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Wednesday, November 7, 2012

where seniority and promotion had been granted on a notional basis, with retrospective effect and it was held that the person to whom the same had been granted, was entitled to all consequential benefits.


REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2133-2134 OF 2004




      Rohitash Kumar & Ors.                        … Appellants


                                   Versus


      Om Prakash Sharma & Ors.                     … Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.:




      1.    These appeals have been preferred against the impugned  judgment
      and order dated 22.7.2001, passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir
      at Jammu in SWP No.  1393  of  1999,  and  judgment  and  order  dated
      1.8.2002 passed in LPA No. 275 of 2002.


      2.    The facts and circumstances giving rise  to  these  appeals  are
      mentioned as under :
      A.     The  appellants  and  contestant  respondents   are   Assistant
      Commandants in the Border Security Force (hereinafter referred to  as,
      `BSF’).  The appellants  and  respondent  nos.  4  and  5  are  direct
      recruits, while respondent no.1 has been promoted against the quota of
      10 per cent posts, that are  reserved for Ministerial Cadre posts.
      B.    The Union of India – respondent no.2, issued  a  seniority  list
      dated 18.7.1995, placing respondent no. 1 at Serial  No.  1863,  below
      all the officers of Batch No.17 and thereafter, a final seniority list
      of Assistant Commandants was published on 5.7.1996.
      C.    Respondent no.1 challenged   the said seniority list in which he
      was ranked below the officers of Batch No. 17, by filing Writ Petition
      No. 1393 of 1999, on the ground that with effect  from  15.3.1993,  he
      stood promoted as Assistant Commandant, and that he had also completed
      all requisite training for the same at the B.S.F.  Academy,  Tekanpur,
      which  had  commenced  on  1.2.1993.  There  was  another  batch  that
      undertook training on 2.7.1993.  However, the  said  officers  of  the
      second batch, who had joined such training on 2.7.1993, could  not  be
      ranked higher than him, in the seniority list.
      D.    The said writ petition filed by respondent no.1,  was  contested
      by the Union of India.  The learned  single  judge  allowed  the  writ
      petition vide impugned judgment and order dated 27.7.2001, wherein  it
      was held  that  respondent  no.1/petitioner  therein,  was,  in  fact,
      entitled to be ranked in seniority above the officers of Batch  No.17,
      and below the officers of Batch No.16.
      E.    The  Union  of  India  challenged  the  aforementioned  impugned
      judgment and order dated 27.7.2001, by filing a Letters Patent  Appeal
      which was dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 1.8.2002.
      F.    The appellants, though had not been impleaded as parties  before
      the High Court, sought permission to file special leave petitions with
      respect to the said matter, and the same was granted  by  this  Court.
      Hence, these appeals.


      3.     Shri R. Venkataramani,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
      behalf of  the  appellants,  has  submitted  that  officers  that  are
      selected in response to a single advertisement, and through  the  same
      selection process,  if  have  been  given  training  in  two  separate
      batches, for administrative reasons i.e. police verification,  medical
      examination  etc.,  cannot  be   accorded   different   seniority   by
      bifurcating them into two or more separate batches.   The  High  Court
      therefore, committed an error by  allowing  the  claim  of  respondent
      no.1, which opposed the seniority of  the  officers,  for  the  reason
      that, if  Batch Nos. 16 and 17 are taken together, the  officers  who,
      in terms of seniority, were placed at Serial No.5, would be  moved  to
      Serial No. 60,  if  treated  separately.   For  instance,  the  person
      placed at Serial No. 8 had moved to Serial No. 62, and the one  placed
      at Serial No. 11 had moved to Serial No. 64. Thus,  such  an  act  has
      materially adversely affected the seniority of  officers  even  though
      they were duly selected in the same batch.  The provisions of  Rule  3
      of the Border Security Force (Seniority, Promotion and  Superannuation
      of Officers) Rules, 1978  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the,  `Rules
      1978’), have been wrongly interpreted.  The Statutory authorities have
      previously, always fixed seniority without taking  note  of  the  fact
      that training of officers was conducted in  different  batches.  Thus,
      appeals deserve to be allowed.


      4.    Per contra, Shri P.P.  Malhotra,  learned  ASG  and  Dr.  Rajeev
      Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent  nos.
      4 and 5, have vehemently opposed the appeals, contending that the said
      Rule is not ambiguous in any manner and thus, the same must  be  given
      a literal interpretation and  that  if,  as  a  result  of  this,  any
      hardship is caused to anyone, the same cannot be a  valid  ground  for
      interpreting the statutory rule in a different manner. The said  rules
      are not under challenge. The rule of contemporanea expositio does  not
      apply in contravention of statutory provisions.  The proviso to Rule 3
      provides for the bifurcation of officers of  the  same  batch  in  the
      event of a contingency which is exactly what has taken  place  in  the
      instant case.  The High Court has only applied  the  said  provisions.
      Thus, no interference is called for and the present appeals are liable
      to be rejected.


      5.    We have considered the rival submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties and perused the record.


      6.      The relevant Rule 3 of the Rules, 1978, reads as under:
           ?“(3) Subject to the  provisions  of  Sub-Rule  (2)  inter  -  se
           seniority amongst officers holding the same  rank  shall  be  as
           follows namely:
           (i) Seniority of Officers promoted on  the  same  day  shall  be
           determined in the order in which they are selected for promotion
           to that rank.
           (ii)  Seniority  of  direct  entrants  shall  be  determined  in
           accordance with the aggregate marks obtained by them before  the
           Selection Board and at the passing out examination conducted  at
           the Border Security Force Academy.
           (iii) Seniority of temporary officers subject to the  provisions
           of clauses (i) and (ii) shall be determined on the basis of  the
           order of merit at the  time  of  their  selection  and  officers
           selected on an earlier batch will be senior to officers selected
           in subsequent batches.
           (iv) Seniority of officers subject to the provisions of  clauses
           (i) (ii) and (iii) shall be determined according to the date  of
           their continuous appointment in that rank.


           Provided that in case of direct entrants the date of appointment
           shall be the date of commencement of their  training  course  at
           the        Border        Security        Force         Academy."
                    (Emphasis added)


      Rule of Contemporanea Expositio:
      7.    This Court applied the rule of contemporanea expositio,  as  the
      Court  found  that  the  same  is  a  well  established  rule  of  the
      interpretation of a statute, with reference to the exposition that  it
      has received from contemporary authorities. However, while  doing  so,
      the Court added words of caution to the effect that such a  rule  must
      give way, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous.,
      This Court applied the said rule of  interpretation  by  holding  that
      contemporanea expositio as expounded by administrative authorities, is
      a very  useful  and  relevant  guide  to  the  interpretation  of  the
      expressions used in a  statutory  instrument.  The  words  used  in  a
      statutory provision must be understood in the same way, in which  they
      are usually understood, in ordinary common parlance  with  respect  to
      the area in which, the said law is in force  or,  by  the  people  who
      ordinarily deal with them. (Vide: K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer,
      Ernakulam & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1922; Indian  Metals  and  Ferro  Alloys
      Ltd., Cuttack v. Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneshwar,  AIR  1991
      SC 1028; and Y.P. Chawla & Ors. v. M.P. Tiwari &  Anr.,  AIR  1992  SC
      1360).


      8.    In N. Suresh Nathan & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,  1992  Supp
      (1) SCC 584; and M.B. Joshi & Ors. v. Satish Kumar Pandey & Ors., 1993
      Supp (2) SCC 419, this Court observed that such construction, which is
       in consonance with long-standing practice prevailing in the concerned
      department in relation to which the  law  has  been  made,  should  be
      preferred.


      9.    In Senior Electric Inspector & Ors.  v.  Laxminarayan  Chopra  &
      Anr., AIR 1962 SC 159; and M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning &  Weaving  Mills
      Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC  191,  it  was  held
      that while a maxim  was  applicable  with  respect  to  construing  an
      ancient statute, the same could not be used to  interpret  Acts  which
      are comparatively modern, and in relation to such Acts, interpretation
      should be given to the words used therein, in the context of new facts
      and the present situation, if the said words are in fact,  capable  of
      comprehending them.


      10.   In Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. &  Ors.  v.  Delhi  Stock  Exchange
      Association Ltd., AIR 1979 SC  1049,  this  Court  observed  that  the
      principle of contemporenea expositio,  i.e.  interpreting  a  document
      with reference to  the  exposition  that  it  has  received  from  the
      Competent Authority, can be invoked though the same will not always be
      decisive with respect to  questions  of  construction.  Administrative
      construction, i.e., contemporaneous construction that is  provided  by
      administrative or executive  officers  who  are  responsible  for  the
      execution  of  the  Act/Rules  etc.,  should  generally   be   clearly
      erroneous, before  the  same  is  over-turned.  Such  a  construction,
      commonly  referred  to  as   practical   construction   although   not
      controlling,  is  nevertheless  entitled  to  be  given   considerable
      weightage  and  is  also,  highly  persuasive.  It  may  however,   be
      disregarded for certain cogent reasons. In a clear case of error,  the
      Court should, without hesitation, refuse to follow such a construction
      for the reason that, “wrong practice does not make the law.”  (Vide  :
      Municipal Corporation for City of Pune & Anr. v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd.
      & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2856). (See also: State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Dev
      Ganga Enterprises, (2010) 1 SCC 505; and Shiba  Shankar  Mohapatra  v.
      State of Orissa & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 471).
            In D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 753,
      the Court held that, “past practice should not be upset provided  such
      practice conforms to the rules” but must be ignored if it is found  to
      be de hors the rules.


      11.    However,  in  Laxminarayan  R.  Bhattad  &  Ors.  v.  State  of
      Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 2003 SC  3502,  this  Court  held  that,  “the
      manner in which a statutory authority understands the application of a
      statute, would not confer any legal right upon a party unless the same
      finds favour with the Court of law, dealing with the matter”.


      12.   This principle has also been applied in judicial  decisions,  as
      it has been held consistently, that long standing settled practice  of
      the Competent Authority should not normally be disturbed,  unless  the
      same is found to be manifestly wrong, ‘unfair’. (Vide: Thamma  Venkata
      Subbamma (dead) by LR. v. Thamma Rattamma & Ors., AIR  1987  SC  1775;
      Assistant District Registrar, Co-operative  Housing  Society  Ltd.  v.
      Vikrambhai Ratilal Dalal & Ors.,  1987  (Supp)  SCC  27;  Ajitsinh  C.
      Gaekwad & Ors. v. Dileepsinh D. Gaekwad & Ors., 1987 (Supp)  SCC  439;
      Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s.  Standard  Motor  Products
      etc., AIR 1989 SC 1298; Kattite Valappil Pathumma & Ors. v. Taluk Land
      Board & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1115;  and Hemalatha Gargya v.  Commissioner
      of Income-tax, A.P. & Anr., (2003) 9 SCC 510).


      13.     The   rules   of    administrative    interpretation/executive
      construction, may be applied, either where a representation is made by
      the maker of a legislation, at the time of  the  introduction  of  the
      Bill itself, or if construction thereupon,  is  provided  for  by  the
      executive, upon its coming into force, then  also,  the  same  carries
      great weightage. (Vide : Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.  &  Anr.  v.
      Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 792).


      14.   In view  of  the  above,  one  may  reach  the  conclusion  that
      administrative interpretation may often  provide  the  guidelines  for
      interpreting a particular Rule or executive instruction, and the  same
      may be accepted unless, of course, it is found to be in  violation  of
      the Rule itself.


      Interpretation of the proviso:
      15.   The normal function of a proviso is generally, to provide for an
      exception i.e. exception of something that is outside the ambit of the
      usual intention of the enactment,  or  to  qualify  something  enacted
      therein, which, but for the proviso would be  within  the  purview  of
      such enactment.  Thus, its purpose is to exclude something which would
      otherwise fall squarely  within  the  general  language  of  the  main
      enactment.  Usually, a proviso cannot be interpreted as a general rule
      that has been provided for.  Nor it can be  interpreted  in  a  manner
      that would nullify the enactment, or take away in  entirety,  a  right
      that has been conferred by the statute.    In case,  the  language  of
      the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a  proviso  can  have  no
      repercussion on the interpretation of the main  enactment,  so  as  to
      exclude by implication, what clearly falls within its expressed terms.
       If, upon plain and fair construction, the main provision is clear,  a
      proviso cannot expand or limit its ambit and scope. (Vide: CIT, Mysore
      etc. v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713; Kush Sahgal & Ors.
      v. M.C. Mitter & Ors., AIR 2000 SC  1390;  Haryana  State  Cooperative
      Land  Development  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Haryana  State   Cooperative   Land
      Development Bank Employees Union &  Anr.,  (2004)  1  SCC  574;  Nagar
      Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187;  and
      State of Kerala & Anr. v B. Six Holiday  Resorts   Private  Limited  &
      Ors., (2010) 5 SCC 186).


      16.   The proviso  to  a  particular  provision  of  a  statute,  only
      embraces the field which is covered by the main provision, by  carving
      out an exception to the said main provision.  (Vide: Ram  Narain  Sons
      Ltd. & Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax & Ors., AIR 1955 SC
      765; and A.N. Sehgal & Ors. v. Rajeram Sheoram & Ors.,   AIR  1991  SC
      1406).


      17.   In  a  normal  course,  proviso  can  be  extinguished  from  an
      exception for the reason that exception is intended  to  restrain  the
      enacting clause to a particular class of cases while  the  proviso  is
      used to remove special cases from the general enactment  provided  for
      them specially.






      Hardship of an individual:
      18.   There may be a statutory provision, which causes great  hardship
      or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to  an  individual,
      but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor.
           It is a well settled principle of interpretation  that  hardship
      or inconvenience caused, cannot be  used  as  a  basis  to  alter  the
      meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if  such  meaning
      is clear upon a bare perusal of the Statute.  If the language is plain
      and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to,
      even if it causes hardship or possible injustice. (Vide:  Commissioner
      of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mandal,  AIR
      1950 SC 265; and D. D. Joshi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1983
      SC 420).


      19.   In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,  AIR  1955
      SC 661 it was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court that,  if
      there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, and
      that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule  of
      interpretation for the purpose of mitigating  such  hardship.  If  the
      language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect
      to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may  be.  The  words,
      ‘dura lex sed lex’ which mean “the law is hard but it is the law.” may
      be used to sum up  the  situation.  Therefore,  even  if  a  statutory
      provision causes hardship to some people, it is not for the  Court  to
      amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain  and
      literal sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation.


      20.   In Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton  &
      Silk Mills Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1128 a Constitution Bench of  this
      Court held that, “inconvenience  is  not”  a  decisive  factor  to  be
      considered while interpreting a statute.


      21.   In Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966  SC
      529, this Court, while dealing with the same issue observed as under:–
               “A result flowing from a statutory  provision  is  never  an
               evil. A Court has no  power  to  ignore  that  provision  to
               relieve what it considers  a  distress  resulting  from  its
               operation. A statute must  of  course  be  given  effect  to
               whether a Court likes the result or not.”


      (See also: The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal I, Calcutta  v.
      M/s Vegetables Products Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 927; and Tata Power  Company
      Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Limited & Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 659).
           Therefore,  it  is  evident  that  the  hardship  caused  to  an
      individual,  cannot  be  a  ground  for  not  giving   effective   and
      grammatical meaning to every word of the provision,  if  the  language
      used therein, is unequivocal.


      Addition and Subtraction of words:
      22.   The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while  interpreting
      the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract  even  a
      single word. The legal maxim  “A  Verbis  Legis  Non  Est  Recedendum”
      means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A  section
      is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and  it  is
      not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The  Court  cannot  proceed
      with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting  the  Statute
      has committed a mistake; it must  proceed  on  the  footing  that  the
      legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in
      the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not  open
      to the court to add and amend, or by construction,  make  up  for  the
      deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron
      out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the  fabric,  of
      which an  Act  is  woven.  The  Court,  while  interpreting  statutory
      provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which
      are not part of it, especially when a literal  reading  of  the  same,
      produces an intelligible result. (Vide:  Nalinakhya  Bysack  v.  Shyam
      Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram  Ram  Narain  Medhi  v.
      State of Bombay, AIR 1959  SC  459;  M.  Pentiah  &  Ors.  v.  Muddala
      Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC  1107;   The  Balasinor  Nagrik  Co-
      operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987  SC
      849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).


      23.   The Statute is not to be construed in light of  certain  notions
      that the legislature might have had in mind, or what  the  legislature
      is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done,  or
      what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The  Courts
      have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not  permissible
      for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment,  in  order
      to  avoid  any  real,  or  imaginary  hardship  which   such   literal
      interpretation may cause.
      24.   In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that,  under  the
      garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the  power
      to add or subtract even a single word,  as  it  would  not  amount  to
      interpretation, but legislation.


      25.   The matter requires  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the
      aforesaid settled legal propositions.
            The Service Selection Board (CPOs) 91, selected 154  persons  to
      be appointed as Assistant Commandant (Direct  Entry),  and  they  were
      then sent for training in two separate batches.  Batch No.16 consisted
      of 67 officers who joined the training on 1.2.1993, while Batch  No.17
      consisted of 87 officers who joined the training  on  2.7.1993.   They
      could not be sent for training in one batch, even though they had been
      selected  through   the   same   competitive   examination,   due   to
      administrative reasons i.e., character verification  etc.   Respondent
      no.1, who was promoted from the feeding  cadre,  joined  his  post  on
      15.3.1993.  Thus, it is evident that he was placed in the  promotional
      cadre, prior to the commencement of the training  of  Batch  No.17  on
      2.7.1993.
      26.   The learned Single Judge dealt  with  the  statutory  provisions
      contained in Rule 3 and held as under:
           “A perusal of the above makes it apparent that in  the  case  of
           the officers who have been promoted their  seniority  is  to  be
           determined on the basis of continuous appointment on  a  day  in
           which they are selected for promoted to that rank.  In  case  of
           direct entrants their inter–se seniority is to be determined  on
           the  basis  of  aggregate  marks  obtained  by  them.   Inter-se
           seniority of the officers mentioned at serial  No.(l)  (ii)  and
           (iii) is to  be  determined  according  to  the  date  of  their
           continuous appointment in the  rank.  Proviso  to  the  rule  is
           clear. It is specifically mentioned that in the case  of  direct
           entrants,  the  date  of  appointment  shall  be  the  date   of
           commencement of their training course  at  the  Border  Security
           Force Academy.”


           In light of the above, relief had  been  granted  to  respondent
      no.1.  The Division Bench concurred with the said interpretation.


      27.    If  we  apply  the  settled  legal  propositions  referred   to
      hereinabove, no other interpretation is permissible.  The language  of
      the said rule is crystal clear.  There is no ambiguity with respect to
      it.  The validity of the rule is not under challenge.  In such a fact-
      situation, it is not permissible for the court to interpret  the  rule
      otherwise.  The said proviso will have  application  only  in  a  case
      where officers who  have  been  selected  in  pursuance  of  the  same
      selection process are split into separate batches.   Interpreting  the
      rule otherwise, would amount to adding words to the proviso, which the
      law does not permit.


      28.   If the contention of the appellants is accepted, it would amount
      to fixing their seniority from a date prior, to  their  birth  in  the
      cadre. Admittedly, the appellants (17th  batch),  joined  training  on
      2.7.1993 and their claim is to fix their seniority  from  the  Ist  of
      February, 1993 i.e. the date on which, the 16th batch joined training.
       Such a course is not permissible in law.
            The facts and circumstances of  the  case  neither  require  any
      interpretation, nor reading down of the rule.


      29.    Shri  R.  Venkataramani,  learned  Senior   counsel   for   the
      appellants, has placed very heavy reliance upon the  judgment  of  the
      Delhi High Court (Dinesh Kumar v. UOI & Ors.) dated 14.2.2011 wherein,
      certain relief was granted to the petitioner therein, in view  of  the
      fact that there was some delay in joining  training,  in  relation  to
      passing the fitness test set by the Review Medical Board.   The  court
      granted relief, in light of the facts and circumstances of  the  case,
      without interpreting Rule  3  of  the  Rules  1978.   Thus,  the  said
      judgment, in fact, does not lay down any law.  The  case  at  hand  is
      easily distinguishable from the  above,  as  that  was  a  case  where
      seniority and promotion had been granted on  a  notional  basis,  with
      retrospective effect and it was held that the person to whom the  same
      had been granted, was entitled to all consequential benefits.


      30.   Thus,  in  view  of  the  above,  the  appeals  lack  merit  and
      therefore, are accordingly dismissed.



                  ………………………………..……………………..J.
                  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)




                  ……………………………….……………………..J.
                           (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)


    New Delhi,
    November 6, 2012