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Monday, September 24, 2012

there is a world of difference between the giving of improper legal advice and the giving of wrong legal advice. Mere negligence unaccompanied by any moral delinquency on the part of a legal practitioner in the exercise of his profession does not amount to professional misconduct. 26) Therefore, the liability against an opining advocate arises only when the lawyer was an active participant in a plan to defraud the Bank. In the given case, there is no evidence to prove that A-6 was abetting or aiding the original conspirators. 27) However, it is beyond doubt that a lawyer owes an “unremitting loyalty” to the interests of the client and it is the lawyer’s responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance the interest of the client. Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators. At the most, he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence and cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 of IPC along with other conspirators without proper and acceptable link between them. It is further made clear that if there is a link or evidence to connect him with the other conspirators for causing loss to the institution, undoubtedly, the prosecuting authorities are entitled to proceed under criminal prosecution. Such tangible materials are lacking in the case of the respondent herein. 28) In the light of the above discussion and after analysing all the materials, we are satisfied that there is no prima facie case for proceeding in respect of the charges alleged insofar as respondent herein is concerned. We agree with the conclusion of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings and reject the stand taken by the CBI. 29) In the light of what is stated above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.


                                     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1460  OF 2012

               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6975 of 2011)


Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad    .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

K. Narayana Rao                               .... Respondent(s)

                                      2



                               J U D G M E N T


P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    Leave granted.
2)    This appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order  dated
09.07.2010 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature,  Andhra  Pradesh  at
Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. 2347  of  2008  whereby  the  High  Court
allowed the petition filed by the respondent herein  under  Section  482  of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) and  quashed  the
criminal proceedings pending against him in CC No. 44 of 2007 (Crime No.  36
of 2005) on the file of the Special Judge for CBI cases, Hyderabad.

3)    Brief facts:
(a)    According  to  the  prosecution,  basing  on  an   information,    on
30.11.2005, the  CBI,  Hyderabad  registered  an  FIR  being  RC  32(A)/2005
against Shri P. Radha Gopal Reddy (A-1) and Shri  Udaya  Sankar  (A-2),  the
then Branch Manager and the Assistant Manager, respectively  of  the  Vijaya
Bank,  Narayanaguda  Branch,  Hyderabad,  for  the  commission  of   offence
punishable under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 471  read  with  Section
109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’)  and  Section  13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of  Corruption  Act,  1988  for
abusing their official position as public servants and for having  conspired
with private individuals, viz., Shri P.Y. Kondala Rao –  the  builder  (A-3)
and Shri N.S. Sanjeeva Rao (A-4) and other unknown  persons  for  defrauding
the bank by sanctioning and disbursement of housing loans  to  22  borrowers
in violation of the Bank’s rules and guidelines and thereby caused  wrongful
loss of Rs. 1.27 crores to the Bank and corresponding gain  for  themselves.
In furtherance of  the  said  conspiracy,  A-2  conducted  the  pre-sanction
inspection in respect of 22 housing loans and A-1 sanctioned the same.
(b)   After completion of the investigation,  the  CBI  filed  charge  sheet
along with the list of witnesses and the list of documents against  all  the
accused persons.  In the said  charge  sheet,  Shri  K.  Narayana  Rao,  the
respondent herein, who is a legal practitioner and a panel advocate for  the
Vijaya Bank, was also arrayed as A-6.  The duty of the respondent herein  as
a panel advocate was to verify the documents  and  to  give  legal  opinion.
The allegation against him is that he gave false legal  opinion  in  respect
of 10 housing loans.  It has been specifically alleged in the  charge  sheet
that the respondent herein (A-6) and Mr. K.C. Ramdas (A-7)-the  valuer  have
failed to point out the actual ownership of the properties and to bring  out
the ownership details and name of the apartments in their reports  and  also
the falsity in the permissions for  construction  issued  by  the  Municipal
Authorities.
(c)   Being aggrieved, the respondent herein (A-6) filed  a  petition  being
Criminal Petition No. 2347 of 2008 under Section 482 of the Code before  the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh at  Hyderabad  for  quashing  of  the  criminal
proceedings in CC No. 44 of 2007 on the file of the Special  Judge  for  CBI
Cases, Hyderabad. By impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2010, the  High
Court quashed the proceedings insofar as  the  respondent  herein  (A-6)  is
concerned.
(d)   Being aggrieved, the CBI,  Hyderabad  filed  this  appeal  by  way  of
special leave.
4)    Heard Mr. H.P. Raval, learned Additional  Solicitor  General  for  the
appellant-CBI and Mr. R.  Venkataramani,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
respondent (A-6).
5)    After taking us through the allegations in the charge sheet  presented
before the special Court and all other relevant materials, the  learned  ASG
has raised the following contentions:
(i)   The High Court while entertaining the petition under  Section  482  of
the Code has exceeded its jurisdiction.  The powers under  Section  482  are
inherent  which  are  to  be  exercised  in  exceptional  and  extraordinary
circumstances.   The  power  being  extraordinary  has   to   be   exercised
sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional circumstances;
(ii)  The High Court has committed an error in holding that no material  had
been gathered by the investigating agency against the respondent herein  (A-
6) that he had conspired with  the  remaining  accused  for  committing  the
offence; and
(iii) There is no material on record to show that the respondent herein  (A-
6) did not verify the originals pertaining to housing  loans  before  giving
legal opinion and  intentionally  changed  the  proforma  and  violated  the
Bank’s circulars.
6)    On the other hand, Mr. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel  for  the
respondent  (A-6),  after  taking  us  through  the  charge  sheet  and  the
materials placed before the  respondent  seeking  legal  opinion,  submitted
that he has not committed any offence much less an offence punishable  under
Section 120-B read with Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 109 of IPC  and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption
Act, 1988.  He further submitted that based on  the  documents  placed,  the
respondent herein after perusing and on satisfying  himself,  furnished  his
legal opinion for which he cannot be implicated as one of  the  conspirators
for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 109 IPC.
7)    We have carefully perused all the relevant  materials  and  considered
the rival submissions.
8)    In order to appreciate the stand of the CBI and  the  defence  of  the
respondent, it is necessary to refer the specific allegations in the  charge
sheet.  The respondent herein has been arrayed  as  accused  No.  6  in  the
charge sheet and the allegations against him are as under:
      “Para 20: Investigation revealed that legal opinions in respect of all
      these 10 loans have been given by Panel Advocate – Sri K. Narayana Rao
      (A-6) and valuation reports were given by Approved Valuer –  Sri  V.C.
      Ramdas(A-7).  Both, the advocate and the valuer, have failed to  point
      out the actual ownership of the property and failed to bring  out  the
      ownership details and name of the apartments in their  reports.   They
      have also failed to  point  out  the  falsehood  in  the  construction
      permission issued by the municipal authorities.


      Para  28:  Investigation  revealed  that  the  municipal   permissions
      submitted to the bank were also fake.


      Para 29: Expert of  Finger  Print  Bureau  confirmed  that  the  thumb
      impressions available on the questioned 22 title deeds pertain to A-3,
      A-4 and A-5.


      Para 30: The above facts disclose that Sri P. Radha Gopal Reddy  (A-1)
      and Sri M. Udaya Sankar (A-2) entered into criminal conspirary with A-
      3 and abused their official position as public servants  by  violating
      the bank norms and in the process caused wrongful gain to A-3  to  the
      extent of Rs.1,00,68,050/- and corresponding wrongful loss to the bank
      in sanctioning 22 housing loans.  Sri P.Y. Kondal Rao(A-3)  registered
      false sale deeds in  favour  of  borrowers  using  impostors  as  site
      owners, produced false municipal permissions and cheated the  bank  in
      getting the housing loans.  He is  liable  for  conspiracy,  cheating,
      forgery for the purpose of cheating and for using forged documents  as
      genuine.  Sri B. Ramanaji Rao(A-4) and Sri R. Sai Sita  Rama  Rao(A-5)
      impersonated as site owners, executed the false sale deeds.  They  are
      liable for impersonation, conspiracy,  cheating,  forging  a  valuable
      security and forgery for the purpose of cheating.  Sri K. Narayana Rao
      (A-6)  submitted  false  legal  opinions  and  Sri  K.C.   Ramdas(A-7)
      submitted  false  valuation  reports  about  the  genuineness  of  the
      properties in collusion with A-3 for sanction of the loans  by  Vijaya
      Bank, Narayanaguda branch, Hyderabad and abetted the crime.  Sri  A.V.
      Subba Rao(A-8) managed verification of salary slips of  the  borrowers
      of 12 housing loans in collusion with A-3 and abetted the crime.


      Para 33: In view of the above, the accused A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-
      6, A-7 & A-8 are liable for offences punishable  under  Section  120-B
      read with Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 109 read  with  Section
      420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
      of Corruption Act and substantive offences thereof.”


With the above details,  let  us  consider  whether  there  is  prima  facie
allegation(s) and material(s) in order  to  pursue  the  trial  against  the
respondent herein.  In the same way, we have to see  whether  the  reasoning
and the ultimate conclusion of the High Court in quashing the  charge  sheet
against the respondent herein (A-6) is sustainable.   We  are  conscious  of
the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of  the  Code
for interfering with the criminal prosecution at the threshold.
9)    Mr. Raval, learned ASG in support of his  contentions  relied  on  the
following decisions:
i)    State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39;
ii)   P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2010) 2 SCC 398; and
iii)  Sajjan Kumar vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368.
10)   The first decision Ramesh Singh (supra) relates to  interpretation  of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge  the
accused or to proceed with trial.  Para 4 of the said  judgment  is  pressed
into service which reads as under:
      “4. Under Section 226 of the Code  while  opening  the  case  for  the
      prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against  the
      accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the  guilt  of
      the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage  the  duty  of  the
      Court to consider the record of the case and the  documents  submitted
      therewith  and  to  hear  the  submissions  of  the  accused  and  the
      prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an  order
      either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the  Code.  If  “the  Judge
      considers that there is no sufficient ground  for  proceeding  against
      the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for
      so doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on  the  other  hand,  “the
      Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground  for  presuming  that  the
      accused has committed an offence which— … (b) is  exclusively  triable
      by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused”,
      as provided in Section 228. Reading the  two  provisions  together  in
      juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that  at  the
      beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth,  veracity  and
      effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not
      to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to  be  attached  to  the
      probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at
      that stage of the trial to consider in  any  detail  and  weigh  in  a
      sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be  incompatible
      with the innocence of the accused or not. The  standard  of  test  and
      judgment which is to be finally applied  before  recording  a  finding
      regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly  to  be
      applied at the stage of deciding  the  matter  under  Section  227  or
      Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether
      there is sufficient ground for conviction of the  accused  or  whether
      the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong  suspicion  against
      the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion,  cannot
      take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of  the  trial.
      But at the initial stage if there is a strong  suspicion  which  leads
      the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused
      has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say  that
      there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.  The
      presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be  drawn  at  the
      initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing  the  trial  of
      criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed  to  be  guilty
      unless the contrary is proved. But it  is  only  for  the  purpose  of
      deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with  the  trial
      or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor  proposes  to  adduce  to
      prove the guilt of the accused even if fully  accepted  before  it  is
      challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the  defence  evidence,
      if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there
      will be no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  with  the  trial.  An
      exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will  lead
      to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor  advisable.  We
      may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example.  If
      the scales of pan as to the guilt or  innocence  of  the  accused  are
      something like even, at the conclusion of  the  trial,  then,  on  the
      theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in  his  acquittal.  But
      if, on the other hand, it is so at the  initial  stage  of  making  an
      order under Section 227 or Section  228,  then  in  such  a  situation
      ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will  be
      one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.”


11)   Discharge of accused under Section 227 of  the  Code  was  extensively
considered by this Court in P.  Vijayan  (supra)  wherein  it  was  held  as
under:

      “10. ……. If two views are possible and  one  of  them  gives  rise  to
      suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge
      will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not
      to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further,
      the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against  the  accused”
      clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post  office  to  frame  the
      charge at the behest of the  prosecution,  but  has  to  exercise  his
      judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a
      case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this
      fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter  into  the  pros  and
      cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing  of  evidence  and
      probabilities which is really the function of  the  court,  after  the
      trial starts.


      11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge  has  merely  to  sift  the
      evidence in order to find out  whether  or  not  there  is  sufficient
      ground for  proceeding  against  the  accused.  In  other  words,  the
      sufficiency of ground would take within its fold  the  nature  of  the
      evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced  before  the
      court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious  circumstances
      against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”



12)   While considering the very same provisions i.e.,  framing  of  charges
and discharge of accused, again in Sajjan Kumar  (supra),  this  Court  held
thus:
      “19. It is clear that at the initial  stage,  if  there  is  a  strong
      suspicion which leads the court to think  that  there  is  ground  for
      presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then  it  is  not
      open to the court to say  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for
      proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the  guilt  of  the
      accused which is to be drawn at the initial  stage  is  only  for  the
      purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed  with
      the trial or not. If the evidence which the  prosecution  proposes  to
      adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully  accepted  before
      it is challenged in  cross-examination  or  rebutted  by  the  defence
      evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the  offence,
      then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.


      20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC  is  not
      to act as a mere post office and has to come to a  conclusion  whether
      the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the  Court
      of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on  record,
      but  only  for  seeing  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence   for
      commitment,  and  not  whether  there  is  sufficient   evidence   for
      conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence  or  the  evidence  is
      totally unworthy of credit, it  is  the  duty  of  the  Magistrate  to
      discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on
      which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case.
      It is also clear that in exercising  jurisdiction  under  Section  227
      CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry  into  the  pros
      and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was  conducting
      a trial.


      Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC

      21. On consideration of the authorities about the  scope  of  Sections
      227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
      (i) The Judge while considering the question of  framing  the  charges
      under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and  weigh  the
      evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
      facie case against  the  accused  has  been  made  out.  The  test  to
      determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
      (ii) Where the  materials  placed  before  the  court  disclose  grave
      suspicion against the accused which has not been  properly  explained,
      the court will be fully justified in framing a charge  and  proceeding
      with the trial.
      (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece  of
      the prosecution but has to consider the  broad  probabilities  of  the
      case, the total effect of the  evidence  and  the  documents  produced
      before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this  stage,
      there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the  matter
      and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
      (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court  could  form
      an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame
      the charge, though for conviction the conclusion  is  required  to  be
      proved beyond reasonable doubt that  the  accused  has  committed  the
      offence.
      (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of  the
      material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the
      court must apply its judicial mind on the material  placed  on  record
      and must be satisfied that the commission of offence  by  the  accused
      was possible.
      (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court  is  required  to
      evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find  out
      if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
      existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For
      this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected  even
      at that initial stage to accept all that  the  prosecution  states  as
      gospel truth even if it is  opposed  to  common  sense  or  the  broad
      probabilities of the case.
      (vii) If two views  are  possible  and  one  of  them  gives  rise  to
      suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge
      will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this  stage,  he  is
      not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”



From the above decisions, it is clear that at the initial  stage,  if  there
is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that  there  is  ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, in that  event,  it
is not open to the Court to say that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for
proceeding against the accused.  A  judicial  magistrate  enquiring  into  a
case under Section 209 of the Code is not to act as a mere post  office  and
has to arrive at a conclusion  whether  the  case  before  him  is  fit  for
commitment of the accused to the Court of Session.  He is entitled  to  sift
and weigh the materials on record, but only  for  seeing  whether  there  is
sufficient evidence for commitment, and  not  whether  there  is  sufficient
evidence for conviction.  On the other hand, if the  Magistrate  finds  that
there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence placed is totally  unworthy
of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused  at  once.   It  is  also
settled law that while exercising jurisdiction  under  Section  227  of  the
Code, the Magistrate should not make a roving  enquiry  into  the  pros  and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting  a  trial.
This provision was introduced in the Code to avoid wastage  of  public  time
and to save the accused from unavoidable harassment and expenditure.   While
analyzing the role of the respondent herein (A-6) from the charge sheet  and
the materials supplied along with it, the above principles have to  be  kept
in mind.
13)   In Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Another vs. Kanwar Pal Singh  Gill  and
Another, (1995) 6 SCC 194, this Court has considered the scope  of  quashing
an FIR and held that it is settled principle of law that  at  the  stage  of
quashing an FIR or complaint, the High Court is not justified  in  embarking
upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability  or  genuineness  of  the
allegations made therein.  By noting the principles laid down  in  State  of
Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held that  an  FIR
or a complaint may be quashed if the allegations made therein are so  absurd
and inherently improbable that no prudent  person  can  ever  reach  a  just
conclusion that there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the
accused.
14)   In Mahavir Prashad Gupta and Another vs.  State  of  National  Capital
Territory of Delhi and Others, (2000) 8 SCC 115, this Court  considered  the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the  Code  and  held  as
under:

      “5. The law on the subject is very clear. In  the  case  of  State  of
      Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988)  4  SCC  655  it  has  been  held  that
      jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  has
      to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. It  has  been  held
      that at an initial stage a court should not embark upon an inquiry  as
      to  whether  the  allegations  in  the  complaint  are  likely  to  be
      established by evidence or not. Again in the case of State of  Haryana
      v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 this  Court  has  held  that  the
      power  of  quashing  criminal  proceedings  must  be  exercised   very
      sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest  of  rare
      cases. It has been held that the  court  would  not  be  justified  in
      embarking upon an inquiry as to  the  reliability  or  genuineness  or
      otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. It  has
      been held that the extraordinary or inherent powers did not confer  an
      arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to  its  whim  or
      caprice.



15)   Regarding conspiracy, Mr. Raval, learned ASG after taking  us  through
the averments in the charge sheet based  reliance  on  a  decision  of  this
Court  in  Shivnarayan  Laxminarayan  Joshi  and   Others   vs.   State   of
Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465 wherein it was held that once  the  conspiracy
to commit an illegal act is proved, act of one conspirator becomes  the  act
of the other.  By pointing out the same,  learned  ASG  submitted  that  the
respondent herein (A-6), along with the  other  conspirators  defrauded  the
Bank’s money by sanctioning loans to various fictitious persons.
16)   We have already extracted the relevant allegations  and  the  role  of
the respondent herein (A-6).  The only allegation against the respondent  is
that he submitted false legal opinion to the Bank in respect of the  housing
loans in the capacity of a panel advocate  and  did  not  point  out  actual
ownership of the properties.  As rightly pointed out by  Mr.  Venkataramani,
learned senior counsel for the respondent, the respondent was not  named  in
the FIR.  The allegations in the FIR are that A-1 to A-4 conspired  together
and cheated Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda, Hyderabad to the  tune  of  Rs.  1.27
crores. It is further seen that the offences alleged against A-1 to A-4  are
the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467, 468 and  471  of
IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section  13  (1)(d)  of  the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988.  It is  not  in  dispute  that  the  respondent  is  a
practicing advocate and according to Mr. Venkataramani,  he  has  experience
in giving legal opinion and  has  conducted  several  cases  for  the  banks
including Vijaya Bank.  As stated earlier, the only allegation  against  him
is that he submitted false  legal  opinion  about  the  genuineness  of  the
properties in question.  It is the definite stand of the  respondent  herein
that he has rendered Legal Scrutiny Reports in all the cases after  perusing
the documents submitted by the Bank.  It is also his  claim  that  rendition
of legal opinion cannot be construed as an offence.  He further pointed  out
that  it  is  not  possible  for  the  panel  advocate  to  investigate  the
genuineness of the documents and in the present case, he  only  perused  the
contents and concluded whether the title was conveyed through a document  or
not.  It is also brought to our notice that LW-5 (Listed  Witness),  who  is
the Law Officer of Vijaya Bank, has given  a  statement  regarding  flaw  in
respect of title of several properties.  It is the claim of  the  respondent
that in his statement, LW-5 has not even made a single  comment  as  to  the
veracity of the legal opinion rendered by the respondent herein.   In  other
words, it is the claim of the respondent that none  of  the  witnesses  have
spoken to any overt act on his  part  or  his  involvement  in  the  alleged
conspiracy.  Learned senior counsel for the respondent has also pointed  out
that out of 78 witnesses no one has made any relevant comment  or  statement
about the alleged involvement of the respondent  herein  in  the  matter  in
question.
17)   In order to appreciate the claim  and  the  stand  of  the  respondent
herein as a panel advocate, we have perused the legal  opinion  rendered  by
the respondent herein in the form of Legal Scrutiny Report dated  10.09.2003
as to the title relating to Sri B.A.V.K. Mohan Rao, S/o late Shri  Someshwar
Rao which is as under.
                            “Legal Scrutiny Report
                                              Dated 10.09.2003.


      To
      The Branch Manager,
      Vijaya Bank,
      Narayanaguda
      Hyderabad


      Sir,


      Sub:- Title Opinion Shri BAVK Mohan Rao
                           S/o Late Shri Someswar Rao.


      With reference to your letter dated NIL.  I submit my Scrutiny  Report
      as hereunder:-


      1.    Name and address of the Mortgagor
           Shri. BAVK Mohan Rao
           S/o Late Shri Someswar Rao
           R/o 1-1 290/3, Vidyanager, Hyderabad.


      2.  Details/Description of documents scrutinized:


      |Sl.No.  |Date             |Name of the documents         |Whether     |
|        |                 |                              |Original/   |
|        |                 |                              |Certified   |
|        |                 |                              |True Copy   |
|1.      |12.05.2003       |C.C. Pahais for the year      |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |1972-73 and 1978-79           |            |
|2.      |08.02.1980       |Death Certificate of Shri PV  |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |Narahari Rao                  |            |
|3.      |07.03.1980       |Legal Heir Certificate of Shri|Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |PV Narahari Rao               |            |
|4.      |24.04.1980       |C.C. of Regd. GPA No. 58/80   |Xerox Copy  |
|5.      |19.09.1980       |Regd. Sale Deed No. 1243/80   |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |with Plan                     |            |
|6.      |07.12.1998       |Sanctioned Plan vide          |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |proceeding No. 2155/98        |            |
|7.      |02.01.2003       |Development Agreement         |Xerox Copy  |
|8.      |25.04.2003       |EC No. 6654/2003 for the      |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |period from 28.06.1980 to     |            |
|        |                 |31.03.1982                    |            |
|9.      |25.04.2003       |EC No. 4136/2003 for the      |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |period from 01.04.1982 to     |            |
|        |                 |23.03.1984                    |            |
|10.     |21.04.2003       |EC No. 3918/2003 for the      |Xerox Copy  |
|        |                 |period from 24.03.1994 to     |            |
|        |                 |20.04.2003                    |            |
|11      |28.07.2003       |Agreement for Sale            |Original    |




      3. Details/Description of Property:-


      Sl.No. Sy. No./H.No. Extent of land     Location      Boundaries
                             Building   Dist.Village


      All that Flat bearing No. F-5 on First Floor, admeasuring 900 sq.  Ft,
      along with undivided share of land 28 sq yds, out of total admeasuring
      870 sq. yds constructed on Plot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in Sy. Nos. 84 and  85
      in  the  premises  of  “Guru  Datta  Nivas”,  situated   at   Nerdmet,
      Malkajagiri Municipality, and Mandal, Ranga Reddy Dist. Hyderabad  and
      bounded by:


      FLAT BOUNDARIES:             LAND BOUNDARIES
      NORTH: Flat No. F-6               20-0”
      SOUTH: Open to sky                Wide Road, Sy No. 86
      EAST   : Corridor & Stair  Case           Sy.  Nos.  76  and  78  open
                             to sky.
      WEST  : Open to sky


      4. Brief History of the  Property  and  How  the  owner/Mortgagor  has
      derived title:


      The Pahains for the years 1972-73 and 1978-79  under  document  No.  1
      reveals that Sri. Venkat Naraari Rao is the pattadar and possessor  of
      the land admeasuring Ac. 1-31 guntas in Sy No. 84 and Ac. 1-22  guntas
      in Sy No. 85 of Malkajgiri, Hyderabad.


      The document No. 2 shows that Sri. PV  Narahari  Rao  was  expired  on
      23.01.1980 as per the Death Certificate issued by MCH.


      The document No 3 shows that Smt. Saraswathi Bai  is  only  the  legal
      heir of Late Shri PV Narahari Rao.


      The document No. 4 shows that Smt. Saraswathi Bai executed  a  GPA  in
      favour of Sri. CV Prasad Rao, empowering him  to  deal  and  sell  the
      above said property.  The GPA was registered in  the  office  of  sub-
      Registrar of Hyderabad-East vide document No. 58/80 dated 24.04.1980.


      The document No. 5 shows that Smt. Saraswathi Bai sold the  Plot  Nos.
      3, 4 and 5 admeasuring 870 sq yds. situated at  Malkajgiri,  Hyderabad
      to Smt. N. Samson Sanjeeva Rao and executed a sale deed in his  favour
      by virtue of document No. 1243/80 dated 19.09.1980 registered  in  the
      office of sub-registrar of Uppat, Ranga Reddy.


      The document No. 6 shows that Shri N.  Samson  Sanjeeva  Rao  obtained
      permission  from   Malkajgiri   Municipality   for   construction   of
      Residential building consisting of Ground + 4 floors vide  permit  No.
      G1/2155/98 dated 07.12.1998.


      The document No. 7 shows that Shri N. Samson Sanjeeva Rao entered into
      development agreement with Shri PY  Kondal  Rao  for  construction  of
      residential flats in the above said plots.


      The document Nos. 8, 9 and 10 are the Encumbrance Certificates for the
      period from 28.06.1998 to 20.04.2003 (23 years)  which  disclose  only
      the transactions mentioned in document No. 5.


      The document No. 11 shows that Shri N.  Samson  Sanjeeva  Rao  (owner)
      along with Shri PY Kondal Rao (builder) agreed to  sell  the  Schedule
      Property (referred under Item No. III of this opinion)  to  Shri  BAVK
      Mohan Rao (applicant) for a total sale consideration of Rs. 5,50,000/-
      and Shri. BAVK Mohan Rao (applicant) also agreed to purchase the  said
      property for the same consideration.


      5.   Search and Investigation.


      |5.1        |The person who is the   |Shri NS Sanjeeva Rao       |
|           |present owner of the    |(present owner/vendor) and |
|           |property                |Shri BAVK Mohan Rao        |
|           |                        |(purchaser/Vendee)         |
|5.2 to 5.5 |xxx                     |xxx                        |
|5.6        |Whether there the latest|The document No. 5 is      |
|           |title deed and          |available in Xerox         |
|           |immediately previous    |(original verified)        |
|           |title deed(s) are       |                           |
|           |available in original   |                           |
|5.7 to 5.13|xxx                     |xxx                        |
|5.14       |Whether the proposed    |Yes, Equitable mortgage is |
|           |equitable mortgage by   |possible.  The original    |
|           |deosit of title deed is |registered Sale Deed       |
|           |possible? If so, what   |executed in favour of Shri |
|           |are the documents to be |BAVK Mohan Rao (applicant) |
|           |deposited? If deposit is|by the Vendors along with  |
|           |not possible, can there |all the documents as       |
|           |be simple mortgage or a |mentioned in the list in   |
|           |registered memorandum or|Item No. 2 of this opinion |
|           |by any other mode of    |should be deposited.       |
|           |mortgage?               |                           |
|5.15to 5.20|xxx                     |xxx                        |




      6-8            xxx      xxx      xxx








      9. CERTIFICATE


      I am of the  opinion  that  Shri  NS  Sanjeeva  Rao  is  having  clear
      marketable title by virtue of Regd.  Sale  Deed  No.  1243/1980  dated
      19.09.1980 referred document No. 5 of this opinion.  He can  convey  a
      valid clear  marketable  title  in  favour  of  Shri  BAVK  Mohan  Rao
      (applicant) in respect of the schedule property (referred  under  Item
      No. 3 of this opinion) by duly executing a  Regd.  Sale  Deed  in  his
      favour.


      Shri BAVK Mohan Rao (applicant) can create a valid equitable  mortgage
      with the Bank by depositing the original Regd. Sale deed  executed  in
      his by the vendors and also depositing all the documents as  mentioned
      in the list in Item No. 2 of this opinion.  I further certify that:-


      |1.      |There are no prior mortgage/charge         |          |
|        |whatsoever as could be seen from the       |          |
|        |encumbrance certificate for the period     |          |
|        |from 28.06.1980 to 20.04.2003 pertaining to|Yes       |
|        |the immovable property covered by the above|          |
|        |title deed(s).                             |          |
|2.      |There are prior mortgages/charges to the   |          |
|        |extent, which are liable to be cleared or  |          |
|        |satisfied by complying with the following. |NA        |
|3.      |There are claims from minors and           |          |
|        |his/her/their interest in the property to  |          |
|        |the extent of (specify) the share of       |NA        |
|        |minor(s) with name                         |          |
|4.      |The undivided share of minor of (specify   |          |
|        |the liability that is fastended or could be|NA        |
|        |fastened on the property).                 |          |
|5.      |The property is subject to the payment of  |          |
|        |Rupees (specify the liability that is      |          |
|        |fastened or could be fastened on the       |NA        |
|        |property)                                  |          |
|6.      |Provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and      |          |
|        |Regulation) Act are not applicable.        |NA        |
|        |Permission obtained.                       |          |
|7.      |Holding/Acquisitions in accordance with the|          |
|        |provisions of the land:                    |NA        |
|8.      |The mortgage if created will be perfect and|          |
|        |available to the bank for the liability of |          |
|        |the intending borrower: Shri BAVK Mohan Rao|          |
|        |(Applicant)                                |          |




      The Bank is advised to obtain  the  encumbrance  certificate  for  the
      period from 21.04.2003 till the date after obtaining a registered sale
      deed in favour of Shri BAVK Mohan Rao (applicant)


      SEARCH REPORT:
      I have verified the title deed of Shri N.S. Sanjeeva Rao in the office
      of sub-Registrar of Uppal, Hyderabad on 18.07.2003 and found that  the
      sale transaction between  parties,  schedule  property  stamp  papers,
      regd. Sale Deed No. 1243/1980 are genuine.  The  verification  receipt
      is enclosed herewith.


                                        (K. NARAYANA RAO)
                                             ADVOCATE”

The above particulars show that the respondent herein, as a panel  advocate,
verified the documents supplied by the Bank and rendered  his  opinion.   It
also shows that he was furnished with Xerox  copies  of  the  documents  and
very few original documents as well as Xerox copies  of  Death  Certificate,
Legal heir-ship Certificate, Encumbrance Certificate  for  his  perusal  and
opinion.  It is his definite claim that he perused those documents and  only
after that he rendered his opinion.  He also  advised  the  bank  to  obtain
Encumbrance Certificate for the period from 21.04.2003  till  date.   It  is
pointed out that in the same way, he furnished  Legal  Scrutiny  Reports  in
respect of other cases also.
18)   We have  already  mentioned  that  it  is  an  admitted  case  of  the
prosecution that his name was not mentioned in the FIR.  Only in the charge-
sheet, the respondent has been shown  as  Accused  No.  6  stating  that  he
submitted false legal opinion to the Bank in respect of  the  housing  loans
in the capacity of a panel advocate and did not point out  actual  ownership
of the properties in question.
19)    Mr.  Venkataramani,  learned  senior  counsel  for   the   respondent
submitted that in support of charge under Section 120B, there is no  factual
foundation  and  no  evidence  at  all.   Section  120A   defines   criminal
conspiracy which reads thus:
      “120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.- When two  or  more  persons
      agree to do, or cause to be done,-


      1) an illegal act, or


      2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is
         designated a criminal conspiracy:
      Provided that no agreement except an agreement to  commit  an  offence
      shall amount to a criminal conspiracy  unless  some  act  besides  the
      agreement is done  by  one  or  more  parties  to  such  agreement  in
      pursuance thereof.


      Explanation.- It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate
      object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.”


Section  120B  speaks  about  punishment  of  criminal  conspiracy.    While
considering the definition of criminal conspiracy, it is relevant  to  refer
Sections 34 and 35 of IPC which are as under:
      “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.-
      When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance  of  the
      common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for  that  act
      in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”


      “35. When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done  with  a
      criminal knowledge or intention. -  Whenever an act, which is criminal
      only by reason  of  its  being  done  with  a  criminal  knowledge  or
      intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who  joins
      in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the  act  in
      the same manner as if the  act  were  done  by  him  alone  with  that
      knowledge or intention.”

20)   The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are  that  there
should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to  conspire  and
the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or  for  doing,  by
illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal.  In  other  words,
the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act  and
such  an  agreement  can  be  proved  either  by  direct  evidence   or   by
circumstantial evidence or by both and in  a  matter  of  common  experience
that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available.   Accordingly,
the circumstances  proved  before  and  after  the  occurrence  have  to  be
considered to decide about the complicity of  the  accused.   Even  if  some
acts are proved to have committed, it  must  be  clear  that  they  were  so
committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons  who
were parties  to  the  alleged  conspiracy.   Inferences  from  such  proved
circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such  circumstances
are incapable of any other  reasonable  explanation.   In  other  words,  an
offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to  have  been  established  on  mere
suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported  by  cogent  and
acceptable evidence.
21)   In the earlier part of  our  order,  first  we  have  noted  that  the
respondent was not named in the FIR  and  then  we  extracted  the  relevant
portions from the charge-sheet about his alleged  role.   Though  statements
of several witnesses have been enclosed along with  the  charge-sheet,  they
speak volumes about others.  However, there is no specific reference to  the
role of the present respondent along with the main conspirators.
22)    The High Court while quashing the criminal proceedings in respect  of
the respondent herein has gone into the allegations in the charge sheet  and
the materials placed for his scrutiny and arrived at a conclusion  that  the
same does not disclose any criminal  offence  committed  by  him.   It  also
concluded that there is no material  to  show  that  the  respondent  herein
joined hands with A-1 to A-3 for giving false opinion.  In  the  absence  of
direct material, he cannot be implicated as one of the conspirators  of  the
offence punishable under Section 420 read with  Section  109  of  IPC.   The
High Court has also opined that even after critically examining  the  entire
material, it does not  disclose  any  criminal  offence  committed  by  him.
Though as pointed out earlier, a roving enquiry is not needed,  however,  it
is the duty of the Court to  find  out  whether  any  prima  facie  material
available against the person who has charged with an offence  under  Section
420 read with Section 109 of IPC.  In  the  banking  sector  in  particular,
rendering of legal opinion for granting of loans  has  become  an  important
component of an advocate’s work. In the  law  of  negligence,  professionals
such as  lawyers,  doctors,  architects  and  others  are  included  in  the
category of persons professing some special skills.
23)   A lawyer does not tell his client that he shall win the  case  in  all
circumstances. Likewise a physician would not assure  the  patient  of  full
recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does  not  guarantee  that  the
result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much less  to  the  extent
of 100% for the  person  operated  on.  The  only  assurance  which  such  a
professional can give  or  can  be  given  by  implication  is  that  he  is
possessed of the requisite skill in that branch of profession  which  he  is
practising and while undertaking the performance of the  task  entrusted  to
him, he would be exercising his skill with reasonable  competence.  This  is
what the person approaching the professional can  expect.   Judged  by  this
standard, a professional may be held liable for negligence  on  one  of  the
two findings, viz., either he was  not  possessed  of  the  requisite  skill
which he professed  to  have  possessed,  or,  he  did  not  exercise,  with
reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess.
24)   In Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr.  (2005) 6 SCC 1 this  court
laid down the standard to be applied for judging. To determine  whether  the
person charged has been negligent or not,  he  has  to  be  judged  like  an
ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that  profession.  It
is not necessary for every professional to  possess  the  highest  level  of
expertise in that branch which he practices.
25)   In Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar vs. Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra  &
Ors. (1984) 2  SCC  556,  this  Court  held  that  “…there  is  a  world  of
difference between the giving of improper legal advice  and  the  giving  of
wrong legal advice. Mere negligence unaccompanied by any  moral  delinquency
on the part of a legal practitioner in the exercise of his  profession  does
not amount to professional misconduct.
26)   Therefore, the liability against an opining advocate arises only  when
the lawyer was an active participant in a plan to defraud the Bank.  In  the
given case, there is no evidence to prove that A-6 was  abetting  or  aiding
the original conspirators.
27)   However, it is  beyond  doubt  that  a  lawyer  owes  an  “unremitting
loyalty”  to  the  interests  of  the  client  and  it   is   the   lawyer’s
responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance  the  interest  of
the client.  Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot  be
mulcted with the criminal  prosecution,  particularly,  in  the  absence  of
tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators.  At the  most,
he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct  if  it  is
established by acceptable evidence and cannot be  charged  for  the  offence
under Sections 420 and 109 of IPC  along  with  other  conspirators  without
proper and acceptable link between them.  It is further made clear  that  if
there is a link or evidence to connect him with the other  conspirators  for
causing loss to the institution, undoubtedly,  the  prosecuting  authorities
are  entitled  to  proceed  under  criminal  prosecution.    Such   tangible
materials are lacking in the case of the respondent herein.
28)   In the light of the above  discussion  and  after  analysing  all  the
materials,  we  are  satisfied  that  there  is  no  prima  facie  case  for
proceeding in respect of the charges alleged insofar  as  respondent  herein
is concerned.  We agree with the conclusion of the High  Court  in  quashing
the criminal proceedings and reject the stand taken by the CBI.
29)   In the light of what is stated above, the appeal fails  and  the  same
is dismissed.

































































                             ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)










                             ..…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 21, 2012.













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