Administrative law — Recruitment — Teacher appointment rules — Distinction between eligibility criteria and merit-list computation — Rule construction. Where the statutory scheme contains separate provisions governing (i) eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test (Chapter 2, Rule 4) and (ii) preparation of the merit list for appointment (Chapter 3, Rule 21), the two rules operate in distinct domains; Rule 21 (which prescribes that marks obtained in an additional subject shall not be included for determination of the educational merit point for the merit list) cannot be invoked to deny a candidate’s entitlement under Rule 4 to be treated as meeting the minimum qualifying marks for eligibility. The computation method printed on a candidate’s marksheet (which provides for addition of vocational bonus marks over and above pass marks to the aggregate) governs the calculation of the intermediate percentage for the limited purpose of determining eligibility under Rule 4 unless a clear statutory provision expressly bars that method. (Paras 15–29)
Interpretation of examination/marksheet provisions — Effect of vocational/‘additional subject’ bonus marks. A marksheet regulation expressly providing that marks obtained in a vocational subject, in excess of pass marks (the bonus), shall be added to the aggregate to improve the result and determine division must be given effect to for calculating a candidate’s intermediate percentage for eligibility, absent a statutory provision to the contrary. Such vocational bonus marks are a legitimate mechanism for improving overall percentage and cannot be excluded by administrative action which misapplies a rule that is limited to a different stage of the recruitment process. (Paras 12–24)
Natural justice — Show-cause notice and change of case — Fresh notice required. Where a noticee replies to a show-cause notice and successfully meets the specific charge framed therein, an authority may not thereafter terminate or penalize the noticee on a different factual or legal basis without issuing a fresh show-cause notice and affording a reasonable opportunity to meet the new case. Termination on a ground materially different from that set out in the original notice, without fresh notice, violates principles of natural justice and renders the action vitiated. Reliance on the proposition that no fresh notice is required where facts are undisputed is misplaced if the authority’s initial acceptance of one set of facts is followed by adverse action predicated on a different factual matrix. (Paras 30–35)
Scope of judicial relief — Reinstatement, continuity of service, arrears and seniority; limits for experience for promotion. Where termination of service is held illegal and the employee has been unlawfully kept out of service, the Court may direct reinstatement with continuity of service and grant full arrears of pay and restoration of seniority; nevertheless, the period not spent on actual duty may be excluded for the purpose of meeting experience criteria for promotion, since practical experience for teaching presupposes hands-on classroom work. (Paras 36–40)
Death of employee during pendency — Heirs’ entitlement. Where an affected employee dies before reinstatement but the termination is set aside, the heirs are entitled to arrears of pay from termination till date of death; the deceased may, for certain administrative purposes, be treated as having died-in-harness and the heirs permitted to apply for compassionate employment, to be considered on merits. (Para 40)
Held that — Directions and time-limits. Division Bench orders of the Jharkhand High Court allowing intra-court appeals are set aside; Single Judge judgments quashing termination orders are restored. Surviving appellants to be treated as continuously in service from original appointment (December 2015) with full arrears and seniority; arrears to be disbursed within three months of receipt of certified copy. Heirs of deceased appellant to produce proof and be paid arrears within three months of approaching the Department; minor heirs’ shares to be released to the widow as guardian where applicable. (Paras 37–42)
2025 INSC 1212
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11748 OF 2025
RAVI ORAON … APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11749 OF 2025
PREMLAL HEMBROM … APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11750 OF 2025
SURENDRA MUNDA … APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
2
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEALS
1. The lead appeal1 challenges the judgment and order dated 3rd August,
2021 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A. No. 83
of 2019, whereby the High Court allowed the intra-court appeal filed by
the respondents. Relying upon the said judgment, the High Court later
allowed two other intra-court appeals of the respondents, viz. L.P.A. No.
332 of 2021 and L.P.A. No. 331 of 2021, by two separate judgments of
the same date, i.e., 20th December, 2022. These latter judgments are
under challenge in the connected appeals2 before us.
FACTS
2. Facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeals, are these:
a. Certain posts of Intermediate Trained Teacher (Classes I to V) were
advertised on 10th August, 20153 by the District Education
Superintendent, Dhanbad (respondent no. 4)4
. The appellants applied
for the post and acquitted themselves successfully in the recruitment
process. After completion of the joining formalities, the appellants
started discharging their duties from December, 2015 as teachers.
b. On 27th September, 2016, show cause notices were issued to the
appellants alleging that they did not fulfil the eligibility criterion of having
1 Civil Appeal No. 11748 of 2025
2 Civil Appeal Nos. 11749 and 11750 of 2025
3 Advertisement No. 10/2015
4 Department
3
secured a minimum of 45% marks in their intermediate examination
(Class XII). Questions were also raised on the validity of their certificates
of graduation.
c. In October 2016, through separate replies to the show cause notices,
the appellants contended that being members of the Scheduled Tribe
category, they were required to secure only 40% marks in the
intermediate examination and not 45%. In other words, they were
entitled to a relaxation of 5% marks in terms of the advertisement. It
was further asserted that Ravi, Premlal and Surendra had secured
42.55%, 40.22%, and 41.33% marks, respectively, in the intermediate
examination and, thus, were eligible for participation in the recruitment
process. With respect to the issue concerning their graduation
certificates, the appellants clarified that no graduation certificate was
required for appointment on posts of teachers in Classes I–V, and that
the same had been furnished by them only for the sake of completeness.
d. On 7th October, 2016, by separate office orders, the services of the
appellants were terminated on the ground that they had secured less
than 40% marks in the intermediate examination and that their
certificates of graduation were not proper. According to the calculation
made by the Department, Ravi, Premlal, and Surendra had secured
38.56%, 39.78%, and 39% marks, respectively in the intermediate
examination. In arriving at this calculation, the Department excluded
the additional marks secured by the appellants in the vocational subject.
We shall examine the validity of this method of calculation a little later.
4
e. Appellants challenged the termination orders dated 7th October, 2016,
before the High Court by filing separate writ petitions5
. A Single Judge
of the High Court allowed these petitions in the years 2018 and 2022
and, consequently, the impugned termination orders were set aside.
f. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents preferred intra-court appeals. As
noted before, a Division Bench of the High Court allowed these appeals
and dismissed the challenge laid by the appellants to the orders
terminating their services.
g. Crestfallen by such determination, the appellants have invoked this
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
JUDGMENTS OF THE SINGLE JUDGE
3. The writ petition filed by Ravi was allowed vide judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 whereas the remaining two writ petitions
presented by Premlal and Surendra were allowed vide a common
judgment and order dated 10th November, 2022. A summary of the
judgments reads thus:
a. W.P. (S) No. 6607 of 2016 of Ravi: The Single Judge noted that the
respondent (department), for ascertaining the minimum qualification of
the candidate, erroneously relied on Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary
School Teacher Appointment Rules, 20126
, which laid down the
procedure for preparing the ‘merit-list’ of candidates and did not provide
for ascertaining ‘minimum qualification’. It was further held that Ravi’s
5 W.P. (S) Nos. 6607, 6704 and 6608 of 2016
6 2012 Rules
5
services could not have been terminated merely on a show-cause notice
without a departmental enquiry. Noting that Ravi had secured more than
40% (383/900) marks in his intermediate examination, the Court
quashed the order of termination of service.
b. W.P. (S) Nos. 6704 & 6608 of 2016 of Premlal and Surendra,
respectively: The Single Judge allowed the writ petitions upon finding
that Premlal and Surendra had secured more than 40% marks in the
intermediate examination taken by them. A submission was made by
the counsel for the Council that in calculating the percentage of marks
secured by Premlal and Surendra, the Department had considered only
the marks secured in the main subjects and excluded the marks in the
vocational subject. Had the marks secured in the vocational subject been
included, both Premlal and Surendra would stand to score above 40%.
In view of the submission made on behalf of the Council, the writ
petitions were allowed and the termination orders quashed.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE DIVISION BENCH
4. We propose to summarise the judgment and order impugned in the lead
appeal as the other judgments and orders, impugned in the connected
appeals, were passed relying upon the former.
a. In the impugned judgment the Division Bench reasoned that the marks
secured by Ravi in the vocational subject could not have been included
for preparing the “merit list”. Although a regulation printed on the
reverse side of the marksheet provided that the bonus marks (over and
above the pass marks) secured in the vocational subject will be added
6
to the sum total of marks secured in the main subjects, the Division
Bench held that such regulation would not apply for the purpose of
calculation of marks under the present recruitment. In support thereof,
the Division Bench assigned three reasons which are reproduced below:
First, the Regulation, as mentioned in the mark-sheet does not
govern the matter of recruitment rather it only governs the process
of examination and nothing more. Secondly, when the rules have
been framed in the year 2012 the recruitment process will proceed
as per the statutory provision as framed in the year 2012. Thirdly,
the Regulation only speaks about addition of marks obtained in the
vocational subject for the preparation of result and nothing else.
b. Appellants argued that once the Department had accepted their reply to
the show cause notice – wherein they explained that they were required
to secure only 40% marks in the intermediate examination being
members of the reserved category – the Department was obliged to
issue a fresh show cause notice before terminating their services on the
ground that they had not secured 40% marks. The Division Bench,
placing reliance on paragraph 64 of the decision of this Court in Escorts
Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. &
others7
, rejected this argument after noting that the offending act of
the Department did not violate the principle of natural justice as there
was “no requirement to follow the principle of natural justice when the
fact is not in dispute”. Since, Rule 21 of the 2012 Rules precludes the
addition of marks secured in the vocational subjects, the Division Bench
7
(2004) 4 SCC 281
7
noted that even if fresh show cause notices were issued, the appellants
could not have rebutted the requirement of the said rule.
c. The Division Bench noted that the Single Judge had held that since Ravi
was allowed to participate in the Teacher Eligibility Test under Rule 4
(considering him to have secured 40% marks), he would be deemed to
have secured 40% marks for the purpose of appointment as well.
Disagreeing with this reasoning, the Division Bench observed that Rule
4 and Rule 21 operate in different contexts. Chapter 2 of the Rules deals
with participation in the Teacher Eligibility Test, while Chapter 3
prescribes the process for recruitment as a teacher. Both chapters serve
distinct purposes: Chapter 2 establishes eligibility to appear in the Test,
whereas Chapter 3 governs the actual recruitment process. It was
further noted that the Teacher Eligibility Test is only an eligibility criterion
for consideration for appointment on the post of teacher. Allowing a
candidate to appear in the Test, even without meeting the 40% marks
requirement under Rule 4, does not confer any right to claim
appointment. Thus, the Division Bench found the termination of the
appellants to be proper.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PARTIES WERE INVOLVED IN LITIGATION
5. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the rival contentions, it is
necessary to note certain developments after the parties started
litigating.
8
6. First, the controversy as to whether the degrees awarded by Hindi
Vidyapeeth, Deoghar8 were valid was set to rest by a judgment and
order of the High Court dated 10th May, 2022 in Vijoy Kumar v. State
of Jharkhand9
. It was declared therein that the various degrees10
awarded by the Vidyapeeth prior to 26th February, 2015 would be valid.
Vide a letter11 issued by the Secretary to the Government of Jharkhand,
Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasha, the
Government upon considering the opinion of the Advocate General
notified its decision inter alia to the effect that the degrees awarded by
the Vidyapeeth prior to 26th February, 2015 would be valid for
appointment and promotion and those awarded thereafter would not be
valid. It was also sought to be informed that the policy decisions taken
by the Government, mentioned in such letter, would be effective from
26th February, 2015.
7. Secondly, consequent upon the aforesaid development, it has been
brought to our notice that the appellants – Ravi and Premlal – have been
freshly appointed as teachers on 17th January, 2025. As a result of such
fresh appointment, however, they stand to lose the benefit of their past
services.
8. Laslty, it has also been brought to our notice that the appellant –
Surendra – breathed his last on 5th August, 2024, i.e., prior to fresh
8 Vidyapeeth
9 W.P.(C) No.3115 of 2015 and batch matters
10 Praveshika, Sahitya Bhushan and Sahitya Alankar
11 No.-15/Policy Ni.-07-03/2022 Ka.-3475 dated 15th June, 2023
9
appointment of the other appellants – Ravi and Premlal. He could not
thus be extended the benefit of fresh appointment. Be that as it may, if
the other appellants – Ravi and Premlal – succeed in persuading us to
hold in their favour, the heirs of the appellant – Surendra – would be
entitled to similar but limited relief other than reinstatement in service.
QUESTIONS
9. Despite fresh appointment of the appellants – Ravi and Premlal – the
basic question that survives for an answer by us is, whether the
termination of services of the appellants, on the ground that their
graduation certificates were not valid and they had not secured at least
40% marks in the intermediate examination taken by them, was proper?
The other question would necessarily relate to the nature and extent of
grant of relief, if any, should the basic question be decided in favour of
the appellants – Ravi and Prem Lal. Also, we would be required to
consider the claim of the other appellant – Surendra – in the changed
circumstances.
ANALYSIS AND REASONS
10. The degrees were awarded to the appellants by the Vidyapeeth on
unspecified dates but prior to 26th February, 2015. As discussed above,
the degrees awarded prior to the said date have been treated to be valid
by the Government of Jharkhand.
11. With the recognition of their degrees as valid, the surviving dispute in
the present appeals is regarding the other ground of termination, i.e.,
10
whether the appellants had secured the minimum qualification marks in
the intermediate examination taken by them.
12. According to the appellants, they scored more than the required
qualifying marks after taking into account the marks secured by them in
the respective vocational subjects. They assert that as per the guidelines
contained on the reverse side of their marksheet, bonus marks secured
in the vocational subjects, over and above the minimum pass marks, are
to be added to the aggregate of compulsory and optional subjects and
in this way, they scored more than 40% marks. The relevant paragraphs
are reproduced below:
4. The result of a candidate offering an additional subject shall be
determined on the basis of marks obtained by him in all the
compulsory and in the three out of the four optional and additional
subjects taken together in which he/she has secured higher marks.
6. The marks obtained by a candidate in vocational subjects over and
above pass (theory and practical taken together) will be added in
aggregate to improve his/her result and determine division. This
advantage will be available only to such candidates who have
appeared at the examination in both theory and practical papers.
(emphasis ours)
13. On the other hand, countering this method of calculation, the
respondents relied on Rule 21 A (ii)(A) of the 2012 Rules which provides
that the marks secured by a candidate in an “additional subject” will not
be taken into consideration while calculating the “educational merit
point”.
14. Before analysing the aforesaid contentions, we need to note and
consider the 2012 Rules, to the extent relevant.
11
2012 RULES
15. In exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India, the Governor of Jharkhand framed the 2012 Rules
for “Appointment on posts of Teachers and Instructors in Primary
Schools under Human Resources Development Department [Primary
Education Directorate]”.
16. Rule 312 provides that for testing the eligibility for appointment on the
post of Teacher in schools including government and aided nongovernmental schools, an examination shall be held by the concerned
authority.
17. Rule 4 provides for eligibility criteria, which a candidate must fulfil to
appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test. Portion of the said rule, which is
material, is reproduced below:
4. For appearing in Teacher Eligibility Test minimum
qualification shall be as follows:
(a) The candidate must be citizen of India.
(b) Educational and Technical Qualifications.
(i) For appointment of Teachers of Primary Class:-
(a)Higher Secondary with minimum 50 % marks or its equivalent
and two years Diploma in elementary Education. [Known by
whatever name]
Or
12 For testing the eligibility for appointment on the post of Teacher, examination shall be
held by Jharkhand Academic Council or any Authority, authorized by State Government,
in which successful candidate shall be eligible of appointment in following schools.
A. All such school which are operated by the Government of Jharkhand or
Jharkhand Education Project Council.
B. Such Non-Governmental School, which are aided by State Government.
C. Such Non-Governmental School, which are granted (sic.) by State Government.
D. Such Non-Governmental Non-Aided School, which are recognized by State
Government.
E. Such School which is affiliated /recognized by any National Education Board and
to whom No- Objection Certificate is issued by State Government.
12
Higher Secondary with minimum 45 % marks or its equivalent
and two years Diploma in elementary Education Science [Known
by whatever name], which is obtained as per National Teacher
Education Council (Recognition, Standard and Activities)
Regulation 2002,
Or
******
Or
******
And
(b)Qualified in Teacher Eligibility Test (T.E.T.) held for class 6 to 8
by the Government of Jharkhand under guideline framed by
National Teacher Education Council.
(c) To the candidates of Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe and
disabled category relaxation shall be given of 5 percent in
minimum obtained marks mentioned in rule 4 (b) (i) (A) and 4
(b) (ii) (A).
(d)Such candidate of which training is complete and Teacher
Training Examination is held, then also said candidate may appear
in Teacher Eligibility Test Examination, but his final passing shall
depend on the result of Teacher Training Examination.
(emphasis ours)
18. Furthermore, Rule 21 reads as follows:
21. For appointment of Teachers/Instructors on vacant posts Merit
List shall be prepared at district level as per following process:-
A. Determination of Merit List for appointment of Inter Trained Teachers:-
(i) For appointment of Inter Trained Teachers category wise Merit List
shall be prepared by Dist. Education Establishment Committee on
basis of total merit point of candidate.
(ii) Total merit point of candidate shall be sum of educational merit
point and merit point of Teacher Eligibility Test, of which calculation
shall be made as follows:-
(A) For determination of educational merit point, after aiding
percentage of obtained marks of Matric Examination, Intermediate
Examination and Teacher Training Examination, on dividing total
sum by three, resultant percentage shall be educational merit point
of candidate. But in this calculation, marks obtained in additional
subject shall not be included.
(B) On basis of obtained marks of Teacher Eligibility Test, the
determination of merit point of Teacher Eligibility Test of candidate
shall be made as follows: -
i. 90% and above 10 point
13
ii. 80% and above but Below 90% 06 point
iii. 70% and above but Below 80% 04 point
iv. 52% and above but Below 70% 02 point
B. Determination of Merit List for appointment of Graduate Trained
Teachers:
******************
(emphasis ours)
19. The aforesaid rule provides for a method of calculation of merit point,
for the purpose of preparation of merit list of eligible candidates. The
merit point, as per the rule, shall be a sum total of “education merit
point” (which shall be the equivalent of the sum total of percentage of
marks secured by a candidate in his/her matric, intermediate and
Teacher Training Examination, divided by three) and “merit point of
Teacher Eligibility Test”. For calculation of “educational merit point”, it is
provided that the marks secured by a candidate in his/her vocational
subject shall not be taken into consideration. We have done a detailed
analysis of the rule in the upcoming part of the judgment. At this point,
it is suffice to mention that this rule applies at the time of preparation
of “Merit List”.
CALCULATION OF MARKS SECURED BY THE APPELLANTS
20. Admittedly, the Department, while calculating the percentage of marks
secured by the appellants in the intermediate examination taken by
them did not take into account the marks secured by them in the
respective vocational subjects.
14
21. It is also clear that if the marks secured by the appellants in their
vocational subjects are taken into account, then they score more than
40% marks; otherwise, not.
22. The relevant guideline from the marksheet has already been reproduced
above. For better understanding of the same, we wish to look into the
marks secured by the appellant – Prem Lal - in his intermediate
examination with and without addition of the marks secured in the
vocational subject and calculate the percentage of marks. It is found
that:
a. In his two compulsory subjects, Prem Lal secured 30/100 marks in one
and 87/200 marks in the other. In his optional subjects, he secured
80/200, 83/200 and 78/200 marks. Thus, the aggregate of marks
secured by him in the main 5 subjects stood at 358/900 marks, which
is roughly 39.77% (less than the required 40% for a candidate belonging
to a Schedule Tribe).
b. Prem Lal secured 39/100 in his vocational subject. The minimum
qualifying marks in the vocational subject was 35 marks. As per
guideline 6 (on the reverse of the marksheet), the additional marks
secured over and above the minimum qualifying marks are to be added
to the aggregate to improve the result of a candidate and determine his
division. The additional marks secured by Prem Lal (4 marks), when
added to the aggregate (358/900) increased his score to 362/900, which
is roughly 40.22%.
15
c. This is how addition of marks secured in the vocational subjects could
come to the aid and advantage of the appellants.
23. In the present case, we find no reason as to why the method of
calculation of the percentage, as provided on the reverse of the
marksheet, should not be applied for the purpose of calculation of marks
of the appellants. Marks secured in the vocational subject is a way for a
candidate to improve his/her overall percentage of marks. The reasoning
behind this method, is clear to us. A vocational subject, though optional,
would place an additional burden on an examinee which he/she
shoulders in the fervent hope of improving his/her overall percentage.
24. In the absence of a bar or an alternate method provided by any law, the
method provided on the marksheet has to be followed. Therefore, the
onus of proof shifted to the respondents to show that calculation as per
the marksheet is not warranted. As discussed above, the respondents
rely on Rule 21 of the 2012 Rules which the appellants have vehemently
refuted. The only issue which therefore remains is, whether Rule 21 of
the 2012 Rules will bar/override the method provided in the marksheet.
RULE 21 – WHETHER APPLICABLE?
25. Indeed, at first blush, it appears to be attractive on a plain reading of
Rule 21 A (ii)(A) that the marks secured by the appellants in their
vocational subjects could not have been considered for calculation of
their overall percentage of marks in the intermediate examination.
16
However, on a deeper scrutiny, the argument suffers from a prodigious
error.
26. The heading of Rule 21 makes it very clear that the procedure in this
rule applies only at the time of preparing the “Merit List”. Rule 21 is no
way concerned with providing a mechanism for deciding whether a
candidate is eligible or not. That consideration falls within the exclusive
domain of Rule 4, which provides for an eligibility criteria for the purpose
of appearing in the Teacher Eligibility Test.
27. That both these rules function in their exclusive domain is further
strengthened by the fact that Rule 4 of the 2012 Rules is under Chapter
2 named “Teacher Eligibility Test” while Rule 21 falls under Chapter 3
named “Appointment”.
28. A combined reading of both the rules, therefore, is that the eligibility of
a candidate for appearing in the Teacher Eligibility Test is to be decided
in accordance with Rule 4 and Merit list (for the purposes of
appointment) is to be prepared in accordance with Rule 21. Thus, the
respondents erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding
whether the appellants fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The Division Bench
also committed the same error.
29. In accordance with Rule 4, which does not provide for exclusion of marks
secured in the vocational subject, and Rule 21 not being applicable for
determining the eligibility of a candidate, the only method which remains
for calculation of the marks is the one which is provided on the reverse
side of the marksheet of the appellants, according to which the
17
appellants have secured more that 40% marks. Therefore, the
appellants were eligible to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test
Examination.
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE – WHETHER VIOLATED?
30. A deeper concern now beckons our attention. We shall place the
appellants’ termination under the sharp lens of natural justice.
31. In the show cause notices issued to the appellants, a question was raised
about them not fulfilling the eligibility criterion of having secured a
minimum of 45% marks in their intermediate examination. The validity
of their graduation certificates was also questioned. The appellants
replied by stating that they secured more than 40% marks in their
intermediate examination, which perfectly fulfilled the eligibility
criterion. To wit, it was their contention that being members of the
Scheduled Tribe, they were entitled to a 5% relaxation of marks. As
regards the graduation certificate, it was made clear that the same was
not a requirement for appointment of a teacher for Classes I-V and the
same was provided only for the sake of completeness. However, on the
very next day, the respondents terminated their services by following a
course of action which shocks our conscience.
32. Why is this course of action shocking? The appellants, in their replies to
the show cause notices, had categorically demonstrated that they were
not required to secure 45% marks in their intermediate examination.
They were required to secure more than 40% marks in the intermediate
examination, which they did secure. Confronted with this situation, the
18
respondents conveniently proceeded to terminate the appellants’
services by computing their marks after excluding the marks secured in
the vocational subject. Significantly, the allegation that the appellants
had failed to secure 40% marks (after exclusion of marks secured in the
vocational subject) in the intermediate examination did not even figure
as an allegation in the show cause notices. Therefore, findings were
returned by the respondents which were at variance with the allegations
levelled in the show cause notices. The appellants having successfully
defended the allegations, the respondents were precluded in law from
proceeding with such notices. In the absence of fresh show cause notices
specifically requiring the appellants to explain why the marks secured in
the vocational subject should not be taken into account for determining
their overall percentage, in our considered view, the appellants had been
denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing and the termination
orders are wholly unsustainable and stand vitiated being in violation of
the principles of natural justice.
33. The present is akin to a situation where the noticee successfully defends
the charge against him but is made to suffer civil consequences because
the notifier finds the noticee guilty of a different charge in respect
whereof he is not put to notice. In such a case, the finding of guilt which
is at variance with the original charge without proper opportunity to
respond offends due process and renders any order or action
unsustainable.
19
34. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court fell in error in holding
that the principles of natural justice were not violated on the ground that
a fresh show cause notice was unnecessary, as there was “no
requirement to follow the principles of natural justice when the fact is
not in dispute.” This conclusion was reached only after the Division
Bench held that Rule 21 was applicable to the case of the appellants,
thereby precluding the inclusion of marks secured in vocational subjects.
However, as already discussed, since Rule 21 has no application to the
present case, the very foundation upon which the Division Bench rested
its decision stands vitiated.
35. Reliance placed by the Division Bench on Escorts Farms (supra)
appears to be wholly misplaced. The approach of the Division Bench was
flawed as would appear from the foregoing discussions. Appellants, if
provided a fair and reasonable opportunity, could have pointed out the
error committed by the respondents. Complying with natural justice
principles, on facts and circumstances, would not have been an idle
formality and/or the decision a forgone conclusion.
CONCLUSION
36. For these two reasons, i.e., (i) the procedure that Rule 21 enshrined is
only to be used for the purpose of preparation of merit list and Rule 4
does not provide for exclusion of marks secured in the vocational
subject; and (ii) the termination order stands vitiated for violation of
principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the respondents excluded the
marks secured in the vocational subjects without affording the
20
appellants notice or an opportunity to contest such exclusion, we have
no other option but to interfere.
RELIEF
37. The judgments and orders of the Division Bench under challenge in these
appeals are set aside.
38. Since the respondents had acted in a rather highhanded, arbitrary and
illegal manner in terminating the services of the appellants without
justifiable reason and also following due process, the orders terminating
the services of the appellants are also set aside.
39. The appellants – Ravi and Prem Lal – shall be treated to have been in
continuous service right from the date(s) of their original appointment
(December, 2015), as if their services were never terminated. They shall
be entitled to service benefits like arrears of pay in full and seniority
counted from the dates of initial appointment. However, for the purpose
of meeting the experience criterion for promotion, the period not spent
on duty will not be counted. The rationale behind this direction is that
practical experience of teaching is gained through imparting of lessons
to the students. They cannot, thus, be held to have acquired experience
without hands-on work. Though the appellants are not at fault, we have
attempted to suitably compensate them by awarding full arrears of pay.
40. Insofar as the appellant – Surendra – is concerned, he cannot be
reinstated in service. However, while setting aside the order of his
termination from service, we order that from the dates of termination of
service till his death, his heirs too would be entitled to full arrears of pay.
21
Additionally, Surendra shall be deemed to have died-in-harness and if
there be a scheme for compassionate employment, his heirs may apply
thereunder. If an application is received, the respondents shall proceed
to consider the same on its own merits.
41. Arrears of pay shall be released to the appellants – Ravi and Premlal –
as early as possible but not later than 3 (three) months from date of
receipt of a copy of this judgment and order.
42. Insofar as release of arrears to the heirs of the appellant – Surendra –
is concerned, such heirs shall be at liberty to approach the Department
with all supporting documents. Upon a satisfaction being reached that
they are the heirs of late Surendra, the Department shall proceed to
disburse the amount payable in equal shares. If any heir is a minor,
his/her share shall be released in favour of the widow of Surendra. The
disbursement be effected also within three months of the heirs
approaching the Department.
43. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms. No costs.
44. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………..………………J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 09, 2025.
