| Reportable |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1834 of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.569 of 2012)
Satish Mehra … Appellant
Versus
State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. …Respondents
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1836 of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.3546 of 2012)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1835 of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.910 of 2012)
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J
Leave granted.
2. In a proceeding registered as FIR case No. 110/94 (P.S.
Connaught Place) charges under different provisions of the Indian
Penal Code were framed by the learned Trial Court, inter-alia, against
the accused appellants G.K. Bhatt and R.K. Arora. In the revision
petition filed before the High Court (Crl. Rev. P. No. 304/2003) for
quashing of the charges framed, relief has been denied to the two
appellants. However, part relief had been granted to two other
accused i.e. Anita Mehra (petitioner in Crl. M.C. No. 2255/2003) and
S.K. Khosla (Petitioner in Crl. Rev.P. No.299/2003). While denial of
relief by the High Court by the impugned order dated 13th October,
2011 has been challenged in the appeals filed by the accused R.K.
Arora and G.K. Bhatt, the grant of partial relief to one of the two co-
accused i.e. S.K. Khosla has been challenged in the appeal filed by
the complainant/ first respondent, Satish Mehra.
3. The facts giving rise to the present appeals may now be noted in
some detail.
The appellant Satish Mehra and accused Anita Mehra were married
some time in the year 1980. At the relevant point of time they were
living in the USA. From about October, 1992, the relations between
husband and wife became strained and both were locked in a series of
litigations including litigations pertaining to custody of the
children born out of the marriage.
4. On 06.01.1994, the appellant Satish Mehra lodged a complaint
before the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police New Delhi that he
along with his wife Anita Mehra had opened five Foreign Currency Non-
Resident Fixed Deposits (FCNR FD) of the total value of about
Rs.20,00,000/- in their joint names. According to the complainant,
accused S.K. Khosla who is his father-in- law had forged his
signatures on the F.D receipts and got the same renewed in the sole
name of Anita Mehra who, thereafter, encashed the value thereof and
unauthorisedly received the payments due. The details of the FCNR FD,
according to the complainant, are as follows:
“i) FCNR FD Nos.9/92 and 22/91 with Canara Bank;
ii) FCNR FD Nos.103402 and 103403 with Punjab and Sind
Bank and ;
iii) FCNR FD No. 0756223 with Vyasa Bank.”
5. On receipt of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No.110/94 was
registered, on investigation whereof the following facts appear to
have come to light:
I) S.K. Khosla had made an endorsement on the reverse of the
receipt pertaining to FCNR FD Nos.22/91 to the effect that the
said FDR be renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra;
II) On 23.11.1992 and 12.03.1993 Canara Bank renewed FCNR FD
Nos.22/91 and 9/92 respectively on the basis of the letters
dated 09.10.1992 written by Anita Mehra to the Bank requesting
for the said renewals. Pursuant to the said renewals made by the
Bank, Anita Mehra encashed FD No. 22/91;
III) Before FD No.9/92 could be encashed by Anita Mehra the
Bank cancelled the renewal of the said FD in the sole name of
Anita Mehra and re-renewed the same in the joint names of Anita
Mehra and Satish Mehra;
IV) On 09.11.1992 Punjab and Sind Bank renewed FDs Nos. 103402
and 103403 in the sole name of Anita Mehra on the basis of an
endorsement made by S.K. Khosla on the reverse of the receipt of
each of the said FDs to the effect that the said FDs be renewed
in the sole name of Anita Mehra;
V) Punjab and Sind Bank claimed to have renewed the FD Nos.
103402 and 103403 in the sole name of Anita Mehra on the basis
of a letter dated 09.10.1992 written by Anita Mehra to the Bank
requesting for such renewal but the said letter seems to be a
manipulated document as it was received by the Bank on
09.11.1993 which was much after the renewal of the said FDs; and
VI) On 22.03.1993 Vyasa Bank renewed FCNR FD No. 0756223 on
the basis of a Investment Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 signed
by both Satish Mehra and Anita Mehra; however Satish Mehra
claimed that he had made no such request to Vyasa bank and that
he had misplaced a blank Investment Renewal Form of Vyasa Bank
which contained his signature.
VII) There was an endorsement of the accused S.K. Khosla in the
Investment Renewal Form to the effect that FD No. 0756223 of
Vyasa Bank be renewed in the sole name of accused Anita Mehra as
against the joint names of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra. The
signatures of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra in the Investment
Renewal Form appear to be old and faded whereas the endorsement
made by S.K.Khosla on the said form is a fresh one. The
passport number of Satish Mehra entered in the said Form is the
old/surrendered passport of the said person.
6. In the light of the aforesaid facts revealed in the course of
investigation of FIR No. 110/94, a cancellation report was filed
before the learned trial court. The appellant Satish Mehra filed his
objections to the said cancellation report. Thereafter, on a due
consideration, the learned trial court directed further investigation
in the matter in the course of which the FD receipts in question; the
letters dated 09.10.1992 purportedly of accused Anita Mehra to the
Canara and Punjab and Sind Bank; the Investment Renewal Form dated
22.03.1993 submitted to Vyasa Bank and the admitted signatures of
accused Anita Mehra, S.K. Khosla and the complainant Satish Mehra were
sent to the Central Forensic Laboratory. On receipt of the report of
the laboratory, charge sheet dated 28.08.1997 was filed by the
investigating agency against the accused S.K. Khosla alone.
7. The learned trial court, however, directed summons to be issued
to the two appellants G.K. Bhat, Chief Manager of the concerned Branch
of Canara Bank and R.K. Arora, Senior Manager of the said Branch as
well to one A.P. Singhna, Manager of Punjab and Sind Bank and also to
the accused Anita Mehra (wife of the complainant) for trial for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section
120 B of the Indian Penal Code.
8. Against the aforesaid order of the learned trial court, the High
Court of Delhi was moved by the accused for setting aside the order
issuing summons and for quashing the proceeding as a whole. By order
dated 23.10.2002, the High Court took the view that as all issues and
contentions raised can be so raised before the learned trial court at
the time of framing of charge, interference would not be justified.
Thereafter, by order dated 21.12.2002 and 08.01.2003, the learned
trial court framed charges against the accused appellants, G.K. Bhat
and R.K. Arora under Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code
(in respect of FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 of Canara Bank). Charges were
also framed against accused S.K. Khosla and Anita Mehra under Sections
120 B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC in respect of all five FDs.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the learned trial court,
all the accused moved the High Court of Delhi for quashing of the
charges framed against them and also for interference with the
Criminal proceedings pending against the accused before the learned
trial court.
10. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 13.10.2011, while
declining any relief to the appellants G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora, set
aside the charges framed against accused S.K. Khosla under Sections
120 B and 420 IPC in respect of FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 as well as the
charges framed against the said accused under Sections 467, 468 and
471 IPC read with Section 120 B IPC. In so far as the accused Anita
Mehra is concerned, the High Court interfered with the charges framed
against the aforesaid accused under Sections 467, 468 and 471 read
with Section 120 B. The rest of the charges in so far as the
aforesaid two accused S.K. Khosla and Anita Mehra is concerned were
maintained by the High Court.
11. Aggrieved, the present appeals have been filed by accused G.K.
Bhat and R.K. Arora in so far as FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 are
concerned. While the other accused have not challenged the order of
the High Court declining full and complete reliefs as prayed for by
them, it is the complainant/first informant, Satish Mehra, who has
instituted the connected appeal in so far as the part relief granted
to accused S.K. Khosla is concerned.
12. We have heard S/Shri M.N. Krishnamani, Brijender Chhahr,
P.V.Shetty and Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respective
parties.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants G.K.Bhat and R.K. Arora has
argued that no material whatsoever has been brought on record to, even
prima facie, show the involvement of either of the accused –
appellants with any of the offences alleged. Mere holding of the
office of Chief Manager and Senior Manager of the concerned Branch of
the Canara Bank, by itself, will not make the accused – appellants
liable unless the positive role of either of the appellants in the
renewal of the FDs in the sole name of accused Anita Mehra or in the
encashment of one of the FDs (FD No.22/91) by the aforesaid accused is
disclosed. Learned counsel has also relied on the provisions of the
Regulations/Guidelines, relating to Fixed Deposit, as in force in the
Bank to contend that the action of accused – appellants has been in
conformity with the mandate of the Banking Norms even if it is to be
assumed that they had any role to play in the matter of renewal of the
FDs in the sole name of the accused Anita Mehra and the subsequent
encashment of FD No.22/91. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
first informant /appellant, Satish Mehra has contended that the
connivance of the Bank officials in the fraudulent renewal of the FDs
is ex facie apparent and further that the endorsements made by accused
S.K. Khosla on the reverse of the FDs and in the Investment Renewal
Form of Vyasa Bank clearly attract the ingredients of the offence of
‘forgery’ as defined under Section 464 of the IPC. It is, therefore,
submitted that the interference made by the High Court with the
charges framed under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC against
accused S.K. Khosla is not tenable in law.
14. Though a criminal complaint lodged before the court under the
provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an FIR
lodged in the police station under Chapter XII of the Code has to be
brought to its logical conclusion in accordance with the procedure
prescribed, power has been conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
interdict such a proceeding in the event the institution/continuance
of the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of
court. An early discussion of the law in this regard can be found in
the decision of this court in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab[1]
wherein the parameters of exercise of the inherent power vested by
Section 561A of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
(corresponding of Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973) had been laid down in the
following terms :
“ (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings
against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court
or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends
of justice;
(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding e.g.
want of sanction;
(iii) where the allegations in the first information report or
the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and
(iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but
there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge.”
15. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or
at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on
the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or
the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a
triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be
made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than
not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or
a sham ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance
thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is
the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal
proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every High Court. The
power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be
exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances
satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting
all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is
disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available
for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but
also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of
the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a
proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider
as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried
out usually comes on record and such materials can be looked into, not
for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused
but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even
if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the
commission of the offence alleged against the accused.
16. The above nature and extent of the power finds an exhaustive
enumeration in a judgment of this court in State of Karnataka vs. L.
Muniswamy and others[2] which may be usefully extracted below :
“ 7. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument is that in any event
the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or
appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find
whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the
respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to
connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case
must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate
or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution
is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a
proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
2 of 1974, provides that:
. . . . .
This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called “Trial Before a
Court of Session”. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions
Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the
record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons
to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the
Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court
to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge
has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into
the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to
determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and
circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which
corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that:
. . . . .
In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to
quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court
or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal
case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of
the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the
like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws
made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of
the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it
would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction.”
It would also be worthwhile to recapitulate an earlier decision
of this court in Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. vs. State of
Maharashtra[3] noticed in L. Muniswamy’s case (Supra) holding that the
order framing a charge affects a person’s liberty substantially and
therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether
the materials warrant the framing of the charge. It was also held that
the court ought not to blindly accept the decision of the prosecution
that the accused be asked to face a trial.
17. While dealing with contours of the inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal proceeding, another decision of this
court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy alias Ramu vs. Kovvuri Satyanaryana
Reddy and others reported in (2011) 12 SCC 437 to which one of us
(Justice P.Sathasivam) was a party may be usefully noticed. In the
said decision after an exhaustive consideration of the principles
governing the exercise of the said power as laid down in several
earlier decisions this court held that:
31. . . . . When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge. The scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may
exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal[4]. The powers possessed
by the High Court under Section 482 are very wide and at the same time
the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on
sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution.”
18. In an earlier part of this order the allegations made in the FIR
and the facts disclosed upon investigation of the same have already
been noticed. The conclusions of the High Court in the petitions
filed by the accused for quashing of the charges framed against them
have also been taken note of along with the fact that in the present
appeals only a part of said conclusions of the High Court is under
challenge and therefore, would be required to be gone into.
19. The view expressed by this Court in Century Spinning’s case
(supra) and in L. Muniswamy’s case (supra) to the effect that the
framing of a charge against an accused substantially affects the
person’s liberty would require a reiteration at this stage. The
apparent and close proximity between the framing of a charge in a
criminal proceeding and the paramount rights of a person arrayed as an
accused under Article 21 of the Constitution can be ignored only with
peril. Any examination of the validity of a criminal charge framed
against an accused cannot overlook the fundamental requirement laid
down in the decisions rendered in Century Spinning and Muniswamy
(supra). It is from the aforesaid perspective that we must proceed in
the matter bearing in mind the cardinal principles of law that have
developed over the years as fundamental to any examination of the
issue as to whether the charges framed are justified or not. So
analysed, we find that in the present case neither in the FIR nor in
the charge sheet or in any of the materials collected in the course of
investigation any positive role of either of the appellants, i.e.,
G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora has been disclosed in the matter of renewal
and encashment of the fixed deposits. All that appears against the
aforesaid two accused is that one was the Chief Manager of the Bank
whereas the other accused was at the relevant time working as the
Senior Manager. What role, if any, either of the accused had in
renewing the two fixed deposits in the sole name of Anita Mehra or the
role that any of them may have had in the payment of the amount due
against FD No. 21/91 to Anita Mehra or in cancelling the FD No.9/92
renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra and thereafter making a fresh
FD in the joint Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra, is not disclosed either
in the FIR filed or materials collected during the course of
investigation or in the charge sheet filed before the court. There
can be no manner of doubt that some particular individual connected
with the Bank must have authorized the aforesaid acts. However, the
identity of the said person does not appear from the materials on
record. It is certainly not the prosecution case that either of the
accused-appellants had authorised or even facilitated any of the
aforesaid action. In such a situation to hold either of the accused-
appellants to be, even prima facie, liable for any of the alleged
wrongful acts would be a matter of conjecture as no such conclusion
can be reasonably and justifiably drawn from the materials available
on record.
A criminal trial cannot be allowed to assume the character
of fishing and roving enquiry. It would not be permissible in law to
permit a prosecution to linger, limp and continue on the basis of a
mere hope and expectation that in the trial some material may be found
to implicate the accused. Such a course of action is not contemplated
in the system of criminal jurisprudence that has been evolved by the
courts over the years. A criminal trial, on the contrary, is
contemplated only on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing
the commission of an offence by the accused which fact has to be
proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable evidence in the course
of the trial against the accused. We are, therefore, of the view that
the criminal proceeding in the present form and on the allegations
levelled is clearly not maintainable against either of the accused –
appellant G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora.
20. The next question that has to be addressed is whether the
criminal charges against accused S.K. Khosla under Sections 120B and
420 IPC in so far as FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 are concerned along with
the charges under Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of
the IPC had been rightly quashed by the High Court. From the
materials on record it appears that in so far as FD No. 22/91 is
concerned an endorsement on the reverse of the FD was made by accused
S.K. Khosla that the said F.D. may be renewed in the name of Anita
Mehra. However, renewal of the said FD was made by the Bank on the
basis of a letter dated 09.10.1992 written by Anita Mehra to the Bank.
If the above fact has been revealed in the course of investigation of
the FIR no liability in respect of the FD bearing No.22/91 can be
fastened on the accused S.K. Khosla. Neither is there any allegation
against S.K. Khosla with regard to receipt of the money against the
aforesaid FD by Anita Mehra. Similarly in respect of FD bearing
No.9/92 there is no allegation that renewal of the said FD was made on
the basis of any endorsement or request made by S.K. Khosla. In the
light of above facts it cannot be held that the High Court had
committed any error in quashing the charges under Sections 120B and
420 IPC against the accused S.K. Khosla in so far as the aforesaid two
FDs, i.e. FD Nos.22/91 and 9/92, are concerned.
21. Coming to the charges under Sections 467, 468, 471 read with
Section 120B IPC framed against accused S.K. Khosla, we do not find
that FD Nos.22/91 and 9/92 of Canara Bank and FDS Nos.103402 and
103403 of Punjab and Sind Bank were renewed in the sole name of Anita
Mehra on the basis of the endorsement made on the reverse of the FD
receipts by accused SK Khosla to the above effect. In fact, the said
FDs were renewed on the basis of the letters addressed to the Bank by
accused – Anita Mehra. However, in respect of FD No.0756223 of Vyasa
Bank it appears that renewal of the aforesaid FD in the sole name of
Anita Mehra was made on the basis of the Investment Renewal Form dated
22.03.1993 which was signed by both Satish Mehra and Anita Mehra. The
said form also contained an endorsement made under the signature of
accused SK Khosla to the effect that the FD be renewed in the sole
name of Anita Mehra. It has been found upon investigation of the FIR
and it has also been recorded by the learned trial court as well as by
the High Court that the signatures of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra on
the aforesaid Investment Renewal Form were old signatures and that the
Investment Renewal Form had been misplaced by Satish Mehra. The
particulars of Satish Mehra entered in the said Investment Renewal
Form, i.e., Passport number etc. being of the expired Passport can be
understood to be facts supporting the allegations made in the FIR and
the conclusion of the investigating agency that the accused S.K.
Khosla had used an Investment Renewal Form signed by Satish Mehra
which was misplaced by him. The signature and the endorsement made by
S.K. Khosla on the said form had also been found, upon investigation,
to be relatively fresh in comparison to the signatures of Anita Mehra
and Satish Mehra on the said form. This is an additional fact that has
to receive due consideration in the process of determination of the
prima facie liability of the accused S.K. Khosla under Sections 467,
468 and 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
22. Section 464 of Indian Penal Code which defines the offence of
“forgery” encompasses a dishonest or fraudulent act of a person in
making a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that
such document was made, signed, sealed etc. by or by the authority of
a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made,
signed, sealed, executed etc. If such an act of a person is covered by
the definition of “forgery” contained in Section 464 of the Penal Code
we do not see as to why the action of the accused S.K. Khosla in
making the endorsement in the Investment Renewal Form dated
22.03.1993 of Vyasa Bank, in the light of the surrounding facts and
circumstances already noted, cannot, prima facie, amount to making
of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that the
same was made by or by the authority of the joint account holder
Satish Mehra. The said document having contained an endorsement that
the FD be altered/renewed in the single name of accused Anita Mehra
and the Bank having so acted, prima facie, the commission of offences
under Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B IPC, in our
considered view, is disclosed against the accused S.K. Khosla. The
order of the High Court quashing the charges framed against S.K.
Khosla under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC read with Section 120B IPC
in so far as the Investment Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 and FD
No.0756223 with Vyasa Bank, therefore, is clearly unsustainable. We
therefore interfere with the aforesaid part of the order of the High
Court in so far as the accused S.K. Khosla is concerned.
23. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions we
allow the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl)
Nos. 3546 and 910 of 2012 and allow the Criminal appeal arising out
of Special Leave petition (Crl) No. 569 of 2012 in part and to the
extent indicated above.
……………………………………J.
[P. SATHASIVAM]
……………………………………J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
November 22, 2012
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[1] AIR 1960 SC 866
[2] AIR 1977 SC 1489
[3] AIR 1972 SC 545
[4] 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335
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