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Tuesday, September 11, 2012

The petitioner herein (writ petitioner before the High Court) is a registered partnership firm which had developed a residential colony in Miramar, Goa, known as La Campala residential colony. It is the case of the petitioner that after completion of the developmental work the residual land of the colony, including all open plots that were meant to be kept open as “vacant space”, were transferred in favour of the petitioner under a registered deed dated 16th November, 1977. Such open spaces, according to the petitioner, included a piece of land measuring about 19250 sq.mtrs. bearing Chalta No.18 of PT Sheet No. 120, Miramar, Panaji, Goa (hereinafter referred to as ‘the land in question’). The petitioner claims that the right, title and interest in the said open land undisputedly vested in the petitioner and the petitioner has exclusive right to develop the said open land which is to the knowledge of all concerned including the respondents in the present appeal. - Keeping in mind the very limited rights of the Petitioner that are disclosed at this stage by the materials on record and taking into account the nature of the developmental works that were proposed and the fact that a part of the work may have been executed in the meantime, we are of the view that the Respondents should be permitted to complete the remaining work on the land and the petitioner should be left with the option of raising a claim before the appropriate forum for such loss and compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled to in law. Naturally, if any such claim of compensation is required to be founded on proof of title/ownership or any other such relevant fact(s), the Petitioner will have to establish the same. No part of the present order shall be construed to be an expression of any opinion of this Court with regard to the ownership or any other right or entitlement of the Petitioner which has to be proved in accordance with law.


                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL APPEAL No.  6383                  of 2012
               ( Arising out of SLP (Civil)No. 29081 of 2011)


M/s. Real Estate Agencies               … Appellant(s)

                                   Versus

Govt. of Goa & Ors.                          … Respondent(s)

                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    This appeal has been filed to challenge the order dated  18th  August,
2011 passed by the High Court of Bombay  (Panaji  Bench)  in  Writ  Petition
No.98/11 by which the reliefs sought in the writ petition have been  refused
and the writ petitioner has been left with the  option  of  approaching  the
civil court for the redressal of his grievances.



3.    The facts in brief may be noted at the very outset:

(i)   The petitioner herein (writ petitioner before the  High  Court)  is  a
registered partnership firm which had  developed  a  residential  colony  in
Miramar, Goa, known as La Campala residential colony. It is the case of  the
petitioner that after completion of  the  developmental  work  the  residual
land of the colony, including all open plots that  were  meant  to  be  kept
open as “vacant space”, were transferred in favour of the  petitioner  under
a registered deed dated 16th November, 1977. Such open spaces, according  to
the petitioner, included a piece of  land  measuring  about  19250  sq.mtrs.
bearing Chalta No.18 of PT Sheet No. 120, Miramar, Panaji, Goa  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the land in  question’).  The  petitioner  claims  that  the
right, title and interest in the said open land undisputedly vested  in  the
petitioner and the petitioner has exclusive right to develop the  said  open
land which is to the knowledge of all concerned  including  the  respondents
in the present appeal.

(ii)  In the writ petition filed, it was further claimed  that  sometime  in
the year 1981 the petitioner wanted to raise  construction  in  an  area  of
about 7,000 sq.mtrs. (consisting of 14 plots of 500 sq.mtrs.  each)  out  of
the aforesaid open space of 19250  sq.mtrs.  According  to  the  petitioner,
such construction over the 7,000 sq.mtrs. of land  would  still  have   kept
more than 12,000 sq.mtrs. as open space which area would  have  been  within
the  prescriptions  contained  in   the   existing   Municipal   Rules   and
Regulations.  However  some  of  the  purchasers  of  the  plots   who   had
constructed their buildings thereon and had formed  a  co-operative  society
i.e. Model Cooperative Housing Society, approached the Bombay High Court  by
way of a civil suit bearing No.1/B of 1981 claiming an easementary right  in
respect of the entire vacant/open space of 19250 sq.mtrs. In  the  aforesaid
suit, the Co-operative Society, as the  plaintiff,  contended  that  in  the
brochures published at the time of development of the housing colony it  was
represented that 19250 sq.mtrs. of open space will be available in order  to
ensure plenty of light and ventilation besides  serving  as  a  recreational
ground  for  the  children  of  the  members  of  the  Society.   In   these
circumstances a decree of injunction was sought against  the  defendants  in
Suit No. 1/B of 1981 particularly the defendant  No.9  i.e.  the  petitioner
herein from raising any construction on the land in  question.  By  judgment
and order dated 29th April, 1983 the  said  suit  was  decreed.  L.P.A.  No.
26/83 filed by the present petitioner against the said  judgment  and  order
dated 29th April, 1983 was dismissed and the decree passed  by  the  Learned
Single Judge was affirmed. According to the petitioner,  in  the  course  of
the aforesaid proceedings,  no  issue  with  regard  to  the  title  of  the
petitioner to the land in question was raised and it  was  accepted  by  all
the contesting parties that the petitioner was the owner of  the  said  land
measuring 19250 sq.mtrs. In fact, the  only  issue  in  the  suit  was  with
regard to the right of the petitioner to raise  constructions  on  the  said
land or on any part thereof.

(iii) It was the further case of the petitioner in the  writ  petition  that
an area of about 625 sq. mtrs.  out  of  the  open  space  in  question  was
acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sometime  in
the year 1990 and in the said acquisition  proceeding,  the  petitioner  was
treated as the absolute owner  of  the  land.  In  fact,  according  to  the
petitioner, the compensation  payable  under  the  Award  was  paid  to  the
petitioner who had also filed a Reference Application under  Section  18  of
the Act and had further carried the matter in an appeal to  the  High  Court
of Bombay.



4.    According to the petitioner the aforesaid  facts  show  and  establish
the undisputed title of the petitioner to  the  land  in  question.  Certain
activities were, however, undertaken on the said land on 2nd  January,  2011
and the inquiries made on behalf of the petitioner indicated that  alongwith
a project of beautification of the  adjoining  Miramar  lake  a  project  to
develop  the  open  land  in  question  was  proposed  to   be   undertaken.
Specifically, a jogging track, walk ways,  recreational  centres  etc.  were
proposed. According to the petitioner, further inquiries revealed that  such
developmental work on  the  land  was  proposed  to  be  undertaken  at  the
instance of the respondent No. 3 who is the local Municipal  Councilor  and,
in fact, a Government Order dated 30th June, 2010 had  been  passed  in  the
matter by the Principal Chief Engineer, Public Works Department,  Government
of Goa. The petitioner had also averred in the  writ  petition  filed,  that
the very first stipulation in the order dated 30th June, 2010 required  that
tenders in respect of the developmental  work  on  the  land  shall  not  be
issued unless the land itself is acquired. However, without  initiating  any
proceeding to acquire the land, a tender was floated sometime in  September,
2010 and the respondent No.  4  was  awarded  the  Work  Order  sometime  in
December, 2010 requiring completion of the developmental works on  the  land
within 180 days. It is pursuant thereto that the  works  on  the  land  were
undertaken w.e.f. 2nd  January,  2011.  As  the  aforesaid  actions  of  the
respondents were not only in violation of the Government  Order  dated  30th
June, 2010 but also had the  effect  of  depriving  the  petitioner  of  the
ownership in the  property  in  question,  the  petitioner  filed  the  writ
petition in question seeking interference of the High Court in the  proposed
developmental work which according to the petitioner had already commenced.



5.    The respondents in the writ petition, including the Government of  Goa
and the Corporation of the city of Panaji apart from the Model  Co-operative
Housing Society, filed separate  counter  affidavits/written  statements  in
the case. According to the State the open space in question was required  to
be kept free from any kind of construction under the planning laws in  force
and that the plot owners in  the  residential  colony  have  an  easementary
right on and over the open space which had been  so  declared  by  the  High
Court  of  Bombay  in  Civil  Suit  No.1/B/1981   and   L.P.A.   No.26/1983.
Furthermore in terms of the judgments of the High  Court  in  the  aforesaid
cases the petitioner was obliged to keep the open  space  so  available  and
vacant at all times. In the affidavit filed the  State  had  also  contended
that at no point of time the petitioner was  interested  in  developing  the
open space and the same had become a dumping ground of garbage.  In  such  a
situation the Local Corporator  of  the  Panaji  Municipal  Corporation  was
requested by the residents to intervene in the matter and develop  the  land
into a recreational area. Initially the work was entrusted to the Goa  State
Infrastructure Development Corporation.  Thereafter,  the  Goa  State  Urban
Development Agency was entrusted with the responsibility. However,  as  both
the aforesaid entities faced  the  problem  of  shortage  of  funds  it  was
decided that the work will be carried out by the PWD, Goa. In the  affidavit
filed it was further stated that the open space was  to  be  developed  into
(a) Children Playing area, (b) Joggers Track,  (c)  Water  Harvesting  Pond,
(d) Multi-purpose court for cricket/football and (e) a Tennis court  and  an
Amphitheatre. Such development which was to be to the  benefit  of  all  the
residents, particularly the children and the elders, was estimated  to  cost
around Rs.2.92 crores. It was specifically stated in the  affidavit  of  the
State, that the work had already commenced and almost 14% thereof  had  been
completed.



      In para 14 of the affidavit  it  was  stated  that  in  terms  of  the
decision of this Court in Chet  Ram  Vashist  v.  Municipal  Corporation  of
Delhi[1], the petitioner has ceased to be the legal owner of  the  land  and
its position was that of a trustee holding the land for the benefit  of  the
members of the Housing Society and the public at large. The  petitioner  had
no right to use the land for any developmental work or to transfer  or  sell
the same; it was merely a trustee  of  the  land  holding  the  same  for  a
specific purpose i.e.  beneficial  utilization  as  an  open  space  by  the
community at large. In a situation where the petitioner had done nothing  to
develop the open space for the public good, the Government  had  decided  to
step in and carry out the project for the benefit of the residents.



6.    In the affidavit filed by the respondent No.2 –  Commissioner  of  the
Municipal Corporation, Panaji, a claim that the open  space  had  vested  in
the Corporation had been raised whereas in the affidavit filed on behalf  of
respondent No. 5 i.e. Model Cooperative Housing Society, the details of  the
judgment in Civil Suit No. 1/B of 1981 had been mentioned  under  which  the
land in question is required to be maintained as an open space so to  enable
the residents to have free access to light and air apart  from  recreational
facilities. In the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5, the decision  of
this Court in Chet Ram Vashist ‘s case (supra) had also been relied upon  to
contend that the legal title of the petitioner in the said open space  stood
extinguished and petitioner is holding the land only as a trustee on  behalf
of the residents of the locality.  As the petitioner had not discharged  the
duties cast upon it as a trustee and had utterly failed to develop the  open
space,  the  residents  of  the  locality  had  approached  the  local  Ward
Councilor (respondent No.3) who had taken  the  initiative  to  develop  the
land in question.



7.    The aforesaid detailed recital of the facts projected by  the  parties
had become necessary as the order of the High Court assailed in the  present
SLP does not contain any reference to the relevant  circumstances  in  which
the High Court had  passed  the  impugned  order  or  the  reasons  why  the
petitioner was relegated to the remedy of initiating a civil  action.   Time
and again this Court has emphasized that such a course of action by a  Court
cannot lead to a legally acceptable conclusion inasmuch  as  the  manner  of
reaching the decision  and  the  reasons  therefor  are  sacrosanct  to  the
judicial process.  However, we do not wish to dilate  the  aforesaid  aspect
of the matter any further in view of the clear and consistent insistence  of
this Court on the aforesaid fundamental requirement.

8.    A reading of the order of the High Court would go  to  show  that  its
refusal to interdict the developmental  works  undertaken  or  about  to  be
undertaken  is  on  the  ground  that  the  Petitioner  has  an  efficacious
alternative remedy, i.e. a suit for injunction. The  Writ  Court  exercising
jurisdiction under Article 26 of the  Constitution  is  fully  empowered  to
interdict the State or its instrumentalities from embarking  upon  a  course
of action to detriment of  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  though,  in  the
exercise of jurisdiction in the domain of public law such a restraint  order
may not be issued against a private individual.  This,  of  course,  is  not
due to any inherent lack of jurisdiction but on the basis  that  the  public
law remedy should not be readily extended to settlement of private  disputes
between individuals. Even where such an order is  sought  against  a  public
body the  Writ  Court  may  refuse  to  interfere,  if  in  the  process  of
determination disputed questions of  fact  or  title  would  require  to  be
adjudicated.



9.    However, there is no universal rule or principle of law  which  debars
the Writ Court from entertaining adjudications involving disputed  questions
of fact.  In fact, in the realm of legal theory, no question or issue  would
be beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction under  Article  226,  even  if  such
adjudication would require taking of oral evidence.  However,  as  a  matter
of prudence, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,  normally
would  not  entertain  a  dispute  which  would  require  it  to  adjudicate
contested questions and conflicting claims of the parties to  determine  the
correct facts for due application of the law.  In ABL International  Ltd.  &
Anr. V. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India  Ltd.[2],  the  precise
position of the law in this regard has been explained in paragraphs  16,  17
and 19 of the Judgment in the course of which  the  earlier  views  of  this
Court in Smt. Gunwant  Kaur  &  Ors.  v.  Municipal  Committee,  Bhatinda  &
Ors.[3] and Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal  Council[4]
has been referred to.  The aforesaid  paragraphs  of  the  judgment  in  ABL
International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee  Corporation  of  India
Ltd. (supra) may, therefore, be usefully extracted below:

           “16.    A perusal of this judgment  though  shows  that  a  writ
           petition involving serious disputed  questions  of  facts  which
           requires consideration of evidence which is not on record,  will
           not normally be entertained by a court in the  exercise  of  its
           jurisdiction under Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India.
           This decision again, in  our  opinion,  does  not  lay  down  an
           absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions  of
           fact the parties should be relegated to a civil  suit.  In  this
           view of ours, we are supported by a judgment of  this  Court  in
           the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda - 1969
           (3) SCC 769 where dealing with  such  a  situation  of  disputed
           questions of fact in a writ petition this Court  held:  (SCC  p.
           774, paras 14-16)

              “14.     The High Court observed that they will not determine
              disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what  facts
              were  in  dispute  and  what  were  admitted  could  only  be
              determined after  an  affidavit-in-reply  was  filed  by  the
              State. The High Court,  however,  proceeded  to  dismiss  the
              petition in limine. The High Court is  not  deprived  of  its
              jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely
              because in  considering  the  petitioner's  right  to  relief
              questions of fact may fall to be determined.  In  a  petition
              under Article 226 the High  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  try
              issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is,
              it  is  true,  discretionary,  but  the  discretion  must  be
              exercised on sound judicial  principles.  When  the  petition
              raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which  may  for
              their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on
              that account the High Court is of the view that  the  dispute
              may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition,  the  High
              Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a  petition
              in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is
              of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of  the
              nature of the claim made dispute sought to  be  agitated,  or
              that the petition against the party against  whom  relief  is
              claimed is  not  maintainable  or  that  the  dispute  raised
              thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try  it  in
              the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

              15. From the averments made in  the  petition  filed  by  the
              appellants it is clear that in proof of  a  large  number  of
              allegations the appellants relied upon  documentary  evidence
              and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may
              possibly  arise  related  to  the  due  publication  of   the
              notification under Section 4 by the Collector.

              16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court  was
              not justified in dismissing the petition on the  ground  that
              it will not determine disputed question  of  fact.  The  High
              Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of  fact,  even
              if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a
              case in which in the interests of both the parties  the  High
              Court should have entertained the petition and called for  an
              affidavit-in-reply from  the  respondents,  and  should  have
              proceeded to try  the  petition  instead  of  relegating  the
              appellants to a separate suit.”

           17. The above judgment of Gunwant  Kaur  (supra)  finds  support
           from another judgment of this Court in the case of Century  Spg.
           and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council – 1970 (1) SCC
           582 wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 587, para 13)

                 “Merely because a question of  fact  is  raised,  the  High
                 Court will not be justified in requiring the party to  seek
                 relief by the  somewhat  lengthy,  dilatory  and  expensive
                 process  by  a  civil  suit  against  a  public  body.  The
                 questions of fact raised by the petition in this  case  are
                 elementary.”

                            xxx         xxx        xxx

           19. Therefore, it is clear from the  above  enunciation  of  law
           that merely because one of the parties to the litigation  raises
           a dispute in  regard  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  court
           entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
           is not always bound to relegate the parties to a  suit.  In  the
           above case of Gunwant Kaur (supra) this Court even went  to  the
           extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts require,
           even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that  in  an
           appropriate  case,  the  writ  court  has  the  jurisdiction  to
           entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions  of  fact
           and there is no absolute bar for entertaining  a  writ  petition
           even if the same arises out of a contractual  obligation  and/or
           involves some disputed questions of fact.




10.   The Petitioner in the present  case  claimed  title  to  the  land  in
question on the basis of the deed of Indenture dated 16.11.1977;  the  order
of the Bombay High Court in Suit No. 1/B/1981 and LPA  No.  26  of  1983  as
well as the proceedings of acquisition in respect of an area  of  about  625
sq. m. out of the open space in question.   The  State  did  not  claim  any
title to the land but had contended that by virtue of the judgment  of  this
Court in Pt. Chet Ram (supra) the Petitioner had ceased to hold  the  normal
attributes of ownership of immovable property in  respect  of  the  land  in
question and its position was more akin to that of  a  trustee  holding  the
land  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  at  large.   The  Housing  Society
(defendant No.5), on the other hand, claim easementary  right  of  enjoyment
of the open space.  It is only the Municipal Corporation, Panaji  (defendant
No.2), who had claimed that the land has vested in  it.   How  and  in  what
manner such vesting had occurred, however, had not been  stated  in  support
of the claim of the Corporation. There is complete silence in  this  regard.
In such circumstances, it was incumbent on the High  Court  to  undertake  a
deeper probe in the matter in order to find out whether  the  claim  of  the
Corporation had any substance or had been so raised merely to  relegate  the
Petitioner to a more “lengthy, dilatory  and  expensive  process”   that  is
inherent in a civil suit. The High Court, in our considered view, ought  not
to have disposed of the Writ Petition at the stage and in the manner it  had
so done and,  instead,  ought  to  have  satisfied  itself  that  there  was
actually a serious dispute between the parties on the question of  ownership
or title.  Only in that event, the High Court would have been  justified  to
relegate the Petitioner to the Civil Court to seek his remedies by way of  a
suit.



11.   On the view that we have taken, we have to conclude that the  impugned
order dated 18.08.2011 passed by the High  Court  is  not  tenable  in  law.
However, having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion the next  question  that
has to engage our attention is what would be the appropriate  order  in  the
facts and circumstances of the case?



12.   In the counter affidavit  filed  before  this  Court,  the  Respondent
claims that about 40% of the work has been completed and extension  of  time
for completion of the remaining work, as per the terms of the  Contract,  is
being processed. Though the Petitioner disputes the aforesaid  position,  it
may be reasonable to assume that  in  absence  of  any  interim  order  some
progress in the execution of the developmental work has taken  place  during
pendency of the present proceeding.  There is also no manner of  doubt  that
the land in question being earmarked as open space and the said fact  having
been affirmed by the High Court in Civil Suit No. 1/B/1981 and  LPA  No.  26
of 1983, the normal attributes of legal ownership of the  land  have  ceased
insofar as the Petitioner is concerned who is holding the land as a  Trustee
on behalf of the residents and other members of the Public.  The  Petitioner
cannot transfer the land or use the same  in  any  other  manner  except  by
keeping it as  an  open  space.   The  aforesaid  position  flows  from  the
decision of this Court in Pt.  Chet  Ram  Vashist  (supra)  wherein  such  a
conclusion had been reached by this  Court  in  a  largely  similar  set  of
facts.



13.   Keeping in mind the very limited rights of  the  Petitioner  that  are
disclosed at this stage by the materials on record and taking  into  account
the nature of the developmental works that were proposed and the  fact  that
a part of the work may have been executed in the meantime,  we  are  of  the
view that the Respondents should be  permitted  to  complete  the  remaining
work on the land and the petitioner  should  be  left  with  the  option  of
raising  a  claim  before  the  appropriate  forum   for   such   loss   and
compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled to in law.  Naturally,  if
any such claim of compensation  is  required  to  be  founded  on  proof  of
title/ownership or any other such  relevant  fact(s),  the  Petitioner  will
have to establish the same. No part of the present order shall be  construed
to be an expression of  any  opinion  of  this  Court  with  regard  to  the
ownership or any other right or entitlement of the Petitioner which  has  to
be proved in accordance with law.




14.   Consequently, we dispose of the Civil Appeal in the above terms.




                                        ...……………………J.
                                          [P SATHASIVAM]



                                        ………………………J.
                                          [RANJAN GOGOI]

New Delhi,
10th September, 2012.


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[1]     (1995) 1 SCC 47

[2]    [2004 (3) SCC 553]

[3]    [1969 (3) SCC 769]

[4]    [1970 (1) SCC 582]



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