LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 — Ss. 4, 5-A, 6 and 11 — Scope of quashing and beneficiaries thereof —
Held, quashing of acquisition proceedings in Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of W.B., AIR 2016 SC 4156, was a remedial exercise targeted to protect vulnerable and resource-deficient agricultural communities — The relief of restoration directed therein was not intended to extend to industrial or commercial entities possessing financial capacity and institutional access — Respondent No.1, being an incorporated manufacturing company with a 60,000 sq. ft. industrial unit, stood outside the “protective framework” envisaged in Kedar Nath Yadav — The benefit of land restoration cannot be claimed by such parties merely on parity with cultivators — Principles of parity and representational PIL relief do not apply to commercial enterprises.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA — Art. 14 — Equality clause — Parity of treatment —
Parity cannot be invoked by unequals — Remedy designed for disadvantaged farmers and poor cultivators cannot be extended to commercial manufacturers with financial and legal sophistication — Relief in Kedar Nath Yadav was class-specific and structured to redress systemic vulnerability.
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 — Ss. 5-A, 6 — Objections and estoppel —
Filing of objections under S. 5-A, without pursuing statutory or judicial remedies, amounts to waiver — Once acquisition attained finality by acceptance of compensation and non-challenge, party is estopped from subsequently seeking restoration on the strength of another’s litigation — Acceptance of compensation without demur constitutes acquiescence — Principles reiterated: Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296; Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421; Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501.
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION — Scope of representative relief —
PIL in Kedar Nath Yadav represented the cause of poor cultivators facing displacement — Commercial landholders with means to individually litigate fall outside representational scope — They cannot later claim to be “similarly situated”.
DOCTRINE OF DELAY AND LACHES —
Respondent’s silence for 10 years (2006–2016), despite receipt of full compensation, fatal — Delay and acquiescence bar relief — Restitution cannot be sought after two decades and post-modification of land during restoration to farmers.
REMEDIES — Equitable limitation of relief —
Judicial benefits flow from diligent pursuit of remedies, not passive opportunism — Extending relief to dormant parties would incentivize inaction and undermine finality in land acquisition — Relief accordingly denied.
DIRECTIONS —
However, Respondent No.1 permitted to remove or auction its plant, structures, and machinery under supervision of District Magistrate, Hooghly, within three months — LAC to adjust compensation considering salvage value — Recovery of excess payment barred — Fresh demarcation to resume possession by State — Compliance within four months.
2025 INSC 1222 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 33701/2018)
The State of West Bengal and Others ...Appellants
versus
M/S Santi Ceramics Pvt. Limited and Another …Respondents
JUDGMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal has been preferred by the State of West
Bengal against the judgment dated 11.10.2018 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta (High Court) in
MAT No. 1260/2017 (Impugned Judgment). By way of the
Impugned Judgment, the High Court has upheld the order of the
learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 29621/2016, directing the State
to restore 28 Bighas of land (Subject Land), including all
structures erected thereon, to M/s Santi Ceramics Private
Limited (Respondent No.1).
3. The controversy arises in the aftermath of this Court's judgment
in Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal1
, whereby the
1 AIR 2016 SC 4156.
Page 1 of 20
land acquisition proceedings for establishing the manufacturing
plant of TATA Motors’ then flagship car “NANO” were quashed. To
explicate, in 2006, pursuant to TATA Motors' decision to
establish this facility in Singur, Hooghly District, West Bengal,
the Appellants had initiated acquisition spanning over 1000
acres (Singur Project). The acquisition encompassed
agricultural lands and lands converted for non-agricultural
purposes. The instant appeal concerns restoration of the Subject
Land, which formed part of the acquisition. The High Court has
accorded restoration in favour of Respondent No.1 on ground of
parity with cultivators to whom such a relief was granted by this
Court in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra).
A. FACTS
4. To appreciate the genesis of the dispute at hand, it is necessary
to examine the factual matrix, which is set out below:
4.1. Respondent No.1 purchased the Subject Land in the year 2001-
2002 with the objective of establishing a manufacturing facility
for the production of ceramic electrical insulators. The Subject
Land at the time was statedly an agricultural land. Upon
application by Respondent No.1, the District Land and Land
Reforms Officer, Hooghly, granted approval on 09.04.2003 for its
conversion to industrial use, thereby enabling the formalization
of commercial operations on the premises.
Page 2 of 20
4.2. Following the approval, Respondent No.1 established a
manufacturing unit, replete with necessary infrastructure, plant
and machinery, and commenced industrial operations. This
trajectory of events took a decisive turn on 21.07.2006 when the
Land Acquisition Collector, Hooghly (LAC), issued notifications
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act),
initiating acquisition proceedings for the Singur Project.
4.3. In response, Respondent No.1 filed objections under Section 5-
A(1) of the 1894 Act on 21.08.2006, seeking exclusion of its
operational manufacturing unit from the acquisition. The
objections were rejected by LAC, whereupon the Appellants
issued a declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act on
30.08.2006. Pursuant to the declaration, the LAC passed the
award for the Subject Land on 25.09.2006, quantifying total
compensation at INR 14,54,75,744, comprising INR 5,46,75,744
for land value and INR 9,08,00,000 for structures. The said
compensation was duly deposited, and the Appellants thereafter
took possession of the acquired land, which was thereupon
handed over to TATA Motors.
4.4. The Singur Project soon evolved into a matter of considerable
public interest and legal controversy, generating widespread
protests by affected farmers against displacement from their
holdings. The acquisition, impacting fertile agricultural land,
highlighted the tension between industrial development and
farming communities. Among the various affected parties, one
Kedarnath Yadav approached the High Court through a Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) in W.P. No. 23836 (W) of 2006,
challenging the acquisition proceedings. Several similar writ
petitions were filed by other affected parties, which were then
Page 3 of 20
clubbed together and dismissed by a common judgment dated
18.01.2008, rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court. The
acquisition was upheld after holding that it was in public interest
and for public purpose.
4.5. Subsequently, in 2010, TATA Motors abandoned the Singur
Project and withdrew from the site, with the Appellants regaining
possession of the acquired land. Parallelly, the dismissal of the
petitions by the High Court was assailed before this Court,
culminating in the judgment dated 31.08.2016 in Kedar Nath
Yadav (supra). While both judges on the Bench delivered
separate opinions with divergent reasoning, they concurred on
quashing the acquisition proceedings on the following grounds:
i) Violation of Section 5-A procedures as the LAC mechanically
rejected objections without proper consideration and failed
to conduct an effective inquiry;
ii) Non-application of mind by the authorities as both the LAC
and State Government failed to objectively consider the
objections and recommendations as mandated under the
1894 Act;
iii) Procedural defects in compensation proceedings as awards
were passed without following due process under Section 11
of the 1894 Act; and
Page 4 of 20
iv) Disproportionate impact on agricultural communities as the
acquisition affected fertile agricultural land and displaced
poor agricultural workers who lacked the means to challenge
governmental action.
4.6. Consequently, this Court directed restoration of land to the
original landowners/cultivators by the State within a period of
twelve weeks.
4.7. Respondent No.1 till then had no grievance and did not challenge
the acquisition of the Subject Land before any forum. However,
as soon as this Court delivered judgment in Kedar Nath Yadav
(supra), Respondent No.1 also submitted a representation on
28.11.2016, to the Appellants stating that the Subject Land had
not been returned within the prescribed period of twelve weeks
as postulated by this Court in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra), and
sought the handing over of the possession of the land,
structures, and plant & machinery. The Appellants, however, did
not restore the possession to Respondent No.1.
4.8. Aggrieved, Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No. 29621/2016
before the High Court, seeking restoration of possession of the
Subject Land along with all structures and machinery.
Respondent No.1 also claimed monthly compensation of INR
Page 5 of 20
5,00,000 from December, 2016 onwards, alleging pecuniary loss
on account of being deprived of the use of its industrial property.
4.9. The High Court allowed the petition vide judgment dated
24.04.2017 and reasoned that:
i) This Court's direction in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) applied
to all landowners without distinction between ‘cultivators’
and ‘business entities’, and Respondent No.1 could not be
excluded merely for being a corporate house; and
ii) The intact structures should be returned with the Subject
Land as ‘land’ under the 1894 Act included attached
structures.
4.10.The High Court accordingly directed the District Magistrate,
Hooghly to deliver possession within six weeks while declining
the prayer seeking compensation for delay.
4.11.The appeal against the afore-cited decision was dismissed by the
Division Bench vide the Impugned Judgment, holding that the
expression “landowners/cultivators” in Kedar Nath Yadav
(supra) ought to be construed widely to include all persons
whose lands were acquired, whether they used it for industrial or
Page 6 of 20
cultivation purposes, with no separate class created while
granting restoration.
4.12.Being aggrieved, the Appellants have preferred the instant
appeal. It may be noted that this Court, vide order dated
04.02.2019, granted an interim stay on the operation of the
Impugned Judgment, which continues to operate till date.
B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
5. Mr. Harin P Rawal and Mr. Ashok Kumar Panda, Learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the Appellants, strenuously argued that
the High Court committed a grave error in extending restoration
to Respondent No.1. It was contended that this Court's decision
in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) was designed with specific
protective intent for vulnerable agricultural communities who
lacked resources to challenge governmental action. Respondent
No.1, operating as an industrial manufacturing concern with
substantial assets, fell entirely outside this protective framework
and could not invoke the same judicial safeguards extended to
disadvantaged segments of the society.
6. It was further highlighted that Respondent No.1 raised no
grievance against the acquisition of Subject Land before or after
the award had been passed by the LAC. Learned Senior Counsel
Page 7 of 20
pointed out that the acquisition attained finality in 2006 and
was first questioned by Respondent No.1 only in 2016, after this
Court's judgment in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra).
7. Our attention was also drawn to Respondent No.1's voluntary
acceptance of INR 14,54,75,744 as compensation without
demur, and it was contended that the same constitutes a clear
acquiescence to the acquisition process. Learned Senior Counsel
submitted that this conduct, combined with the principle of
estoppel, precluded any afterthought claim for restoration of
property for which full consideration had already been received
and retained. It was emphasized that permitting such claims
would open the floodgates for numerous commercial entities
seeking similar relief, thereby transforming a narrowly tailored
remedy into a general relief scheme with catastrophic fiscal
implications for the Appellants.
C. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1
8. Per Contra, Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1, vehemently opposed the
instant appeal by challenging the Appellants’ interpretation of
Kedar Nath Yadav (supra). He asserted that the judgment
contained no artificial distinction between different categories of
Page 8 of 20
landowners, with the terminology “landowners/cultivators”
encompassing every person whose land was subjected to the
procedurally flawed acquisition. Learned Senior Counsel
emphasized that the original notifications under Section 4 of the
1894 Act addressed all affected persons uniformly as “owners of
land,” offering identical packages without regard to their
agricultural or commercial status.
9. It was further contended that Respondent No.1 was a bona fide
manufacturing enterprise that had proactively filed
comprehensive objections under Section 5-A accompanied by
detailed inventories of assets, which had been summarily
rejected without proper consideration. Drawing reference to the
compensation structure where INR 9,08,00,000 was specifically
allocated for structures, it was argued that this demonstrated
governmental recognition of structural entitlement. Learned
Senior Counsel, thus, urged that the appeal represents an
attempt to deny legitimate dues through selective application of
binding precedent and accordingly, prayed for the dismissal of
the instant appeal.
D. ANALYSIS
10. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties and after
perusal of the material on record, we are of the considered view
Page 9 of 20
that the short question that falls for our consideration is:
whether this Court's ruling in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra), which
directed restoration of acquired land to original
landowners/cultivators, extends to Respondent No.1 as well?
11. That being said, our determination of this question necessitates
the analysis on following counts:
i) The intended scope and beneficiaries of this Court's decision
in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) and whether Respondent No.1
also falls within that ambit;
ii) The procedural principles governing the applicability of
judicial orders quashing acquisition proceedings to parties
who did not participate in the original litigation; and
iii) The legal consequences of long delay in questioning the
acquisition and acceptance of compensation without demur.
12. Turning to the first aspect, this Court's judgment in Kedar Nath
Yadav (supra) arose from a contentious acquisition initiative
that sparked widespread resistance and prolonged litigation
challenging the State's exercise of its power. The Court’s ultimate
determination to quash the acquisition and direct restoration
was predicated upon systematic procedural failures under
Page 10 of 20
Section 5-A of the 1894 Act. However, its approach in fashioning
this remedy was informed by considerations that extended
beyond procedural compliance alone.
13. Crucially, the remedial framework in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra)
was anchored in its recognition that the acquisition
disproportionately affected vulnerable communities lacking
financial resources and institutional access to challenge
governmental action. This determination stemmed from an
understanding that certain segments of society remain
disadvantaged in asserting their rights against the State. In para
63, this Court specifically observed:
63. In this day and age of fast paced development,
it is completely understandable for the state
government to want to acquire lands to set up
industrial units. What, however, cannot be lost
sight of is the fact that when the brunt of this
‘development’ is borne by the weakest sections
of the society, more so, poor agricultural
workers who have no means of raising a voice
against the action of the mighty state
government, as is the case in the instant fact
situation, it is the onerous duty of the state
Government to ensure that the mandatory
procedure laid down under the L.A. Act and
the Rules framed there under are followed
scrupulously otherwise the acquisition
proceedings will be rendered void ab initio in
law. Compliance with the provisions of the L.A. Act
cannot be treated as an empty formality by the
State Government, as that would be akin to
handing over the eminent domain power of State to
the executive, which cannot be permitted in a
Page 11 of 20
democratic country which is required to be
governed by the rule of law. …….”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. This Court's identification of “poor agricultural workers” as the
“weakest sections of society” established the jurisdictional
boundary of relief. Subsistence farmers dependent entirely on
inherited land face destitution when acquisition bypasses
mandatory safeguards—they possess no alternative livelihood,
lack resources to navigate administrative procedures or afford
prolonged litigation. The remedy provided by this Court
addressed this structural vulnerability.
15. Notably, the aforesaid classification carries decisive legal
significance. By grounding relief in structural incapacity rather
than extending automatic restoration to all affected parties, this
Court prevented undermining finality in land acquisition
proceedings while ensuring protection for the genuinely
defenceless. Extraordinary judicial intervention is warranted
when systemic barriers prevent certain classes from accessing
ordinary remedies, not when parties possess adequate means to
vindicate their rights. Relief conceived to prevent impoverishment
among the disadvantaged cannot extend to commercial
enterprises with financial capacity and institutional
sophistication.
Page 12 of 20
16. Against this backdrop, we have no hesitation in holding that
Respondent No.1 falls squarely outside the protective framework
envisaged by this Court. Unlike marginal farmers facing potential
destitution from loss of their sole livelihood, Respondent No. 1
operated a 60,000 square feet manufacturing facility employing
over 100 workers since 2003, having purchased and converted
agricultural land for commercial purposes.
17. The origin of the litigation further reinforces this distinction, as
the proceedings before the High Court commenced through a PIL
specifically initiated to prevent poor farmers from losing their
fertile agricultural land. The express objective of PIL was to
safeguard cultivators whose livelihoods faced extinction through
large-scale acquisition. Extending such relief to industrial
entities like Respondent No.1 would thus defeat the remedy's
foundational intent.
18. In view of the above analysis, we hold that the reasoning in
Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) does not enure to the benefit of
Respondent No.1. The restoration remedy was conceived for
disadvantaged farming communities, not as general restitution
for all affected parties.
Page 13 of 20
19. Beyond this distinction, we are constrained to add that even the
established procedural principles preclude Respondent No.1’s
claim. Orders quashing acquisition proceedings may operate
either in personam or in rem. Where the Court quashes
acquisition on grounds personal to individual objectors—such as
vitiated consideration of their specific objections under Section
5-A—the relief operates in personam and benefits only those
parties who contested the matter before judicial forums. On the
other hand, where the Court declares the entire process void ab
initio on grounds going to the root of acquisition—the relief
operates in rem. It is thus clear that the benefits of quashing do
not accrue to persons who were not parties unless the Court has
struck down the entire acquisition on fundamental grounds
applicable to all.2
20. It may be apposite to observe here that the objections under
Section 5-A raise issues personal to each landowner. Upon
rejection of such objections, the aggrieved party must approach
judicial forums to challenge the same and mere filing of
objections does not exhaust remedies available in law. To further
simplify, claimants who do not file objections or pursue judicial
challenge cannot contend that Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated, nor
2 Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421, para 9-12.
Page 14 of 20
can they seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground.3
It is trite law that in the event objections are not pursued
through litigation, the notification becomes conclusive proof of
waiver.
21. Applying these principles, the cause of cultivators and farmers
affected by the Singur Project was espoused before the High
Court, inter-alia, on grounds that it disproportionately affected
vulnerable agricultural communities and fertile land, with
procedural violations including vitiated Section 5-A inquiry and
non-application of mind by authorities. Respondent No.1 filed
objections under Section 5-A on 21.08.2006, which were
rejected. Despite possessing financial resources and institutional
access, it never pursued the appellate remedies available under
the 1894 Act. It accepted the entire compensation amount of
INR 14,54,75,744 without protest and remained passive while
cultivators pursued litigation for years. Having chosen not to
contest the acquisition through available statutory mechanisms,
Respondent No.1 now seeks the same relief that was granted to
disadvantaged communities through PIL—a classic free-rider
problem that judicial remedies cannot encourage.
3 Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296, para 42-47.
Page 15 of 20
22. Turning to the third aspect, the acquisition attained finality qua
Respondent No.1 through its own inaction. Respondent No.1
remained silent for an entire decade from 2006 to 2016, making
no attempt to challenge the acquisition despite the award being
passed on 25.09.2006. Once the proceedings conclude in the
award and possession is taken without challenge, the Court
would not entertain any belated grievance from the interested
person.4
In stark contrast, affected farmers brought their plight
before the High Court through PIL in November, 2006 itself—
challenging procedural violations at the earliest opportunity.
Hence, Respondent No.1 cannot now seek parity and question
what had been conclusively settled.
23. Insofar as reference to the PIL jurisdiction in Kedar Nath Yadav
(supra) is concerned, we are afraid the same may not be
applicable to the facts of the instant case. We say so because PIL
enables representation of similarly situated vulnerable persons
who lack means to approach courts individually. When
cultivators challenged the Singur acquisition through PIL, all
farmers/cultivators across the acquisition were represented.
Having failed to pursue legal remedies when available,
Respondent No.1—a party possessing financial resources and
4 Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt.
Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501, para 19.
Page 16 of 20
institutional access to statutory remedies falls outside this
representative framework designed for disadvantaged
communities.
24. Additionally, the temporal dimension presents a further bar.
Nearly two decades have elapsed since the acquisition. Following
TATA Motors' withdrawal of the project in 2010, the acquired
land vested back with the Appellants free from all
encumbrances. Pursuant to the judgment in Kedar Nath Yadav
(supra), extensive survey operations were undertaken to restore
land to cultivators. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants
have informed this Court that structures originally on the
Subject Land were modified during these restoration efforts to
enable demarcation and distribution of individual holdings to
farmers. After nearly two decades and such modifications
undertaken to restore land to farmers, the relief cannot be
granted.
25. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Respondent No.1 cannot
claim the benefit of this Court's directions in Kedar Nath Yadav
(supra). Having accepted monetary settlement without challenge
and remained passive during litigation spanning several years, it
cannot now seek benefits from relief secured by others. The
confluence of its commercial status, nature of the relief, and the
Page 17 of 20
practical impossibility of restoration due to intervening
modifications collectively defeats this claim.
E. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
26. Permitting industrial entities to claim restoration benefits from
litigation they chose not to pursue would establish an
undesirable precedent. Such an approach would incentivize
strategic inaction, encouraging parties to remain dormant during
protracted litigation only to emerge as claimants after favourable
outcomes are secured by others. This would undermine both the
targeted nature of remedial relief and the fundamental principle
that legal benefits flow from active pursuit of remedies, not
passive opportunism.
27. In view thereof, the instant appeal is allowed and the Impugned
Judgment dated 11.10.2018 passed by the Division Bench as
well as the judgment dated 24.04.2017 of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court are hereby set aside. Consequently, the
Writ Petition filed by Respondent No.1 insofar as it pertained to
challenge to the acquisition of Subject Land is hereby dismissed.
However, considering that Respondent No.1 has claimed to have
had standing structures on the Subject Land at the time of
acquisition, we issue the following directions:
Page 18 of 20
i) Respondent No.1 is permitted to remove any remaining
structures, plant, and machinery from the Subject Land
within three months from the date of this judgment, in the
presence of officials designated by the District Magistrate,
Hooghly; or
ii) Alternatively, Respondent No.1 may request the Appellants to
put the structures, machinery and other movable and
immovable articles belonging to it for public auction. In such
event, Respondent No.1 shall be entitled to the auction
proceeds after deducting expenses incurred on the auction
process. Respondent No.1 shall not then claim any
compensation from Appellants.
iii) The LAC shall calculate the compensation for structures
after deducting the salvage value of materials removed by
Respondent No.1 from the compensation already paid for
such structures. However, recovery of any excess payment
made to Respondent No.1 shall not be effected by the
Appellants.
iv) Since Respondent No.1 was granted possession of the
Subject Land pursuant to the Impugned Judgment which
has been set aside, the Appellants are directed to carry out
fresh demarcation to identify the precise boundaries of the
acquired area. Thereafter, the Appellants shall resume
possession of the Subject Land, subject to compliance with
the other directions.
v) The assessment exercise under clauses (ii), (iii) & (iv) shall
be completed within four months from the date of this
judgment.
Page 19 of 20
28. Ordered accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of in the above terms.
………..........................J.
(SURYA KANT)
………..........................J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
NEW DELHI;
Dated: 13.10.2025
Page 20 of 20
