LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, July 6, 2012

Ponnala Lakshmaiah -whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was right in holding that the election petition filed by respondent No.1 against the appellant who happens to be the successful candidate in the election to the 98-Jangaon Assembly Constituency in the State of Andhra Pradesh, disclosed a cause of action and could not therefore be dismissed at the threshold. The factual matrix in which the election petition came to be filed by the respondent has been set out at length by the High Court, hence need not be recounted except to the extent the same is essential for the disposal of the appeal. The High Court has, while holding that the averments made in the election petition raised triable issues and disclosed a cause of action, observed: “23. As seen from the statement showing voter turn out report in connection with General Elections, 2009 to 98-Jangaon Legislative Assembly Constituency on 16.04.2009, the total votes polled, as reported by the Returning Officer, is shown as 1,50,678 from 251 polling stations. Whereas the final result sheet in Form no.20, total valid votes is shown as 1,51,411. So, from this document, it is clear that prima facie a proper counting had not taken place. Therefore, prima facie it can be said to be an irregularity on the part of the Returning Officer involved in dereliction of the duty. Similarly, there is a specific allegation that out of 653 postal ballots, the election petitioner would have secured more than 300 votes, if properly counted, and out of the said votes, 142 votes which were validly polled in favour of the election petitioner, were illegally declared as invalid and another 52 votes polled in favour of the election petitioner were counted in favour of the first respondent, and 45 invalid votes were illegally counted in favour of the first respondent. Since the margin between the elected candidate and the nearest rival is only 236 votes, had postal ballots been counted properly, then there would be a possibility of materially affecting the result of the election in so far as the returned candidate. So, under no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the allegations in the Election Petition are vague. 24. No doubt, it is true that in view of the decision of the Apex Court, recounting of the votes cannot be resorted to as a matter of course and every endeavour should be made to protect the secrecy of the ballots. But, at the same time suspicion of the correctness of the figures mentioned in the crucial documents of the statement showing voters’ turn out report and Form-20-final result sheet, where there is a variance between total number of votes polled and votes counted. The two basic requirements laid down by the Apex Court, to order recounting, are: (a) the election petition seeking recount of the ballot papers must contain an adequate statement of the material facts on which the allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting are founded; and (b) on the basis of evidence adduced in support of the allegations, the Tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the parties, making of such an order is imperatively necessary. Therefore, the questions–whether counting of votes by the officials is in accordance with the rules and regulations and also whether the votes polled in favour of the election petitioner were rejected as invalid or there was improper counting of votes polled in favour of the returned candidate, are required to be decided after adducing evidence only. The allegation that because of the improper counting of postal ballots polled in favour of the election petitioner, the election petitioner could not secure 300 votes, if accepted as true at this stage, it would materially affect the election result because the margin of votes polled between returned candidate and his nearest rival is very narrow. In the Election Petition, the allegation with regard to irregularity or illegality in counting of votes, which affects election of the returned candidate materially, has been clearly stated in the Election Petition. It is not a vague or general allegation that some irregularities or illegalities have been committed in counting. Similarly, there is allegation that in the first instance, after totalling of all votes, the election petitioner secured a majority of 44 votes and the same was informed to the electronic media, and some TV channels telecasted the same immediately. A Compact Disc (CD) is also field along with the Election Petition, in support of the said allegation. It is also alleged that none of the contested candidates filed any petition for recounting of votes within maximum period of five minutes after the election petitioner was declared to have secured a majority of 44 votes. Therefore, there is prima facie material to show that there was irregularity or illegality in counting of votes which resulted in affecting materially the election of the returned candidate, so as to proceed further with the Election Petition. As, at this stage, prima facie case for recounting, as seen from the allegations in the Election Petition, is made out, the pleadings cannot be struck off as unnecessary. Therefore, rejecting the Election Petition at this stage does not arise.”- There is no denying the fact that the election of a successful candidate is not lightly interfered with by the Courts. The Courts generally lean in favour of the returned candidates and place the onus of proof on the person challenging the end result of an electoral contest. That approach is more in the nature of a rule of practice than a rule of law and should not be unduly stretched beyond a limit. We say so because while it is important to respect a popular verdict and the courts ought to be slow in upsetting the same, it is equally important to maintain the purity of the election process. An election which is vitiated by reason of corrupt practices, illegalities and irregularities enumerated in Sections 100 & 123 of the Act cannot obviously be recognised and respected as the decision of the majority of the electorate. The Courts are, therefore, duty bound to examine the allegations whenever the same are raised within the framework of the statute without being unduly hyper-technical in its approach & without being oblivious of the ground realities. Experience has shown that the electoral process is, despite several safeguards taken by the Statutory Authorities concerned, often vitiated by use of means, factors and considerations that are specifically forbidden by the statute. The electoral process is vulnerable to misuse, in several ways, in the process distorting the picture in which the obvious may be completely different from the real. Electoral reforms is, therefore, a crying need of our times but has remained a far cry. If the Courts also adopt a technical approach towards the resolution of electoral disputes, the confidence of the people not only in the democratic process but in the efficacy of the judicial determination of electoral disputes will be seriously undermined. This Court has in several pronouncements while emphasising the need to leave the elections untouched, reiterated, the need to maintain the purity of elections and thereby strengthening democratic values in this country. The decisions of this Court in T.A. Ahammed Kabeer v. A.A. Azeez & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 650 and P. Malaichami v. M. Andi Ambalam and Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 170 express a similar sentiment. 23. Suffice it to say, that in the absence of any provision making breach of the proviso to Section 83(1), a valid ground of dismissal of an election petition at the threshold, we see no reason why the requirement of filing an affidavit in a given format should be exalted by a judicial interpretation to the status of a statutory mandate. A petition that raises triable issues need not, therefore, be dismissed simply because the affidavit filed by the petitioner is not in a given format no matter the deficiency in the format has not caused any prejudice to the successful candidate and can be cured by the election petitioner by filing a proper affidavit. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.25000/-.


                                                   REPORTABLE




                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   4993   OF 2012
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20013 of 2010)




Ponnala Lakshmaiah                           …Appellant

                 Versus

Kommuri Pratap Reddy & Ors.                  …Respondents











                               J U D G M E N T



T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The short question that falls for  determination  in  this  appeal  by
special leave is whether the High Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  was  right  in
holding that the election petition filed  by  respondent  No.1  against  the
appellant who happens to be the successful candidate in the election to  the
98-Jangaon Assembly Constituency in the State of Andhra  Pradesh,  disclosed
a cause of action and could not therefore be  dismissed  at  the  threshold.
The factual matrix in which the election petition came to be  filed  by  the
respondent has been set out at length by the High Court, hence need  not  be
recounted except to the extent the same is essential  for  the  disposal  of
the appeal. The High Court has, while holding that  the  averments  made  in
the election petition  raised  triable  issues  and  disclosed  a  cause  of
action, observed:

         “23.     As seen from the statement showing voter turn  out  report
         in  connection  with  General   Elections,   2009   to   98-Jangaon
         Legislative Assembly Constituency on 16.04.2009,  the  total  votes
         polled, as reported by the Returning Officer, is shown as  1,50,678
         from 251 polling stations.  Whereas the final result sheet in  Form
         no.20, total valid votes is  shown  as  1,51,411.   So,  from  this
         document, it is clear that prima facie a proper  counting  had  not
         taken place.  Therefore, prima facie  it  can  be  said  to  be  an
         irregularity on the part  of  the  Returning  Officer  involved  in
         dereliction of the duty.  Similarly, there is a specific allegation
         that out of 653 postal ballots, the election petitioner would  have
         secured more than 300 votes, if properly counted, and  out  of  the
         said votes, 142 votes which were validly polled in  favour  of  the
         election petitioner, were illegally declared as invalid and another
         52 votes polled in favour of the election petitioner  were  counted
         in favour of the  first  respondent,  and  45  invalid  votes  were
         illegally counted in favour of the  first  respondent.   Since  the
         margin between the elected candidate and the nearest rival is  only
         236 votes, had postal ballots been  counted  properly,  then  there
         would be a possibility of materially affecting the  result  of  the
         election in so far as the returned candidate. So, under no  stretch
         of imagination, it can be said that the allegations in the Election
         Petition are vague.

         24.      No doubt, it is true that in view of the decision  of  the
         Apex Court, recounting of the votes cannot  be  resorted  to  as  a
         matter of course and every endeavour should be made to protect  the
         secrecy of the ballots.  But, at the same  time  suspicion  of  the
         correctness of the figures mentioned in the  crucial  documents  of
         the statement showing voters’ turn  out  report  and  Form-20-final
         result sheet, where there is a variance  between  total  number  of
         votes polled and votes counted. The  two  basic  requirements  laid
         down by the Apex Court, to order recounting, are: (a) the  election
         petition seeking recount of  the  ballot  papers  must  contain  an
         adequate statement of the material facts on which  the  allegations
         of irregularity or illegality in counting are founded; and  (b)  on
         the basis of evidence adduced in support of  the  allegations,  the
         Tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide  the
         dispute and to  do  complete  and  effectual  justice  between  the
         parties, making of such an order is imperatively necessary.

             Therefore, the questions–whether  counting  of  votes  by  the
         officials is in accordance with the rules and regulations and  also
         whether the votes polled in favour of the election petitioner  were
         rejected as invalid or there was improper counting of votes  polled
         in favour of the returned candidate, are  required  to  be  decided
         after adducing evidence only. The allegation that  because  of  the
         improper counting  of  postal  ballots  polled  in  favour  of  the
         election petitioner, the election petitioner could not  secure  300
         votes, if accepted as true  at  this  stage,  it  would  materially
         affect the election result  because  the  margin  of  votes  polled
         between returned candidate and his nearest rival  is  very  narrow.
         In  the  Election  Petition,  the   allegation   with   regard   to
         irregularity or illegality in  counting  of  votes,  which  affects
         election of the returned candidate  materially,  has  been  clearly
         stated in the Election Petition.  It is  not  a  vague  or  general
         allegation that  some  irregularities  or  illegalities  have  been
         committed in counting.  Similarly, there is allegation that in  the
         first  instance,  after  totalling  of  all  votes,  the   election
         petitioner secured a majority of 44 votes and the same was informed
         to the electronic media, and some TV channels telecasted  the  same
         immediately.  A Compact Disc (CD) is  also  field  along  with  the
         Election Petition, in support of the said allegation.  It  is  also
         alleged that none of the contested candidates  filed  any  petition
         for recounting of votes within maximum period of five minutes after
         the election petitioner was declared to have secured a majority  of
         44 votes.  Therefore, there is prima facie material  to  show  that
         there was irregularity or illegality in  counting  of  votes  which
         resulted in affecting  materially  the  election  of  the  returned
         candidate, so as to proceed further  with  the  Election  Petition.
         As, at this stage, prima facie case for recounting,  as  seen  from
         the  allegations  in  the  Election  Petition,  is  made  out,  the
         pleadings  cannot  be  struck  off  as   unnecessary.    Therefore,
         rejecting the Election Petition at this stage does not arise.”



3.    Having carefully gone through  the  averments  made  in  the  election
petition, we are of the opinion that the  election  petition  sets  out  the
requisite material facts that disclose a cause of action and gives  rise  to
triable issues, which can not be given a short shrift by  taking  an  unduly
technical view as to the nature of the pleadings.  There is no  denying  the
fact that Courts are competent to dismiss petitions not only on  the  ground
that the same do not comply with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 & 117  of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 but also on the ground  that  the
same do not disclose any cause of action.  The expression “cause of  action”
has not been defined either in the Civil Procedure Code or elsewhere and  is
more easily understood than precisely defined. This Court has in Om  Prakash
Srivastava v.  Union  of  India  &  Anr.  (2006)  6  SCC  207  attempted  an
explanation of the expression in the following words:

         “The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled
         meaning. In the  restricted  sense  "cause  of  action"  means  the
         circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the  immediate
         occasion for the  reaction.  In  the  wider  sense,  it  means  the
         necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not
         only the infraction of the right, but also the  infraction  coupled
         with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above the expression
         means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff  to
         prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the  judgment
         of the Court. Every fact, which  is  necessary  to  be  proved,  as
         distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary,  to
         prove each fact. comprises in "cause of action”.”




4.    It is equally well settled that while examining whether  a  plaint  or
an election petition discloses a cause of action, the Court has a  full  and
comprehensive view of  the  pleading.   Averments  made  in  the  plaint  or
petition cannot be read out of context or in isolation.  They must be  taken
in totality for a true and proper understanding of the case set  up  by  the
plaintiff.  This Court has  in  Shri  Udhav  Singh  v.  Madhav  Rao  Scindia
(1977) 1 SCC 511 given a timely reminder of the principle in  the  following
words:

         “We  are  afraid,  this  ingenious  method  of  construction  after
         compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversion of  the
         language of the paragraph, suggested by Counsel,  runs  counter  to
         the  cardinal  canon  of  interpretation,  according  to  which,  a
         pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It
         is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to  read
         it out of the context, in isolation. Although it is  the  substance
         and not merely the form that has to be looked  into,  the  pleading
         has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of
         words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense.  The  intention
         of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor
         and terms of his pleading taken as a whole.”




5.    Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Church  of
North India v. Lavajibhai
Ratanjibhai and Ors. (2005) 10 SCC 760, wherein this Court  reiterated  that
for purposes of determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of  action,
the Court must take into consideration the plaint as a whole.   It  is  only
if even after the plaint is read as a whole, that  no  cause  of  action  is
found discernible that the Court can exercise  its  power  under  Order  VII
Rule 11 of the CPC.

6.    To the same effect is the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Liverpool  &
London S.P. and I. Asson. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success I. & Anr. (2004)  9  SCC
512; where this Court held that the disclosure of a cause of action  in  the
plaint is a question of fact and the answer to that question must  be  found
only from the reading of the plaint itself.  The Court trying a suit  or  an
election petition, as the position is  in  the  present  case,  shall  while
examining whether the plaint or the petition discloses a  cause  of  action,
to assume that the  averments  made  in  the  plaint  or  the  petition  are
factually correct. It is only  if  despite  the  averments  being  taken  as
factually correct, the Court finds no cause  of  action  emerging  from  the
averments that it may be justified in rejecting the  plaint.  The  following
paragraph from the decision is apposite in this regard:

         “Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially
         a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must  be  found
         out from reading the  plaint  itself.  For  the  said  purpose  the
         averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held  to  be
         correct. The test is as to whether if the  averments  made  in  the
         plaint are taken to be correct in its entirety, a decree  would  be
         passed.”


7.    We may also gainfully refer to the decision  of  this  Court  in  H.D.
Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC  217,  where  this  Court  held
that an election petition can be dismissed for  non-compliance  of  Sections
81, 82 and 117 of the Representation of the People  Act,  1951  but  it  may
also be dismissed if the matter falls within the scope of Order VI  Rule  16
or Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.   A  defect  in  the  verification  of  the
election petition or the affidavit accompanying the  election  petition  was
held to be curable, hence,  not  sufficient  to  justify  dismissal  of  the
election petition under Order VII Rule 11 or Order VI Rule 16 of  CPC.   The
following passage in this regard is instructive:

         “…..the relevant provisions in the Act are very  specific.  Section
         86 provides for dismissal of an election petition in limine for non-
         compliance with Sections 81, 82 and 117. Section 81 relates to  the
         presentation of an election petition. It is not  the  case  of  the
         appellant before us that the requirements of Section  81  were  not
         complied with….. Sections 82 and 117 are not relevant in this case.
         Significantly, Section 86 does not refer to  Section  83  and  non-
         compliance with Section 83 does not lead to dismissal under Section
         86. This Court has laid down that non-compliance  with  Section  83
         may lead to dismissal of the petition if the  matter  falls  within
         the scope of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7  Rule  11  CPC.  Defect  in
         verification of the election petition or the affidavit accompanying
         the election petition has been held to be curable and not fatal.”




8.    Applying the above principles to the case at hand, we do not  see  any
error in the order  passed  by  the  High  Court  refusing  to  dismiss  the
petition in limine on the  ground  that  the  same  discloses  no  cause  of
action.  The averments  made  in  the  election  petition  if  taken  to  be
factually correct, as they ought to for purposes of  determining  whether  a
case for exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 has been  made  out,  do
in our opinion, disclose a  cause  of  action.   The  High  Court  did  not,
therefore, commit any error much less an error resulting in  miscarriage  of
justice, to warrant interference by this Court in  exercise  of  its  extra-
ordinary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution.

9.    There was some debate at the bar as to whether the petition  discloses
material facts and particulars and if  it  does  not  whether  it  could  be
dismissed on the ground of the petition being deficient, hence  no  petition
in the eyes of Law. That argument, need not  detain  us  for  long,  as  the
legal position on the subject is well-settled by a long  line  of  decisions
rendered by this Court.  In Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi & Anr.  (1972)
3 SCC 850, this Court held that if allegations regarding a corrupt  practice
do not disclose the constituent parts of the corrupt practice  alleged,  the
same will not be allowed to  be  proved  and  those  allegations  cannot  be
amended after the period of limitation for filing an election  petition  but
the Court may allow particulars of  any  corrupt  practice  alleged  in  the
petition to be amended or amplified.  Dealing with the rules  of  pleadings,
this Court observed:
         “Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial  and  for
         reaching a just decision. An action at law should not be equated to
         a game of chess. Provisions of law are  not  mere  formulae  to  be
         observed as rituals. Beneath the  words  of  a  provision  of  law,
         generally speaking, there lies a juristic principle. It is the duty
         of the court to ascertain that principle and implement it.”


10.   The Court further held that just because a corrupt practice has to  be
strictly proved does not mean that a pleading in an election  petition  must
be strictly construed.  Even in a criminal trial,  a  defective  charge  did
not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused unless it  was  shown
that any such defect had prejudiced him.  The  Court  held  that  it  cannot
refuse to enquire into allegations made by the  election  petitioner  merely
because the election petitioner or someone who prepared his  brief  did  not
know the language of the law.  The principle was reiterated  by  this  Court
in  H.D.  Revanna  v.  G.  Puttaswamy  &  Ors.   (1999)  2  SCC  217,   V.S.
Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 737, Mahendra Pal  v.  Ram
Dass Malanger & Ors. (2000) 1 SCC 261, Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar  v.  Sukh
Darshan Singh & Ors. (2004) 11 SCC 196.
11.   In Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh (2005)  13  SCC  511,  this  Court
once again stated the distinction between  material  facts  and  particulars
and declared that material facts are primary and basic facts which  must  be
pleaded by the plaintiff while particulars are details in support  of  those
facts meant to amplify, refine and embellish the material  facts  by  giving
distinct touch to the basic contours of a picture already  drawn  so  as  to
make it more clear and informative.  To the same effect  are  the  decisions
of this court in Umesh Challiyil  v.  K.P.  Rajendran  (2008)  11  SCC  740,
Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh & Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 617.
12.   The High Court has, in the present case, held that the material  facts
constituting the foundation of the case set  up  by  the  election  petition
have been stated in the election petition. That being  so,  the  requirement
of Section 83 of the Act viz. that “the petition  shall  contain  a  concise
statement of material facts” has been satisfied. The question of  dismissing
the petition on that ground also therefore did not arise.   The  High  Court
in our opinion committed no wrong in coming  to  that  conclusion.  We  need
only emphasise that the burden which  lies  on  an  election  petitioner  to
prove the allegations made by him in the election petition whether the  same
relate to commission of any corrupt practice or proof of  any  other  ground
urged in support of the petition has to be discharged by him at  the  trial.
There is no dilution of that obligation when the court refuses to dismiss  a
petition at the threshold.  All that the refusal  to  dismiss  the  petition
implies is that the appellant has made out a case for the matter to  be  put
to trial.  Whether or not the petitioner will succeed at the  trial  remains
to be seen till the trial is concluded.  Even so  on  a  somewhat  erroneous
understanding of the law settled by this Court,  the  successful  candidates
charged with commission of  corrupt  practices  or  other  illegalities  and
irregularities that constitute grounds for  setting  aside  their  elections
seek dismissal of the petitions in limine on grounds  that  are  more  often
than not specious, in an attempt to achieve a two fold objective. First,  it
takes a chance of getting the election petition dismissed on the  ground  of
it being deficient, whether the deficiency be  in  terms  of  non-compliance
with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 & 117 of the Act  or  on  the  ground
that it does not disclose a  cause  of  action.  The  second  and  the  more
predominant objective is that the trial of the election gets  delayed  which
in itself sub-serve the interests of  the  successful  candidate.   Dilatory
tactics including long drawn arguments on whether the petition  discloses  a
cause of action or/and whether  other  formalities  in  the  filing  of  the
petition have been complied with are adopted with a view to  prevent  or  at
least delay a trial of the petition within a reasonable time frame. While  a
successful candidate is entitled to defend his election and  seek  dismissal
of the petition on ground legally available  to  him,  the  prolongation  of
proceedings by prevarication is not conducive to ends of  justice  that  can
be served only by an early and speedy  disposal  of  the  proceedings.   The
Courts have, therefore, to guard against such attempts made by  parties  who
often succeed in dragging the proceedings beyond the  term  for  which  they
have been elected. The Courts need to be cautious in dealing  with  requests
for dismissal of the petitions at the threshold and  exercise  their  powers
of dismissal only in cases where even on a plain reading of the petition  no
cause of action is disclosed.  Beyond that note of caution, we do  not  wish
to say anything at this stage for it is neither necessary nor proper for  us
to do so.
13.   Mr. Rao next argued that  the  election  petition  was  liable  to  be
dismissed also on the ground  that  the  same  was  not  accompanied  by  an
affidavit which the election petitioner was obliged  to  file  in  terms  of
proviso to Section 83 (1) of the Act.  He urged that the use   of  the  word
‘shall’ in the proviso made it mandatory for the petitioner to  support  the
averments in the election petition with an affidavit in Form  25  prescribed
under Rule 94 (A) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.   Inasmuch  as  an
affidavit had  not  been  filed  in  the  prescribed  format,  the  election
petition, argued Mr. Rao, was no election petition in the  eye  of  law  and
was, therefore, liable to be dismissed in limine.   Reliance in  support  of
his submissions was placed by Mr. Rao upon the decisions of  this  Court  in
M. Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohammed (1978) 2  SCC  659,  R.P.  Moidutty  v.
P.T.  Kunju  Mohammad  (2000)  1  SCC   481,   V.   Narayanswamy   v.   C.P.
Thirunavukkarasu (2000) 2 SCC 294, Kamalnath v. Sudesh Verma  (2002)  2  SCC
410, Mithilesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav  &  Ors.  (1984)  2  SCC  1,
Ravinder Singh v. Janmeja Singh  (2000)  8  SCC  191,  Ram  Sukh  v.  Dinesh
Aggarwal (2009) 10 SCC 541.
14.   On behalf of the respondent, it was argued by Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  that
the non-filing of an affidavit in terms of proviso to Section 83(1)  of  the
Act was never taken as a ground before the High  Court  in  the  application
which the High court has decided in terms of the impugned order nor was  the
point ever argued at the bar. The appellant  cannot,  therefore,  urge  that
point before this Court for the first time. Relying  upon  the  decision  of
this Court in Balwan Singh v. Prakash Chand & Ors. (1976)  2  SCC  440,  Mr.
Kumar argued that a plea relating to defective verification of the  petition
was not allowed to be taken by this Court for the first time in  appeal.  It
was further submitted by Mr. Kumar that  an  affidavit  in  support  of  the
election petition had indeed been  filed  by  the  respondent-petitioner  in
which the averments and the grounds alleged by the respondent were  set  out
and reiterated on oath.  An affidavit filed under Order  VI  Rule  15(4)  of
the CPC supporting the averments made in  the  election  petition  has  also
been filed including averments made  in  para  12  to  15  of  the  election
petition.  It was urged that two  affidavits  mentioned  above  sufficiently
complied with the requirements of Section 83 of the Act and  Rule  94(A)  of
The Conduct of Election Rules 1961. He submitted  that  even  assuming  that
there was any deficiency in the  affidavit  sworn  by  the  respondent,  not
being in the format in which the same was required  to  be  filed,  yet  the
same was not fatal to the election petition inasmuch  as  the  Court  trying
the petition can at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings  direct  the  election
petitioner to file a proper affidavit if  it  finds  that  the  one  already
filed is deficient in any way.
15.   There is considerable merit in the submission made by Mr.  Kumar.  The
ground urged by Mr. Rao was not admittedly raised in the  application  filed
by the appellant before the High Court nor was it argued at  the  bar.   The
High Court had in that view no occasion to deal with the contention that  is
sought to be advanced before us for the first time. There is no  reason  why
the appellant should not have urged the point before the High Court,  if  he
was serious about its implications.
16.   Even otherwise the question whether non-compliance of the  proviso  to
Section 83 (1) of the Act is fatal to the election  petition  is  no  longer
res-integra in the light of a three-Judge Bench decision of  this  Court  in
Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh & Ors. (2004) 11 SCC  196.
 In that case a plea based on a defective affidavit was  raised  before  the
High Court resulting in the dismissal of the election petition.   In  appeal
against the said  order,  this  Court  held  that  non-compliance  with  the
proviso to Section 83 of the Act did not  attract an order of  dismissal  of
an election petition in terms of Section 86 thereof. Section 86 of  the  Act
does not provide for dismissal of an election petition on  the  ground  that
the same does not comply with the provisions of Section 83 of the  Act.   It
sanctions dismissal of an election petition for non-compliance  of  Sections
81, 82 and 117 of the Act only.  Such being the position, the defect if  any
in the verification of the affidavit filed in support of  the  petition  was
not fatal, no  matter  the  proviso  to  Section  83(1)  was  couched  in  a
mandatory form.  This Court observed:
         “14.  So is the case with the defect pointed out by the High  Court
         in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition alleging
         corrupt practice by the winning candidate. The proviso  enacted  to
         Sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act is couched in a  mandatory
         form inasmuch as it  provides  that  a  petition  alleging  corrupt
         practice shall be accompanied by an  affidavit  in  the  prescribed
         form in support of the allegations of such corrupt practice and the
         particulars thereof. The form is prescribed by Rule  94-A.  But  at
         the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that  failure  to  comply
         with the requirement as to filing  of  an  affidavit  cannot  be  a
         ground for dismissal of an election petition in limine  under  Sub-
         section (1) of Section 86 of the Act. The  point  is  no  more  res
         integra and is covered by several decisions of this Court.  Suffice
         it to refer to two recent decisions namely G.  Mallikarjunappa  and
         Anr. v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa and  Ors.  and  Dr.  Vijay  Laxmi
         Sadho v. Jagdish, both three-Judges Bench  decisions,  wherein  the
         learned Chief Justice has spoken for the Benches. It has been  held
         that an election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine under
         Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does  not  comply
         with either the provisions of "Section 81 or Section 82 or  Section
         117 of the RP Act". The requirement of filing  an  affidavit  along
         with an election petition, in the prescribed form,  in  support  of
         allegations of corrupt practice is contained in  Section  83(1)  of
         the Act. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section  83  of  the
         Act, however,  does  not  attract  the  consequences  envisaged  by
         Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election  petition  is  not
         liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the  Act,  for
         alleged non-compliance with provisions of Section 83(1) or  (2)  of
         the Act or of its proviso. The defect in the verification  and  the
         affidavit is a curable defect. What other consequences, if any, may
         follow from an allegedly "defective" affidavit, is required  to  be
         judged at the trial of an election petition but  Section  86(1)  of
         the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case.


17.   More importantly the Court held that if the High Court had  found  the
affidavit to  be  defective  for  any  reason  it  should  have  allowed  an
opportunity to the election petitioner  to  remove  the  same  by  filing  a
proper affidavit.  This Court observed:
         “15.  Having formed an opinion that there was  any  defect  in  the
         affidavit, the election petitioner  should  have  been  allowed  an
         opportunity of removing the defect by filing  a  proper  affidavit.
         Else the effect of  such  failure  should  have  been  left  to  be
         determined and adjudicated  upon  at  the  trial,  as  held  in  G.
         Mallikarjunappa and Anr.'s case (supra).”


18.   To the same effect is the decision of  a  three-Judge  bench  of  this
Court in G. Mallikarjunappa and Anr. v. Shamanur Shiv  Ashankappa  and  Ors.
(2001) 4 SCC 428. The High  Court  had  in  that  case  also  dismissed  the
election petitions taking the view that there had been  non-compliance  with
Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 inasmuch as the  affidavit
filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practices with  the  election
petitions did not comply with the requirements of the format  as  prescribed
in Form 25.  Allowing the appeal this Court observed:

         “An election petition is liable to be  dismissed  in  limine  under
         Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does  not  comply
         with either the provisions of “Section 81 or Section 82 or  Section
         117 of the RP Act”. The requirement of filing  an  affidavit  along
         with an election petition, in the prescribed form,  in  support  of
         allegations of corrupt practice is contained in  Section  83(1)  of
         the Act. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section  83  of  the
         Act, however,  does  not  attract  the  consequences  envisaged  by
         Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election  petition  is  not
         liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the  Act,  for
         alleged non-compliance with provisions of Section 83(1) or  (2)  of
         the Act or of its proviso. The defect in the verification  and  the
         affidavit is a curable defect. What other consequences, if any, may
         follow from an allegedly “defective” affidavit, is required  to  be
         judged at the trial of an election petition but  Section  86(1)  of
         the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case.”


19.   A similar view was taken by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in  F.A.
Sapa and Ors. v. Singora and Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 375 and in  Dr.  Vijay  Laxmi
Sadho v. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247.
20.   We may also refer to a Constitution Bench decision of  this  Court  in
Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore &  Ors.  (AIR  1964  SC
1545) where this Court held that a defective affidavit is not  a  sufficient
ground for summary dismissal of an election petition  as  the  provision  of
Section 83 of the Act are not mandatorily to be complied with  nor  did  the
same make a petition invalid as an affidavit can be allowed to be  filed  at
a later stage or so.  Relying upon the decision of a  three-Judge  Bench  of
this Court in T. Phungzathang v. Hangkhanlian and  Ors.  (2001)  8  SCC  358
this Court held that non-compliance with Section 83  is  not  a  ground  for
dismissal of an election petition under Section 86 and the defect,  if  any,
is curable as has been held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in  Manohar
Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil (1996)  1  SCC  169  and  H.D.  Revanna  v.  G.
Puttaswamy Gowda & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 217.  This Court observed:
         “…….If the view of the High Court in the order impugned  before  us
         is to be upheld, an election petitioner having filed  an  affidavit
         fully satisfying the requirement of Section 83(1) proviso and  Rule
         94-A in all respects but having made an omission in the copy of the
         affidavit delivered to the respondent would be placed in a position
         worse than an election petitioner whose  original  affidavit  filed
         with the election petition itself did not satisfy  the  requirement
         of Section 83(1) proviso read with Rule 94-A. This could  not  have
         been the intendment of law. Such an interpretation  would,  to  say
         the least, make a mockery  of  justice.  That  non-compliance  with
         Section 83 cannot  be  a  ground  for  dismissal  of  the  election
         petition under Section 86 and the defect, if any, is  curable,  has
         been the view taken by a three-Judge  Bench  in  Manohar  Joshi  v.
         Nitin Bhaurao Patil and also in H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda
         wherein all the decisions available till then have been considered.
         In Kamal Narain Sarma v. Dwarka Prasad Mishra affidavit  was  sworn
         in before the Clerk of  Court  attached  with  the  Office  of  the
         District Judge empowered by the District Judge under Section 139(c)
         of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of administration of
         oaths on affidavits made under the Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  The
         Election Tribunal allowed a fresh affidavit to be filed in place of
         such affidavit, treating it to be defective. On the matter reaching
         this Court, a Constitution Bench held that an extreme and technical
         view was not justified. The affidavit was held to be proper and the
         second affidavit was held to be not necessary.”


21.   The decisions relied upon by Mr. Rao do  not  in  terms  deal  with  a
comparable situation to the one  this  Court  was  dealing  with  in  Sardar
Harcharan Singh Brar’s case (supra). The format of the affidavit is  at  any
rate not a matter of substance. What is important and at the  heart  of  the
requirement is whether the election petitioner has made averments which  are
testified by him on oath, no matter in a form other than  the  one  that  is
stipulated in the Rules.  The absence of an affidavit or an affidavit  in  a
form other than the one stipulated by the Rules does  not  by  itself  cause
any prejudice to the successful candidate  so  long  as  the  deficiency  is
cured by the election petitioner by filing a proper affidavit when  directed
to do so.
22.   There is no denying  the  fact  that  the  election  of  a  successful
candidate is  not  lightly  interfered  with  by  the  Courts.   The  Courts
generally lean in favour of the returned candidates and place  the  onus  of
proof on the person challenging the end  result  of  an  electoral  contest.
That approach is more in the nature of a rule of practice  than  a  rule  of
law and should not be unduly stretched beyond a limit.  We  say  so  because
while it is important to respect a popular verdict and the courts  ought  to
be slow in upsetting the same, it  is  equally  important  to  maintain  the
purity of the election process.  An election which is vitiated by reason  of
corrupt practices, illegalities and irregularities  enumerated  in  Sections
100 & 123 of the Act cannot obviously be recognised  and  respected  as  the
decision of the majority of the electorate. The Courts are, therefore,  duty
bound to examine the allegations whenever the same  are  raised  within  the
framework of  the  statute  without  being  unduly  hyper-technical  in  its
approach & without being oblivious of the ground realities.  Experience  has
shown that the electoral process is, despite  several  safeguards  taken  by
the Statutory  Authorities  concerned,  often  vitiated  by  use  of  means,
factors and considerations that are specifically forbidden by  the  statute.
The electoral process is vulnerable to  misuse,  in  several  ways,  in  the
process distorting the picture  in  which  the  obvious  may  be  completely
different from the real. Electoral reforms is, therefore, a crying  need  of
our times but has remained a far cry.  If the Courts also adopt a  technical
approach towards the resolution of electoral  disputes,  the  confidence  of
the people not only in the democratic process but in  the  efficacy  of  the
judicial determination of electoral disputes will be  seriously  undermined.
This Court has in several  pronouncements  while  emphasising  the  need  to
leave the elections untouched, reiterated, the need to maintain  the  purity
of elections and thereby strengthening democratic values  in  this  country.
The decisions of this Court in T.A. Ahammed Kabeer  v.  A.A.  Azeez  &  Ors.
(2003) 5 SCC 650 and P. Malaichami v. M. Andi Ambalam and Ors. (1973) 2  SCC
170 express a similar sentiment.
23.   Suffice it to say, that in the absence of any provision making  breach
of the proviso to Section 83(1), a valid ground of dismissal of an  election
petition at the threshold, we see no reason why the  requirement  of  filing
an  affidavit  in  a  given  format  should  be  exalted   by   a   judicial
interpretation to the status  of  a  statutory  mandate.   A  petition  that
raises triable issues need not, therefore, be dismissed simply  because  the
affidavit filed by the petitioner is not in a given  format  no  matter  the
deficiency in the format has not caused  any  prejudice  to  the  successful
candidate and can be cured by the election petitioner  by  filing  a  proper
affidavit. In the result, this appeal fails  and  is  dismissed  with  costs
assessed at Rs.25000/-.


                                                        ……………………..……………..…J.
                                         (T.S. THAKUR)




                                                          ……………………………….………J.
                                     (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
July 6, 2012