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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 2009
Vadlakonda Lenin …Appellant
Versus
State of Andhra Pradesh …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
29.9.2006 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence
of life imprisonment imposed on him.
2. On 18.4.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. PW 1, Ponnam Pedda Sathaiah, the
father of the deceased, filed a FIR in the Maripeda police station stating
that he had given his daughter, Vadlakonda Radha, in marriage to the
accused-appellant in the year 1999. At the time of marriage a sum of
Rs.50,000 was claimed to have been given by the first informant as dowry,
inspite of which, according to the first informant, the accused-appellant
had been demanding more dowry and on that account committing atrocities on
his daughter. In the FIR filed it was alleged that in the early morning of
18.4.2003 the accused-appellant had murdered his wife while she was
sleeping and had run away. It was further alleged by the first informant
that on coming to know of the incident he rushed to the appellant’s house
and saw his daughter taking her last breath. Thereafter, he had brought her
to the Area Hospital at Mahbubabad but on the way to the hospital she died
at about 8.00 a.m.
3. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, a case under section 302 and 304B
of the IPC was registered. In the course of the investigation inquest was
held on the dead body and the same was sent for post mortem examination. A
large number of witnesses were examined and their statements were recorded
under section 161 Cr.P.C. On 3.5.2003 the accused-appellant who was
absconding was arrested from his house. On the same day at the instance of
the accused-appellant PW 15, M. Laxminarayana, the Sub-Divisional Police
Officer of Mahabubabad recovered a tapper knife (M.O.6) and a blood stained
shirt of the accused (M.O.7).
4. Charge sheet under section 302 and 498A IPC was submitted against the
accused-appellant. However in the trial court, charge under section 302
alone was framed. The trial ended in the conviction of the accused-
appellant who, as already noticed, was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life. The aforesaid conviction and sentence having been
affirmed by the High Court this appeal, by special leave, has been filed.
5. We have heard Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant and
Mr. Mayur R. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent-State.
6. Of the 15 witnesses examined by the prosecution, the evidence
tendered by PWs 1 and 2 (father and brother of the deceased); the evidence
of PW 3, Ponnam Buchamma, who is a neighbour and who had seen the deceased
lying on cot in her house with bleeding injuries from the neck and the
accused running away from the place; the evidence of PW 10, who was a
witness to the seizure of material objects No. 6 and 7 and PW 15, the Sub-
Divisional Police Officer of Mahabubabad who had recovered material objects
6 and 7 on the basis of the statement made by the accused (Exh.P8) as well
as the evidence of PW 12, Dr. Vaidehi, the Medical Officer who had
performed the post mortem, would be relevant, and therefore, must be
noticed in some details.
7. PWs 1 and 2 have deposed in the same vein. From the evidence of the
said two witnesses, it transpires that the accused, though had received a
sum of Rs.50,000 at the time of his marriage, had been persistently
demanding more dowry and harassing and assaulting his wife i.e. the
deceased from time to time. It also transpires from the evidence of PW 1
and 2 that in the evening before the occurrence there was a betrothal
ceremony of the brother of the deceased, which was attended, amongst
others, by PWs 1, 2 as well as the accused and the deceased. A plot of land
measuring one and half acres and Rs.30,000 was offered as dowry to the
brother of the deceased which had led to further renewed demands for
additional dowry by the accused. Immediately after the ceremony a quarrel
had taken place between the accused and the deceased as a result of which
the deceased went to her co-sister’s place (PW 5) to spend the night. In
the early morning, she came to her own house and was lying in a cot when,
according to PWs 1 and 2, the accused caused knife injuries on the neck of
the deceased. According to the said witnesses though the deceased was taken
to the hospital she died en-route.
8. PW 3 had deposed that in the early morning of the day of the
occurrence while she was going to the stools side she noticed the deceased
lying in the cot of her house with injuries on the neck from which she was
bleeding. PW 3 had also deposed that she saw the accused running away from
the house. The co-sister of the deceased to whose house the deceased had
gone after the quarrel with the accused was examined as PW 5. She, however,
did not support the prosecution case. PW 3 had however admitted that in the
early morning of 18.4.2003 as the deceased had not come out of her house
she went to the house of the deceased and found her lying in the cot with
injuries on the neck. PW 10, as already noticed, had deposed to the
recovery of M.O. Nos.6 and 7 on the basis of the statement made by the
accused (Ex.P.8) before PW 15, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer. PW 12 is
the Doctor who had performed the post mortem on the deceased. He had
deposed that he found incised wound involving the whole of the neck of the
deceased and also cut wounds of the hyoid bone and the trachea.
Corresponding to the said external injuries, PW 12 found the carotid
vessels (the major vital blood vessels supplying blood to the brain) as
well as the wind pipe of the deceased to have been cut. PW 15 is the Sub-
Divisional Police Officer before whom the accused had made the statement
(Exh.P8) leading to the recovery of material object No. 6 (knife) and
material object No. 7 (blood stained shirt). PW 15 had also deposed that
the whereabouts of the accused after the incident were not known and he
could be arrested only on 3.5.2003.
9. Coupled with the above, from the examination of the accused under
section 313 Cr.P.C., it transpires that the accused was not available after
the incident. The absence of the accused has been sought to be explained by
him by stating that he could come to know of the news of the death of his
wife from the newspapers after which he had reported the incident to his
sister.
10. A careful consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
would go to show that there is no direct evidence of any eye witness to the
crime alleged against the accused. However, it transpires from the
depositions of the prosecution witnesses that certain circumstances
inimical to the accused have been proved by the prosecution in the present
case. Such circumstances which have been culled out by the learned trial
court and also by the High Court can be summarised as below:
i) The accused had been making demands for dowry and on that account
was harassing, intimidating and committing atrocities on the
deceased;
ii) the accused and the deceased alognwith PWs 1 and 2 had attended the
betrothal function of the brother of the deceased in the evening
prior to the incident. Immediately after the incident, there was a
quarrel between the accused and the deceased;
iii) in the early morning of the next day the deceased was found by PW
3, lying in a cot in her own house with injuries on her neck;
iv) the accused was found by PW 3 to be running away from the place.
v) the whereabouts of the accused was not known after the incident and
he could be arrested only on 3.5.2003; and
vi) the accused had stated in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C.
that he came to know of the incident only from the newspapers,
whereafter he had explained the whole incident to his sister.
11. The culpability of the accused-appellant, in the absence of any direct
evidence, has to be judged on the basis of the circumstances enumerated
above. The principles of law governing proof of a criminal charge by
circumstantial evidence would hardly require any reiteration save and
except that the circumstances on which the prosecution relies must be
proved beyond all reasonable doubt and such circumstances must be capable
of giving rise to an inference which is inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. It is only in such an event
that the conviction of the accused, on the basis of the circumstantial
evidence brought by the prosecution, would be permissible in law. In this
regard a reference to the “five golden principles” enunciated by this Court
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 may be
recapitulated for which purpose para 153 of the judgment in the above case
may be usefully extracted below:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be
said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances
concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not
only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and
'must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra : (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the
following observations were made:
certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that in the
present case the prosecution has failed to prove the most vital
circumstance of the case, namely, motive of the accused for committing the
alleged crime. Infact, according to the learned counsel, no charge against
the accused having been framed under section 498A IPC inspite of specific
allegations of demand of dowry and harassment etc. of the deceased by the
accused the motive for commission of the alleged offence remain
unsubstantiated. Learned counsel has also pointed out that the prosecution
case to the effect that the deceased had left her house in the evening
prior to the incident and has spent the night in the house of co-sister, PW
5, has not been established. It is also urged that, in any case, if the
deceased had spent night in the house of the co-sister, as claimed by the
prosecution, no explanation has been forthcoming as to how she could be
seen by PW 3 lying injured in the cot in her own house in the morning.
Learned counsel has further submitted that PW 3 has contradicted herself on
a vital part of the prosecution story, namely, the point of time when she
had seen the deceased lying in the cot and the accused fleeing away from
the place. While at one place PW 3 had claimed to have seen the above
sequence of events while going to the stools side, in her cross-examination
she had stated that she saw the same while returning.
13. In reply, the learned State Counsel has contended that prosecution
case cannot fail merely on account of the absence of proof of any motive on
the part of the accused to commit the crime. Learned counsel has submitted
that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 amply demonstrates that demand for dowry
was made by the accused from time to time and also the ill-treatment meted
out by the accused to the deceased. The incident had taken place in the
house of the accused to which the deceased had returned in the early
morning. It is pointed out that PW 3, who had seen the accused fleeing away
from the place of occurrence, is related to both the sides and, therefore,
is eminently reliable. The absence of accused for a period of nearly 15
days after the incident and the recoveries made on the basis of the
statement of the accused has been pointed out by the learned counsel as
sufficient proof of the involvement of the accused in the crime alleged
against him. The contradictions in the evidence of PW 3, according to the
learned counsel, are minor and insignificant. Learned counsel has also
pointed out that though PW 5 was declared hostile, she had, infact,
supported the prosecution case to the extent that in the early morning of
the day of the incident, as the deceased had not come out from her house,
PW 5 had gone to the house of the deceased and found her lying on the cot
with injuries on the neck.
14. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties
and the entire evidence on record. Upon such consideration we find that
from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 it is crystal clear that the accused had
been persistently demanding additional dowry from the deceased and had been
ill-treating her. From the evidence tendered by the said two witnesses it
is also clear that immediately before the incident there was a quarrel
between the accused and the deceased. In the early morning of 18.4.2003 the
deceased was found lying injured in the cot in her own house by PW 3 as
well as by PW 5. Nobody except the accused was in the house immediately
before the occurrence. The accused was seen fleeing away from the house by
PW 3. Thereafter, the whereabouts of the accused were not known until he
was arrested on 3.5.2003. After his arrest, the accused had made a
statement (Exh. P.8) on the basis of which a knife and a blood stained
shirt of the accused (M.Os. 6 and 7) were recovered. The explanation
offered by the accused for his absence for a period of nearly 15 days
following the death of his wife is unnatural and opposed to all cannons of
acceptable human conduct and behaviour. The aforesaid circumstances which
have been proved and established by prosecution, in our considered view,
squarely satisfies the test laid down by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda (supra). The principles laid down in the aforesaid decision have
been consistently reiterated by this court and exhaustively considered in a
very recent decision in Sathya Narayanan v. State Rep. by Inspector of
Police (decided on November 2, 2012). (Reported in J.T. 2012 (11) SC 57).
15. Having considered the totality of the facts of the present case and
the principles of law as above, we are left with no doubt whatsoever that
in the present case the prosecution has established beyond all reasonable
doubt that it is the accused alone and nobody who had committed the
offence. Accordingly, we are of the view that the conviction of the accused
and the sentence imposed on him by the learned trial court as affirmed by
the High Court will not justify any interference. We, therefore, dismiss
the appeal and affirm the conviction of the accused under section 302 IPC
and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.
................J.
[P. SATHASIVAM]
................J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
November 22, 2012.
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