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Thursday, September 20, 2012

i) The suit land stood notified under Section 4 of the Act as on 15.5.1978. There is nothing on record to show, nor have the appellants made any pleadings to the effect that, the persons interested at the relevant time ever filed any objections whatsoever, in response to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act. ii) Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have filed two writ petitions challenging the validity of acquisition of some of their land but they did not raise the issue of validity of the acquisition in respect of the suit land. iii) Award no.14/1983 was made on 28.6.1983, in respect of Survey Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3. The amount of compensation, was withdrawn by the original tenure holders/persons-interested, though of course, under protest, and the same was limited to the extent of quantum of compensation, so that they could approach the Collector for making a reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act. iv) The judgment of the learned Single Judge is subsequent to the aforesaid award. As the compensation related to the land had been withdrawn, and the land stood vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, quashing the declaration under Section 6 in cases filed by others, would not enure any benefit to the original tenure holders/appellants, as has been explained by this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra), and furthermore, even if the declaration stood quashed in toto, it could not save the suit land, as its possession had already been taken over. v) In the instant case, the High Court did not declare the acquisition proceedings to be void, or the purpose for which the land had been acquired not to be a “public purpose” within the meaning of the Act. There has also been no direction whatsoever, to restore the possession of the said land to the tenure holders, upon refund of the compensation amount by them. vi) Another award no.11/1986 in respect of Survey No.284/2 was made on 14.8.1986. Compensation awarded in relation to the said piece of land was withdrawn. The land thus, vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. vii) In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e. vendors of the first sale were not vested with any title over the said land, the transfer by them, was itself void and all subsequent transfers would also, as a result, remain ineffective and unenforceable in law. Therefore, sale deeds executed in the years 2004-05 would not confer any title on the appellants. viii) The appellants claimed to have made some enquiries in relation to the acquisition proceedings qua the suit land, to which the competent authorities replied, that the land was free from acquisition proceedings and therefore, the appellants proceeded to purchase the said suit land. The letters written by the Authorities dated 4.3.2004, 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not make any reference to the present appellants, nor was any information sought by any of them in this regard. Some of the said letters had been addressed to the original tenure holders and other were merely found to be inter- departmental communications. ix) Letter dated 7.7.2005, filed by the appellants before the Court is admittedly a forged document. x) So far as the matter relating to the proceedings issued in R.C. No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed that the appellants have used unfair means to obtain sanction for their plan of construction of flats. xi) The appellants filed an affidavit before the High Court only to mislead the court by furnishing false information. xii) The appellants also managed to obtain certain orders from the Department and further have abused the process of the court. xiii) The appellants did neither approach the statutory authority nor the court with clean hands. xiv) Compensation was paid to the original tenure holders in 1983 and 1986. The same was refunded by the present appellants in the name of the original tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the same has not been accepted by the Board and has been duly returned to the appellants. xv) The recommendations of the High Level Committee contained in Annexure-P.11 make it clear that the said Committee was constituted, only upon the request of the appellants to consider their grievances. The recommendations suggest that although possession of the suit land was taken, as the land was inaccessible, it remained unutilized for the purpose for which it was acquired. Therefore, reconveyance of the same was suggested. xvi) An application for re-conveyance was filed by the original tenure holders and their legal heirs, and not by the appellants with respect to the said part of the suit land, as is evident from the orders dated 18.12.2007 and 7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact, were addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal, Tmt. Girija, Tmt. Nagammal, Thiru A.E. Kothandaraman Mudaliar, and Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to an application made by them. xvii) It is evident from the record that there was no application for reconveyance of the land in Survey No.284/2, though the appellants have sought relief in relation to this land also. xviii) The appellants filed applications for re-conveyance through the original tenure holders/legal heirs. This clearly reveals that the appellants themselves had been of the view that the suit land had already vested in the State, otherwise there could be no question of re-conveyance. (xix) The land once vested in the State, free from all encumbrances cannot be divested. xx) The appellants had attempted to be succeeded in illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public land, by connivance with the officers of the State Govt./Board and raised a huge construction upon the said land, after getting the Plan sanctioned from the competent statutory authority. xxi) The State/Board authorities never made an attempt to stop the construction. Nor the Board approached the court to restrain the appellants from encroaching upon its land and construction of the flats. Connivance of the officers of the Board in the scandal is writ large and does not require any proof. Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs as how the public property can be looted with the connivance and collusion of the so called trustees of the public properties. It reflects on the very bad governance of the State authorities. 43. The aforesaid conclusions do not warrant any relief to the appellants. The appeals are dismissed with the costs of Rupees Twenty Five lacs, which the appellants are directed to deposit with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within a period of six weeks. 44. In addition thereto, the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu is requested to examine the issues involved in the case and find out as who were the officials of the State or Board responsible for this loot of the public properties and proceed against them in accordance with law. He is further directed to ensure eviction of the appellants from the public land forthwith.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6342-6343  OF 2012



      V. Chandrasekaran & Anr.
      …Appellants




                                   Versus




       The Administrative Officer & Ors.
      …Respondents







                               J U D G M E N T

      Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.




      1.       These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned
      judgment and order dated  24.1.2012,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of
      Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal Nos. 805-806 of  2011,  by  which,
      the Division Bench  reversed the judgment and  order  of  the  learned
      Single Judge, dated 1.11.2010 passed in relation to  land  acquisition
      proceedings.

      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise  to  these  appeals  are  as
      under:

      A.    A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land  Acquisition  Act,
      1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’), was issued  on  15.5.1978
      with respect to land measuring 58.59 acres, in the revenue  estate  of
      Tambaram Village, Saidapet Taluk,  Chengalpet  District,  Tamil  Nadu,
      including the suit land measuring 2.26  acres  in  Survey  Nos.  283/1
      (extent of 27 cents), 284/1 (extent of 70 cents), 284/2 (extent of  65
      cents) and 284/3 (extent of 64  cents).   As  the  provisions  of  the
      Urgency Clause under Section 17 of  the  Act  were  not  invoked,  the
      persons interested were at liberty to file objections under Section  5-
      A of the Act.  A declaration under Section 6 of the Act  with  respect
      to the said land was issued on 6.6.1981. Very few  among  the  persons
      interested, challenged the land  acquisition  proceedings  by  way  of
      filing 8 writ petitions, including Writ Petition Nos. 8897 and 8899 of
      1983 etc. which were filed by some of the original  tenure-holders  of
      the suit land on several grounds. However, the  said  petitioners  did
      not challenge the acquisition proceedings so far as the suit  land  is
      concerned, rather they chose to restrict  their  cases  to  the  other
      parts of their lands.   The batch of said writ petitions  was  allowed
      by way of a common judgment and order, dated 16.12.1983, quashing  the
      declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on the ground  that  the
      inquiry was not conducted fairly, and that the  objections  raised  by
      the said writ petitioners under Section 5-A,  were also not dealt with
      properly.  However, the learned Single Judge upheld  the  Notification
      issued under Section 4 of the Act and hence, granted  liberty  to  the
      Government of  Tamil  Nadu  to  continue  with  the  said  acquisition
      proceedings, in accordance with law.

      B.    Being aggrieved by this,  the  writ  petitioners  including  the
      predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, preferred Writ Appeal Nos.
      214 to 225 and 435 of 1984, before the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
      Court, against the judgment and order dated  16.12.1983,  praying  for
      quashing of the Notification issued under Section 4  of  the  Act,  as
      well. The Government did not challenge the judgment  and  order  dated
      16.12.1983. The said writ appeals were allowed vide judgment and order
      dated 23.8.1985, and the said notification under Section 4(1)  of  the
      Act, only in respect of the land, which constituted the subject matter
      of the aforementioned appeals, was quashed.  Against the judgment  and
      order dated 23.8.1985,  the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  preferred  a
      Special Leave Petition before this Court,  which  was  dismissed  vide
      order dated 6.5.1992. Thus, those orders attained finality.

      C.    In the meantime, an Award was passed with respect  to  the  said
      land, including the suit land, on 28.6.1983, to  the  extent  of  4.26
      acres i.e. Survey Nos. 283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.

      D.    A second batch of writ petitions was filed before the High Court
      challenging the acquisition proceedings, as well as the Award. All the
      said writ petitions were  allowed,  following  the  earlier  judgments
      dated  16.12.1983  and  23.8.1985  vide  judgment  and   order   dated
      22.12.1986.

      E.    A second award  was  made  on  14.8.1986,  in  relation  to  the
      remaining part of said land, including a part of the suit  land,  i.e.
      Survey No. 284/2.

      F.     So  far  as  the  suit  land   is   concerned,   the   persons-
      interested/tenure-holders never filed any objection under Section  5-A
      of the Act, and nor have they challenged the acquisition  proceedings,
      at any stage. Instead, they accepted  the  compensation  amount  under
      protest. Possession of the suit land was taken over by  the  authority
      subsequently. There is nothing on record to show whether the claimants
      had filed any application for making a reference under Section  18  of
      the Act.

      G.    The tenure-holders/persons-interested in the  suit  land,  after
      receiving  compensation,  and  handing  over  the  possession  to  the
      respondents authorities with respect to the suit land, transferred the
      said land to some persons, and ultimately, after  undergoing  multiple
      sales, the suit land was purchased by the appellants herein, vide sale-
      deeds dated 4.3.2004, 10.11.2004, 7.7.2005 and 11.8.2005.  As a result
      thereof, they claim to have acquired possession of the said suit land.
       The appellants planned to construct flats upon the said land, for the
      purpose of which, they had also obtained permission from  the  Chennai
      Metropolitan Development Authority  on  16.3.2007.  Applications  were
      filed by the original tenure-holders for  re-conveyance  of  the  suit
      land which stood as rejected vide order dated 7.7.2008.

      H.    Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 6108  of
      2009 for the quashing of  the  Notification  dated  15.5.1978,  issued
      under Section 4 of the Act, pertaining to the land  that  comprised  9
      Survey  Numbers,  including  the  suit  land   contending   that   the
      declaration under Section 6 had been quashed  in  toto  and  no  fresh
      declaration  was  subsequently  issued.  The  proceedings   therefore,
      automatically lapsed as there  could  be  no  Award  without  a  fresh
      declaration, and therefore, all subsequent proceedings would  be  void
      ab-initio.  Another Writ Petition No. 20896 of 2009,  was  also  filed
      seeking totally inconsistent/contrary reliefs  i.e.  praying  for  the
      quashing of the letter dated 7.7.2005, as also  for  the  issuance  of
      directions to re-convey the suit land in favour of the appellants.

      I.    A learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated  1.11.2010
      allowed  both  Writ  Petitions,  observing  that  as  the  Section   6
      declaration had been quashed in toto  and  no  fresh  declaration  was
      issued thereafter, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed and the
      suit land was hence, free from any and all acquisition proceedings.

      J.    Being aggrieved,  the  Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board  (hereinafter
      referred to as `the Board’) – the respondents, then filed writ appeals
      which have  been  allowed  vide  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated
      24.1.2012, reversing the judgment and  order  of  the  learned  Single
      Judge.

            Hence, these appeals.

      3.    Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi and  Mr.  Rajiv  Dutta,  learned  senior
      counsel appearing for the appellants, have submitted that,  since  the
      Section 6 declaration dated 6.6.1981 has been quashed in toto  and  no
      fresh declaration was made thereafter, subsequent proceedings are void
      ab-initio. The  appellants,  before  purchasing  the  suit  land  made
      various inquiries and were informed in writing by various authorities,
      that the said land was not  the  subject  matter  of  any  acquisition
      proceedings at the relevant time.  More so, a high powered  committee,
      constituted by the Board itself, submitted a report that the suit land
      was not required by the Board, and that even though the possession  of
      the land had been taken, the land vested in the State.  There  was  no
      approach road to the suit land and thus, the said land  could  not  be
      utilised for the purpose for which, it was acquired. The Board was not
      in a position to utilise the suit land and, thus, it could be released
      in favour of the appellants, subject  to  refunding  the  compensation
      amount received by the land owners.  More so, the compensation  amount
      received by the persons aggrieved in 1983 was received under  protest,
      and was refunded to them in 2010, by way of demand draft,  though  the
      same was not accepted by the Board and was therefore, returned to  the
      tenure-holders.  The appellants are still willing to refund the amount
      of compensation received by the persons- interested, in  pursuance  of
      the  illegal  and  void  awards,  dated   28.6.1983   and   14.8.1986.
      Therefore, the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set  aside
      and the present appeals should  be allowed.

      4.    On the contrary, Shri S.  Gomathi  Nayagam,  learned  Additional
      Advocate General appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed
      the appeals,  contending  that  the  predecessor-in-interest,  of  the
      appellants did not raise any objection under Section 5-A of  the  Act,
      with respect to such acquisition proceedings at any stage, rather they
      accepted the compensation granted under protest. To receive  an  award
      under protest is a legal requirement  for  the  purpose  of  making  a
      reference  under  Section  18  of  the  Act.   The  quashing  of   the
      declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not  automatically  apply
      to the suit land, as it was not the subject matter of  challenge  with
      respect to the acquisition proceedings before court.   The  appellants
      did not make any inquiry whatsoever, with respect to the title of  the
      suit land, though inquiry was sought to be made  in  relation  to  the
      said land, by different persons in altogether different contexts.  The
      report of the high powered committee appointed by the Board itself, is
      self-contradictory, as they clearly provided that possession had  been
      taken and, in view of the fact that once  possession  is   taken,  the
      said land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances under Section
      16 of the Act, the same cannot be divested.  Therefore,  the  question
      of re-conveying the suit land  in  favour  of  the  appellants  cannot
      possibly arise.  Land can be  released  from  acquisition  proceedings
      either under Section 48 of the Act, or in exercise  of   powers  under
      the General Clauses Act, 1897, but this can be done only prior to  the
      vesting of the land in the State, which in itself is prior  to  taking
      possession thereof.   The appellants, being  purchasers  of  the  said
      suit land, after more than 20 years of the Award, cannot challenge the
      acquisition proceedings at such a belated stage.  More so, the vendors
      were not competent to make any transfer, as  none  of  them  had  good
      title over the suit land.  Therefore, any and  all  sale  transactions
      are illegal and void.   The  sale-deeds  executed  in  favour  of  the
      appellants, do  not  confer  upon  them,  any  title.   More  so,  the
      subsequent purchasers  cannot  challenge  the  validity  of  the  land
      acquisition.  The appeals lack merit and are therefore  liable  to  be
      dismissed.

      5.    We have considered the rival submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties and perused the records.

            However, before coming to the merit of the case, it is desirable
      to consider the legal issues involved herein.

      Whether   subsequent   purchaser   can   challenge   the   acquisition
      proceedings:

      6.    The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person
      who purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued under
      Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court time and again.

            In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975  SC  2112,  this
      Court held that, any one who deals  with  the  land  subsequent  to  a
      Section 4 notification being issued, does so, at  his  own  peril.  In
      Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996  SC  540,  this  Court
      held that a Section 4 notification gives a notice  to  the  public  at
      large that the land in respect to which it has been issued, is  needed
      for a public purpose, and it further points out that there will be "an
      impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired  thereunder."  The
      alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the beneficiary under
      the  acquisition.  The  purchaser  is   entitled   only   to   receive
      compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was placed on  an
      earlier judgment of this Court in Union of india v.  Shri  Shiv  Kumar
      Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.

      7.    Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd.,
      AIR 1996 SC 1170,  this  Court  held  that,  purchase  of  land  after
      publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such  land,  is
      void against the State and at the most, the purchaser may be a person-
      interested in compensation, since he  steps  into  the  shoes  of  the
      erstwhile owner and may therefore,  merely  claim  compensation.  (See
      also: Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC
      698).

      8.    In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of  India,  AIR  1996  SC  2677;
      Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC  335;
      Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC  528;  and  Meera  Sahni  v.
      Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008)  9  SCC  177,  this  Court
      categorically held  that,  a  person  who  purchases  land  after  the
      publication of a Section 4 notification with respect  to  it,  is  not
      entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that  his  title
      is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of vendor’s
      title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a Section 4
      notification  is  void  and  the  purchaser   cannot   challenge   the
      acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.,  (2009)
      10 SCC 689).

      9.    In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized  to
      the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance
      of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is  not  competent  to
      challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings  on  any  ground
      whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in  his  favour
      does not confer upon him, any title and  at  the  most  he  can  claim
      compensation on the basis of his vendor’s title.

      The acquisition challenged by one – whether others can also  take  the
      benefit of the same.

      10.   The relief obtained by some persons, by  approaching  the  Court
      immediately after the cause of action has arisen, cannot be the  basis
      for other persons who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the
      benefit of earlier relief provided, for the reason that, such  persons
      cannot be permitted to take impetus of an order passed by  the  court,
      at the behest of another more diligent person.  (Vide:  Ratan  Chandra
      Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2276;  State  of
      Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267; and Jagdih
      Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366).




      11.   In Abhey Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. Union of  India  &  Ors.,
      AIR 1997 SC 2564, a three Judge Bench of this  Court,  dealt  with  an
      issue similar to the one involved herein. The question that arose  was
      whether the quashing of the notification/declaration under the Act  by
      the court in respect of other matters, would confer benefit upon  non-
      parties also.  The Court held as under:

              “The question then arises is  whether  the  quashing  of  the
              declaration by the Division Bench in  respect  of  the  other
              matters would enure  the  benefit  to  the  appellants  also.
              Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned  counsel  is
              attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to  give
              acceptance to the contention…..  If it were a  case  entirely
              relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by  the
              High Court, necessarily  that  would  enure  the  benefit  to
              others also, though they did not file any petition, except to
              those whose lands were taken possession of  and  were  vested
              in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from
              all                                            encumbrances.”
              (Emphasis                                              added)



      12.   In H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed  Khader  &
      Ors., AIR 1995 SC  2244,  this  Court  quashed  the  land  acquisition
      proceedings in toto,  wherein  the  land  had  been  acquired  by  the
      Government for the use of the cooperative society which had planned  a
      housing scheme upon it, in view of the conclusion that it could not be
      called a “public purpose”, within the meaning of the Act.   The  Court
      further directed the respondents therein to restore the possession  of
      the land to the tenure-holders/persons-interested,  and  such  persons
      were thereafter, directed to refund the amount  received  by  them  as
      compensation. (See also: H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society  v.
      M. Venkataswamappa & Ors.,  (1995) 3 SCC 128)

      13.   The said judgment has subsequently been approved and followed by
      this Court, in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.,  AIR  1999  SC
      3822, wherein this Court held as follows:

              “Quashing the notification in the cases  of  individual  writ
              petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. That
              was what was held in Abhey Ram case (supra). The main  points
              raised before us are fully covered by  the  judgment  of  the
              three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case.”




      14.   In Om Prakash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC  2430,  this
      Court considered a similar issue and reiterated the view taken by this
      Court in Abhey Ram (supra), wherein it was held that, in case a person
      interested has not filed any objection  to  the  notice  issued  under
      Section 5-A of the Act, or challenged the acquisition proceedings,  he
      cannot claim that the order of quashing the declaration in some  other
      matter, would also cover his case.  The Court held as under:

              “The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in the case
              in hand as many as four declarations under Section 6  of  the
              Act were issued from time to time. Finally  when  declaration
              is quashed by any Court, it would only enure to  the  benefit
              of those who had approached the Court. It would certainly not
              extend the benefit to those who had not approached the  Court
              or who might have gone into slumber.”




      15.   Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to state that,
      in the event that the person interested has not  filed  objections  in
      response to a  notice issued under Section 5-A, and has not challenged
      the acquisition proceedings, the quashing of  the  declaration  issued
      under Section 6 in some other case, would not  enure  any  benefit  to
      such  person.  More so, where the possession of land has already  been
      taken, and such land  stands  vested  in  the  State,  free  from  all
      encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act, prior
      to the date of decision of the Court quashing the declaration in toto,
      no benefit can be taken by him. Where a party has not filed objections
      to the notice issued under  Section  5-A,  the  declaration  qua  such
      persons is generally neither quashed, nor does it stand  vitiated  qua
      him, by any error of  law  warranting  interference.   There  is  also
      another view with respect to this matter, which is that, in  case  the
      said land has been acquired for a Scheme, which does not  fall  within
      the ambit of “public purpose” then, in such a case, it would not be  a
      case of acquisition  under  the  Act,  instead,  it  would  amount  to
      colourable exercise of power.

      Land once vested in the Government – whether can be divested:

      16.   It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is  vested
      in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot  be  divested  and
      proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if  an  award  is  not
      made within the statutorily stipulated  period.  (Vide:  Avadh  Behari
      Yadav v. State of Bihar &. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P.  Jal  Nigam  v.
      Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra);  Allahabad Development Authority v.
      Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of
      Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra  Pradesh
      v. Syed Akbar & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492).

      17.   The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to  the  tenure
      holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for
      which it was so  acquired,  or  for  any  other  purpose  either.  The
      proceedings cannot be  withdrawn/abandoned  under  the  provisions  of
      Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
      once the possession of the land  has been taken and the land vests  in
      the State, free  from  all  encumbrances.  (Vide:   State  of   Madhya
      Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593;  Lt.  Governor  of  Himachal
      Pradesh &  Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR  1970  SC  1576;  Satendra
      Prasad  Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors.,  AIR  1993  SC  2517;  Rajasthan
      Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan  &  Ors.,  (1993)  2  SCC  84  and
      Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of  India  v.  Subodh  Singh  &
      Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100).

      18.    The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by  this
      Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants  Union  v.  The
      Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this  Court  held  that  the
      meaning of word 'vesting' varies as per the context  of  the  Statute,
      under which the property vests. So far as the vesting  under  Sections
      16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under.-

                "In the cases contemplated  by  Sections  16  and  17,  the
                property  acquired  becomes  the  property  of   Government
                without any condition or ; limitations either as  to  title
                or possession. The  legislature  has  made  it  clear  that
                vesting of the property is not for any limited  purpose  or
                limited duration.”




      19.   In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977
      SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held as under:-

                "Once the original  acquisition  is  valid  and  title  has
                vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land  is
                no concern of the original owner and cannot  be  the  basis
                for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle  of
                law by which a valid compulsory acquisition  stands  voided
                because long later the requiring Authority diverts it to  a
                public  purpose  other  than  the   one   stated   in   the
                ….declaration.”




      20.     Similarly, in State of Kerala & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai  &
      Anr.,  (1997) 5 SCC 432, this Court held as under:

                “It is settled law that if  the  land  is  acquired  for  a
                public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved,  the
                rest of the  land  could  be  used  for  any  other  public
                purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which
                the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale
                to the erstwhile owner, the land should be  put  to  public
                auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be
                better utilised for the public  purpose  envisaged  in  the
                Directive Principles of the Constitution.


      (See also: C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to  the  Government  of
      Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627; Bhagat Singh v. State of  U.P.  &
      Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of  West
      Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532; Northern Indian Glass Industries v.  Jaswant
      Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; and Leelawanti  &  Ors.  v.  State  of
      Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66).




      21.   In Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh & Anr. v. Syed Akbar (Supra),
      this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has
      vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of  Section
      48  of  the  Act,  nor  can  it  be   reconveyed   to   the   persons-
      interested/tenure  holders,  and  that  therefore,  the  question   of
      restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not  arise.  (See
      also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996  SC  1296;  Chandragaudaj
      Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 6  SCC  405;  State  of
      Kerala & Ors. v. M.  Bhaskaran  Pillai  &  Anr.,  AIR  1997  SC  2703;
      Printers (Mysore) . Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed &  Ors.  (2004)  4  SCC  460;
      Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah, (2005)  12  SCC  508;
      and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State  of  U.P.  &  Anr.
      (2011) 9 SCC 354).

      22.   In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean,  that
      once the land is acquired and it vests in the  State,  free  from  all
      encumbrances, it is not the concern of the  land  owner,  whether  the
      land is being used for the purpose for which it was  acquired  or  for
      any other purpose. He becomes persona non-grata once the land vests in
      the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for  the  same,
      unless the acquisition proceeding is   itself  challenged.  The  State
      neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land  to  the  person-
      interested, nor can such person claim any right of restitution on  any
      ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment  to  this
      effect.

      23.   The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a
      better title than he himself  possesses;  Nemo  dat  quod  non  habet.
      However, this Rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the
      transfer must be in good  faith  for  value,  and  there  must  be  no
      misrepresentation or fraud, which would  render  the  transactions  as
      void and also that the property is purchased after  taking  reasonable
      care to ascertain that the  transferee  has  the  requisite  power  to
      transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties  have  acted  in
      good faith, as is  required  under  Section  41  of  the  Transfer  of
      Property Act, 1882. (Vide: Asa Ram & Anr. v.  Mst. Ram  Kali  &  Anr.,
      AIR 1958 SC 183; State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh  &  Ors.,
      AIR 1969 SC 401,  Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v.  Aloke  Mitra,
      AIR 1981 SC 102;  Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohal Lal,  AIR  1988  SC
      299; and State of Punjab v. Surjit Kaur (Dead) through LRs., JT (2001)
      10 SC 42).

      24.   This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the award is
      not accepted under protest, the  persons  interested  cannot  make  an
      application to make a reference under Section  18,  (Vide:  Wardington
      Lyngdoh & Ors. v. Collector, Mawkyrwat, (1995)  4  SCC  428),  wherein
      this Court held that, a person who has received the  amount  of  award
      made under Section 11  of  the  Act,  without  protest,  will  not  be
      entitled  to  make  an  application  under  Section  18  of  the  Act.
      Therefore, receipt of the said amount under protest,  is  a  condition
      precedent for making an  application  under  Section  18,  within  the
      limitation prescribed under the Act.

      25.    The  aforesaid  view  however,  has   not   been   consistently
      reiterated,  as is evident from the judgment in Ajit Singh &  Anr.  v.
      State of Punjab & Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 67, wherein  it  was  held  that,
      merely an application under Section 18 of the Act would make it  clear
      that the person-interested has not accepted  the  award  made  by  the
      authority.

      26.   The instant case requires to be examined in the  light  of  the
      aforesaid legal propositions.

           From the facts it is evident that,  the  predecessor-in-interest
      of the appellants approached the court by  filing  Writ  Petitions  as
      well as writ appeals, with respect to some of their lands, but for the
      reasons best known to them, they did  not  challenge  the  acquisition
      proceedings so far as the suit  land  is  concerned.   The  appellants
      filed a writ petition for quashing the  land  acquisition  proceedings
      and/or seeking a declaration  to  the  effect  that  the  notification
      issued under Section 4 of the Act on 15.5.1978, in relation to  Survey
      Nos.  282/1, 282/2, 283/1, 283/2, 284/1, 284/2, 284/3, 284/4  situated
      in Tambaram Village, Chennai, had lapsed and  become  inoperative  and
      consequently, to issue a mandamus, barring the respondents, their men,
      their agents, subordinates, servants or anyone acting under them, from
      interfering  in  any  manner,  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of  the
      properties  belonging  to  the  appellants,  as  stipulated   in   the
      aforementioned  surveys.

      27.   The appellants also filed another writ petition for quashing the
      orders passed in relation to the applications of their predecessors-in-
      interest with respect to re-conveyance of the said land.  The  reliefs
      claimed therein inter-alia, are as under:

                 “Issue a writ of  Certiorarified  Mandamus  or  any  other
               order or direction in the nature of a writ of  Certiorarified
               Mandamus  by  calling  for  the  records  comprised  in   the
               proceedings  of  the  4th  respondent  bearing   Letter   No.
               2899/LAI(1)/2007-6 dated  7.7.2008  and  quash  the  same  as
               illegal and unconstitutional and consequently issue a Writ of
               Mandamus directing the respondents to reconvey  the  property
               situate at Survey  No.  283/1  measuring  about  0.27  cents,
               Survey No. 284/1 measuring about 0.70 cents, Survey  No.284/2
               measuring about 0.65  cents  and  Survey  No.284/3  measuring
               about 0.64 cents in 166 of Tambaram Village, Old  State  Bank
               Colony,  Saidapet  Taluk,  Chengalpat  District  as  per  the
               provisions contained in  Sec.48-B  of  the  Land  Acquisition
               (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil  Nadu  Act  of  16  of
               1997) and pass such further or other orders as  this  Hon'ble
               Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and  circumstances
               of the case and thus render justice.”




      28.   It is evident from the relief clauses of the two writ  petitions
      filed by the appellants, that the reliefs sought by them are  mutually
      inconsistent and contradictory.  In  the  event  that  the  appellants
      wanted a declaration to the effect that the acquisition proceedings in
      pursuance of issuance of the Section 4 notification,  dated  15.5.1978
      had lapsed or were void, the question of seeking re-conveyance of  the
      said land could not arise. More so, it is difficult to understand, how
      the appellants can claim relief in respect of 9  survey  numbers.   In
      the present appeals, relief is restricted only  to  4  of  the  survey
      numbers.   Dr.  A.M.  Singhvi  has  not  pressed  for  the  relief  of
      reconveyance.  However, it is  apparent  that  the  appellants’  claim
      cannot co-exist and can be said to be blowing hot  and  blowing  cold,
      simultaneously.

      29.    In  Cauvery  Coffee  Traders,  Mangalore  v.  Hornor  Resources
      (International)  Company  Limited,  (2011)  10  SCC  420,  this  Court
      considered a large number of judgments on the issue of  estoppels  and
      held as under:

                     “A party cannot be permitted to “blow  hot  and  cold”,
                 “fast and loose” or “approbate and  reprobate”.  Where  one
                 knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or  conveyance
                 or an order, is estopped to deny the  validity  or  binding
                 effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This
                 rule is applied to do  equity,  however,  it  must  not  be
                 applied in a manner as to violate the principles  of  right
                 and good conscience…..

                     ……….The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of  the
                 species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which
                 is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded
                 by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to
                 speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have
                 had.”




      30.   In  the  instant  case,  the  tenure  holders/person-interested
      neither filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, nor  have  they
      challenged the land acquisition proceedings, so far as the  suit  land
      is concerned, instead they chose to withdraw the compensation  awarded
      in 1983 and 1986; after the expiry of about three decades  and  hence,
      they cannot be permitted to challenge the acquisition  proceedings  on
      any ground whatsoever. The appellants cannot claim title/relief better
      than what the original vendors were entitled to.

      31.   In fact, the  appellants  have  claimed  reliefs  in  the  writ
      petitions with  respect to not just the suit land but also in relation
      to the land which was the subject matter of an earlier  litigation  by
      their  predecessors-in-interest.   We  fail  to  understand  for  what
      purpose the relief of quashing the acquisition  proceedings  has  been
      sought when, in respect of the  said  land,  the  proceedings  already
      stood quashed.




      32.   The High Court dealt with the  proceeding,  issued  in  RC  No.
      8222/95/F5, which is purported to have been  issued  by  one  K.Muthu,
      Special Tahsildar (Land  Acquisition),  and  observed  that  the  said
      proceeding itself stood cancelled and somehow a xerox copy of the said
      proceeding was  obtained by the appellants and they utilised the  same
      to secure permission for sanctioning their  plan  of  construction  of
      flats on the said land.  Thus, the appellant have played  fraud   upon
      the authorities in order to obtain the said sanction.  Even as per the
      RC No. 8222/95/F5, it is evident that the possession of the suit  land
      was taken over ages ago and therefore, the  said  suit  land  was  the
      subject matter of the earlier litigation.

     33.    The High Court also recorded findings to the  effect  that  the
     appellants have “managed”, not only to obtain certain orders from  the
     department, but have also misused the process of the court to  achieve
     a sinister design. The  court  further  took  note  that  one  of  the
     appellants had filed an additional affidavit before the High Court  in
     a writ petition by way of which, had attempted to  mislead  the  court
     through furnishing of false information.

            It has even been admitted at the Bar,  that  the  letter  dated
      7.7.2005 which was placed on the record by the appellants  before  the
      High Court, was in fact, a forged document.

      34.   The appellants have not approached the court with clean  hands,
      and are therefore, not entitled for  any  relief.  Whenever  a  person
      approaches a Court of Equity, in the  exercise  of  its  extraordinary
      jurisdiction, it is expected that he will approach the said court  not
      only with clean hands but also with a clean mind, a  clean  heart  and
      clean objectives. Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity. The  legal
      maxim “Jure Naturae Aequum Est  Neminem  cum  Alterius  Detrimento  Et
      Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem”, means that it is a law  of  nature  that
      one should not be enriched by  causing  loss  or  injury  to  another.
      (Vide: The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993
      SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242; and Ramniklal
      N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236).


      35.   The judicial process cannot become an instrument of  oppression
      or abuse, or a means  in the process of the court to subvert  justice,
      for the reason that the court  exercises  its  jurisdiction,  only  in
      furtherance of justice.  The interests of justice and public  interest
      coalesce, and therefore, they are very often  one  and  the  same.   A
      petition or an affidavit containing a misleading and/or an  inaccurate
      statement, only to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of
      process of the court.
      36.   In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC  114,  this
      Court noticed an altogether new creed of litigants, that is, dishonest
      litigants and went on to strongly deprecate their conduct by observing
      that, the truth constitutes an integral part of the  justice  delivery
      system.  The quest for personal gain has become so intense that  those
      involved in litigation do not hesitate to seek shelter  of  falsehood,
      misrepresentation and suppression of facts  in  the  course  of  court
      proceedings.  A  litigant  who  attempts  to  pollute  the  stream  of
      justice, or who touches the pure  fountain  of  justice  with  tainted
      hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.


      37.   The truth should be the guiding  star  in  the  entire  judicial
      process. “Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth  is  the
      quest”.  An action at law  is  not  a  game  of  chess,  therefore,  a
      litigant cannot prevaricate and take inconsistent positions. It is one
      of those fundamental principles of jurisprudence that  litigants  must
      observe total clarity and candour  in their pleadings.  (Vide:  Ritesh
      Tewari & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 677; and
      Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69).


     38.    In  Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack de
      Sequeria (dead), (2012) 5 SCC 370), this  Court  taking  note  of  its
      earlier judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011)  8  SCC
      249  held:

                “False claims and defences are really serious problems with
                real estate  litigation,  predominantly  because  of  ever-
                escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining
                to  valuable  real  estate  properties  is  dragged  on  by
                unscrupulous litigants in the hope  that  the  other  party
                will tire out and ultimately  would  settle  with  them  by
                paying a huge amount. This happens because of the  enormous
                delay in adjudication of cases in our courts. If  pragmatic
                approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimised  to
                a large extent.”



            The Court further  observed  that  wrongdoers  must  be  denied
      profit from their  frivolous  litigation,  and  that  they  should  be
      prevented from introducing  and  relying  upon,  false  pleadings  and
      forged or fabricated documents in the records furnished by them to the
      court.
      39.   In view of the above, the appellants have disentitled themselves
      for any equitable relief.

      40.   Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the  State  Amendment
      Act, 1996, and the same imposes a complete restriction on the sale of
      acquired land by the tenure holder.  In case the land is  transferred
      in contravention of these provisions, the Government may, by  way  of
      an order, declare the transfer to be  null  and  void,  and  on  such
      declaration, the land shall, as penalty, be forfeited  to,  and  vest
      in, the   Revenue  Department  of  the  Government,   free  from  all
      encumbrances.

            In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
      sale deeds in favour of the appellants are void and unenforceable.

      41.   In such  a  fact-situation,  we  fail  to  understand  how  the
      appellants came to possess the suit land which had been vested in  the
      State ages ago, in the years 1983 and 1986.   Such  a  course  is  not
      possible without the collusion of the officers of  the State/Board.

      42.   After considering the entire material on record, we  reach  the
      following inescapable conclusions:-

      i)    The suit land stood notified under Section 4 of the  Act  as  on
      15.5.1978.   There  is  nothing  on  record  to  show,  nor  have  the
      appellants  made  any  pleadings  to  the  effect  that,  the  persons
      interested at the relevant time ever filed any objections  whatsoever,
      in response to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act.

      ii)   Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have filed  two  writ
      petitions challenging the validity of acquisition  of  some  of  their
      land but they did not raise the issue of validity of  the  acquisition
      in respect of the suit land.

      iii)  Award no.14/1983 was made on 28.6.1983,  in  respect  of  Survey
      Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.  The amount of compensation, was withdrawn
      by the original tenure holders/persons-interested, though  of  course,
      under protest, and the same was limited to the extent  of  quantum  of
      compensation, so that they could approach the Collector for  making  a
      reference  to the Court under Section 18 of the Act.

      iv)   The judgment of the learned Single Judge is  subsequent  to  the
      aforesaid award.  As the compensation related to  the  land  had  been
      withdrawn, and the land stood vested  in  the  State,  free  from  all
      encumbrances, quashing the declaration under Section 6 in cases  filed
      by others,  would  not  enure  any  benefit  to  the  original  tenure
      holders/appellants, as has been explained by this Court in the case of
      Abhey Ram (supra), and furthermore,  even  if  the  declaration  stood
      quashed in toto, it could not save the  suit land, as  its  possession
      had already been taken over.

      v)    In the  instant  case,  the  High  Court  did  not  declare  the
      acquisition proceedings to be void, or the purpose for which the  land
      had been acquired not to be a “public purpose” within the  meaning  of
      the Act.  There has also been no direction whatsoever, to restore  the
      possession of the said land to the tenure holders, upon refund of  the
      compensation amount by them.

      vi)    Another award no.11/1986 in respect of Survey No.284/2 was made
      on 14.8.1986. Compensation awarded in relation to the  said  piece  of
      land was withdrawn.  The land thus, vested in the State, free from all
      encumbrances.

      vii)  In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e. vendors of the
      first sale were not vested with any title  over  the  said  land,  the
      transfer by them, was itself void and all subsequent  transfers  would
      also, as a  result,  remain  ineffective  and  unenforceable  in  law.
      Therefore, sale deeds executed in the years 2004-05 would  not  confer
      any title on the appellants.

      viii)     The appellants  claimed  to  have  made  some  enquiries  in
      relation to the acquisition proceedings qua the suit  land,  to  which
      the competent authorities   replied,  that  the  land  was  free  from
      acquisition proceedings and therefore,  the  appellants  proceeded  to
      purchase the said suit land.  The letters written by  the  Authorities
      dated 4.3.2004, 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not make  any  reference  to
      the present appellants, nor was any information sought by any of  them
      in this regard.  Some of the said letters had been  addressed  to  the
      original tenure holders and other were  merely  found  to  be   inter-
      departmental communications.




      ix)   Letter dated 7.7.2005, filed by the appellants before the  Court
      is admittedly a forged document.

      x)    So far as the matter relating to the proceedings issued in  R.C.
      No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed that the appellants  have  used
      unfair means to obtain sanction for  their  plan  of  construction  of
      flats.

      xi)   The appellants filed an affidavit before the High Court only  to
      mislead the court by furnishing false information.

      xii)  The appellants also managed to obtain certain  orders  from  the
      Department and further have abused the process of the court.

        xiii)       The  appellants  did  neither  approach  the   statutory
      authority nor the court with clean hands.

      xiv)  Compensation was paid to the original tenure holders in 1983 and
      1986.  The same was refunded by the present appellants in the name  of
      the original tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the  same
      has not been accepted by the Board and has been duly returned  to  the
      appellants.

      xv)   The recommendations of the High  Level  Committee  contained  in
      Annexure-P.11 make it clear that the said Committee  was  constituted,
      only upon the request of the appellants to consider their  grievances.
      The recommendations suggest that although possession of the suit  land
      was taken, as the land was inaccessible, it  remained  unutilized  for
      the purpose for which it was acquired.  Therefore, reconveyance of the
      same was suggested.

      xvi)  An application for  re-conveyance  was  filed  by  the  original
      tenure holders and their legal heirs, and not by the  appellants  with
      respect to the said part of the suit land,  as  is  evident  from  the
      orders dated 18.12.2007 and 7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact,  were
      addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal, Tmt. Girija,  Tmt.  Nagammal,  Thiru
      A.E. Kothandaraman Mudaliar, and Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to an
      application made by them.

      xvii) It is evident from the record that there was no application  for
      reconveyance of the land in Survey  No.284/2,  though  the  appellants
      have sought relief in relation to this land also.

      xviii)        The  appellants  filed  applications  for  re-conveyance
      through the original tenure holders/legal heirs.  This clearly reveals
      that the appellants themselves had been of the view that the suit land
      had already vested in the State, otherwise there could be no  question
      of re-conveyance.

      (xix) The land once vested in the State, free  from  all  encumbrances
      cannot be divested.

       xx)    The   appellants   had   attempted   to   be   succeeded   in
      illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public land,  by  connivance
      with  the  officers  of  the  State  Govt./Board  and  raised  a  huge
      construction upon the said land, after  getting  the  Plan  sanctioned
      from the competent statutory authority.
      xxi)  The State/Board authorities never made an attempt to  stop  the
     construction. Nor the Board  approached  the  court  to  restrain  the
     appellants from encroaching upon its  land  and  construction  of  the
     flats. Connivance of the officers of the Board in the scandal is  writ
     large and does not require any proof.
            Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs  as  how
     the public property can be looted with the connivance and collusion of
     the so called trustees of the public properties. It  reflects  on  the
     very bad governance of the State authorities.


     43.    The aforesaid conclusions do not  warrant  any  relief  to  the
     appellants. The appeals are dismissed with the costs of Rupees  Twenty
     Five lacs, which the appellants  are  directed  to  deposit  with  the
     Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within a period of six weeks.


     44.    In addition thereto, the  Chief  Secretary  of  Tamil  Nadu  is
     requested to examine the issues involved in the case and find  out  as
     who were the officials of the State or Board responsible for this loot
     of the public properties and proceed against them in  accordance  with
     law. He is further directed to ensure eviction of the appellants  from
     the public land forthwith.



                                           …………..………………………J.

                                           (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)




                                            ……….….………………………J.

                                                (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)




      New Delhi,

      September 18, 2012