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Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Section 19. Dissolution of marriage-Court to which petition should be presented-Parties marrying in India under Hindu Law-Husband's petition for dissolution of marriage in Foreign Court-Fraud-Incorrect representation of jurisdictional facts-Husband neither domiciled nor had intention to make the foreign state his home but only technically satisfying the requirement of residence of 90 days for the purpose of obtaining divorce- Divorce decree by foreign court on a ground not available under the 1955 Act-Enforceability of. Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Section 13. Matrimonial dispute-Foreign judgment-When not conclusive. Clause (a)-``Court of competent jurisdiction''-Which is. Clause (b)-Judgment on merits-What is. Clause (c)-Judgment founded on a ground not recognised by Law of India-Effect of. Clause (d)-Judgment obtained in proceedings opposed in principles of natural justice-Effect of-Principles of natural justice-Scope of. Clause (e)-`Fraud'-Scope of-Judgment obtained by fraud- Effect of. Clause (f)-Judgment founded on a breach of law in force in India-Effect of. Section 14-Presumption as to foreign judgments- Expression ``Certified copy of a foreign judgment''-Should be read consistent with requirement of Section 86 of Indian Evidence Act. Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 41-``Competent court''-Which is. 822 Section 63(1)(2), 65(e)(f), 74(1)(iii), 76, 77 and 86. Foreign judgment-Photostat copy-Admissibility of. Private International Law-Matrimonial dispute- Recognition of foreign judgment-Rules for recognition of foreign matrimonial judgment laid down-Hague convention of 1968 on the recognition of divorce and legal separations- Article 10-Judgment Convention of the European Community. Words and phrases ``Residence-Meaning of''. The first appellant and the first respondent were married at Tirupati on 27.2.1975 according to Hindu Law. They separated in July 1978. The appellant-husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in the Sub-Court of Tirupati stating that he was a resident of South Claiborn Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, and that he was a citizen of India and that he and his wife last resided together at New Orleans, Louisiana. Subsequently he filed another petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court St. Louis Country, Missouri, USA alleging that he has been a resident of the State of Missouri for 90 days or more immediately preceding th filing of the petition by refusing to continue to live with the appellant in the US and particularly in the State of Missouri. But from the averments made by him in the petition before the Sub-Judge, Tirupati it was obvious that he and his wife had last resided together at New Orleans, Louisiana and never within the jurisdiction of th Circuit Court of St. Louis Country in the State of Missouri. The respondent-wife filed her reply raising her objections to the maintainability of the petition. She also clearly stated that her reply was without prejudice to her contention that she was not submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. The Circuit Court Missouri assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the 1st Appellant had been a resident of the State of Missouri for 90 days next preceding the commencement of the action in the Court. In the absence of the respondent-wife the Circuit Court, Missouri passed a decree for dissolution of marriage on the only ground that the marriage has irretrievably down. Subsequent to the passing of the decree by the Circuit Court, Missouri, the appellant filed an application for dismissal of his earlier petition before the Sub-Court of Tirupati and the same was dismissed. 823 On 2nd November 1981 the last appellant married appellant No. 2. Thereafter, the 1st-respondent filed a criminal complaint against the appellants for the offence of bigamy. The appellants filed an application for their discharge in view of the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the Circuit Court, Missouri. The Magistrate discharged the appellants by holding that the complainant-wife had failed to make out a prima facie case against the appellants. The respondent preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court which set aside the order of the Magistrate by holding (i) that a photostat copy of the judgment of Missouri Court was not admissible in evidence; (ii) since the Learned Magistrate acted on the photostat copy of the judgment, he was in error in discharging the accused. Accordingly the High Court directed the Magistrate to dispose of the petition filed by the appellants for their discharge afresh in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellants filed appeal in this Court. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The decree dissolving the marriage passed by the foreign court is without jurisdiction according to the Hindu Marriage Act as neither the marriage was celebrated nor the parties last resided together nor the respondent resided within the jurisdiction of that Court. Further, irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one of the grounds recognised by the Act of dissolution of marriage. Hence, the decree of the divorce passed by the foreign court was on a ground unavailable under the Act which is applicable to the marriage. Since with regard to the jurisdiction of the forum as well as the ground on which it is passed the foreign decree in the present case is not in accordance with the Act under which the parties were married, and the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or consented to its passing, it cannot be recognised by the courts in this country and is therefore, unenforceable. [828H, 829A, 828E, 834H, 835A] 2. Residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of obtaining a divorce but habitual residence or residence which is intended to be permanent for future as well. [829E] Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 1971, referred to. 3. The rules of Private International Law in this country are not codified and are scattered in different enactments such as the Civil Procedure Code, the Contract ACt, the Indian Succession Act, the Indian Divorce Act, the Special Marriage Act etc. In addition, some 824 rules have also been evolved by judicial decisions. In matters of status or legal capacity of natural persons, matrimonial disputes, custody of children, adoption, testamentary and intestate succession etc. the problem in this country is complicated by the fact that there exist different personal laws and no uniform rule can be laid down for all citizens. Today more than ever in the past, the need for definitive rules for recognition of foreign judgments in personal and family matters, and particularly in matrimonial disputes has surged to the surface. A large number of foreign decrees in matrimonial matters is becoming the order of the day. A time has, therefore, come to ensure certainty in the recognition of the foreign judgments in these matters. The minimum rules of guidance for securing the certainty need not await legislative initiative. This Court can accomplish the modest job within the frame-work of the present statutory provisions if they are rationally interpreted and extended to achieve the purpose. Though the proposed rules of guidance in this area may prove inadequate or miss some aspects which may not be present to us at this juncture, yet a begining has to be made as best as one can, the lacunae and the errors being left to be filled in and corrected by future judgments. [829H, 830A, 831C, F-H] 4. The relevant provisions of Section 13 of the CPC are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the corner stones of our social life. [832A] 4.1 On an analysis and interpretation of Section 13 of CPC the following rule can be deduced for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows; (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties. [834B-D] 825 5. The High Court erred in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate only on the ground that the photostat copy of the decree was not admissible in evidence. In the instant case photostat copies of the judicial record of the Court of St. Louis is certified for th Circuit Clerk by the Deputy clerk who is a public officer having the custody of the document within the meaning of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act also in the manner required by the provisions of the said section. Hence the photostat copy per se is not inadmissible in evidence. It is inadmissible because it has not further been certified by the representative of our Central Government in the United States as required by Section 86 of the Act. Therefore the document is not admissible in evidence for want of the certificate under Section 86 of the Act and not because it is a photostat copy of the original as held by the High Court. [835B, E, F-G] 6. The Magistrate is directed to proceed with th matter pending before him according to law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four months. [835G] , 1991( 2 )SCR 821, 1991( 3 )SCC 451, 1991( 2 )SCALE1 , 1991( 3 )JT 33


PETITIONER:
Y. NARASIMHA RAO AND ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
Y. VENKATA LAKSHMI AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/07/1991

BENCH:
SAWANT, P.B.
BENCH:
SAWANT, P.B.
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)

CITATION:
 1991 SCR  (2) 821  1991 SCC  (3) 451
 JT 1991 (3) 33  1991 SCALE  (2)1


ACT:
    Hindu  Marriage  Act, 1955: Section 19.  Dissolution  of
marriage-Court to which petition should be presented-Parties
marrying  in  India under Hindu Law-Husband's  petition for
dissolution  of marriage in  Foreign  Court-Fraud-Incorrect
representation of  jurisdictional  facts-Husband   neither
domiciled  nor had intention to make the foreign  state his
home  but  only technically  satisfying the  requirement  of
residence  of 90 days for the purpose of obtaining  divorce-
Divorce decree by foreign court on a ground  not  available
under the 1955 Act-Enforceability of.
    Civil  Procedure  Code, 1908:  Section  13. Matrimonial
dispute-Foreign judgment-When not conclusive.
    Clause (a)-``Court of competent jurisdiction''-Which is.
    Clause (b)-Judgment on merits-What is.
    Clause  (c)-Judgment founded on a ground not  recognised
by Law of India-Effect of.
    Clause  (d)-Judgment obtained in proceedings opposed  in
principles   of natural  justice-Effect  of-Principles  of
natural justice-Scope of.
    Clause (e)-`Fraud'-Scope of-Judgment obtained by  fraud-
Effect of.
    Clause (f)-Judgment founded on a breach of law in  force
in India-Effect of.
    Section   14-Presumption   as  to foreign  judgments-
Expression  ``Certified copy of a foreign  judgment''-Should
be read consistent with requirement of Section 86 of  Indian
Evidence Act.
    Indian   Evidence  Act,  1872.  Section   41-``Competent
court''-Which is.
      822
    Section  63(1)(2), 65(e)(f), 74(1)(iii), 76, 77 and 86.
Foreign judgment-Photostat copy-Admissibility of.
    Private    International Law-Matrimonial    dispute-
Recognition  of foreign judgment-Rules for  recognition  of
foreign matrimonial judgment laid down-Hague convention  of
1968  on  the recognition of divorce and  legal separations-
Article 10-Judgment Convention of the European Community.
    Words and phrases ``Residence-Meaning of''.



HEADNOTE:
    The first appellant  and the  first  respondent were
married at  Tirupati on 27.2.1975 according to Hindu Law.
They  separated in July 1978. The appellant-husband filed  a
petition for dissolution of the marriage in the Sub-Court of
Tirupati  stating that he was a resident of  South  Claiborn
Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, and that he was a citizen of
India and that he and his wife last resided together at New
Orleans,  Louisiana. Subsequently he filed another  petition
for  dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court St.  Louis
Country, Missouri, USA alleging that he has been a  resident
of  the State of Missouri for 90 days or  more immediately
preceding th filing of the petition by refusing to  continue
to live with the appellant in the US and particularly in the
State of Missouri. But from the averments made by him in the
petition before the Sub-Judge, Tirupati it was obvious that
he  and his wife had last resided together at  New  Orleans,
Louisiana  and never within the jurisdiction of th  Circuit
Court of St. Louis Country in the State of Missouri.
    The  respondent-wife  filed  her  reply   raising her
objections to the maintainability of the petition. She also
clearly stated that her reply was without prejudice to her
contention  that she was not submitting to the jurisdiction
of the foreign court.
    The Circuit Court Missouri assumed jurisdiction on the
ground that  the 1st Appellant had been a resident  of the
State of  Missouri  for  90  days  next   preceding the
commencement  of the action in the Court. In the absence  of
the  respondent-wife  the Circuit Court, Missouri  passed  a
decree for dissolution of marriage on the only ground that
the  marriage  has  irretrievably down. Subsequent  to the
passing of the decree by the Circuit Court,  Missouri, the
appellant filed an application for dismissal of his  earlier
petition  before the Sub-Court of Tirupati and the same was
dismissed.
      823
    On 2nd November 1981 the last appellant married appellant
No.  2. Thereafter,  the 1st-respondent  filed a  criminal
complaint against the appellants for the offence of  bigamy.
The  appellants filed an application for their discharge  in
view of the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the
Circuit Court, Missouri.  The Magistrate  discharged the
appellants  by holding that the complainant-wife had  failed
to  make out a prima facie case against the appellants. The
respondent preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the
High  Court which set aside the order of the  Magistrate  by
holding (i)  that  a  photostat copy  of  the judgment  of
Missouri  Court was not admissible in evidence; (ii)  since
the  Learned Magistrate acted on the photostat copy  of the
judgment,  he  was  in error  in  discharging  the  accused.
Accordingly  the  High Court  directed the  Magistrate  to
dispose of the petition filed by the appellants  for  their
discharge  afresh in accordance with law. Aggrieved  by the
decision  of the High Court the appellants filed  appeal  in
this Court.
    Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
    HELD:  1. The decree dissolving the marriage  passed  by
the  foreign court is without jurisdiction according to the
Hindu  Marriage Act as neither the marriage  was  celebrated
nor  the  parties last resided together nor  the  respondent
resided within the jurisdiction of  that  Court.  Further,
irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage is not one  of the
grounds recognised by the Act of dissolution  of  marriage.
Hence, the decree of the divorce passed by the foreign court
was  on a  ground  unavailable under the  Act  which  is
applicable  to the  marriage. Since  with  regard  to the
jurisdiction of the  forum as well as the ground on which it
is  passed the foreign decree in the present case is not  in
accordance  with  the  Act  under  which  the  parties were
married,  and  the  respondent had  not  submitted  to the
jurisdiction  of the court or consented to its passing,  it
cannot be recognised by the courts in this country  and  is
therefore, unenforceable. [828H, 829A, 828E, 834H, 835A]
    2. Residence does not mean a temporary residence for the
purpose of  obtaining a divorce but habitual  residence  or
residence  which is intended to be permanent for  future  as
well. [829E]
    Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 1971, referred
to.
    3. The  rules  of Private International  Law  in this
country are  not codified and are  scattered  in  different
enactments  such as the Civil Procedure Code,  the  Contract
ACt, the Indian Succession Act, the Indian Divorce Act, the
Special Marriage Act etc. In addition, some
      824
rules  have  also  been evolved by  judicial  decisions.  In
matters of  status or legal capacity  of  natural  persons,
matrimonial   disputes, custody  of   children,   adoption,
testamentary  and intestate succession etc. the problem  in
this  country  is complicated by the fact that there  exist
different personal laws and no uniform rule can be laid down
for all citizens. Today more than ever in the past, the need
for definitive rules for recognition of foreign judgments in
personal and family matters, and particularly in matrimonial
disputes  has  surged  to the surface. A  large  number  of
foreign decrees in matrimonial matters is becoming the order
of the day. A time has, therefore, come to ensure  certainty
in  the recognition  of  the  foreign judgments  in  these
matters.  The  minimum rules of guidance  for  securing the
certainty need not await legislative initiative. This  Court
can  accomplish the modest job within the frame-work of the
present  statutory  provisions if  they   are  rationally
interpreted and extended to achieve the purpose. Though the
proposed rules of guidance in this area may prove inadequate
or miss some aspects which may not be present to us at this
juncture, yet a begining has to be made as best as one can,
the  lacunae and the errors being left to be filled  in and
corrected by future judgments. [829H, 830A, 831C, F-H]
    4. The relevant provisions of Section 13 of the CPC are
capable  of  being  interpreted  to  secure  the   required
certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in  conformity
with  public  policy, justice, equity and  good conscience,
and  the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity  of the
institution  of marriage and the unity of family  which are
the corner stones of our social life. [832A]
    4.1 On an analysis and interpretation of Section 13  of
CPC  the  following rule can be deduced for  recognising  a
foreign  matrimonial judgment  in   this   country. The
jurisdiction  assumed  by the foreign court as well  as the
grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance
with   the  matrimonial law under  which  the parties are
married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows; (i)
where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the
respondent  is domiciled  or  habitually  and permanently
resides and the relief is granted on a ground available  in
the  matrimonial  law under which the parties  are  married;
(ii)  where  the  respondent  voluntarily  and effectively
submits to the jurisdiction of the forum and  contests the
claim  which  is  based on a  ground  available  under the
matrimonial  law under which the parties are married;  (iii)
where  the  respondent consents to the grant of the  relief
although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in  accordance
with  the provisions of the matrimonial law of the  parties.
[834B-D]
      825
    5. The High Court erred in setting aside the  order  of
the   learned  Magistrate  only on  the  ground  that the
photostat copy of the decree was not admissible in evidence.
In the instant case photostat copies of the judicial  record
of the Court of St. Louis is certified for th Circuit  Clerk
by  the Deputy clerk who is a public officer having the
custody of the document within the meaning of Section 76  of
the  Indian Evidence Act also in the manner required by the
provisions of the said section. Hence the photostat copy per
se  is not  inadmissible in evidence. It  is inadmissible
because  it   has  not further  been certified   by the
representative of  our Central Government  in the  United
States as required by Section 86 of the Act. Therefore the
document  is  not  admissible in evidence for  want  of the
certificate  under Section 86 of the Act and not because  it
is  a  photostat copy of the original as held  by  the High
Court. [835B, E, F-G]
    6. The Magistrate is directed to proceed with th  matter
pending before him according to law  as  expeditiously  as
possible, preferably within four months. [835G]



JUDGMENT:
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 385
of 1991.
    From  the  Judgment and Order dated  18.4.1988  of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. Revision Petition No.  41
of 1987.
    M.C. Bhandare and Ms. C.K. Sucharita for the Appellants.
    C.N. Sreekumar and G. Prabhakar (for the State) for the
Respondents.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
    SAWANT,  J. Leave is granted. Appeal is taken  oj  board
for final hearing by consent of parties.
    The 1st appellant and the 1st respondent were married ar
Tirupati on February 27, 1975. They separated in July  1978.
The  1st  appellant  filed a  petition for  dissolution  of
marriage in the Circuit of St. Louis Country Missouri, USA.
The 1st respondent sent her reply from here under  protest.
The  Circuit  Court  passed  a decree for  dissolution  of
marriage  on  February 19, 1980 in the absence of  the 1st
respondent.
      826
    2. The 1st appellant had earlier filed a  petition for
dissolution  of marriage in the Sub-Court of Tirupati  being
O.P. No. 87/86. In that petition, the 1st appellant filed an
application  for dismissing the same as not pressed in view
of   the decree passed by the Missouri Court. On August 14,
1991  the  learned  sub-Judge  of  Tirupati  dismissed the
petition.
    3. On November 2, 1981, the 1st appellant married the
2nd  appellant in  Yadgirigutta,  1st respondent  filed  a
criminal complaint against the appellants for the offence of
bigamy. It is not necessary to refer to the details of the
proceedings in the said complaint. Suffice it to say that in
that  complaint,  the appellants filed an  application for
their  discharge  in view of the decree for  dissolution  of
marriage  passed  by  Missouri Court. By  this judgment  of
October 21,  1986, the learned Magistrate  discharged the
appellants  holding  that  the complainant,  i.e.,  the 1st
respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case against
the   appellants.  Against  the said  decision,   the 1st
respondent   preferred a Criminal Revision Petition  to the
High  Court and the High Court by the impugned decision  of
April 18, 1987 set aside the order of the magistrate holding
that a photostat copy of the judgment of the Missouri  Court
was  not admissible in evidence to prove the dissolution  of
marriage.  The Court further held that since the  learned
Magistrate  acted on the photostat copy, he was in error  in
discharging  the  accused  and directed the  Magistrate  to
dispose of  the  petition  filed  by  the  accused,   i.e.,
appellants herein for their discharge, afresh in  accordance
with law. It is aggrieved by this decision that the  present
appeal is filed.
    4. It is necessary to note certain facts relating to the
decree of  dissolution of marriage passed  by the  Circuit
Court  of  St. Louis Country Missouri, USA.  In  the  first
instance, the Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter  on
the ground that the 1st appellant had been a resident of the
State of   Missouri  for  90 days  next   preceding the
commencement of the action and that petition in that  Court.
Secondly, the decree has been passed on the only ground that
there  remains no reasonable likelihood that  the  marriage
between the parties can be preserved, and that the  marriage
is,  therefore, irretrievably broken''.  Thirdly,  the 1st
respondent  had not submitted to the  jurisdiction  of the
Court. From the record, it appears that to the petition she
had  filed two replies of the same date. Both are  identical
in  nature  except that one of the replies  begins  with  an
additional  averment as follows: ``without prejudice to the
contention  that  this respondent is not submitting  to the
jurisdiction of this hon'ble court, this respondent sub-
      827
mits as follows''. She had also stated in the replies, among
other  things, that (i) the petition was  not  maintainable,
(ii)  she  was not aware if the first appellant  had been
living in the State of Missouri for more than 90  days and
that he was entitled to file the petition before the  Court,
(iii)  the  parties were Hindus and governed by Hindu Law,
(iv) she was an Indian citizen and was not governed by laws
in force in the State of Missouri and , therefore, the Court
had  no jurisdiction  to entertain the petition,  (v) the
dissolution of the marriage between the parties was governed
by the Hindu Marriage Act and that it could not be dissolved
in any other way except as provided under the said Act, (vi)
the  Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the  foreign laws
and  none  of  the  grounds  pleaded  in  the  petition was
sufficient   to grant any divorce under the  Hindu  Marriage
Act.
    Fourthly, it is not disputed that the 1st respondent was
neither present  nor represented in the  Court passed the
decree in  her absence. In fact, the Court  has  in  terms
observed  that it had  no jurisdiction ``in personam'' over
the respondent or minor child which was born out of the wed-
lock  and both of them had domiciled in India. Fifthly,  in
the  petition which was filed by the 1st appellant  in that
Court on October 6, 1980, besides alleging that he had been
a  resident  of the State of Missouri for 90  days  or more
immediately preceding the filing of the petition and he was
then  residing at 23rd Timber View Road, Kukwapood,  in the
Country of St. Louis, Missouri, he had also alleged that the
1st  respondent had deserted him for one year or  more next
preceding the filing of the petition by refusal to  continue
to  live  with the  appellant in  the United States and
particularly  in the State of Missouri. On the other  hand,
the averments made by him in his petition filed in the court
of the Subordinate Judge, Tirupati in 1978 shows that he was
a  resident  of Apartment No. 414,  6440,  South  Claiborn
Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States and  that  he
was a citizen of India. He had given for the service of all
notices and processes in the petition, the address  of his
counsel Shri  PR  Ramachandra Rao,  Advocate,  16-11-1/3,
Malakpet, Hyderabad-500 036. Even according to his averments
in   the said petition, the 1st respondent had resided with
him  at Kuppanapudi  for  about 4  to 5  months  after  th
marriage.  Thereafter she had gone to her parental house  at
Relangi,  Tanuka  Taluk,  West Godawari District.  He was,
thereafter,  sponsored by his friend Prasad for a  placement
in  the medical service in the United States and  had  first
obtained employment in Chicago and thereafter in Oak  Forest
and  Greenville Springs  and  ultimately  in  the   Charity
Hospital  in Louisiana at New Orleans where he continued  to
be emp-
      828
loyed. Again  according  to  the  averments  in  the said
petition,  when the 1st respondent joined him in the  United
States, both of them had stayed together as husband and wife
at New Orleans. The 1st respondent left his residence in New
Orleans and went first to Jackson, Texas and, thereafter, to
Chicago to  stay at the residence of  his  friend,  Prasad.
Thereafter  she left Chicago for India. Thus it is  obvious
from  these  averments in the petition that  both  the 1st
respondent and the 1st petitioner had last resided  together
at New Orleans, Louisiana and never within  the jurisdiction
of  the Circuit Court of St. Louis Country in the  State  of
Missouri. The averments to that effect in the petition filed
before the St. Louis Court are obviously incorrect.
    5. Under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(hereinafter  referred to as the ``Act'') only the  District
Court  within  the  local limits  of  whose  original  civil
jurisdiction  (i) the marriage was solemnized, or  (ii) the
respondent, at the time of the presentation of the  petition
resides, or (iii) the parties to  the marriage last  resided
together, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time  of
the  presentation  of  the petition, in a  case  where the
respondent is, at the time, residing outside the territories
to which the Act extends, or has not been heard of as  being
alive  for a period of seven years of more by those  persons
who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive, has
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Circuit Court of
St. Louis Country, Missouri had, therefore, no jurisdiction
to  entertain the petition according to the Act under  which
admittedly the parties were married. Secondly, irretrievable
breakdown  of marriage is not one of the grounds  recognised
by the Act for dissolution of marriage. Hence, the decree of
divorce passed by  the  foreign  court  was  on  a  ground
unavailable under the Act.
    6. Under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908
(hereinafter  referred to  as the  ``Code''), a   foreign
judgment  is  not  conclusive  as  to  any  matter   thereby
directly adjudicated upon between the parties if (a) it has
not  been pronounced by a  Court of competent  jurisdiction;
(b) it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c)  it
is  founded on an incorrect view of international law  or  a
refusal to recognize the law of India in cases in which such
law  is applicable;  (d) the  proceedings  are opposed  to
natural justice,  (e) it  is obtained by  fraud,  (f)  it
sustains  a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in
India.
    7. As pointed out above, the present decree  dissolving
the  marriage  passed  by  the foreign court is   without
jurisdiction  according to the Act as neither  the  marriage
was celebrated nor the parties last
      829
resided together  nor the respondent resided within the
jurisdiction  of that Court. The decree is also passed on  a
ground which  is  not available under the  Act  which  is
applicable to the marriage. What is further, the decree has
been  obtained by the 1st appellant by stating that  he was
the  resident  of the Missouri State when the  record  shows
that he was only a bird of passage there and was  ordinarily
a  resident  of the State of Louisiana. He had, if  at all,
only  technically satisfied the requirement of residence  of
ninety days with the only purpose of obtaining the  divorce.
He  was  neither  domiciled in that State  nor had  he  an
intention  to make it his home. He had also  no substantial
connection  with  the forum. The 1st appellant has  further
brought no rules on record under which the St. Louis  Court
could assume jurisdiction over the matter. On the  contrary,
as pointed out earlier, he has in his petition made a  false
averment that the 1st respondent had refused to continue  to
stay  with him in the State of Missouri where she had  never
been.  In the absence of the rules of jurisdiction  of that
court, we  are not aware whether the residence of  the 1st
respondent  within  the State of Missouri was  necessary  to
confer jurisdiction  on  that court, and  if  not,  of the
reasons for making the said averment.
    8. Relying on a decision of this Court in Smt. Satya  v.
Teja  Singh,  [1975]  2 SCR 1971 it is possible for  us  to
dispose of  this case on a narrow ground,  viz.,  that the
appellant played a fraud on the foreign court residence does
not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of  obtaining
a  divorce  but habitual residence or residence  which  is
intended to be permanent for future as well. We remain from
adopting  that course in the present case because  there  is
nothing on record to assure us that the Court of St.  Louis
does  not  assume jurisdiction only on the basis of  a mere
temporary residence of the appellant for 90 days even is such
residence is for the purpose of obtaining divorce. We would,
therefore,  presume that the foreign court by its own  rules
of  jurisdiction  had rightly entertained  the dispute and
granted a valid decree of divorce according to its law. The
larger question that we would like to address ourselves  to
is  whether even  in such cases, the Courts in this  country
should recognise the foreign divorce decrees.
    9. The  rules  of Private International  Law  in this
country are  not codified and are  scattered  in  different
enactments  such as the Civil Procedure Code,  the  Contract
Act, the Indian Succession Act, the Indian Divorce Act, the
Special Marriage Act etc. In addition, some rules have also
been evolved by judicial decisions. In matters of status  or
legal  capacity of natural persons,  matrimonial  disputes,
custody of
      830
children,  adoption, testamentary and  intestate  succession
etc. the problem in this country is complicated by the fact
that there exist different personal laws and no uniform rule
can  be laid down for all citizens. The distinction  between
matters which concern personal and family affairs and  those
which concern commercial relationships, civil wrongs etc. is
well  recognised in other countries and legal  systems. The
law in the former area tends to be primarily determined and
influenced  by social, moral and  religious  considerations,
and  public  policy plays a special and important   role  in
shaping  it.  Hence,  in  almost  all the  countries the
jurisdicational procedural and substantive rules which are
applied to disputes arising in this area are  significantly
different from those applied to claims in other areas. That
is  as it  ought  to be. For, no  country  can  afford  to
sacrifice its internal unity, stability and tranquility for
the sake of  uniformity of rules and comity of nations which
considerations are important and appropriate to  facilitate
international  trade,  commerce,  industry,   communication,
transport,  exchange of services, technology, manpower etc.
This glaring fact of national life has been recognised both
by  the Hague Convention of 1968  on the  Recognition  of
Divorce and Legal Seperations as well as by  the  Judgments
Convention  of the  European Community of  the same  year.
Article 10 of the Hague Convention expressly provides that
the contracting States may refuse to recognise a divorce  or
legal separation   if such  recognition   is  manifestly
incompatible   with  their  public  policy.  The   Judgments
Convention of the European Community expressly excludes from
its  scope (a) status or legal capacity of natural  persons,
(b)  rights  in property  arising  out of  a matrimonial
relationship, (c) wills and succession, (d) social  security
and  (e) bankruptcy. A separate convention  was contemplated
for the last of the subjects.
    10. We are in the present case concerned only with the
matrimonial  law and what we state here will apply  strictly
to  matters  arising  out of and  ancillary  to matrimonial
disputes.  The Courts in this country have so far  tried  to
follow in  these  matters  the English  rules of  Private
International  Law  whether common law rules  or  statutory
rules. The dependence on English Law even in matters  which
are  purely  personal, has  however  time  and again been
regretted.  But nothing much has been done  to remedy the
situation.  The labours of the Law Commission poured in its
65th  Report on this very subject have not fructified  since
April  1976,  when  the Report was  submitted.  Even the
British were circumspect and hesitant to apply their   rules
of  law in  such matters during their governance  of this
country and had left the family law to be governed  by the
customary rules of the diffe-
      831
rent communities. It is only where was a  void that they had
stepped in by enactments such as the Special Marriage Act,
Indian Divorce Act, Indian Succession Act etc.  In  spite,
however, of more than  43 years of independence we find that
the  legislature  has not thought it fit to enact  rules  of
Private International Law in this area and in the absence of
such  initiative  from the legislature the  courts  in this
country their inspiration,  as stated earlier,  from the
English rules. Even in doing so they have not been  uniform
in  practice with the result that we have  some conflicting
decisions in the area.
    11. We cannot also lose sight of the  fact that  today
more   than ever in the past, the need for definitive  rules
for recognition of foreign judgments in personal and  family
matters, and particularly in matrimonial disputes has surged
to  the surface.  Many a man and woman of  this  land with
different  personal laws have migrated and are migrating  to
different  countries  either to make their  permanent  abode
there  or  for temporary residence. Likewise there  is also
immigration  of the  nationals of  other  countries. The
advancement  in communication and transportation  has also
made it easier for individuals to hop from one country  to
another.  It is also not unusual to come across cases  where
citizens  of  this country have been  contracting  marriages
either in  this  country or abroad with  nationals  of the
other countries or among themselves, or having married here,
either both or one of them migrate to other countries. There
are  also cases where parties having married here have been
either domiciled or residing separately in different foreign
countries. This migration, temporary or permanent, has also
been  giving rise to various kinds of  matrimonial  disputes
destroying  in its turn the family  and its peace.  A  large
number of foreign decrees in matrimonial matters is becoming
the  order  of the recognition of the foreign  judgments  in
these  matters. The minimum rules of guidance  for  securing
the  certainty need not await legislative  initiative. This
Court can accomplish  the modest job within the framework of
the  present  statutory provisions if they  are  rationally
interpreted and extended to achieve the purpose. It is with
this  intention that we are undertaking  this venture.  We
aware  that  unaided and left solely to our  resources the
rules of guidance which we propose to lay down in this area
may  prove inadequate or miss some aspects which may not  be
present to  us at this juncture. But a begining has  to  be
made  as best as one can, the lacunae and the  errors  being
left to be filled in and corrected by future judgments.
      832
    12. We believe that the relevant provisions of  Section
13  of the Code are capable of being interpreted  to  secure
the required certainty in the sphere  of this branch of law
in  conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good
conscience,  and  the rules so  evolved  will protect  th
sanctity  of  the institution of marriage and the  unity  of
family which are the corner stones of our societal life.
    Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign  judgment
shall  not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by  a
court  of  competent jurisdiction. We are of the  view that
this  clause  should be interpreted to mean that  only that
court  will be a court of competent jurisdiction  which the
Act  or the  law  under  which the  parties  are   married
recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain
the  matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held  to
be   a court  without jurisdiction  unless  both   parties
voluntarily  and unconditionally subject themselves  to the
jurisdiction  of  that court. The  expression ``competent
court'' in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to
be construed likewise.
    Clause  (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign has
not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this
country  will not  recognise such  judgment. This  clause
should be interpreted to mean (a) that the  decision of the
foreign court should be on a ground available under the law
under  which  the  parties are married, and  (b)  that the
decision   should  be a result of the  contest between the
parties.  The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the
respondent    is   duly  served   and  voluntarily and
unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction
of  the  court and contests the claim, or  agrees  to the
passing of  the decree with or without appearance.  A mere
filing of the reply to the claim under protest and  without
submitting  to the  jurisdiction  of  the   court,   or  an
appearance  in the  Court either in  person  or  through  a
representative for  objecting to the  jurisdiction  of the
Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits
of  the case. In this respect the  general  rules  of the
acquiescence to the  jurisdiction of the Court which may be
valid  in  other  matters and areas should  be ignored and
deemed inappropriate.
    The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that
where  the  judgment is founded on a  refusal  to  recognise
the  law  of  this country in cases in which  such  law  is
applicable,  the  judgment  will not be recognised  by the
courts in this country. The marriages which take  place  in
this  country can only be under either the customary or the
statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law
that can be applicable
      833
to  the matrimonial  disputes is the one  under  which the
parties are married, and no other law. When,  therefore,  a
foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on  ground
not  recognised by such law, it is a judgment which  is  in
defiance  of  the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive  of the
matters adjudicated therein and therefore, unenforceable  in
this  country. For the same reason, such a  judgment will
also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13,  since
such  a judgment  would  obviously  be in  breach  of the
matrimonial law in force in this country.
    Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign  judgment
unenforceable on th ground that the proceedings in which  it
is  obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more
than  an elementary principle on which any civilised  system
of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the  family
law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has  to
b  extended to mean something more than mere compliance with
the  technical rules  of procedure. If the  rule  of audi
alteram  partem  has  any meaning  with  reference  to the
proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule
it  should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has
been  duly  served  with the process of the  court.  It  is
necessary  to  ascertain  whether the respondent  was  in  a
position  to  present or  represent  himself/herself and
contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement
should apply  equally to the appellate proceedings  if and
when they are file by either party. If the foreign court has
not  ascertained  and  ensured such  effective contest  by
requiring  the petitioner to make all  necessary  provisions
for the respondent to defend including the costs of  travel,
residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held
that  the  proceedings are in breach of the  principles  of
natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the
rules of Private International Law of some countries insist,
even in commercial matters, that the action should be  filed
in  the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or  is
habitually  resident. It is only in special cases  which  is
called special jurisdiction where the claim has  some real
link  with  other  forum that a judgment of  such  forum  is
recognised. This jurisdiction principle is also  recognised
by the Judgments Convention of this European Community . If,
therefore,  the courts in this country also  insist  as   a
matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment  will  be
recognised  only it it is of the forum where the  respondent
is  domiciled  or habitually and  permanently  resides, the
provisions of clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied.
    The provision   of clause (e)  of  Section  13  which
requires that the
      834
courts in this country will not recognise a foreign judgment
if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident.  However,
in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja
Singh, (supra) it must be understood that the fraud need not
be only in relation to the merits of the mater but may also
be in relation to jurisdictional facts.
     13.  From the aforesaid discussion the  following rule
can be deduced for recognising foreign matrimonial  judgment
in  this country.  The jurisdiction assumed by the  foreign
court as well as the grounds on which the relief is  granted
must  be in accordance with the matrimonial law under  which
the parties are married.  The exceptions to this rule may be
as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the
forum  where  the respondent is domiciled or habitually and
permanently  resides and the relief is granted on  a  ground
available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are
married;   (ii)  where the  respondent   voluntarily and
effectively  submits  to the jurisdiction of  the  forum  as
discussed  above and contests the claim which is  based on a
ground available under the matrimonial law under which the
parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents  to
the  grant  of the relief although the jurisdiction  of the
forum  is  not in accordance with  the provisions  of the
matrimonial law of the parties.
     The  aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the
merit of being just and equitable.  It does no injustice  to
any of the parties.  The parties do and ought to know their
rights and obligations when they marry under  a  particular
law.   They  cannot be heard to make a grievance  about  it
later  or  allowed  to bypass it by subterfuges as  in the
present case. The rule also has an advantage of  rescuing
the  institution of marriage from the uncertain maze of the
rules  of  the Private International Law  of  the  different
countries  with regard to jurisdiction  and  merits  based
variously  on domicile, nationality, residence-permanent  or
temporary  or  ad hoc forum, proper law etc.  and  ensuring
certainty  in  the  most vital field of national  life and
conformity  with  public  policy.  The rule  further  takes
account of the needs of modern life and makes due  allowance
to  accommodate them. Above all, it  gives  protection  to
women, the most vulnerable section of our society,  whatever
the strata to which they may belong.  In particular it frees
them  from  the bondage of the tyrannical and  servile rule
that wife's domicile follows that of her husband and that it
is  the husband's  domicilliary law  which  determines the
jurisdiction and judges the merits of the case.
     14. Since with regard to the jurisdiction of the  forum
as  well  as the ground on which it is passed the  foreign
decree in the present case
      835
is  not in accordance with the Act under which the  parties
were  married, and the respondent had not submitted  to the
jurisdiction  of the court or consented to its passing,  it
cannot be recognised by the courts in this country and is,
therefore, unenforceable.
     15.  The High Court, as stated earlier, set  aside the
order of the learned Magistrate only on the ground that the
photostat copy of the decree was not admissible in evidence.
The  High  Court  is not correct in  its  reasoning.   Under
Section 74(1)(iii) of the Indian Evidence  Act (Hereinater
referred  to  as the "Act") documents forming  the  acts  or
records of the acts of public judicial officers of a foreign
country are public documents. Under Section 76  read with
Section 77 of the Act, certified copies of  such  documents
may be produced in proof of their contents.  However,  under
Section 86 of the Act there is presumption with  regard  to
the genuineness and accuracy of such certified copy only if
it  is also  certified by the representative of our  Central
Government  in or for that country that the manner in  which
it has been certified is commonly in use in that country for
such certification.
     Section  63(1) and (2) read with Section 65(e) and (f)
of the Act permits certified copies and copies made from the
original  by mechanical process to be tendered as  secondary
evidence.   A  photostat copy is prepared  by  a  mechanical
process which in  itself  ensures  the  accuracy  of the
original.   The present photostat copies  of  the  judicial
record of  the Court of St. Louis  is certified  for the
Circuit Clerk by the Deputy Clerk who is a  public  officer
having the  custody of the document within the meaning  of
Section 76 of the Act and also in the manner  required  by
the  provisions of the said section.  Hence  the  Photostat
copy  per  se  is  not inadmissible  in  evidence.   It  is
inadmissible because it has not further been certified by the
representative of  our Central Government   in the  United
States as required by Section 86 of the Act.  The expression
"certified copy" of a foreign judgment in Section 14 of the
Code  has  to  be read consistent with the  requirement  of
Section 86 of the Act.
     16. While, therefore, holding that the document is not
admissible  in evidence for want of the  certificate  under
Section 86 of the Act and not because it is a photostat copy
of  the original as held by the High Court, we uphold the
order  of  the High Court also on a  more  substantial and
larger ground as stated in paragraph 14 above. Accordingly,
we  dismiss the appeal and direct the learned Magistrate  to
proceed with the matter pending before him according to law
as expenditiously as possible, preferably within four months
from now as the prosecution is already a decade old.
T.N.A.    Appeal dismissed.
      836