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Thursday, August 11, 2011

Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appellants were not entitled to any compensation even when their forest land is acquired by the government, merely because the appellants had not derived any Page 1 of 52 income from the said forest, is one of the several important questions of law which has arisen for consideration in the present appeal.



                                                             REPORTABLE



           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4772 OF 1998




Rajiv Sarin & Anr.                                                     ....

Appellants



                                   Versus



State of Uttarakhand & Ors.                                               ....

Respondents





                                JUDGMENT





Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.





        The   present   Civil   Appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment
  1.


        and   order   dated   12th  August   1997   passed   by   the   High



        Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in   Writ   Petition   No.



        8927   of   1988,   whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High



        Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants.



        Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the



        appellants   were   not   entitled   to   any   compensation   even



        when   their   forest   land   is   acquired   by   the   government,



        merely   because   the   appellants   had   not   derived   any

                                Page 1 of 52


      income   from   the   said   forest,   is   one   of   the   several



      important   questions   of   law   which   has   arisen   for



      consideration in the present appeal.




      The   appellant's   father   Shri   P.   N.   Sarin   had   in   the   year
2.


      1945   acquired   proprietary   right   in   an   Estate   known   as



      Beni   Tal   Fee   Simple   Estate   situated   in   Pargana



      Chandpur,   Tehsil   Karan   Prayag,   District   Chamoli,



      Uttarakhand   (hereinafter   referred   to   as  "the   property   in



      question")   which   comprised   of   large   tracts   of   forest



      spanning   in   and     around   1600   acres.     On   the   death   of



      Shri P.N. Sarin in the year 1976 appellants succeeded to



      the property in question. By a Gazette Notification dated



      21st  December,   1977   under   Section   4-A   of   the  Kumaun



      and   Uttarakhand  Zamindari Abolition  and  Land   Reforms



      Act,   1960  (hereinafter   referred   to   as   "KUZALR   Act")   as



      amended by the U.P. Act No. 15 of 1978, the rights, title



      and   interest   of   every  hissedar  in   respect   of   forest   land



      situated   in   the   specified   areas   ceased   with   effect   from



      01st  January,   1978   and   the   same   were   vested   in   the



      State   Government.   A   notice   issued   by   the   Assistant



      Collector, Karan Prayag, District Chamoli, under Rule 2



      of  the  Kumaun  and  Uttrakhand  Zamindari Abolition and

                                Page 2 of 52


            Land Reform Rules, 1965  (hereinafter referred to as "the



            KUZALR   Rules")   framed   under   the   KUZALR   Act   was



            served upon the appellants intimating them that effective



            from   1st  January,   1978,   the   rights,   title   and   interest   of



            hissedar  in   respect   of   the   property   in   question   had



            vested   in   the   State   Government   free   from   all



            encumbrances and it invited objections and statement, if



            any,   relating   to   the   compensation   qua   the   property   in



            question.




            Assailing   the   aforesaid   notice   issued   by   the   Assistant
      3.


            Collector,   the   appellants   preferred   a   writ   petition   under



            Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court. On 13th



            December   1978   while   disposing   the   aforesaid   writ



            petition, this Court passed the following order




            "We   are   of   the   opinion   that   it   will   be   better   if   the

            Petitioner   files   a   petition   under   Article   226   of   the

            Constitution   in   the   High   Court.   This   Petition   is

            therefore allowed to be withdrawn."





      Subsequently,   on   02nd  April   1979   the   appellants   filed
4.


      objections   to   the   notice   issued   by   the   Assistant   Collector



      challenging   the   vires   of   the   KUZALR   Act   and   also   stating



      that   no   profit   was   being   made   from   the   property   in



                                        Page 3 of 52


      question. By an order dated 11th  April 1988, the Assistant



      Collector   dismissed   the   objections   of   the   appellants   by



      observing   that  that   he   had   no  jurisdiction   to   consider   the



      legal validity of the KUZALR Act. With regard to the issue of



      compensation,   the   Assistant   Collector   held   that   since   the



      KUZALR   Act   does   not   provide   for   a   method   to   compute



      compensation  in  cases   where  no  income   has  been  derived



      from   the   forests,   the   appellants   were   not   entitled   to   any



      compensation.




      Feeling aggrieved, the appellants preferred a writ petition in
5.


      the  High Court of Judicature at Allahabad questioning the



      legality   and   validity   of  the   order   of   the   Assistant   Collector



      and also challenging  the constitutional validity of Sections



      4A, 18(1)(cc) and 19(1)(b) of the KUZALR Act. By impugned



      judgment   dated   12th         August   1997,   the   High   Court



      dismissed the writ petition.




      Not   satisfied   with   the   judgment   rendered   by   the   High
6.


      Court,   the   appellants   preferred  a  Special  Leave   Petition  in



      which leave was granted by this Court by order dated 11th



      September 1998. By an order passed on 11th August, 2010,



      this appeal was directed to be listed before the Constitution




                                   Page 4 of 52


      Bench.   This   matter   was   thereafter   listed   before   the



      Constitution   Bench   alongwith   other   connected   matters



      wherein   also   the   issue   of   scope   and   extent   of   right   under



      Article   300A   of   the   Constitution   of   India   was   one   of   the



      issues to be considered.




7. We   heard   the   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the



      parties   in   respect   of   all   the   contentions   raised   before   us.



      Before   addressing   the   rival   contentions   advanced   by   the



      parties, it will be useful to throw some light on the relevant



      legal   position   which   is   intrinsically   complex   and   requires



      closer examination.




      The  Uttar   Pradesh   Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land   Reforms
8.


      Act, 1950  (hereinafter to be referred as "UPZALR Act") was



      enacted  in   the   year   1950   and   the   UPZALR   Act   was   made



      applicable to the whole of the State of U.P. except  inter-alia



      the   areas   of   Kumaon,   Uttarakhand.   The   object   of   the



      UPZALR   Act   as   quite   evident   from   its   statements   and



      objects   are   to   provide   for   the   abolition   of   the   Zamindari



      System   which   involves   intermediaries   between   the   tiller   of



      the   soil   and   the   State   in   Uttar   Pradesh   and   for   the



      acquisition  of   their   rights,   title   and   interest   and   to   reform




                                   Page 5 of 52


      the   law   relating   to   land   tenure   consequent   upon   such



      abolition   and   acquisition   and   to   make   provision   for   other



      matters connected therewith.




      Subsequently,   on   02nd            August   1960          Kumaun   and
9.


      Uttarakhand   Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land   Reforms   Act,



      1960  was   enacted.   The   object   of   the   KUZALR   Act   is   to



      provide for the acquisition of the rights, title and interests



      of   persons   between   the   State   and   the   tiller   of   the   soil   in



      certain areas of the Kumaun and Garhwal Divisions and for



      the introduction of land reforms therein. It is important to



      notice   that   the   original   KUZALR   Act   did   not   provide   for



      vesting   of   private   forests,   and   the   definition   of   the   word



      "land"   in   Section   3(10)   thereof   excluded   forest.       Section



      3(10) of the KUZALR Act reads as follows:-




         "3(10).     "land"   means   land   held   or   occupied   for

         purposes   connected   with   agriculture,   horticulture

         or   animal   husbandry   which   includes   pisciculture

         and poultry farming but shall not include a forest;"





       However, after the commencement of the  Constitution (42nd
10.


      Amendment)   Act,   1976  which   came   into   effect   from   03rd



      January   1977   wherein   inter-alia   the   subject   "forests"   was



      included in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of



                                    Page 6 of 52


the Constitution as Entry 17A; the U.P. Zamindari Abolition



(Amendment) Act, 1978 (U.P. Act 15 of 1978) was passed on



30th  November   1977   whereby   KUZALR   Act   was   amended.



In   the   preamble   and   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons



necessitating   the   amendment,   it   is   stated   that   the



amendment   act   amends   Kumaun   and   Uttarakhand



Zamindari   abolition   and   Land   Reforms   Act,   1960   also.     It



goes on to state that in the areas governed by the Principal



Act   namely   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Zamindari   Abolition   and



Land   Reforms   Act,   the   rights,   title   and   interest   of   ex-



intermediaries   in   respect   of   their   private   forests   were



abolished   and   vested   in   State.       It   also   states   that   in   the



areas   to   which   the   Kumaun   and   Uttarakhand   Zamindari



Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 apply, the hissedars



(Intermediaries) continued to enjoy their rights in respect of



their   private   forests   and   therefore   it   was   necessary   to



remove the disparity as well by introducing an amendment



in   the   nature   of   Section   4A.   Under   the   aforesaid



amendment   to   the   KUZALR   Act,   Section   4A   was   added   to



the KUZALR Act and private forests were brought within its



purview. It will be useful to reproduce Section 4A, 18(1)(cc)



and 19(1)(b) of the KUZALR Act which reads as follows:



                              Page 7 of 52


         "4-A.     Vesting   of   interest   of   hissedar   in   the   forest

         land - With effect from January 1, 1978 the rights,

         title   and   interest   of   every   hissedar   in   respect   of

         forest   land   shall   cease   and   shall   vest   in   the   State

         Government   free   from   all   encumbrances,   and   the

         provisions   of   this   Chapter   and   Chapter   V   shall

         mutatis   mutandis   apply   to   a   forest   land   as   they

         apply to a khaikari land."



                              xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


         "18   (1)   (cc)   in   the   case   of   a   private   forest,   the

         average annual income from such forest for a period

         of   twenty   agricultural   years   immediately   preceding

         the date of vesting;"


                      xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


         "19(1) (b) - in the case of a private forest, eight times

         of the amount of average annual income from such

         forest."





       Kumaun   and   Uttarakhand   Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land
11.


   Reforms Act, 1960, which is a State legislation received the



   assent   of   the   President   of   India   on   10th  September,   1960.



   The   amendment   brought   in   1978   through   UP   Act   15   of



   1978   to   the   said   Act   also   received   the   assent   of   the



   President on 26th April, 1978.




12.At   the   outset   we   would   like   to   mention   that   there   is   no



   specific   whisper   of   defence   raised   under   Articles   31A,   31B



   and 31C of the Constitution in the Counter-Affidavit/Reply



   filed by the State of Uttarakhand to the writ petition filed by




                                   Page 8 of 52


   the appellants in the High Court nor even before this Court



   but   an   attempt   was   made   to   argue   the   case   on   those



   grounds   on   behalf   of   the   respondents.   As   there   is   no



   mention of any of the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution



   in   the   arguments   or   specific   pleadings   by   the   respondents



   in   the   writ   petition,   the   question   of   deciding   the



   applicability   of   those   provisions   of   the   Constitution   and



   consequent protection of the Act, therefore, does not arise.




13.It   was   contended   by   Shri   K.K.   Venugopal,   learned   senior



   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants   that   the   original



   KUZALR   Act,   1960   excluded   private   forests   [Section   6(1)



   (4)],   since   the   vesting   of   private   forests   in   the   State   would



   not be by way of agrarian reform. It was further contended



   that the provision for agrarian reforms, therefore, should be



   a   part   of   the   Act,   but,   in   the   present   case,   the   private



   forests   so   acquired   under   Section   4A   of   the   KUZALR   Act



   becomes the property of the State which is untenable.




14.It was further argued that in any event, under Section 4A



   of   the   KUZALR   Act,   it   is   only   the   provisions   of   Chapter-II



   and Chapter-V which shall apply to forests land while Rule



   41   occurs   in   Chapter   IV   and   has   no   application   to   the




                                 Page 9 of 52


  forests   covered   by   Section   4A,   and   hence   Rule   41   will   not



  apply  to forests  acquired  under  Section 4A of the  KUZALR



  Act.   Further,   if   Article   31A   of   the   Constitution   has   no



  application,   then   the   law   has   to   be   tested   against   the



  Constitution   as   it   stood   on   the   date   of   its   enactment,   i.e.



  the   U.P.   Amendment   Act,   1978   bringing   forth   amendment



  to KUZALR Act has to stand the test of Articles 14, 19 and



  21   of   the   Constitution.   It   was   further   contended   that   the



  said   Amendment   Act   would   be   invalid   since   the   mere



  transfer   of   the   private   forests   to   the   State   would   by   itself



  not be a public purpose and, furthermore, non-grant /total



  absence   of   compensation   to   the   appellants,   while   granting



  full   compensation   to   other   owners   of   private   forests   who



  have   mismanaged   the   forests   or   clear-felled   the   forests,



  would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.




       Per   contra   Shri   Parag   P.   Tripathi,   Ld.   Additional   Solicitor
15.


  General strenuously argued that that the entry "Acquisition



  and   Requisitioning   of   property"   which   was   earlier   in   the



  form   of   Entry   36/List-II   of   the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the



  Constitution [which was subject to Entry  42/List-III  of  the



  Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution]   and   Entry   33/List-I



  of   the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution   provided   only

                                  Page 10 of 52


   the field of legislative power and did not extend to providing



   or         requiring      compensation.   The           requirement      of



   compensation   in   the   event   of   "taking"   flows   only   from



   Article 31(2) of the Constitution, which was repealed by the



   Constitution   (44th  Amendment)   Act,   with   effect   from   26th



   September, 1979.




16.As  far   as   the   question   of   alleged   discrimination  i.e.   giving



   compensation to other owners and nil compensation to the



   appellants   herein   is   concerned,   it   was   contended   by



   Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   that   merely   because



   there   may   be   two   compensation   laws,   which   may   be



   applicable, one of which provides for a higher compensation



   than   the   other,   would   not   by   itself   make   the   provisions



   discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.




17.It   is   settled   law   that   Agrarian   Reforms   fall   within   Entry



   18/List-II   read   with   Entry   42/List-III   of   the   Seventh



   Schedule of the Constitution.




       In the instant case, it cannot be denied that KUZALR Act,
18.


   1960   is   a   statutory   enactment,   dealing   with   the   agrarian



   reforms.   Section   4   of   the   KUZALR   Act   provides   that   in



   respect   of   non-forest   land,   State   Government   may   by


                                Page 11 of 52


  notification   take   over   the   rights,   title   and   interests   of



  hissedar. The  land so released is then dealt  with by giving



  bhumidhari  rights/asami  rights   to   the   tillers   and   thereby



  effectuating the purpose of agrarian reforms.




       It   is   important   to   notice   that   Section   4A   introduced   in
19.


  KUZALR   Act   by   the   UP   Amendment   Act   1978   does   not



  require   any   notification   but   it   specifies   the   date   i.e.   01st



  January 1978 and provides that the right, title and interest



  of a  hissedar  in respect of forest land shall cease and vest



  by   the   application   of   the   statute   itself   in   the   State



  Government.   Section   8   of   the   KUZALR   Act   mandates   that



  such   "hissedar"   becomes   by   operation   of   the   statute   a



  "bhumidhar".       The   aforesaid   amendment   was   introduced



  by way of amendment so as to bring the said act in parity



  with the Principal Act, namely UP Zamindari Abolition and



  Land Reforms Act wherein the rights, title and interest of an



  intermediary   (hissedar)   was   abolished   and   vested   with   the



  State   from   the   very   inception   of   the   said   Act   as   such



  provision was part of the principal Act itself.




20.Further, Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules, 1965 framed under



  the   KUZALR   Act   declares   that   the   forests   belonging   to   the




                                 Page 12 of 52


State shall be managed by "Goan Sabha or any other local



authority   established"   upon   a   notification   issued   by   the



State   Government.       The   Rule   41   of   the   KUZALR   Rules,



1965 reads as follows:-




    "41.  Section 41 :  Management of land and things

    belonging   to   State   -              At   any   time   after   the

    appointed   date,   the   State   Government,   may,   by

    notification published in the Gazette, declare that as

    from   the   date   to   be   specified,   all   or   any   of   the

    following things, namely, -


    (i)      lands,   whether   cultivable   or   otherwise,   except

             land   for   the   time   being   comprised   in   any

             holding or grove,


    (ii)     forests,


             trees, other than trees in a holding or in a grove
    (iii)
             or in abadi,


    (iv)     fisheries,


             Hats, bazars and melas, except hats, bazars and
    (v)
             melas   held   on   land   referred   to   in   Section   7   or

             which   is   for   the   time   being   comprised   in   the

             holding of a bhumidar, and


             Tanks, ponds, ferries, water-channels, pathways
    (vi)
             and abadi sites;


    Belonging to the State, shall be managed by the Goan

    Sabha or any other local authority established for the

    whole   or   part   of   the   village   in   which   the   things

    specified   in   clauses   (i)   to   (vi)   are   situate,   subject   to

    and in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII

    of   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land

    Reforms   Act,   1950,   and   the   rules   made   thereunder,

    as applicable to Kumaun and Uttarakhand Divisions:


                Provided  that  it   shall   be   lawful   for   the   State

    Government   to   make   the   declaration   aforesaid


                              Page 13 of 52


        subject   to   such   exceptions   or   conditions   as   may   be

        specified in the notification."


21.  This   being   so,   it   clearly   brings   out   that   the   vesting   of



   forest  land under the  KUZALR  Act are directly linked with



   the   agrarian   reforms,   as   the   land   as   also   the   forest   are



   managed by the Goan Sabha or any local authority dealing



   with   the   rights   of   villagers   for   betterment   of   village



   economy. So, where the land acquired by the State is to be



   transferred   to   a   Goan   Sabha/Village   Panchayat   for   its



   management   and   use   of   land   leading   to   betterment   of



   village economy, the legislation is in the nature of agrarian



   reforms.




22.  The   aforesaid   conclusions   arrived   at   by   us   find   support



   from   the   Constitution   Bench   decision   of   this   Court   in



   Ranjit   Singh   and   Others   Vs.   State   of   Punjab   and   Others



   reported   in   [1965]   1   SCR   82.       In   the   said   decision,   the



   Constitution Bench has stated thus:-




        "..........The   scheme   of   rural   development   today

        envisages   not   only   equitable   distribution   of   land   so

        that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting

        in   a   landless   class   on   the   one   hand   and   a

        concentration   of   land   in   the   hands   of   a   few   on   the

        other,   but   envisages   also   the   raising   of   economic

        standards   and   bettering   rural   health   and   social

        conditions.   Provisions for the assignment of lands to

        village   Panchayat   for   the   use   of   the   general


                                Page 14 of 52


           community,   or   for   hospitals,   schools,   manure   pits,

           tanning   grounds   etc.   ensure   for   the   benefit   of   rural

           population   must   be   considered   to   be   an   essential

           part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands

           to   which   no   objection   is   apparently   taken.       If

           agrarian reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of

           land to the landless is not enough.   There must be a

           proper planning of rural economy and conditions and

           a body like the village Panchayat is best designed to

           promote rural welfare than individual owners of small

           portions of lands...."





         It   is   true   that   Section   4A   of   KUZALR   Act,   1960,   as
23.


  amended   by   the   UP   Amendment   Act   1978,   provides   that



  Chapter   II   and   Chapter   V   of   the   KUZALR   Act  would   apply



  mutatis   mutandis  and   Rule   41   of   the   KUZALR   Rules   is



  relatable to Chapter IV of the KUZALR Act.     However, the



  necessary consequence of Section 4A of the KUZALR Act is



  that the forest land vests in the State and all that Rule 41



  of   the   KUZALR   Rules   does   is   to   provide   how   the   lands



  vested in the State including forest and non-forest land is to



  be dealt with.   Thus, Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules clearly



  applies   to   forest   lands   as   it   has   been   specifically   so



  mentioned in the said Rules as well which are vested in the



  State   under   Section   4A   of   the   KUZALR   Act   and   therefore



  have   become   the   land/property   of   the   State,   which   would



  be managed by the Goan Sabha.  




                                  Page 15 of 52


Repugnancy and Article 254 of the Constitution




       Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raised
24.


  two   contentions   in   the   context   of   the   inter-relation   of   the



  Indian   Forest   Act   1927  and   the   KUZALR   Act;   firstly,   the



  case   of   alleged   discrimination   in   as   much   as   the   Central



  Act   i.e.   the   Indian   Forests   Act   provides   for   compensation



  under the  Land  Acquisition Act 1894, which is higher; and



  secondly, the case of alleged repugnancy.




       It   was   submitted   that   the   provisions   of   Section   18(1)(cc)
25.


  read   with   Section   19(1)(b)   of   KUZALR   Act   as   amended   by



  the  UP  Amendment   Act  1978   are  repugnant  to  Section   37



  and Section 84 of the  Indian Forests Act 1927, in so far as



  no compensation is provided for under the U.P. Amendment



  Act,   1978   for   private   forests   which   are   preserved   and



  protected   through   prudent   management,   while   a   private



  forest   which   is   neglected   or  mismanaged   to   which   Section



  36  of  the  Indian  Forest Act,  1927  applies,  can  be  acquired



  under   the  Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894  by   paying   market



  value and solatium.




       However,   per   contra   the   Learned   Additional   Solicitor
26.


  General   appearing   for   the   respondents   contended   that   the


                                 Page 16 of 52


  issue of repugnancy does not arise at all in the instant case



  as  there  is  in fact  no  repugnancy  between  the  Central  Act



  i.e. the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and KUZALR Act in as much



  as the Central Act and KUZALR Act in pith and substance



  operates in different subject matters.




       It   was   submitted   by   Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General
27.


  that   once   the   pith   and   substance   of   the   aforesaid   two



  legislations   viz.   KUZALR   Act   and   the  Indian   Forest   Act,



  1927  is   examined,   the   following   picture   would   emerge:



  firstly,   the   KUZALR   Act   is   an   enactment   under   Entry



  18/List-II,   i.e.   "land"   read   with   Entry   42/List-III   of   the



  Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution.   It   was   further



  submitted that at the highest, it can be said that KUZALR



  Act is relatable to Entry 18 of List II and 42 of List-III of the



  Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution   and   if   at   all,   only



  incidentally   trenches   in   the   legislative   field   of   Entry



  17A/List-III   of   the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution;



  and   secondly,   the  Indian   Forest   Act,   1927  on   the   other



  hand,   is   in   pith   and   substance   a   legislation   under   Entry



  17-A/List-III i.e. "Forests" read with Entry 42/List-III of the



  Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.





                                Page 17 of 52


28.It   is   trite   law   that   the   plea   of   repugnancy   would   be



   attracted   only   if   both   the   legislations   fall   under   the



   Concurrent   List   of   the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the



   Constitution.       Under   Article   254   of   the   Constitution,   a



   State   law   passed   in  respect  of  a  subject  matter   comprised



   in List III i.e. the Concurrent List of the Seventh  Schedule



   of   the   Constitution   would   be   invalid   if   its   provisions   are



   repugnant   to   a   law   passed   on   the   same   subject   by   the



   Parliament and that too only in a situation if both the laws



   i.e. one made by the State legislature and another made by



   the   Parliament   cannot   exist   together.     In   other   words,   the



   question   of   repugnancy   under   Article   254   of   the



   Constitution   arises   when   the   provisions   of   both   laws   are



   completely   inconsistent   with   each   other   or   when   the



   provisions   of   both   laws   are   absolutely   irreconcilable   with



   each other and it is impossible without disturbing the other



   provision, or conflicting interpretations resulted into, when



   both   the   statutes   covering   the   same   field   are   applied   to   a



   given   set   of   facts.       That   is   to   say,   in   simple   words,



   repugnancy between the two statutes would arise if there is



   a   direct   conflict   between   the   two   provisions   and   the   law



   made   by   the   Parliament   and   the   law   made   by   the   State



                               Page 18 of 52


   Legislature   occupies   the   same   field.   Hence,   whenever   the



   issue   of   repugnancy   between   the   law   passed   by   the



   Parliament   and   of   State   legislature   are   raised,   it   becomes



   quite   necessary   to   examine   as   to   whether   the   two



   legislations   cover   or   relate   to   the   same   subject   matter   or



   different.




       It   is   by   now   a   well-established   rule   of   interpretation   that
29.


   the entries in the list being fields of legislation must receive



   liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit



   and not a narrow or  pedantic approach.  This Court in the



   cases   of  Navinchandra   Mafatlal  v.  CIT,  reported   in   AIR



   1955 SC 58 and State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti


   Lal   Shah,  reported   in   (2008)   13   SCC   5   held   that   each


   general  word should extend to all ancillary  and subsidiary



   matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended



   within   it.     In   those   decisions   it   was   also   reiterated   that



   there shall always be a presumption of constitutionality in



   favour of a statute and while construing such statute every



   legally   permissible   effort   should   be   made   to   keep   the



   statute within the competence of the State Legislature.




30.As   and   when   there   is   a   challenge   to   the   legislative




                                   Page 19 of 52


  competence,   the   courts   will   try   to   ascertain   the   pith   and



  substance   of   such   enactment   on   a   scrutiny   of   the   Act   in



  question. In this process, it would also be necessary for the



  courts   to   examine   the   true   nature   and   character   of   the



  enactment,   its   object,   its   scope   and   effect   to   find   out



  whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to



  a field of the legislation allotted to the respective legislature



  under  the  constitutional  scheme.   In  the  aforesaid  context



  we now proceed to examine the nature and character of the



  KUZALR   Act   and   examine   and   scrutinize   the   same   in   the



  context of the Central Act, namely, the Indian Forests Act,



  1927.




       As   noted   hereinbefore,   Section   4A   was   introduced   in
31.


  KUZALR Act by an amendment in the year 1978 as a part



  of   agrarian   reforms   and   not   by   a   separate   enactment,   as



  was   done   in   the   case   of   the  UP   Private   Forests   Act,   1948.



  Significantly,   the   agrarian   reforms   introduced   by   the



  UPZALR   Act   were   not   brought   about   by   amending   the  UP



  Private Forests Act, 1948. It is to be noticed that the Indian



  Forest Act,  1927  and the  UP Private  Forests Act,  1948  that



  deal broadly with the same field of,  inter-alia  conservation,



  regulation,   etc.,   of   forests.   It   is   to   be   further   noticed   that

                                Page 20 of 52


  the   UPZALR   Act   and   after   the   1978   amendment,   KUZALR



  Act   do   not   deal   with   conservation   or   regulation   of   forests



  but with agrarian reforms. In order to find out the subject



  matter of an enactment, even in the context of enactments



  relatable   to   List   III   of   the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the



  Constitution,   passed   by   different   legislatures,   the   doctrine



  of pith and substance can be relied upon and would apply.




       As discussed hereinbefore KUZALR Act is a law principally
32.


  relatable to Entry 18 (land) of List II read with Entry 42 in



  List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and only



  incidentally trenches upon "forest" i.e. Entry 17A/List-III of



  the   Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution.   This   is   so



  because it is an enactment for agrarian reforms and so the



  basic subject matter is "land". Since the land happens to be



  forest   land,   it   spills   over   and   incidentally   encroaches   on



  Entry   17A   i.e.   "forest"   as   well.   On   the   other   hand,   the



  Central   Act   i.e.   the  Indian   Forests   Act  1927  is   relatable   to



  Entry 17A read with entry 42, both of List III of the Seventh



  Schedule   of   the   Constitution.   It   is   in   pith   and   substance



  relatable   to   Entry   17A,   as   it   deals   with   "forests"   and   not



  with   "land"   or   any   other   subject.   It  only   incidentally   spills



  over  in the  field of Entry 42,  as it deals with "control over

                              Page 21 of 52


  forest land and not property of the Government" and in that



  context   Section   37,   as   an   alternative   to   management   of



  forests   under   Section   36   of   the  Indian   Forests   Act   1927,



  deals   with   the   grant   of   power   to   acquire   land   under   the



  Land Acquisition Act 1894.




       This   Court   in   the   case   of  Glanrock   Estate   Private
33.


  Limited  v.  State   of   Tamil   Nadu,  reported   in  (2010)   10


  SCC   96   observed   in   paragraph   45   of   the   Judgment   as



  follows:



         ".............we are of the view that the requirement of

         public purpose and compensation are not legislative

         requirements   of   the   competence   of   legislature   to

         make   laws   under   Entry   18   List   II   or   Entry   42   List

         III,   but   are   conditions   or   restrictions   under   Article

         31(2) of the Constitution as the said article stood in

         1969.   ................   Lastly,   in  pith   and  substance,   we

         are   of   the   view   that   the   Janmam   Act   (24   of   1969)

         was   in   respect   of   "land"   and   "land   tenure"   under

         Entry 18 List II of the Constitution.




       It   is   quite   clear   that   the   KUZALR   Act   relates   to   agrarian
34.


  reforms and therefore it deals with the "land"; however, the



  Central   Act   i.e.   the  Indian   Forests   Act   1927  deal   with



  "forests"   and   its   management,   preservation   and   levy   of



  royalty/fees   on   forest   produce.   KUZALR   Act   further



  provides   for   statutory vesting,  i.e.,  statutory  taking  over  of



  property   of  hissedar,   which   happens   to   be   1st  January

                                   Page 22 of 52


  1978,   i.e.   the   statutorily   fixed   date.   Therefore,   this   forest



  land becomes the property of the State Government and is



  dealt with like land, which is acquired under Section 4A of



  KUZALR Act. This emerges from a reading of Rule 41 of the



  KUZALR   Rules   itself.   Further,   the   acquisition   under   the



  KUZALR   Act   is   a   case   of   "taking"   upon   payment   of   an



  amount, which is not intended to be the market price of the



  rights acquired. On the other hand, the power of acquisition



  under   Section   37   of   the  Indian   Forests   Act   1927  i.e.   the



  Central   Act   is   an   acquisition   based   on   the   principles   of



  public purpose and compensation.




       Thus,   not   only   do   the   aforesaid   Acts   relate   to   different
35.


  subject matters, but the acquisitions mentioned therein are



  conceptually   different.   The   Central   Act   i.e.   the  Indian



  Forests   Act   1927  mainly   deals   with   the   management,



  preservation   and   levy   of   royalty   on   transmit   of   forest



  produce.   The  Indian   Forests   Act   1927  also   incidentally



  provides for and empowers the State Government to acquire



  any land which might be required to give effect to any of the



  purposes   of   the   Act,   in   which   case   such   land   could   be



  acquired   by   issuing   a   notification   under   Section   4   of   the



  Indian   Forests   Act  1927.  This  however  is   to be  understood

                                  Page 23 of 52


  as   an   incidental   power   vested   on   the   State   Government



  which could be exercised for giving effect to the purposes of



  the  Indian Forests Act 1927. While considering the issue of



  repugnancy   what   is   required   to   be   considered   is   the



  legislation in question as a whole and to its main object and



  purpose   and   while   doing   so   incidental   encroachment   is   to



  be ignored and disregarded.




       In   fact,   it   is   the  UP   Private   Forest   Act,   1948,   which   is   an
36.


  enactment   relatable   to   Entry   17A   of   List   III,   i.e.,   Forests,



  read with Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the



  Constitution,   i.e.,   acquisition   to   the   extent   of   "vested"



  forests. It is this Act which covers a field similar to that of



  the   Central   Act   and   therefore,   sought   and   obtained   the



  permission   of   the   President   under   Section   76   of   the



  Government of India Act.




       Thus, in the State, there are two Acts, which are applicable
37.


  viz. the  UP Private  Forests Act, 1948, which is in the same



  field as the Central Act i.e. the  Indian Forest Act 1927  and



  the   KUZALR   Act,  which   is   in   respect   of  a  different   subject



  matter.




38.For   repugnancy   under   Article   254   of   the   Constitution,


                                    Page 24 of 52


  there is a twin requirement, which is to be fulfilled: firstly,



  there has to be a "repugnancy" between a Central and State



  Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as



  being   non-existent.   The   test   for   determining   such



  repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of



  the both legislations and whether such dominant intentions



  of   both   the   legislations   are   alike   or   different.   To   put   it



  simply, a provision in one legislation in order to give effect



  to   its   dominant   purpose   may   incidentally   be   on   the   same



  subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation,



  but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in



  a different context  and to achieve  a different purpose does



  not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In nutshell, in order



  to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations



  must be substantially on the same subject.




       Repugnancy   in   the   context   of   Article   254   of   the
39.


  Constitution is understood as requiring the fulfillment of a



  "Triple   test"   reiterated   by   the   Constitutional   Bench   in  M.



  Karunanidhi   v.   Union   of   India,   (1979)   3   SCC   431   @   page



  443-444, which reads as follows:-



           "24.   It   is   well   settled   that   the   presumption   is
         always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute
         and the onus lies on the person assailing the Act to


                                 Page 25 of 52


  prove   that it  is   unconstitutional.  Prima  facie,  there
  does   not   appear   to   us   to   be   any   inconsistency
  between the State Act and the Central Acts. Before
  any   repugnancy   can   arise,   the   following   conditions
  must be satisfied:

  1.   That   there   is   a   clear   and   direct   inconsistency
  between the Central Act and the State Act.

  2.   That   such   an   inconsistency   is   absolutely
  irreconcilable.

  3. That the inconsistency between the provisions of
  the   two   Acts   is   of   such   nature   as   to   bring   the   two
  Acts   into   direct   collision   with   each   other   and   a
  situation   is   reached   where   it   is   impossible   to   obey
  the one without disobeying the other."





       In other words, the two legislations must cover the same
40.


  field.   This   has   to   be   examined   by   a   reference   to   the



  doctrine  of pith  and substance.  In the  instant case,  the



  KUZALR   Act   deals   with   agrarian   reforms   and   in   the



  context deals with the private forests, this vests with the



  State   and   would   therefore   be   managed   by   the   Goan



  Sabha. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 which is the existing



  Central law, has nothing to do with agrarian reforms but



  deals  with forest  policy and management,  and therefore



  is in a different field. Further, there is no direct conflict



  or collision, as the  Indian Forest Act, 1927  only gives an



  enabling   power   to   the   government   to   acquire   forests   in



  accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the  Land   Acquisition



  Act   1894,   whereas   KUZALR   Act   results   in   vesting   of



  forests   from   the   dates   specified   in   Section   4A   of   the

                            Page 26 of 52


  KUZALR   Act.   Consequently,   it   could   be   deduced   that



  none   of   the   aforesaid   three   conditions   as   mentioned   in



  the  decision  of  M.  Karunanidhi  case   (supra)   is   attracted



  to the facts of the present case.




       The   only   other   area   where   repugnancy   can   arise   is
41.


  where   the   superior   legislature   namely   the   Parliament



  has   evinced   an   intention   to   create   a   complete   code.



  This   obviously   is   not   the   case   here,   as   admittedly   even



  earlier,   assent   was   given   under   Section   107(2)   of   the



  Government of India Act by the Governor General to the



  U P Private Forests Act, 1948.




       This   Court   succinctly   observed   as   follows   in  Hoechst
42.


  Pharmaceuticals  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Bihar,  (1983)  4  SCC  45,



  at page 87:



         "67.  Article   254   of   the   Constitution   makes
  provision first, as to what would happen in the case
  of   conflict   between   a   Central   and   State   law   with
  regard   to   the   subjects   enumerated   in   the
  Concurrent   List,   and   secondly,   for   resolving   such
  conflict.   Article   254(1)   enunciates   the   normal   rule
  that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a
  State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails
  over the latter.  Clause (1) lays down that if a State
  law relating to a concurrent subject is `repugnant' to
  a Union law relating to that subject, then, whether
  the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law
  will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of
  such   repugnancy,   be   void.   To   the   general   rule   laid
  down in clause (1), clause (2) engrafts an exception
  viz.   that   if   the   President   assents   to   a   State   law


                             Page 27 of 52


         which   has   been   reserved   for   his   consideration,   it
         will   prevail   notwithstanding   its   repugnancy   to   an
         earlier   law   of   the   Union,   both   laws   dealing   with   a
         concurrent subject. In such a case, the Central Act,
         will   give   way   to   the   State   Act   only   to   the   extent   of
         inconsistency   between   the   two,   and   no   more.   In
         short,   the   result   of   obtaining   the   assent   of   the
         President to a State Act which is inconsistent with a
         previous Union law relating to a concurrent subject
         would be that the State Act will prevail in that State
         and   override   the   provisions   of   the   Central   Act   in
         their   applicability   to   that   State   only.   The
         predominance   of   the   State   law   may   however   be
         taken   away   if   Parliament   legislates   under   the
         proviso   to   clause   (2).   The   proviso   to   Article   254(2)
         empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend
         a   repugnant   State   law,   either   directly,   or   by   itself
         enacting   a   law   repugnant   to   the   State   law   with
         respect   to   the   `same   matter'.   Even   though   the
         subsequent   law   made   by   Parliament   does   not
         expressly   repeal   a   State   law,   even   then,   the   State
         law will become void as soon as the subsequent law
         of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A State
         law   would   be   repugnant   to   the   Union   law   when
         there   is   direct   conflict   between   the   two   laws.   Such
         repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate
         in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand
         together:   See   Zaverbhai   Amaidas   v.   State   of
         Bombay;   M.   Karunanidhi   v.   Union   of   India   and   T.
         Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe."




       Again   a   five-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   while   discussing
43.


  the said doctrine in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3



  SCC 589 @ page 630 observed as under:



         "60. This doctrine of `pith and substance' is applied

         when the legislative competence of a legislature with

         regard to a particular enactment is challenged with

         reference to the entries in the various lists i.e. a law

         dealing with the subject in one list is also touching

         on   a   subject   in   another   list.   In   such   a   case,   what

         has   to   be   ascertained   is   the   pith   and   substance   of

         the enactment. On a scrutiny of the Act in question,

         if found, that the legislation is in substance one on a

         matter   assigned   to   the   legislature   enacting   that

         statute, then that Act as a whole must be held to be

                                    Page 28 of 52


         valid notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon

         matters   beyond   its   competence   i.e.   on   a   matter

         included   in   the   list   belonging   to   the   other

         legislature.          To          say          differently,         incidental

         encroachment is not altogether forbidden."





       Further in Govt. of A.P. v. J.B. Educational Society, (2005) 3
44.


  SCC  212,  this Court  while  explaining the scope  of Articles



  246   and   254   of   the   Constitution   and   considering   the



  proposition laid down by this Court in M. Karunanidhi case



  (supra)  with respect to the situations in which repugnancy



  would arise, held as follows at page 219:



         "9.   Parliament   has   exclusive   power   to   legislate   with

         respect   to   any   of   the   matters   enumerated   in   List   I,

         notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   clauses   (2)

         and (3) of Article 246. The non obstante clause under

         Article   246(1)   indicates   the   predominance   or

         supremacy of the law made by the Union Legislature

         in   the   event   of   an   overlap   of   the   law   made   by

         Parliament   with   respect   to   a   matter   enumerated   in

         List   I   and   a   law   made   by   the   State   Legislature   with

         respect   to   a   matter   enumerated   in   List   II   of   the

         Seventh Schedule.

         10.   There   is   no   doubt   that   both   Parliament   and   the

         State   Legislature   are   supreme   in   their   respective

         assigned fields. It is the duty of the court to interpret

         the   legislations   made   by   Parliament   and   the   State

         Legislature in such a manner as to avoid any conflict.

         However,   if   the   conflict   is   unavoidable,   and   the   two

         enactments   are   irreconcilable,   then   by   the   force   of

         the  non obstante  clause   in  clause   (1)  of  Article   246,

         the         parliamentary               legislation         would          prevail

         notwithstanding   the   exclusive   power   of   the   State

         Legislature   to   make   a   law   with   respect   to   a   matter

         enumerated in the State List.

         11.   With   respect   to   matters   enumerated   in   List   III


                                          Page 29 of 52


  (Concurrent   List),   both   Parliament   and   the   State

  Legislature   have   equal   competence   to   legislate.   Here

  again,   the   courts   are   charged   with   the   duty   of

  interpreting   the   enactments   of   Parliament   and   the

  State   Legislature   in   such   manner   as   to   avoid   a

  conflict.   If   the   conflict   becomes   unavoidable,   then

  Article   245   indicates   the   manner   of   resolution   of

  such a conflict."

  Thereafter,   this   Court,   in   para   12,   held   that   the

  question   of   repugnancy   between   the   parliamentary

  legislation and the State legislation could arise in the

  following two ways: (SCC p. 220)

  "12.   ...   First,   where   the   legislations,   though   enacted

  with   respect   to   matters   in   their   allotted   sphere,

  overlap   and   conflict.   Second,   where   the   two

  legislations   are   with   respect   to   matters   in   the

  Concurrent   List   and   there   is   a   conflict.   In   both   the

  situations,               parliamentary            legislation         will

  predominate,   in   the   first,   by   virtue   of   the   non

  obstante   clause   in   Article   246(1),   in   the   second,   by

  reason   of   Article   254(1).   Clause   (2)   of   Article   254

  deals   with   a   situation   where   the   State   legislation

  having been reserved and having obtained President's

  assent,   prevails   in   that   State;                this   again   is

  subject   to   the   proviso   that   Parliament   can   again

  bring   a   legislation   to   override   even   such   State

  legislation."





       The   aforesaid   position   makes   it   quite   clear   that   even   if
45.


  both   the   legislations   are   relatable   to   List-III   of   the



  Seventh   Schedule   of   the   Constitution,   the   test   for



  repugnancy   is   whether   the   two   legislations   "exercise



  their   power   over   the   same   subject   matter..."   and



  secondly whether the law of Parliament was intended "to



  be exhaustive to cover the  entire  field".      The answer to




                               Page 30 of 52


  both   these   questions   in   the   instant   case   is   in   the



  negative, as the Indian Forest Act 1927 deals with the law



  relating   to   forest   transit,   forest  levy   and  forest  produce,



  whereas   the   KUZALR   Act   deals   with   the   land   and



  agrarian reforms.




46.In   respect   of   the   Concurrent   List   under   Seventh



  Schedule   to   the   Constitution,   by   definition   both   the



  legislatures viz. the Parliament and the State legislatures



  are   competent   to   enact   a   law.       Thus,   the   only   way   in



  which   the   doctrine   of   pith   and   substance   can   and   is



  utilised in determining the question of repugnancy is to



  find   out   whether   in   pith   and   substance   the   two   laws



  operate and relate to the same matter or not.     This can



  be   either   in   the   context   of   the   same   Entry   in   List   III   or



  different Entries in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the



  Constitution. In other words, what has to be examined is



  whether   the   two   Acts   deal   with   the   same   field   in   the



  sense   of   the   same   subject   matter   or   deal   with   different



  matters.




47.The concept of repugnancy does not arise as far as the



  American and Canadian Constitutions are concerned, as



                             Page 31 of 52


  there   is   no   Concurrent   List   there,   nor   is   there   any



  provision akin to Article 254 of the Constitution of India.



  Repugnancy arises in the Australian Constitution, which



  has   a   Concurrent   List   and   a   provision   i.e.   Section   107,



  akin to Article 254 of the Constitution of India.




48.In the Australian cases, the concept of Repugnancy has



  really been applied in the context of Criminal Law where



  for   the   same   offence,   there   are   two   inconsistent   and



  different   punishments,   which   are   provided   and   so   the



  two   laws   cannot   co-exist   together.   To   put   it   differently,



  an   area   where   the   two   Acts   may   be   repugnant   is   when



  the Central Act evinces a clear interest to be exhaustive



  and unqualified and therefore, occupies the entire field.




       In   a   Full   Bench   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
49.


  State   of   Maharashtra  v.  Bharat   Shanti   Lal   Shah,  (2008)



  13 SCC 5, this Court observed as follows at page 23  :



       "48.  Article   254   of   the   Constitution   succinctly

       deals   with   the   law   relating   to   inconsistency

       between   the   laws   made   by   Parliament   and   the

       State   Legislature.   The   question   of   repugnancy

       under   Article   254   will   arise   when   a   law   made   by

       Parliament   and   a   law   made   by   the   State

       Legislature occupies the same field with respect to

       one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent

       List   and   there   is   a   direct   conflict   in   two   laws.   In


                                 Page 32 of 52


       other   words,   the   question   of   repugnancy   arises

       only   in   connection   with   subjects   enumerated   in

       the   Concurrent   List.   In   such   situation   the

       provisions   enacted   by   Parliament   and   the   State

       Legislature   cannot   unitedly   stand   and   the   State

       law will have to make way for the Union law. Once

       it  is   proved   and  established   that   the   State   law   is

       repugnant   to   the   Union  law,  the   State   law   would

       become void but only to the extent of repugnancy.

       At   the   same   time   it   is   to   be   noted   that   mere

       possibility   of   repugnancy   will   not   make   a   State

       law invalid, for repugnancy has to exist in fact and

       it must be shown clearly and sufficiently that the

       State law is repugnant to the Union law."




50.In   a   nutshell,   whether   on   account   of   the   exhaustive



   code   doctrine   or   whether   on   account   of   irreconcilable



   conflict   concept,   the   real   test   is   that   would   there   be   a



   room   or   possibility   for   both   the   Acts   to   apply.



   Repugnancy   would   follow   only   if   there   is   no  such   room



   or possibility.




       Having discussed the law, as applicable in the aforesaid
51.


   manner and upon scrutiny of subject matters of both the



   concurrent   Acts,   it   is   crystal   clear   that   no   case   of



   repugnancy is made out in the present case as both the



   Indian  Forest Act,  1927  and the KUZALR  Act operate   in



   two   different   and   distinct   fields   as   pointed   out



   hereinbefore. Accordingly, both the Acts are legally valid



   and   constitutional.   That   being   so,   there   was   no

                               Page 33 of 52


    requirement   of   obtaining   any   Presidential   assent.



    Consequently, Article 254(2) of the Constitution has also



    no application in the instant case. However, it would be



    appropriate   to   discuss   the   issue   as   elaborate   argument



    was made on this issue as well.




Presidential Assent and Article 254(2) of the Constitution


         The   issue   argued   was   whether   "General   Assent"   can
  52.


    always be sought and obtained by the State Government.



    Reference was  made   to a  Constitutional  Bench   decision



    of this Court in  Gram Panchayat Jamalpur  v.  Malwinder



    Singh,   (1985)   3   SCC   661;   which   was   subsequently



    further   interpreted   and   followed   in   the   case   of  P.N.



    Krishna Pal v. State of Kerala, (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 187.




         In   the  Gram   Panchayat   Jamalpur  case   (supra),   the
  53.


    Constitution Bench observed as follows at page 669:



           "13.   This   situation   creates   a   conundrum.   The

    Central Act of 1950 prevails over the Punjab Act of

    1953  by   virtue  of  Article  254(1)  of  the  Constitution

    read   with   Entry   41   of   the   Concurrent   List;   and,

    Article   254(2)   cannot   afford   assistance   to   reverse

    that   position   since   the   President's   assent,   which

    was   obtained   for   a   specific   purpose,   cannot   be

    utilised   for   according   priority   to   the   Punjab   Act.

    Though   the   law   made   by   the   Parliament   prevails

    over   the   law   made   by   the   State   Legislature,   the

    interest   of   the   evacuees   in   the   Shamlat-deh   lands


                              Page 34 of 52


cannot   be   dealt   with   effectively   by   the   Custodian

under   the   Central   Act,   because   of   the   peculiar

incidents   and   characteristics   of   such   lands.   The

unfortunate   result   is   that   the   vesting   in   the

Custodian   of   the   evacuee   interest   in   the   Shamlat-

deh   lands   is,   more   or   less,   an   empty   formality.   It

does   not   help   the   Custodian   to   implement   the

provisions   of   the   Central   law   but,   it   excludes   the

benign operation of the State law.

   14. The line of reasoning of our learned Brother,

Chinnappa Reddy, affords a satisfactory solution to

this constitutional impasse, which we adopt without

reservation  of  any  kind.  The  pith  and   substance   of

the Punjab Act of 1953 is "Land" which falls under

Entry   18   of   List   II   (State   List)   of   the   Seventh

Schedule   to   the   Constitution.   That   Entry   reads

thus:

   "18.   Land,   that   is   to   say,   rights   in   or   over   land,

land  tenures  including  the  relation of  landlord and

tenant,   and   the   collection   of   rents;   transfer   and

alienation   of   agricultural   land;   land   improvement

and agricultural loans; colonisation."

Our learned Brother has extracted a passage from a

decision   of   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in

Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab3 which took the view

that since,  the  Punjab Act of 1953  is  a  measure of

agrarian   reform,   it   would   receive   the   protection   of

Article   31-A.   It   may   be   recalled   that   the   Act   had

received  the   assent   of   the   President   as  required   by

the   first   proviso   to   that   article.   The   power   of   the

State   Legislature   to   pass   laws   on   matters

enumerated in the State List is exclusive by reason

of   the   provision   contained   in   Article   246(3).   In   a

nutshell,   the   position   is   that   the   Parliament   has

passed a law on a matter which falls under Entry 41

of   the   Concurrent   List,   while   the   State   Legislature

has passed a law which falls under Entry 18 of the

State List. The law passed by the State Legislature,

being a measure of agrarian reform, is conducive to

the welfare of the community and there is no reason

why   that   law   should   not   have   effect   in   its   full

amplitude.   By   this   process,   the   Village   Panchayats

will   be   able   to   meet   the   needs   of   the   village


                          Page 35 of 52


         community and secure its welfare. Accordingly, the

         Punjab   Act   of   1953   would   prevail   in   the   State   of

         Punjab over the Central Act of 1950, even insofar as

         Shamlat-deh lands are concerned."




       Following   the   ratio   of  Gram   Panchayat   Jamalpur  case
54.


  (supra) this Court in the case of P.N. Krishna Pal v. State of



  Kerala,   (1995)   Suppl.   2   SCC   187   observed   as   follows   at



  page 200.



         "14.   In  Jamalpur   Gram   Panchayat   case3  the   facts

         were   that   specific   assent   of   the   President   was

         sought,   namely,   Article   31   and   Article   31-A   of   the

         Constitution   vis-`-vis   Entry   18   of   List   II   of   the

         Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The President

         had given specific assent. The Shamlat-deh lands in

         Punjab were owned by the proprietors of the village,

         in   proportion   to   their   share   in   the   property   of   the

         lands   held   by   them.   After   the   partition,   the

         proprietary   interests   in   the   lands   of   the   migrants

         and proportionate to share of their lands vest in the

         Union   of   India.   The   question   arose   whether   the

         Punjab   Village   Common   Lands   (Regulation)   Act,

         1953   prevails   over   Evacuee   Property   Act,   1950.   It

         was   contended   that   in   view   of   the   assent   given   by

         the President, the State Act prevails over the Central

         Act. This Court in that context considered the scope

         of   the   limited   assent.   Chandrachud,   C.J.   speaking

         for majority, held that the Central Act, 1950 prevails

         over   the   Punjab   Act,   1953   and   the   assent   of   the

         President which was obtained for a specific purpose

         cannot   be   utilised   for   according   precedence   to   the

         Punjab   Act.   At   page   42,   placitum   `B'   to   `E',   this

         Court held that

         "the assent  of the  President  under  Article  254(2)  of

         the   Constitution   is   not   a   matter   of   idle   formality.

         The   President   has,   at   least,   to   be   apprised   of   the

         reason   why   his   assent   is   sought   if,  there   is   any

         special   reason   for   doing   so.  If   the   assent   is   sought


                                  Page 36 of 52


         and   given   in  general  terms  so  as  to  be   effective  for

         all   purposes,   different   considerations   may

         legitimately arise."


         Thus   it   is   clear   that   this   Court   did   not   intend   to

         hold   that   it   is   necessary   that   in   every   case   the

         assent   of   the   President   in   specific   terms   had   to   be

         sought   and   given   for   special   reasons   in   respect   of

         each   enactment   or   provision   or   provisions.   On   the

         other hand, the observation clearly indicates that if

         the   assent   is   sought   and   given   in   general   terms   it

         would  be   effective   for   all  purposes.   In  other   words,

         this Court observed that the assent sought for and

         given   by   the   President   in   general   terms   could   be

         effective   for   all   purposes   unless   specific   assent   is

         sought   and   given   in   which   event   it   would   be

         operative only to that limited extent."





       Further, in the case Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile
55.


  Corporation   (Maharashtra   North),   (2002)   8   SCC   182,   this



  Court   made   it   clear   that   it   was   not   considering;   whether



  the   assent   of   the   President   was   rightly   or   wrongly   given?;



  and   whether   the   assent   given   without   considering   the



  extent   and   the   nature   of   the   repugnancy   should   be   taken



  as no assent at all? It observed as follows at page 203:



            "27.   In   this   case,   we   have   made   it  clear   that  we

         are  not considering the question that the  assent  of

         the   President   was   rightly   or   wrongly   given.   We   are

         also   not   considering   the   question   that   --   whether

         "assent"   given   without   considering   the   extent   and

         the nature of the repugnancy should be taken as no

         assent  at   all.  Further,   in  the   aforesaid   case,  before

         the   Madras   High   Court   also   the   relevant   proposal

         made   by   the   State   was   produced.   The   Court   had

         specifically   arrived   at   a   conclusion   that   Ext.   P-12

         shows that Section 10 of the Act has been referred

                                   Page 37 of 52


         to   as   the   provision   which   can   be   said   to   be

         repugnant   to   the   provisions   of   the   Code   of   Civil

         Procedure   and   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   which

         are   existing   laws   on   the   concurrent   subject.   After

         observing   that,   the   Court   has   raised   the

         presumption. We do not think that it was necessary

         to   do   so.   In   any   case   as   discussed   above,   the

         essential   ingredients   of   Article   254(2)   are:   (1)

         mentioning of the entry/entries with respect to one

         of   the   matters   enumerated   in   the   Concurrent   List;

         (2) stating repugnancy to the provisions of an earlier

         law   made   by   Parliament   and   the   State   law   and

         reasons   for   having   such   law;   (3)   thereafter   it   is

         required   to   be   reserved   for   consideration   of   the

         President;   and   (4)   receipt   of   the   assent   of   the

         President."





       It   is   in   this   context,   that   the   finding   of   this   Court   in
56.


  Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd.  (supra)  at para 65 becomes important



  to   the   effect   that   "pointed   attention"   of   the   President   is



  required to be drawn to the repugnancy and the reasons for



  having   such   a   law,   despite   the   enactment   by   Parliament,



  has to be understood. It summarizes the point as follows at



  page 215 as follows:



             "65. The result of the foregoing discussion is:

         1.   It   cannot   be   held   that   summary   speedier

         procedure  prescribed under  the  PP Eviction Act for

         evicting   the   tenants,   sub-tenants   or   unauthorised

         occupants, if it is reasonable and in conformity with

         the   principles   of   natural   justice,   would   abridge   the

         rights conferred under the Constitution.

         2.   (a)   Article   254(2)   contemplates   "reservation   for

         consideration   of   the   President"   and   also   "assent".

         Reservation   for   consideration   is   not   an   empty

         formality.   Pointed   attention   of   the   President   is


                                   Page 38 of 52


  required to be drawn to the repugnancy between the

  earlier   law   made   by   Parliament   and   the

  contemplated   State   legislation   and   the   reasons   for

  having   such   law   despite   the   enactment   by

  Parliament.

         (b) The word "assent" used in clause (2) of Article

  254   would   in   context   mean   express   agreement   of

  mind to what is proposed by the State.

         (c) In case where it is not indicated that "assent"

  is qua a particular law made by Parliament, then it

  is open to the Court to call for the proposals made

  by   the   State   for   the   consideration   of   the   President

  before obtaining assent.

  3. Extending the duration of a temporary enactment

  does   not   amount   to   enactment   of   a   new   law.

  However   such   extension   may   require   assent   of   the

  President in case of repugnancy."





       If   it   is   to   be   contended   that  Kaiser  lays   down   the
57.


  proposition   that   there   can   be   no   general   Presidential



  assent,   then   such   an   interpretation   would   be   clearly



  contrary to the observation of the Bench in Para 27 itself



  where it states that it is not examining the issue whether



  such an assent can be taken as an assent.




       Such an interpretation would also open the judgment to
58.


  a   charge   of   being,   with   respect,   per   in   curium   as   even



  though   while   noting   the  Jamalpur  case   -   (1985)   3   SCC



  661,   it   overlooks   the   extracts   in   the  Jamalpur  case



  dealing with the aspect of general assent:



  "The assent of the President under Article 254(2) of


                             Page 39 of 52


       the   Constitution   is   not   a   matter   of   idle   formality.

       The   President   has,   at   least,   to   be   apprised   of   the

       reason   why   his   assent   is   sought   if,   there   is   any

       special reason for doing so.   If the assent is sought

       and   given   in  general  terms  so  as  to  be   effective  for

       all   purposes,   different   considerations   may

       legitimately arise.   But if, as in the instant case, the

       assent   of   the   President   is   sought   to   the   Law   for   a

       specific purpose, the efficacy of the assent would be

       limited   to   that   purpose   and   cannot   be   extended

       beyond it."




Article 300A of the Constitution and Compensation


59. After passing of the  Constitution (Forty Forth) Amendment



Act 1978 which deleted Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 from the



Constitution and introduced Article 300A in the Constitution,



the Constitution (44th  Amendment) Act inserted in Part XII, a



new chapter:  "Chapter  IV  - Right to Property" and inserted  a



new Article 300A, which reads as follows:-



       "No   person   shall   be   deprived   of   property   save   by

       authority of law"




60.       It would be useful to reiterate paragraphs 3, 4 and 5



of   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   of   the   Constitution



(44th Amendment) Act which reads as follows:-



       "3. In view of the special position sought to be given

       to   fundamental   rights,   the   right   to   property,   which

       has   been   the   occasion   for   more   than   one

       Amendment of the Constitution, would cease to be a

       fundamental   right   and   become   only   a   legal   right.

       Necessary   amendments   for   this   purpose   are   being

       made   to   Article   19   and   Article   31   is   being   deleted.

                                 Page 40 of 52


       It   would,   however,   be   ensured   that   the   removal   of

       property   from   the   list   of   fundamental   rights   would

       not   affect   the   right   of   minorities   to   establish   and

       administer educational institutions of their choice.



       4.          Similarly,  the  right  of persons holding  land

       for   personal   cultivation  and  within  the  ceiling   limit

       to receive compensation at the  market value  would

       not be affected.



       5.          Property, while ceasing to be a fundamental

       right,  would,  however,  be  given   express  recognition

       as   a   legal   right,   provision   being   made   that   no

       person   shall   be   deprived   of   his   property   save   in

       accordance with law."





61.          The   incident   of   deprivation   of   property   within   the



meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution normally occurred



mostly   in   the   context   of   public   purpose.   Clearly,   any   law,



which   deprives   a   person   of   his   private   property   for   private



interest,   will   be   amenable   to   judicial   review.       In   last   sixty



years,   though   the   concept   of   public   purpose   has   been   given



quite   wide   interpretation,   nevertheless,   the   "public   purpose"



remains   the   most   important   condition   in   order   to   invoke



Article 300A of the Constitution.




62.          With   regard   to   claiming   compensation,   all   modern



constitutions   which   are   invariably   of   democratic   character



provide   for   payment   of   compensation   as   the   condition   to



exercise   the   right   of   expropriation.   Commonwealth   of


                                Page 41 of 52


Australia   Act,   a   French   Civil   Code   (Article   545),   the   5th



Amendment   of   the   Constitution   of   U.S.A.   and   the   Italian



Constitution   provided   principles   of   "just   terms",   "just



indemnity",   "just   compensation"   as   reimbursement   for   the



property taken, have been provided for.




63.       Under   Indian   Constitution,   the   field   of   legislation



covering   claim   for   compensation   on   deprivation   of   one's



property   can   be   traced   to   Entry   42   List   III   of   the   Seventh



Schedule   of   the   Constitution.   The                Constitution   (7th



Amendment) Act, 1956 deleted Entry 33 List I, Entry 36 List II



and   reworded   Entry   42   List   III   relating   to   "acquisition   and



requisitioning   of   property".   The   right   to   property   being   no



more   a   fundamental   right,   a   legislation   enacted   under   the



authority   of   law   as   provided   in   Article   300A   of   the



Constitution   is   not   amenable   to   judicial   review   merely   for



alleged violation of Part III of the Constitution. Article 31A was



inserted   by   the  Constitutional   (1st  Amendment)   Act,   1951  to



protect   the   zamindari   abolition   laws.   The   right   to   challenge



laws   enacted   in   respect   of   subject   matter   enumerated   under



Article   31A  (1)   (a)  to  (g)   of  the   Constitution on  the   ground  of



violation   of   Article   14   was   also   constitutionally   excluded.



Further,   Article   31B   read   with   Ninth   Schedule   of   the

                               Page 42 of 52


Constitution protects  all laws even if they are violative of the



Part III of the Constitution. However, it is to be noted that in



the   Constitutional   Bench   decision   in  I.   R.   Coelho   v.   State   of



Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1, this Court has held that the laws



added to the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, by violating



the   constitutional   amendments   after   24.12.1973,   would   be



amenable to judicial review on the ground like basic structure



doctrine.





64.       It has been contended by ld. senior counsel appearing



for   the   appellants   that   the   action   taken   by   the   respondents



must   satisfy   the   twin   principles   viz.   public   purpose   and



adequate   compensation.               It   has   been   contended   that



whenever there is arbitrariness by the State in its action, the



provisions   of   Article   14,   19   and   21   would   get   attracted   and



such action is liable to be struck down. It was submitted that



the   KUZALR   Act   does   not   provide   for   any   principle   or



guidelines   for   the   fixation   of   the   compensation   amount   in   a



situation   when   no   actual   income   is   being   derived   from   the



property   in   question.   It   was   further   submitted   that   the



inherent   powers   of   public   purpose   and   eminent   domain   are



embodied   in   Article   300A,   and   Entry   42   List   III,   "Acquisition




                                Page 43 of 52


and   Requisitioning   of   Property"   which   necessarily   connotes



that the acquisition and requisitioning of property will be for a



public   use   and   for   compensation   and   whenever   a   person   is



deprived  of  his  property,   the   limitations  as  implied   in   Article



300A as well as Entry 42 List III will come into the picture and



the Court can always examine the legality and validity of the



legislation in question. It was further submitted that awarding



nil   compensation   is   squarely   amenable   to   judicial   review



under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India.




65.      It   is   the   case   of   the   State   that   the   statutory   scheme



under the UPZALR Act, 1950 is provided in Section 39(1) (e) in



respect  of  forests.   The   said  section   provides  for   two  methods



for computation of compensation, namely, the average annual



income of last 20 to 40 years as provided in Section 29(1) (e)



(i)  and the estimate  of annual yield  on  the date  of vesting  as



provided in Section 39(1) (e) (ii). It was further argued that in



respect of KUZALR Act, the same U.P. Legislature which had



the   example   of   Section   39(1)(e)   deliberately   dropped   the



second   sub-clause   and   limited   the   compensation   only   to   the



average annual income of the last 20 years. From this it was



argued that where there is no annual income, there would be



no compensation.

                               Page 44 of 52


66.       It  had   been   further   argued   that  since   the   expression



"average   annual   income"   under   Section   39(1)   (e)   (i)   has



already   been  judicially  interpreted in  the  case  of  Ganga Devi



v.   State   of   U.P.  (1972)   3   SCC   126   to   mean   "actual"   annual



income and not an estimate, therefore, if the forest land is not



earning any income, then in the statutory formula set out in



KUZALR Act, it would not be entitled to any compensation.




67.       The   Government   is   empowered   to   acquire   land   by



exercising   its   various   statutory   powers.   Acquisition   of   land



and   thereby   deprivation   of   property   is   possible   and



permissible   in   accordance   with   the   statutory   framework



enacted.   Acquisition   is   also   permissible   upon   exercise   of



police power of the State. It is also possible and permissible to



acquire   such   land   by   exercising   the   power   vested   under   the



Land   Acquisition   Act.   This   Act   mandates   acquisition   of   land



for public purpose or public use, which expression is defined



in the Act itself. This Act also empowers acquisition of land for



use   of   companies   also   in   the   manner   and   mode   clearly



stipulated   in   the   Act   and   the   purpose   of   such   acquisition   is



envisaged in the Act as not public purpose but for the purpose



specifically enumerated in Section 40 of the Land Acquisition



                               Page 45 of 52


Act. But, in case of both the aforesaid  manner of acquisition



of land, the Act envisages payment of compensation for such



acquisition   of   land   and   deprivation   of   property,   which   is



reasonable and just.




68.       Article   31(2)   of   the   Constitution   has   since   been



repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act 1978. It is



to be noted that Article 300A was inserted by the Constitution



(44th  Amendment)   Act,   1978   by   practically   reinserting   Article



31(1)   of   the   Constitution.   Therefore,   right   to   property   is   no



longer   a   fundamental   right   but   a   right   envisaged   and



conferred by the Constitution and that also by retaining only



Article   31(1)   of   the   Constitution   and   specifically   deleting



Article 31(2), as it stood.  In view of the aforesaid position the



entire   concept   to   right   to   property   has   to   be   viewed   with   a



different   mindset   than   the   mindset   which   was   prevalent



during   the   period   when   the   concept   of   eminent   domain   was



the embodied provision of fundamental rights.   But even now



as   provided   under   Article   300A   of  the   Constitution  the   State



can proceed to acquire land for specified use but by enacting



a   law   through   State   legislature   or   by   Parliament   and   in   the



manner   having   force   of   law.     When   the   State   exercises   the



power   of   acquisition   of   a   private   property   thereby   depriving

                                Page 46 of 52


the private person of the property, provision is generally made



in the statute to pay compensation to be fixed or determined



according to the criteria laid down in the statute itself. It must



be   understood   in   this   context   that   the  acquisition   of   the



property by the State in furtherance of the Directive Principles



of State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the



community   including   acquisition   and   taking   possession   of



private   property   for   public   purpose.   It   does   not   require



payment   of   market   value   or   indemnification   to   the   owner   of



the property expropriated. Payment of market value in lieu of



acquired   property   is   not   a   condition   precedent   or   sine   qua



non   for   acquisition.   It   must   be   clearly   understood   that   the



acquisition   and   payment   of   amount   are   part   of   the   same



scheme   and   they   cannot   be   separated.   It   is   true   that   the



adequacy of compensation cannot be questioned in a court of



law,   but   at   the   same   time   the   compensation   cannot   be



illusory.




69.       Further, it  is  to  be clearly understood  that the  stand



taken   by   the   State   that   the   right,   title   or   interests   of   a



hissedar      could   be   acquired   without   payment   of   any



compensation,   as   in   the   present   case,   is   contrary   to   the



express   provisions   of   KUZALR   Act   itself.     Section   12   of   the

                               Page 47 of 52


KUZALR   Act,   1960   states   that   every  hissedar  whose   rights,



title or interest are acquired under Section 4, shall be entitled



to receive and be paid compensation.   Further, Section 4A of



the KUZALR Act makes it clear that the provisions of Chapter



II   (Acquisition   and   Modifications   of   existing   rights   in   Land),



including Section 12, shall apply  mutatis mutandis  to a forest



land as they apply to a khaikhari land.   Further, the intention



of   the   legislature   to   pay   compensation   is   abundantly   clear



from   the   fact   that   Section   19   itself   prescribes   that   the



compensation payable to a hissedar under Section 12 shall, in



the   case   of   private   forest,   be   eight   times   the   amount   of



average annual income from such forest. In the instant case,



income also includes possible income in case of persons who



have   not   exploited   the   forest   and   have   rather   preserved   it.



Otherwise,   it   would   amount   to   giving   a   licence   to



owners/persons   to   exploit   forests   and   get   huge   return   of



income and not to maintain and preserve it. The same cannot



be   said   to   be   the   intention   of   the   legislature   in   enacting   the



aforesaid   KUZALR   Act.   In   fact,   the   persons   who   are



maintaining   the   forest   and   preserving   it   for   future   and



posterity cannot be penalised by giving nil compensation only



because of the reason that they were in fact chose to maintain



                                 Page 48 of 52


the forest instead of exploiting it.




70.       We are of the considered view that the decision of this



Court   in  Ganga  Devi  (supra)   is   not   applicable   in   the   present



case   in   as   much   as   this   Court   in  Ganga   Devi  (supra)   never



dealt   with   a   situation   of   unexploited   forest   and   the



interpretation of actual income was done in the peculiar facts



and   circumstances   of   the   said   case.   The   said   case   does   not



deal   with   a   situation   where   there   could   be   such   income



possible   to   be   derived   because   it   was   unexploited   but   there



could  be   no income  derived  immediately   even   if  it  is   used  or



exploited.   Therefore,   the   said   case   is   clearly   distinguishable



on facts. A distinction and difference has been drawn between



the   concept   of   `no   compensation'   and   the   concept   of   `nil



compensation'.  As mandated by Article 300A, a person can be



deprived   of   his   property   but   in   a   just,   fair   and   reasonable



manner.     In   an   appropriate   case   the   Court   may   find   `nil



compensation'   also   justified   and   fair   if   it   is   found   that   the



State   has   undertaken   to   take   over   the   liability   and   also   has



assured   to   compensate   in   a   just   and   fair   manner.     But   the



situation   would   be   totally   different   if   it   is   a   case   of   `no



compensation' at all. As already held `a law seeking to acquire



private   property   for   public   purpose   cannot   say   that   `no

                                Page 49 of 52


compensation'   would   be   paid.     The   present   case   is   a  case   of



payment of `no compensation' at all.  In the case at hand, the



forest land which was vested on the State by operation of law



cannot  be   said   to   be   non-productive   or  unproductive   by   any



stretch of imagination. The property in question was definitely



a   productive   asset.   That   being   so,   the   criteria   to   determine



possible  income on  the  date  of  vesting   would  be  to  ascertain



such   compensation   paid   to   similarly   situated   owners   of



neighboring   forests   on   the   date   of   vesting.   Even   otherwise,



revenue authority can always make an estimation of possible



income on the date of vesting if the property in question had



been   exploited   by   the   appellants   and   then   calculate



compensation on the basis thereof in terms of Sections 18(1)



(cc) and 19(1) (b) of KUZALR Act. We therefore find sufficient



force   in   the   argument   of   the   counsel   for   the   appellants   that



awarding   no   compensation   attracts   the   vice   of   illegal



deprivation   of   property   even   in   the   light   of   the   provisions   of



the Act and therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction.




71.       That being so, the omission of the Section 39(1) (e) (ii)



of   the   UPZALR   Act   1950   as   amended   in   1978   is   of   no



consequence   since   the   UPZALR   Act   leaves   no   choice   to   the



State   other   than   to   pay   compensation   for   the   private   forests

                                Page 50 of 52


acquired by it in accordance with the mandate of the law.




72.       In   view   of   the   above,   the   present   appeal   is   partly



allowed   while   upholding   the   validity   of   the   Act   and



particularly   Sections   4A,   18(1)   (cc)   and   19   (1)   (b)   of   the



KUZALR   Act,   we   direct   the   second   respondent,   i.e.   Assistant



Collector   to   determine   and   award   compensation   to   the



appellants   by   following  a  reasonable   and  intelligible   criterion



evolved on the aforesaid guidelines provided and in light of the



aforesaid   law   enunciated   by   this   Court   hereinabove.   The



appellants   will   also   be   entitled   to   interest   @   six   percent   per



annum   on   the   compensation   amount   from   the   date   of



dispossession till the date of payment provided possession of



the   forest   was   handed   and   taken   over   formally   by   the



Respondent physically and provided the appellant  was totally



deprived   of   physical   possession   of   the   forest.     However,   we



would   like   to   clarify   that   in   case   the   physical/actual



possession has not been handed over by the appellants to the



State   government   or   has   been   handed   over   at   some



subsequent  date i.e.  after the date of vesting, the interest  on



the   compensation   amount   would   be   payable   only   from   the



date of actual handover/physical possession of the property in



question   and   not   from   the   date   of   vesting.   In   terms   of   the

                                Page 51 of 52


aforesaid findings, the present appeal stands disposed of. No



costs.





                                                 .........................................CJI

                                                       [ S.H. Kapadia ]

                                                                           




                                                 ............................................J

                                                               [Dr.   Mukundakam

Sharma]





                                                 ............................................J

                                                       [ K. S. Radhakrishnan ]





                                            ............................................J

                                                       [ Swatanter Kumar ]





                                            ............................................J

                                                      [ Anil R. Dave ]



New Delhi,

August 9, 2011.





                                       Page 52 of 52