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Tuesday, November 6, 2012

A total of 215 bighas (approximately) of land was allotted to the appellant – Company in Samvat 1998 (corresponding to English Calender year 1941) on the basis of 6 pattas issued by Zamindar in whom the land had come to be vested. The pattas specified that the land was meant for setting up of the sugar factory and any kind of agricultural operations therein was prohibited. The pattas also specified that the same would be valid till the existence of the factory.surplus land has been transferred contrary to the terms of the patta in connivance and collusion with the officials of the State Government.land measuring about 178 bighas stood recorded in the name of the appellant – Company in the revenue record of Samvat 2013. In the said records the name of the appellant was recorded as a “pucca tenant” under Section 54 (vii) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’). Thereafter with the coming into force of the MP Land Revenue Code in the year 1959 the name of the appellant – Company was recorded as a ‘bhumiswami’ in respect of the aforesaid land.The rights of a bhumiswami are clearly enumerated by Section 165 of the MP Land Revenue Code which encompasses a right to transfer. The bar imposed on the right to transfer does not apply to non-agricultural lands and, hence, would not be relevant to the present case. If the right of transfer has been conferred on the appellant by the provisions of a statute and the bar contemplated does not apply to the appellant, we do not see how a clause or a condition in the original patta granted by the Zamindar in samvat 1978-79 (corresponding to English Calender year 1940-41) can restrict such a right. In any case, there is no specific clause or condition in any of the original pattas prohibiting or even restricting the right of the appellant to transfer any part of the land allotted to it that may be lying vacant. Neither any material has been placed before us to enable us to take the view that under terms of the lease granted under Section 101 of Tenancy Act and Section 39 of Abolition of Zamindari Act any restriction or bar had been imposed on the appellant – Company from making such a transfer. 14. In view of the aforesaid conclusions the issue with regard to applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, need not detains us, save and except to hold that the provisions of either of the aforesaid Acts, ex-facie, do not apply to the case of the appellant – Company. We would further like to observe on the view taken by us it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the decree affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in S.A. No.482 of 2002 binds the State or whether the same is in respect of the entire land holding of the appellant – Company or only a part thereof. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 01.12.2007 of the High Court as well as the directions contained in the said order.


|REPORTABLE            |

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 7760  of 2012
                (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1861 of 2008)


Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. & Anr.                … Appellant(s)
                                   Versus
Anil  Gupta and Ors.                         … Respondent(s)

                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

      Leave granted.

2.     This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
01.12.2007 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a  Public  Interest
Litigation registered and numbered as Writ Petition  No.1773/2006.   By  the
order impugned in the present appeal, directions have  been  issued  by  the
High Court for demarcation of the surplus land of the  appellant  –  Company
both under the provisions  of  the  Urban  Land  Ceiling  Act,  1976  (since
repealed) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Urban Land Ceiling Act’) as  well
as the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agriculture Holding  Act,
1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding  Act).
 After the demarcation of the excess land in terms of the directions  issued
by the High Court, further directions have been issued for  vesting  of  the
excess land, both urban and agricultural, in the  Government.   Furthermore,
the appellant – Company has been restrained from affecting any transfers  of
the urban land allotted to it and all such transfers as may have  been  made
have been declared as null and void by the High Court.

3.    A brief resume  of  the  relevant  facts  in  which  the  above  noted
directions have been issued by the High Court may now be set out:

      The appellant, a private limited company, is  the  owner  of  a  sugar
mill located at Dabra, district Gwalior in the State of Madhya  Pradesh.   A
total of 215 bighas (approximately) of land was allotted to the appellant  –
Company in Samvat 1998 (corresponding to English Calender year 1941) on  the
basis of 6 pattas issued by Zamindar  in  whom  the  land  had  come  to  be
vested.  The pattas specified that the land was meant for setting up of  the
sugar  factory  and  any  kind  of  agricultural  operations   therein   was
prohibited.  The pattas also specified that the same  would  be  valid  till
the existence of the factory.  After  setting  up  of  the  sugar  mill  the
Company appears to have run into certain financial difficulties and for  the
upkeep of the sugar mill and for modernization  thereof  the  Company  by  a
Resolution decided to sell/transfer some parts of the vacant  land  allotted
to it.  In fact some surplus land  stood  transferred  by  way  of  sale  to
certain individuals and the area so transferred is roughly about  9  bighas.
In these circumstances, the Writ Petition in question was filed as a  Public
Interest Litigation  contending  that  surplus  land  has  been  transferred
contrary to the terms of the patta in  connivance  and  collusion  with  the
officials of the State Government. According to  the  petitioner  more  such
transfers were contemplated.

4.    The stand of the officials – respondents,  initially,  was  that  land
measuring about 178 bighas stood recorded in the name  of  the  appellant  –
Company in the revenue record of Samvat 2013.  In the said records the  name
of the appellant was recorded as a “pucca tenant” under Section 54 (vii)  of
the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy  Act,  Samvat  2007  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’).   Thereafter with the coming  into  force
of the MP Land Revenue Code in the year 1959 the name  of  the  appellant  –
Company was recorded as a ‘bhumiswami’ in respect  of  the  aforesaid  land.
The revenue records in support of the above facts were in fact  enclosed  to
the return filed before the High Court on behalf of  the  State.   A  report
dated  2.5.2003  of  the  primary  revenue  authority  i.e.  Naib  Tehsildar
reciting the above facts  and  the  fact  that  the  appellant  Company  was
exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  provisions  of   the   Ceiling   on
Agricultural Holding Act by an order dated 8.1.1976 passed by the  competent
authority was also enclosed to the said return.  Subsequently,  however,  an
additional return dated 7.8.2007 was filed on behalf of  the  state  wherein
the right of the appellant to transfer the land contrary  to  the  terms  of
the pattas issued to it was questioned, notwithstanding,  its  status  as  a
Bhumiswami under the Land Revenue Code, 1959.

5.    The appellant – Company and its principal Director who were  impleaded
respondent Nos.12 and 13 in the PIL, in  their  return,  placed  before  the
High Court copies of the original pattas granted by  the  then  Zamindar  in
Samvat 1997-98 (English Calender year 1941-42).  It was claimed that on  the
basis of the entries in the  revenue  records,  namely,  Khasra  of  village
Dabra, Samvat 2007 (equivalent to English calendar year 1950) the status  of
the appellant – Company in respect of the land in question was  recorded  as
‘Gair Mairusi’.  The appellant – Company had contended that with the  coming
into force of the Tenancy Act, w.e.f. 15.8.50, by virtue of  the  provisions
of Section 54 (vii), the status of the appellant – Company became that of  a
“pucca tenant”.  Thereafter, on the coming into force of  the  Land  Revenue
Code in  the year 1959, the status of the appellant – Company was that of  a
bhumiswami which vested in the appellant – Company a right  of  transfer  of
the land under Section 165 (1)  of  the  Code.   The  bar  imposed  on  such
transfer by sub-section (4) of section 165 did not apply to the case of  the
appellant – Company in view of the fact that the land that  it  was  holding
was non-agricultural land.  The appellant – Company, in  its  return  before
the High Court, had also referred to an order dated 22.11.1993 of the  Under
Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Law  Justice  and  Company
Affairs (Department of Company Affairs) which  had  noticed  all  the  above
facts including the reasons for the transfers of some of the lands  held  by
the appellant – Company already made or proposed.   It  was  contended  that
by virtue of the aforesaid order dated  22.11.93  approval  of  the  Central
Government for commencement of business of  sale  of  surplus  land  by  the
company was granted.    Another significant fact that was mentioned  by  the
appellant – Company in its return is a proceeding before the High  Court  of
Madhya Pradesh  in  Second Appeal No.482 of 2002 which  stood  concluded  by
order dated 25.8.03 holding that the appellant – Company  had  acquired  the
status of Bhumiswami in respect of the land allotted to it.

6.    On a consideration of the respective cases pleaded by  the  contesting
parties and on due consideration  of the materials on record the High  Court
had thought it fit to pass the impugned directions, details  of  which  have
already been noticed. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed.

7.    We have heard Shri  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Shri B.S. Banthia, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.  3-
12. None has appeared on  behalf  of  the  PIL  petitioners  who  have  been
impleaded as the respondents 1 and 2 in the present appeal.


8.    Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that  in  the  revenue
records  pertaining  to  the  land  in  question,  as  existing   prior   to
commencement of Tenancy Act, the appellant  –  Company  was  recorded  as  a
‘Gair  Mairusi’.   After  coming  into  force  of  the  Tenancy  Act  w.e.f.
15.8.1950 the appellant – Company acquired the status of  a  “pucca  tenant”
under Section 54(vii) of the Act.  The said status entitled the appellant  –
Company to the status of “bhumiswami” once the MP Land  Revenue  Code,  1959
came into force.   The aforesaid position,  it  is  pointed  out,  had  been
accepted and acknowledged by the State Government in the return filed by  it
before the High Court.  Learned  counsel  has  also  pointed  out  that  the
status of the appellant – Company as a bhumiswami had not been  disputed  in
the additional return filed on behalf  of  the  State  –  wherein  the  only
contention urged is that such status would not confer  in  the  appellant  a
right to transfer the land contrary to the  terms  of  the  patta.   Learned
counsel has  also  referred  to  the  order  of  the  Government  of  India,
Ministry of Law Justice and Company Affairs dated 22.11.1993 as well as  the
judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated  25.08.2003  in
Second Appeal No. 480 of 2002 to contend that the transfers already made  or
proposed by the  appellant  –  company  were  with  due  permission  of  the
competent authority of  the  Government  of  India  and  the  right  of  the
appellant  –  company  to  affect  such  transfers,  as  a  bhumiswami,  had
attained  finality  in  law  by  virtue  of  the  judgment  passed  in   the
proceedings of the Second Appeal before the High Court. Learned counsel  had
vehemently argued that the right of a bhumiswami to transfer the land  being
a  statutory  right,  the  exercise  thereof  cannot  be  curtailed  by  the
conditions of the patta, as urged in the additional  return  dated  7.8.2007
of the State.


9.    Proceeding further, learned counsel has pointed  out  that  the  Urban
Land Ceiling Act stood repealed w.e.f. 22.3.1999 and thus was not  in  force
on the date of the judgment of the High Court.  The provisions of  the  said
repealed Act, therefore, could not have been applied  to  the  case  of  the
appellant.  In so far  as  the  Ceiling  on  Agricultural  Holding   Act  is
concerned, it is pointed out that in  the  report  of  the  Tehsildar  dated
02.05.2003 it has already been recorded that the  appellant  –  Company  was
exempted from the provisions of the said Act. In such a situation  the  High
Court could not have invoked the provisions of  either of the enactments  to
the present case so as to justify the directions under challenge.

10.   The State which had initially supported  the  case  of  the  appellant
before the High Court had reiterated before us the stand taken by it in  the
additional counter filed before the High Court on  7.8.2007.   Shortly  put,
it is urged that the land  held  by  the  appellant  was  allotted  for  the
purpose of industry and not agriculture.   It  is  pointed  out  that  after
coming into force of the Madhya  Pradesh  Zamindari  Abolition  Act,  Samvat
2003, w.e.f. 2.10.1951, the land stood reverted  to  the  Government.  Under
Section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act it was incumbent on the  appellant
to submit an application for grant of a fresh lease  to  be  issued  by  the
State Government under Section 101 of  the  Tenancy  Act  of  1950.   It  is
contended that no such  application  was  filed  nor  any  fresh  lease  was
granted by the State Government under the aforesaid provisions  of  the  two
Acts in question. The acquisition  of  the  status  of  bhumiswami,  in  the
absence of a fresh lease under Section 101 of  the  Tenancy  Act,  has  been
questioned on the aforesaid basis. It is also contended that  the  order  of
the Government of India, Ministry of Law Justice and Company  Affairs  dated
22.11.93 was not a permission authorizing to  the  appellant  –  Company  to
sell the land. In so far as the Civil  Court  decree  is  concerned,  it  is
contended that the said decree  pertains  only  to  land  covered  by  three
specific khasra Nos. i.e. 1760/1, 1755/1 and 1776/1 and not to  the   entire
area allotted.  In any case according to the State, the  said  decree  would
not be binding on it in as much as it was not a party to the  suit  and  the
resultant proceedings.

11.   The provisions of section 101 of the Tenancy Act  and  section  39  of
the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act may  be  extracted  herein  below  for  the
purpose of necessary clarity in the discussions that will have to follow:
      Section 101 of the Tenancy Act


      “101.   Leases for non-agricultural purposes – (1) The Government  may
      grant leases of land to be used for other than agricultural  purposes.
      The rights and liabilities of the lessee of such land shall be such as
      may be defined by the terms of his lease.


      Special leases for agricultural purposes – (1) In order to develop and
      demonstrate farming by mechanical means or  in  view  of  the  special
      circumstances of *[1][any tract or piece of land] the  Government  may
      also grant leases of land for agricultural  purposes  on  special  and
      specified conditions. The rights and liabilities of the lessee of such
      land shall be such as may be defined by the terms of the lease.


        2) The Government may either generally or specially delegate any of
           its powers  under  this  section  to  such  officer  as  may  be
           specified in this behalf.”



      Section 39 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act

      “39.  Grant of fresh lease for land  given  for  purposes  other  than
      agriculture


      A person who has taken land on  lease  from  the  proprietor  for  any
      purpose other than agriculture shall apply within six months from  the
      date of vesting, to obtain from  the  Government  a  new  lease  under
      Section 101 (1) of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration  and  Ryotwari
      Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat  2007,  and  the  Government  may
      grant a lease subject to such terms and conditions  for  securing  the
      rent and utility of land as may be deemed proper.  From  the  date  of
      vesting up to the grant of new lease the person shall be deemed to  be
      a lessee of the Government for that land on  the  same  conditions  on
      which the  lease  was  granted  to  him  by  the  proprietor.  If  the
      Government does not think it proper in the public  interest  to  grant
      the lease, the amount of compensation shall be paid at market value.”


 12.    At the very outset, it must be made clear  that  the  provisions  of
the Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, have been pressed into  service  for  the
first time in the present appeal.  Neither  in  the  pleadings  nor  in  the
arguments made before the High Court on behalf of the State,  the facts  now
asserted and the legal issues  now  raised  had  been  urged.  However,  the
question raised being with regard to the effect of a statutory enactment  we
have considered the same. In the absence of any pleading that the  procedure
for grant of a fresh lease contemplated under section 39  of  the  Zamindari
Abolition Act  had  not  been  followed  by  the  appellant  by  making  the
requisite application as contemplated by section 101 of the Tenancy Act,  no
adverse consequence can be attributed  to  the  appellant  as  contended  on
behalf of the State.  Rather, the status of the appellant  as  a  bhumiswami
recorded in the revenue records of the later years, in the  absence  of  any
contrary material, will have to be understood to be pursuant  to  the  grant
of a fresh lease under section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act  read  with
the provisions of section 101 of the Tenancy  Act.   Infact,  acceptance  of
the acquisition of  the  status  of  bhumiswami  by  the  appellant  in  the
aforesaid manner will render it unnecessary for us to go into the  basis  of
the acquisition of the said status as argued by the learned counsel for  the
appellant, which, in any case, appears to be contrary to  the  provision  of
section 1(2) of the Tenancy Act. The said  provision  clearly  excludes  the
villages settled  under  the  Zamindari  system  from  the  purview  of  the
operation of Part II of the Tenancy Act, which part of the Act, inter  alia,
also deals with  the  acquisition  of  the  status  of  “pucca  tenant”  and
“Bhumiswami” by a tenant. However obliteration of Part  II  of  the  Tenancy
Act by operation of section 1(2) thereof does not extinguish  the  different
denominations of tenancy including the status of Bhumiswami which  can  very
well be acquired by grant of such status by a  fresh  lease  under  sections
101 of the Tenancy Act read with section 39 of the M.B. Zamindari  Abolition
Act.


13.   The rights of a bhumiswami are clearly enumerated by  Section  165  of
the MP Land Revenue Code which encompasses a right  to  transfer.   The  bar
imposed on the right to transfer does not apply  to  non-agricultural  lands
and, hence, would not be relevant to the present  case.   If  the  right  of
transfer has been conferred on the appellant by the provisions of a  statute
and the bar contemplated does not apply to the appellant, we do not see  how
a clause or a condition in the original patta granted  by  the  Zamindar  in
samvat  1978-79  (corresponding  to  English  Calender  year  1940-41)   can
restrict such a right.   In  any  case,  there  is  no  specific  clause  or
condition in any of the original pattas prohibiting or even restricting  the
right of the appellant to transfer any part of the land allotted to it  that
may be lying vacant. Neither any material  has  been  placed  before  us  to
enable us to take the view that under  terms  of  the  lease  granted  under
Section 101 of Tenancy Act and Section 39 of Abolition of Zamindari Act  any
restriction or bar had been imposed on the appellant – Company  from  making
such a transfer.


14.   In view  of  the  aforesaid  conclusions  the  issue  with  regard  to
applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Ceiling on  Agricultural
Holding Act, need not   detains  us,  save  and  except  to  hold  that  the
provisions of either of the aforesaid Acts, ex-facie, do not  apply  to  the
case of the appellant – Company.  We would further like to  observe  on  the
view taken by us it is not necessary to go into the question as  to  whether
the decree affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in  S.A.  No.482  of
2002 binds the State or whether the same is in respect of  the  entire  land
holding of the appellant – Company or only a part thereof.


15.   In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached we  allow
this appeal and set aside the judgment and order  dated  01.12.2007  of  the
High Court as well as the directions contained in the said order.

                                         ...…………………………J.
                                           [P. SATHASIVAM]



                                ........……………………J.
                                           [RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
November 2, 2012.
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[1]    The words “or place of land”  are inserted by M.B. Act No. 18 of
1952.

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