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Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920), s. 4--Whether Insolvency Court can go behind decree. 1099 Jyoti Parshad was indebted to the Bank of Patiala. As he could not pay the debt, he asked the Bank in 1952 to allow him to pay the same in instalments and the Bank agreed. Rattan Singh, Respondent stood surety to the extent of Rs. 2 lacs and entered into a contract of guarantee with the Bank to discharge the liability of Jyoti Parshad to the extent of Rs. 2 lacs in case of default by Jyoti Parshad. A deed of guarantee was also executed. As Jyoti Parshad did not pay, the Bank started proceedings against Rattan Singh under the Act. The Managing Director of the Bank dismissed the objections raised by Rattan Singh. The Board of Directors dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed a petition in the Court of the Insolvency Judge praying for adjudication of Rattan Singh Respondent as insolvent on account of his transfer of his houses and agricultural lands without consideration to his wife and two sons within 3 months of the petition with intent to defeat and delay his creditor Bank having full knowledge of his liability towards the State. The contention of the Respondent was that he did not stand surety and that the impugned transfer of lands and houses was made on account of natural love and affection for his wife. The insolvency petition was dismissed by the Insolvency Judge on the ground that the Respondent had not executed a deed of guarantee. The appellant went in appeal to the District Judge but the appeal was dismissed. The revision was also dismissed by the High Court. The appellant came to this court after obtaining special leave. The contentions of the appellant before this court were that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine matters which could be determined by the Head of the Department under the provisions of the Act, that the Head of the Department in the exercise of the powers conferred under s. 4 on him could not only determine the amount due from the defaulter but also could determine whether the alleged defaulter was really a defaulter or not and that in view of s. 1 1 of the Act, a civil court could not determine the question of the liability of the alleged defaulter to pay the debt demanded from him. The contentions of the Respondent were that the Head of the Department could only determine the amount of debt due from a person alleged to be a defaulter but could not determine whether that person was defaulter or not and even if the Head of the Department could determine the liability of the alleged defaulter to pay the debt, the jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court itself to decide whether the debt was due from the alleged debtor sought to be declared insolvent was not ousted by the provisions of s. II of the Act and that the Insolvency Court was not a civil court. Dismissing the appeal, Held : The provisions of s. 4 of the Act empower the Head of department to determine not only the amount of State dues recoverable but also the liability of the alleged defaulter to pay those debts. In view of the provisions of s. 11 of the Act, no civil court has jurisdiction to determine the amount of State 1100 dues recoverable and the liability of the alleged defaulter to pay that amount. Such powers were however possessed by the Insolvency Court. In the present case, the Insolvency Court had found that the Respondent had not executed the surety bond and therefore, was not liable to make good any payment under it. The order of the Insolvency Judge dismissing the insolvency petition was correct. An insolvency court can go behind a decree and probe into the genuineness of the debt on which it is founded. Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353, Kanshi Ram v. The State of Punjab, I.L.R. [1961] 2 Punjab 823, Ex parte Kibble. In re Onslow, (1875) 10 Ch. A.C. 373, Ex parte Lennox. In re Lennox (1885), 16 Q.B.D 315, In re Freser, Ex parte Central Bank of London, [1892] 2 Q.B.D 633, In re Van Laun, Ex parte Chatterton, [1907] 2 KB 23, In re Van Laun Ex parte Pattullo, [1907] 1 KB 155, Narasimha Sastri v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1930 Madras 751 and Sadhu Ram v. Kishori Lal A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 148, referred to. The Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act (Act IV of 2002 BK), ss. 4 and 11-- Scope of-Civil Court-Jurisdiction to decide if a person is defaulter. 1964 AIR 1223, 1964( 5 )SCR1098, , ,


PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
S. RATTAN SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
16/12/1963

BENCH:
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
BENCH:
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SUBBARAO, K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:
 1964 AIR 1223  1964 SCR  (5)1098


ACT:
The Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act (Act IV of 2002 BK),
ss.  4 and 11-- Scope of-Civil Court-Jurisdiction to  decide
if a person is defaulter.



HEADNOTE:
Provincial  Insolvency Act  (5 of  1920),  s.  4--Whether
Insolvency Court can go behind decree.
1099
Jyoti  Parshad was indebted to the Bank of Patiala.   As  he
could  not pay the debt, he asked the Bank in 1952 to  allow
him  to pay the same in instalments and  the  Bank  agreed.
Rattan Singh, Respondent stood surety to the extent of Rs. 2
lacs and entered into a contract of guarantee with the Bank
to discharge the liability of Jyoti Parshad to the extent of
Rs.  2 lacs in case of default by Jyoti Parshad.  A deed  of
guarantee was also executed.  As Jyoti Parshad did not pay,
the Bank started proceedings against Rattan Singh under the
Act.   The  Managing  Director of  the Bank  dismissed the
objections  raised by Rattan Singh.  The Board of  Directors
dismissed the appeal.  The appellant filed a petition in the
Court  of the Insolvency Judge praying for  adjudication  of
Rattan Singh  Respondent  as insolvent on  account  of his
transfer  of  his  houses  and agricultural  lands  without
consideration  to his wife and two sons within 3  months  of
the  petition with intent to defeat and delay  his  creditor
Bank  having  full knowledge of his  liability towards the
State. The contention of the Respondent was that he did not
stand  surety  and that the impugned transfer of  lands and
houses was made on account of natural love and affection for
his  wife.   The insolvency petition was  dismissed  by the
Insolvency  Judge on the ground that the Respondent had not
executed a deed of guarantee.  The appellant went in  appeal
to  the District Judge but the appeal was  dismissed. The
revision  was  also  dismissed by  the High  Court. The
appellant came to this court after obtaining special leave.
The contentions of the appellant before this court were that
the  Civil  Court had no jurisdiction to  determine  matters
which  could  be determined by the Head of  the  Department
under  the  provisions of the Act, that  the  Head  of the
Department in the exercise of the powers conferred under  s.
4  on him could not only determine the amount due  from the
defaulter  but also  could determine  whether the  alleged
defaulter was really a defaulter or not and that in view  of
s.  1  1 of the Act, a civil court could not  determine the
question  of the liability of the alleged defaulter  to pay
the  debt  demanded  from  him.  The  contentions  of the
Respondent  were that the Head of the Department could only
determine the amount of debt due from a person alleged to be
a defaulter but could not determine whether that person was
defaulter  or  not and even if the Head of  the  Department
could  determine the liability of the alleged  defaulter  to
pay  the  debt, the jurisdiction of  the  Insolvency  Court
itself to decide whether the debt was due from the  alleged
debtor sought to be declared insolvent was not ousted by the
provisions of s. II of the Act and that the Insolvency Court
was not a civil court. Dismissing the appeal,
Held : The provisions of s. 4 of the Act empower the Head of
department  to determine not only the amount of State dues
recoverable but also the liability of the alleged  defaulter
to  pay those debts.  In view of the provisions of s. 11  of
the  Act, no civil court has jurisdiction to  determine the
amount of State
1100
dues recoverable and the liability of the alleged  defaulter
to  pay that amount.  Such powers were however possessed  by
the  Insolvency Court. In the present case, the  Insolvency
Court  had  found that the Respondent had not  executed the
surety bond and therefore, was not liable to make good any
payment under it.   The  order  of  the  Insolvency  Judge
dismissing   the  insolvency  petition was   correct.  An
insolvency  court can go behind a decree and probe into the
genuineness of the debt on which it is founded.
Lachhman  Dass v.  State of Punjab, [1963]  2 S.C.R. 353,
Kanshi Ram v. The State of Punjab, I.L.R. [1961]  2  Punjab
823,  Ex  parte Kibble. In re Onslow, (1875) 10  Ch. A.C.
373, Ex parte Lennox.  In re Lennox (1885), 16 Q.B.D 315, In
re  Freser, Ex parte Central Bank of London, [1892] 2  Q.B.D
633, In re Van Laun, Ex parte Chatterton, [1907] 2 KB 23, In
re  Van Laun Ex parte Pattullo, [1907] 1 KB  155,  Narasimha
Sastri v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1930 Madras 751
and Sadhu Ram v. Kishori Lal A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 148,  referred
to.



JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order  dated
May 14, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision No.
404 of 1957.
S.   V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of India, D.D.
Chaudhuri and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the appellant.
M.C.  Setalvad, S.N. Andley, and Rameshwar  Nath,  for the
respondent.
December 16, 1963.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered
by
RAGHUBAR  DAYAL J.-This appeal, by  special  leave,  raises
mainly the question whether the Insolvency Court can, at the
hearing of a petition by a creditor for declaring a  debtor
insolvent, determine the liability of the alleged debtor for
the  payment  of  the debt for the  recovery  of  which the
creditor had obtained an order under the Patiala Recovery of
State  Dues  Act, 2002 BK (Act IV of 2002  BK), hereinafter
called the Act.  To appreciate how the question  arises  on
the  facts of the case, reference to the provisions  of the
Act is necessary, and we set them out first.
The  Act  was  enacted to consolidate and  amend  the law
relating to the recovery of State dues. According
1101
to  cl. (1) of s. 3 'State dues' included debts due  to the
Patiala State Bank.  The expression  'department'  includes
the Patiala State Bank, and the expression 'defaulter' means
a person from whom State dues are due and includes a  person
who  is responsible as surety for the payment of  any such
dues. 'Head of department' means, among other things, the
Managing  Director  in the case of the Patiala State  Bank.
Chapter 11  purported to deal with determination  of  State
dues  and modes of recovery thereof.  Section 4 which  falls
in  this Chapter provides that the head of department  shall
determine in the prescribed manner the exact amount of State
dues  recoverable  by  his department  from  the  defaulter.
Section 5  lays down the modes for the recovery  of  State
dues. Section 6  provides  for  the transmission  of   a
certificate as to the amount of State dues recoverable from
the defaulter to the Nazim and to the Accountant-General and
its sub-s. (2) is:
     "A certificate transmitted under the preceding
     sub-section  shall be conclusive proof of the
     matters  stated therein and the Nazim  or the
     Accountant-General  shall not  question the
     validity of  the certificate  or  hear any
     objections  of the defaulter as to the  amount
     of State dues mentioned in the certificate  or
     as  to the liability of the defaulter  to pay
     such dues."
     Section  10 provides that no action  shall  be
     taken  by the Nazim or the  Accountant-General
     on  a  certificate coming from  the  Managing
     Director, unless it is sent to him within the
     period   of  limitation  specified   in that
     section. Section 11 reads:
     "No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in any
     matter  which the head of department,  or any
     authority or officer authorised by the head of
     department  is  empowered by this Act  or the
     rules  made thereunder to dispose of, or take
     cognizance  of  the manner in which  any such
     head of department, or authority, or  officer,
     exercises any powers vested in him or it by or
     under this Act or the rules made thereunder."
1102
Section 12  empowers the Government of the  State  to make
rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
Act.   Sub-s. (2) thereof states that the rules may  provide
the  manner  in which the amount of  State  dues  shall  be
determined by a head of department.
The  Patiala Recovery of State Dues Rules, 2002 hereinafter
called the  rules, lay down the mode  of  determination  of
State  dues  in rr. 3 to 7. Rule 3  requires  the  head  of
department  to serve a notice on the  defaulter  specifying
therein the  amount of State dues and from whom  such dues
were recoverable and shall require the defaulter to pay such
dues  on or before a specified date or to appear before the
authority specified therein (called the Inquiry Officer) and
present a  written  statement of  his defence.   If the
defaulter  appears  and pays the amount of State  dues, the
head  of department issues a receipt to him, under r. 4 and
the  matter  is closed.   If he  does not  appear  on the
specified date and the Inquiry Officer be satisfied that the
notice has  been duly served, he may proceed ex  parte and
determine  by  order  in writing the amount  of State dues
recoverable  from  him.'  The  order is to  be subject  to
confirmation  by  the head of department.   If the  Enquiry
Officer is not so satisfied another notice is issued to the
defaulter.
Rule 6 provides that where the defaulter appears on the date
fixed in the notice and presents his written statement, the
head of department, or the Inquiry Officer, as the case may
be, shall examine the objections of the defaulter stated  in
written statement in the light of the relevant records  of
the  department and  shall  then,  by order  in   writing,
determine finally the exact amount of State dues recoverable
from  such defaulter.  The Inquiry Officer is to submit his
report to  the head of department before the  latter  shall
finally determine the State dues recoverable.
Rule 7 provides that if the defaulter does not pay the State
dues  within the period specified in that rule, the head  of
department may proceed to recover
 1103
them  through the Nazim or the Accountant-General  or  both.
Rule  8 provides for appeal by the  defaulter against the
orders passed under  rr. 5 or 6. Rule 9  provides  for  a
revision  by the defaulter in case his appeal is  dismissed.
Rule 12 provides that the appellate or revisional  authority
may pass such order in appeal or revision as it thinks fit.
The facts of the case may be briefly stated now.
One Jyoti Parshad, proprietor of M/s.  Ralla Ram Jai  Gopal,
a  firm at Patiala, was indebted to the  Bank of  Patiala.
Being unable to pay the debt of rupees 5 lacs, Jyoti Parshad
approached  the Bank in 1952 with a request to forbear from
recovering  the amount just then all at once and grant time
and  allow him to pay the amount in instalments.   The Bank
agreed. In pursuance of the agreement between Jyoti Parshad
and the Bank, Sardar Rattan Singh, respondent, stood  surety
to  the extent of Rs. 2 lacs and entered into a contract  of
guarantee with the Bank to discharge the liability of  Jyoti
Parshad to the extent of rupees 2 lacs in case of  default.
He executed a deed of guarantee on July 1, 1952.  When Jyoti
Parshad made default in payment of the requisite amount, the
Bank started proceedings for the recovery of its dues  under
the Act against Rattan Singh, the defaulter under its terms.
On May 26, 1955, the Managing Director of the Bank dismissed
the  objections Rattan Singh had  raised  by his  written
statement  and held  him  liable  for the  amount  he had
undertaken  to pay under the surety bond.  An appeal by him
to  the Board of Directors was dismissed  on  December 24,
1955.
Meanwhile,  on May 10, 1955 during the proceedings  for the
recovery  of  the debt under the Act, the State of  Patiala
filed  a petition in the Court of the Sab-Judge,  1st  Class
(Insolvency Court) Patiala, praying for the adjudication  of
Rattan Singh, respondent, an insolvent on account  of his
transferring  all  his houses at  Patiala  and agricultural
lands  at Sunihal Heri and Patiala without consideration  to
his wife
1104
and two sons within three months of the petition with intent
to defeat and delay his creditor-Bank having full  knowledge
of his liability towards the State.
By his written statement dated June 16, 1955 the  respondent
denied having stood surety or having signed  the  deed  of
guarantees  and stated that he was not liable to  the  State
and that the impugned transfers of land and houses were made
on  account of natural love and affection for his wife.  He
also challenged the jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court  to
entertain that application.
The   learned  Insolvency  Judge  rejected  the  insolvency
petition  holding that the respondent had not  executed the
deed  of guarantee.  It, however, held that  the  Insolvency
Court  was  competent  to  consider  the  question  of the
liability  of the respondent to the State under the deed  of
guarantee,   its  jurisdiction being  not  ousted  by the
provisions   of S.  11 of  the  Act  which  excluded the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in any matter which the head
of the department was empowered by the Act or the rules made
thereunder to dispose of or take cognizance of, as the head
of  the department could, under the Act, determine only the
amount of the debt due from the alleged defaulter  and not
the  question  whether the alleged defaulter  was  really  a
defaulter in case this was disputed.
The  State  of Punjab, successor of the State of  Patiala,
appealed against this order to the District Judge who agreed
with  the  findings  of the trial Court and  dismissed the
appeal.  The State then went in revision to the High  Court
under s.  75 of  the Provincial  Insolvency Act. Two
contentions   were  raised  there.   One  relating  to the
respondent's executing the deed of guarantee was repelled as
being concluded by the finding of fact by the courts  below.
The  other contention was that in view of the provisions  of
the  Act  the Managing Director of the Bank  had  exclusive
jurisdiction  to determine whether a certain person  was  or
was  not a surety or a defaulter and what the extent of his
liability to the bank, if any, was
1105
and that therefore the Insolvency Court had no jurisdiction
to  reconsider and determine it.  The High  Court  did not
agree  with this contention and dismissed the revision.  It
is against this order that the State of Punjab has preferred
this appeal after obtaining special leave.
The  contention for the appellant in this Court is that the
Civil  Court had no jurisdiction to determine matters  which
could be determined by the Head of the Department under the
provisions  of the Act, that the head of the  department  in
the exercise of the powers conferred under s. 4 on him, can
not  only  determine the amount due from the  defaulter but
also whether the alleged defaulter is really a defaulter  or
not  in case such an objection be raised by that person and
that therefore the Civil Court, in view of s. 11 of the Act,
cannot determine  the question of  the  liability  of the
alleged defaulter to pay the debt demanded from him.  It  is
contended for the respondent that (i) the head of department
can only determine the amount of the debt due from a  person
alleged to be a defaulter, but cannot determine whether that
person is a defaulter or not, i.e., the question whether the
debt is due from that person or not if the, person  disputes
his liability to pay the alleged debt; (ii) that even if the
bead  of  department  can determine  the  liability  of the
alleged defaulter to pay the debt, the jurisdiction of the
Insolvency  Court itself to decide whether the debt was due
from  the alleged debtor sought to be declared insolvent  is
not ousted by the provisions of s. 11 of the Act; and  (iii)
that the Insolvency Court is not a Civil Court.
The first question to determine then is whether the head  of
a  department  can  determine the objection  of an  alleged
defaulter that he is really not a defaulter, i.e., no  State
dues  are due from him as he is not liable for any  dues  to
the  State irrespective of the question whether what  amount
is  due if he is liable for that debt to  the State. The
contentions  for the respondent are based on these  grounds:
(i)  s. 4 empowers the head of the department to
1106
determine  the exact amount of State dues  recoverable and
does  not  empower  him to determine the  liability  of the
alleged defaulter to pay those dues in case the liability is
disputed   (ii)  The  question of  liability may   raise
complicated questions of  fact and law for determination and
to  determine  which  the  head of  department cannot  be
competent;  (iii) The Managing Director of the Patiala Bank
cannot be taken to be an independent person to determine the
question  of  the alleged defaulter's liability to  pay the
amount as he is an official of the bank and the dispute  is
between the bank and the alleged defaulter.
The  vires of the Act came up for consideration before this
Court  in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab(1). This  Court
held  the  Act to be valid and in  considering the  various
contentions,  Venkatarama Aiyar J., delivering the  majority
judgment, said at p. 235.
     "The  Managing  Director is  a high-ranking
     official on a salary of Rs.  1,600-100-2,500,
     with  a free furnished residence. He  has  no
     personal interest in the transaction and there
     is  no  question of  bias,  or  any  conflict
     between his interest and duty.  "
     The  vesting  of the power  to  determine the
     matters  covered by  s. 4  in  the  Managing
     Director who has no personal interest in the
     matter  cannot  therefore be  a ground for
     holding  that the Act could not have  provided
     and  does not provide for the head of  depart-
     ment to determine the liability of an  alleged
     defaulter in case he disputes it.
     In  construing  r. 6 it was said at  the same
     page:
      "It  does not bar the parties from  examining
     witnesses or producing other documentary evi-
     dence.  The Managing Director, has, under this
     Rule, to examine the statement and the records
     of  the  Bank in so far as they  bear  on the
     points in dispute and that normally, would  be
     all that is relevant.  But he is not precluded
     by the Rule from examining witnesses or taking
     into
     (1)   [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353.
      1107
     account other documentary evidence, if he con-
     siders that, is necessary for a proper  deter-
     mination of the dispute."
it  follows  that  the Managing Director or the head  of  a
department   can  record  evidence  with  respect   to the
objections raised before him by the alleged defaulter  about
his liability to pay the dues.
Section 4 is really concerned with the determination of the
amount of  State  dues recoverable  from  a  defaulter and
therefore  the determination can take into account both the
amount and also its recoverability from the person said  to
be a defaulter. There is nothing in it which directly makes
the head of department incompetent to determine the question
of  the liability  of the alleged  defaulter in  case  of
dispute.
This appears more clearly from the provisions of sub-s. (2)
of s. 6 which provides for the certificate issued under sub-
s. (1) of s. 6 to be conclusive proof of the matters  stated
therein,  the  matters being that such and such amount was
recoverable  from the person shown as defaulter.  This sub-
section further provides that the specified authorities will
not bear any objections of the defaulter as to the amount of
State  dues  mentioned in  the certificate  or as  to the
liability  of  the  defaulter to pay  such  debt.   The Act
therefore  contemplated that there might be a dispute  about
the  liability of the alleged defaulter to pay the dues and
therefore, directed the authorities to whom the certificate
is  Submitted  not to bear objections about  it.   When the
authorities  were  conscious  of  the  possibility  of such
objections,  it must be presumed that they  intended  these
objections  to be decided by the authority  determining the
amount of State dues recoverable from a defaulter under s. 4
of  the Act. If it was not so intended by  the  Act, the
legislature  would  have provided for the  determination  of
such  an objection either by an agency specified in the Act
or  by the regular courts.  The Act would  have  made some
mention about the agency and would not have left this matter
without a definite provision in the Act.  What would be the
consequence
1108
of  so construing the provisions of s. 4 as to exclude ,the
objection  to  liability of the alleged defaulter  from the
purview of  the head of department?  It would be  that the
Bank  will have to go to the Civil Court for  a declaration
that the alleged person is liable to pay its dues.  The suit
will  have  to be  merely  ,for  a  declaration,  as, the
determination of the amount he has to 'pay, if liable, will
inevitably have to be made by the head of department and  in
accordance  with  s.  4 of the Act.   Two  proceedings for
achieving  one object are neither desirable  nor  convenient
and if the Bank has to go to the Civil Court for the  deter-
mination  of the liability of the alleged  defaulter,  there
can  be no good reason for enacting that  the Civil  Court
which ordinarily decides such disputes cannot determine the
amount, if  any, the alleged defaulter has to pay  to the
Bank.
Further, the proceedings in the Civil Court may take a long
time  for final disposal and that may affect the  limitation
prescribed  under  s.  10 of the Act for the  Nazim  or the
Accountant-General  to take action for the recovery  of the
amount due.  Section 10(.1) provides that no action shall be
taken  by  the Nazim or the Accountant-General on  a  certi-
ficate from the Managing Director of the Bank unless it  is
sent  to him within such period of limitation prescribed  by
the Limitation Act for the time being in force in the  State
within which  the Bank would have instituted a suit  in  a
Civil Court  for  the recovery  of  its  debts  or dues
respectively,  if  such debts or dues were not declared  as
State dues under the Act.  This means that if the period  of
limitation for the institution of a suit for the recovery of
a  debt has elapsed, that debt could not  be  recovered  as
State  dues under the procedure laid down by the  Act. The
usual period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of
a  debt is three years and the time taken  in obtaining  a
final decision from the Civil Courts for the declaration  of
liability of a certain person may take longer time.  So long
as  the final decision about that person's liability is not
reached in those proceedings, the
 1109
relevant  authority under s. 4 of the Act cannot proceed  to
determine  the exact  amount of debt due  and even  if  it
determined   the  amount  it  cannot  obviously issue any
certificate  to the  Nazim or Accountant-General  for the
recovery of that amount.
In  view  of  these  considerations,  it  is  reasonable  to
conclude that the provisions of s. 4 of the Act empower the
head of department to determine not only the amount of State
dues  recoverable  but also the liability  of the  alleged
defaulter to pay those debts.  It follows therefore that  in
view  of the provisions of s. 11 of the Act no Civil  Court
can have jurisdiction to determine these two matters,  viz.,
determining  the  amount of State dues recoverable  and the
liability of the alleged defaulter to pay the amount.
We  may mention that the Punjab High Court itself  has,  in
Kanshi Ram v. The State of Punjab(1) has taken the view  we
have  expressed and did not approve  its  earlier  decision
under appeal.
The  next question then to decide is whether the  Insolvency
Court  can, in spite of the provisions of s. II of  the Act
and  the jurisdiction which the head of the department has,
under s. 4 as construed by us, go into the question  whether
the alleged debtor sought to be adjudicated insolvent really
owed  the debt which has been determined or could be  deter-
mined only by the head of department under s. 4 of the Act.
It  is well-settled that the Insolvency Court can,  both  at
the  time  of  hearing the petition for adjudication  of  a
person as an insolvent and subsequently at the stage of the
proof of debts, reopen the transaction on the basis of which
the creditor had secured the judgment of a court against the
debtor.  This is based on the principle that it is for the
Insolvency Court to determine at the time of the hearing  of
the petition for Insolvency whether the alleged debtor does
owe the debts mentioned by the creditor in the petition and
whether, if he owes them, what is the extent of those debts.
A debtor is not to be
(1)  I.L.R. [1961] 2 Punj. 823.
1110
adjudged  an insolvent unless he owes the debts equal to  or
more than a certain amount and has also committed an act  of
insolvency.   It  is  the  duty of  the  Insolvency   Court
therefore to determine itself the alleged debts owed by the
debtor irrespective of whether those debts are based  on  a
contract  or ,under a decree of Court. At the stage of the
proof  of the debts, the debts to be proved by the  creditor
are scrutinized by the Official Receiver or by the Court, in
order  to  determine the amount of all the debts  which the
insolvent owes as his total assets will be utilised for the
payment of  his  total debts and if  any  debt is  wrongly
included  in his total debts that will adversely affect the
interests of the creditors other than the judgment  creditor
in respect of that particular debt as they were not  parties
to  the suit in which the judgment debt was  decreed. That
decree is not binding on them and it is right that they  be
in  a position to question the correctness of  the  judgment
debt. It is on their behalf that the Insolvency  Court  or
the Official Receiver is to scrutinize the proof of debts to
be  proved and can even demand proof of the debts  on  which
the  judgment debt has been decreed.  The decree is  binding
only  on the parties.  The debtor sought to be adjudged  is
bound by it and so is the creditor.  But this binding effect
of  the decree is only to be respected by  the  Insolvency
Court  in circumstances where nothing is reasonably  alleged
against  the  correctness  of the  judgment debt. The
Insolvency  Court has the jurisdiction to reopen such  debts
and  will  do so ordinarily when such  judgments  have been
obtained by fraud, collusion or in circumstances  indicating
that  there  might  have been miscarriage  of  justice.  On
similar grounds it must be held that the  determination  of
the amount of the debt and the liability of the defaulter to
pay it could be open for scrutiny by the Insolvency Court in
the aforesaid circumstances in spite of the provisions of s.
11 of the Act which provisions really contemplate a decision
of  the dispute about the matters covered by it between the
same  parties, viz.,  the creditor  Bank  and the  alleged
defaulter.  The determination of the amount of State
 1111
dues  recoverable from the defaulter under S. 4 of  the Act
can  have  no better status than the ordinary  judgment and
decree of a civil court have. The head of  the  department
could  not  have decided a dispute about the amount  of the
State dues recoverable from the defaulter between  creditors
other  than the Bank and the defaulter and therefore such  a
dispute between the creditors in general and the  defaulter
cannot be a dispute which comes within the mischief of s. II
of the Act.
Such a jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court is readily made
out by the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
(Act  5 of  1920) hereinafter called  the  Insolvency Act.
According to s. 2, sub-s.(1), cl. (a), 'creditor' includes a
decree holder ,  'debt'  includes  a judgment-debt, and
'debtor'  includes  a judgment-debtor. Section  3  confers
insolvency  jurisdiction  on  the  District  Courts.   Civil
Courts, as  such, have not got this  jurisdiction.   Courts
subordinate to the District Courts can, however, be invested
with  jurisdiction  in any  class of  cases  by  the  State
Government.
Section 4 deals with the power of the Insolvency Court with
respect to the questions it can decide. It reads :
     "(1)  Subject to the provisions of  this Act,
     the Court shall have full power to decide all
     questions whether of title or priority or  of
     any  nature whatsoever, and whether  involving
     matters of law or of fact, which may arise  in
     any  case of  insolvency coming within the
     cognizance  of the Court, or which  the  Court
     may  deem it expedient or necessary to  decide
     for  the purpose of doing complete justice  or
     making a complete distribution of property  in
     any such case.
     (2)   Subject  to the provisions of  this Act
     and notwithstanding anything contained in any
     other  law for the time being in force,  every
     such  deciSion shall be final and binding for
     all purposes as between, on the one hand, the
     debtor  and  the debtor's estate and,  on the
     other hand, all
     1112
     claimants against him or it and all  persons
     claiming through or under them or any of them.
     (3)   Where   the Court does  not  deem  it
     expedient or necessary to decide any  question
     of the nature referred to in sub-section (1),
     but has reason to believe that the debtor has
     a saleable interest in any property, the Court
     may   'without  further  inquiry sell such
     interest in such manner and subject  to such
     conditions as it may think fit."
It is to be noticed that the Insolvency Court has full power
to decide all questions of any nature whatsoever which arise
in  any insolvency case before it. It can also decide all
questions  which it may consider expedient or  necessary  to
decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a
complete distribution of property in any such case.  Nothing
could  be  more expedient or necessary for  exercising its
jurisdiction  in  adjudicating a  person  insolvent  or  in
distributing the assets of the insolvent than to probe into
the question of the genuineness of the debts said to be owed
by  the debtor. The 'decisions of the Insolvency  Court  in
view  of  sub-s. (2) of s. 4 are final and binding  for all
purposes despite what is contained in any other law for the
time  being in force.  This finality and binding  nature  of
the  decisions for all purposes are between the debtor and
the  debtor's  estate  on the one  hand and  all  claimants
against him or it.  The binding nature of such decisions  is
clearly not  just between the individual creditor  and the
debtor but is between all the creditors on one side and the
debtor and his estate on the other.  The jurisdiction of the
Insolvency  Court is therefore much larger than that  of  an
ordinary civil court deciding a particular claim between the
claimants and the other party.
Section  7  provides  for  an Insolvency  petition   being
presented  either by a creditor or by a debtor and  for the
Court  adjudicating  the  debtor insolvent,  if the  debtor
commits an  act  of insolvency.  Section 9  lays  down the
condition which a creditor must
 1113
satisfy before presenting an insolvency petition.  In view
of  the definition  of creditor, debtor  and  debt  already
referred  to, the judgment-creditor can present a  petition
for the adjudication of the judgment debtor an insolvent  on
the  basis of the judgment debt.  Section 10 lays  down the
condition  on  which  the debtor  can  present a  petition.
Section 14 provides that no petition presented, whether by a
creditor or by a debtor, shall be withdrawn without leave of
the  Court.  This fits in with the position that  insolvency
proceedings  are  not proceedings between  the petitioning-
creditor and the debtor alone. Section 16 provides for the
substitution of any other creditor in place of the  original
creditor  who  had filed the petition in case  he  does not
proceed with due diligence with his petition. Even  after
the death of the debtor, insolvency proceedings can continue
for the realisation and distribution of the property of the
debtor in view of s. 17.  Section 24 lays down the procedure
at the hearing of the insolvency petition, and provides that
the Court shall require proof of the fact that the  creditor
or  the debtor as the case may be, is entitled to present  a
petition.  One of the conditions for the creditor to present
the  petition  is that the debt owing by the debtor  to him
amounts to Rs. 500 and one of the conditions for the  debtor
to  apply for adjudication is that his debts amount  to Rs.
500.   The Court, therefore, has to be provided with  proof
about the existence of the debt and its amount, even  though
the debt be a judgment debt.  The judgment or decree can  be
prima facie evidence of the debt, but in view of the Court's
requiring  proof of the debt, it is not bound to  treat the
judgment  or decree to be conclusive proof of the  existence
of the debt for which the decree had been passed.
Subsequent   to the  adjudication  of the  debtor  as  an
insolvent,  the next  stage  for  the preparation  of the
schedule  of  creditors under s. 33 of the  Insolvency Act
comes. All persons alleging themselves to be creditors  of
the insolvent in respect of the debts provable under the Act
have to tender proof of the
1114
respective debts by producing evidence of the amount and the
particulars thereof and the Court has then to determine the
person who  have proved themselves to be creditors  of the
insolvent in respect of such debts and the amount of  debts,
respectively, and then frame a schedule of such persons and
debts. Creditors other than the creditor who had  applied
for  the  adjudication of the insolvent may  have  judgment
debts against that insolvent and they will have to prove  by
evidence the amount and particulars of the debts owed by the
insolvent  to  them.   Judgments  or  decrees  may  be good
evidence  for proving of such debts, but it is open  to the
Court  to  require independent roof of the  debt  which had
merged in the judgment debt.
It is clear from the above provisions of the Insolvency Act
that  it is the duty of the Insolvency Court  and  therefore
clearly within its jurisdiction to require  proof  to its
satisfaction  of the debts sought to be proved at the  stage
of  the hearing of the insolvency petition or subsequent  to
the adjudication.
There is plenty of case law in support of the view that the
Insolvency  Court  can go behind the decree of a  court  in
order  to  probe  into the  genuineness  of  the  debt  in
connection with which the decree is passed.
In  Ex parte Kibble.  In re Onslow(1) it was  said  by Sir
James, L.J., at p. 376:
     "It  is  the  settled rule  of  the  Court  of
     Bankruptcy,  on  which we have  always  acted,
     that the Court of Bankruptcy can inquire into
     the consideration for a judgment debt.   There
     are obviously strong reasons for this, because
     the  object  of  the  bankruptcy laws  is  to
     procure  the distribution of a debtor's  goods
     among his just creditors. If a judgment were
     conclusive,  a man might allow any  number  of
     judgments to be obtained by  default  against
     him  by his friends or relations without any
     debt being due on them at all; it is therefore
     necessary that the consideration of
     (1)   [1875] 10. Ch.  A.C. 373.
      1115
     the  judgment should be liable  to  investiga-
     tion."
     In this case the probe into the judgment debt
     was  made at  the time  of  the adjudication
     proceedings.
     In  Ex  parte  Lennox, In re  Lennox(1) Lord
     Esher, M.R., said at p. 323:
     "  The  authority,  however,  of  Ex   parte
     Kibble(2) seems to me quite sufficient, and  I
     think it was decided on right principles.  If
     that be so it is not true to say that the mere
     fact  of a judgment existing ought to  prevent
     the Court at the instance of the debtor at the
     first  stage of the proceedings, viz., when  a
     receiving order is applied for, from inquiring
     whether  there  was  any real  debt  as the
     foundation  of the judgment, and, although  by
     consenting   to  a  judgment  the debtor  is
     estopped everywhere  else  from saying that
     there was no debt due-although the judgment is
     binding upon him by reason of his consent, and
     of its being the judgment of the Court, yet no
     such  estopped  is effectual  as against the
     Court   of  Bankruptcy. The  Court  is not
     estopped by the conduct of the parties, but it
     has a right to inquire into the debt."
     Cotton, L.J., said at p. 325:
     "It has been long established, as regards the
     proof  of a  debt  in  bankruptcy,  that the
     trustee, acting on behalf of  the  creditors,
     can  go behind a judgment, and that,  although
     the judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt
     due  to the creditor who claims to  prove for
     the judgment debt, yet the trustee, on  behalf
     of  the creditors, may show that in  fact the
     judgment does not establish a debt.  That rule
     is  founded  upon this principle that,  under
     whatever circumstances  a judgment  may have
     been obtained against the bankrupt, yet no act
     of   his-collusion,   compromise  improperly
     entered into,  or  anything  else-ought  to
     prejudice the rights of the other creditors,
     (2)   [1875] 10 Ch.  A.C. 373.
     (1) [1885] 16 Q.B.D. 315.
     1116
     because the assets ought to be distributed  in
     the  bankruptcy only amongst the honest bona
     fide creditors of the bankrupt."
     Lindley, L.J., said at pp. 328, 329:
     "Bankruptcy proceedings are not like  ordinary
     proceedings;  they are a very serious  matter,
     not only to the debtor himself, but to all his
     other creditors; and, before the machinery  of
     the  Court of Bankruptcy is put in motion,  it
     appears to me that it is, not only the  right,
     but  the duty of the Court to  see  at  whose
     instance it is asked to act.  By the  express
     language of  sub-s. 3, of s. 7 the  Court  is
     enabled to look into a judgment debt;"
     "It   means,  I  think,  that,  although the
     judgment debtor could  not  go behind the
     judgment, the  Court of Bankruptcy  will now
     allow  itself  to be put in  motion  at the
     instance of  a  person  who  is not  a real
     creditor. The Court will not allow bankruptcy
     proceedings  to  be had recourse to  for the
     purpose of   enforcing debts which are
     fictitious,  and not real, even although they
     are in the form of judgment debts."
     In  re  Fraser,  Ex  parte  Central  Bank  of
     London(1) Lord Esher, M.R. said at p. 635:
     "As  a matter of law the judgment,  therefore
     stands as a good judgment against John  Fraser
     and  it  cannot be questioned by him  in any
     Court,  except the Court of Bankruptcy. But,
     when it is sought to obtain a receiving  order
     against  him in respect of the judgment  debt,
     the  Court of Bankruptcy has to  exercise its
     discretion,  and for  the  exercise  of that
     discretion one rule of conduct is to be  found
     in  s.  7 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883,  which
     provides, by sub-s. 3, that 'if the Court  is
     not   satisfied with  the   proof   of the
     petitioning creditor's debt, or of the act  of
     bankruptcy, or of the service of the petition,
     or is satisfied by the debtor that is able to
     (1)   [1892] 2 Q.B.D. 633.
     pay  his debts, or that for  other  sufficient
     cause no order ought to be made, the Court may
     dismiss the petition'."
In In re Van Laun, Ex parte Chatterton(1) Cozens Hardy M.R.
said  at p. 30 what Bigham J., had said in In re  Van  Laun.
Ex parte Pattullo : (2)
     "The trustee's right and duty when examining a
     proof   for  the purpose of   admitting  or
     rejecting it is to require some satisfactory
     evidence that the debt on which the proof  is
     founded is a real debt.  No judgment recovered
     against the bankrupt, no covenant given by  or
     account  stated  with  him,  can deprive the
     trustee  of this right.  He is entitled to  go
     behind such forms to get at the truth, and the
     estopped to  which  the bankrupt  may have
     subjected himself  will not  prevail  against
     him."
The  principles of  these cases have been  applied  by the
courts in this country. Reference may be made to  Narasimha
Sastri v. Official Assignee, MadraS(3).
Reference may also be made to Sadhu Ram v. Kishori Lal(4) in
which  it was held in view of s. 4(2) of the Insolvency Act
that  the  decree founded on a debt held  fictitious  by  an
Insolvency Court could not be executed. Bhide J said:
     "In  the present instance the finding  of the
     Insolvency  Court had, I think, the effect  of
     rendering the decree inoperative, as  it was
     tantamount  to a declaration that the  decree
     was  non-existent and the finding was  binding
     on the decree-holder as well as the  judgment-
     debtor."
In  view  of  our opinion that an Insolvency  Court  can  go
behind a decree and probe into the genuineness of the debt
on which it is founded, it is not necessary to consider the
contention  as to whether the Insolvency Court is  a  Civil
Court or not for the purpose of s. 11 of the Act.
(1)  [1907] 2 K.B. 23.
(3)  A.I.R. 1930 Madras 751.
(2)  [1907] 1 K.B. 155,162.
(4)  A.I.R. 1938 Lah, 148.
1118
We therefore hold that the head of department had the  power
to  decide,  under  s. 4 of the Act,  whether the  alleged
defaulter  was a defaulter or not, that no Civil  Court can
consider  this matter in view of s. 11 of the Act  and that
the Insolvency Court is however not precluded from enquiring
into  the question whether the alleged debtor was  really  a
debtor and liable to "/pay sums said to be payable by him.
The  Insolvency Court has found that the respondent had not
executed the surety bond and that therefore he could not  be
liable to make good any payment under it.  The order of the
Court  below  in  dismissing  the  insolvency  petition is,
therefore, correct.
We  accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs, though for
different reasons.
    Appeal dismissed.
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