Juvenile Justice — Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, Ss. 7-A, 15(1)(g), 20 — Claim of juvenility — Maintainability — Period of detention — Effect
Held, claim of juvenility may be raised before any court at any stage even after final disposal of the case. The court is duty-bound to inquire into such claim and grant appropriate relief if found that the accused was below 18 years on the date of offence.
In the instant case, petitioner, aged 12 years 5 months on the date of incident (2-11-1981), was convicted of murder under Ss. 302/149 IPC. Sessions Court had recognised him as a “child” under the Children’s Act, 1960 and directed his detention in a children’s home. Later, on appeal by the State, this Court (8-5-2009) restored conviction. Petitioner, arrested only in 2022, was in custody for over 3 years 10 months.
Since maximum permissible period of detention of a juvenile under S. 15(1)(g) is three years, further detention was illegal. The JJ Act, 2000 being beneficial and retrospective in scope, applied even though the offence occurred in 1981. Petitioner entitled to release.
Breach of Article 21 established.
— Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211; Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 210, followed.
Held that: Writ petition allowed; petitioner directed to be released forthwith.
Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Right to personal liberty — Illegal detention — Juvenile detained beyond statutory period — Entitlement to immediate release
Detention of a person recognised as a juvenile for period exceeding the statutory maximum (three years) is per se illegal and violative of Article 21.
Purpose of earlier order directing reformative custody under Children’s Act, 1960, having become unworkable, continued incarceration impermissible.
Juvenile Justice — Children’s Act, 1960, Ss. 24, 27 — Joint trial of child with adult offenders — Held, impermissible — Breach noted
The trial of the petitioner, a child, jointly with adult co-accused under the IPC was contrary to Section 24 of the 1960 Act, which prohibits such joint trials.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 374(2) — Appeal against conviction — Effect of subsequent finding of juvenility
Even if conviction is final and upheld by Supreme Court, a subsequent plea of juvenility is maintainable and must be decided in light of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000.
2025 INSC 1211
1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 340 OF 2025
HANSRAJ …PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. This Court’s extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution has been invoked by the petitioner, who is a murder convict.
As per the custody certificate issued on 14th August, 2025, the petitioner is
in custody for a period of 3 years 10 months 28 days. Relief that is claimed
in this writ petition reads as follows:
“A. issue a Writ of Mandamus of any similar writ, order or direction
thereby directing the respondent – State to immediate release the
petitioner from Central Jail, Agra against the conviction order dated
16.08.1984 passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur in
S.T. No. 08 of 1983, in view of the order dated 08.05.2009 passed by
this Hon’ble Court in Criminal Appeal No. 276 of 2002 (Annexure P-3)
wherein in paragraph – 13, the petitioner was held to a child/juvenile,
aged about 16 years”.
2. Incidents having a bearing on our decision are summarised
hereunder:
a. The date of birth of the petitioner is 10th June, 1969.
2
b. It was alleged in a First Information Report1
registered under Sections
302/149, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602
, that the
petitioner along with 5 others had assaulted the father3 of the first
informant with knife and lathis, on 2nd November, 1981. The victim
succumbed to his injuries on the following day.
c. In course of investigation of the FIR, the petitioner came to be
arrested on 6th November, 1981. He was, however, released on bail
on 8th December, 1981. As an undertrial, the petitioner was behind
bars for 1 month 3 days.
d. Petitioner and the co-accused were tried by the Special Additional
Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 1983. A finding
was returned in the judgment of conviction dated 14th August, 1984,
that the petitioner, along with the co-accused, were guilty of murder
of the victim.
e. The order of sentence was passed on 16th August, 1984. The coaccused were sentenced to life in prison. The Sessions Court having
noted that the petitioner was aged about 16 years, held that he was
entitled to the benefit of the Childrens Act, 19604
. Accordingly,
instead of sending the petitioner to jail, he was directed to be kept in
a children’s home in accordance with the provisions of the 1960 Act
to give him a chance to reform himself.
1 FIR
2
IPC
3 victim
4
the 1960 Act
3
f. All the convicts, including the petitioner, challenged the conviction
and sentence before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench, in an appeal5 under Section 374(2), Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Vide a judgment and order dated 7th April, 2000,
the High Court acquitted the appellants and allowed the appeal.
g. State of Uttar Pradesh, aggrieved by the acquittal, appealed to this
Court6
. By a judgment and order dated 8
th May, 2009, a coordinate
bench of this Court reversed the order of acquittal and restored the
conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. The
concluding paragraph of the order also restored the order of the
Sessions Court qua the petitioner.
h. The petitioner absconded. He could be arrested only on 19th May,
2022, and is still in custody, as noted above.
3. The question that we are tasked to decide is whether the petitioner
is entitled to the benefit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 20007
, as amended by Act 33 of 2006 whereby Section 7-A
was inserted with effect from 22nd August, 2006. Section 7-A reads as
follows:
“7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is
raised before any court. – (1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised
before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a
juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an
inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so
as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether
the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may
be:
5 Criminal Appeal No. 631 of 1984
6 Criminal Appeal No. 276 of 2002
7
the JJ Act, 2000
4
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court
and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the
case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions
contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile
has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the
juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if
any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect.”
4. Mr. Parinav Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that
the petitioner has been behind bars for more than 3 years and 8 months
despite being a juvenile who is entitled to the benefit of the JJ Act, 2000.
According to him, the maximum period of detention of a juvenile is 3 years
as per Section 15(1)(g) and detention in excess of such period of 3 years
would amount to an illegal detention. This, being in clear breach of the
petitioner’s right to life protected by Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
he ought to be immediately released from illegal detention. Reliance has
been placed by Mr. Gupta on the decisions of this Court in Pratap Singh
v. State of Jharkhand8
, Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of Uttar
Pradesh9 and Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar Pradesh10
.
5. Opposing the writ petition, Mr. Neeraj Shekar, learned counsel
representing the respondent contends that the date of occurrence of crime
is 2nd November, 1981; and, therefore, the provisions of the 1960 Act would
be applicable and not the JJ Act, 2000, as contended on behalf of the
petitioner. It is next contended that the petitioner was found guilty of a
heinous offence and, therefore, he is not entitled to any mercy. Referring
8
(2005) 3 SCC 551
9
(2020) 10 SCC 555
10 (2023) 15 SCC 210
5
to the decision of this Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi)11
,
the contention advanced is that the offence of murder providing for a
minimum sentence of life imprisonment has to be regarded as a heinous
offence. He also invites our attention to the fact that despite this Court by
its order dated 8th May, 2009 having reversed the acquittal recorded by the
High Court, the petitioner did not surrender and evaded arrest by
absconding. He could only be arrested on 19th May, 2022. Culpability being
writ large, it is finally contended that this Court may refuse to exercise
discretion in favour of the petitioner.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
decisions cited at the bar.
7. From the factual narrative, the undisputed fact is that the petitioner
was 12 years 5 months old on the date of the incident. Even this Court has
acknowledged such fact in its order dated 8th May, 2009. Having read the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Sessions Court, which was
ultimately upheld by this Court, it is clear that apart from one assailant who
was armed with a knife, the other assailants had lathis in their hands which
were used by them to beat the victim. The victim died as a result of multiple
injuries caused by user of knife as well as lathis. In the absence of any
specific role played by the petitioner, the Sessions Court recorded conviction
against the petitioner by taking aid of Section 149 of the IPC, i.e., he was
member of an unlawful assembly which perpetrated an act in furtherance
of a common object and, therefore, would be liable thereunder.
11 (2020) 2 SCC 787
6
8. Be that as it may, the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more
than the period permissible in law. Moreover, the purpose for which the
Sessions Court directed the petitioner to be kept in a children’s home is no
longer feasible now. We have also not been shown by Mr. Shekar why
provisions contained in Section 24 of the 1960 Act - prohibiting joint trial of
a child with a person who is not a child - was observed in the breach.
9. In Pratap Singh (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court after
analysing the reasoning behind Sections 3 and 20 of the JJ Act, 2000 held
that the JJ Act, 2000 would be applicable to any proceeding which is pending
before any Court/Authority initiated under the 1986 Act and pending when
the JJ Act, 2000 came into force.
10. After placing reliance on the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap
Singh (supra), this Court in Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar12, held as
follows:
18. In the present case, when the inquiry has been initiated against the
appellants herein, they were admittedly “juvenile” even under the
provisions of the 1986 Act but this issue has been ignored by the trial
court and as well as the appellate court. There is no dispute whatsoever
that both the appellants have crossed the age of 18 years, yet both the
appellants, for the purposes of hearing of this appeal continued as if
they were to be “juvenile”.
11. In Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)13, this Court in no uncertain
terms held that from a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and
49 of the Act of 2000 read with Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, all persons who were below
12 (2011) 2 SCC 251
13 (2010) 5 SCC 344
7
the age of eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence even
prior to 1
st April, 2001 would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of
juvenility is raised after they have attained the age of eighteen years on or
before the date of commencement of the JJ Act, 2000 and were undergoing
sentences upon being convicted. A profitable reference may also be made
to the decision in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan14
.
12. No provision in the 1960 Act has been brought to our notice that
creates a legal impediment and, thus, limits our authority to grant relief to
the petitioner. Incidentally, the developments in legislation in relation to
juvenile justice introduced by the Parliament from time to time can hardly
be overlooked. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the new avatar of
Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000. Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000, relevant
for the present case, permits raising of a plea of juvenility in any court at
any stage and even after final disposal of a special leave petition under
Article 136 of the Constitution. On the plain terms of Section 7-A, the courts
are under an obligation to consider the plea of juvenility and to grant
appropriate relief if, at all, in an enquiry it is found that the convict was a
juvenile on the date of offence. The object and purpose of the JJ Act, 2000
has been noticed in great detail by the coordinate Bench in Vinod Katara
(supra). We share the view expressed therein. Incidentally, in Vinod
Katara (supra), the coordinate Bench, having regard to the facts and
circumstances, had to direct the Sessions Court, Agra, to examine the claim
14 (2009) 13 SCC 211
8
of the writ applicant that he was a juvenile on the date of the offence. In
the present case, no such determination is at all required since the
petitioner stands on firmer footing. Petitioner’s date of birth and his age as
on date of the offence are not disputed by the respondent and, thus, no
enquiry is needed to ascertain his age.
13. Since there is no quarrel with the fact that the petitioner was a child
at the time of commission of the offence and the petitioner having been
behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty has been curtailed not in
accordance with procedure established by law. Breach of the right
guaranteed by Article 21 is writ large and, hence, the benefit of release
from detention ought to be extended to the petitioner.
14. Accordingly, there shall be an order in terms of prayer (a) of the writ
petition. The petitioner shall be immediately released, if not wanted in any
other case.
15. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
16. The Senior Superintendent, Central Jail, Varanasi, shall act on the
basis of a downloaded copy of this judgment and order as and when
produced, without insisting for a certified copy thereof.
………………………………….……J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
………..………………………..……J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 09, 2025.
