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Thursday, August 11, 2011

of the Magistrate did not call for any interference. The High Court, however, failed to consider whether Magistrate has addressed to the essential aspects before invoking his power under Section 319 of the Code. Moreover, the High Court did not advert to the question whether or not filing of copy of registration of the firm by Accused Nos. 2 and 3 would be covered by expressions `in the course of any inquiry into or trial' and `evidence' occurring in Section 319 of the Code and also the aspect as to whether such document could be treated as an evidence to show that the appellant (newly added accused) has committed an offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. As regards the criminal liability of 10 a partner in the firm, in light of the provisions contained in Section 141 of the N.I. Act, there has to be evidence that at the time the offence was committed, the partner was in-charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm.


                                                                                               REPORTABLE




                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                CRIMINAL APPEAL  NOS. 1554-1557 OF 2011

            (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 9527-9530 of 2010)  




Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah Etc.                                             ...Appellants


                                   Versus



State of Gujarat &  Anr.                                                  ...Respondents





                                       JUDGEMENT




R.M. LODHA, J.




                   Leave granted.


2.                 These   four   appeals,   by   special   leave,   are   directed


against   the   common   order   of   the   Gujarat   High   Court   whereby


single Judge of that Court refused to interfere with the orders (all


dated July 11, 2000) of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Prantij


directing addition of the present appellant as an accused (Accused


No. 5) in various complaints.


3.                 For the sake of brevity and convenience, we shall refer


to the facts from the appeal arising from complaint (Criminal Case



                                                                                               1


no. 1132 of 1999)  pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First


Class, Prantij. Respondent no. 2--Gulamnabi Hebatkhan Sumara


- filed a complaint against (i) M/s. Rashmi Builders, a partnership


firm, (ii) Ashwinkumar Tribhovandas Shah and (iii) Chandravadan


Gopaldas Thakkar in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,


Prantij. It was alleged in the complaint that M/s. Rashmi Builders


(Accused   No.   1)   is   a   duly   registered   partnership   firm   and


Ashwinkumar   Tribhovandas   Shah   (Accused   No.   2)   and


Chandravadan   Gopaldas   Thakkar   (Accused   No.   3)   are   its


partners.   On   the   recommendation   and   advise   of   one   Balkabhai


alias Himatlal  Dwarkadas Lal, a financial broker,  the complainant


lent   and   advanced   a   sum   of   Rs.   5   lakhs   to   the   firm.   The   firm


through   its   partner   Ashwinkumar   Tribhovandas   Shah


acknowledged   the   receipt   of   the   said   amount   and   also   executed


and delivered a promissory note for Rs. 5 lakhs on the same date.


Later   in   discharge   of   its   liability,   the   firm   through   its   partner


(Accused   No.   2)   issued   a   cheque   for   Rs.   5   lakhs   drawn   on   the


Federal   Bank   of   India,   Fort   Branch,   Bombay   and   delivered   the


same to Balkabhai alias Himatlal Dwarkadas Lal who handed over


the said cheque to the complainant along with the promissory note.


The   complainant   presented   the   said   cheque   for   encashment   on


May 31, 1999 with his Banker but the same was dishonoured on


June 3, 1999 with  the remark  "account  closed".  The  complainant



                                                                                   2


then   sent   a   statutory   notice   of   15   days   to   the   firm   and   its   two


partners which was received by them on or about June 23, 1999.


The   accused   failed   and   neglected   to   make   payment   within   the


statutory period and instead in its reply dated June 29, 1999, the


firm  denied  having entered into  any  financial  transaction  with the


complainant. The complainant thus alleged that the accused have


committed   offence   under   Section   138   of   the   Negotiable


Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, `N.I. Act') and under Section 420


and Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The other complaints


were   lodged   by   Usmanmiya   Nanumiya   Ghori,   Mohamad


Umarkhan   Akbarkhan   Ghori   and   Daudbhai   Rasulbhai   Mansuri


against the above three accused on the identical facts.


4.             The   Judicial   Magistrate,   First   Class,   Prantij   took


cognizance   in   the   above   complaints   against   the   three   accused,


namely,   (i)   M/s.   Rashmi   Builders   (a   partnership   firm),   (ii)


Ashwinkumar   Tribhovandas   Shah   and   (iii)   Chandravadan


Gopaldas Thakkar.


5.             On November 4, 1999, the complainant in each of the


complaints made an application under Section 319 of the Code of


Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, `the Code') for joining Paresh


Lakshmikant   Vyas   and   Sarojben   Ashwinkumar   Shah   (appellant


herein) as Accused Nos. 4 and 5 respectively.  It was averred that


Accused Nos. 2 and 3 have submitted a copy of the registration of



                                                                                      3


the   firm--M/s.   Rashmi   Builders   (Accused   No.   1)   wherein   the


proposed Accused No. 4 and Accused No. 5 have been shown as


the partners of the firm and in this view of the matter, it was prayed


that complainant may be permitted to join them  as accused.


6.           The   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class,   Prantij,   as   noted


above, has directed that Paresh Lakshmikant Vyas  and Sarojben


Ashwinkumar Shah (appellant herein) be joined as Accused Nos. 4


and 5 and the High Court maintained such direction.


7.           Section 319 of the Code reads as under :




       "S. 319.  Power to proceed against other persons appearing

       to  be  guilty of offence.--(1) Where,  in the  course of  any

       inquiry   into,   or   trial   of,   an   offence,   it   appears   from   the

       evidence   that   any   person   not   being   the   accused   has

       committed any offence for which such person could be

       tried together with the accused, the court may proceed

       against such person for the offence which he appears to

       have committed.

       

       (2)   Where   such   person   is   not   attending   the   court,   he

       may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of'

       the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

       

       (3)  Any person   attending  the   court  although  not   under

       arrest   or   upon   a   summons,   may   be   detained   by   such

       court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the

       offence which he appears to have committed.

       

       (4) Where the court proceeds against any person under

       sub-section (1), then-

       

             (a) The proceedings in respect of such person shall

             be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard:

       

             (b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case

             may   proceed   as   if   such   person   had   been   an

             accused person when the court took cognizance of

             the   offence   upon   which   the   inquiry   or   trial   was

             commenced."

                                                                                          4


8.                  The ambit and scope of the power of the Court under


Section 319 of the Code has come up for consideration before this


Court on more than one occasion.


9.                  In  Joginder Singh and Another  v.  State of Punjab and


Another1, this Court stated that the power conferred under Section


319(1) of the Code is applicable to all courts including a Sessions


Court and the Court has power to add any person, not being the


accused   before   it,   against   whom   there   appears   during   trial


sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an


accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused.


10.                 In   the  case   of  Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi  v.  Ram


Kishan Rohtagi and Others2, this Court (at page 8)  held as under :


          "19.        In   these   circumstances,   therefore,   if   the

          prosecution   can   at   any   stage   produce   evidence   which

          satisfies the court that the other accused or those who

          have   not   been   arrayed   as   accused   against   whom

          proceedings   have   been   quashed   have   also   committed

          the offence the Court can take cognizance against them

          and   try   them   along   with   the   other   accused.   But,   we

          would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary

          power   which   is   conferred   on   the   court   and   should   be

          used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist

          for taking cognizance against the other person against

          whom   action   has   not   been   taken.   More   than   this   we

          would not like to say anything further at this stage. We

          leave   the   entire   matter   to   the   discretion   of   the   court

          concerned   so   that   it   may   act   according   to   law.   We

          would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the

          proceedings have been quashed against respondents 2

          to   5   will   not   prevent   the   court   from   exercising   its

          discretion   if   it   is   fully   satisfied   that   a   case   for   taking


1 (1979) 1 SCC 345

2 (1983) 1 SCC 1

                                                                                             5


          cognizance   against   them   has   been   made   out   on   the

          additional evidence led before it."




11.              In  Michael Machado and Another  v.  Central Bureau of


Investigation   and   Another3,  this   Court   on   extensive   consideration


of   the   provision   contained   in   Section   319   stated   the     (at   pages


267-268) as follows :


          "11.   The   basic   requirements   for   invoking   the   above

          section   is   that   it   should   appear   to   the   court   from   the

          evidence   collected   during   trial   or   in   the   inquiry   that

          some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused

          in   that   case,   has   committed   an   offence   for   which   that

          person could be tried together with the accused already

          arraigned.   It   is   not   enough   that   the   court   entertained

          some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement

          of   another   person   in   the   offence.   In   other   words,   the

          court   must   have   reasonable   satisfaction   from   the

          evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First

          is   that   the   other   person   has   committed   an   offence.

          Second is that for such offence that other person could

          as   well   be   tried   along   with   the   already   arraigned

          accused.


          12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only

          a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the

          court   may   proceed   against   such   person".   The

          discretionary   power   so   conferred   should   be   exercised

          only  to   achieve   criminal   justice.   It   is   not   that   the   court

          should turn against another person whenever it comes

          across evidence connecting that other person also with

          the  offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a

          conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the

          trial   has   proceeded   already   and   the   quantum   of

          evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time

          which the court had spent for collecting such evidence.

          It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty

          on the court to proceed against other persons.


          xxx              xxx              xxx              xxx              xxx





3 (2000) 3 SCC 262

                                                                                            6


          14.   The   court   while   deciding   whether   to   invoke   the

          power   under   Section   319   of   the   Code,   must   address

          itself   about   the   other   constraints   imposed   by   the   first

          limb   of   sub-section   (4),   that   proceedings   in   respect   of

          newly-added   persons   shall   be   commenced   afresh   and

          the   witnesses   re-examined.   The   whole   proceedings

          must   be   recommenced   from   the   beginning   of   the   trial,

          summon   the   witnesses   once   again   and   examine   them

          and   cross-examine   them   in   order   to   reach   the   stage

          where   it   had   reached   earlier.   If   the   witnesses   already

          examined   are   quite   large   in   number   the   court   must

          seriously   consider   whether   the   objects   sought   to   be

          achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole

          labour already undertaken.  Unless the court  is hopeful

          that   there   is   a   reasonable   prospect   of   the   case   as

          against   the   newly-brought   accused   ending   in   being

          convicted   of  the   offence   concerned   we  would  say  that

          the court should refrain from adopting such a course of

          action.




12.             In      Shashikant   Singh         v.     Tarkeshwar   Singh   and


Another4,  this   Court   considered   the   scope   of   Section   319   of   the


Code  at page 743 of the Report in the following words:


          "9.  The  intention of the provision here is that  where  in

          the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it

          appears to the court from the evidence that any person

          not being the accused has committed any offence, the

          court may proceed against him for the offence which he

          appears   to   have   committed.   At   that   stage,   the   court

          would   consider   that   such   a   person   could   be   tried

          together   with   the   accused   who   is   already   before   the

          court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect

          of   such   person   is   that,   the   proceedings   right   from   the

          beginning   have   mandatorily   to   be   commenced   afresh

          and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a

          de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial

          is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so

          brought   before   the   court.   It   would   not   be   sufficient   to

          only tender   the  witnesses   for  the  cross-examination   of

          such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh

          examination-in-chief and not only their presentation  for

          the   purpose   of   the   cross-examination   of   the   newly

          added  accused is  the  mandate  of  Section  319(4).  The



4 (2002) 5 SCC 738

                                                                                        7


          words   "could   be   tried   together   with   the   accused"   in

          Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. "Could be"

          cannot under these circumstances be held to be "must

          be".   The   provision   cannot   be   interpreted   to   mean   that

          since the trial in respect of a person who was before the

          court has concluded with the result that the newly added

          person   cannot  be  tried  together  with   the   accused  who

          was  before the court when  order under Section 319(1)

          was   passed,   the   order   would   become   ineffective   and

          inoperative,  nullifying  the opinion earlier formed by the

          court   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   before   it   that   the

          newly   added   person   appears   to   have   committed   the

          offence resulting in an order for his being brought before

          the court."




13.             In  Krishnappa  v.  State   of   Karnataka5,  this   Court


reiterated   what   has   been   repeatedly   stated   that   the   power   to


summon   an   accused   is   an   extraordinary   power   conferred   on   the


court   and   should   be   used   very   sparingly   and   only   if   compelling


reasons   exist   for   taking   cognizance   against   the   other   person


against whom action has not been taken.


14.             In      Palanisamy   Gounder   and   Another                    v.       State


represented   by   Inspector   of   Police6,  this   Court   referred   to   two


earlier   decisions   of   this   Court   in  Michael   Machado3    and


Krishnappa5    and   observed   that   power   under   Section   319   of   the


Code cannot be exercised so as to conduct a fishing inquiry.


15.             In Guriya alias Tabassum Tauquir and Others v. State


of Bihar and Another7 most of the above decisions were referred to


and   it   was   observed   that   the   parameters   for   dealing   with   an




5 (2004) 7 SCC 792

6 (2005) 12 SCC 327

7 (2007) 8 SCC 224

                                                                                            8


application under Section 319 of the Code have been laid down in


these cases.


16.             The   legal   position   that   can   be   culled   out   from   the


material   provisions   of   Section   319   of   the   Code   and   the   decided


cases of this Court is this :


       (i)      The   Court   can   exercise   the   power   conferred   on   it   under

                Section 319 of the Code suo motu or on an application by

                someone.


       (ii)     The   power   conferred   under   Section   319(1)   applies   to

                all courts including the Sessions Court.


       (iii)    The phrase "any person not being the accused" occurring

                in   Section   319   does   not   exclude   from   its   operation   an

                accused   who   has   been   released   by   the   police   under

                Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2

                of   the   charge-sheet.   In   other   words,   the   said   expression

                covers   any   person   who   is   not   being   tried   already   by   the

                court and would include person or persons who have been

                dropped   by   the   police   during   investigation   but   against

                whom   evidence   showing   their   involvement   in   the   offence

                comes before the court.


       (iv)     The   power   to   proceed   against   any   person,   not   being   the

                accused   before   the   court,   must   be   exercised   only   where

                there   appears   during   inquiry   or   trial   sufficient   evidence

                indicating his involvement in the offence as an accused and

                not   otherwise.   The   word   `evidence'   in   Section   319

                contemplates   the   evidence   of   witnesses   given   in   court   in

                the   inquiry   or   trial.   The   court   cannot   add   persons   as

                accused on the basis of materials available in the charge-

                sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence

                adduced   before   it.   In   other   words,   the   court   must   be

                satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not

                being   the   accused   before   it,   has   been   made   out   on   the

                additional evidence let in before it.


       (v)      The   power   conferred   upon   the   court   is   although

                discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner.

                In   a   sense,   it   is   an   extraordinary   power   which   should   be

                used   very   sparingly   and   only   if   evidence   has   come   on

                record  which  sufficiently  establishes  that   the  other  person

                has   committed   an   offence.   A   mere   doubt   about


                                                                                         9


                 involvement   of   the   other   person   on   the   basis   of   the

                 evidence  let  in  before  the   court  is   not  enough.   The   Court

                 must   also   be   satisfied   that   circumstances   justify   and

                 warrant   that   other   person   be   tried   with   the   already

                 arraigned accused.


       (vi)      The court while exercising its power  under Section 319 of

                 the   Code   must   keep   in   view   full   conspectus     of   the   case

                 including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already

                 and  the quantum of evidence collected till then.


       (vii)     Regard   must   also   be   had   by   the   court   to   the   constraints

                 imposed in Section 319 (4) that proceedings in respect of

                 newly   -   added   persons   shall   be   commenced   afresh   from

                 the beginning of the trial.


       (viii)    The court must, therefore, appropriately consider the above

                 aspects and then exercise its judicial discretion.




17.              Now,    if  the  order   of   the   High  Court   is  seen,  it  would


transpire     that   after   noticing   the   provisions   contained   in   Section


319 and its scope, the High Court proceeded to hold that the order


of the Magistrate did not call for any interference.  The High Court,


however, failed to consider whether  Magistrate has addressed  to


the essential aspects before invoking his power under Section 319


of   the   Code.     Moreover,   the   High   Court   did   not   advert   to   the


question whether or not filing of copy of registration of the firm by


Accused   Nos.   2   and   3   would   be   covered   by   expressions   `in   the


course   of   any   inquiry   into   or   trial'   and   `evidence'   occurring   in


Section 319 of the Code and also the aspect as to whether such


document   could   be   treated   as   an   evidence   to   show   that   the


appellant   (newly   added   accused)   has   committed   an   offence   of


cheating under Section 420 IPC.  As regards the criminal liability of

                                                                                          10


a partner in the firm, in light of the provisions contained in Section


141 of the N.I. Act, there has to be evidence that at the time the


offence   was   committed,   the   partner   was   in-charge   of   and   was


responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm.


A perusal of the impugned order would show that all these relevant


aspects have not been considered by the High Court at all and the


petitions   under   Section   482   of   the   Code   were   dismissed.     As,   in


our   view,   the   matter   needs   to   be   considered   by   the   High   Court


afresh, we refrain from dealing with the orders of the Magistrate on


merit lest it may prejudice the consideration of the petitions under


Section 482 of the Code before the High Court.


18.           Consequently,   these   appeals   are   allowed   and   the


impugned   order   dated   May   5,   2010   is   set   aside.     Criminal


Miscellaneous Application Nos. 5157 of 2000, 5158 of 2000, 5159


of 2000 and 5160 of 2000 are restored to the original number for


hearing and reconsideration by the High Court in accordance with


law.





                                                              ...........................J.

                                                                     (Aftab Alam)





                                                            ..........................J.

                                                                     (R.M. Lodha)


NEW DELHI

AUGUST 10, 2011

                                                                                     11