REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 482 OF 2002
ASHRAFKHAN @ BABU MUNNEKHAN
PATHAN … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT …RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 486-487 OF 2002
YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDDADKHAN
PATHAN & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT …RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 762-765 OF 2002
STATE OF GUJARAT … APPELLANT
VERSUS
YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDADATTKHAN
PATHAN & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 766-768 OF 2002
STATE OF GUJARAT … APPELLANT
VERSUS
ABDUL KHURDUSH ABDUL GANI
SHAIKH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
These appeals have been filed against the judgment and order dated
31st of January, 2002 passed by Additional Designated Judge, Court No.3,
Ahmedabad City in TADA Case Nos. 15/1995 and 6/1996 consolidated with TADA
Case Nos. 32/1994 and 43/1996.
According to the prosecution, Abdul Wahab Abdul Majid Khan was
arrested in a case of murder. On being interrogated in that case, he made
startling and shocking revelations. He disclosed that accused Yusuf
Laplap, who is involved in illegal business of liquor and running a
gambling den is in possession of four foreign made hand grenades, revolvers
and AK-47 rifles. The fountainhead of the weapons, according to the
information is notorious criminal Abdul Latif Shaikh and came at the hand
of accused Yusuf Laplap through his close associate accused Abdul Sattar @
Sattar Chacha. Sattar gave the arms and explosives to accused Siraj @ Siraj
Dadhi, a constable attached to Vejalpur Police Station. He in turn
delivered those arms and explosives to accused Imtiyaz Nuruddin, the
servant of Yusuf Laplap at latter’s instance. The aforesaid information
was passed on to A.K. Suroliya, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime
Branch. The police party searched the house of the accused Yusuf Laplap in
the night and found him leaving the house with two bags. From one of the
bags one revolver with ISI mark and five foreign made hand grenades were
recovered and from another bag five detonators having clips affixed to it
were found.
According to the allegation, the arms and explosives seized were
similar to those used in the Ahmedabad City earlier by gang of criminals
and intended to be used in the forthcoming “Jagannath Rath Yatra”. The
information given by the Police Inspector, U.T. Brahmbhatt led to
registration of Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9th of June, 1994, at
the Crime Branch Police Station under Section 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, Section 3 & 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
(hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA’), Section 7 & 25 (1) of the Arms Act and
Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act against seven accused
persons[1].
It is the case of the prosecution that the Police Inspector U.T.
Brahmbhatt, before recording the first information report, sought prior
approval of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, for
registration of the case which was granted. It is only thereafter, the
first information report was registered and the investigation proceeded.
It is also their case that another approval was granted on 15th of June,
1994 by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department. Not only that, the
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, PW-65 A.R. Suroliya gave
another approval on 11th of August, 1994.
During the course of investigation, the complicity of large number of
persons surfaced. In all 46 AK-56 rifles, 40 boxes of cartridges, 99
bombs, 110 fuse pins and 110 magazines were brought to Ahmedabad and seized
by the investigating agency from various accused persons. These were
distributed to the accused persons for killing and terrorising the Hindu
community during “Jagannath Rath Yatra”. All those persons who were either
found in possession or involved in transporting or facilitating
transportation of those weapons were charge-sheeted. All these were
intended to be used to disturb peace and communal harmony during “Jagannath
Rath Yatra”.
Ultimately, the investigating agency, on 16th of December, 1994
submitted first[2] charge-sheet against 14 accused persons under Section
120B, 121A, 122, 123 and 188 of Indian Penal Code, Section 3 and 5 of TADA,
Section 4, 5 and 6 of Explosive Substances Act, Section 25(1A) of Arms Act,
Section 135 of Customs Act and Section 135 (1) of Bombay Police Act.
Second[3] charge-sheet came to be filed on 23rd of May, 1995 against 2
accused persons. Investigation did not end there and third[4], fourth[5]
and fifth[6] charge-sheets were submitted on 17th of April, 1996, 20th of
December, 1996 and 24th of May, 2000 against 33, 11 and 2 accused persons
respectively. Thus, altogether 62 persons were charge-sheeted.
The Designated Court framed charges against 60 accused persons under
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 4,
5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 25 (1A) of the Arms
Act. However, Accused No. 57 namely, Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz @ Chhote
Rahim, has been discharged by the Designated Court by its order dated 24th
of August, 2001. During the course of trial six accused namely, Adambhai
Yusufbhai Mandli (Shaikh), Accused No. 11, Fanes Aehmohmad Ansari, Accused
No. 18, Abdullatif Abdulvahab Shaikh, Accused No. 35, Ikbal Jabbarkhan
Pathan, Accused No. 38, Firoz @ Firoz Kankani, Accused No. 56 and Jay
Prakash Singh @ Bachchi Singh, Accused No. 60 died. One accused namely,
Accused No. 9, Mohmad Ismail Abdul Shaikh absconded.
In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution altogether examined
70 witnesses and a large number of documents were also exhibited. The
accused were given opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing in
the evidence against them and their defence was denial simpliciter. The
Designated Court, on analysis of the evidence, both oral and documentary,
vide its order dated 31st of January, 2002 convicted 11 accused persons[7]
under Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and
Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act. They have been
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence
punishable under Section 3 and 5 of TADA and fine with default clause. The
Designated Court further sentenced those convicted under Section 4, 5 and 6
of the Explosive Substances Act to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five
years and fine with default clause. They were further sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine with default clause under
Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to
run concurrently. The Designated Court, however, acquitted 41 accused[8]
of all the charges leveled against them.
Those found guilty have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 482 of 2002
(Ashrafkhan @ Babu Munnekhan Pathan & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat) and
Criminal Appeal Nos. 486-487 of 2002 (Yusufkhan @ Laplap Khuddadkhan Pathan
& Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat). State of Gujarat, aggrieved by the
inadequacy of sentence, preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 762-765 of 2002
(State of Gujarat Vs. Yusufkhan @ Laplap Khudadattkhan Pathan & Ors.) and
also preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 766-768 of 2002 (State of Gujarat Vs.
Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani Shaikh & Ors.) against acquittal.
As all these appeals arise out of the same judgment, they were heard
together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar and Mr. Ranjit Kumar learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Garvesh Kabra, learned amicus curiae, Mr. Sanjay Jain and Ms.
Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel on behalf of the accused. Mr. Yashank
Adhyaru, learned Senior Counsel was heard on behalf of the State of
Gujarat.
In order to assail the conviction several submissions were made by the
learned counsel representing the accused. However, as the conviction has
to be set aside on a very short ground, we do not consider it either
expedient to incorporate or answer those submissions.
We may record here that we have incorporated only those parts of the
prosecution case which have bearing on the said point and shall discuss
hereinafter only those materials which are relevant for adjudication of the
said issue.
It is the contention of the accused that the first information report
under the provisions of TADA was registered without approval of the
District Superintendent of Police as contemplated under Section 20-A(1) of
TADA and this itself vitiates the conviction.
Plea of the State, however, is that such an approval was granted by
A.R. Suroliya, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, who is an
officer of the rank of District Superintendent of Police. Alternatively,
the State contends that Section 20-A of TADA is a two tiered provision
which provides for approval by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 20-
A(1) and sanction by the Commissioner under Section 20-A(2) of TADA. In
the absence of challenge to the sanction, challenge only to the approval,
to use the counsel’s word “would be curable defect under Section 465 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure”. It has also been pointed out that the accused
having not challenged the sanction granted by the Commissioner of Police
under Section 20-A(2) of TADA, they cannot assail their conviction on the
ground of absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) by the Deputy
Commissioner. In order to defend the conviction, the State of Gujarat
further pleads that the Designated Court having taken cognizance and
decided to try the case by itself under Section 18 of TADA, the prior
defects, if any, are rendered irrelevant and cannot be raised. It has also
been pointed out that the Designated Court having been empowered to take
cognizance under Section 14 of TADA irrespective of absence of compliance
of Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-compliance would not be fatal to the
prosecution. It has also been highlighted that several safeguards have
been provided under the scheme of TADA including the power of the court to
take cognizance and proceed with the trial and once cognizance has been
taken, defects prior to that cannot be allowed to be raised. In any view
of the matter, according to the State, absence of approval under
Section 20-A(1) of TADA would not vitiate the conviction of the accused
persons under other penal provisions.
In view of the rival submissions the question for determination is as
to whether the Deputy Commissioner, A.R. Suroliya gave prior approval on
9th of June, 1994 or 11th of August, 1994 for recording the first
information report as contemplated under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and in
case it is found on facts that no such approval was granted, the effect
thereof on the conviction of the accused. Further, the effect of approval
by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department on 15th of June,1994 is
also required to be gone into.
To prove prior approval by the Deputy Commissioner before the lodging
of the first information report, the prosecution has mainly relied on the
evidence of the Inspector of Police U.T. Brahmbhatt, PW-10 and Deputy
Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, PW-65. Xerox copy of the approval (Exh.
775)has also been brought on record to establish that. It is not in dispute
that officer of the rank of Deputy Commissioner is equivalent to District
Superintendent of Police. U.T. Brahmbhatt has stated in his evidence that
“Mr. Suroliya passed an order, sanctioned the same and an endorsement is
also made regarding that”. This witness has been subjected to cross-
examination and in the cross-examination he has admitted that the letter
asking for approval to investigate and the report under Section 157 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) has been
lost while producing the same in the Supreme Court. A.R. Suroliya, PW-65,
in his evidence has supported the case of the prosecution regarding prior
approval. While explaining the absence of the original approval, this
witness has stated in his evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court
for hearing of the application filed by the accused Yusuf Laplap and handed
over the original papers to the senior counsel. According to him, the
senior counsel told him that after producing the necessary papers before
the Supreme Court, the original papers would be sent back but it has not
come and despite efforts and inquiry, it could not be traced out.
According to his evidence “as the original letter of approval thereof is
not found” the xerox copy thereof was produced. It was marked as Exh.775.
In the cross-examination, he reiterated that he had gone to the Supreme
Court along with original approval letter and in the bail application of
accused Yusuf Laplap, the said approval was produced. He feigned ignorance
as to whether entry was made into outward register regarding approval and
denied suggestion that he did not receive any proposal for approval nor
granted the same and with a view to see that the case does not fall, he had
deposed falsely regarding approval. In his cross-examination he has stated
as follows:
“I do not know whether there is any such paper in my office or
not for grant of approval for which I have deposed.”
The Designated Court accepted the case of the prosecution and held
that prior approval was granted by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 20-
A(1) of TADA. While doing so, the Designated Court observed as follows:
“…The original documents were sent to the honorable Supreme
Court for the purpose of producing the same in court in
connection with the same petition and thereafter the same have
been misplaced or lost….”
It further observed as follows:
“….On receiving certain information from Abdul Wahab and Yusuf
Laplap Mr. Brahmbhatt lodged the FIR against seven accused
persons and it was sent for the approval of DCP and on getting
the approval under section 20-A(1), the offence was registered
under the TADA Act. Thereafter on perusal of the deposition, it
becomes clear that there was total compliance of Section 20-A(1)
of the TADA Act before lodging the FIR and on getting the
approval from DCP the offence was registered.
Having given our anxious consideration to the facts of the present
case and the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the case of the
prosecution that the Deputy Commissioner granted approval under Section 20-
A(1) of TADA before registration of the case is fit to be rejected. It is
interesting to note that the Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya has
categorically stated in his evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court
with original records, which included the first information report, on
which he had granted approval and handed over the same to the counsel.
Thereafter, according to him, the said original first information report
got lost or misplaced. It has been brought to our notice that accused
Yusuf Laplap had not come to this Court for grant of bail and, therefore,
the Deputy Commissioner had no occasion to come with the original record in
connection with that case. True it is that some of the accused persons in
the case had approached this Court for various reliefs, but in the face of
the evidence of the Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya that he came along
with the record in connection with the case of the accused Yusuf Laplap is
fit to be rejected. There are various other reasons also to reject this
part of the prosecution story.
As stated earlier, charge-sheet in the case has been filed in five
stages. Further, report under Section 157 of the Code has been filed and
all these acts had taken place before the alleged loss of the document in
the Supreme Court and, therefore, should have formed part of the charge-
sheet and the report given under Section 157 of the Code. It has also come
on record that later on, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch
had sought for approval of the Deputy Commissioner which he granted on 11th
of August, 1994. The communication of the Assistant Commissioner of Police
(Exh.1173) does not refer to any approval granted by the Deputy
Commissioner earlier and, not only that, the Deputy Commissioner while
giving approval on 11th of August, 1994 has nowhere whispered that earlier
he had already granted the approval. No explanation is forthcoming from
the side of the prosecution that when Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya had
already granted approval on 9th of June, 1994, what was the occasion to
write to him for grant of another approval and the Deputy Commissioner
granting the same. To prove prior approval, the prosecution has produced
the xerox copy. According to the evidence of Deputy Commissioner A.R.
Suroliya, he had got it prepared from the copy kept in his office. We
wonder as to how and why when a copy of the approval was kept in the office
of the Deputy Commissioner itself, xerox copy was produced. It is relevant
here to state that this witness, in his cross-examination, has admitted
that he does not remember whether “there is any such paper in my office or
not for grant of approval for which” he had deposed.
In the face of what we have observed above the case of the prosecution
that prior approval was granted on 9th of June, 1994 is fit to be rejected.
It seems that the prosecution has come out with a story of grant of prior
approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA in view of the decision of
this Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC
459. There the prosecution has propounded the theory of oral permission
which was rejected. In that case also the prosecution has pressed into
service the permission granted on 11th of August, 1994 by the same Deputy
Commissioner i.e. A.R. Suroliya and earlier oral permission. While
rejecting the same this Court has observed as follows:
“4. It is, however, contended by the prosecution that on the
very date when investigation had been made in this case, the
Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad was present and he had given
oral permission under Section 20-A(1) of TADA. We may indicate
here that considering the serious consequences in a criminal
case initiated under the provisions of TADA, oral permission
cannot be accepted. In our view, Section 20-A(1) must be
construed by indicating that prior approval of the statutory
authority referred to in the said sub-section must be in writing
so that there is transparency in the action of the statutory
authority and there is no occasion for any subterfuge
subsequently by introducing oral permission.”
From the analysis of the evidence on record, we have no manner of
doubt that the Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya did not grant prior
approval before registration of the case.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has relied on another approval
dated 11th of August, 1994 granted by the Deputy Commissioner. In order to
prove this, reference is made to the letter of the Assistant Commissioner
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Exh. 1173). In the said
letter, the Assistant Commissioner of Police has observed that the Home
Department of the Government has given approval to apply sections of TADA
and the approval of the Deputy Commissioner is necessary in this regard.
The Deputy Commissioner of Police on the same day granted approval.
However, Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, in his evidence, has nowhere
stated about the approval granted on 11th of August, 1994 though he had
deposed about the approval granted on 9th of June, 1994. In the face of
it, the case of the prosecution that Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya gave
another approval on 11th of August, 1994 is fit to be rejected.
Another approval said to have been granted by the Additional Chief
Secretary, Home Department for “using TADA sections” (Exh. 439) has also
been proved by the prosecution to establish compliance of Section 20-A(1)
of TADA. Accused has not joined issue on this count and in view of the
evidence on record, we have no hesitation in accepting the case of the
prosecution that the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, on 15th
of June, 1994 had given approval. However, its consequences on the
conviction of the accused shall be discussed later on.
Having found that the Deputy Commissioner has not granted the prior
approval, as required under Section 20-A(1) of TADA, we proceed to consider
the consequence thereof. For that, we deem it expedient to reproduce
Section 20-A of TADA which reads as under:
20-A Cognizance of offence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
information about the commission of an offence under this Act
shall be recorded by the police without the prior approval of
the District Superintendent of Police.
(2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act
without the previous sanction of the Inspector-General of
Police, or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police.
It is worth mentioning here that TADA, as originally enacted, did not
contain this provision and it has been inserted by Section 9 of the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (Act 43 of
1993). From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that
no information about the commission of an offence shall be recorded by the
police without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police.
The legislature, by using the negative word in Section 20-A(1) of TADA,
had made its intention clear. The scheme of TADA is different than that of
ordinary criminal statutes and, therefore, its provisions have to be
strictly construed. Negative words can rarely be held directory. The
plain ordinary grammatical meaning affords the best guide to ascertain the
intention of the legislature. Other methods to understand the meaning of
the statute is resorted to if the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd
result. No such situation exists here. In the face of it, the requirement
of prior approval by the District Superintendent of Police, on principle,
cannot be said to be directory in nature. There are authorities which
support the view we have taken. Reference, in this connection, can be made
to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji
Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302. As in the
present case, in the said case also the permission granted by the
Additional Chief Secretary was considered. The effect of absence of prior
approval by the District Superintendent of Police and the grant of approval
by the Additional Chief Secretary were not found to be in conformity with
the scheme of TADA. Paragraph 11 of the judgment which is relevant for the
purpose reads as follows:
“11. The case against the appellants originally was registered
on 19-3-1995 under the Arms Act. The DSP did not give any prior
approval on his own to record any information about the
commission of an offence under TADA. On the contrary, he made a
report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for
permission to proceed under TADA. Why? Was it because he was
reluctant to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by the
provision of Section 20-A(1)? This is a case of power conferred
upon one authority being really exercised by another. If a
statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to
exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion
is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some
higher authority's instruction, then it will be a case of
failure to exercise discretion altogether. In other words, the
discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20-A(1) was
not exercised by the DSP at all.”
The effect of non-compliance of Section 20-A(1) of TADA also
came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Mukhtiar Ahmed
Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2005) 5 SCC 258 and while holding that
absence of prior approval would vitiate the conviction, the Court observed
as under:
“23. We are unable to uphold the argument. In this case, the
Deputy Commissioner of Police himself had been examined as
prosecution witness (PW 4). In his deposition, he had not stated
that he had given any such direction to PW 11 Ram Mehar Singh to
register case against the accused under TADA. On the contrary,
he had expressly stated that he had granted sanction (which was
in writing) which is at Ext. P-4/1. As already adverted earlier,
it was under the Arms Act and not under TADA.
24. In our opinion, therefore, from the facts of the case, it
cannot be held that prior approval as required by Section 20-
A(1) has been accorded by the competent authority under TADA.
All proceedings were, therefore, vitiated. The contention of the
appellant-accused must be upheld and the conviction of the
appellant-accused under TADA must be set aside.”
In the present case, we have found that no prior approval was granted
by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and in the face of the judgments of
this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja (supra) and
Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari (supra), the conviction of the accused cannot be
upheld. It is worth mentioning that this Court had taken the same view in
the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) and on fact, having found that no
permission was granted, the charge was held to have been vitiated. It is
worth mentioning here that in Mohd. Yunus (supra) this Court observed that
no oral permission is permissible but in Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8
SCC 732 this Court held that District Superintendent of Police, in a given
contingency, can grant oral approval and that would satisfy the requirement
of Section 20-A(1) of TADA.
The conflict between the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Yunus
(supra) and Kalpnath Rai (supra) was considered by a three-Judge Bench in
the case of State of A.P. v. A. Sathyanarayana, (2001) 10 SCC 597 and this
Court held that oral approval is permissible and while over-ruling the
decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra), upheld the ratio laid down in
the case of Kalpnath Rai (supra) that the prior approval may be either
in writing or oral also. But, at the same time, the decision in the case
of Mohd. Yunus (supra) that prior approval is sine qua non for prosecution,
has not been watered down and, in fact, reiterated. This would be evident
from paragraph 8 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“8. Having applied our mind to the aforesaid two judgments of
this Court, we are in approval of the latter judgment and we
hold that it is not the requirement under Section 20-A(1) to
have the prior approval only in writing. Prior approval is a
condition precedent for registering a case, but it may be either
in writing or oral also, as has been observed by this Court in
Kalpnath Rai case, 1997 (8) SCC 732 and, therefore, in the case
in hand, the learned Designated Judge was wholly in error in
refusing to register the case under Sections 4 and 5 of TADA.
We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the learned
Designated Judge and direct that the matter should be proceeded
with in accordance with law.”
(underlining ours)
Another question which needs our attention is the effect of approval
dated 15th of June, 1994 given by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home
Department of the State. Section 20-A of TADA authorises the District
Superintendent of Police to grant approval for recording the offence and
Additional Chief Secretary of the Home Department or for that matter, State
Government does not figure in that. The legislature has put trust on the
District Superintendent of Police and therefore it is for him to uphold
that trust and nobody else. Hence approval by the Additional Chief
Secretary is inconsequential and it will not save the prosecution on this
count, if found vulnerable otherwise. We may however observe that in order
to prevent the abuse of TADA, the State Government may put other conditions
and prescribe approval by the Government or higher officer in the hierarchy
but the same cannot substitute the requirement of approval by the District
Superintendent of Police. Not only this, the District Superintendent of
Police is obliged to grant approval on its own wisdom and outside dictate
would vitiate his decision. This view finds support from the decision of
this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja (Supra).
Now we proceed to consider the submission advanced by the State that
non-compliance of Section 20-A(1) i.e. absence of approval of the District
Superintendent of Police, is a curable defect under Section 465 of the
Code. We do not have the slightest hesitation in holding that Section 465
of the Code shall be attracted in the trial of an offence by the Designated
Court under TADA. This would be evident from Section 14 (3) of TADA which
reads as follows:
“S.14.Procedure and powers of Designated Courts
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Designated
Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all
the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as
if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before
the Court of Session.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that for
the purpose of trial Designated Court is a Court of Session. It has all
the powers of a Court of Session and while trying the case under TADA, the
Designated Court has to follow the procedure prescribed in the Code for the
trial before a Court of Session. Section 465 of the Code, which falls in
Chapter XXXV, covers cases triable by a Court of Session also. Hence, the
prosecution can take shelter behind Section 465 of the Code. But Section
465 of the Code shall not be a panacea for all error, omission or
irregularity. Omission to grant prior approval for registration of the
case under TADA by the Superintendent of Police is not the kind of omission
which is covered under Section 465 of the Code. It is a defect which goes
to the root of the matter and it is not one of the curable defects.
The submission that absence of sanction under Section 20-A(2) by the
Commissioner of Police has been held to be a curable defect and for parity
of reasons the absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) would be curable
is also without substance and reliance on the decision of Lal Singh v.
State of Gujarat, (1998) 5 SCC 529, in this connection, is absolutely
misconceived. An Act which is harsh, containing stringent provision and
prescribing procedure substantially departing from the prevalent ordinary
procedural law cannot be construed liberally. For ensuring rule of law its
strict adherence has to be ensured. In the case of Lal Singh (supra)
relied on by the State, Section 20-A(1) of TADA was not under scanner.
Further, this Court in the said judgment nowhere held that absence of
sanction under Section 20-A(2) is a curable defect. In Lal Singh (supra)
the question of sanction was not raised before the Designated Court and
sought to be raised before this Court for the first time which was not
allowed. This would be evident from the following paragraph of the
judgment
“4. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that when the objection could
and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the
proceeding and has not been raised, mere error or irregularity
in any sanction of prosecution becomes ignorable. We therefore
do not permit the appellants to raise the plea of defect in
sanction.”
(underlining ours)
The decision of this Court in the case of Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh v.
State of U.P., (1996) 11 SCC 61, relied on by the State, instead of
supporting its contention clearly goes against it. As observed earlier,
the omission to grant approval does not come within the purview of Section
465 of the Code and, hence, the rigors of Section 465 (2) shall be wholly
inapplicable. Otherwise also, the accused have raised this point at the
earliest. Grant or absence of approval by the District Superintendent of
Police is a mixed question of law and fact. The very existence of the
approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA has been questioned by the accused
during the course of trial, which is evident from the trend of cross-
examination. Not only this, it was raised before the Designated Court
during argument and has been rejected. Thus, it cannot be said that it was
not raised at the earliest.
The plea of the State is that the Commissioner of Police having
granted the sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA, the conviction of the
accused cannot be held to be bad only on the ground of absence of approval
under Section 20-A(1) by the Deputy Commissioner. As observed earlier, the
provisions of TADA are stringent and consequences are serious and in order
to prevent persecution, the legislature in its wisdom had given various
safeguards at different stages. It has mandated that no information about
the commission of an offence under TADA shall be recorded by the police
without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police. Not
only this, further safeguard has been provided and restriction has been put
on the court not to take cognizance of any offence without the previous
sanction of the Inspector-General of Police or as the case may be, the
Commissioner of Police. Both operate in different and distinct stages and,
therefore, for successful prosecution both the requirements have to be
complied with. We have not come across any principle nor we are inclined
to lay down that in a case in which different safeguards have been provided
at different stages, the adherence to the last safeguard would only be
relevant and breach of other safeguards shall have no bearing on the trial.
Therefore, we reject the contention of the State that the accused cannot
assail their conviction on the ground of absence of approval under Section
20-A(1) of TADA by the Deputy Commissioner, when the Commissioner of Police
had granted sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA.
As regards submission of the State that the Designated Court having
taken cognizance and decided to try the case by itself in exercise of the
power under Section 18 of TADA, the prior defects, if any, are rendered
irrelevant and cannot be raised, has only been noted to be rejected.
Section 18 of TADA confers jurisdiction on the Designated Court to transfer
such cases for the trial of such offences in which it has no jurisdiction
to try and in such cases, the court to which the case is transferred, may
proceed with the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of the
offence. The power of the Designated Court to transfer the case to be
tried by a court of competent jurisdiction would not mean that in case the
Designated Court has decided to proceed with the trial, any defect in
trial, cannot be agitated at later stage. Many ingredients which are
required to be established to confer jurisdiction on a Designated Court are
required to be proved during trial. At the stage of Section 18 the
Designated Court has to decide as to whether to try the case itself or
transfer the case for trial to another court of competent jurisdiction.
For that, the materials collected during the course of investigation have
only to be seen. The investigating agency, in the present case, has come
out with a case that prior approval was given for registration of the case
and the allegations made do constitute an offence under TADA. In the face
of it, the Designated Court had no option than to proceed with the trial.
However, the decision by the Designated Court to proceed with the trial
shall not prevent the accused to contend in future that they cannot be
validly prosecuted under TADA. We hasten to add that even in a case which
is not fit to be tried by the Designated Court but it decides to do the
same instead of referring the case to be tried by a court of competent
jurisdiction, it will not prevent the accused to challenge the trial or
conviction later on.
The submission of the State that the Designated Court having been
empowered to take cognizance under Section 14 of TADA irrespective of
absence of compliance of Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-compliance would
not be fatal to the prosecution, does not commend us. Section 14 of TADA
confers jurisdiction on a Designated Court to take cognizance of any
offence when the accused being committed to it for trial upon receiving a
complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of
such facts. The offence under TADA is to be tried by a Designated Court.
The Designated Court has all the powers of Court of Session and it has to
try the offence as if it is a Court of Session. The Code provides for
commitment of the case for trial by the Court of Session. Section 14(1) of
TADA provides that the Designated Court may take cognizance on receiving a
complaint of facts or upon a police report. Had this provision not been
there, the cases under TADA would have been tried by the Designated Court
only after commitment. In any view of the matter, the accused during the
trial under TADA can very well contend that their trial is vitiated on one
or the other ground notwithstanding the fact that the Designated Court had
taken cognizance. Taking cognizance by the Designated Court shall not make
all other provisions inconsequential.
Lastly, it has been submitted that absence of approval under Section
20-A(1) of TADA would not vitiate the conviction of the accused under other
penal provisions. As stated earlier, the accused persons besides being
held guilty under Section 3 and 5 of TADA, have also been found guilty
under Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6 of the
Explosive Substances Act. According to the State, the conviction under the
Arms Act and the Explosive Substances Act, therefore, cannot be held to be
illegal. It is relevant here to state that the Designated Court, besides
trying the case under TADA, can also try any other offence with which the
accused may be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with
the offence under TADA. When the Designated Court had the power to try
offences under TADA as well as other offences, it is implicit that it has
the power to convict also and that conviction is permissible to be ordered
under TADA or other penal laws or both. In our opinion it is not necessary
for the Designated Court to first order conviction under TADA and only
thereafter under other penal law. In view of the five-Judge Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 2
SCC 409, this point does not need further elaboration. In the said case
this Court has observed that “the Designated Court is empowered to convict
the accused for the offence under any other law notwithstanding the fact
that no offence under TADA is made out.” This would be evident from
paragraph 37 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“37. The legislative intendment underlying Sections 12(1) and
(2) is clearly discernible, to empower the Designated Court to
try and convict the accused for offences committed under any
other law along with offences committed under the Act, if the
offence is connected with such other offence. The language “if
the offence is connected with such other offence” employed in
Section 12(1) of the Act has great significance. The necessary
corollary is that once the other offence is connected with the
offence under TADA and if the accused is charged under the Code
and tried together in the same trial, the Designated Court is
empowered to convict the accused for the offence under any other
law, notwithstanding the fact that no offence under TADA is made
out. This could be the only intendment of the legislature. To
hold otherwise, would amount to rewrite or recast legislation
and read something into it which is not there.”
We have held the conviction of the accused to have been vitiated on
account of non-compliance of Section 20-A(1) of TADA and thus, it may be
permissible in law to maintain the conviction under the Arms Act and the
Explosive Substances Act but that shall only be possible when there are
legally admissible evidence to establish those charges. The Designated
Court has only relied on the confessions recorded under TADA to convict the
accused for offences under the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances Act.
In view of our finding that their conviction is vitiated on account of non-
compliance of the mandatory requirement of prior approval under Section 20-
A(1) of TADA, the confessions recorded cannot be looked into to establish
the guilt under the aforesaid Acts. Hence, the conviction of the accused
under Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6 of the
Explosive Substances Act cannot also be allowed to stand.
As we have held the conviction and sentence of the accused to be
illegal and unsustainable, the appeals filed by the State against acquittal
and inadequacy of sentence have necessarily to be dismissed.
We appreciate the anxiety of the police officers entrusted with the
task of preventing terrorism and the difficulty faced by them. Terrorism
is a crime far serious in nature, more graver in impact and highly
dangerous in consequence. It can put the nation in shock, create fear and
panic and disrupt communal peace and harmony. This task becomes more
difficult when it is done by organized group with outside support. Had the
investigating agency not succeeded in seizing the arms and explosives, the
destruction would have been enormous. However, while resorting to TADA,
the safeguards provided therein must scrupulously be followed. In the
country of Mahatma, “means are more important than the end”. Invocation of
TADA without following the safeguards resulting into acquittal gives an
opportunity to many and also to the enemies of the country to propagate
that it has been misused and abused. District Superintendent of Police and
Inspector General of Police and all others entrusted with the task of
operating the law must not do anything which allows its misuse and abuse
and ensure that no innocent person has the feeling of sufferance only
because “My name is Khan, but I am not a terrorist”.
The facts of the case might induce mournful reflection how an attempt
by the investigating agency charged with the duty of preventing terrorism
and securing conviction has been frustrated by what is popularly called a
technical error. We emphasize and deem it necessary to repeat that the
gravity of the evil to the community from terrorism can never furnish an
adequate reason for invading the personal liberty, except in accordance
with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws.
We have been told that many of the accused, because of poverty or for
the reason that they had already undergone the sentence, have not preferred
appeals before this Court. Further, this Court had not gone into the
merits of the appeals preferred by few convicts on the ground that they
have already served out the sentence and released thereafter. The view
which we have taken goes to the root of the matter and vitiates the
conviction and, hence, we deem it expedient to grant benefit of this
judgment to all those accused who have been held guilty and not preferred
appeal and also those convicts whose appeals have been dismissed by this
Court as infructuous on the ground that they had already undergone the
sentence awarded.
In the result, we allow the appeals preferred by those accused who
have been convicted and sentenced by the Designated Court and set aside the
judgment and order of their conviction and sentence. However, we dismiss
the appeals preferred by the State against the inadequacy of sentence and
acquittal of some of the accused persons.
………………….………………………………….J.
(H.L. DATTU)
………..………..……………………………….J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 26, 2012.
SCHEDULE - I
List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9th of June,
1994.
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Yusufkhan Khudadatkhan Pathan @ Laplap |Accused No. 1 |
|2 |Abdul Latif Abdul Vahab Shaikh |Accused No. 2 |
|3 |Rasulkhan @ Yaz |Accused No. 3 |
|4 |A.H.C. Sirajmiya Akbarmiya @ Siraj |Accused No. 4 |
| |Dadhi | |
|5 |Imtiyaz |Accused No. 5 |
|6 |Gulal |Accused No. 6 |
|7 |Sattar Battery @ Sattar Chacha |Accused No. 7 |
SCHEDULE – II
List of persons named in the First Charge-Sheet dated 16th of December,
1994
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap Khudadatkhan |Accused No. 1 |
| |Pathan | |
|2 |Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore |Accused No. 2 |
|3 |Abdulkhurdush Abdulgani Shaikh |Accused No. 3 |
|4 |Mohmad Farukh @ Farukbawa Allarakha |Accused No. 4 |
| |Shaikh | |
|5 |Sajidali @ Benimohmadali Saiyed |Accused No. 5 |
|6 |Anwarkhan Mohmadkhan Pathan |Accused No. 6 |
|7 |Mohmad Jalaluddin @ Jalababa Tamizuddin|Accused No. 7 |
| |Saiyed | |
|8 |Gulamkadar Gulamhusain Shaikh |Accused No. 8 |
|9 |Mohmad Ismail Abdul Vahab Shaikh |Accused No. 9 |
|10 |Haiderkhan Lalkhan Pathan |Accused No. 10 |
|11 |Adambhai Yusufbhai Mandli (Shaikh) |Accused No. 11 |
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|12 |Mohmad Soyeb @ Soyeb Baba Abdul Gani |Accused No. 12 |
| |Shaikh | |
|13 |Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyed Husain Saiyed |Accused No. 13 |
|14 |Mohmad Hanif @ Anudin Husain Miya |Accused No. 14 |
| |Shaikh | |
SCHEDULE - III
List of persons named in the Second Charge-Sheet dated 23rd of May, 1995
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Gajanfarkhan @ Gajukhan |Accused No. 15 |
|2 |Asrafkhan @ Babu |Accused No. 16 |
SCHEDULE – IV
List of persons named in the Third Charge-Sheet dated 17th of April, 1996
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Munavar Ullakhan @ Imtiyaz Ullakhan @ |Accused No. 17 |
| |Pappu | |
|2 |Fanes Aehmohmad Ansari |Accused No. 18 |
|3 |Afzalhusain |Accused No. 19 |
|4 |Samimulla @ Sammu |Accused No. 20 |
|5 |Barikkhan @ Abdulsalim |Accused No. 21 |
|6 |Babukhan @ Lala |Accused No. 22 |
|7 |Maksud Ahmed Fatehahmed Shaikh |Accused No. 23 |
|8 |Mohmedsafi Abdul Rahman Saikh |Accused No. 24 |
|9 |Hafizudin Fajiudin Kaji |Accused No. 25 |
|10 |Sohrabduin @ Salim |Accused No. 26 |
|11 |Abdulgafar @ Gafar |Accused No. 27 |
|12 |Abdulkayam Nizamudin Shaikh |Accused No. 28 |
|13 |Mohmed Rafik @ Haji Rafikbhai Kapadia |Accused No. 29 |
|14 |Usmangani Musabhai Vohra |Accused No. 30 |
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|15 |Abdulvahab Abdulmajid Baloch |Accused No. 31 |
|16 |Abdul Sattar @ Sattar Battery |Accused No. 32 |
|17 |Abdulrauf @ Rauf |Accused No. 33 |
|18 |Imtiyazahmed Nurharanmiya Kadri |Accused No. 34 |
|19 |Abdullatif Abdulvahab Shaikh |Accused No. 35 |
|20 |Sabbirhusain Husainmiya Shaikh |Accused No. 36 |
|21 |Mustak Ahmed Istiyak Ahmed Pathan |Accused No. 37 |
|22 |Ikbal Jabbarkhan Pathan |Accused No. 38 |
|23 |Ayub @ Lala |Accused No. 39 |
|24 |Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandli |Accused No. 40 |
|25 |Musabhai Yusufbhai Madli |Accused No. 41 |
|26 |Daubhai Musabhia Shaikh |Accused No. 42 |
|27 |Mohmedamin @ Amin Chobeli |Accused No. 43 |
|28 |Musrafkhan Gorekhan Pathan |Accused No. 44 |
|29 |Mehmood @ Pepa Pelhwan Husenkhan |Accused No. 45 |
| |Nilgaramal | |
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|30 |Sahibudin @ Konjibaba |Accused No. 46 |
|31 |Husanbhai @ Bhajia |Accused No. 47 |
|32 |Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai Ajmeri |Accused No. 48 |
|33 |Gulam Mohmed @ Gulu |Accused No. 49 |
SCHEDULE – V
List of persons named in the Fourth Charge-Sheet dated 20th of December,
1996
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Mahebub Bag @ Mehbub Senior |Accused No. 50 |
|2 |Mohmad Rafik @ R.D. @ Mustak @ Nazim |Accused No. 51 |
|3 |Gulam Mohmad@ Gulal @ Arif |Accused No. 52 |
|4 |Imtiyaz @ Fatush |Accused No. 53 |
|5 |Parminder Singh @ Kaka |Accused No. 54 |
|6 |Aminkhan @ Alamkhan |Accused No. 55 |
|7 |Firoz @ Firoz Kankani |Accused No. 56 |
|8 |Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz @ Chhote |Accused No. 57 |
| |Rahim | |
|9 |Mujfarkhan @ Nasir Luhar |Accused No. 58 |
|10 |Mohmad Yakil @ Yakil |Accused No. 59 |
|11 |Jay Prakash Singh @ Bachhi Sing |Accused No. 60 |
SCHEDULE – VI
List of persons named in the Fifth Charge-Sheet dated 24th of May, 1994
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Jahangir Khan Fazalkhan Pathan |Accused No. 61 |
|2 |Mohmad Anwarkhan @ Rushi Pathan |Accused No. 62 |
SCHEDULE – VII
List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31st
of January, 2002
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap Khudadadkhan |Accused No. 1 |
| |Pathan | |
|2 |Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore |Accused No. 2 |
|3 |Sajidali @ Deni Mohammedali Saiyed |Accused No. 5 |
|4 |Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyedhussein Saiyed |Accused No. 13 |
|5 |Gajnafarkhan @ Gajjukhan Sabdrkhan |Accused No. 15 |
| |Pathan | |
|6 |Asharafkhan @ Babu Munnakhan Pathan |Accused No. 16 |
|7 |Shohrabuddin @ Salim Anvaruddin Shaikh |Accused No. 26 |
|8 |Abdulsattar @ Sattar Battery Abdulgani |Accused No. 32 |
| |Shaikh | |
|9 |Abdul Raoof @ Raoof Abdul Kadar Shaikh |Accused No. 33 |
|10 |Hussainbhai @ Bhajiya Mohammedbhai |Accused No. 47 |
| |Patani | |
|11 |Mujffarkhan @ Nashir Luhar |Accused No. 58 |
| |Umardarajkhan Pathan | |
SCHEDULE – VIII
List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31st
of January, 2002
|Sr.No. |Names of accused persons |Accused Nos. |
|1 |Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani Shaikh |Accused No. 3 |
|2 |Mohammed Faruq @ Faruqbava Allarakha |Accused No. 4 |
|3 |Anvarkhan Mohammedkhan Pathan |Accused No. 6 |
|4 |Mohammed Jalaluddin @ Jalalbaba |Accused No. 7 |
| |Tamijuddin Saiyed | |
|5 |Gulam Kadar Gulam Hussain Shaikh |Accused No. 8 |
|6 |Hyderkhan Lalkhan Pathan |Accused No. 10 |
|7 |Mohammed Soeb @ Soebbava Abdul Gani |Accused No. 12 |
| |Shaikh | |
|8 |Mohammed Hanif @ Anudi Husseinmiya |Accused No. 14 |
| |Shaikh | |
|9 |Munavarullakhan @ Imtiyazullakhan @ |Accused No. 17 |
| |Pappu Mohammed Safiullakhan | |
|10 |Afzalhussain Ajgarhussein Rangrej |Accused No. 19 |
|11 |Shamtullakhan @ Sammu Mohammed Safiulla|Accused No. 20 |
| |Pathan | |
|12 |Bariqkhan @ Abdul Salim Hussein Khan @ |Accused No. 21 |
| |Abdul Hussein Shaikh | |
|13 |Babukhan @ Lala Niyajkhan @ |Accused No. 22 |
| |Niyajmohammed Pathan | |
|14 |Maksud Ahmed Fatehmohammed Shaikh |Accused No. 23 |
|15 |Mohammed Safi Abdul Rehman Saikh |Accused No. 24 |
|16 |Hafizuddin Fazluddin Kazi |Accused No. 25 |
|17 |Abdulgafar @ Gafar Party Mohammed Rafiq|Accused No. 27 |
| |Shaikh | |
|18 |Abdul Kaiyum Nizamuddin Shaikh |Accused No. 28 |
|19 |Mohammed Rafiq @ Haji Rafiqbhai |Accused No. 29 |
| |Husseinbhai Kapadia | |
|20 |Usmangani Musabhai Vora |Accused No. 30 |
|21 |Abdul Wahab Abdul Majid Baloch |Accused No. 31 |
|22 |Imtieaz Ahmed Noorhadanmiya Kadari |Accused No. 34 |
|23 |Sabbirhussein Husseinmiya Shaikh |Accused No. 36 |
|24 |Mustaq Ahmed Istiyaq Ahmed Pathan |Accused No. 37 |
|25 |Aiyub @ Lala Yusufbhai Mandali |Accused No. 39 |
|26 |Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandali |Accused No. 40 |
|27 |Musabhai Yusufbhai Mandali |Accused No. 41 |
|28 |Daoodbhai Musabhai Shaikh |Accused No. 42 |
|29 |Mohammed Amin @ Amin Chotely Rahimmiya |Accused No. 43 |
|30 |Musharrafkhan Gorekhan Pathan |Accused No. 44 |
|31 |Mehmood @ Pepa Pahelvan Hussainkhan |Accused No. 45 |
| |Nilgadamal | |
|32 |Shahbuddin @ Kanijbaba Badruddin Shaikh|Accused No. 46 |
|33 |Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai Ajmeri |Accused No. 48 |
|34 |Gulammohammed @ Gulu Gulam Hyder Momin |Accused No. 49 |
|35 |Mehboobbeg @ Mehboob Senior Chhotubeg |Accused No. 50 |
| |Mogal | |
|36 |Mohammed Rafiq @ R.D. @ Mustaq @ Nazim |Accused No. 51 |
| |Majidkhan | |
|37 |Gulam Mohammed @ Gulal @ Arif Abdul |Accused No. 52 |
| |Kadar Shaikh | |
|38 |Imtiyaz @ Fetas Ibrahim Ismial |Accused No. 53 |
| |Bhathiyara | |
|39 |Parmindarsing @ Kaka Maliksing Sikh |Accused No. 54 |
|40 |Aminkhan @ Alamkhan Mojkhan Pathan |Accused No. 55 |
|41 |Mohammed Yaakil @ Aakil Maiyuddin Malek|Accused No. 59 |
-----------------------
[1] List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9th of
June, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.-I.
[2] List of persons charge-sheeted in the first charge-sheet dated 16th
of December, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.–II.
[3] List of persons charge-sheeted in the second charge-sheet dated 23rd
May, 1995 is appended at Schedule No.–III.
[4] List of persons charge-sheeted in the third charge-sheet dated 17th
of April, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–IV.
[5] List of persons charge-sheeted in the fourth charge-sheet dated 20th
of December, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–V.
[6] List of persons charge-sheeted in the fifth charge-sheet dated 24th
of May, 2000 is appended at Schedule No.–VI.
[7] List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide its order dated
31st of January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VII.
[8] List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide its order dated
31st of January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VIII.
• All Schedules appended shall form part of the judgment.
-----------------------
60
