cases. -

(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station

of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable

offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the

information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the

State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer, the

informant to the Magistrate.

(2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without

the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the

case for trial.

(3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same

powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest

without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise

in a cognizable case.

(4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one

is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case,

notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable.’

156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case. -

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a

Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having

jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would

have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage

be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such

officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an

investigation as above-mentioned.

16. The above provisions make it clear that the procedure to be followed

apropos a cognizable offence is vastly different from the procedure

relating to a non-cognizable offence - in the context of how information as

to commission of such offence is to be dealt with and how it is to be

investigated. When information as to commission of a non-cognizable

offence is given to a jurisdictional police officer, he must record the same 

9

in the manner prescribed and refer the informant to a Magistrate. Section

155(2) CrPC makes it clear that a non-cognizable case cannot even be

investigated without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such

case or commit it for trial. It is only after receipt of such order that a police

officer can exercise the same powers in respect of investigation, except

the power to arrest without warrant, as an officer in charge of a police

station may exercise in relation to a cognizable case.

17. This being the scheme obtaining at the time that Section 195A IPC

came to be inserted in the statute book, the issue is as to how the offence

thereunder is to be dealt with. The conundrum arises due to the fact that

Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC remained unchanged even after insertion of

Section 195A IPC. As noted earlier, Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC stated that

offences punishable under Sections 193 IPC to 196 IPC (both inclusive)

could not be taken cognizance of until a complaint in writing was made by

the Court concerned or by an officer authorized by that Court or by a

superior Court. Section 195A IPC, introduced in 2006, obviously fell

between Sections 193 IPC to 196 IPC but the issue is whether the same

procedure would apply to the offence thereunder.

18. Notably, in Salib alias Shalu alias Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

and others2

, this Court found, on facts, that the ingredients to constitute

2 (2023) 20 SCC 194

10

an offence under Section 195A IPC were not made out and, therefore,

while noting that the said offence was a cognizable one whereby a police

officer would have the power to investigate it, the question as to whether

Section 195 CrPC would apply to that offence was left open.

19. Pertinent to note, when Section 195A IPC was inserted in the statute

book in the year 2006, an amendment was also made in the First

Schedule to the CrPC, inserting Section 195A IPC therein, specifically

categorizing it as a ‘cognizable offence’, unlike the offences under

Sections 193 IPC, 194 IPC, 195 IPC and 196 IPC, which were shown as

non-cognizable offences. Significantly, an amendment was also made in

Section 195(1) of the CrPC by the very same Act No. 2 of 2006, with effect

from 16.04.2006, whereby the phrase ‘or by such officer of the Court as

that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf’, came to be inserted in

addition to the existing ‘except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or

of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate’. Unfortunately,

while making this amendment in Section 195(1) CrPC, the lawmakers did

not deem it necessary to clarify whether the offence under Section 195A

IPC was to be treated as an exception to the procedure prescribed for the

other offences, referred to in Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, by excluding it

specifically from the ambit thereof. However, in the year 2009, Section

195A CrPC was introduced in the statute with effect from 31.12.2009, vide

Act No. 5 of 2009. This provision reads as under: -

11

‘195A. Procedure for witnesses in case of threatening, etc.-

A witness or any other person may file a complaint in relation to an

offence under section 195A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).’

20. This provision made it clear that a witness or any other person could

file a complaint about commission of an offence under Section 195A IPC.

This procedure was demonstrably dichotomous with the procedure under

Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, as the offences enumerated thereunder

required the complaint to be made only by the Court concerned or by an

officer authorized by that Court or by a superior Court. In that scenario,

there was no possibility of any other person making a complaint

independently. Section 195A CrPC made it manifest that this was not the

case with an offence under Section 195A IPC!

21. The ticklish issue of Section 195A IPC has troubled several High

Courts resulting in contradictory and inconsistent views. In Rahul Yadav

vs. State and another3

, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court observed

that the offence under Section 195A IPC was a cognizable one and,

therefore, it was within the power of the police officer concerned to register

an FIR. The learned Judge observed that Section 195A CrPC only

provided an additional remedy of filing a complaint in relation to the

offence punishable under Section 195A IPC but it did not declare the

offence under Section 195A IPC to be a non-cognizable offence.

3 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8271

12

22. In Abdul Razzak vs. State of M.P. and another4

, a learned Judge

of the Madhya Pradesh High Court affirmed and followed the view taken

in Rahul Yadav (supra). On similar lines, in Homnath Niroula vs. State

of West Bengal5

, a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court observed

that the restriction imposed on procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC

was not applicable to cases arising under Section 195A IPC. Again, in

Ramlal Dhakad and others vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh6

, a

learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court noted that the act of

threatening a person with the intention of making him give false evidence

constituted an offence under Section 195A IPC and actual false evidence

being given in Court, pursuant to such threat, is not the requirement. The

action of the police officer in registering an FIR in relation to the offence

under Section 195A IPC was, accordingly, held to be lawful and valid.

23. On the contrary, in Neput Rajiyung @ Action Dimasa @ Miput

Rajiyung vs. State of Assam and another7

, a learned Judge of the

Gauhati High Court opined that a separate procedure is laid down in

Sections 195 CrPC, 340 CrPC and 195A CrPC for launching prosecution

in relation to certain cognizable offences, including the offence of witness

threatening under Section 195A IPC. The learned Judge concluded that

4 2023 SCC OnLine MP 7152 = ILR 2024 MP 1067

5 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 7323

6 MCRC No. 31316 of 2020, decided on 22.01.2024

7 (2023) 6 Gauhati Law Reports 302

13

prosecution under Section 195A IPC can be launched by a witness or any

other person only by way of a complaint before a Magistrate and not by

way of an FIR before a police officer. This view was followed by a learned

Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sazid vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh8

.

24. In the cases on hand also, the High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka

proceeded under the assumption that the procedure under Section

195(1)(b)(i) CrPC was required to be followed in the context of an offence

committed under Section 195A IPC.

In the appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6238 of 2024, the

officer-in-charge of Koratty Police Station, Thrissur Rural, registered FIR

No. 1062 dated 05.12.2022 under Section 195A IPC read with Section

120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011. The offence alleged was that the de

facto complainant, who had turned approver in a murder case, was

threatened with dire consequences if he failed to give false evidence. The

accused in that FIR applied for bail on the ground that due procedure was

not followed in connection with the registration of the offence. A learned

Judge of the Kerala High Court held that the procedure under Section

195(1)(b)(i) CrPC had to be followed and granted him bail, by order dated

04.04.2023. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Kerala is before us.

8 2022 SCC OnLine MP 4583

14

The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8223-8224 of 2025 assail

separate orders dated 22.01.2025 passed by a learned Judge of the

Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No. 11719 of 2023 and Criminal

Revision Petition No.123 of 2023 respectively. Crime No. 135 of 2016 was

registered on 15.06.2016 in relation to the killing of one Yogesh Goudar.

This case was entrusted by the Government of Karnataka to the Central

Bureau of Investigation (CBI). During the course of investigation, the CBI

found that the charge-sheeted accused were not the ones who had

executed Yogesh Goudar and submitted its own chargesheet naming

different accused. Thereafter, the CBI found that some witnesses were

intimidated by those accused prior to examination before the Court and,

as a result, they had turned hostile. The CBI then brought the same to the

notice of the learned Principal Civil Judge & Principal Judicial Magistrate

(First Class), Dharwad, which was treated as a complaint under Section

195A CrPC, and cognizance was taken, vide order dated 04.12.2020.

Assailing the said order, one of the accused approached the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC in Criminal Petition No. 11719 of 2023

complaining of procedural irregularity. Another accused in that FIR filed a

discharge petition under Section 227 CrPC but the same was dismissed

by the learned LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru,

vide order dated 14.07.2022. Aggrieved thereby, the said accused filed a

revision petition in Criminal Revision Petition No.123 of 2023. 

15

By separate orders dated 22.01.2025 passed in the two cases, a

learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court set aside the orders dated

04.12.2020 and 14.07.2022 on the ground that the procedure under

Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC was not followed. The cognizance order dated

04.12.2020 was set aside along with the order dated 14.07.2022 and the

petitioner in Criminal Revision Petition No.123 of 2023 was discharged

from the array of accused. Hence, these appeals by the CBI.

25. The learned senior counsel appearing for the accused sought to rely

upon the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar

Sharma and others9

. We find such reliance to be misconceived, as that

was a case arising in a different statutory milieu under the Drugs and

Cosmetics Act, 1940. Section 32 thereof dealt with cognizance of offences

under Chapter IV and stated that such prosecution could be initiated only

by the persons/entities named therein. In that context, this Court held that

a police officer could not register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC in

relation to offences under Chapter IV, as only the persons mentioned in

Section 32 could initiate prosecution for such offences. The scheme of

that statute being entirely different, this decision has no relevance.

26. The further argument of the learned senior counsel is that the

offence under Section 195A IPC should be split up into two. His argument

9 (2021) 12 SCC 674

16

requires the provision to be interpreted in such a manner as to create two

categories of offences, that is, if the offence under Section 195A IPC is

committed in or in relation to a proceeding before the Court, then the

complaint would have to be made by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i)

CrPC duly following the procedure under Section 340 CrPC. However, if

the offence under Section 195A IPC is committed not in, or in relation to,

a proceeding before the Court, then Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC would not

be applicable so the Court cannot make a complaint in relation thereto

and it is for the victim of such offence to then file a complaint under Section

195A CrPC. We find no merit in this argument as it practically requires us

to rewrite the provision contrary to how it actually reads.

27. We may note, at this stage, that the shortfalls and lack of lucidity in

the statute do not constitute casus omissus, i.e., ‘a case of omission’. It is

well settled that it is not permissible for the Court to apply the doctrine of

casus omissus where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous

as the words used by the statue speak for themselves and it is not the

function of the Court to add words or expressions merely to suit what the

Court thinks is the intent of the legislature [See S.R. Bommai vs. Union

of India10]. As pointed out by a Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi vs.

Radha Devi Gupta11, while interpreting a statute, effort should be made

10 (1994) 3 SCC 1

11 (2005) 2 SCC 271

17

to give effect to each and every word used by the legislature and a

construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature should not be

accepted except for compelling reasons, such as obvious drafting errors.

However, in a situation where it is not an instance of casus omissus by

the draftsman of the legislation and there are ample means to gather the

clear intention of the lawmakers, the statutory provisions which are

seemingly lacking in clarity, but are actually not so, can be synchronized

so as to give effect to the legislation as intended, without the Court

venturing into the realm of legislative drafting. Such an exercise would

only require harmonious construction of the provisions so as to give full

effect to the legislation.

28. From the statutory scheme, as set out supra, it is clear that Section

195A IPC was conceptualized as an offence distinct and different from

those under Sections 193 IPC, 194 IPC, 195 IPC and 196 IPC. Those

offences require a complaint to be made only by those named in Section

195(1)(b)(i) CrPC and they were all non-cognizable offences. However,

an offence under Section 195A IPC was a cognizable offence and

pertained to inducing a person to give false evidence by intimidating

him/her with threat of injury either to his/her person or reputation or

property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is

interested. The threat to a witness may be given long before he comes to

the Court though the giving of false evidence, under such threat, is in 

18

connection with a proceeding before that Court. That is, perhaps, the

reason why this offence was made cognizable so that the threatened

witness or other person may take immediate steps by either giving oral

information of the commission of this cognizable offence to the concerned

police officer, under Section 154 CrPC, or by making a complaint to a

jurisdictional Magistrate, under Section 195A CrPC, so as to set the

process of criminal law in motion. Requiring that person to go before the

Court concerned, i.e., the Court in which the proceeding is pending in

relation to which false evidence is to be given, and inform it about the

threat received, thereby necessitating a complaint under Section

195(1)(b)(i) along with an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC, would only

cripple and hamper the process.

29. Section 195A CrPC, therefore, aimed at bringing clarity to the issue.

The threatened witness or other person could approach the police or file

a complaint in relation to an offence under Section 195A IPC so that the

process relating to cognizable offences could commence immediately.

The use of the word ‘may’ in Section 195A CrPC indicates that it is not

compulsory for a threatened witness or other person to only approach the

Magistrate concerned to complain of the offence under Section 195A IPC.

Given the scheme and structure of both the statutes, i.e., the IPC and the

CrPC, in the context of the offence under Section 195A IPC, we are not

persuaded by the argument that the word ‘may’ in Section 195A CrPC 

19

should be read as ‘shall’. The undeniable fact remains that the offence

under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence and once that is so, the

power of the police to take action in relation thereto under Sections 154

CrPC and 156 CrPC cannot be doubted. As the said offence is classified

as a cognizable offence, the process of criminal law can as well be set in

motion by giving information of the commission of such offence to the

concerned police officer under Section 154 CrPC. It is only by way of an

additional remedy that Section 195A CrPC permits the threatened witness

or any other person acting on his behalf to file a complaint before the

jurisdictional Magistrate to set the process of criminal law in motion. This

aspect has already been touched upon by this Court, though in the

passing, in Salib (supra). This, in our considered opinion, is the proper

and correct method of construing and giving effect to the relevant

provisions in relation to an offence under Section 195A IPC.

30. In the result, the interpretation placed upon such provisions by the

learned Judges of the Kerala and Karnataka High Courts is held to be

erroneous and unsustainable.

In consequence, the order dated 04.04.2023 passed by the Kerala

High Court in B.A. No. 556 of 2023 is set aside and the bail granted to the

accused, Suni @ Sunil, is set aside. He shall surrender before the Trial

Court within two weeks. However, as bail was granted to him only on the

limited ground of the procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC not being 

20

followed, which we have held to be incorrect, this order shall not preclude

him from seeking bail afresh on other grounds, if warranted.

The orders dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Karnataka High Court

in Criminal Petition No. 11719 of 2023 and Criminal Revision Petition No.

123 of 2023 respectively are set aside. In consequence, the cognizance

order dated 04.12.2020 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge &

Principal Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Dharwad, shall stand restored.

Further, the dismissal of the discharge application filed by the petitioner in

Criminal Revision Petition No. 123 of 2023, Sri Basayya Thirakaya

Hiremath, by the learned LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,

Bengaluru, vide order dated 14.07.2022, shall also stand restored.

The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.

 ……………………...J

 [SANJAY KUMAR]

 .……………………...J

[ALOK ARADHE]

New Delhi;

October 28, 2025.

. Criminal Law — Sections 302/149, 307/149, 147, 148 IPC — Unlawful assembly — Common object — Murder — Aggressor identified When a group of accused persons, forming an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, attack another party causing death and injuries, and the evidence establishes that the accused were the aggressors, conviction under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC is justified. Common object need not be premeditated; it can form on the spot when the members act in concert to commit the offence. 2. Evidence — Injured eyewitness — Credibility and evidentiary value Testimony of an injured eyewitness carries greater evidentiary value and cannot be discarded lightly. Unless shown to be unreliable or inconsistent with medical evidence, such testimony is sufficient to sustain conviction. (Ref: Bangal Singh (PW-2) — injured witness whose version corroborated by other eyewitnesses and medical evidence.) 3. Criminal Jurisprudence — Cross cases — Determination of aggressor In cases of cross FIRs arising out of the same incident, the Court must ascertain which party was the aggressor. The mere existence of injuries on both sides does not make it a “free fight.” When the accused side initiates the attack and inflicts fatal injuries, they cannot claim parity or right of private defence. (Here, appellants demolished the ridge and launched attack with sharp weapons.) 4. Delay in lodging FIR — Not always fatal Delay in lodging the FIR is not by itself sufficient to discard the prosecution case if the delay is reasonably explained — for example, when time was spent in taking the injured to hospital or arranging for treatment. (Complainant side’s delay of 3 days was explained satisfactorily.) 5. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC — “Sudden fight” — When not applicable The fourth exception to Section 300 (sudden fight, without premeditation, in heat of passion) is not applicable when: The accused side is the aggressor; Deadly weapons are used; Multiple blows are inflicted with intention to kill; and The attack is not in self-defence. (Hence, conviction for murder under Section 302/149 IPC upheld; not reduced to 304 Part II.) 6. Appeal under Article 136 — Interference with concurrent findings The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or involve gross misappreciation of material evidence. (Here, concurrent findings were consistent and supported by credible evidence.) 7. Motive — Boundary dispute — Supporting evidence Existence of a motive (boundary dispute decided against the accused) corroborates the prosecution case and reinforces the inference of premeditation and common object. 8. Medical evidence — Consistency with ocular testimony Medical evidence corroborating the nature and seat of injuries described by eyewitnesses strengthens the prosecution version. (Fatal incised wounds on the skull consistent with use of sharp-edged weapons like tabal and spade.) 9. Sentencing — Life imprisonment — Justified Where two persons were killed and others grievously injured in a deliberate group assault, the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/149 IPC and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 IPC is justified and proportionate.


. Criminal Law — Sections 302/149, 307/149, 147, 148 IPC — Unlawful assembly — Common object — Murder — Aggressor identified

When a group of accused persons, forming an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, attack another party causing death and injuries, and the evidence establishes that the accused were the aggressors, conviction under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC is justified. Common object need not be premeditated; it can form on the spot when the members act in concert to commit the offence.

2. Evidence — Injured eyewitness — Credibility and evidentiary value

Testimony of an injured eyewitness carries greater evidentiary value and cannot be discarded lightly. Unless shown to be unreliable or inconsistent with medical evidence, such testimony is sufficient to sustain conviction.
(Ref: Bangal Singh (PW-2) — injured witness whose version corroborated by other eyewitnesses and medical evidence.)

3. Criminal Jurisprudence — Cross cases — Determination of aggressor

In cases of cross FIRs arising out of the same incident, the Court must ascertain which party was the aggressor. The mere existence of injuries on both sides does not make it a “free fight.” When the accused side initiates the attack and inflicts fatal injuries, they cannot claim parity or right of private defence.
(Here, appellants demolished the ridge and launched attack with sharp weapons.)

4. Delay in lodging FIR — Not always fatal

Delay in lodging the FIR is not by itself sufficient to discard the prosecution case if the delay is reasonably explained — for example, when time was spent in taking the injured to hospital or arranging for treatment.
(Complainant side’s delay of 3 days was explained satisfactorily.)

5. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC — “Sudden fight” — When not applicable

The fourth exception to Section 300 (sudden fight, without premeditation, in heat of passion) is not applicable when:

  • The accused side is the aggressor;

  • Deadly weapons are used;

  • Multiple blows are inflicted with intention to kill; and

  • The attack is not in self-defence.
    (Hence, conviction for murder under Section 302/149 IPC upheld; not reduced to 304 Part II.)

6. Appeal under Article 136 — Interference with concurrent findings

The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or involve gross misappreciation of material evidence.
(Here, concurrent findings were consistent and supported by credible evidence.)

7. Motive — Boundary dispute — Supporting evidence

Existence of a motive (boundary dispute decided against the accused) corroborates the prosecution case and reinforces the inference of premeditation and common object.

8. Medical evidence — Consistency with ocular testimony

Medical evidence corroborating the nature and seat of injuries described by eyewitnesses strengthens the prosecution version.
(Fatal incised wounds on the skull consistent with use of sharp-edged weapons like tabal and spade.)

9. Sentencing — Life imprisonment — Justified

Where two persons were killed and others grievously injured in a deliberate group assault, the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/149 IPC and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 IPC is justified and proportionate.2025 INSC 1262

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 1 of 25

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1624 OF 2011

OM PAL & ORS …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P

(NOW STATE OF UTTARAKHAND) …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1613-1614 OF 2011

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. The present set of Appeals is directed against the common judgment and

order dated 29.11.2010 whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal appeals

filed by the appellants against their conviction under Section 302 read with

Sections 149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601.

1 “IPC”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 2 of 25

2. In the present set of Appeals, Criminal Appeal No.1624 of 2011 is filed by

appellants – Om Pal, Narendra and Ranvir; Criminal Appeal No.1613 of 2011 is

filed by Dharamvir; and Criminal Appeal No.1614 of 2011 was filed by Inchha

Ram, who has passed away during the pendency of the present Appeals.

Therefore, Criminal Appeal No.1614 of 2011 preferred by Inchha Ram stands

abated and the same is, accordingly, dismissed as such.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

3. In the present case, two sets of First Information Reports2 were lodged with

regard to the same incident which took place on 19.05.1988.

THE FIRST FIR

4. FIR No.65 dated 20.05.1988 was lodged under Sections 147, 148, 149,

323, 324 and 307 of the IPC from the side of the appellants stating that one

Molhar along with his brother Kantu and his sons, Narendra, Om Pal, Inchha,

Ranvir and Pardeep were cutting sugar cane and at the same time, Dile Ram,

Ved Pal, Bengal Singh, Sher Singh entered the field of the appellants along with

lathis, tabals and axes and started attacking the appellants. There was a fight

that ensued and, in the process, Kantu, Narendra, lnchha received several

injuries.

THE SECOND FIR

5. FIR No. 65A/1988 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324 and 506

of the IPC was lodged by the opposite/complainant side on 23.05.1988 that

2 “FIR”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 3 of 25

Molhar and Dharamvir Singh damaged their boundary of the field on 19.05.1988

and, thereafter, the appellants started beating Dile Ram with lathis, tabals, axes,

phawara due to which Dile Ram, Braham Singh and Bangal Singh received

serious injuries, both were taken to hospital where Dile Ram succumbed to the

injuries on 24.5.1988 and Braham Singh expired on 31.5.1988.

6. Taking into account the two sets of FIR, FIR No.65 gave rise to Session

Trial No.57 of 1992 and FIR No. 65A emanated into Session Trial No.56 of 1992.

7. In Session Trial No.56 of 1992, out of which the present Appeals have

arisen, all the seven accused persons were found guilty of the offences

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and Section 307 read

with Section 149 IPC. Each of them were sentenced to imprisonment for life and

a fine of ₹10,000/- under Section 302/149 IPC, rigorous imprisonment for 10

years and a fine of ₹10,000/- under Section 307/149 IPC. Additionally, the

accused persons were individually sentenced to the following:

Appellant Offence Sentence

Molhar Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Kantu Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Om Pal Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Narendra Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Ranvir Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Inchha Ram Section 148 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Dharamvir Section 148 IPC R.I. for 2 years

8. On the other hand, in Sessions Trial No.57 of 1992, which emanated from

FIR No. 65A lodged by the appellants, all the accused persons were acquitted. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 4 of 25

9. Aggrieved by the judgment in Session Trial No.56 of 1992 convicting the

appellants, three separate appeals were preferred — Criminal Appeal No.1516 of

2001 by Molhar and Dharamvir, Criminal Appeal No.921 of 2001 by Kantu and

Criminal Appeal No.922 of 2001 by Om Pal, Narendra, Inchha Ram and Ranvir

before the Allahabad High Court.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment in Session Trial No.57 of 1992, Criminal

Revision No.321 of 2001 was filed by Molhar Singh before the Allahabad High

Court.

11. All the three criminal appeals and the criminal revision were transferred

to the High Court of Uttarakhand under Section 35 of the Uttar Pradesh

Reorganization Act, 2000 after the formation of the State of Uttarakhand.

12. The High Court of Uttarakhand vide its common impugned judgment and

order dated 29.11.2010 after reappreciating the entire evidence of the

prosecution, dismissed all the criminal appeals and the criminal revision filed by

appellants. Thus, the High Court vide impugned judgment affirmed the

conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No.56 of

1992.

13. The appellants are now before us assailing the judgment passed by the

High Court which affirmed their conviction.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

14. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the present case is not of

a premeditated murder but a result of a free fight that ensued between the two 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 5 of 25

groups. As the injuries were sustained on both sides, the possibility of the

appellants exercising their self-defense cannot be ruled out. Also, the fact that

none of the witnesses could attribute specific role to any particular accused,

thus, it indicates that it was a case of free fight.

15. Additionally, it was the side of the appellants that lodged the first FIR. It

was also argued that the cross-FIR from the side of the complainant was in fact

lodged after three days of the incident by the son of the deceased Dile Ram and

not by the injured eyewitness.

16. Learned counsel for the appellants have also questioned the testimonies

of the eyewitnesses. In a nutshell, it was argued that the conviction of the

appellants under Section 302/149 of the IPC is totally misconceived and, if at all

they are liable, they can be liable only under Section 304 Part II of the IPC as

their case falls under fourth exception to Section 300 IPC.

17. To bolster their submissions, the appellants have relied on the decisions

of this Court in Puran vs. State of Rajasthan3, Pappu vs. State of M.P.

4,

Kailash vs. State of M.P.

5, Vadla Chandraiah vs. State of A.P.

6 and

Sandhya Jadhav (Smt.) vs. State of Maharashtra7.

18. Per contra, the respondent-State has argued that the appellants had the

motive for killing Dile Ram since the consolidation proceedings were pending

3 (1976) 1 SCC 28

4 (2006) 7 SCC 391

5 (2006) 11 SCC 420

6 (2006) 13 SCC 587

7 (2006) 4 SCC 653

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 6 of 25

between the parties, but in the consolidation proceedings, the field was given to

Dile Ram, which enraged the appellants.

19. It was also argued that it was the appellants who were the aggressors.

They are the ones who attacked on the complainant side. PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured eyewitness) in his testimony had stated that the appellants’ lathi

contained an arc shaped iron blade. Hence, it cannot be stated that the injuries

on the person of accused are not explained.

20. The State has argued that the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC

is not attracted in the present case considering that it was a shared motive on

the part of the appellants to cause death on the complainant side. Additionally,

on the issue of delay in lodging the FIR by the complainant, the State argues that

the Trial Court has rejected this contention as the delay was well explained by

the complainant side. Thus, the present Appeals need no interference and the

conviction against the appellants be upheld in toto.

21. To bolster its submissions, the State relied on the decisions of this Court

in Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy vs. State of A.P.8 and Abdul

Sayeed vs. State of Madya Pradesh9.

22. The rival submissions now fall for our analysis.

C. ANALYSIS

23. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having

gone through the material on record, the only question that falls for our

8 (2006) 11 SCC 444

9 (2010) 10 SCC 259

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 7 of 25

consideration is whether the High Court committed an error in passing the

impugned judgment and order?

24. As the appellants before us seek for interference with the concurrent

findings by two Courts below, this Court generally should be slow in interfering

with the concurrent findings. In Mekala Sivaiah vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh10, this Court observed as follows:

“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that

Article 136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred

under the said Article are not hedged by any technical

hurdles. This overriding and exceptional power is,

however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance

of cause of justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal

has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some

misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring

material evidence then this Court is not only empowered

but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of

justice.

16. It is not the practice of this Court to reappreciate the

evidence for the purpose of examining whether the findings

of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court and the

High Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and

exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or

grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of

misreading or ignoring material evidence that this Court

would interfere with such finding of fact.”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. The scope of this Court for interference under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India was further explained in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail

Mohd. Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra11

“23. Again, in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC

219:1974 SCC (Cri) 837], this Court also held that the

powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

10 (2022) 8 SCC 253

11 (2023) 12 SCC 558 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 8 of 25

Constitution are wide but in criminal appeals this Court

does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact

save in exceptional circumstances. In

Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC

297:1979 SCC (Cri) 454], this Court, while agreeing with

the views expressed on the aforesaid mentioned decisions

of this Court, has thus stated : (SCC p. 300, para 4)

“4. … The power is plenary in the sense

that there are no words in Article 136 itself

qualifying that power. But, the very nature

of the power has led the court to set limits

to itself within which to exercise such

power. It is now the well-established

practice of this Court to permit the

invocation of the power under Article 136

only in very exceptional circumstances, as

when a question of law of general public

importance arises or a decision shocks the

conscience of the court. But, within the

restrictions imposed by itself, this Court

has the undoubted power to interfere even

with findings of fact, making no distinction

between judgments of acquittal and

conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at

those findings, has acted “perversely or

otherwise improperly”.”

(emphasis supplied)”

24. In Nain Singh v. State of U.P. [(1991) 2 SCC 432:

1991 SCC (Cri) 421] , in which all the aforesaid decisions

as referred to hereinabove were considered and after

considering the aforesaid decisions on the question of

exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution

and after agreeing with the views expressed in the

aforesaid decisions, the Court finally laid down the

principle that the evidence adduced by the prosecution

in that decision fell short of the test of reliability and

acceptability and, therefore, was highly unsafe to act

upon it. In State of U.P. v. Babul Nath [(1994) 6 SCC 29:

1994 SCC (Cri) 1585], this Court, while considering the

scope of Article 136 as to when this Court is entitled to

upset the findings of fact, observed as follows : (SCC p.

33, para 5)

“5. At the very outset we may mention that

in an appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution this Court does not normally

reappraise the evidence by itself and go

into the question of credibility of the

witnesses and the assessment of the 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 9 of 25

evidence by the High Court is accepted by

the Supreme Court as final unless, of

course, the appreciation of evidence and

finding is vitiated by any error of law of

procedure or found contrary to the

principles of natural justice, errors of

record and misreading of the evidence, or

where the conclusions of the High Court

are manifestly perverse and

unsupportable from the evidence on

record.”

25. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court on the

exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136

of the Constitution, the following principles emerge:

25.1. The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this

Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of

fact save in exceptional circumstances.

25.2. It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings

of fact recorded by the High Court if the High Court

has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.

25.3. It is open to this Court to invoke the power under

Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and

when a question of law of general public importance

arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

25.4. When the evidence adduced by the

prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and

acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon

it.

25.5. Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is

vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary

to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and

misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of

the High Court are manifestly perverse and

unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

26. The parties in the present matter are close relatives of each other as they

happen to be the descendants of a common ancestor. There was a long-standing

dispute between the rival parties due to the pending land boundary dispute. On 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 10 of 25

the day of the incident, an altercation took place between both the groups as the

appellants had broken the mendh (ridge) between the farmlands of the appellants

and the complainant side. Both the sides inflicted injuries on each other, leading

to the death of Dile Ram and Braham Singh.

27. To prove the guilt of the appellants, the prosecution examined PW-1 (Tejpal

Singh) (complainant and son of deceased Dile Ram), PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured and eyewitness), PW-3 (Mahendra Singh) (eyewitness), PW-4 (Mohan Lal

@ Som) (another eyewitness), PW-5 (Dr. R.K. Singhal) (who conducted

postmortem examination on the dead body of Braham Singh), PW-6 (Constable

Jeet Singh) (who registered the case and prepared chik report of both the cross

cases), PW-7 (Dr. Harish Chandra Dua) (who recorded injuries of the accused

and injured), PW-8 (Sub-Inspector D.C. Yadav) (who started the investigation),

PW-9 (Inspector P.C. Pant) (who completed the investigation), and PW-10 (Dr.

P.S. Chahal) (who conducted postmortem examination on dead body of Dile

Ram).

28. In their statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, appellant-Om pal admitted the on-going animosity with the complainant

side and he had accordingly stated that Bangal Singh and others had committed

assaults upon him and in order to carve-out a cross-case against him, they had

nominated appellant-Om Pal, as being an accused, in this matter. AppellantNarendra too tendered identical statement. Appellant-Dharamvir had stated

that since he happens to be a witness in the cross-case pertaining to the present

matter, therefore, he had been nominated as an accused. Both the Courts below 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 11 of 25

while holding the appellants guilty heavily relied on the testimonies of PW-1

(Tejpal Singh) (complainant and son of deceased Dile Ram), PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured and eyewitness), PW-3 (Mahendra Singh) (eyewitness) and PW-4 (Mohan

Lal @ Som) (eyewitness).

29. The Trial Court in its judgement while convicting the appellants held that

from the evidence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4, it is clear that the appellants had

initiated the said occurrence and they had been the aggressor. Further, nature

of the injuries as well as the evidence available on record itself proved that the

injuries had been knowingly and intentionally inflicted with due, proper and

sufficient motive and object, while the blades of spades, phawads had been used,

from their sharp contours in order to inflict fatal injuries on the head of both the

deceased persons resulting in their death.

30. The High Court in the impugned judgment too held that the appellants

were the aggressors. It was further held that the complainant side used lathis to

defend themselves only after the assault was initiated from the side of the

appellants who used sharp weapons. Additionally, PW-3 and PW-4, who were

the eyewitnesses, have corroborated the prosecution’s case as narrated by PW2, an injured eyewitness.

31. Since injuries were sustained from both the sides, at the outset, it will be

appropriate to mention the injuries that were found on Dile Ram, Braham Singh

and Bangal Singh, and appellants - Om Pal, Narendra and Inchha Ram by PW7 (Dr. Harish Chandra Dua) who prepared the injury report. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 12 of 25

Dile Ram (deceased) received the injuries in nature of

i) Incised wound 13 ½ cm X 2 cm X bone deep over parietal region left

side extending upto right temporal region. Transversely placed.

Margins clear cut, edges well defined, bleeding present.

Braham Singh (deceased) received the following injuries

i) Incised wound 13 cm X 2 cm X bone deep over left parietal region of

skull extending upto left temporal region 9 cm above left ear. Margins

clear cut, edges well defined. Oozing of blood present. Patient

conscious.

ii) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over left parietal

region of skull 3 ½ cm behind injury No. (i).

iii) Lacerated wound 2 ½ cm X ½ cm X bone deep over left parietal region

of skull 3 cm behind injury No.(ii)

iv) Lacerated wound 4 cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietaltemporal region of skull 9 cm above right ear.

v) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X muscle deep over back of left

forearm 7 cm below left elbow joint.

vi) Lacerated wound 2 cm X ½ cm X muscle deep over back of left elbow

joint.

Bangal Singh (PW-2) received following injuries

i) "Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over left parietal

region of skull 9 cm above medial ends of eyebrow.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 13 of 25

ii) Lacerated wound 2 cm X ½ cm X muscle deep in front and middle of

right index finger with traumatic swelling 3 cm X 2 cm. Advised X-ray.

iii) Abrasion ½ cm X ½ cm over back of middle of index finger with

traumatic swelling 2 cm X 1 cm extending upto root. Advised X-ray.

iv) Linear abrasion 6 cm in length over outer aspect of right upper arm 4

cm below the left shoulder.

v) Abrasion 2 cm X 1 cm over back of left forearm, below left elbow joint.

vi) Lacerated wound 3 cm X ½ cm X skin deep over outer aspect of left

arm 14 cm above left elbow joint.

32. From the side of the appellants, Narendra received injuries in the nature

of:

i) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietal

region of skull. Oozing of blood present. Advised X-ray.

ii) Incised wound 20 cm X 4/10 cm X muscle deep over posterio aspect

of index finger of right hand. Margins clear cut, edges well defined.

Bleeding present.

iii) Incised wound 1 cm X 2/10 cm X skin deep just below injury No. (ii).

Margins clear cut, edges well defined.

Om Pal received the following injuries:

i) Abraded contusion 11 cm X 2 ½ cm over upper surface of left

shoulder.

ii) Abrasion in an area 3 cm X 2 cm in front of the lateral part of supra

clavicular region left. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 14 of 25

iii) Contusion 6 cm X 3 cm over lateral aspect left shoulder.

iv) Traumatic swelling 5 cm X 4 cm over medial aspect of left foot.

Inchha Ram received the following injuries:

i) Lacerated wound 7 cm X 1 cm X bone deep over left parietal region 6

cm above left ear. Margins of the wound are irregular and contused.

ii) Lacerated wound 1 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right occipital

region of the skull. 3 ½ cm behind injury No. (i).

iii) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep right side of parietal

region 12 cm above top of the right ear.

iv) Lacerated wound 1 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietal

region of skull. 8 cm above top of right ear.

v) Traumatic swelling in an area 18 cm X 8 cm over back of right forearm

in upper half of the arm. Advised X-ray.

vi) Contusion 9 cm X 2 ½ cm over posterio lateral aspect of right shoulder

and adjoining part of right arm.

vii) Contusion 3 ½ cm X 2 cm over back right side of scapula region, 14

cm below right shoulder.

viii) Contusion 6 cm X 2 cm over back of left arm 10 cm above left elbow

joint.

ix) Abrasion 12 cm X 1 cm over posterio medial aspect of left forearm just

below elbow joint.

x) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X skin deep over back of thigh just

below the gluteal region.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 15 of 25

OCULAR EVIDENCE

33. The present case before us is not the one based on circumstantial

evidence, but is based on ocular evidence. Time and again this Court has held

that ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it.

This Court in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh (supra) held

thus:

“30. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence

of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are

whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to

believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such

situations as would make it possible for them to witness

the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there

is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their

evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the

circumstances either elicited from those witnesses

themselves or established by other evidence tending to

improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of

their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which

a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases

where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the

evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined

on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea

or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with

that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case

and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be

taken into account while assessing the value of the

prosecution evidence.

31. There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of

the two eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can take the

view that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few

contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not

sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the

eyewitnesses.”

(Emphasis supplied)

34. Coming to the testimony of PW-2 (Bangal Singh), an injured eyewitness.

He stated that on the day of the incident his grandfather Dile Ram and uncle

Braham Singh were working in the sugarcane field when at about 11:00 A.M., 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 16 of 25

Molhar and Dharamvir damaged the mendh (ridge) of the field to which Dile Ram

objected to, and Molhar and Dharamvir started hurling abuses. Thereafter,

Molhar and Dharamvir called other accused Kantu, Inchha Ram, Narendra, Om

Pal, Pehlu (since deceased) and Ranvir. He had further stated that Dharamvir

and Inchha Ram were armed with spades, while the other accused were armed

with lathis. It is further stated that both the deceased persons and PW-2 were

assaulted with dangerous weapons. The witness further stated that at the time

of incident PW-3 and PW-4 also arrived at the spot.

35. It is settled that the testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a

special status in law. As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be

doubted. The testimony of an injured eyewitness has its own relevancy as he has

sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to

his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of

the injured eyewitness should be generally given due importance unless there

are glaring contradictions.

36. While dealing with the importance of the injured eyewitness testimony,

this Court in Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab12 held as under

“28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had

been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be

brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the

incident as he was present at the time when the assailants

reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa

Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC

235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the

deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon

unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his

evidence on the basis of major contradictions and

discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the

12 (2009) 9 SCC 719

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 17 of 25

scene stands established in case it is proved that he

suffered the injury during the said incident.

29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [(2004) 7 SCC 629 :

2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] a similar view has been reiterated

observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its

own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness

sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence,

lends support to his testimony that he was present during

the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to

lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to

discard his testimony, it should be relied upon

(vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 459 :

(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214] ). Thus, we are of the considered

opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly

been relied upon by the courts below.”

(Emphasis supplied)

37. In Abdul Sayeed (supra), this Court explained that injury to the witness

is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the

witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely

implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, deposition by the

injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for

rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies

therein.

38. In the present case before us, it is clear from the record that the defence

had not at all challenged the version of PW-2, but on the contrary, the defence

had admitted his presence at the spot of the said occurrence.

39. Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a

presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical

evidence, testimony of PW-2 does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be

considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 18 of 25

40. With respect to the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 who were the

eyewitnesses, it has been revealed that they were taking their respective bullockcarts loaded with sugarcanes towards the Northern direction on the chak-road,

in order to get the same weighed. While at the time of the incident, both of them

had been in the vicinity of the spot of occurrence and they had accordingly

arrived there upon hearing hue and cry and commotion being raised. PW-4 had

also narrated that he had seen the mendh (ridge) which stood demolished and

cut-off and the middle portion thereof had since been missing from the spot of

its existence.

41. While examining these eyewitnesses, the defence had not at all been

successful in eliciting any contradiction in their respective evidence on the basis

of which their evidence may be according1y discarded and thrown out in this

matter. Thus, there is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the two

eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can be of the view that they are not true

or reliable eyewitnesses.

MOTIVE

42. Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is

not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons. Motive even

in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the

prosecution’s case and fortify the Court in its ultimate conclusion. Thus, the fact

of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available. In 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 19 of 25

the case of Sheo Shankar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr.13, this Court

observed as under:

“15. The legal position regarding proof of motive as an

essential requirement for bringing home the guilt of the

accused is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of

this Court. These decisions have made a clear distinction

between cases where the prosecution relies upon

circumstantial evidence on the one hand and those where

it relies upon the testimony of eyewitnesses on the other.

In the former category of cases proof of motive is given the

importance it deserves, for proof of a motive itself

constitutes a link in the chain of circumstances upon

which the prosecution may rely. Proof of motive, however,

recedes into the background in cases where the

prosecution relies upon an eyewitness account of the

occurrence. That is because if the court upon a proper

appraisal of the deposition of the eyewitnesses comes to

the conclusion that the version given by them is credible,

absence of evidence to prove the motive is rendered

inconsequential. Conversely, even if the prosecution

succeeds in establishing a strong motive for the

commission of the offence, but the evidence of the

eyewitnesses is found unreliable or unworthy of credit,

existence of a motive does not by itself provide a safe basis

for convicting the accused. That does not, however, mean

that proof of motive even in a case which rests on an

eyewitness account does not lend strength to the

prosecution case or fortify the court in its ultimate

conclusion. Proof of motive in such a situation certainly

helps the prosecution and supports the eyewitnesses.

See Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 3

SCC 219 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 214] , Hari Shanker v. State of

U.P. [(1996) 9 SCC 40 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 913] and State of

U.P. v. Kishanpal [(2008) 16 SCC 73 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)

182].”

43. In the present case, the question is what actually drove the appellants to

commit this double murder after forming an unlawful assembly. According to

the prosecution, Dile Ram had asked Molhar and Dharamvir to desist from

mendh (ridge) of his field, whereupon Molhar hurled abuses and then called upon

13 (2011) 3 SCC 654

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 20 of 25

the other appellants on the spot and committed assaults upon the complainant

party with lathis, spades, phawadas, which they had already carried with

themselves. Also, the fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute

clearly establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

PRESENT CASE DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE FOURTH EXCEPTION TO

SECTION 300 OF THE IPC

44. Now let us come to the contentions raised by the appellants. One of the

main arguments from the side of the appellants was that since it was a case of

free fight where injuries were received on the side of the appellants as well and

considering there was no premeditation from their side, the case would fall under

the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC. We, however, are not convinced

with this argument in view of the law laid down by this Court in Pulicherla

Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy (supra) wherein it was held:

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the

pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as

that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302

or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant

matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of

children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable

glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes

culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed,

jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases.

There may be no intention. There may be no

premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality.

At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of

murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty

for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was

no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure

that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302,

are not converted into offences punishable under Section

304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting

to murder, are treated as murder punishable under

Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered

generally from a combination of a few or several of the 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 21 of 25

following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the

weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the

accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the

blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of

force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was

in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for

all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or

whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there

was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a

stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden

provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix)

whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the

person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or

has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the

accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list

of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there

may be several other special circumstances with reference

to individual cases which may throw light on the question

of intention. Be that as it may.”

(Emphasis supplied)

45. From the medical evidence on record, it stands established that the death

of both the deceased persons was the result of ante-mortem injuries. The nature

and extent of these injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave

no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted. The use of the sharp edges of

spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased

demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of

permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder. Thus, the

circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the

IPC do not exist.

DELAY IN FILING OF FIR IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE

PROSECUTION

46. The issue of delay in the filing of the FIR from the side of the complainant

came up during the hearing. It was argued that the cross FIR was lodged on

23.05.1988 which is after three days of the incident. Thus, according to them,

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 22 of 25

the second FIR was merely an afterthought of the first FIR which was lodged by

the appellants. This contention has been dealt by both the Courts below holding

that the delay was well explained by PW-1, who is the son of deceased Dile Ram.

It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be

fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the

delay in filing the FIR is well explained. This Court in the case of State of H.P.

vs. Gian Chand 14 observed that:

“12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a

ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and

discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in

lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of

putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation

has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is

satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily

explain the delay and there is a possibility of

embellishment in the prosecution version on account of

such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution.

However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the

court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for

disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution….”

(Emphasis supplied)

47. Furthermore, in the case of Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana15, this

Court observed thus:

“11. With regard to the delay in filing the FIR, both the

courts have found that there was no delay in filing the FIR.

The trial court found that the rushing of the victim to the

hospital to save his life instead of first going to the police

station was a satisfactory explanation for the delay in

making the complaint. The view was affirmed by the High

Court and we find no reason to interfere with the same.”

(Emphasis supplied)

14 (2001) 6 SCC 71

15 (2000) 9 SCC 88

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 23 of 25

48. In the present case, we will have to consider whether there was a probable

explanation from the side of PW-1 for the delay in the lodging of the FIR. From

the statement of PW-1, it is clear that on his coming back from Muzaffarnagar,

he took his injured father (Dile Ram), injured uncle (Braham Singh), and nephew

to the hospital in Chandigarh and after he came back from Chandigarh on

23.05.1988, he lodged the FIR. The present explanation, according to us, is

probable and natural considering the facts and circumstances of the case.

NON- RECOVERY OF THE WEAPONS IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE

PROSECUTION

49. Another contention raised by the appellants was that the weapons used

during the incident were never recovered from the site. However, this Court has

many a times reiterated that non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered

fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular

evidence. This Court in the case State of Rajasthan vs. Arjun Singh & Ors.16

held as under:

“18. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for the State that mere nonrecovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of

the prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is

acceptable. Likewise, absence of evidence regarding

recovery of used pellets, bloodstained clothes, etc. cannot

be taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken

place. As a matter of fact, we have already pointed out that

the gunshot injuries tallied with medical evidence. It is also

seen that Raghuraj Singh and Himmat Raj Singh, who had

died, received 8 and 7 gunshot wounds respectively while

Raj Singh (PW 2) also received 8 gunshots scattered in

front of left thigh. All these injuries have been noted by the

doctor (PW 1) in his reports, Exts. P-1 to P-4.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16 (2011) 9 SCC 115

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 24 of 25

50. Also in Nankaunoo vs. State of Uttar Pradesh17, this Court held that

where in light of unimpeachable oral evidence is corroborated by the medical

evidence, non-recovery of murder weapon does not materially affect the case of

the prosecution. Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go

against the prosecution’s case. Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors

such omission by the investigating agency. Otherwise, it would shake the

confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the

administration of justice.

D. CONCLUSION

51. From the above discussion, there remains no doubt in our minds that the

present appellants in furtherance of their common intention formed an unlawful

assembly. Inncha and Dharamvir stood armed with sharp edged deadly weapons

committed the murder of Braham Singh and Dile Ram, while in order to achieve

their common intention, they had also inflicted such injuries on the physical

person of Bangal Singh knowing fully well that had Bangal Singh died on account

of the said injuries they ought to have been held guilty of causing his murder in

this matter.

52. Consequently, the Appeals, being sans merit, stand dismissed. As we have

dismissed the Appeals, the appellants shall surrender to custody forthwith and

it will be the duty of the Trial Court to see that they are taken into custody. The

bail bonds stand cancelled accordingly.

17 (2016) 3 SCC 317

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 25 of 25

53. We shall further clarify that nothing mentioned above shall preclude the

appellants from making an application for remission in accordance with law and

the applicable policy of the State Government. In the event, such an application

is preferred, the same shall be considered by the competent authority on its own

merits, strictly in terms of the available policy of the State Government.

………………………………………J.

 (SANJAY KAROL)

………………………………………J.

 (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 28, 2025