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Tuesday, September 4, 2012

although the appellant is aged below 18 years and is a child for the purpose of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having been conducted along with other accused who are not children is not in accordance with law. However, this contention had not been raised either before the trail court or before the High Court. In such circumstances, this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, 1997 (8) SCC 720, following the earlier decision in Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Supp. SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., 1989 (3) SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1995 Supp(4) SCC 419, while sustaining that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside. In view of the exhaustive discussion of the law on the matter in Bhola Bhagat case, we are obviated of the duty to examine the same but following the same, with respect, we pass similar orders in the present case. Conviction of the appellant Arvind Singh is confirmed but the sentence imposed upon him stands set aside. He is, therefore, set at liberty, if not required in any other case.” - Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was juvenile, as envisaged under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on the date of commission of the offence. The Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests that he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years out of the maximum period prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. In the circumstance, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant for the aforesaid offences, the sentence awarded to him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal is partly allowed.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        In the Supreme Court of India
                       Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

                   Criminal Appeal No.  1349       of 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.9023 of 2010)

Babla @ Dinesh                               .......Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Uttarakhand                    ......Respondent


                               J u d g m e n t

H. L. Dattu, J.


1.    leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed  by  the
High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal  Appeal  No.1481  of  2001
dated 21.07.2009.  By the impugned judgment, the High  Court  has  confirmed
the Order of conviction and sentence of the appellant passed  by  the  Trial
Court under Section 302 read with Section 149  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 (for short ‘the IPC’).

3.    The appellant was one of the accused before the Trial  Court  for  the
alleged offences punishable under Section 302 read  with  Sections  149  and
147 of the IPC.  The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated  18.10.1995
in Sessions Trial No. 39 of 1992, convicted and sentenced the appellant  for
rigorous imprisonment of two years under Section 147  and  imprisonment  for
life under Section 302 read with Section 149  IPC,  both  sentences  to  run
concurrently.  Aggrieved by the order so  made,  the  appellant  and  others
approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at  Nainital  by  way  of  criminal
appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for
short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) on various grounds.

4.    Before the High Court, apart from  others,  the  learned  counsel  for
appellant raised the contention that the appellant was juvenile on the  date
of the commission or occurrence of the offence,  i.e.  on  01.12.1991.   The
said contention was rejected by the High Court on the  ground  that  it  was
not raised before the Trial Court  and  no  evidence  has  been  adduced  in
defence and no suggestion had been made to the witnesses  during  the  trial
and that the appellant  admitted  his  age  as  20  years  at  the  time  of
recording his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C..   In  conclusion,
the Court has observed:


   “11.    Learned counsel for the  appellants  contended  that  appellants
   Gadha and Babla, were minors on the day of the incident.   But  no  such
   suggestion was made to any of the witnesses nor is any evidence  adduced
   in defence.  Rather the  accused  /  appellants  Gadha  and  Babla  have
   disclosed their age 20 years on  the  day  when  their  statement  under
   Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded also makes out the case that their age
   was more than 16 years on the day of the incident.  It is  pertinent  to
   mention here that on the day of the  incident,  and  during  the  trial,
   Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, was applicable to the cases of Juveniles and
   not Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000.”

5.    After issuing notice to the opposite  parties  in  the  special  leave
petition, by our  Order  dated  18.04.2011,  we  had  directed  the  learned
Sessions Judge or his nominee to conduct an inquiry  into  the  question  of
the age of the appellant on the date of commission of offence and to  submit
a report as envisaged under Rule  12  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (for short ‘Rules, 2007).

6.    Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the inquiry report was  submitted
before this Court, but the same was not accepted, as it was merely based  on
the opinion of an individual doctor which was not  in  accordance  with  the
procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007.   Therefore,  by  our
Order dated 01.11.2011, we had, once again, directed  the  learned  Sessions
Judge to conduct an inquiry as prescribed under Rule 12 of the  Rules,  2007
and submit his report.

7.    Pursuant to the  directions  issued  by  us,  the  learned  Additional
Sessions Judge has conducted inquiry by following the  prescribed  procedure
under the Rules, 2007 and submitted his  inquiry  report  dated  03.12.2011,
wherein, it is concluded that the appellant was aged about  10-15  years  on
the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 01.12.1991.   Therefore,  the
appellant is juvenile within the meaning of  the  expression  under  Section
2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and  Section  2(k)  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

8.    This report is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent-
State.

9.    We have heard the learned counsel for the  parties  to  the  lis.   We
have also carefully perused the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  High
Court.  We are of the opinion that the High Court has  erred  in  dismissing
the appeal on the ground that no evidence was adduced and no suggestion  was
made to the witnesses regarding  juvenility  of  the  appellant  during  the
trial.  In our opinion, the issue of raising the plea for  determination  of
juvenility for the first  time  at  the  appellate  stage  is  no  more  res
integra.  This Court in Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar, (2011) 2 SCC 251,  has
allowed such plea raised before this Court for the first  time  and,  taking
note of its previous decisions on this point, has observed thus :
      “The fact remains that the issue as to whether  the  appellants  were
   juvenile did not come up for consideration for whatever  reason,  before
   the Courts below.  The question is whether the same could be  considered
   by this Court at this stage of  the  proceedings.   A  somewhat  similar
   situation had arisen in Umesh Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar, (2000) 6
   SCC 89 wherein this Court relying upon the earlier  decisions  in  Bhola
   Bhagat v. State of Bihar, (1997) 8 SCC 720, Gopinath Ghosh v.  State  of
   W.P. 1984 Supp SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., (1989) 3  SCC  1,
   while sustaining the conviction of the Appellant therein under  all  the
   charges, held that the sentences awarded to them need to be  set  aside.
   It was also a case where the appellant therein was aged below  18  years
   and was a child for the purposes of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on  the
   date of the occurrence.  The relevant paragraph reads  as  under  (Umesh
   Singh case, SCC, pp.93-94, para 6) :
      “6. So far as Arvind Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No.  659  of
   1999 is concerned, his case stands  on  a  different  footing.   On  the
   evidence on record, the learned Counsel for the appellant, was not in  a
   position to point out any infirmity in the conviction  recorded  by  the
   trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.  The only contention put
   forward before the court is that the appellant is born on  1-1-67  while
   the date of the incident is 14-15-1980 and on that date he was hardly 13
   years old.  We called for report of  experts  being  placed  before  the
   court as to the age of the appellant,  Arvind Singh.  The report made to
   the court clearly indicates that on the date of the incident he  may  be
   13 years old.  This fact is also supported by the school certificate  as
   well as matriculation  certificate  produced  before  this  Court  which
   indicate that his date  of  birth  is  1-1-1967.   On  this  basis,  the
   contention put forward before the court is that although  the  appellant
   is aged below 18 years and is a child  for  the  purpose  of  the  Bihar
   Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having  been
   conducted along with other accused  who  are  not  children  is  not  in
   accordance with law.  However,  this  contention  had  not  been  raised
   either before the trail  court  or  before  the  High  Court.   In  such
   circumstances, this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of  Bihar,  1997  (8)
   SCC 720, following the earlier decision in Gopinath Ghosh  v.  State  of
   West Bengal, 1984 Supp. SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., 1989 (3)
   SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1995 Supp(4)  SCC  419,  while
   sustaining that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside.   In
   view of the exhaustive discussion of the law  on  the  matter  in  Bhola
   Bhagat case, we are obviated  of  the  duty  to  examine  the  same  but
   following the same, with respect, we pass similar orders in the  present
   case.  Conviction of the appellant Arvind Singh  is  confirmed  but  the
   sentence imposed upon him stands set aside.  He is,  therefore,  set  at
   liberty, if not required in any other case.”

10.   We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by  this  Court
in the aforesaid decision.

11.   We have carefully perused the report dated 03.12.2011 of  the  learned
Additional Sessions Judge.  Since the  report  is  made  after  holding  due
inquiry as required under the  Act  and  the  Rules,  we  accept  the  same.
Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was  juvenile,  as  envisaged  under
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on the date of  commission  of  the
offence.

12.   The Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests  that
he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years  out
of the maximum period prescribed under  Section  15  of  the  Act.   In  the
circumstance, while sustaining the  conviction  of  the  appellant  for  the
aforesaid offences, the sentence awarded to  him  by  the  Trial  Court  and
confirmed by the High Court is set aside.  Accordingly, we direct  that  the
appellant be released forthwith, if not required in  any  other  case.   The
appeal is partly allowed.

       ...................................................................J.
                                                                (H.L. Dattu)


       ...................................................................J.
                                                   (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)
New Delhi;
sEPtEmber 04, 2012.
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