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Wednesday, July 18, 2012

(i) The first appellate court as well as the High Court committed grave error in shifting the burden of proof on the Union of India, appellant/defendant No.1, though it could have been exclusively on the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to prove his case. (ii) There is nothing on record to prove the grant/gift by the Maratha Government in favour of ancestors of plaintiff/respondent No.1 in the year 1800. (iii) Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 miserably failed to prove the pedigree produced by him. (iv) The alleged partition in the year 1819 among the ancestors of plaintiff/respondent No.1 even if had taken place, cannot be a proof of title of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 over the suit property as the pedigree has not been proved. Presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act in respect of 30 years’ old document coming from proper custody relates to the signature, execution and attestation of a document i.e. to its genuineness but it does not give rise to presumption of correctness of every statement contained in it. The contents of the document are true or it had been acted upon have to be proved like any other fact. More so, in case the Will is ignored, there is nothing on record to show as how the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 could claim the title. (v) The rent note produced by the appellant/defendant No.1 before the court below does not prove anything in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The same being a vague document is incapable of furnishing any information and, thus, is liable to be rejected. The said document does not make it clear as who has executed it and in whose favour the same stood executed. It does not bear any date as it cannot be ascertained when it was executed. The lease deed cannot be executed without the signature/thumb impression of the lessee. The said lease does not contain any signature/thumb impression of any lessee and also the tenure of the lease has not been mentioned therein. The rent has been mentioned as Rs.22/- without giving any detail as to whether it was per day, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly or yearly or for ever. More so, there is no reference to the said rent note in the pleadings contained in the plaint, therefore, it is just to be ignored. (vi) Had there been any Will in existence and not available with the plaintiff/respondent No.1 for any reason whatsoever at the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 could have definitely mentioned that Will had been executed in his favour by his maternal grand-father which could not be traced. Therefore, the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC was liable to be rejected. Even otherwise, the Will in absence of any pleading either in the plaint or first appeal could not be taken on record. More so, the Will was not proved in accordance with law i.e. Section 68 of the Evidence Act. (vii) The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as no party can lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and in case, such evidence has been adduced or a finding of fact has been recorded by the Court, it is just to be ignored. Though it may be a different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue is not framed and parties having full knowledge of the issue in controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it. (viii) The first appellate court committed a grave error in deciding the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC much prior to the hearing of the appeal. Thus, the order allowing the said application is liable to be ignored as the same had been passed in gross violation of the statutory requirement. (ix) The documents produced by the Union of India have not been properly appreciated by the first appellate court and the High Court. (x) The courts below further committed an error holding that in case the document is taken on record, the document as well as the content thereof would be deemed to have been proved. (xi) The appellate courts have also wrongly rejected the certified copies of the documents prepared by the Cantonment Board which were admissible in evidence. (xii) The High Court committed a grave error in not addressing itself to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal and it ought to have decided the same or after discussing the same a finding could have been recorded that none of them was substantial question of law. (xiii) The suit was barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, for the reason that plaintiff/respondent No.1, admittedly, had not been in possession and he did not ask for restoration of possession or any other consequential relief. (xiv) The first appellate court as well as the High Court recorded a finding that the Union of India failed to prove its title over the suit land. The said courts did not realise that this was not the issue to be determined, rather the issue had been as to whether the plaintiff/respondent No.1 was the owner of the suit land. (xv) The first appellate court has not decided the issue of admission of documents in correct perspective and recorded a perverse finding. (xvi) Question of filing a document in rebuttal of a Will could not arise. The other party has to admit or deny the document as required under Order XII CPC. There could be no Will in favour of the Union of India by the predecessors of the plaintiff, on the basis of which it could also claim title. (xvii) The courts below had wrongly drawn adverse inference against the appellant/defendant No.1 for not producing the documents as there was no direction of the court to produce the same. Neither the plaintiff/respondent No.1 had ever made any application in this respect nor he filed any application under Order XI CPC submitting any interrogation or for inspection or production of document. (xviii) The appellate courts have decided the appeals in unwarranted manner in complete derogation of the statutory requirements. Provisions of CPC and Evidence Act have been flagrantly violated. 70. In view of above, appeal succeeds and is allowed, judgments and decrees of the first and second appellate courts are set aside and the judgment and decree dated 20.1.1998 passed by Civil Court in Original Suit No.442 of 1995 is restored. No costs.


                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1374 of 2008


     Union                             of                              India
     ....Appellant
                                   Versus
     Ibrahim                  Uddin                  &                  Anr.
     ....Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
    Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

    1.      This appeal has been preferred against  the  impugned  judgment
    and decree dated 19.4.2007 passed by the High Court  of  Judicature  at
    Allahabad in Second Appeal No.289 of 2000 by which it  has  upheld  the
    judgment and decree of  the  first  appellate  Court  dated  15.10.1999
    passed in Civil Appeal No.81 of 1998 by which the first appellate Court
    had reversed the judgment and decree of the Civil Court dated 20.1.1998
    passed in Original Suit No.442 of 1995 wherein the plaintiff/respondent
    no.1 had sought declaration of title of the  ownership  in  respect  of
    the suit property.


    2.      Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

    A.      Plaintiff/respondent no.1-Ibrahim  Uddin  filed  Original  Suit
    No.442 of 1995 in the Court of Civil Judge, Agra on 25.7.1995 seeking a
    decree for declaration that he was  the  owner  of  the  suit  property
    (Agriculture land measuring 25 bighas), making averments that the  suit
    land originally had been with the Maratha Government (Scindia-Gwalior).
     The ancestors of the  plaintiff  having  close  association  with  the
    Maratha Government, were made a grant in respect of the  suit  land  in
    the year 1800.  Subsequently, the  land  was  partitioned  between  the
    ancestors of the plaintiff in the year 1819.  The  plaintiff/respondent
    no.1  being  the  only  heir  (descendant)  of  Smt.  Hasin  Begum  and
    Zafaruddin became the absolute owner of the land after the death of his
    mother Smt. Hasin Begum.  The said  land  was  never  sold,  alienated,
    transferred or gifted to any person either  by  the  plaintiff  or  his
    ancestors at any point of time.  The suit land was given on rent to the
    State authorities in Agra by executing a rent note for a sum of Rs.22/-
    per month.  The Union  of  India  claimed  title  over  the  suit  land
    illegally and in an unauthorised manner on  22.2.1993  and  afterwards,
    thus the cause of action arose to approach the court.

    B.       The  defendant  no.1/appellant  filed  the  written  statement
    denying the averments and ownership of  the  plaintiff/respondent  no.1
    and averred that the land belonged to the Ministry  of  Defence,  i.e.,
    Union of India, a part of which has been leased out to several  persons
    for agriculture work and their lease has  been  renewed  from  time  to
    time.  As they became  unauthorised  occupants,  proceedings  had  been
    initiated in accordance with law and eviction  order  had  been  passed
    against the occupants/tenants.

    C.      In view of the pleadings, 8 issues were  framed  by  the  Trial
    Court and after appreciating the evidence on record,  the  trial  Court
    came  to  the  conclusion  that  Pedigree  produced  by  the  plaintiff
    alongwith the plaint was not successfully proved; the  plaintiff  could
    not  prove  any  kind  of  grant  by  the  Maratha  Government  to  his
    ancestors/great-grandfathers in the year  1800.   Plaintiff  failed  to
    prove the partition between his ancestors  in  1819.   The  lease  deed
    alleged to have been executed in favour of the Military Estate  Officer
    under  the  Union  of  India,   appellant/defendant   No.1,   was   not
    successfully proved. In view of the above, the suit was dismissed  vide
    judgment and decree dated 20.1.1998.

    D.      Aggrieved, the plaintiff/respondent no.1  preferred  the  first
    appeal before the District Judge, Agra.  During  the  pendency  of  the
    said appeal, he preferred an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the
    Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter called “CPC”) on 6.4.1998 for
    adducing additional evidence,  i.e.,  Will  executed  by  his  maternal
    grandfather dated 1.3.1929 in his favour bequeathing the suit property.
     The said application was allowed by the  first  appellate  Court  vide
    order dated 28.4.1999.  The First Appeal itself stood  allowed  by  the
    first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 15.10.1999 wherein
    the  first  appellate  Court  came  to  the  conclusion  that   Maratha
    Government had made the gift of land in  favour  of  plaintiff’s  fore-
    fathers which was subsequently partitioned.  The  registered  partition
    deed stood duly proved and it  was  the  proof  of  the  title  of  the
    plaintiff/respondent  no.1.  The  plaintiff/respondent  no.1  made   an
    application for inspection of the record before  the  officers  of  the
    appellant/defendant no.1 but perusal of the record was  not  permitted.
    The appellant/defendant no.1 did not produce any document to  show  its
    title  and  failed  to  produce  the  original  record,  thus,  adverse
    inference was drawn against it in view of the provisions of Section 114
    clause(g) of the Indian Evidence  Act,  1872  (hereinafter  called  the
    Evidence Act).  The Will, taken on record as an additional evidence  at
    appellate stage stood proved and thus, contents  thereof  automatically
    stood proved.

    E.      Aggrieved, the appellant preferred  Second  Appeal  before  the
    High Court which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment and  decree.
    Hence, this appeal.

    3.      Shri R.P. Bhatt, learned Senior counsel duly  assisted  by  Ms.
    Madhurima Tatia, Advocate has submitted that there was  no  documentary
    evidence or trustworthy oral evidence that the suit property  had  been
    given to the fore-fathers  of  the  plaintiff/respondent  no.1  by  the
    Maratha Government in the year 1800.  Same remained the factual  aspect
    in respect of alleged partition among  his  fore-fathers  in  the  year
    1819.  The  first  appellate  Court  had  no  occasion  to  decide  the
    application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC prior to  the  hearing  of  the
    appeal itself.  More so, as there has been no reference to the Will  in
    the plaint or First Appeal, thus, it could not be taken on  record  for
    want of pleadings in this respect.  Further, taking the Will on  record
    did not mean that either the Will or its contents stood  proved.   None
    had proved the said Will and thus, could not be relied  upon.   If  the
    Will is ignored, there is no  evidence on record to prove the  case  of
    the plaintiff/respondent no.1.

            The High Court had framed 4 substantial questions of law at the
    time of admission of the appeal and 2 additional substantial  questions
    at a later stage but did not answer either of  them  nor  recorded  any
    finding that none of them was, in fact, a substantial question of  law,
    rather the appeal has been decided placing reliance on the Will,  which
    was liable to be ignored altogether and making reference to the  record
    of the Cantonment Board.  In case, the Union of India did  not  produce
    the revenue record before the trial Court, the  first  appellate  Court
    has wrongly  drawn  adverse  inference  under  Section  114(g)  of  the
    Evidence Act.  Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

    4.      Per contra, Shri Asok Ganguly and  Shri  C.L.  Pandey,  learned
    Senior counsel with Shri Vibhor Garg, Advocate vehemently  opposed  the
    appeal contending that concurrent findings recorded by  the  first  and
    second appellate  Court  are  not  liable  to  be  interfered  with  in
    discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136  of  the  Constitution  of
    India, 1950. The registered partition deed of  1819  is  the  proof  of
    title of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1.  In view of the fact that  the
    Second Appeal could be decided on limited issues, the  High  Court  was
    not bound to answer the substantial questions of  law,  framed  by  it.
    The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

    5.      We have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned
    counsel for the parties and perused the record.




    Presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act :

    6.       Generally, it is the duty  of  the  party  to  lead  the  best
    evidence in his possession, which could throw light  on  the  issue  in
    controversy and in case such material evidence is withheld,  the  Court
    may draw adverse inference under Section 114(g) of  the   Evidence  Act
    notwithstanding, that the onus of proof did not lie on such  party  and
    it was not called upon to produce the said evidence.  (Vide:  Murugesam
    Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi, AIR 1917 PC  6;  Hiralal  &
    Ors. v. Badkulal & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 225; A. Raghavamma &  Anr.  v.  A.
    Chenchamma & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 136;  The Union of India  v.  Mahadeolal
    Prabhu Dayal, AIR 1965 SC 1755;  Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji
    Latif & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1413;  M/s. Bharat Heavy Electrical  Ltd.  v.
    State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 3024;   Musauddin Ahmed v.  State  of
    Assam, AIR 2010 SC 3813; and Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of
    India & Anr., (2011) 9 SCC 126).


    7.      However, in Mt. Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh,  AIR  1915
    PC 96, a view has been expressed that it  is  open  to  a  litigant  to
    refrain from producing any document that he  considers  irrelevant;  if
    the other litigant  is  dissatisfied,  it  is  for  him  to  apply  for
    interrogatories/inspections and production of documents.  If  he  fails
    to do so, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion,  is  entitled  to
    draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents.


    8.      In Kamma Otukunta Ram Naidu v. Chereddy  Pedda  Subba  Reddy  &
    Ors., AIR 2003 SC 3342, this Court held that all the pros and cons must
    be examined before drawing an adverse inference  against  a  party.  In
    that case the issue had been,  as  to  whether  two  persons  had  been
    travelling together in the vehicle and presumption had been drawn  only
    on the basis that  the  bus  tickets  of  both  the  persons  were  not
    produced. This Court held that presumption could not have been drawn if
    other larger evidence was shown to the contrary. (See  also:   Mohinder
    Kaur v. Kusam Anand, (2000) 4 SCC 214; and Takhaji  Hiraji  v.  Thakore
    Kubersing Chamansing & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2328).


    9.      In  Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, AIR 2004 SC
    4681, this Court has taken the view that the  law  laid  down  by  this
    Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar (supra) did not lay down any law,  that
    in all situations the presumption in terms of clause (g) of Section 114
    of the Evidence Act  must be drawn.


    10.     In Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das & Anr.,
    AIR 1967 SC 256, this Court held that mere withholding  of  documentary
    evidence by a party is not enough to  draw  adverse  inference  against
    him. The other party must ask the party in possession of such  evidence
    to produce the same, and in case  the  party  in  possession  does  not
    produce it, adverse inference may be drawn:
             “It is true that the defendant-respondent  also  did  not  call
             upon the plaintiff-appellant to  produce  the  documents  whose
             existence was admitted by one  or  the  other  witness  of  the
             plaintiff and that therefore, strictly speaking,  no  inference
             adverse to the plaintiff can be drawn  from  his  non-producing
             the list of documents. The Court may not be in  a  position  to
             conclude from such omission that  those  documents  would  have
             directly established the case for the respondent.  But  it  can
             take into consideration in weighing the evidence or any  direct
             inferences from established facts that the documents might have
             favoured the respondent case.”


    11.     In  Ramrati Kuer v. Dwarika Prasad Singh & Ors.,  AIR  1967  SC
    1134, this Court held:
             “It is true that Dwarika Prasad Singh said that his father used
             to keep accounts. But no attempt was  made  on  behalf  of  the
             appellant to ask the court to order  Dwarika  Prasad  Singh  to
             produce the accounts. An adverse inference could only have been
             drawn against the plaintiffs-respondents if the  appellant  had
             asked the court to order them to produce accounts and they  had
             failed to produce them after admitting that Basekhi Singh  used
             to keep accounts. But no such prayer was made to the court, and
             in the circumstances no adverse inference could be  drawn  from
             the non-production of accounts.”


    (See also: Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector,  Raigad  &  Ors.,
    AIR 2012 SC 1339).


    12.     In Smt. Indira Kaur & Ors. v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC
    1074, the lower courts drew an adverse inference against the appellant-
    plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to
    perform his part of the contract. The question arose as to whether  the
    party had the means to pay. The court  further  held  that  before  the
    adverse inference is drawn against a particular party, the conduct  and
    diligence of the other party is also to be  examined.  Where  a  person
    deposed that as he had deposited the money in the Bank  and  the  other
    party did not even ask as on what date and in which Bank the amount had
    been deposited and did not remain  diligent  enough,  the  question  of
    drawing adverse inference against such a person for not  producing  the
    Pass Book etc. cannot be drawn.


    13.     In Mahendra L. Jain & Ors. v. Indore  Development  Authority  &
    Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 639, this Court held  that  mere  non-production  of
    documents would not result in adverse  inference.  If  a  document  was
    called for in the absence of any pleadings, the same was not  relevant.
    An adverse inference need not necessarily  be  drawn  only  because  it
    would be lawful to do so.


    14.     In Manager, R.B.I., Bangalore v. S. Mani & Ors.,  AIR  2005  SC
    2179, this Court dealt with the issue wherein the  Industrial  Tribunal
    directed the employer to produce the attendance register in respect  of
    the first party workmen. The explanation of the appellant was that  the
    attendance registers  being  very  old,  could  not  be  produced.  The
    Tribunal, however, in its award noticed the same and  drew  an  adverse
    inference against the appellants for non-production of  the  attendance
    register alone.  This Court reversed the finding observing:
             “As noticed hereinbefore, in this case also the respondents did
             not adduce any evidence whatsoever.  Thus,  in  the  facts  and
             circumstances of the case, the Tribunal  erred  in  drawing  an
             adverse inference.
                The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show  that
             they had completed 240 days of service. The  Tribunal  did  not
             consider the question from that angle. It held that the  burden
             of proof was upon the appellant on the premise that  they  have
             failed to prove their plea of abandonment of service”


    (See also: A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534; R.M. Yellatti
    v. Assistant Executive Engineer AIR 2006 SC 355;  and  Pratap  Singh  &
    Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 514).


    15.     Order XI CPC contains certain provisions  with  the  object  to
    save expense by obtaining information  as  to  material  facts  and  to
    obtain admission of any fact which  he  has  to  prove  on  any  issue.
    Therefore, a party has a right to submit  interrogatories  relating  to
    the same matter in issue.  The expression “matter” means a question  or
    issue in dispute in the action  and not  the  thing  about  which  such
    dispute arises. The object of introducing such provision is  to  secure
    all material documents  and to put an end to  protracted  enquiry  with
    respect to document/material in possession of the other party. In  such
    a fact-situation, no adverse inference can be drawn against a party for
    non-production of a document unless notice is served and  procedure  is
    followed. Under Rule 14 of Order XI, the court is competent  to  direct
    any party to produce the document asked by the other party which is  in
    his possession or power and relating to any  material  in  question  in
    such suit. Rule 15  Order  XI  provides  for  inspection  of  documents
    referred to in pleadings or affidavits. Rule 18 thereof,  empowers  the
    court to issue order for inspection. Rule 21 thereof provides for  very
    stringent consequences for non-compliance with the order of  discovery,
    as in view of the said provisions in case the  party  fails  to  comply
    with any order to answer interrogatories or for discovery or inspection
    of documents, he shall, if he is a plaintiff, be  liable  to  have  his
    suit dismissed for want of prosecution and if he  is  a  defendant,  to
    have his defence, if any, struck out and  to  be  placed  in  the  same
    position as if he had not defended,  and  the  party  interrogating  or
    seeking discovery or inspection may apply to the court for an order  to
    that effect. Thus, in view of the above, the suit may be dismissed  for
    non-compliance of  the  aforesaid  orders  by  the  plaintiff  and  the
    plaintiff shall also be precluded from bringing a  fresh  suit  on  the
    same cause of action.  Similarly,  defence  of  the  defendant  may  be
    struck off for non-compliance of such orders.


    16.     Thus, in view of the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  can  be
    summarised to the effect that, issue of drawing  adverse  inference  is
    required to be decided by  the  court  taking  into  consideration  the
    pleadings of the parties and by deciding whether any document/evidence,
    withheld, has any relevance at all or omission of its production  would
    directly establish the case of the other side.  The court cannot  loose
    sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party  which  makes  a
    factual averment.  The court has to consider further as to whether  the
    other side could file  interrogatories  or  apply  for  inspection  and
    production of the documents etc. as is required  under  Order  XI  CPC.
    Conduct  and  diligence  of  the  other  party  is  also  of  paramount
    importance. Presumption or  adverse  inference  for  non-production  of
    evidence is always optional and a relevant  factor to be considered  in
    the background of facts involved in the case.  Existence of some  other
    circumstances may justify non-production of   such  documents  on  some
    reasonable grounds. In case one party has asked the court to direct the
    other side to produce the document and other side failed to comply with
    the court’s order, the court may be justified in  drawing  the  adverse
    inference. All the pros and cons must be examined  before  the  adverse
    inference is drawn. Such presumption is permissible,  if  other  larger
    evidence is shown to the contrary.


    17.     In the instant case, admittedly, the plaintiff/respondent  no.1
    during the pendency of his suit had  made  an  application  before  the
    authorities under the control of the appellant/defendant no.1  to  make
    the inspection.  However, he was not permitted  to have any inspection.
      The  plaintiff/respondent  no.1  did  not  submit  any  interrogatory
    statement or an application for making inspection or for production  of
    the document as provided under Order XI CPC.  In such a fact-situation,
    in view of the law referred to hereinabove, it is  not permissible  for
    the first appellate Court  or  the  High  Court  to  draw  any  adverse
    inference against the appellant/defendant no.1.




    Admissions:


    18.     The first appellate court  while  dealing  with  the  issue  of
    admission and proof of documents held as under:
             ?“The plaintiff  has  produced   will   dated  l.3.1929  of  his
             maternal grandfather, Syed Nazim Ali which the court had  taken
             on record on 28.4.99 and the defendant No.1 was given one  week
             time for producing the rebuttal, but  the  defendant  No.1  did
             not produce any paper against the Will. Therefore, it has  been
             given in section 58 of the Evidence that if the defendant  does
             not produce any paper  in  rebuttal,  then  it  means  that  he
             admitted the paper produced by the plaintiff. There is no  need
             of proving the same.” (Emphasis added)


    19.     The question does arise as to whether not filing a document  in
    rebuttal of  a  document  amounts  to  an  admission  and  whether  the
    provisions of Section 58 of the Evidence Act are  attracted.
             Order XII CPC deals with admission of the  case,  admission  of
    the documents and judgment on admissions. Rule 1 thereof provides  that
    a party to a suit may give notice  by  his  pleading  or  otherwise  in
    writing that he admits the truth of the whole or any party of the  case
    of any other party. Rule 2 deals with notice to admit  documents  –  it
    provides that each party may call upon the other party to admit  within
    7 days from the date of service of the notice of  any  document  saving
    all such exceptions. Rule 2A provides that a document could  be  deemed
    to have been admitted if not denied after service of  notice  to  admit
    documents.


    20.     Admission is the best piece of  substantive  evidence  that  an
    opposite party can rely upon, though not conclusive, is decisive of the
    matter, unless successfully withdrawn or  proved  erroneous.  Admission
    may in certain circumstances, operate  as  an  estoppel.  The  question
    which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be attached to an
    admission and for that purpose it  is  necessary  to  find  out  as  to
    whether it is clear, unambiguous and a relevant piece of evidence,  and
    further it is proved in accordance with the provisions of the  Evidence
    Act. It would be appropriate that an opportunity is given to the person
    under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clear  the  point
    on the question of admission.       (Vide:  Narayan Bhagwantrao  Gosavi
    Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi & Ors., AIR  1960  SC  100;   Basant
    Singh v. Janki Singh & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 341; Sita Ram  Bhau  Patil  v.
    Ramchandra Nago Patil, AIR 1977 SC 1712;  Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar,
    AIR 2004 SC 230;  United Indian Insurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Samir  Chandra
    Choudhary., (2005) 5 SCC 784; Charanjit lal Mehra & Ors v. Kamal  Saroj
    Mahajan & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2765; and Udham Singh v. Ram Singh &  Anr.,
    (2007) 15 SCC 529.)


    21.     In Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B.Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593,
    this Court held that admission made by a party is admissible  and  best
    evidence, unless it is proved that it had been made  under  a  mistaken
    belief. While deciding the said case reliance has been placed upon  the
    judgment in Slatterie v. Pooley, (1840) 6 M & W  664,  wherein  it  had
    been observed “What a party himself admits to be true,  may  reasonably
    be presumed to be so.”


    22.     In L.I.C of India & Anr v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen,  (2010)  4  SCC
    491, this Court held that “failure to prove the defence does not amount
    to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden  of  proof
    of the plaintiff.”


    23.     In view of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  admissions  can  be
    summarised to the effect that admission made  by  a  party  though  not
    conclusive, is a decisive factor in  a  case  unless  the  other  party
    successfully withdraws the same or proves it to be erroneous.  Even  if
    the admission is not conclusive it may operate  as  an  estoppel.   Law
    requires that an opportunity be  given  to  the  person  who  has  made
    admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify
    the point on the question of admission.  Failure of a  party  to  prove
    its defence does not  amount  to  admission,  nor  it  can  reverse  or
    discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff.


    24.     In the instant  case,  the  Court  held  that  not  filing  any
    document in rebuttal of the Will dated 1.3.1929 amounts to admission of
    the said Will as well as it contents.  Without following the  procedure
    as required under Order XII CPC  or  admission  having  not  been  made
    during the  course  of  hearing  before  the  Court,  the  question  of
    application of Section 58 of the Evidence Act could not arise.  Section
    58 provides that a fact may not need to be  proved  in  any  proceeding
    which the parties thereto agreed to admit  at  the  hearing  or  which,
    before the hearing, they agree to admit  by  any  writing  under  their
    hands or which they admitted by their pleading, even in that case court
    may, in its discretion, even if such a admission has been made  by  the
    party, require the fact admitted to be proved otherwise  than  by  such
    admission. In fact, admission by a party may be  oral  or  in  writing.
    `Admissions’ are governed under Sections 17 to 31 of the  Evidence  Act
    and  such  admission  can  be  tendered  and  accepted  as  substantive
    evidence.  While admission for purposes  of  trial  may  dispense  with
    proof of a particular fact.  Section 58 deals  with  admissions  during
    trial i.e. at or before  the  hearing,  which  are  known  as  judicial
    admissions or stipulations dispense it with proof.  Admissions are  not
    conclusive proof  but  may  operate  as  estoppel  against  its  maker.
    Documents are  necessarily  either  proved  by  witness  or  marked  on
    admission.


            In view of above, it is evident that the first appellate  court
    has misdirected itself so far as the issue of admission  is  concerned.
    The finding recorded by it  that  appellant/defendant  No.1  failed  to
    produce any document in rebuttal of the Will  is  not  only  wrong  but
    preposterous.


    Order XLI Rule  27 C.P.C.


    25.     The general principle is that the Appellate  Court  should  not
    travel outside the record of  the  lower  court  and  cannot  take  any
    evidence in appeal.  However, as an exception, Order XLI  Rule  27  CPC
    enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in  exceptional
    circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence  only
    and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found  to  exist.
    The parties are not entitled, as of right, to  the  admission  of  such
    evidence.   Thus, provision does  not  apply,  when  on  the  basis  of
    evidence on record, the Appellate Court can  pronounce  a  satisfactory
    judgment.  The matter is entirely within the discretion  of  the  court
    and is to be used sparingly.  Such a  discretion  is  only  a  judicial
    discretion circumscribed  by  the  limitation  specified  in  the  rule
    itself.   (Vide:  K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy &  Ors.,  AIR
    1963 SC 1526; The Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay  v.  Lala
    Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal  &
    Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors.,  AIR
    1979 SC 553).
    26.     The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow  new  evidence
    to be adduced in order to enable a  party  to  raise  a  new  point  in
    appeal.  Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain
    point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to  a  fresh
    opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court  can,  in  such  a  case,
    pronounce judgment against him and  does  not  require  any  additional
    evidence to enable it to  pronounce  judgment.   (Vide:  Haji  Mohammed
    Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and  Mohamed  Ali  and
    Co., AIR 1978 SC 798).
    27.     Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC,  the  appellate  Court  has  the
    power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be  examined.
    But the requirement of the said Court must be limited  to  those  cases
    where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it  to
    pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court
    to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such
    evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not  entitle  the
    appellate Court to let in  fresh  evidence  only  for  the  purpose  of
    pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words,  it  is  only
    for removing a lacuna in the  evidence  that  the  appellate  Court  is
    empowered to admit additional evidence.  [Vide:  Lala  Pancham  &  Ors.
    (supra) ].
    28.           It  is  not  the  business  of  the  Appellate  Court  to
    supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the  lower
    Court. Hence, in the absence  of  satisfactory  reasons  for  the  non-
    production of the evidence in  the  trial  court,  additional  evidence
    should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the
    lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to  give
    further evidence under this rule.  So a party who had ample opportunity
    to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do  so  or
    elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal.  (Vide:  State
    of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912; and S.  Rajagopal
    v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101).
    29.           The  inadvertence  of  the  party  or  his  inability  to
    understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of  a  pleader
    or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did  not  realise  the
    importance of a document  does not  constitute  a  "substantial  cause"
    within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is
    important, is not in itself a  sufficient  ground  for  admitting  that
    evidence in appeal.
    30.      The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read  with
    the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that  it  is  only
    where, for any other substantial cause, the  Appellate  Court  requires
    additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has
    been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the  Appellate  Court
    cannot pass a satisfactory judgment.
    31.          Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it
    should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a  salutary
    provision which operates as a check against a  too  easy  reception  of
    evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may
    inspire  confidence  and  disarm  objection.  Another  reason  of  this
    requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the
    record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further
    appeal to see, if the discretion under  this  rule  has  been  properly
    exercised by the Court below.  The omission to record the reasons must,
    therefore, be treated as a serious defect.  But this provision is  only
    directory and not mandatory,  if the reception of such evidence can  be
    justified under the rule.
    32.      The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order  provided
    they are embodied in the  judgment  of  the  appellate  Court.  A  mere
    reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere  statement
    that the evidence is necessary  to  pronounce  judgment,  or  that  the
    additional evidence is required to be  admitted  in  the  interests  of
    justice, or that there is no  reason  to  reject  the  prayer  for  the
    admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the
    requirement as to recording of reasons.
    33.     It is a settled legal proposition that not only  administrative
    order, but also judicial order must be supported by  reasons,  recorded
    in it.  Thus, while deciding an issue,  the  Court  is  bound  to  give
    reasons for its conclusion.  It is the duty and obligation on the  part
    of the Court to record  reasons  while  disposing  of  the  case.   The
    hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is
    for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving  of  reasons
    has always been insisted upon as  one  of  the  fundamentals  of  sound
    administration of the justice – delivery system, to make it known  that
    there had been proper and due application of mind to the  issue  before
    the Court and also as an  essential  requisite  of  the  principles  of
    natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every  conclusion.   It
    introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order  becomes
    lifeless.  Reasons  substitute  subjectivity  with  objectivity.    The
    absence  of  reasons  renders   an   order   indefensible/unsustainable
    particularly when the order is subject to further  challenge  before  a
    higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice  and
    every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in  writing.
    It ensures transparency and fairness in decision  making.   The  person
    who is adversely affected  must  know  why  his  application  has  been
    rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004  SC  1794;
    State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar  Singh  Negi,  AIR  2008  SC
    2026; The  Secretary  &  Curator,  Victoria  Memorial  Hall  v.  Howrah
    Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285; and Sant Lal  Gupta
    & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group  Housing  Society  Limited  &  Ors.,
    (2010) 13 SCC 336).
    34.     In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust  Board,
    Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 1976 SC 2403, while  dealing
    with the issue, a three judge Bench of this Court held as under:
             “We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded
             its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence
             to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it
             necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given  to
             the  appellant  to  rebut  any  inference  arising   from   its
             insistence       by       leading       other        evidence.”
                       (Emphasis added)


            A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya  I.
    Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108.


    35.     A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra),
    while dealing with the same issue held:
                  “It is very much to be desired that the courts  of  appeal
             should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule   and
             should  record   their   reasons   for   admitting   additional
             evidence….. The omission to record reason must,  therefore,  be
             treated as a  serious  defect.   Even  so,  we  are  unable  to
             persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.”
                                            (Emphasis added)


          In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case
    came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a  long  time  and
    the application for taking additional  evidence  on  record  was  filed
    during the final hearing of the appeal.  In such a fact-situation,  the
    order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons.


    36.     Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes  the
    cloud of doubt over  the  case  and  the  evidence  has  a  direct  and
    important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice
    clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on
    record such application may be allowed.




    37.     To sum up on the issue, it may be  held  that  application  for
    taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed
    as a matter of right.  The court can consider such an application  with
    circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite
    condition  incorporated  in  the  statutory  provisions  itself.    The
    discretion is to be exercised  by  the  court  judicially  taking  into
    consideration the relevance of the document in respect  of  the  issues
    involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence
    could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had
    prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether
    such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment  by  the  appellate
    court.  In case the court comes to the conclusion that the  application
    filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself,
     the evidence may be taken on record, however, the  court  must  record
    reasons as  on  what  basis  such  an  application  has  been  allowed.
    However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage.


    Stage of Consideration :


    38.     An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be  considered
    at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to  find  whether  the
    documents  and/or  the  evidence  sought  to  be   adduced   have   any
    relevance/bearing  on  the  issues  involved.   The  admissibility   of
    additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue  on
    hand, or on the fact, whether the  applicant  had  an  opportunity  for
    adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends  upon
    whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought  to  be
    adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial
    cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able
    to pronounce judgment on the materials before it  without  taking  into
    consideration the  additional  evidence  sought  to  be  adduced.  Such
    occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the
    court comes to the conclusion  that  some  inherent  lacuna  or  defect
    becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh  v.  Kartar  Singh  &
    Ors., AIR 1951 SC  193;  and  Natha  Singh  &  Ors.  v.  The  Financial
    Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053).


    39.     In Parsotim Thakur & Ors. v. Lal Mohar Thakur & Ors., AIR  1931
    PC 143, it was held:
             ?“The provisions of  S.107  as  elucidated  by  O.41,  R.27  are
             clearly  not  intended  to  allow  a  litigant  who  has   been
             unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak  parts  of
             his case and fill up omissions in the Court  of  appeal.  Under
             R.27,  Cl.(1)  (b)  it  is  only  where  the  appellate   Court
             “requires” it  (i.e.  finds  it  needful).  ……  The  legitimate
             occasion for the exercise of this discretion  is  not  whenever
             before the appeal is heard a  party  applies  to  adduce  fresh
             evidence, but “when on examining the  evidence  as  it  stands,
             some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent”,  it may  well
             be that the defect may be pointed out by a  party,  or  that  a
             party  may  move  the  Court  to  apply  the  defect,  but  the
             requirement must be the  requirement  of  the  court  upon  its
             appreciation of evidence as  it  stands.   Wherever  the  Court
             adopts this procedure it is bound by R.  27(2)  to  record  its
             reasons for so doing, and under R.29 must specify the points to
             which the  evidence  is  to  be  confined  and  record  on  its
             proceedings the points so specified.  The  power  so  conferred
             upon the Court by the Code ought to be very sparingly exercised
             and one requirement at least of any new evidence to be  adduced
             should be that it should have a direct and important bearing on
             a main issue in the case…”                    (Emphasis added)


    (See also: Indirajit Pratab Sahi v. Amar Singh, AIR 1928 P.C. 128)


    40.     In Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors. (supra), this Court held:
              “………If the additional  evidence  was  allowed  to  be  adduced
             contrary to the principles  governing  the  reception  of  such
             evidence,  it  would  be  a  case  of  improper   exercise   of
             discretion, and the  additional  evidence  so  brought  on  the
             record will have to be ignored and the case decided  as  if  it
             was non-existent……. The order allowing the  appellant  to  call
             the additional evidence is dated  17.8.1942.   The  appeal  was
             heard on 24.4.1942.  There  was  thus  no  examination  of  the
             evidence on the record and a decision reached that the evidence
             as it stood disclosed a lacuna which the court required  to  be
             filled     up      for      pronouncing      the      judgment”
                        (Emphasis added)
    41.     Thus, from the above, it is crystal clear that application  for
    taking additional evidence on record at an  appellate  stage,  even  if
    filed during the pendency of the appeal, is to be heard at the time  of
    final hearing of the appeal at a  stage  when  after  appreciating  the
    evidence on record, the court reaches the  conclusion  that  additional
    evidence was required to be taken on record in order to  pronounce  the
    judgment or for any other substantial cause.  In case, application  for
    taking additional evidence on record has been  considered  and  allowed
    prior to the hearing of the appeal, the order being a product of  total
    and complete non-application of mind, as to whether  such  evidence  is
    required to be taken on  record  to  pronounce  the  judgment  or  not,
    remains inconsequential/inexecutable and is liable to be ignored.


            In the instant case, the application under Order  XLI  Rule  27
    CPC was filed on 6.4.1998 and it was allowed on  28.4.1999  though  the
    first appeal was heard and disposed of on 15.10.1999.   In view of  law
    referred to hereinabove, the  order  dated  28.4.1999  is  just  to  be
    ignored.


   42.  The High Court while admitting the appeal had framed the  following
       substantial questions of  law:
            1.  Whether  the  judgment  and  decree  passed  by  the  lower
               appellate court is vitiated in law inasmuch as the  land  in
               dispute which was recorded in Column B-4 under Rule 6 of the
               Cantonment Land Administration Rule  1937  was  wrongly  and
               illegally discarded on the ground of secondary  evidence  in
               the presence of the  original  register  maintained  by  the
               Military Estate Officer.
            2.  Whether  the  certified  copy  of  the  relevant  registers
               maintained  under  the  Cantonment  Act  are  admissible  in
               evidence and appellate court erred in law in discarding  the
               same  illegally  against  the  relevant  provisions  of  the
               Evidence Act and decreed the suit of the  plaintiff  on  the
               false pretext that there is no document was filed on  behalf
               of the defendant?
            3. Whether the appellate court did not consider this aspect  at
               all that the suit for declaration without possession is  not
               maintainable is barred by the provision of  Specific  Relief
               Act.
            4. Whether the lower appellate court has  committed  illegality
               while accepting the Will dated 1.3.1992 filed  on  28.4.1999
               without its proof by plaintiff?


        The High Court admittedly did not answer any of  them,  though  had
    the question Nos. 2, 3 and 4 been decided, the result would  have  been
    otherwise.




    Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 :


    43.      The  Section  provides  that  courts  have  discretion  as  to
    declaration of status or right, however, it  carves  out  an  exception
    that a court shall not make any such declaration  of  status  or  right
    where the complainant, being able to seek further relief  than  a  mere
    declaration of title, omits to do so.


    44.     In  Ram Saran & Anr. v. Smt. Ganga Devi, AIR 1972 SC 2685, this
    Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for  declaration  of
    title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is  hit  by  the
    proviso of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter  called
    ‘Specific Relief Act’) and, thus, not maintainable.


    45.     In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra & Anr.,  AIR  1993  SC  957,
    this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff  was  not  in
    exclusive  possession  of  property  and  had  filed  a  suit   seeking
    declaration of title of ownership. Similar  view  has  been  reiterated
    observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the  proviso
    to Section 34 of the Specific Relief  Act.  (See  also:  Gian  Kaur  v.
    Raghubir Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 567).


    46.     In view of above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is  not
    permissible  to  claim  the  relief  of  declaration  without   seeking
    consequential relief.  In the instant case,  suit  for  declaration  of
    title of ownership had been filed though, the plaintiff/respondent  no.
    1 was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit
    was barred by the provision of Section 34 of the  Specific  Relief  Act
    and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed  solely  on  this  ground.
    The High Court though framed a substantial question on this  point  but
    for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same.
    Section 100 CPC :


    47.     Section 100 CPC provides  for  a  second  appeal  only  on  the
    substantial question of law.  Generally, a Second Appeal does  not  lie
    on question of facts or of law.


    48.     In State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC  2594,
    this Court explained  the  terms  “substantial  question  of  law”  and
    observed as under :
                “The word ‘substantial’ prefixed to ‘question of  law’  does
             not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor  intended  to
             refer only to questions  of  law  of  general  importance,  but
             refers to impact or effect  of  the  question  of  law  on  the
             decision in the lis between the parties. ‘Substantial questions
             of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of  general
             importance, but also substantial question of law arising  in  a
             case as between the parties. ……..... any question of law  which
             affects the final decision in a case is a substantial  question
             of law as between the parties. A question of law  which  arises
             incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing  on  the  final
             outcome, will not be  a  substantial  question  of  law.  There
             cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as  to  when  a
             substantial question of law arises in a case.”

             (Emphasis added)


            Similarly, in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta  &  Sons  Ltd.  v.  Century
    Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, this  Court  for
    the purpose of determining the issue  held:-
             “The proper test for determining  whether  a  question  of  law
             raises in the case is substantial, would, in  our  opinion,  be
             whether it is  of  general  public  importance  or  whether  it
             directly  and  substantially  affects   the   rights   of   the
             parties…..”
             (Emphasis added)


    49.     In Vijay Kumar Talwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi,
    (2011) 1 SCC 673, this Court held that, a point of law which admits  of
    no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial
    question of law.  To  be  'substantial'  a  question  of  law  must  be
    debatable, not previously settled by law  of  the  land  or  a  binding
    precedent, and must have a material on the decision  of  the  case,  if
    answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are
    concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case'  there  must
    be first a foundation for it laid in the  pleadings  and  the  question
    should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court
    of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for  a
    just and proper decision of the case. It will, therefore, depend on the
    facts and circumstance of each case, whether a question  of  law  is  a
    substantial one or not; the paramount overall consideration  being  the
    need  for  striking  a  judicious  balance  between  the  indispensable
    obligation to do justice at  all  stages  and  impelling  necessity  of
    avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."
    (See also: Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60).


    50.      The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also  entertain
    a second appeal even on any other  substantial  question  of  law,  not
    formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such
    a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question  of  law
    is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions
    of Section 100 CPC. The second appeal does not lie  on  the  ground  of
    erroneous findings of facts  based  on  appreciation  of  the  relevant
    evidence.
            There may be a question, which may be  a  “question  of  fact”,
    “question of law”, “mixed question of fact and  law”  and  “substantial
    question of law.” Question means anything  inquired;  an  issue  to  be
    decided. The  “question  of  fact”  is  whether  a  particular  factual
    situation  exists  or  not.  A  question  of  fact,  in  the  Realm  of
    Jurisprudence, has been explained as under:-
             “A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way  of
             demonstration. A question of opinion is one that cannot  be  so
             answered. An answer to it is  a  matter  of  speculation  which
             cannot be proved by any  available  evidence  to  be  right  or
             wrong.”


    (Vide: Salmond, on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. page 69,  cited  in  Gadakh
    Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil &  ors.,  AIR
    1994 SC 678).


    51.     In Smt. Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narayan Roy & Ors., AIR 1947
    PC 19, the Privy Council has provided the guidelines as in  what  cases
    the  second  appeal  can  be  entertained,  explaining  the  provisions
    existing prior to the amendment of 1976, observing as under:-
              “..... that miscarriage of justice means such a departure from
             the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that
             which happen not in the proper  sense  of  the  word  ‘judicial
             procedure’ at all. That the violation of some principles of law
             or procedure must be such erroneous proposition of law that  if
             that proposition to be corrected, the finding cannot stand,  or
             it may be the neglect of some principle of  law  or  procedure,
             whose application will  have  the  same  effect.  The  question
             whether there is evidence on which the Courts could  arrive  at
             their finding, is such a question of law.


                  ‘That the question  of  admissibility  of  evidence  is  a
             proposition of law but it must be such as to affect  materially
             the finding. The question of  the  value  of  evidence  is  not
             sufficient reason for departure from the practice......”


    52.     In Suwalal Chhogalal v. Commissioner of Income Tax,  (1949)  17
    ITR 269, this Court held as under:-
             “A fact is a fact irrespective of  evidence,  by  which  it  is
             proved. The only time a question of law can  arise  in  such  a
             case is when it is alleged that there is no material  on  which
             the conclusion can be based or no sufficient evidence.”


    53.     In Oriental Investment Company Ltd. v. Commissioner  of  Income
    Tax, Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 852, this Court considered a large  number  of
    its earlier judgments, including Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai  v.
    Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1957 SC 49, and held that where
    the question of decision is whether certain profit is made and shown in
    the name of certain intermediaries,  were,  in  fact,  profit  actually
    earned by the assessee or the intermediaries, is a  mixed  question  of
    fact and law. The Court further held that inference from facts would be
    a question of fact or of law according as the point  for  determination
    is one of pure fact or a “mixed question of law and fact”  and  that  a
    finding of fact without evidence to support it or if based on  relevant
    or irrelevant matters, is not unassailable.


    54.     There is no prohibition to entertain a second  appeal  even  on
    question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the  findings  of
    the  courts  below  were  vitiated  by  non-consideration  of  relevant
    evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the  matter  and  findings
    recorded in the court below are perverse. (Vide: Jagdish Singh v. Nathu
    Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604; Smt. Prativa Devi  (Smt.)  v.  T.V.  Krishnan,
    (1996) 5 SCC 353; Satya Gupta (Smt.) @ Madhu Gupta  v.  Brijesh  Kumar,
    (1998) 6 SCC 423; Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary  &  Co.,  AIR
    2000 SC 534;  Molar Mal (dead) through Lrs. v. M/s. Kay Iron Works Pvt.
    Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261; Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya  Renganathan
    & Ors.,  AIR 2010 SC 2685; and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC
    740).


    55.     In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala, AIR 2002 SC 1428, this  Court  held
    that it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact but it may
    be only in “very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity  that  the
    authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible   it  is  a
    rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can thus be  safely
    concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power  to
    scrutiny can only be had in very  exceptional  circumstances  and  upon
    proper circumspection.”
          Similar view has been taken in the case of Kashmir Singh v. Harnam
    Singh & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1749.


    56.      Declaration  of  relief  is  always  discretionary.   If   the
    discretion is not exercised by the lower court “in the  spirit  of  the
    statute or fairly or honestly or according to the rules of  reason  and
    justice”, the order passed by the lower court can be  reversed  by  the
    superior court. (See: Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v.  Mirja
    Khasim Ali Beg &  Anr., AIR 1977 SC 747).


    57.     There may be exceptional circumstances where the High Court  is
    compelled to interfere, notwithstanding the limitation imposed  by  the
    wording of Section 100 CPC.  It may be  necessary  to  do  so  for  the
    reason that after all the purpose of the  establishment  of  courts  of
    justice is to render justice between the parties, though the High Court
    is bound to act with circumspection while exercising such jurisdiction.
     In second appeal the court frames the substantial question of  law  at
    the time of admission of the appeal and the Court is required to answer
    all the said questions unless the appeal is finally  decided on one  or
    two of those questions or the court comes to the  conclusion  that  the
    question(s) framed could not be the  substantial  question(s)  of  law.
    There is no prohibition in law  to  frame  the  additional  substantial
    question of law if the need so arises at the time of the final  hearing
    of the appeal.


    58.     In the instant case, none of the substantial  questions  framed
    by the Court had been answered.  Much reliance has been placed  on  the
    Will which was liable just to be ignored.  Even otherwise, the Will  in
    the instant case cannot be relied upon for want of pleadings.


    59.     The pleading  taken  in  the  plaint  dated  25.7.1995  clearly
    revealed that the land in dispute belonged to Hafiz Ahmad Bux and Hafiz
    Kareem Bux who were the ancestors of the plaintiff and  they  were  the
    owners of the same in the year  1800.   The  property  was  partitioned
    between ancestors of the plaintiff in the year 1819.   There  had  been
    succession of the property by various documents of Hafiz Kareem Bux and
    Hafiz Ahmad Bux.  The plaintiff claims to be heir and successor of  one
    Smt. Hasin Begum wife of  Zafaruddin and daughter of Sri Hazim Ali.  He
    had inherited the suit property being a lone heir of Shri  Hafiz  Ahmed
    Bux  after the death of his mother Smt. Hasin Begum.
          In case, the plaint does not make any reference that the  property
    had been given to the plaintiff/respondent no.1 by  way  of  Will,  and
    pleadings had not been amended  at  the  stage  of  first  appeal,  the
    question does arise as  to  whether,  the  Will  could  be  taken  into
    consideration, while deciding the case.


          The trial court had considered as many as seven  issues  and  does
    not make any reference  that  the  property  had  been  gifted  to  the
    ancestors of the plaintiff by the Maratha rulers.  Further finding  has
    been recorded that in respect of  documents,  the  plaintiff/respondent
    no. 1 had given paper to defendant no. 1 for inspection of  the  record
    but he did not make any inspection.  However, a passing  reference  had
    been made by the trial court that no record had been  produced  by  the
    plaintiff to show that the Maratha Government had given the land to the
    forefathers of the plaintiff.
          So far as the First Appellate Court is concerned, it placed a very
    heavy reliance on the Will and further recorded a finding that in spite
    of the fact that the plaintiff  filed  an  application  for  inspection
    before the appellant/defendant no.1, he was not permitted to  have  the
    inspection.  Nor the said revenue record was presented by  the  present
    appellant and, therefore, an adverse inference was  drawn  against  it.
    So far as the Will is concerned, it is evident that it was taken on the
    record as an additional evidence without any pleading anywhere.   There
    is nothing on record  that  the  plaintiff/defendant  no.  1  made  any
    attempt to make an amendment in the plaint even at the appellate  stage
    by moving an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.


    60.     Relevant part of the application under Order XLI Rule  27  CPC,
    reads as under:
             ?“2.  That the property in suit belongs to the ancestors of  the
             plaintiff. The grand father of the plaintiff/appellant had made
             the Will in favour of the plaintiff regarding the  property  in
             suit inter alia other properties in year 1929.
             3. That at the time of trial of the suit the said will was  not
             in possession of the plaintiff and the same  was  misplaced  in
             the other lot of old papers of the plaintiff kept in store.
             4. That even after best effort, and due diligence the aforesaid
             Will could not be available at the time of trial  of  the  suit
             and now after due  diligence  and  best  effort  it  has   been
             available and traced our.
             5. That the papers were not available earlier so it  could  not
             be filed in the lower court.
             6. That the said paper is very much relevant to  establish  the
             right, title or  interest  in  the  disputed  property  of  the
             plaintiff so the same is very necessary to be taken on record.
             7. That if the said paper is not taken on record the  plaintiff
             will be deprived from getting justice.”




    61.     The first Appellate Court allowed the application filed by  the
    plaintiff under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC vide order dated 28.4.1999  which
    reads as under:
              “The Will in question is necessary for the  disposal  of  the
             appeal because the applicant/appellant  obtains  right  in  the
             disputed property from  this  Will.  The  respondent/defendants
             have neither opposed it that as to why it was not  produced  in
             the subordinate court, there is no any relevancy of  it.    The
             applicant has given reason of not producing  the  Will  in  the
             subordinate court that this will was lost.  In my opinion,  the
             will appears to be necessary for the disposal of the appeal for
             the property which was obtained to  the  appellant  earlier  by
             this Will.  Proper reason has been given for not producing this
             Will in the subordinate court.”




    62.     This Court while dealing with an issue in  Kalyan Singh Chouhan
    v. C.P. Joshi,   AIR 2011 SC 1127, after placing  reliance  on  a  very
    large number of its earlier judgments including  Messrs. Trojan  &  Co.
    v. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953  SC  235;  Om  Prakash  Gupta  v.
    Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC  665;  Ishwar  Dutt  v.  Land  Acquisition
    Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165; and State of  Maharashtra  v.  M/s.
    Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.,  AIR  2010  SC  1299,   held  that
    relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted.  A decision of a
    case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of  the  parties.
    No evidence is permissible to be taken on  record  in  absence  of  the
    pleadings in that respect.  No party can he permitted to travel  beyond
    its pleading and that  all  necessary  and  material  facts  should  be
    pleaded by the party in support of the case  set  up  by  it.   It  was
    further held that where the  evidence  was  not  in  the  line  of  the
    pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.


    63.     In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Ors.,  AIR  2009  SC  1103,
    this court held that a case not specifically pleaded can be  considered
    by the court unless the pleadings in substance  contain  the  necessary
    averments to make out a particular case and issue has  been  framed  on
    the point. In absence of pleadings, the court cannot make  out  a  case
    not pleaded, suo motu.


          Therefore, in view of the above, there is  nothing  on  record  to
    show that Maratha Government had made a gift to the  ancestors  of  the
    plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff to get a title by virtue  of  the
    Will cannot be taken note of being not based on pleadings.   Even  this
    Will is dated 1.3.1929, affidavits filed  by  the  plaintiff/respondent
    no.1 before this Court reveal that on 26.3.2012 he was 80 years of age.
      The date of Will is 1.3.1929.   So, it appears that the Will had been
    executed prior to the birth of the plaintiff/respondent no.1.  In  such
    a fact-situation, it could  not  have  been  taken  into  consideration
    without proper scrutiny of facts and, that too, without  any  pleading.
    In the plaint, the plaintiff for the reasons, best known  to  him,  did
    not even make reference  to  the  Will.   In  absence  of  any  factual
    foundation of the case,  based  on  Will,  the  first  appellate  Court
    committed a grave error taking into consideration the said Will.   More
    so, the Will had not been proved as required under Section  68  of  the
    Evidence Act.


    64.     The High Court had placed a very heavy  reliance  on  the  rent
    note  allegedly  executed  by  the  fore-fathers  of   the   plaintiff/
    respondent no.1.  The same reads as under:
             “Applicant caretaker masque noori darwaza which was constructed
             by Hafiz Ahmed is of our ancestor and who received cash payment
              which  has  been  deposited  register  board   no.38  treasury
             collectorate agra situated namner cantt., Agra,  questioner  is
             entitled to which is following mentioned money which  has  been
             stated  after enquiry it be given to me, and if govt.  has  any
             objection to pay to me the information about the same given  to
             us that condition govt. will be  liable  for  the  expenses  of
             court I hafiz ahmed is receiver of rent of this land which  has
             been situated at namner the rent which is rupees 22.”


            The said rent note does not  provide  any  description  of  the
    property nor does it bear any date, so it cannot be  determined  as  on
    what date it was executed;  what was the duration  of  the  lease;   in
    whose favour the lease had been executed; and what was the  lease  rent
    because it simply mentions that the rent to  be  Rs.22/-.   It  is  not
    evident whether it was a rent for a month, or a year  or  for  a  total
    indefinite period. The rent note does not provide any period at all. In
    fact, such a vague document could not be linked  in  the  circumstances
    proving the title.
     65.    Appellant/defendant No.1 produced the certified  copies  of  the
     Extract from General Land Register prepared on 15.3.1948 in support  of
     its case and  denying  title  of  the  plaintiff/respondent  No.1.  The
     relevant part thereof reads as under:
|Sl.No|Survey No.5           |Existing Entry        |
|.    |                      |                      |
|1.   |    ------            |   ------             |
|2.   |    ------            |   ------             |
|3.   |    ------            |   ------             |
|4.   |Area in acres         |9.447 acres           |
|5.   |Description           |Agricultural land     |
|6.   |Class                 |B-4                   |
|7.   |By whom managed       |Military Estate       |
|     |                      |Officer               |
|8.   |Landlord              |Govt. of India        |
|9.   |   ------             |   -------            |
|10.  |   ------             |   -------            |


            Similarly, another land had also been shown in  Survey  No.6  in
     the same manner and showing the similar entries.
            The High Court has considered the said entries and rejected  the
     same on the ground that  the  partition  among  the  ancestors  of  the
     plaintiff/respondent No.1 had taken place prior  to  enactment  of  the
     Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, though there is nothing  on
     record to prove the said partition. More so, the partition  made  among
     the ancestors of plaintiff/respondent No.1  in  1819  would  not  be  a
     conclusive factor to determine the title of ownership in favour of  the
     plaintiff/respondent No.1. The High Court dealt with the  issue  in  an
     unwarranted manner as it observed as under:
           “Clause B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 and B-5 Classification  of  land  was
        first   time   introduced   by   enactment   of   Cantonment   Land
        Administration Rule 1925. The General Land  Register  was  prepared
        near about in the year 1928, whereas the partition is in  the  year
        1819. The appellant also failed to file  the  notification  in  the
        official gazette regarding survey Nos. 5 and 6 which  are  situated
        outside the notified area and  to  establish  that  such  area  was
        declared under Section 43A of the  Cantonment  Act,  1924.  In  the
        circumstances, I do not find that it is a case where this court  in
        exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can  set  aside  the
        findings of fact arrived at by the court below.”




    66.     The General Land Register and other documents maintained by the
    Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act,  1924  and  the  Rules  made
    thereunder are public documents and the certified copies  of  the  same
    are admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 65 read
    with Section 74 of the Evidence Act.   It  is  settled  legal  position
    that the  entries  made  in  General  Land  Register  maintained  under
    Cantonment Land  Administration Rules  is conclusive evidence of title.
    (Vide: Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar  Vakil,  AIR  1999  SC
    2294; and Union of India & Ors. v. Kamla Verma, (2010) 13 SCC 511).


    67.     In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
    appellate courts dealt with the case in an unwarranted manner giving  a
    complete go-by to the procedure prescribed by law.


    68.     The appellate courts examined the title of  government  instead
    of the plaintiff/respondent no.1. Such a course was not warranted.  The
    title of government cannot be disputed.  In  any  event  possession  of
    government for decades is not disputed.  The plaintiff shifted the case
    from time to time but failed to prove his title.


    69.     To sum up: In view  of  the  above  discussion,  we  reach  the
    following conclusion:
    (i)     The first appellate court as well as the High  Court  committed
    grave error in shifting the burden of proof  on  the  Union  of  India,
    appellant/defendant No.1, though it could have been exclusively on  the
    plaintiff/respondent No.1 to prove his case.
    (ii)    There is nothing on record  to  prove  the  grant/gift  by  the
    Maratha Government in favour of ancestors of plaintiff/respondent  No.1
    in the year 1800.
    (iii)   Plaintiff/Respondent  No.  1  miserably  failed  to  prove  the
    pedigree produced by him.
    (iv)   The alleged partition in the year 1819 among  the  ancestors  of
    plaintiff/respondent No.1 even if had taken place, cannot be a proof of
    title of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 over the suit  property  as  the
    pedigree has not been proved.  Presumption  under  Section  90  of  the
    Evidence Act in respect of 30 years’ old document  coming  from  proper
    custody relates to  the  signature,  execution  and  attestation  of  a
    document i.e.  to  its  genuineness  but  it  does  not  give  rise  to
    presumption of correctness of every statement  contained  in  it.   The
    contents of the document are true or it had been acted upon have to  be
    proved like any other fact. More so, in case the Will is ignored, there
    is nothing on record to show as  how  the  plaintiff/respondent  no.  1
    could claim the title.
    (v)     The rent note produced by the appellant/defendant  No.1  before
    the  court  below  does  not  prove   anything   in   favour   of   the
    plaintiff/respondent. The same being a vague document is  incapable  of
    furnishing any information and, thus, is liable  to  be  rejected.  The
    said document does not make it clear as who  has  executed  it  and  in
    whose favour the same stood executed. It does not bear any date  as  it
    cannot be ascertained when it was executed. The lease  deed  cannot  be
    executed without the signature/thumb impression of the lessee. The said
    lease does not contain any signature/thumb impression of any lessee and
    also the tenure of the lease has not been mentioned therein.  The  rent
    has been mentioned as Rs.22/- without giving any detail as  to  whether
    it was per day, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly or yearly or for  ever.
    More so, there is no reference to the said rent note in  the  pleadings
    contained in the plaint, therefore, it is just to be ignored.
    (vi)    Had there been any Will in existence and not available with the
    plaintiff/respondent No.1 for any reason  whatsoever  at  the  time  of
    institution of the  suit,  the  plaintiff/respondent  No.1  could  have
    definitely mentioned that Will had been executed in his favour  by  his
    maternal  grand-father  which  could  not  be  traced.  Therefore,  the
    application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC  was  liable  to  be  rejected.
    Even  otherwise, the Will in absence of  any  pleading  either  in  the
    plaint or first appeal could not be taken on record.  More so, the Will
    was not proved in accordance with law i.e. Section 68 of  the  Evidence
    Act.
    (vii)   The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as  no  party  can
    lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and  in
    case, such evidence has been adduced  or a finding  of  fact  has  been
    recorded by the Court, it is just to be ignored. Though  it  may  be  a
    different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue
    is not framed and  parties  having  full  knowledge  of  the  issue  in
    controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it.
    (viii)  The first appellate court committed a grave error  in  deciding
    the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC much prior  to the  hearing
    of the appeal. Thus, the order allowing the said application is  liable
    to be ignored as the same had been passed in  gross  violation  of  the
    statutory requirement.
    (ix)    The documents produced by the Union  of  India  have  not  been
    properly appreciated by the first appellate court and the High Court.
    (x)     The courts below further committed an  error  holding  that  in
    case the document is taken on record,  the  document  as  well  as  the
    content thereof would be deemed to have been proved.
    (xi)    The appellate courts have also wrongly rejected  the  certified
    copies of the documents prepared by the  Cantonment  Board  which  were
    admissible in evidence.
    (xii)   The High Court committed a grave error in not addressing itself
    to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission  of
    the appeal and it ought to have decided the same  or  after  discussing
    the same a finding could have been  recorded  that  none  of  them  was
    substantial question of  law.
    (xiii)     The suit was barred by the proviso  to  Section  34  of  the
    Specific Relief Act, for the  reason  that  plaintiff/respondent  No.1,
    admittedly, had  not  been  in  possession  and  he  did  not  ask  for
    restoration of possession or any other consequential relief.
    (xiv)   The first appellate court as well as the High Court recorded  a
    finding that the Union of India failed to prove its title over the suit
    land.  The said courts did not realise that this was not the  issue  to
    be  determined,  rather  the  issue  had  been  as   to   whether   the
    plaintiff/respondent No.1 was the owner of the suit land.
    (xv)    The  first  appellate  court  has  not  decided  the  issue  of
    admission of documents in correct perspective and recorded  a  perverse
    finding.
    (xvi)   Question of filing a document in rebuttal of a Will  could  not
    arise. The other party has to admit or deny the  document  as  required
    under Order XII CPC. There could be no Will in favour of the  Union  of
    India by the predecessors of the plaintiff, on the basis  of  which  it
    could also claim title.
    (xvii)  The courts below had wrongly drawn  adverse  inference  against
    the appellant/defendant No.1 for not producing the documents  as  there
    was no direction  of  the  court  to  produce  the  same.  Neither  the
    plaintiff/respondent No.1   had  ever  made  any  application  in  this
    respect  nor he filed any application under Order XI CPC submitting any
    interrogation or for inspection or production of document.
    (xviii) The appellate courts have decided the  appeals  in  unwarranted
    manner in complete derogation of the statutory requirements. Provisions
    of CPC and Evidence Act have been flagrantly violated.


    70.     In view of above, appeal succeeds and is allowed, judgments and
    decrees of the first and second appellate courts are set aside and  the
    judgment and decree dated 20.1.1998 passed by Civil Court  in  Original
    Suit No.442 of 1995  is restored. No costs.





     ....…………….....................J.
                                                          ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
     )





     .…………............................J.
                                                ( DIPAK MISRA )



     New Delhi,
     July 17, 2012








































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