REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 128 OF 2007
Oriental Bank of Commerce & Anr. .... Appellants
Versus
R.K. Uppal ....Respondent
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
Two questions presented for consideration in this appeal
by special leave, at the instance of the appellants--Oriental Bank of
Commerce and its General Manager - are: (one) whether in terms
of regulation 17 of Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1982 (for short, `the 1982
Regulations'), the appellate authority is required to accord personal
hearing to the respondent in a departmental appeal; and (two)
1
whether the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the appellate
authority in the appeal preferred by the respondent under regulation
17 suffers from infirmity for want of reasons.
2. The brief facts leading to the above questions are these :
the respondent--R.K. Uppal (hereinafter referred to as `delinquent')
faced departmental inquiry under regulation 6 of the 1982
Regulations for acts of omission and commission committed by him
while working as Senior Manager/Incumbent In-charge at 19-D,
Chandigarh Branch. The article of charges served on the
delinquent contained four charges, namely : (I) between the period
September 14, 1999 to December 20, 1999, while recommending
sanction of credit facilities and further enhancements in the
account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited, the delinquent failed to
ensure that the proposal has been properly
appraised/processed and all the relevant information has been
recorded in the process note; (II) the delinquent recommended
release of working capital facilities aggregating to Rs. 64 lac
in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited for the unit
located at Sikandarabad (UP) at a distance of approximately 300
k.m. from the branch although the monitoring of unit at such a
2
distant place was not possible; (III) the delinquent recommended
enhancement of Rs. 175 lac in the Bank Guarantee limit on
November 17, 2000 in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries
Limited without ensuring satisfactory conduct of the account and
without going into the details of the transactions and implications
thereof and (IV) the delinquent released credit facilities in the
account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited without complying with the
terms of sanction.
3. On March 17, 2003, Shri M.K. Ghosh, Commissioner for
Departmental Inquiries, Central Vigilance Commission, was
appointed inquiring authority to inquire into the above charges
levelled against the delinquent.
4. The delinquent submitted his reply and denied the
charges. The inquiring authority after recording the evidence
submitted its report on November 11, 2003. Charge I and Charge II
were held to be partly proved while Charge III and Charge IV were
held to be proved.
5. The findings and report of the inquiring authority were
sent to the delinquent who in response submitted his representation
on December 15, 2003. The disciplinary authority concurred with
3
the findings of the inquiring authority and keeping in view the
seriousness of charges and gravity of the proved conduct, it
imposed the penalty of dismissal vide order dated February 14,
2004.
6. The delinquent preferred appeal under regulation 17 of
the 1982 Regulations assailing his dismissal order on diverse
grounds and also requested for grant of personal hearing. The
appellate authority rejected the delinquent's request for personal
hearing and dismissed his appeal vide its order dated June 4, 2004.
7. The delinquent challenged the order of penalty dated
February 14, 2004 and also the order of the appellate authority
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Division Bench of
that Court vide its order dated January 23, 2006 allowed the
delinquent's writ petition partly and set aside the order of the
appellate authority and remitted the matter back to it with a direction
to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner. It is this order which is impugned in the present appeal.
8. We have heard Mr. K.N. Bhatt, senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Ram Lal Roy, counsel for the respondent.
4
Re : Question (one)
9. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations reads as follows:-
"17. Appeals :
(i) An officer employee may appeal against an order
imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in
regulation 4 or against the order of suspension
referred to in regulation 12. The appeal shall lie to
the Appellate Authority.
(ii) An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from the
date of receipt of the order appealed against. The
appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority
and submitted to the authority whose order is
appealed against. The authority whose order is
appealed against shall forward the appeal together
with its comments and the records of the case to the
Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall
consider whether the findings are justified or whether
the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass
appropriate orders. The Appellate Authority may
pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or
setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the
authority which imposed the penalty or to any other
authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the
circumstances of the case....."
10. The High Court has taken a view that regulation 17 of
the 1982 Regulations impliedly requires that a delinquent who has
preferred appeal is afforded an opportunity of personal hearing by
the appellate authority. While taking such view, the High Court
relied on a decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India &
5
Ors.1 and a Full Bench decision of that Court in Ram Niwas Bansal
v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr.2 .
11. We shall refer to the above two decisions first. In Ram
Chander's case1 before this Court, the appellant who was employed
as Shunter, Grade `B' in the Railways was removed from service
after holding disciplinary inquiry wherein his guilt of misconduct was
held to be proved. The inquiry officer proceeded ex-parte against the
delinquent as he did not appear and recorded a finding that
misconduct was proved. The disciplinary authority (General
Manager) concurred with the view of the inquiry officer; formed a
provisional view that penalty of removal should be imposed on him
and issued a show cause notice to the delinquent in this regard.
This time, the delinquent did respond to the show cause notice and
submitted his explanation. The disciplinary authority was not
satisfied with the delinquent's response and imposed the penalty of
removal. The delinquent preferred a departmental appeal before the
Railway Board under the relevant Rules. His appeal was dismissed
by the appellate authority. The delinquent then challenged the
orders of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority before the
1 (1986) 3 SCC 103
2 (1998) (4) SLR 711
6
High Court in a writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed and so
also the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by him. The matter then
reached this Court in an appeal by special leave. Inter alia, the
contention of the delinquent before this Court was that it was
incumbent upon the appellate authority to afford him personal
hearing before his appeal was decided. Construing the relevant
Rules, namely, Rule 18(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline &
Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Rule 22(2) of the said Rules, this Court
held (at pages 117-118) as under :
"25. ..........Such being the legal position, it is of utmost
importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as
interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC
398] case that the appellate authority must not only give a
hearing to the government servant concerned but also
pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised
by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned
decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the
present case, will promote public confidence in the
administrative process. An objective consideration is
possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a
chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders
that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair
play and justice also require that such a personal hearing
should be given.
26. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed.
The judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court dated August 16, 1983 and that of the
Division Bench dismissing the letters patent appeal filed by
the appellant in limine by its order dated February 15, 1984
are both set aside, so also the impugned order of the
7
Railway Board dated March 11, 1972. We direct the
Railway Board to hear and dispose of the appeal after
affording a personal hearing to the appellant on merits by a
reasoned order in conformity with the requirements of Rule
22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1968, as expeditiously as possible, and in any
event, not later than four months from today."
In our opinion, in Ram Chander's case1, this Court has not laid down
as an absolute proposition that in matters of departmental appeal
against the punishment order of a disciplinary authority, the appellate
authority must invariably afford personal hearing to a delinquent.
12. Insofar as, Punjab and Haryana High Court is concerned,
it is true that in Ram Niwas Bansal2 while dealing with a similar
regulation, i.e. regulation 70 of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers)
Service Regulations, 1979, the Full Bench of that Court has read into
such rule a provision of right of personal hearing to a delinquent but
we find it difficult to approve that view. As a matter of fact, the
judgment of this Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala Vs.
Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 was not brought to the notice of that Court
nor that judgment was adverted to which lays down in clear terms
that the rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer
3 (1994) Supp (2) SCC 463
8
a right of audience at appellate stage. This is what this Court said (at
page 464) in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 :
"2. Heard counsel on both sides. The respondent was
visited with the punishment of dismissal from service. He
filed a departmental appeal which came to be dismissed,
whereupon he moved the High Court by way of a writ
petition. The High Court quashed the order of the appellate
authority on the ground that no personal hearing was given
before the appeal was dismissed. The matter was,
therefore, remitted to the appellate authority to dispose of
the appeal after hearing the delinquent personally. It is
against the said order that the present appeal is filed.
3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires
the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule
of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a
right of audience at the appellate stage. That is what this
Court observed in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs,
Calcutta [1957 SCR 1151 = AIR 1957 SC 648]. We,
therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our
attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder
Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi
[(1978) 1 SCC 405] wherein observation is made in regard
to the right of hearing. But that was not a case of a
departmental inquiry, it was one emanating from Article
324 of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, those
observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case."
13. In Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus Sales Corporation4, this
Court was concerned with an appeal that was filed against the
judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court holding that an
oral hearing has to be given by appellate authority before taking a
decision under 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M of the
4 (1996) 4 SCC 69
9
Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The Court noticed
Section 4-M of that Act and in paragraph 3 at page 73 of the
Report framed the question as to whether the requirement of
hearing to the appellants has to be read as an implicit condition
while construing the scope of 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 4-M. This Court held (at pages 74-75) as under :
"5. The High Court has primarily considered the question
as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be
heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the
penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles
of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of
this Court have been referred to. It need not be pointed out
that under different situations and conditions the
requirement of compliance of the principle of natural justice
vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances
and under different statutory provisions personal hearings
have to be afforded to the persons concerned. If this
principle of affording personal hearing is extended
whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to
exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it
shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals
and applications are disposed of by the competent
authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose
of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be
quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial
mind over the grievances made by the appellants or
applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before
dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the
quasi-judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the
applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural
justice require an opportunity to be heard before an
adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it
does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing.
The requirement is complied with by affording an
opportunity to the person concerned to present his case
before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to
10
apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if
in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the
applicant to be heard because of special facts and
circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open
to such authority to decide the appeal or the application
only after affording a personal hearing. But any order
passed after taking into consideration the points raised in
the appeal or the application shall not be held to be invalid
merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been
afforded. This is all the more important in the context of
taxation and revenue matters. When an authority has
determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty, then
the requirement that before the appeal is heard such tax or
penalty should be deposited cannot be held to be
unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case of
Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1993) 1 SCC
22] it has been held by this Court that such requirement
cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit
itself as unconstitutional. In this background, it can be said
that normal rule is that before filing the appeal or before the
appeal is heard, the person concerned should deposit the
amount which he has been directed to deposit as a tax or
penalty. The non-deposit of such amount itself is an
exception which has been incorporated in different statutes
including the one with which we are concerned. Second
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M says in clear and
unambiguous words that an appeal against an order
imposing a penalty shall not be entertained unless the
amount of the penalty has been deposited by the appellant.
Thereafter the third proviso vests a discretion in such
appellate authority to dispense with such deposit
unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may
impose in its discretion taking into consideration the undue
hardship which it is likely to cause to the appellant. As such
it can be said that the statutory requirement is that before
an appeal is entertained, the amount of penalty has to be
deposited by the appellant; an order dispensing with such
deposit shall amount to an exception to the said
requirement of deposit. In this background, it is difficult to
hold that if the appellate authority has rejected the prayer
of the appellant to dispense with the deposit
unconditionally or has dispensed with such deposit subject
11
to some conditions without hearing the appellant, on
perusal of the petition filed on behalf of the appellant for the
said purpose, the order itself is vitiated and is liable to be
quashed being violative of the principles of natural justice.
14. Thus, in Jesus Sales Corporation4, it was held by this
Court that under the relevant rule, it was not obligatory upon the
appellate authority to hear the appellant.
15. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and
Anr.5, the appellate authority proposed to enhance the penalty
imposed upon the delinquent by the punishing authority. The
disciplinary authority recommended to the punishing authority the
punishment of reduction in substantive salary at one stage. The
punishing authority accepted the recommendation of the disciplinary
authority and imposed the punishment accordingly. The appellate
authority proposed to enhance the penalty to an order of removal. In
this context, inter alia, one of the contentions raised before this Court
was that the order of removal from service could not be sustained as
no personal hearing was given to the delinquent before the
enhancement of punishment even though personal interview was
specifically asked for. The Court noticed various judgments of this
Court including the Constitution Bench judgment in Managing
5 (2005) 1 SCC 13
12
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and Ors.6 and
also the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram
Niwas Bansal2. In paragraph 31 at page 29 of the Report, it was held
that the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar6 should govern
all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no
notice and no opportunity but one of not affording the proper hearing
that is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or
requirement governing that inquiry. We have not been able to discern
anything in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 that lays down that the
appellate authority must, in all cases of departmental appeal, afford
personal hearing to the delinquent.
16. Be it noted that the principal question for consideration
in B. Karunakar6 was whether the report of the inquiry
officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority
to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee
is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make
proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such
authority arrives at its own finding with regard to guilt or otherwise of
the employee and the punishment, if any, to be awarded to him.
While dealing with this question and its diverse facets, the Court
6 (1993) 4 SCC 727
13
exhaustively considered the principles of natural justice in the context
of furnishing the report of the inquiry officer/authority to the delinquent
employee. B. Karunakar6 does not deal with the question of necessity
of affording a personal hearing to a delinquent by the appellate
authority.
17. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for the appellants
cited a Single Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y.
Malleswara Rao v. Chief General Manager, State Bank of India,
Hyderabad & Ors.7. In that case the delinquent was visited with the
penalty of removal from service. The concerned delinquent preferred
appeal before the appellate authority and one of the contentions
raised before the High Court was that the appellate authority failed to
afford a personal hearing to the delinquent and, therefore, the order
of the appellate authority suffered from transgression of an essential
principle of natural justice. The Single Judge of the High Court
referred to decisions of this Court in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3,
Jesus Sales Corporation4 and Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and also the
decision of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram
Niwas Bansal2. The Single Judge also referred to few decisions of
other High Courts and followed the proposition propounded by this
7 2006 LAB. I.C. 1384
14
Court in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 viz; that in the absence of the
specific requirement by the relevant rules, there is no right to a
personal hearing at the appellate stage and the rules of natural
justice do not require that in all cases a right of audience should be
provided at the appellate stage.
18. It is now fairly well settled that the requirements of natural
justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of
the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject
matter that is being dealt with and so forth. In the words of
Ramaswami, J. (Union of India & Anr. v. P.K. Roy & Ors.8) the extent
and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned
within the straitjacket of a rigid formula. The application of the
doctrine depends upon the nature of jurisdiction conferred on the
administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the
persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other
relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.
19. A right of appeal is not an inherent right. None of the
facets of natural justice requires that there should be right of appeal
from any decision. The extent of power of an appellate forum and the
mode and manner of its exercise can always be provided in the
8 AIR 1968 SC 850
15
provision that creates such right. Insofar as provision of appeal in
regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations is concerned, it must be stated
that the said provision affords to an employee right of appeal against
an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in
regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred to in
regulation 12. It provides for limitation within which the appeal is to
be preferred. As per the said provision, the appeal must be
addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority
whose order is appealed against. The authority whose order is
appealed against is required to forward the appeal together with its
comments and also the record of the case to the appellate authority.
The appellate authority then proceeds with the consideration of the
appeal and considers whether the findings are justified; whether the
penalty is excessive or inadequate and passes appropriate order
confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or
remitting the case to the authority that imposed the penalty or to any
other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the
circumstances of the case. The appeal provision in regulation 17 of
the 1982 Regulations does not expressly provide for personal hearing
to the appellant. Is the right of personal hearing to the appellant
16
implicit in the provision? We think not. In our considered view, in the
absence of personal hearing to the appellant, it cannot be said that
the very right of appeal is defeated. One situation is, however,
different. Where the appellate authority proposes to enhance the
penalty, obviously, the appellate authority must issue notice to the
delinquent asking him to show cause why penalty that has been
awarded to him must not be enhanced and give him personal
hearing. It is so because the appellate authority seeks to inflict such
punishment for the first time which was not given by the
disciplinary/punishing authority. Although there are no positive words
in regulation 17, requiring that the appellant shall be heard before
enhancement of the penalty, the fairness and natural justice require
him to be heard.
20. It is true that in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5, this Court did
not accept the contention of the delinquent relating to non-grant of
personal hearing to him by the appellate authority before the
enhancement of the punishment. But it was so in the peculiar fact-
situation of the case. First, this Court observed that Charge 5 of
granting loan to the spouse under SEEUY Scheme in violation of
Rule 34(3) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service
17
Rules was found by the appellate authority more serious and grave in
nature. Secondly and more importantly, the Court noticed that
delinquent in his appeal before the appellate authority admitted that
he had committed misconduct of disbursing the loan to his wife in a
Scheme which was meant for educated unemployed youth. To our
mind, thus, there is no inconsistency in the judgment of this Court in
Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and our statement above that where the
appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty, the appellate
authority must issue notice to the delinquent and give him personal
hearing.
21. However, personal hearing may not be required where
the appellate authority, on consideration of the entire material placed
before it, confirms, reduces or sets aside the order appealed
against. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does not require that
in all situations personal hearing must be afforded to the delinquent
by the appellate authority. The view taken by the Full Bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ram Niwas Bansal2
is too expansive and wide and cannot be held to be laying down
correct law particularly in light of the judgment of this Court in
Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 . We answer this question accordingly.
18
Re : Question (two)
22. The High Court has faulted the order of the appellate
authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order. Is it
so? We have carefully perused the order of the appellate authority
and we find that the order dated June 4, 2004 cannot be labelled as a
non-speaking order. The order does not suffer from the vice of non-
application of mind. The appellate authority has addressed the points
raised in the appeal and critical to the decision, albeit briefly. It is true
that the appellate authority must record reasons in support of its order
to indicate that it has applied its mind to the grounds raised but it is
not the requirement of law that an order of affirmance by the
appellate authority must be elaborate and extensive. Brief reasons
which indicate due application of mind in decision making process
may suffice. Each ground raised in the appeal has been dealt with
briefly as would be apparent from the following consideration of the
matter by the appellate authority:
"The contention of the appellant that no departmental
action can be taken against him during pendency of
criminal proceedings before the Court is not tenable; as
departmental enquiry is independent of criminal
proceedings and as such there is no bar to pass the order
19
of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority during the
pendency of criminal proceedings.
The appellant has alleged that Inquiring Authority has erred
in holding the imputation 2 & 3 under Article of Charge No.
1 as proved. On carefully perusing the evidence brought on
record of the enquiry and other related record, I find that
Disciplinary Authority has fully considered
evidence/submissions made by the appellant and based on
that the article of charge no. 1 is held partly proved against
the appellant. This does not, however, mean that the
Disciplinary Authority has in anyway exonerated the
appellant of this charge. Hence, I do not find any
force/substance in the allegation of the appellant. I find that
on the basis of evidence adduced in the inquiry, article of
charge no. 1 has been rightly held as partly proved against
the appellant.
The appellant has further contended that PO had not
furnished any proof of his having recommended the
proposal to the Regional Office. I have perused the
relevant record and evidence adduced in respect of the
charge. It is evident from Ex. MEX 10/6 (which is admitted
document in the enquiry) that the appellant had sent letter
dated 24-10-2000 based on which Regional Office
permitted the party to avail facility for unit at Sikandrabad
which was 300 kms away from Chandigarh and in this way,
it was not possible for the branch to monitor the unit at
such a distant place. Although the appellant has not
disputed reference of letter dated 24-10-2000 in Ex. MEX
10/6, yet due to its non-production by the PO, the IA has
held this charge as partly proved. On the basis of evidence
brought on record of enquiry and after considering
submission of appellant, I find that Disciplinary Authority
has rightly held article of charge no. 2 as partly proved and
contention of the appellant that this charge should be set
aside is devoid of any merit.
The appellant has contended that he had recommended
the proposal keeping in view the General Manager's
instructions. The appellant had neither produced any
document nor adduced any evidence in his defence to
substantiate this fact. However, during general examination
20
by the Inquiring Authority, he has admitted that he had no
exposure of processing of the guarantees and proposal
was analysed at Regional Office and he had just
recommended it. This clearly shows that the appellant
recommended enhancement of bank guarantee limit of
Rs. 175 lacs in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Ltd.
without ensuring satisfactory conduct of the account and
without going into details of transaction and implications
thereof. After carefully analyzing the evidence adduced
during the enquiry, I find that the article of charge no. 3
against the appellant is rightly held proved by Disciplinary
Authority. I therefore, do not find any merit/force in the
allegations of the appellant.
The Appellant has contended that common seal on all
documents had been affixed and all the documents are
valid. On careful perusal of documents ME-23/1/2 and after
evaluating evidence of PW-1 during regular hearing held
on 20-9-2003, I observe that article of charge no. 4 against
the appellant in respect of releasing credit facilities in the
account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Ltd. without complying
with terms of sanction is rightly held proved by the
Disciplinary Authority. Hence I do not find any force/merit in
contention of the appellant that article of charge no. 4 has
been wrongly upheld by the Inquiring Authority.
The appellant has also referred to some pending enquiry
proceedings against him in respect of charge sheet dated
12-8-2003 in the matter of Bankarpur Cold Storage and
has contended that it is against principles of natural justice
to take into account past service record without valid legal
grounds. After perusing relevant enquiry record, I find that
Disciplinary Authority in his order has referred to certain
lapses/irregularities attributable to the appellant for the
misconduct committed by him while posted as Sr.
Manager/Incumbent In-charge, B/O 19-D, Chandigarh.
Having regard to imposition/inflictment of penalty of
dismissal on the appellant w.e.f. 14-2-2004 by the
Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 4(j) of Oriental
Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Discipline &
Appeal) Regulations, 1982 it was not open to the bank to
pursue pending charge sheet dated 12-8-2003 against the
appellant as referred to in the appeal. Disciplinary
21
Authority, therefore, has rightly stated in his order dated
14-2-2004 that "no action is required to be taken at this
stage" in relation to this charge sheet. Hence, I do not find
any force/merit in the allegations of the appellant that
Disciplinary Authority has taken into account the matter of
pending inquiries in respect of charge sheet dated 12-8-
2003. As such, there is no violation of principles of natural
justice as alleged."
Having discussed the matter as above, the appellate authority held
that on consideration of the inquiry record and facts and
circumstances of the case, the findings and the order dated February
14, 2004 passed by disciplinary authority are based on evidence
brought on record of inquiry and not founded on past record or any
other matter not connected with inquiry as alleged by the delinquent
in the appeal. Consequently, the appellate authority concurred with
the view of the disciplinary authority and found no justification to
interfere with the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority.
23. The order of the appellate authority, by no stretch of
imagination can be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons. We
answer question no. (two) in the negative.
24. In our view, the High Court was clearly in error in setting
aside and quashing the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the
appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority to pass a
22
reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner
(respondent herein).
25. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment and
order dated January 23, 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.
.........................J.
(Aftab Alam)
........................ J.
(R.M. Lodha)
NEW DELHI.
AUGUST 11, 2011.
23
