REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1507 OF 2007
M/s Sharma Transports .............. Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1508 OF 2007
M/s Sangita Travel Agency & Ors. ..............Appellants
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ........Respondents
1
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1492 OF 2007
M/s N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates, Bangalore ........... Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1509 OF 2007
K. Srinivas .............. Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1493 OF 2007
Southern Carriers, Bangalore .............. Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
2
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1494 OF 2007
M/s. N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates,
Bangalore & Anr. .............. Appellants
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 100 OF 2007
Ishwar Lal Sharma .............. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 668 OF 2007
VRL Logistics Limited .............. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..............Respondents
3
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 566 OF 2009
Anand, Managing Director
VRL Logistics Ltd. .............. Petitioner
Versus
State of Karnataka & Ors. ..............Respondents
J U D G M E N T
H.L. Dattu, J.
1. These appeals and writ petitions are directed against the order
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.3 of
1996 dated 21.07.2006, whereby the High Court has held that
transporters (writ petitioners before the High Court) could only
provide luggage space at the rear or the sides of a tourist vehicle as
mandated by Rule 128(9) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
[hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"], and no luggage could be
carried on the roof of the vehicle. The prayer in the writ petitions is
to direct the respondents therein not to check, levy and collect the
compounding fee from the vehicles of the petitioners.
4
2. The transport operators [hereinafter referred to as the
"transporters"] are in appeal by special leave before us, claiming that
they have the right to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of
their vehicles. In all, there are six appeals and three writ petitions
before us, but for the sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual
scenario in C.A. No. 1507 of 2007, as the same dicta will also be
applicable to the rest of the matters.
3. The transporters operate tourist vehicles between the States of
Karnataka and Maharashtra and have been granted tourist permits by
the State Transport Authority of Karnataka under Section 88 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"]. The
respondents, by their communication/circular dated 15.12.1995 had
issued instructions to all the subordinate authorities under the Act to
ensure that there was no luggage carried on the roof of the vehicles,
as the same was not permissible under law. Due to this instruction,
the checking authorities had started imposing and collecting fines to
the tune of `1500/- for each entry and exit from the transporters for
carrying goods on the roof of vehicles with tourist permits.
5
4. Aggrieved by this imposition and collection of fine, the
transporters preferred a writ petition before the Bombay High Court
inter-alia seeking the following relief/(s):
"i) Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
Writ, Order or Direction and prohibit the 3rd and
4th Respondents and their sub-ordinate checking
officers from checking, levying and collecting the
compounding fee from the vehicles of the
Petitioners on the alleged offence of carriage of
goods on the top of the vehicle.
ii) A Writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other
appropriate Writ, Order, Direction and quash
memo receipts issued to several vehicles of the
Petitioners vide Annexure `C' produced in the
Writ Petition.
iii) A Writ in the nature of Declaration or any
other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction and
direct the Respondent not to levy and collect
illegal compounding fee for carriage of goods on
the top of the Petitioners vehicles as per the limits
prescribed.
iv) Direct the 3rd and 4th Respondents to refund the
compound fee already collected from the
Petitioners."
5. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the
writ petition holding that by virtue of Rule 128 (9) of the Rules,
luggage of the passengers could be stored only in the rear and side of
the vehicle and not on the roof of the vehicle. The High Court held:
6
"15... The specifications are aimed at securing
safety and security of the passengers so also the
luggage and thus the same needs to be
meticulously adhered to. It has been stated in the
affidavit in reply that on account of the loading of
the luggage on the roof of the vehicle in huge
quantities or weights, unevenly kept, is likely to
result in exposing the vehicle to accidents and as
such the respondents insistence in not permitting
keeping of the luggage on the roof of the vehicles
is justified.
16. Having regard to the language used in sub
rule 9(i) which mandates that the luggage holds
shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or
both, what is intended is exclusion of the making
of a provision for luggage holds at any other
place. Sub rule 9(i) is indicative of the
mandatory nature of the provisions as the
phraseology used is "that the luggage holds
shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or
both of the tourist vehicle...". `Shall' is
ordinarily used to indicate the provisions to be
mandatory. It is also settled position of law that
if a provisions (sic.) requires a thing to be done
in a particular manner, it has to be so done, or
not at all. When the provision indicate place or
places where luggage holds are to be provided,
by necessary implication, other places for
luggage holds stand excluded. In this view of the
matter we proceed to accept the interpretation
of Rule 128(9) as contended by the learned
counsel for respondents. We are not accepting
the submission of the petitioner that in the
absence of a specific restriction in regard to
having luggage holds/carrier on the roof of the
vehicle the petitioners cannot be prevented from
carrying the goods/luggage on the roof of the
vehicle. On the contrary we are of the clear view
that luggage has to be stored at the places
7
specifically permitted by sub rule 9(i) viz., at the
rear or at sides or both, but not the roof of the
vehicle."
6. The transporters are represented by Shri. Rakesh Dwivedi,
learned senior counsel, and Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel
appears for the respondent-State.
7. The learned senior counsel, Shri. Rakesh Dwivedi, submits
that in Rule 128 (9), there is no express bar on carriage of luggage on
the roof of the vehicles. He states that the Rule requires that the
transporters should provide space for the luggage of the passengers at
the rear and the sides of the vehicle, but does not prohibit carrying
the luggage on the roof of the vehicle. On the contrary, the learned
senior counsel states that Rule 93, which regulates the overall
dimensions of motor vehicles, by virtue of Rule 128 (1), gets
incorporated into Rule 128. Shri. Dwivedi pointed out to the
Explanations to sub-Rule (3) and sub-Rule (3A), where it is
expressly stated that any ladder provided for uploading luggage on
the roof of a vehicle shall be excluded while calculating the "overall
length" of the vehicle. He also refers to sub rule (4), (6A) and (8) of
Rule 93. In view of this, the learned senior counsel would contend
8
that in the absence of an express bar of carrying luggage on the roof
of the vehicle, a vehicle could carry luggage on the roof of a vehicle.
Shri. Dwivedi further draws our attention to Rule 125C and the
Automotive Industry Standards Code of Practice for Bus Body
Design and Approval ("AIS specification" for short) to contend that
there is no express prohibition from carrying luggage on the roof of
the vehicle.
8. Summing up the arguments, Shri Dwivedi would urge before
us that on a conjoint reading of the Rules, it is clear that there was no
prohibition for the transporters to carry luggage of the passengers on
the roof of tourist vehicles. It is also argued that such restriction of
carrying the luggage on the roof of a vehicle unreasonably restricts
the right of the transporters to carry on trade or business which
would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In aid of
his submissions, Shri Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, draws our
attention to a view taken by the Karnataka High Court.
9. Per contra, Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel for the
respondent, states that Rule 128 (9) requires that sufficient space be
provided at the rear and/or the sides of the vehicle. Ms. Divan lays
9
emphasis on the phrase "sufficient space and size" and contends that
the transporter is required compulsorily to provide adequate space for
the luggage of the passengers of a tourist vehicle. She states that
there is a limit on how much luggage a passenger can carry and such
luggage must be stored only in the luggage compartment provided
for in accordance with Rule 128 (9). The learned counsel further
submits that the incorporation of Rule 93 into Rule 128 is only for
the purpose of complying with the dimensions of the vehicle laid
down in that Rule and the reference to the ladder for loading luggage
on the roof is only for the purpose of excluding the length of the
ladder, while calculating the overall dimensions of the vehicle, and
does not, in any way, imply that a tourist vehicle may carry luggage
on the roof of the vehicle. She further states that Rule 128(9) is a
special provision for tourist vehicles only and they would override
any general provision like Rule 93, and that loading any luggage on
the roof of a vehicle is detrimental to the balance of the vehicle and
thereby the safety of the passengers inside the vehicle. Ms. Divan
also states that the transporters are duty bound by Rule 128(9) to
ensure that there is sufficient space to house the luggage of the
passengers and any plea of placing the extra luggage on the roof of
10
the vehicle due to insufficiency of space in the compartment at the
rear and/or sides of the vehicle, would itself be a violation of the
Rule. By placing reliance on case laws, the learned counsel states
that if something is provided for in a particular manner, then it must
be done in that manner, or not at all. She further states that there is a
clear distinction between luggage and goods as defined by Section
2(13) of the Act, and that the real intention of the transporters by this
appeal is to carry goods on the roof of the tourist vehicles, as is clear
from their prayer in the writ petition before the High Court.
Both the learned counsel have cited some case laws before us, which
we will deal with, as and when required.
10. The issue involved is whether a transporter can provide
luggage carriers on the roof of his vehicle.
11. The transporters are the permit holders of the tourist vehicles.
The vehicles are registered as tourist vehicles and endorsement is
recorded on the Registration Certificate that tourist vehicle complies
with all the requirements of Rule 128 of the Rules. Section 2 of the
Act defines the meaning of the expression `contract carriage'.
Section 2(43) defines the meaning of the expression `tourist vehicle'
11
to mean a contract carriage, constructed or adapted and equipped and
maintained in accordance with such specifications as may be
prescribed in this behalf. Section 110 of the Act authorizes the
Central Government to make rules regulating the construction,
equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles and trailers with
respect to matters enumerated in Clause (a) to (p) of the Section. In
exercise of the power so conferred, the Central Government has
framed special provisions with respect to tourist vehicles other than
motor cabs, etc. Apart from others, it provides for specification for
dimension and luggage holds for a tourist vehicle. Rule 128(1), by
way of incorporation, provides that the dimension of a tourist vehicle
shall conform to the dimensions specified in Rule 93 of the Rules.
Rule 128(9) provides that the luggage holds shall be provided at the
rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist vehicle. The relevant portion
of Rule 93 of the Rules is as under:
"Overall dimension
93. Overall dimension of motor vehicles.--(1) The
overall width of a motor vehicle, measured at right
angles to the axis of the motor vehicle between
perpendicular planes enclosing the extreme points,
134 shall not exceed 2.6 metres.
Explanation.--For purposes of this rule, a rear-
view mirror, or guard rail or a direction indicator
12
rub-rail (rubber beading) having maximum
thickness of 20 mm on each side of the body shall
not be taken into consideration in measuring the
overall width of a motor vehicle.
......
(3) In the case of an articulated vehicle or a
tractor-trailer combination specially constructed
and used for the conveyance of individual load of
exceptional length,--
(i) if all the wheels of the vehicle are fitted with
pneumatic tyres, or
(ii) if all the wheels of the vehicle are not fitted
with pneumatic tyres, so long as the vehicle is not
driven at a speed exceeding twenty-five kilometers
per hour, the overall length shall not exceed 18
metres.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this rule
"overall length" means the length of the vehicle
measured between parallel planes passing through
the extreme projection points of the vehicle
exclusive of--
(i) a starting handle;
(ii) any hood when down;
(iii) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle;
(iv) any post office letter-box, the length of which
measured parallel to the axis of
the vehicle, does not exceed 30 centimeters;
(v) any ladder used for loading or unloading from
the roof of the vehicle or any
tail or indicator lamp or number plate fixed to a
vehicle;
(vi) any spare wheel or spare wheel bracket or
bumper fitted to a vehicle;
13
(vii) any towing hook or other fitment which does
not project beyond any fitment covered by clauses
(iii) to (vi).
(3-A)The overall length of the construction
equipment vehicle, in travel shall not exceed 12.75
metres:
Provided that in the case of construction
equipment vehicle with more than two axles, the
length shall not exceed 18 metres.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-rule
"overall length" means the length of the vehicle
measured between parallel planes through the
extreme projection points of the vehicle, exclusive
of--
(i) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle;
(ii) any ladder used by the operator to board or
alight the vehicle;
(iii) any tail or indicator lamp or number plate
fixed to a vehicle;
(iv) any sphere wheel or sphere wheel bracket or
bumper fitted to a vehicle;
(v) any towing hook or other fitments;
(vi) any operational attachment on front, rear or
carrier chassis of construction equipment vehicle
in travel mode.
......"
Rule 128(9) of the Rules is as under:
"...
(9) Luggage.--(i) Luggage holds shall be provided
at the rear or at the sides, or both, of the tourist
vehicle with sufficient space and size, and shall be
rattleproof, dustproof and waterproof with safety
arrangements;
14
(ii) The light luggage racks, on strong brackets
shall be provided inside the passenger
compartment running along the sides of the tourist
vehicle. Except where nylon netting is used, the
under side of the rack shall have padded
upholstery to protect the passengers from an
accidental hit. The general design and fitment of
the rack shall be so designed as to avoid sharp
corners and edges."
12. Chapter V of the Act relates to control of transport vehicles.
Section 66 prescribes the necessity of a permit, without which, the
vehicle cannot be used in any public place. Section 84 deals with
general conditions attaching to all permits. These conditions are
deemed to be incorporated in every permit. One of the general
conditions is that the vehicle is, at all times, to be so maintained as to
comply with the requirements of the Act and the Rules made
thereunder. The authorities are empowered to cancel or suspend the
permit on the breach of any of the general conditions specified in
Section 84 or any other condition which is contained in the permit.
Section 86 of the Act lays down the power of cancellation and
suspension of permit and Section 200 of the Act confers power on
the State Government that it may, by notification in the official
15
gazette, specify the various compounding fees for the breach of the
permit conditions.
13. Rule 128 (9) is a special provision meant for laying down
specifications for a tourist vehicle. The sub-Rule specifically
provides that in a tourist vehicle, the permit holder should only
provide luggage holds at the rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist
vehicle with sufficient space and size. When the Rules specifically
make a provision in regard to the place where luggage holds shall be
provided by necessary implication, it goes to exclude all the other
places of the tourist vehicle for being used as luggage holds. In our
view, since the language of the Rule is clear and unambiguous, no
other construction need be resorted to understand the plain language
of the sub-Rule (a) of Rule 128 of the Rules. Rule 128 is a special
provision for tourist vehicles which excludes General Rule 93 to the
extent of conflict between the former and the later.
14. On a close examination of the argument on the incorporation
of Rule 93 into Rule 128, we find that it is not the whole Rule 93 that
is incorporated into Rule 128. On a plain reading of Rule 93 (3) and
(3A), on which the transporters have heavily relied upon, it is clear
16
that these Sub-Rules are not applicable to tourist vehicles, as sub-
Rule (3) is applicable only to "an articulated vehicle or a tractor-
trailer combination specially constructed and used for the
conveyance of individual load of exceptional length" and sub-Rule
(3A) is applicable to "construction equipment vehicle". Only sub-
Rule (1) of Rule 93, which is in reference to "a motor vehicle", will
be incorporated and read into Rule 128 by virtue of sub-Rule (1) of
Rule 128. In other words, the effect of Rule 128(1) with regard to
the conformation to the dimensions specified in Rule 93 are
applicable to tourist vehicles and no other sub-Rule. Therefore, we
are not inclined to agree with Shri Dwivedi that Rule 93 must be
fully incorporated into Rule 128, thereby implying that the
transporters may load goods on the roof of a tourist vehicle due to the
reference to a ladder to upload luggage found in sub-Rules (3) and
(3A). Both these sub rules specifically refer to vehicles that are for
the purpose of carrying heavy loads and not for carrying tourists.
15. The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general
words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the
Statute gives a different indication of such meaning and is likely to
lead to absurd result, in which case their meaning can be restricted by
17
the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line
with the specific things designated by the preceding words. When
the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the
duty of the court to give effect to it.
16. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay,
(2002) 4 SCC 297, this Court took the view:
"10. No words or expressions used in any statute
can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In
matters of interpretation one should not
concentrate too much on one word and pay too
little attention to other words. No provision in the
statute and no word in any section can be
construed in isolation. Every provision and every
word must be looked at generally and in the
context in which it is used. It is said that every
statute is an edict of the legislature. The
elementary principle of interpreting any word
while considering a statute is to gather the mens
or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the
words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope
for the court to take upon itself the task of
amending or alternating the statutory provisions.
Wherever the language is clear the intention of the
legislature is to be gathered from the language
used. While doing so, what has been said in the
statute as also what has not been said has to be
noted. The construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words has to be avoided..."
18
17. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.,
(2003) 2 SCC 111, this Court held:
"24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be
determined on the basis of what it provides by its
clear language, with due regard to the scheme of
law.
25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the
legislature cannot be enlarged when the language
of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In
other words statutory enactments must ordinarily
be construed according to its plain meaning and
no words shall be added, altered or modified
unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a
provision from being unintelligible, absurd,
unreasonable, unworkable or totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."
18. In the case of Harshad S. Mehta v. State of
Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 257, this Court opined:
"34. There is no doubt that if the words are plain
and simple and call for only one construction, that
construction is to be adopted whatever be its
effect..."
19. In the case of Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC
273, this Court observed:
19
"9...It is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that when the language of the statute is
plain and unambiguous, then the court must give
effect to the words used in the statute and it would
not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical
construction on the ground that such construction
is more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act..."
20. In the case of Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav
Deshmukh,(2001) 3 SCC 594, this Court took the view:
"12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a
provision, one must look at well-settled principles
of construction but it is not open to first create an
ambiguity which does not exist and then try to
resolve the same by taking recourse to some
general principle."
21. In light of the above, we are not inclined to agree with the
submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that Rule
128 (9) does not place a prohibition on carrying of luggage on the
roof of a tourist vehicle. If that was so, it would have to be
incorporated thus in the bare language of the provision. Since there is
no ambiguity in the language of Rule 128 (9), there is no reason for
us to read the same into the Rules.
20
22. In the case of Taylor v. Taylor, (1875-76) L.R. 1 Ch. D. 426,
the Court took a view that if a particular method is prescribed for
doing a certain thing by the Statute, it rules out any other method.
This view has been adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Nazir
Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253. By this logic, we are
inclined to accept the argument of Ms. Divan that the luggage of the
passengers may only be stored in the compartments provided at the
sides and/or at the rear of the bus, as the buses are mandated to
provide sufficient space for the storage of luggage.
23. There is another argument advanced on behalf of the
transporters before us, who claim that the prohibition to carry
luggage of the passengers on the roof of the vehicle is an
unreasonable restriction and, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution. In our view, the restriction imposed by the Rule
is a reasonable restriction keeping in view the safety of the
passengers in a tourist vehicle. Therefore, the Rule cannot be said
either arbitrary or unreasonable or violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. At the time of hearing of the appeals, reference was
made to AIS specifications to contend that specification so provided
support the interpretation given by the Karnataka High Court to Rule
21
128(a) of the Rules. In our view, this submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants has no merit and is, therefore, rejected.
24. In the result, the appeals and writ petitions fail. They are
dismissed. Costs are made easy.
..............................J.
[ G. S. SINGHVI ]
...........................
...J.
[ H. L. DATTU ]
New Delhi,
August 02, 2011.
22
