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Wednesday, July 4, 2012

whether the petitioner has succeeded in making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. This consideration needs to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before the Reference Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction and the vendee had paid unusually high price for extraneous reasons. The parties had produced several sale deeds, majority of which revealed that the price of similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre. A reading of the sale deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary prudence to make an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had paid more than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which have been purchased by the vendor only a year back at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre. However, the fact of the matter is that neither the advocate for the petitioner nor its officers/officials, who were dealing with the cases made any attempt to lead such evidence. This may be because they were aware of the fact that at least in two other cases such parcels of land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs.13 lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale deed was executed in respect of the land of village Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs per acre. This omission coupled with the fact that the petitioner’s assertion about commonality of the management of two companies is ex-facie incorrect leads to an irresistible inference that judgment dated 17.8.2010 does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting its review. Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask for de novo hearing of the appeals. 20. The petitioner’s plea that the documents produced along with the review petitions could not be brought to the notice of the Reference Court and the High Court despite exercise of due diligence by its officers does not commend acceptance because it had not explained as to why the concerned officers/officials, who were very much aware of other sale transactions produced by themselves and the landowners did not try to find out the reasons for wide difference in the price of land sold by Exhibit P1 and other parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15. 21. Before concluding, we would like to add that while deciding the review petitions, this Court cannot make roving inquiries into the validity of the transaction involving the sale of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. or declare the same to be invalid by assuming that the vendee had paid higher price to take benefit of an anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign company. Of course, the petitioner has not controverted the statement made by the respondents that the vendee had sold the land to M/s. Lattu Finance and Investments Ltd. in 2004 for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.1,13,00,000/- per acre. 22. In the result, the review petitions are dismissed. The interim order passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically vacated. The petitioner shall pay cost of Rs.25,000/- in each case. The amount of cost shall be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of three months. 23. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be free to withdraw the amount which it had deposited in compliance of this Court’s order dated 30.3.2011. In any case, the petitioner shall pay the balance amount of compensation to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with other statutory benefits within three months from today. 24. In view of the dismissal of the review petitions and the direction given for payment of the balance amount, the contempt petitions and all the pending interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   REVIEW PETITION (C) NO(s). 235-578/2011

                                     IN

  CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6561/2009,6528/2009, 6531/2009, 6529/2009, 6552/2009,
      6567/2009, 6535/2009, 6836/2009, 6560/2009, 6571/2009, 6530/2009,
     6525/2009, 6527/2009,  6570/2009, 6546/2009, 6565/2009, 6548/2009,
      6550/2009, 6563/2009, 6537/2009, 6532/2009, 6569/2009, 6534/2009,
      6559/2009, 6572/2009, 6583/2009, 6580/2009, 6573/2009, 6584/2009,
      6588/2009, 6590/2009, 6575/2009, 6823/2009, 6853/2009, 6855/2009,
      6554/2009, 6566/2009, 6557/2009, 6533/2009, 6558/2009, 6541/2009,
      6556/2009, 6562/2009, 6568/2009, 6564/2009, 6539/2009, 6538/2009,
      6553/2009, 6540/2009, 6852/2009, 6576/2009, 6587/2009, 6582/2009,
      6581/2009, 6577/2009, 6574/2009, 6585/2009, 6578/2009, 6579/2009,
 6854/2009, 6666-6667/2009, 6757/2009, 6747-6755/2009, 6831/2009, 6756/2009,
      6591/2009, 6651/2009, 6606/2009, 6592/2009, 6658/2009, 6594/2009,
     6595/2009, 6650/2009, 6657/2009, 6655/2009, 6596/2009,   6597/2009,
      6620/2009, 6621/2009, 6602/2009, 6603/2009, 6622/2009, 6598/2009,
      6624/2009, 6647/2009, 6654/2009, 6599/2009, 6607/2009, 6608/2009,
      6623/2009, 6609/2009, 6600/2009, 6601/2009, 6649/2009, 6593/2009,
      6605/2009, 6610/2009, 6611/2009, 6612/2009, 6653/2009, 6613/2009,
      6642/2009, 6652/2009, 6643/2009, 6614/2009, 6659/2009, 6645/2009,
      6648/2009, 6656/2009, 6646/2009, 6626/2009, 6615/2009, 6616/2009,
      6644/2009, 6625/2009, 6639/2009, 6636/2009, 6637/2009, 6627/2009,
      6631/2009, 6628/2009, 6638/2009, 6641/2009, 6629/2009, 6630/2009,
   6619/2009, 6635/2009, 6640/2009, 6632/2009, 6633/2009, 6824- 6827/2009,
   6664-6665/2009, 7724/2009, 7725/2009, 7723/2009, 6871-6875/2010, 6876-
 6878/2010, 53/2010, 1370/2010, 2475/2010, 4212/2010, 4213/2010, 4214/2010,
      4215/2010, 4218/2010, 4220/2010, 4221/2010, 4222/2010, 4224/2010,
      4225/2010, 4226/2010, 4227/2010, 4228/2010, 4223/2010, 4229/2010,
      4230/2010, 4231/2010, 4232/2010, 4233/2010, 4234/2010, 6879/2010,
   6880/2010, 6881/2010, 6882/2010, 6883/2010, 6884/2010, 6885-6888/2010,
      6889/2010, 6890/2010, 6891/2010, 6892/2010, 6893/2010, 6894/2010,
     6895/2010, 6896/ 2010, 6897/2010, 6898/2010, 6899/2010, 6900/2010,
      6901/2010, 6902/2010, 6903/2010, 6904/2010, 6905/2010, 6906/2010,
      6907/2010, 6908/2010, 6909/2010, 6910/2010, 6911/2010, 6912/2010,
      6913/2010, 6914/2010, 6915/2010, 6916/2010, 6917/2010, 6918/2010,
      6919/2010, 6920/2010, 6921/2010, 6922/2010, 6923/2010, 6924/2010,
      6925/2010, 6926/2010, 6927/2010, 6928/2010, 6929/2010, 6930/2010,
      6931/2010, 6932/2010, 6933/2010, 6934/2010, 6935/2010, 6936/2010,
      6937/2010, 6938/2010, 6939/2010, 6940/2010, 6941/2010, 6942/2010,
      6943/2010, 6944/2010, 6945/2010, 6946/2010, 6947/2010, 6948/2010,
      6949/2010, 6950/2010, 6951/2010, 6952/2010, 6953/2010, 6954/2010,
      6955/2010, 6956/2010, 6957/2010, 6958/2010, 6959/2010, 6960/2010,
      6961/2010, 6962/2010, 6963/2010, 6964/2010, 6965/2010, 6966/2010,
      6967/2010, 6968/2010, 6969/2010, 6970/2010, 6971/2010, 6972/2010,
      6973/2010, 6974/2010, 6975/2010, 6976/2010, 6977/2010, 6978/2010,
      6979/2010, 6980/2010, 6981/2010, 6982/2010, 6983/2010, 6984/2010,
      6985/2010, 6986/2010, 6988/2010, 6989/2010, 6990/2010, 6991/2010,
   6992/2010, 6993/2010, 6994/2010, 6995/2010, 6996-6997/2010, 7002/2010,
      7003/2010, 7004/2010, 7005/2010, 7006/2010, 7007/2010, 7008/2010,
      7009/2010, 7010/2010, 7011/2010, 7012/2010, 7013/2010, 7014/2010,
      7015/2010, 7016/2010, 7017/2010, 7018/2010, 7019/2010, 7020/2010,
      7021/2010, 7022/2010, 7023/2010, 7024/2010, 7025/2010, 7026/2010,
      7027/2010, 7028/2010, 7029/2010, 7030/2010, 7031/2010, 7032/2010,
      7033/2010, 7034/2010, 7035/2010, 7036/2010, 7037/2010, 7038/2010,
      7039/2010, 7040/2010, 7041/2010, 7042/2010, 7043/2010, 7044/2010,
                 7045/2010, 7046/2010, 7047/2010, 7048/2010


HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.                       Petitioner

                                   VERSUS

MAWASI & ORS. ETC.ETC.                                        Respondent(s)

                                    With

                              I.A.Nos.2066-2067

                                    With

                 Conmt.Pet.(C)No.51/2011 In C.A.No.6526/2009

                 Conmt.Pet.(C)No.52/2011 In C.A.No.6537/2009

                 Conmt.Pet.(C)No.89/2011 In C.A.No.6854/2009
                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1. Undeterred by the dismissal  of  two  similar  petitions,  Haryana  State
   Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) has filed these petitions  for
   review of judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed in Civil Appeal  No.  6515  of
   2009 and batch whereby the appeals filed by it against the  judgments  of
   the learned Single Judge of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  were
   dismissed, those filed by the landowners were allowed and a direction was
   given for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20  lakhs  per  acre
   with all statutory benefits.

2. The facts necessary for deciding whether the petitioner has succeeded  in
   making   out   a   case    for    review    are    encapsulated    below:
                                                              2.1.  For  the
   purpose of setting up an Industrial Model Township at  Manesar,  District
   Gurgaon, the Government of Haryana acquired large  chunks  of  land.   By
   Notification dated 30.4.1994  issued  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Land
   Acquisition Act, 1894  (for  short,  ‘the  Act’),  the  State  Government
   proposed the acquisition of  256  acres  3  kanals  and  17  marlas  land
   situated in village Manesar.  The  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  was
   published on 30.3.1995.  The  Land  Acquisition  Collector  passed  award
   dated 28.3.1997 and fixed market value of the acquired land at  the  rate
   of  Rs.3,67,400/-  per  acre.    Additional   District   Judge,   Gurgaon
   (hereinafter described as ‘the Reference Court’) to  whom  the  reference
   was made under Section 18 considered the pleadings and  evidence  of  the
   parties and  determined  the  amount  of  compensation  by  dividing  the
   acquired land into two blocks, i.e., ‘A’ and ‘B’.  For the land comprised
   in Block ‘A’ which fell within 500 yards of National  Highway  No.8,  the
   Reference Court  fixed   the  amount  of  compensation  at  the  rate  of
   Rs.6,57,994.13 per acre. The remaining land was included in Block ‘B’ and
   the  amount  of  compensation  was  fixed  at  Rs.3,91,196.97  per  acre.
                                                      2.2.     By    another
   Notification dated  15.11.1994  issued  under  Section  4(1),  the  State
   Government proposed the acquisition of 1490 acres 3 kanals and 17  marlas
   land situated in villages Manesar, Naharpur Kasan, Khoh and  Kasan.   The
   declaration issued under Section 6(1) was published on 10.11.1995.  By an
   award dated 3.4.1997, the Land Acquisition Collector fixed  market  value
   at the rate of Rs.4,13,600/- per acre. The Reference  Court  divided  the
   land into two Blocks.  For the land comprised in Block ‘A’, the Reference
   Court determined the amount of compensation at the rate of  Rs.6,89,333/-
   per acre. The remaining land was included in Block ‘B’ and no enhancement
   was granted in  the  compensation  determined  by  the  Land  Acquisition
   Collector.

2.3.  Before proceeding further, we may mention that  in  support  of  their
claim for award of higher compensation, the  land  owners  had  produced  13
sale deeds which were marked Exhibits P1 to P13. Of these, Exhibit P1  dated
16.9.1994 was in respect of 12  acres  land  situated  in  village  Naharpur
Kasan, which was sold by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s.  Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. and was proved by Shri Albel Singh, authorised signatory  of
M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.  The land owners  also  produced  copy  of
Massavi Chakbandi of Village Khoh (Exhibit P14) and Aks-shajras of the  four
villages (Exhibits P15 to P18). On behalf  of  the  State  Government,  Shri
Arun Kumar Pandey, Manager, HSIDC  was  examined  as  RW-1  and  sale  deeds
marked Exhibits R1 to R15 were produced along  with  other  documents.   The
Reference Court did consider Exhibit P1 but did not rely upon the  same  for
the    purpose    of    determining    the    amount    of     compensation.
                                        2.4.   The  appeals  filed  by   the
landowners  who  were  affected  by   Notification  dated  15.11.1994   were
disposed of by the learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court  vide  judgment
dated 19.5.2006 and market value of the entire acquired land  was  fixed  at
Rs.15 lakhs per acre.  The learned Single Judge referred to  the  sale  deed
Exhibit P1 and opined that the same reflected market value which  a  willing
buyer would have paid to a willing seller.   The  reasons  assigned  by  the
learned Single Judge for arriving at this conclusion  are  extracted  below:


           “The claimants have produced various  sale  instances  to  prove
           their claim. Sale deed Ex.Pl is dated September 16, 1994 whereby
           96 kanals and 13 marlas ( more  than  12  acres  )  of  land  in
           village Naharpur Kasan was sold  by  the  owner,  M/s.  Heritage
           Furniture Private  Limited  to  M/s  .Dura  Cell  India  Private
           Limited  for  a   sale   consideration   of   Rs,.2,42,00,000/-,
           reflecting the average price of  Rs,20,03,103/-  per  acre.  The
           aforesaid sale instance has been proved by the statement of  one
           Albel Singh PWl, who at the relevant  time  was  the  authorised
           signatory of the seller Company, M/s. Heritage Furniture Private
           Limited. The aforesaid witness has clearly proved that the  said
           transaction was genuinely entered between the two companies  and
           the entire payment was made through bank drafts. The  factum  of
           the payment  having  been  made  through  bank  drafts  is  also
           reflected in the sale deed  Ex.Pl.  Some  other  sale  instances
           relied upon by the claimants are Ex.P2, P3, P4, P7 and P8.  Vide
           Ex.P2 land measuring 9 kanals was  sold  on  June  4,  1994  for
           consideration of Rs.7,87,500/-, reflecting an average  price  of
           Rs.7 lacs per acre. Similarly Ex.P3 is also dated June 24,  1994
           pertaining to sale of 10 kanals 10  marlas  of  land  reflecting
           average sale price  of  Rs,7,00,000/-  Ex.P4  is  dated  October
           25,1991 whereby land measuring 9 kanals 9 marlas in Manesar  was
           sold  for  Rs.  9,15,470/-  reflecting  an  average   price   of
           Rs,7,75,000/- per acre.  Ex.P7  and  Ex.P8  are  also  the  sale
           instances dated June 24,  1994  with  regard  land  measuring  9
           marlas each reflecting  an  average  price  of  Rs,7,00,000/-per
           acre. The remaining sale instances Ex.P9 and P13 are of the year
           1996 i.e. more than two years after  the  date  of  notification
           under section 4 of the Act. Similarly the sale instances Ex.Pl0,
           P11 and PI2 pertain to the sale of land in  village  Noorangpur.
           The   said   sale   instances   are,   thus,    not    relevant.

               On the other hand, the sale instances  relied  upon  by  the
           State are Ex.Rl to Ex. R15 but they have rightly  been  rejected
           by the reference court itself on the ground that the  said  sale
           instance reflected an average price which is even less than  the
           one assessed by the Collector and,  as  such,  in  view  of  the
           provisions of section 25 of the Act, the same were not  relevant
           and                     worth                     consideration.
                                                   As  noticed  above,  the
           land  which  was  acquired  in  the   present   proceedings   is
           approximately  1500  acres.  The  sale  instance  Ex.Pl  in   my
           considered view, reflects as near as possible, the market  value
           of the acquired land on the date of notification under section 4
           of the Act. The said sale had taken place on September  16,1994.
           The recitals in the sale deed reflect that  there  was  a  prior
           agreement between the two companies on May 31, 1994 with  regard
           to the sale of the land. It is also recited  in  the  sale  deed
           that the entire sale consideration was paid  by  the  purchaser-
           company to the seller company by bank drafts. The aforesaid fact
           is also proved by Albel Singh, PWl.  In this view of the matter,
           since the aforesaid transaction was between two companies,  then
           obviously , there is no justification to doubt the  authenticity
           of the said sale transaction. Moreover, the land  covered  under
           the aforesaid sale transaction is a big chunk of land  i.e  more
           than 12 acres. The said land was situated  in  village  Naharpur
           Kasan i.e. one of the villages from which the present  land  was
           also acquired. In these circumstances to my mind, the said  sale
           instance could not have been rejected by the reference Court, in
           any manner. Although the other sale instances Ex. P2, P3, P7 and
           P8 reflect the market price of Rs.7 lacs per acre but it is also
           apparent that the aforesaid transactions pertain to small  piece
           of land and are between private persons. In these circumstances,
           the possibility of the aforesaid sale deeds  being  undervalued,
           with a view to save stamp duty  and  registration  charges,  can
           also not be ruled out. However, there  is  no  justification  to
           prefer the aforesaid sale deeds Ex.P2, P3, P7 and  P8  over  and
           above the sale deed Ex.Pl which is a transaction between the two
           cooperate bodies and wherein the entire sale  consideration  had
           been paid through bank drafts. The aforesaid sale also  pertains
           to a big chunk of land i.e. more than 12 acres. It may  also  be
           noticed that the acquired land was owned by  approximately  more
           than 350 persons, thus each having a small  holding.  Therefore,
           the sale-deed Ex.Pl duly reflects  the  market  value,  which  a
           willing  buyer  would  have  paid  to  a   willing   seller.   “



                                        (underlining is ours)

2.5.  The appeals filed by the landowners affected by the first  acquisition
were disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide judgment  dated  5.9.2008.
He referred to judgment dated 19.5.2006 but  applied  the  cut  of  20%  and
fixed market value of the acquired land at  the  rate  of  Rs.12  lakhs  per
acre.

2.6.  The petitioner had challenged the  judgments  of  the  High  Court  on
several grounds but the only point argued  by  the  learned  senior  counsel
appearing on its behalf was that the High Court committed serious  error  by
determining market value of  the  acquired  land  solely  on  the  basis  of
Exhibit P1 ignoring other sale deeds by which similar parcels of  land  were
sold at the rate of Rs.7 lakhs per acre or less.  This is evinced  from  the
following extracts of the judgment under review:
           “Shri  Amarendera  Sharan,  learned  Senior  Counsel  and   Shri
           Ravindra Bana, learned counsel  appearing  for  the  Corporation
           argued that the High Court committed  serious  error  by  fixing
           market value of the acquired land at Rs. 15 lakhs  per  acre  in
           one batch of appeals and Rs. 12 lakhs  in  the  other  batch  of
           appeals by relying upon the sale deed, Ext. P-1 excluding  other
           sale transactions, which  were  produced  before  the  Reference
           Court. The learned counsel submitted that the value of 12  acres
           of land which was sold by Ext. P-1 was  wholly  disproportionate
           to the prevailing market value and, therefore,  the  same  could
           not be made basis for fixing market value of the  acquired  land
           measuring  more  than  1490  acres.   Shri   Amarendera   Sharan
           emphasised that actual market value of the acquired land was not
           more than Rs. 7 lakhs and the High Court committed serious error
           by discarding other  sale  transactions  through  which  similar
           parcels of land were sold for Rs. 7 lakhs or less.  The  learned
           Senior Counsel submitted that if the High Court  had  given  due
           weightage to  other  sale  transactions,  market  value  of  the
           acquired land could not have been fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs or  even
           Rs. 12 lakhs per acre.”


2.7.  This Court rejected the aforesaid argument and observed:

           “In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit any  error
           by relying upon sale transaction Exhibit P1 for the  purpose  of
           fixing market value of the  acquired  land.  Undisputedly,  that
           sale transaction was between  two  corporate  entities  and  the
           entire sale price was paid through bank drafts. It is  also  not
           in dispute that the land which was subject matter of Exhibit  P1
           is situated at village Naharpur Kasan and  is  adjacent  to  the
           acquired land. The Corporation and the State Government did  not
           adduce any evidence to prove that the land sold vide Exhibit  P1
           was over valued with an  oblique  motive  of  helping  the  land
           owners to claim higher compensation. Therefore, we do  not  find
           any justification to discard or ignore sale deed Exhibit P1. The
           refusal of the learned Single Judge  to  rely  upon  other  sale
           transactions in which sale price of the land was shown  as  Rs.7
           lakhs per acre also does not suffer  from  any  legal  infirmity
           because it is well-known that transactions involving transfer of
           properties are usually undervalued with a view to avoid  payment
           of  the  requisite  stamp  duty   and   registration   charges.”



   8. With a view to generate funds  necessary  for  payment  of  additional
      compensation to the landowners, the petitioner increased the  cost  of
      land to be allotted to the prospective  industrial  entrepreneurs  and
      others.  IMT  Industrial   Association,   which   claims   to   be   a
      representative  body  of  the  plot  holders  protested  against  this
      decision of the petitioner and persuaded it to seek review of judgment
      dated 17.8.2010.

   9.  In the review petitions filed on behalf of the petitioner, which were
      registered as Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010,  it  was  pleaded
      that the determination of market value needs  reconsideration  because
      the sale deed Exhibit P1 on which reliance  was  placed  by  the  High
      Court and this Court was not a genuine transaction. According  to  the
      petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell  India
      Pvt. Ltd. were controlled by the same management  and  this  fact  was
      brought to the notice of the concerned officers only after disposal of
      the appeals by this Court.  IMT Industrial Association filed I.A.Nos.5
      and 6 for impleadment as party to the review  petitions.   This  Court
      dismissed the  review petitions and the impleadment applications  vide
      order dated 13.1.2011, paragraphs 4 to 8 of which are extracted below:


            “4. In the review petitions, it has been averred that the  sale
           transaction dated 16.9.1994, upon which reliance was  placed  by
           the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and  Haryana  High  Court
           and  by this Court for grant of   enhanced   compensation    was
           motivated because parties to  the  transaction  were  under  the
           control and management of the common board of directors and this
           fact came to the notice of  the  review  petitioner  only  after
           dismissal of the appeals by this Court.


           5.     In paragraph 'A' of the grounds of the review  petitions,
           the review petitioner has referred to the  composition  of  M/s.
           Dura Cell India Private Limited and Heritage  Furniture  Private
           Limited to show that both the companies have common management.


           6.     The review petition is supported by an affidavit of  Shri
           Hamvir Singh,  Deputy  General  Manager  (I.A.),  Haryana  State
           Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.    In
           paragraph 2 of his  affidavit,  the  deponent  has  stated  that
           contents of the review petition (pages 25 to 43), list of  dates
           (pages B to P) and other applications are true to  my  knowledge
           and the information derived from records of the case.   However,
           he has not enclosed any document on  the  basis  of  which  this
           assertion has been made.


           7.     We    have    carefully      perused       the     entire
              record   and   are  convinced  that  the  judgment  of  which
           review has been sought does not suffer from any  error  apparent
           warranting  its reconsideration.  The review petitioner has  not
           produced any material to substantiate  its  assertion  that  the
           price mentioned in the sale deed relied upon by the  courts  was
           manipulated with an oblique motive. Hence, the review  petitions
           are dismissed.


           8.    The application filed by  IMT  Industrial  Association  is
           wholly  misconceived.    The  members  of  the   applicant   are
           beneficiaries of the acquisition of the land because plots  have
           been allotted to them out of the acquired land which  belong  to
           the respondents and others.  Therefore, they  do  not  have  the
           locus  standi  to  be  heard  in  the  proceedings  relating  to
           determination of market value of the acquired land and that  too
           in a petition  filed  by  the  Corporation  for  review  of  the
           judgment of this Court.  It is  not  the  pleaded  case  of  the
           applicant that its members were not aware of the fact  that  the
           plots have been carved out of the land  acquired  by  the  State
           Government for and on behalf of the  Corporation  and  that  the
           price      mentioned in the allotment letter   was     tentative
             and further that in paragraph 5 of the  allotment  letter,  it
           was specifically mentioned that they will have to pay additional
           price in the event of enhancement in  the  compensation.  It  is
           quite surprising that members of the applicant-Association  paid
           price of the plots at the rate of Rs.2200/- per square yard  and
           they are objecting to the payment of compensation  to  the  land
           owners at the rate  of  less  than  Rs.500/-  per  square  yard.
                                 This shows that members of  the  applicant
           want to take  advantage  of  the  measure  taken  by  the  State
           Government for   compulsory  acquisition  of  the  land  of  the
           farmers  and  want  to  deprive  them  of  just  and  reasonable
           compensation.  Consequently,  the  impleadment  application   is
           dismissed.”



3.    Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed these petitions  by  reiterating
that sale  deed  Exhibit  P1  dated  16.9.1994  executed  by  M/s.  Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s. Duracell India Pvt.  Ltd.  was  not  a
bona fide transaction and the High Court and this  Court  committed  serious
error by relying upon the same for the purpose of determining the amount  of
compensation.  In paragraph A of the review  petition,  the  petitioner  has
set out the brief history of the two companies and pleaded that at the  time
of the execution of sale deed both the entities were under  the  control  of
the same set of persons.  It has also been averred that the  facts  relating
to composition of the Board of Directors  of  two  companies  could  not  be
ascertained by exercising due diligence and the true nature  of  Exhibit  P1
was revealed only after the  judgment  of  this  Court.   According  to  the
petitioner, M/s.  Heritage  Furniture  Pvt.  Ltd.  had  purchased  different
parcels of land from the  farmers  by  executing  10  different  sale  deeds
executed on 16th and 18th   August, 1993 at an average price of  Rs.6  lakhs
per acre and, as such, there was no occasion for M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.
Ltd. to have purchased the same land just after one  year  at  the  rate  of
Rs.20,03,103/- per acre.  It is the petitioner’s case that exorbitant  price
is shown to have been paid by the vendee to the vendor  because  its  Indian
promoters were to be benefited by the proposed  joint  venture  between  the
Indian company and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA.   Another  ground  taken  by  the
petitioner is that sale deeds Exhibits P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7 and P-8, three  of
which were executed in June, 1994 and one in October,  1991  at  an  average
price of Rs.7 lakhs per acre reflected true market  value  of  the  acquired
land and in the absence of any cogent evidence,  the  High  Court  and  this
Court could not have discarded the same  by  assuming  that  the  same  were
undervalued.

4.    On 30.3.2011, this Court issued notice to the landowners  and  granted
stay subject to  certain  conditions  which  included  a  direction  to  the
Managing Director of the petitioner to file an affidavit  and  disclose  the
names of the officers/officials  responsible  for  not  bringing  the  facts
relating to Exhibit P1 to the notice of the High Court and this  Court.   In
compliance of that order, Shri Rajiv Arora, the  Managing  Director  of  the
petitioner filed affidavit dated 27.7.2011 in which he did not disclose  the
names  of  the   concerned   officers/officials   but   claimed   that   the
functionaries of the Corporation did not suspect the bona fides of the  sale
deed executed between M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.  and  M/s.  Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. because the same was a registered instrument  and  they  did
not know that the two companies were controlled by the same set of  persons.
Shri Arora further claimed that the facts relating  to  two  companies  were
brought to the notice of the concerned officers by  the  representatives  of
the Manesar Industrial Welfare Association, who were  given  opportunity  of
personal hearing in compliance  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Punjab  and
Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No.6527/2010. According to  Shri  Arora,
the information made available by the Association was got verified from  the
records of the Registrar of Companies and the same was found to be  correct.
In support of the affidavit of its Managing  Director,  the  petitioner  has
placed on record the following documents:

   i) Search Reports issued by M/s AKG  and  Co  relating  to  M/s  Heritage
      Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Duracell India Pvt Ltd dt.  20.1.2011  and
      21.2.2011;

  ii) Certificate of Incorporation of Heritage;

 iii) MoA and AoA of Heritage;

  iv) Mutations showing the purchase of land by Heritage  under  sale  deeds
      dt. 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993 at an average price of Rs 6 lac per acre;

   v) Annual Return of Duracell dt. 14.6.2000 showing  Saroj  Kumar  Poddar,
      Gurbunder Singh Gill and Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors;

  vi) True copy of sale deed dt. 16.9.1994;

 vii)  Statement  of  Albel  Singh  substantiating  the  statements  of  the
      petitioners.



5.    Some of the landowners have filed reply affidavits.   Their  stand  is
that Exhibit P1 reflected true market value of the acquired land as  on  the
date of issue of notifications under Section 4(1) and that the  petitioner’s
assertion that the transaction was not genuine is  not  correct.  They  have
denied that the vendor and vendees  were  under  the  control  of  the  same
management and that exorbitantly high price was paid for 12  acres  land  in
anticipation of some collaboration between M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.  Ltd.
and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA, which would have benefited the  former.  With  a
view  to  avoid  repetition,  we  may  notice  the  averments  contained  in
paragraphs  4  to  9  of  the  reply  affidavit  filed  in  Review  Petition
No.239/2011 and paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on  behalf  of  the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009. The same  read
as under:

           Paragraphs 4 to  9  of  the  reply  affidavit  filed  in  Review
           Petition No.239/2011


            “4.  I state that vide 5  sale  deeds  all  dt.  6.7.1992  land
           measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village  Kherka  Daula,
           District Gurgaon was sold by some of the co-owners to one Sh. D.
           C.  Rastogi  s/o  Sh.  L.  P.  Rastogi  at  the  sale  price  of
           Rs.1,35,000/- per acre.  The said village is at the distance  of
           about 2 km from the land in question. Copies of 5 sale deeds all
           dt. 6.7.1992 are collectively Annexure R-1  hereto.   Thereafter
           the vendee Sh. D. C. Rastogi sold the  said  land  in  terms  of
           agreement to sell dt.6.12.1993 vide sale deed dated 16.3.1994 at
           the rate of about Rs.15,73,289/-  per  acre.   This  shows  that
           there was a jump in the price of the land in that area equal  to
           almost 11 times of  the  original  price.   It  is  also  common
           knowledge that the parties often undervalue the  land  price  in
           order to minimize stamp duty and the land might have  been  sold
           at a higher price.  Copy of sale deed dt. 16.3.1994 is  Annexure
           R-2 hereto.  Thus if M/s Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.  purchased
           land, which is subject matter of sale deed dt.16.9.1994, Ex.P.1,
           in the year 1993 at a price of about  Rs.6  lakhs  per  acre  as
           alleged by  the  review  petitioner  even  though  there  is  no
           evidence of purchase at such rate then its value  increasing  to
           Rs.20 lakhs per acre in the year 1994 is commensurate  with  the
           market trend.   Moreover  agreement  to  sell  dt.31.5.1994  was
           executed after first notification u/s 4 on 30.4.1994 and it is a
           common  knowledge  that   after   publication   of   section   4
           notification, the value of the land increases.


           5.    It is further  submitted that vide sale deed dt.14.12.1993
           (Ex.P.10) one M/s. DCN Internatinal Ltd. sold land measuring  62
           kanals 7 marlas situated in Village Naurangpur District  Gurgaon
           for Rs.95,21,160/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.13,74,345/- per  acre.
           Copy of sale deed dt. 14.12.1993 is Annexure R.3 hereto.


           6.    I further state that sale deed dt. 16.9.1994 (Ex.P.1)  was
           executed pursuant to agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994 between  M/s
           Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (vendor) and M/s  Duracell  (India)
           Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) wherein the vendor agreed to sell the land in
           question measuring about 12 acres to the vendee at a sale  price
           of Rs.2,42,00,000/- (Rs. Two crore forty lakhs only) as is clear
           from the recital in the sale deed itself.  Ultimately vide  sale
           deed dt.16.9.1994 the said land was sold at the same sale  price
           by the vendor to the vendee.  Thus the sale price  of  the  land
           was agreed upon and fixed on 31.5.1994  as  is  clear  from  the
           recitation of the sale deed itself.


           7.    I further state  that  as  per  assertion  of  the  review
           petitioner  M/s.  Heritage  Furniture  Pvt.  (vendor)  and   M/s
           Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had common persons in  their
           Board of Directors namely Sh. Saroj Kumar Poddar,  Ms.  Jyotsana
           Poddar and Sh. Gurvinder Singh Gill.  The review petitioner  has
           filed search reports of both the said companies to show that the
           abavoe said three persons were  common  directors  of  both  the
           companies.   However,  from  the  said  search  report  of  M/s.
           Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. it is clear the two directors  namely
           Sh. Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as
           Directors of this company  on  9.6.1994  whereas  Sh.  Gurvinder
           Singh gill was appointed as its Director on 9.2.1997.  Thus  all
           the three alleged common Directors  of  the  vendor  and  vendee
           companies were not on the Board of  Directors  of  M/s  Duracell
           (India) Pvt. Ltd. on or  before  31.5.1994  on  which  date  the
           agreement to sell of the land in question was executed  and  the
           sale price was fixed.   The said three directors had no interest
           in M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) as on 31.5.1994 when
           the sale price of the land was fixed.


           8.    I further state that except for making a  bald  allegation
           that the sale price of the said land was inflated  intentionally
           so that the vendee company would increase its share holding in a
           Joint Venture it was going to enter into with one  Duracell  INC
           USA, this assertion has not been  substantiated  by  placing  ay
           cogent evidence on record.  So much so that even it has not been
           pleaded in the review  petition  as  to  whether  Joint  Venture
           between M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell INC USA
           did take place or not.  To the knowledge of the  deponent  there
           was no joint venture between M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and
           M/s. Duracell INC USA.   This  fact  that  there  was  no  Joint
           Venture between the said two companies also stands  proved  from
           the  fact  that  the  land  purchased  vide   said   sale   deed
           dt.16.9.1994 was sold by M/s Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  vide
           sale deed dt.28.4.2004 to one M/s Lattu  Finance  &  Investments
           Ltd.   at   a   sale   consideration   Rs.13,62,00,000/-    i.e.
           approximately at the  rate  of  Rs.1,13,00,000/-  (Rs.one  crore
           thirteen lakhs per acre approximately).  At the time the name of
           M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. had been changed to M/s  Gillette
           India Ltd. on account of its amalgamation  with  other  company.
           In this sale deed dt. 28.4.2004 entire history  of  purchase  of
           land by M/s. Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  from  M/s.  Heritage
           Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in 1994  onwards  has  been  recited,  which
           includes construction of industrial building over the said land,
           its conversion of status from Pvt. Ltd. to Public Ltd.  Company,
           its amalgamation with Indian Shaving Products Ltd. in  the  year
           2000 and its change of name from Indian Shaving Products Ltd. to
           Gillette India Ltd. in December, 2000 and thereafter its sale to
           M/s. Lattu Finance & Investments Ltd.  However,  in  the  entire
           recitation there is no mention of any  joint  venture  with  M/s
           Duracell INC USA.


           9.    It is submitted by the respondents/land  owners  that  the
           said sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects true market price of  the  land
           in the year 1994 when section 4 notifications for  the  acquired
           land was issued.  The allegation of the review  petitioner  that
           the sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects  inflated  price  is  false  and
           baseless.  It  is  further  submitted  that  another  sale  deed
           dt.17.7.1996 which is on record as (Ex.P.9) reflects the  market
           value  of  the  land  in  one  of  the  acquired   villages   at
           Rs.25,00,000/- (Rs.  Twenty  five  lakhs)  per  acre.   In  this
           transaction 1 kanal  11  marlas  of  land  situated  in  Village
           Naharpur Kasan, has been sold at a price of Rs.4,84,375/-.  This
           sale deed also proves that the market price of the acquired land
           in the year 1994 was Rs.20 lakhs per acre.  Copy  of  sale  deed
           dt.17.7.1996 is Annexure R-4 is hereto.   It  may  be  mentioned
           here that the same purchaser purchased different pieces of  land
           at the same rate vide 15 different sale deeds and the total land
           purchased was 18 kanals 5 marlas i.e. more than 2.25 acres.”


           Paragraph 5 of the  reply  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  the
           landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009.


           “5. That the present review petition is being filed only on  the
           ground that Ex. P-1, which has been relied upon by  the  Hon’ble
           High Court as well as upheld by this Hon’ble Court  was  entered
           by the corporate which were under the control and management  of
           common board of directors and hence it is not the correct market
           value. In reply thereto the respondents humbly submits that:-


           a) This fact for the first time is brought into  the  notice  at
           the level of this Hon’ble Court, therefore review  petition  are
           estopped by their own conduct.


           b) That merely the both  the  corporate  have  common  board  of
           directors does not prove that the sale in between the  corporate
           was an escalated rates, rather it should be on other  side  i.e.
           common board would have trying to get the sale as possible as on
           lower rate. Therefore the  ground  for  review  is  not  legally
           justifiable.


           c) It is submitted that later on corporate Gillette  India  Ltd.
           made a sale deed (land in issue of Ex.P-1)  dated  28.4.2004  to
           another corporate namely Laltu Finance and Investment Ltd. for a
           sum of Rs. 13,62,00,000/- of land measuring 96  Kanalas  and  13
           Marlas. (i.e. one crore sixty lacs per acre).  It  is  submitted
           that this sale can not be said  to  be  an  escalated  rate  and
           therefore the Ex. P-1 denotes the correct market  value  at  the
           relevant time. A copies of the relevant sale deeds  are  annexed
           herewith and marked as ANNEXURE R-1.


           d) It is also submitted  that  some  other  sale  deeds  at  the
           relevant time (20.9.1996) were executed in favour of Time Master
           Pvt. Ltd. which came around 25 lakh per  acre.  Details  of  the
           same are as follows-

           Sr. No.     Vasika No.       Dt.         Land  sold         Sale
           consideration
           1.    8725       20.9.1996        1K 1-1/2M        3,55,000/-
           2.    8726       20.9.1996        1K 8M      3,59,375/-
           3.    8727       20.9.1996        1K 1-1/2M        3,53,000/-
           4.    8728       20.9.1996        1K 5M      4,06,000/-
           5.    8799       20.9.1996        1K 9M      3,75,000/-
           6.    8807       20.9.1996        1K 5M      4,06,000/-
           7.    8815       20.9.1996        1K 6M      4,08,000/-
           8.    8825       20.9.1996        1K 1M      3,53,000/-
           9.    8832       20.9.1996        0K 17M           2,75,000/-
           10.   8839       20.9.1996        1K 6M      4,08,000/-
           11.   8846       20.9.1996        1K 5M      4,06,000/-
           12.   8854       20.9.1996        1K 1M      3,55,000/-
           13.   8861       20.9.1996        0K 17M           2,75,000/-


                 Total land  sale  is  15  Kanals  3  Marlas  total  amount
                 4734375/- i.e. at rate of Rs.25 lakh per acre.


           14.   5431       17.7.96          1K 11M           4,84,375/-
                            i.e. at the rate of Rs. 25 lakh per acre.


                 It is submitted at sale deed No.5431 (at sr. no.  14)  was
                 already produced as Ex.P-9 before Reference Court in favour
                 of Time Master Pvt. Ltd. by Vinod Kumar vendor.


                 Thus time master India  Pvt.  Ltd.  purchased  total  land
                 measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at the rate of Rs.  25  lakhs
                 per acre.




           e)    It is also relevant to point out  the  following  are  the
           sale   transactions   in   December   2006   of   the    village
           Naharpur/Kasan.


                     Land sold of Village Naharpur/Kasan
           Sr. No.Vasika No.       Dt  .               Land  sold      Sale
           consideration    Per acre
           1.            18628           4.12.06               12K    16.5M
           2,56,50,000/-          1,60,00000
           2.             18742             5.12.06               5K    13M
           1,13,00,000/-          1,60,00000
           3.             18743             5.12.06               5K    14M
           74,00,000/-      1,60,00000
           4.             19350            14.12.06               5K    13M
           1,13,00,000/-          1,60,00000


           f)      it is also submitted that the rate on which auction sale
           of Tower side on acquired land is done on 30.6.2006.


           Tower  Site  No.        Area  in  meters             Amount   of
           consideration    per sq yard
           J                                                           6804
                95.10 crores                              116865/- per  sq.
           yd
           K                                                           5832
            101.50 crores                          145518/- per sq. yd
           L                                                           6804
             93.00 crores                 114284.50/- per sq. yd


           g)      It is also submitted the following details of auction by
           HSIDC IMT Manesar.


                      Auction sales by HSIDC IMT Manesar

                 Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-I, IMT
                 Manesar auction held on 18.8.2009.

                 Sr.No.                   Site No.                 Area  in
                 Sq. Mts           Price of Site
                             1.                                         T-1
                     144     2,67,50,000/-
                             2.                                         T-2
                     144     2,33,50,000/-
                             3.                                         T-3
                      144    2,29,00,000/-
                             4.                                         T-4
                      144    2,29,00,000/-
                             5.                                         T-5
                      144    2,31,00,000/-
                             6.                                         T-7
                      144    2,28,00,000/-
                             7.                                         T-8
                      144    2,25,00,000/-
                              8.                                        T-9
                      144    2,22,00,000/-
                              9.                                       T-10
                      144    2,16,00,000/-
                              10.                                       D-1
                    108      1,82,00,000/-
                               11.                                      D-2
                    108      1,58,00,000/-
                                 12.                                    D-3
                   108 1,62,50,000/-
                                 13.                                    D-4
                   108 1,60,00,000/-
                                 14.                                    D-5
                   108 1,51,00,000/-
                                 15.                                    D-6
                   108 1,38,50,000/-
                                 16.                                    D-7
                   108 1,40,00,000/-
                                 17.                                    D-8
                   108 1,37,00,000/-
                                 18.                                    D-9
                   108 1,35,00,000/-
                                19.                                    D-10
                  108  1,33,50,000/-


                 Total area 2376 square mts. total  Rs.35,78,50,000/-  i.e.
                 150610.26  per  Mt.i.e.   Rs.12,5928.58   per   yard   i.e.
                 Rs.60,94,94,327/- per acre.


                 Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-1, IMT
                 Manesar auction held on 11.8.2010.




                               1.                                      D-10
                  108  2,12,50,000/-
                               2.                                      D-12
                  108  1,89,50,000/-
                               3.                                      D-14
                  108  1,90,00,000/-
                               4.                                      D-15
                  108  1,88,50,000/-
                                5.                          D-16        108
                              1,92,00,000/-


           Allotment of Triple  Storey  SCO  Sites  for  in  Sector-1,  IMT
           Manesar, auction held on 11.8.2010 on following rates.


                               1.                                        11
                    144      3,03,00,000/-


                               1.                                        11
                    144      3,03,00,000/-
                               2.                                        12
                    144      3,00,00,000/-
                              3.                                       12-A
                  144  2,87,00,000/-


           Total area 972 sq mts allotted for total amount of Rs.186250000/-
            i.e Rs.191615.22 per Mt. i.e. Rs.160213.67 per square  yard  or
           Rs. 77,54,34189/- per acre.”







6.    S/Shri Gopal Subramanium and Altaf  Ahmed,  learned  senior  advocates
and other counsel who appeared for the petitioner relied upon reports  dated
20.1.2011 and 21.1.2011 prepared by the Chartered Accountant  M/s.  AKG  and
Company to show that at least two  of  the  Directors,  namely,  Shri  Saroj
Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were common to the  management  of  the
two companies and submitted that land was shown to have  been  purchased  by
M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. at a very high price because it was hoping  to
reap benefit of the joint venture agreement with  M/s.  Duracell  Inc.  USA.
Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  the  vendor,  namely,  M/s.   Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased 12 acres land  from  different  landowners
at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre  and  argued  that  even  if  the
benefit of 12% notional increase in the value of land  was  allowed  to  the
vendor, no person of ordinary prudence would have purchased  the  same  land
after a period of 13 months at the rate of more than Rs.20 lakhs  per  acre.
Learned counsel also referred to the statement of the  authorised  signatory
of the vendor M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.  to  drive  home  the  point
that the Sale Deed Exhibit P1 was not  a  bona  fide  transaction.   Learned
senior counsel then argued that dismissal of Review  Petition  Nos.2107-2108
of 2010 cannot operate as a bar to the maintainability  of  these  petitions
because till 13.1.2011, the officers of the  petitioner  did  not  have  any
inkling about the composition of the two companies and  the  fact  that  the
vendor had purchased the land in 1993 at the rate of  Rs.6  lakhs  per  acre
only and the relevant facts came to their notice only in October, 2010  from
the representatives of IMT Industrial Association.

7.    S/Shri J.L. Gupta, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia and Paras  Kuhad,  senior
advocates and other counsel, who appeared  for  the  landowners  argued  for
dismissal of the review petitions.  They emphasized that  the  very  premise
on which the review petitions have been  filed,  namely,  discovery  of  the
facts relating  to  composition  of  the  board  of  directors  of  the  two
companies is incorrect because no-one from the Poddar group on the board  of
directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. till 9.6.1994.  Shri J. L.  Gupta
and Shri Paras Kuhad pointed out  that  Shri  Saroj  Kumar  Poddar  and  Ms.
Jyotsana Poddar were taken on the board of directors of M/s. Duracell  India
Pvt. Ltd. after execution of the agreement for sale  and  no  joint  venture
agreement was executed between the vendee, i.e., M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.
Ltd. and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Shri  Paras  Kuhad  also  referred  to  the
Memorandum of Association and  Articles  of  Association  of  M/s.  Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. to show that S/Shri Jyoti Sagar and  Sajay  Singh  were  the
only promoters of  the  company.   Learned  counsel  then  argued  that  the
petitioner cannot seek review of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the pretext  of
discovery of facts relating to composition of the two companies  because  no
evidence was adduced before the Reference Court to prove that the sale  deed
Exhibit P1 was  not  a  bona  fide  transaction  or  that  vendee  had  paid
exorbitant price for extraneous reasons.   Learned  counsel  further  argued
that  after  dismissal  of  Review  Petition  Nos.2107-2108  of  2010,   the
petitioner cannot revive its prayer  because  there  was  total  absence  of
diligence on the part of its officers.

8.    We shall first consider whether the  petitioner’s  prayer  for  review
should be entertained by ignoring the  dismissal  of  similar  petitions  by
this Court vide order dated 13.1.2011.  A  careful  reading  of  that  order
shows that in Review Petition Nos.2107-2108  of  2010,  the  petitioner  had
sought reconsideration of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the premise  that  the
vendor and the vendee had common management and that the price mentioned  in
the sale deed had  been  manipulated  with  an  oblique  motive.  The  Court
declined to entertain this plea by observing that  the  petitioner  had  not
produced any  material  to  substantiate  its  assertion.   Along  with  the
present batch of review petitions, the petitioner has placed on  record  the
search  reports  prepared  by  M/s   AKG   and   Company,   Certificate   of
Incorporation, Memorandum of Association  and  Articles  of  Association  of
M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd., mutations showing the  purchase  of  land
by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vide sale  deeds  dated  16.8.1993  and
18.8.1993, annual return of M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.  Ltd.  showing  Shri
Saroj Kumar Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and  Ms.  Jyotsana  Poddar  as
the Directors and the statement of Albel Singh, but these documents  neither
singularly nor collectively support the petitioner’s  plea  that  management
of the two companies, i.e.,  the  vendor  and  the  vendee,  was  under  the
control of the same set of persons or that the  vendee  had  paid  unusually
high price with some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri  Saroj  Kumar
Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of M/s.  Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. on 9.6.1994 and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was  so  appointed
on 9.2.1997 whereas the agreement for sale was executed  on  31.5.1994.  The
petitioner has not controverted the averments contained in paragraphs 4  and
5 of the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition  No.239/2011,  perusal  of
which makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of land had been  sold  at
the rate of Rs.15,73,289/-  and  Rs.13,74,345/-  per  acre.   Therefore,  it
cannot be said that M/s. Duracell India  Pvt.  Ltd.  had  paid  exorbitantly
high price to M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous  reasons  and
we do not  find  any  valid  ground  for  indirect  review  of  order  dated
13.1.2011.

9.    At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of  review
is a creature of  the  statute  and  no  Court  or  quasi-judicial  body  or
administrative authority can  review  its  judgment  or  order  or  decision
unless it is legally empowered to do so.  Article 137  empowers  this  Court
to review its judgments subject  to  the  provisions  of  any  law  made  by
Parliament or any rules made under Article  145  of  the  Constitution.  The
Rules framed by this Court under that Article lay down that in civil  cases,
review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of  the  Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:

           “Order 47, Rule 1:


           1. Application for review of judgment.—


           (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—


           (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal  is  allowed,  but
           from which no appeal has been preferred,


           (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or


           (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,


           and who, from the discovery  of  new  and  important  matter  or
           evidence which, after the exercise  of  due  diligence  was  not
           within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time
           when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of  some
           mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for  any
           other sufficient reason, desires  to  obtain  a  review  of  the
           decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a  review
           of judgment to the court which passed the  decree  or  made  the
           order.


           (2) A party who is not appealing from  a  decree  or  order  may
           apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the  pendency  of
           an appeal by some other party except where the  ground  of  such
           appeal is common to the applicant and the  appellant,  or  when,
           being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
           of which he applies for the review.


           Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of law  on
           which the judgment of the Court is based has  been  reversed  or
           modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court  in  any
           other case, shall not  be  a  ground  for  the  review  of  such
           judgment.”


10.   The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in  several  cases.  We
shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State  of  Karnataka  1993  Supp
(4) SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand  Lal
Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 and  Rajunder  Narain  Rae  v.  Bijai
Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 and observed:

           “Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-
           consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the  universal
           acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the  realm  of  law  the
           courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality
           of  decision  legally  and  properly   made.   Exceptions   both
           statutorily and judicially  have  been  carved  out  to  correct
           accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even  when  there
           was no statutory provision and  no  rules  were  framed  by  the
           highest court indicating the circumstances  in  which  it  could
           rectify its order the courts culled  out  such  power  to  avoid
           abuse of process or miscarriage  of  justice.  In  Raja  Prithwi
           Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that  even
           though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court  to
           review its order yet it was available on the limited and  narrow
           ground developed by the Privy Council and the  House  of  Lords.
           The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy  Council
           in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order  made
           by the Court was final and could not be altered:

                 “...  nevertheless,  if  by  misprision  in  embodying  the
                 judgments, by errors have  been  introduced,  these  Courts
                 possess, by Common law, the same power which the Courts  of
                 record and statute have of rectifying  the  mistakes  which
                 have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises  a  similar
                 power of rectifying mistakes made in  drawing  up  its  own
                 judgments, and this Court must possess the same  authority.
                 The Lords have  however  gone  a  step  further,  and  have
                 corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence  in  the
                 details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects  in
                 order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or  have  added
                 explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.”

           Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same  decision
           as under:

                 “It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended  in
                 such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing
                 to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court  of
                 last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the
                 party  has  not  been  heard  and   an   order   has   been
                 inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.”

           Rectification of  an  order  thus  stems  from  the  fundamental
           principle that justice is above all. It is exercised  to  remove
           the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution
           was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the  order
           passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of
           the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the  practical
           wisdom to visualise the efficacy  of  such  provision  expressly
           conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or  order
           by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause  (c)  of  Article
           145 permitted this Court to frame rules  as  to  the  conditions
           subject to which any judgment  or  order  may  be  reviewed.  In
           exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering  this
           Court to  review  an  order  in  civil  proceedings  on  grounds
           analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The
           expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause  has
           been given an expanded meaning and  a  decree  or  order  passed
           under misapprehension of true state of  circumstances  has  been
           held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power.  Apart  from
           Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this  Court  has  the
           inherent power to make such orders as may be  necessary  in  the
           interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court.
           The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing  its
           own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do  so  for
           sake of justice.”

11.   In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose  Athanasius
AIR 1954 SC 526, the three-Judge Bench referred to  the  provisions  of  the
Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to  Order  47  Rule  1
CPC and observed:

           “It is needless to emphasise that the scope  of  an  application
           for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under
           the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil  Procedure  which
           is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1  of  our  Code  of  Civil
           Procedure,  1908,  the  court  of  review  has  only  a  limited
           jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the
           language used therein.

           It may allow a review on three specified  grounds,  namely,  (i)
           discovery of new and important matter or evidence  which,  after
           the exercise of due diligence, was not  within  the  applicant's
           knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time  when  the
           decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of
           the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

           It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the  words  “any
           other sufficient reason”  must  mean  “a  reason  sufficient  on
           grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. See
           Chhajju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922 PC  12  (D).  This  conclusion  was
           reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar  Pratap  Sahi
           v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by on Federal
           Court in Hari Shankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter AIR 1949  FC  106
           at pp. 110, 111 (F). Learned counsel  appearing  in  support  of
           this appeal recognises the  aforesaid  limitations  and  submits
           that his case comes within  the  ground  of  “mistake  or  error
           apparent on the face of the record”  or  some  ground  analogous
           thereto.”



12.   In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.  (1964)  5  SCR  174,
another three-Judge Bench  reiterated  that  the  power  of  review  is  not
analogous to the appellate power and observed:
           “A review is by no  means  an  appeal  in  disguise  whereby  an
           erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies  only  for
           patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a  suitable
           occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any
           great detail, but it would suffice for  us  to  say  that  where
           without any elaborate argument one could point to the error  and
           say here is a substantial point of law which stares one  in  the
           face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained
           about it, a clear case of error apparent  on  the  face  of  the
           record would be made out.”



13.   In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979)  4  SCC  389,
this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High  Court  can
review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution  and  proceeded
to observe:
           “But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of  the  power
           of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery
           of new  and  important  matter  or  evidence  which,  after  the
           exercise of due diligence was not within the  knowledge  of  the
           person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the
           time when the order was made; it may  be  exercised  where  some
           mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it
           may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it  may  not
           be exercised on the ground that the decision  was  erroneous  on
           merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power
           of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which  may
           enable an appellate  court  to  correct  all  manner  of  errors
           committed by the subordinate court.”


14.         In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170,
the Court considered as to what can be characterised as an error apparent
on the fact of the record and observed:

           “…….it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face
           of record must be such an error which must strike  one  on  mere
           looking at the record  and  would  not  require  any  long-drawn
           process of reasoning on points where there  may  conceivably  be
           two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of  this
           Court  in  the  case  of  Satyanarayan  Laxminarayan  Hegde   v.
           Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC  137  wherein,  K.C.
           Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court  has  made  the  following
           observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of
           the record:

                 “An error which has  to  be  established  by  a  long-drawn
                 process of reasoning on points where there may  conceivably
                 be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error  apparent
                 on the face of the record. Where an alleged  error  is  far
                 from self-evident and if it can be established, it  has  to
                 be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments,  such
                 an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari  according
                 to the rule governing the powers of the superior  court  to
                 issue such a writ.”



15.   In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court  observed:

                 “An error which is not self-evident and has to be  detected
                 by a process of reasoning, can hardly  be  said  to  be  an
                 error apparent on the face of  the  record  justifying  the
                 Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
                 CPC…….. A review petition, it  must  be  remembered  has  a
                 limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an  appeal  in
                 disguise”.”



16.   In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC  224,  R.P.  Sethi,  J.,
who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope  of  the  power
of review in the following words:

           “Such powers can be exercised within the limits of  the  statute
           dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated
           like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on
           the subject is not a ground for review. Once a  review  petition
           is dismissed no further petition of review can  be  entertained.
           The rule of law of following the practice of the binding  nature
           of the larger Benches and not  taking  different  views  by  the
           Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to  be
           followed and practised.”



17.   In Haridas Das  v.  Usha  Rani  Banik  (2006)  4  SCC  78,  the  Court
observed:
           “The parameters are prescribed in  Order  47  CPC  and  for  the
           purposes of this lis,  permit  the  defendant  to  press  for  a
           rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent  on  the
           face of the records or for any  other  sufficient  reason”.  The
           former part of the rule deals with a situation  attributable  to
           the applicant, and  the  latter  to  a  jural  action  which  is
           manifestly  incorrect  or  on  which  two  conclusions  are  not
           possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of  the  dispute
           because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the  case
           or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully  and/or  cited
           binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable
           verdict.”



18.   In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612, the  Court
considered  the  question  whether  a   Tribunal   established   under   the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can  review  its  decision,  referred  to
Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:

           “At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review  is
           sought on the ground of discovery of  new  matter  or  evidence,
           such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of  such  a
           character that if the same had  been  produced,  it  might  have
           altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of  new  or
           important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review
           ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has
           also to show that such additional matter  or  evidence  was  not
           within  its  knowledge  and  even  after  the  exercise  of  due
           diligence, the same could  not  be  produced  before  the  court
           earlier.

           The term “mistake or error apparent”  by  its  very  connotation
           signifies an error which is evident per se from  the  record  of
           the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and
           elucidation either of the facts or the  legal  position.  If  an
           error is not self-evident and detection  thereof  requires  long
           debate and process of reasoning, it  cannot  be  treated  as  an
           error apparent on the face of the  record  for  the  purpose  of
           Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act.  To  put  it
           differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected
           merely because it is erroneous in law or on the  ground  that  a
           different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on  a
           point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of
           review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in  appeal  over
           its judgment / decision.”



19.   In the light of the  propositions  laid  down  in  the  aforementioned
judgments, we shall now examine whether  the  petitioner  has  succeeded  in
making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article  137  of
the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.   This  consideration  needs
to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not  offered  any
explanation as to why it did not lead  any  evidence  before  the  Reference
Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction  and
the vendee had  paid  unusually  high  price  for  extraneous  reasons.  The
parties had produced several sale deeds, majority  of  which  revealed  that
the price of similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per  acre.
A reading of the sale deeds would  have  prompted  any  person  of  ordinary
prudence to make an  enquiry  as  to  why  M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.  Ltd.
(vendee) had paid more than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land,  which  have
been purchased by the vendor only a year back at an average  price  of  Rs.6
lakhs per acre. However,  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  neither  the
advocate for the petitioner nor its  officers/officials,  who  were  dealing
with the cases made any attempt to lead such evidence.  This may be  because
they were aware of the fact that at least in two other  cases  such  parcels
of land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs.13 lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs  per
acre and in 1996, a sale deed  was  executed  in  respect  of  the  land  of
village Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs per acre.   This  omission
coupled with the fact that the petitioner’s assertion about  commonality  of
the  management  of  two  companies  is  ex-facie  incorrect  leads  to   an
irresistible inference that judgment dated 17.8.2010 does  not  suffer  from
any error apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record  warranting  its  review.
Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask  for  de  novo
hearing of the appeals.

20.   The petitioner’s plea that  the  documents  produced  along  with  the
review petitions could not be brought to the notice of the  Reference  Court
and the High Court despite exercise of due diligence by  its  officers  does
not commend acceptance because it had not explained as to why the  concerned
officers/officials, who were very much  aware  of  other  sale  transactions
produced by themselves and the landowners  did  not  try  to  find  out  the
reasons for wide difference in the price of land  sold  by  Exhibit  P1  and
other parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15.

21.   Before concluding, we would  like  to  add  that  while  deciding  the
review petitions, this Court cannot make roving inquiries into the  validity
of the transaction involving the sale of land  by  M/s.  Heritage  Furniture
Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India  Pvt.  Ltd.  or  declare  the  same  to  be
invalid by assuming that the vendee had paid higher price  to  take  benefit
of an anticipated joint  venture  agreement  with  a  foreign  company.   Of
course, the petitioner has  not  controverted  the  statement  made  by  the
respondents that the vendee had sold the land  to  M/s.  Lattu  Finance  and
Investments Ltd. in 2004 for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate  of
Rs.1,13,00,000/- per acre.

22.   In the result, the review petitions are dismissed.  The interim  order
passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically vacated. The petitioner  shall  pay
cost of Rs.25,000/- in each case. The amount  of  cost  shall  be  deposited
with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within  a  period  of  three
months.

23.   However, it is made  clear  that  the  petitioner  shall  be  free  to
withdraw the amount which it had deposited in  compliance  of  this  Court’s
order dated 30.3.2011. In any case, the petitioner  shall  pay  the  balance
amount of compensation to the landowners and/or their legal  representatives
along with other statutory benefits within three months from today.

24.   In view of the dismissal of the review  petitions  and  the  direction
given for payment of the balance amount, the contempt petitions and all  the
pending interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous.


                                                   ……….....……..….………………….…J.
                                 [G.S. Singhvi]



                                                     ………..………..….………………….…J.
                               [Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]
New Delhi,
July 02, 2012.