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Tuesday, July 10, 2012

a suit for interest simpliciter was not maintainable when the principal amount was received without any demur and that the Act did not revive the claims that were already settled.- novation of Contract is a mixed question of fact and law and it is being raised, for the first time, at the time of hearing of the case before us which cannot be permitted to be raised. The said fact of novation or alteration of contract is required to be urged evidentially and scrutinised by the courts below. In absence of such factual findings, it is not possible to decide such a mixed question of law and facts. In Shakti Tubes Ltd. (supra), the issue of novation of contract was raised before this Court for the first time at the time of hearing. This Court declined to entertain such ground as being a mixed question of law and fact. This Court further observed that even on the merits of the case the escalation of price, reduction of the quantity of the supply order and extension of date of supply does not amount to novation or alteration in the supply order. Conclusion 70) The result is appeals fail and accordingly, they are dismissed. No order as to costs.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2348 OF 2003

M/s Purbanchal Cables & Conductors Pvt. Ltd. .………… Appellant

                                   Versus

Assam State Electricity Board & Another      …………..Respondents

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2351 OF 2003

Assam State Electricity Board & Others     ………….. Appellants

                                   Versus

M/s Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. & Another     ………..Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T


H.L. DATTU, J.


1) Since the issues in these appeals are common, they  are  disposed  of  by
  this common judgment and order.


Factual background of the two appeals


2) The facts in brief needs to be stated for answering  the  issues  raised.
  They are:   In the case of Purbanchal Cables (C.A. No. 2348 of 2003), the
  supplier is the manufacturer of  Aluminium  Conductors  Steel  Reinforced
  (for short “ACSR”) for various specifications. The  respondent-Board  had
  placed orders for supply of ACSR of different specifications in three (3)
  quarterly phases, i.e. in June 1992, September  1992  and  December  1992
  with the appellant vide supply order dated 31.3.1992. In pursuance to the
  said supply order, the supplier had initially made delivery of goods with
  respect to three bills on 16.09.1992, but did not  receive  payment  from
  the respondent.  Subsequently, the supplier had made another delivery  of
  goods with  respect  to  nine  other  bills  in  between  25.09.1992  and
  30.03.1993. These supplies  were  made  after  the  expiry  of  the  time
  stipulated in the agreement/supply order, but  after  obtaining  specific
  extension of time by the buyer. The supplier  had  completed  the  entire
  supply by 12.10.1993 and received the payment for such supplies from  the
  respondent in the month of September and October, 1993. In  pursuance  to
  such supplies, the supplier has raised the demand for interest on delayed
  payment made by the respondent, vide its  letters  dated  14.12.1992  and
  3.12.1993, however, the same was not acceded to by the buyer.


3) The supplier had instituted a Money Suit No.109 of 1996 before  Assistant
  District Judge No.1, Kamrup for the payment of interest to  the  tune  of
  `24,57,927.28/-,  on  delayed  payment  of  principal   amount   by   the
  respondent, under the Interest on Delayed Payments  to  Small  Scale  and
  Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (for short  ‘the  Act’).  The
  said suit was decreed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1,  Kamrup
  vide his order dated 27.01.2000 in favour of the  supplier,  who  granted
  the compound interest @ 18.25% per annum plus interest of 5%   above  the
  said rate of interest with monthly rest till realization. Being aggrieved
  by the said order, the respondent had filed a Regular First Appeal No. 80
  of 2000 before the High Court of Gauhati. The Division Bench of the  High
  Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit vide its judgment and
  order dated 18.8.2001 on the ground that suit is not maintainable  as  no
  amount was due on the  date  of  institution  of  the  suit  and  thereby
  followed its earlier view rendered by the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
  Court in Assam State Electricity Board and Another  v.  M/s  Trusses  and
  Towers (P) Ltd.  (F.A.  NO.  109/95),  2001  (2)  GLT  121,  whereby  and
  whereunder a Division Bench of the High Court had held that  a  suit  for
  interest simpliciter was not maintainable when the principal  amount  was
  received without any demur and that the Act did  not  revive  the  claims
  that were already settled. The High Court has also, inter alia,  directed
  the appellant to refund the amount of ` 10 lakhs, paid by the respondents
  pursuant to the Court’s direction at the time of admission of the  appeal
  to the respondent within a period of two months and failure to pay within
  such period would entail interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Aggrieved
  by this decision of the High  Court,  the  supplier  has  preferred  this
  appeal.


4) In the case of Shanti Conductors (C.A. No. 2351 of 2003), the  Board  had
  placed two supply orders for  the  manufacture  and  supply  of  KM  ACSR
  Penther Conductors, and the supplier  completed  the  supplies  in  eight
  parts between 22.03.93 and 04.10.93. In March 1997,  about  three  and  a
  half years of making the supplies, and after the receipt  of  the  entire
  amount, the supplier filed a suit for interest on delayed payment by  the
  Board in terms of the provisions of the Act, in Money  Suit  No.  21/1997
  before the Court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 1, Guahati.  The same
  was disputed by the Board in the written statement  filed  in  the  suit.
  However, the suit filed by the  supplier  was  decreed  and  the  Learned
  Assistant District Judge  awarded  a  sum  of  `51,60,507.42  by  way  of
  interest for the delayed payment. Being aggrieved by the said order,  the
  Board preferred a Regular First Appeal (F.A. No. 66 of 2000)  before  the
  Guahati High Court. The Division Bench hearing the appeal of the Board in
  the case of Shanti Conductors doubted the correctness of the  view  taken
  by the Division Bench in the case of Trusses and Towers, and referred the
  matter to the Full Bench to determine whether a suit is maintainable only
  for interest and whether the provisions  of  the  Act  is  applicable  to
  contracts concluded prior to its commencement, where the delayed  payment
  is made after its commencement.


5) The Full Bench of the High Court after considering the provisions of  the
  Act, concluded that the findings of the Division Bench  in  the  case  of
  Trusses & Towers that once a principal amount  is  received  without  any
  protest, then no further claim for interest can  be  made;   is  not  the
  correct legal position in law. In other words, the Full Bench came to the
  conclusion that a suit for only interest was also maintainable.  Further,
  the Full Bench also held that the Act  is  applicable  to  any  contracts
  entered into prior to the commencement of the Act, and a higher  rate  of
  interest could be charged in terms of the provisions of the Act, however,
  the same was to be done after 23.09.1992, i.e. after the  Act  came  into
  force. The matter was then remitted back to the Division Bench to  decide
  the other issues  in  accordance  with  law  and  in  the  light  of  the
  observations made therein. Aggrieved by the decision of the  Full  Bench,
  the Board is before us in Civil Appeal No.2351 of 2003.


6) The issues that are required to be answered by us in  these  appeals  are
  whether a suit for interest alone is maintainable under the provisions of
  the Act, and whether the Act would be applicable to contracts  that  have
  been concluded prior to the commencement of the Act. In other  words,  we
  are required to examine whether the Act would apply  to  those  contracts
  which were entered prior to the commencement of the Act but supplies were
  effected after the Act came into force.





  The Scheme of the Act:


7) The Statement of Objects and Reasons read as under:


      “A policy  statement  on  small  scale  industries  was  made  by  the
      Government in Parliament. It was stated at  that  time  that  suitable
      legislation would be brought to ensure  prompt  payment  of  money  by
      buyers to the small industrial units.


      2. Inadequate working  capital  in  a  small  scale  or  an  ancillary
      industrial undertaking causes serious and endemic  problems  affecting
      the health of such undertakings. Industries in this sector  have  also
      been demanding that adequate measures by taken  in  this  regard.  The
      Small Scale Industries Board,  which  is  an  apex  advisory  body  on
      polices relating to small scale industrial units with  representatives
      from all the States, governmental bodies and  the  industrial  sector,
      also expressed this view. It was, therefore, felt that prompt payments
      of money  by  buyers  should  be  statutorily  ensured  and  mandatory
      provisions for payment of interest on the outstanding money,  in  case
      of default, should be made. The buyers, if required under law  to  pay
      interest, would refrain from withholding payment to  small  scale  and
      ancillary industrial undertakings.


      3. An Ordinance, namely, the Interest on  Delayed  Payments  to  Small
      Scale and Ancillary  Industrial  Undertakings  Ordinance,  1992,  was,
      therefore, promulgated by the President on 23rd September, 1992.”






8) The long title of the Act reads as “An Act to provide  for  and  regulate
  the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and  ancillary
  industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental
  thereto.” The Act though enacted on 2nd April 1993, by a legal fiction is
  deemed to have come into effect from the  date  of  promulgation  of  the
  Ordinance, i.e. 23rd September 1992. The provisions of  the  Act  largely
  deal with the liability of  the  buyer  to  make  payment  for  supplies,
  determination of the date from which and the rate at  which  interest  is
  payable to the supplier from the buyer, liability of  the  buyer  to  pay
  compound interest, recovery of the amount due to the  supplier  from  the
  buyer, and other provisions relating to appeal, etc.








9) Section 2(b) of the Act defines the meaning of the expression  ‘appointed
  day’ to mean the day  following  immediately  after  the  expiry  of  the
  payment period of thirty days from the date of payment, acceptance of any
  goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. Section 3  of  the  Act
  imposes a statutory liability upon the buyer  to  make  payment  for  the
  supplies of any goods either on or before the appeal date or where  there
  is no agreement, before the appointed day. Section  4  provides  for  the
  award of interest where the price has not been paid within time.  Section
  5 provides for the liability of  the  buyer  to  pay  compound  interest.
  Section 6 of the Act gives a right to the buyer to  file  a  civil  suit.
  Section 10 of the Act gives overriding effect to any other law which  are
  inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.





On the question of maintainability of a suit for interest


10) Shri Rakesh Dwivedi and Shri Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel  appear
  for the suppliers and Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel appears
  for the buyer – Assam State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as
  ‘the Board’).


11) The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the suppliers  has  brought  to
  our notice  that  the  first  question  that  has  been  raised  for  our
  consideration has been answered by this Court in favour of the suppliers,
  in the case of Modern Industries v. Steel  Authority  of  India  Limited,
  (2010) 5 SCC 44, in which this Court has held:


      “40. In Assam SEB  v.  Shanti  Conductors  (P)  Ltd.  inter  alia  the
      question that fell for consideration before  the  Full  Bench  of  the
      Gauhati High Court was as to whether the suit for recovery of  a  mere
      interest under the 1993 Act is maintainable. The argument on behalf of
      the appellant therein was that no suit merely for the recovery of  the
      interest under the 1993 Act is maintainable under  the  provisions  of
      Section 6. It was contended that both principal sum and  the  interest
      on delayed payment simultaneously must coexist for maintaining a  suit
      under Section 6 of the 1993 Act.


      41. The Full Bench held that the suit is maintainable for recovery  of
      the outstanding principal amount, if any, along with the  interest  on
      delayed payments as calculated under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1993 Act.
      It said: (Assam SEB case, Gau LR pp. 559-60, para 12)


        “12. … The opening words of Section 6(1) ‘the amount  due  from  the
        buyer, together with the amount of interest….’ can  only  mean  that
        the principal sum due from the buyer as well as or  along  with  the
        amount of interest calculated under the provisions of the  Act,  are
        recoverable. The word ‘together’ here would mean  ‘as  well  as’  or
        ‘along with’. This cannot mean that the principal sum must be due on
        the date of the filing of the suits. The suits are maintainable  for
        recovery of the outstanding, principal amount, if  any,  along  with
        the amount of interest on the delayed payments as  calculated  under
        Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. We are unable to agree with that if the
        principal sum is not due, no suit would lie for the recovery of  the
        interest on the delayed payments, which might have already  accrued.
        If such an interpretation is given the very object of  enacting  the
        Act would be frustrated. The Act had been enforced to see that small-
        scale industries get the  payment  regarding  supply  made  by  them
        within the prescribed period and in case of delay  in  payments  the
        interest would be at a much higher  rate  (one-and-a-half  times  of
        lending rate charged by State Bank  of  India).  The  obligation  of
        payment of higher interest under the Act is  mandatory.  Sections  4
        and 5 of the  Act  of  1993  contain  a  non  obstante  clause  i.e.
        ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in  any  agreement  between  the
        buyer and the supplier’. In other words, the parties to the contract
        cannot even contract out of the provisions of the 1993 Act. Even  if
        such provision that interest under the Act on delay meant would  not
        be chargeable is incorporated in the contract, Sections 4 and  5  of
        the Act of 1993 would still prevail as the  very  wording  of  these
        sections indicate. Take for instance that the buyer has not paid the
        outstanding amount of the supply by the due date. After  much  delay
        he offers the outstanding amount of the supply to the  supplier.  If
        the argument of the learned counsel  for  the  appellant  is  to  be
        accepted, then, if the supplier accepts entire amount  he  would  be
        losing his right to recover the amount of interest  on  the  delayed
        payment under the Act. Therefore, he would have to refuse to  accept
        the amount of payment and then file  a  suit  for  recovery  of  the
        principal amount and the interest on the delayed payment  under  the
        Act. The Act does not create any embargo  against  supplier  not  to
        accept principal amount at any stage and thereafter file a suit  for
        the recovery or realisation of the  interest  only  on  the  delayed
        payments under the Act.”


      42. The word “due” has a variety of meanings, in different context  it
      may have different meanings. In its narrowest meaning, the word  “due”
      may import a fixed and settled obligation or  liability.  In  a  wider
      context the amount can be said to be “due”, which may be recovered  by
      action. The amount that can be claimed as “due” and recoverable by  an
      action may sometimes be also covered  by  the  expression  “due”.  The
      expression “amount due  from  a  buyer”  followed  by  the  expression
      “together with the  amount  of  interest”  under  sub-section  (1)  of
      Section 6 of the 1993 Act must be interpreted keeping the purpose  and
      object of the 1993 Act and its provisions, particularly Sections 3,  4
      and 5 in mind.  This  expression  does  not  deserve  to  be  given  a
      restricted meaning as that would defeat the whole purpose  and  object
      of the 1993 Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 provides that the amount
      due from a buyer  together  with  amount  of  interest  calculated  in
      accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Sections  4  and  5  shall   be
      recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way  of  suit  or  other
      proceeding under any law for the time being in force.


      43. If the argument of the Senior Counsel for the buyer  is  accepted,
      that would mean that where  the  buyer  has  raised  some  dispute  in
      respect of goods supplied or services  rendered  by  the  supplier  or
      disputed his liability to make payment then the supplier shall have to
      first pursue his remedy for  recovery  of  amount  due  towards  goods
      supplied or services rendered under regular procedure  and  after  the
      amount due is adjudicated, initiate action for recovery of  amount  of
      interest which he may be entitled to in accordance with Sections 4 and
      5 by pursuing remedy under sub-section (2) of Section 6.


      44. We are afraid the scheme of Section 6 of the 1993  Act  read  with
      Sections 3,  4  and  5  does  not  envisage  multiple  proceedings  as
      canvassed. Rather, whole idea of Section 6  is  to  provide  a  single
      window to the supplier for redressal of his grievance where the  buyer
      has not made payment for goods supplied or services  rendered  in  its
      entirety or part of it or such payment has not been made  within  time
      prescribed in Section 3 for whatever reason  and/or  for  recovery  of
      interest as per Sections 4 and 5 for such  default.  It  is  for  this
      reason that sub-section (1) of Section 6  provides  that  “amount  due
      from a buyer together  with  the  amount  of  interest  calculated  in
      accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Sections  4  and  5”  shall  be
      recoverable by the supplier from buyer by way of a suit or other legal
      proceeding. Sub-section (2) of Section 6  talks  of  a  dispute  being
      referred to IFC in respect of the matters referred to  in  sub-section
      (1) i.e. the dispute concerning amount due  from  a  buyer  for  goods
      supplied or services rendered by the supplier to  the  buyer  and  the
      amount of interest to which the supplier  has  become  entitled  under
      Sections 4 and 5.


      45. It is true that word “together”  ordinarily  means  conjointly  or
      simultaneously but this ordinary meaning put upon the  said  word  may
      not be apt in the context of Section 6. Can it be said that the action
      contemplated in Section 6 by way of suit or any other legal proceeding
      under sub-section (1) or by making reference to IFC under  sub-section
      (2) is maintainable only if it is for recovery of principal sum  along
      with interest as per Sections 4 and 5 and not for interest alone?  The
      answer has to be in negative.


      46. We approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in  Assam  SEB  that
      word “together” in Section 6(1) would mean “along with”  or  “as  well
      as”. Seen thus, the action under Section 6(2) could be maintained  for
      recovery of principal amount and interest or only for  interest  where
      liability is admitted  or  has  been  disputed  in  respect  of  goods
      supplied or services rendered. In  our  opinion,  under  Section  6(2)
      action by way of reference to IFC cannot be restricted to a claim  for
      recovery of interest due under Sections 4 and 5 only in  cases  of  an
      existing determined, settled or admitted liability. IFC has competence
      to determine the amount due for goods supplied or services rendered in
      cases where the liability is disputed by the buyer.  Construction  put
      upon Section 6(2) by the learned Senior Counsel for the buyer does not
      deserve to be accepted as it  will  not  be  in  conformity  with  the
      intention, object and purpose of the 1993 Act.  The  Preamble  to  the
      1993 Act, upon which strong reliance has been placed  by  the  learned
      Senior Counsel, does not persuade us  to  hold  otherwise.  It  is  so
      because the Preamble may not exactly correspond  with  the  enactment;
      the enactment may go beyond the Preamble.”






12) The decision of the Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court which has  been
  approved by this Court in Modern Industries (supra)  is  impugned  before
  us in one of the appeals. Since  a  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  has
  already approved the dictum of the Full Bench  of  the  High  Court  with
  regard to the maintainability of a suit only for interest, that  question
  is no longer res integra. Therefore, the suppliers may file a  suit  only
  for a higher rate of interest on delayed payments made by the buyer  from
  the commencement of the Act.


13) The other question that remains for our consideration is; as to  whether
  the suppliers can get the benefit of the provisions of the  Act  even  if
  the contract of supply was executed prior to the commencement of the Act,
  whereas the supplies being made after the commencement  of  the  Act.  In
  other words, the question we are called upon to answer is with regard  to
  the status of contracts of supply concluded prior to the commencement  of
  the Act vis-à-vis the Act.





Arguments on behalf of the suppliers


14) Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that  the  Act
  is a beneficial legislation and is aimed at providing relief to suppliers
  which are small scale industries, who are not paid  on  time  even  after
  supplies are effected  and  accepted  and  hence  had  to  suffer  severe
  financial crunch. He would submit that the Act is supply oriented and the
  date of the supply is the critical and  crucial  date  for  applying  the
  provisions of the Act, and not the date on which the contract is  entered
  into by the parties. Shri. Dwivedi, learned Senior  Counsel  would  state
  that Section 1(3) of the Act by way of a deeming fiction, brought the Act
  into force from the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance  i.e.  23rd
  September 1992.  He would then draw our attention to the text of  Section
  3, and submit that the liability of a buyer to make payment arose on  the
  completion   of   the   event   of   supply   of   the   good   by    the
  supplier/manufacturer.  The  learned  Senior  Counsel   refers   to   the
  definition of ‘appointed day’ to mean the day of acceptance of the supply
  of goods or the date of  deemed  supply  of  goods.  He  would  refer  to
  Sections 4 and 5 and also Section 10 of  the  Act  and  submit  that  the
  liability and payment of higher rate of interest is a result  of  delayed
  payment by the buyer to the supplier at the time of the supply. He  would
  also stress on the non-obstante clause that  is  found  in  the  text  of
  section 5 and overriding effect given to  the  Act  vide  section  10  to
  stress upon the fact that the  provisions  of  the  Act  with  regard  to
  compound interest would prevail even if there was  an  agreement  to  the
  contrary that the Act would override the provisions of any other law.  He
  would lay emphasis upon the crucial date for the operation of the Act  as
  the date on which the supply is made  and  not  the  date  on  which  the
  contract of supply was concluded as understood by the decisions  of  this
  Court in Assam Small Scale Industries and Shakti Tubes. He would also lay
  emphasis on the expression “appointed day” as defined in Section 2(b)  of
  the Act to contend that though the contract between the parties was prior
  to the enactment, it is the date of acceptance of the goods or any  other
  service by a buyer from the supplier and thus, is the relevant  date  for
  applying the beneficial supply oriented legislation.  In the alternative,
  it is contended by Shri Dwivedi that even if the contract is entered into
  prior to the date  of  commencement  of  the  Act,  and  the  supply  was
  subsequent, then the Act would apply in respect of such buyers that  made
  delayed payments to the suppliers. He would also submit that the ills  of
  delayed payment was causing great inconvenience and hardship to the small
  scale industries, and that being the reason  for  the  enactment  of  the
  legislation, coupled with the fact that the event of supply is  the  core
  theme of the legislation, hence  all the supplies  made  after  the  23rd
  September 1992 would attract the provisions of the Act.


15) In conclusion, Shri Dwivedi contends: (1)  that  the  Act  is  a  supply
  oriented; (2) that on a wholesome reading of Sections 4 and 5 and Section
  10 of the Act  gives  overriding  effect  to  any  other  law  which  are
  inconsistent with the provisions of the Act; (3) the emphasis on the text
  of Section 3 on the supply of the goods and the liability  of  the  buyer
  arose on the supply of goods; (4) It is a beneficial  legislation  and  a
  purposive construction is required to be  adopted.  He  points  out  that
  since these salient features are neither noticed nor considered in  Assam
  Small Scale Industries, the decision needs reconsideration  by  a  larger
  Bench.


16) Shri Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel while  adopting  the  principal
  arguments of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi would submit, that, on a  plain  reading
  of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Act,  it  is  clear  that
  Parliament enacted the legislation in order to  assist  the  small  scale
  industries to get their payment on time from the buyers. He  would  state
  that there is extrinsic evidence in the Act to show that  the  Act  would
  apply even  to  those  contracts,  which  were  executed  prior  to  23rd
  September 1992. Shri Gupta would further rely on the long  title  of  the
  Act to make good his submission  that  the  scope  of  the  Act  was  not
  restricted to contracts entered into after the Act came into  force.   He
  would further submit that the Act did not apply  to  those  contracts  or
  payment disputes that were ceased to exist but are  maintainable  to  all
  those disputes, even if those cases in which recovery suit was filed  and
  pending after the Act has come into force.  The  learned  Senior  Counsel
  would further submit that the Act is prospective and applies to all those
  contracts which had been executed earlier but supplies  were  made  after
  the Act came into  force.  Shri  Gupta  would  state  that  even  if  the
  agreement and supply was prior to the coming into force of  the  Act,  it
  would still apply, if the issue with regard to delayed payment was  still
  alive. He would submit that the vested right that has accrued  in  favour
  of the supplier should not be abrogated. Shri Gupta would  also  take  us
  through the debates in  Parliament  by  the  various  members  while  the
  legislation was being enacted and decisions of this Court in  support  of
  his submissions. Shri Gupta would also submit that  the  question  to  be
  addressed is not as to who is within the scope of  the  Act  but  who  is
  necessarily out of the ambit of the Act.


Arguments of behalf of the Board


17) Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel  appearing  for  the  Board,
  would submit that the suits in both the cases of  Shanti  Conductors  and
  Purbanchal Cables were barred by limitation.


18) In case of Purbanchal Cables  (C.A.  No.  2348  of  2003),  the  learned
  Senior Counsel would state that the last supply was  made  on  12.10.1993
  and the suit was filed on 31.08.1996 i.e. after the expiry of the  period
  of limitation. He would contend that the only reason assigned in the suit
  to take the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is  that  a  writ
  petition  filed  on  behalf  of  the   Assam   Conductors   Manufacturers
  Association was pending and only after the same  was  disposed  of,  they
  have filed the suit. He would refer to Section 14 of the Limitation  Act,
  1963 and state that writ proceedings which caused the delay of the filing
  of the suit was filed by an  Association  on  behalf  of  the  suppliers.
  Further, he would submit that when the suit was filed, a writ appeal  was
  pending.  He  would  rely  on  the  case  of   Consolidated   Engineering
  Enterprises v. Municipal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008)  7  SCC
  169, to contend that for the operation of Section  14,  it  was  required
  that a civil proceeding be pending by the same party. Though, the learned
  Senior Counsel would state that the writ petition would fall  within  the
  ambit of a civil proceeding, it had to be filed by the same party,  which
  is not the case in the present suit. The writ petition, he  would  state,
  was filed by an Association for different relief, than what was sought by
  the supplier in the suit, and hence, the benefit of  Section  14  of  the
  Limitation Act would not be available.


19) In case of Shanti Conductors (C.A. No. 2351 of 2003), the  supply  order
  was completed on 4th October 1993 and the suit was  filed  only  on  10th
  January 1997 i.e. after the expiry of three year limitation  period.  The
  learned Senior Counsel would submit that there was no  specific  pleading
  with regard to applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation  Act,  1963,
  though it was raised by the defendant in the suit. He  would  assail  the
  trial court’s reasoning wherein it is held that in view of the Section 10
  of the Act, the Limitation Act does not apply. He would  submit  that  in
  the light of the judgment of this Court in  Mukri  Gopalan  v.  Cheppilat
  Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5,  this  Court  while  construing
  Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act has held that if  the  operation  of
  the Limitation Act has to be barred, then a time schedule has to be given
  under the special law and in the absence  of  such,  the  Limitation  Act
  would apply.


20) On the question of applicability of  Act,  the  learned  Senior  Counsel
  would submit that since 2005, this Court has consistently held  that  the
  Act was not applicable to the contracts which  were  concluded  prior  to
  commencement of the Act.  In aid of his submission,  the  learned  Senior
  Counsel would draw our attention to issues raised and arguments canvassed
  in Assam Small Scale Industries, which was specifically answered  in  the
  negative by observing that the Act is not applicable  for  the  contracts
  entered into prior to the commencement of the Act. Shri Hansaria, further
  submits that this issue was again raised in the  case  of  Shakti  Tubes,
  wherein this Court was called upon to  reconsider  the  question  of  law
  decided by this Court in Assam Small Scale Industries and this  Court  in
  Shakti Tubes categorically refused to refer the matter to a larger  Bench
  for reconsideration by  approving  the  decision  in  Assam  Small  Scale
  Industries as correctly decided.  He would then  submit  this  Court  had
  also considered this  issue  in  Rampur  Fertilizers  Limited  v.  Vigyan
  Chemical Industries- (2009) 12 SCC 324  and  Modern  Industries  (supra).
  Therefore, he would submit that this Court has consistently followed  the
  above view and relying on several decisions of this Court, he would state
  that it is desirable to further uphold the same view as per the  doctrine
  of stare decisis and precedents in order to  maintain  certainty  of  the
  law.


Our Conclusion


21) Though the learned Senior Counsel would state that the suits,  filed  by
  both the suppliers in the  present  batch  of  appeals,  were  barred  by
  limitation, we do not intend to express our view on the issue, since some
  of the appeals filed by the suppliers are still pending before  the  High
  Court.  Any observation that we  may  make  would  certainly  effect  the
  interest of both the parties since that issue is yet to be decided by the
  High Court.


Retrospective operation of the Act


22) The fundamental rule of  construction  is  the  same  for  all  statutes
  whether fiscal or  otherwise.  The  under-lying  principle  is  that  the
  meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the  plain  and
  unambiguous expression used therein rather from any notion. To arrive  at
  the real meaning, it is always necessary  to  get  an  exact  conception,
  scope and object of the whole Act.


23) In the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana - (2004)  8  SCC  1,  this
  Court observed that there were four relevant factors which needed  to  be
  considered while considering whether a statute applied  prospectively  or
  retrospectively:


      “15.…Four factors are suggested as relevant:  (i)  general  scope  and
      purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to  be  applied;  (iii)
      the former state of the law; and (iv)  what  it  was  the  legislature
      contemplated….”






24) The general scope of the  Act  has  been  discussed  above.  The  remedy
  sought to be applied by the Act is made clear in the Statement of Objects
  and Reasons, in which, it is stated that due to the delayed  payments  by
  buyers to the small scale industries, their  working  capital  was  being
  affected, causing great harm to the small scale  industries  in  general.
  This Act was passed by Parliament to  impose  a  heavy  interest  on  the
  buyers who delayed the payments of the small scale industries,  in  order
  to deter the buyers  from  delaying  the  payments  after  accepting  the
  supplies made by the suppliers. The policy statement of the  Ministry  of
  Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises dated 6th August 1991, reads:


      “3.4) A beginning has been made towards solving the problem of delayed
      payments to  small  industries  setting  up  of  ‘factoring’  services
      through Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI). Network of
      such services would be set up  throughout  the  country  and  operated
      through commercial banks. A suitable legislation will be introduced to
      ensure prompt payment of small industries’ bills.”






25)  Keeping  in  view  the  above  object,  the  Act  was  enacted  by  the
  Parliament. Before such enactment, it is required to  examine  rights  of
  the supplier qua the buyer prior to the commencement of the Act. In  case
  of delayed payment, the supplier, prior to the commencement of  the  Act,
  was required to file a suit for the payment of the principal amount,  and
  could claim interest along with the principal amount. The supplier  could
  avail of the same under Section 34 of the Code of Civil  Procedure,  1908
  (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), Section 61 of Sale of Goods  Act,
  1930 and Section 3 of Interest Act, 1978.


26) In other words, the supplier whose payment  was  delayed  by  the  buyer
  prior to the commencement of the Act, could file a suit  for  payment  of
  the principal amount along with the interest. The supplier, thus, had the
  vested right to claim the principal amount along with interest thereon in
  case of a delay in payment by the buyer and it was the discretion of  the
  Court to award this interest. The  Court  has  the  discretion  to  award
  interest along with the principal amount and the same is clear  from  the
  use of the word ‘may’ in all the three provisions cited above. Section 34
  of the CPC is the main provision under which interest could be awarded by
  the Court and Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 is an offshoot of
  Section 34 of the CPC. Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 also makes the
  Interest Act subject to the provision of Section 34 of the CPC. Hence, we
  can safely deduce that the interest awarded is a discretion exercised  by
  the Court, on the principal  amount  claimed,  in  case  of  a  suit  for
  recovery of payment by the supplier if such payment  is  delayed  by  the
  buyer.


27) With the commencement of the Act, a new vested  right  exists  with  the
  supplier, that being, if there is delay in payment after  the  acceptance
  of the goods by the buyer, the supplier can  file  a  suit  for  claiming
  interest at a higher rate, as prescribed by the Act.  This  position  has
  been approved by this Court in the case of Modern Industries (supra).  If
  a suit for interest simpliciter is maintainable as held by this Court  in
  Modern Industries (supra), then a new liability qua the buyer is  created
  with the commencement of the Act giving a vested right to the supplier in
  case of delayed payment. In other words, if there is a delayed payment by
  the buyer, then a right to claim a higher rate of interest as  prescribed
  by the Act accrues to the supplier.


28) The phrase ‘vested right’ has been defined by this Court in the case  of
  Bibi Sayeeda Vs. State of Bihar -  (1996) 9 SCC 516 as:


      “17. The word ‘vested’ is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.)
      at p. 1563 as:


        “Vested; fixed; accrued; settled;  absolute;  complete.  Having  the
        character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent;
        not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent.”


      Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present  or  prospective,
      has become property of some particular person or  persons  as  present
      interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or  contingent  interest
      in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws,  does
      not constitute vested rights. In Webster's  Comprehensive  Dictionary,
      (International Edn.) at p. 1397 ‘vested’ is defined as:


        “[L]aw held  by  a  tenure  subject  to  no  contingency;  complete;
        established by law as a permanent right; vested interests.””






29) A statute creating vested rights is a substantive statute.  This  Court,
  in the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal  Minor  Irrigation  Division
  Vs. N.C. Budharaj - (2001) 2 SCC 721, opined:


      “23. … “Substantive law”, is that  part  of  the  law  which  creates,
      defines and regulates rights in contrast to what is  called  adjective
      or remedial  law  which  provides  the  method  of  enforcing  rights.
      Decisions, including the one in  Jena  case  while  adverting  to  the
      question  of  substantive  law  has  chosen  to  indicate  by  way  of
      illustration laws such as Sale of Goods  Act,  1930  [Section  61(2)],
      Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Section 80), etc. The provisions  of
      the Interest Act, 1839, which prescribe the general  law  of  interest
      and become applicable in the  absence  of  any  contractual  or  other
      statutory provisions specially dealing with the  subject,  would  also
      answer the description of substantive law…”






30) In the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Limited Vs. Union of India -  (2011)
  6 SCC 739, this Court comparing  substantial  law  with  procedural  law,
  stated:


      “23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that  creates,  defines
      and regulates rights and liabilities. Right conferred on  a  party  to
      prefer an appeal against an order is a substantive right conferred  by
      a statute which remains  unaffected  by  subsequent  changes  in  law,
      unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. Procedural  law
      establishes a mechanism for determining those rights  and  liabilities
      and  a  machinery  for  enforcing  them.  Right  of  appeal  being   a
      substantive right always acts prospectively.  It  is  trite  law  that
      every statute is prospective unless it is expressly  or  by  necessary
      implication made to have retrospective operation.”


      24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but the  procedure  for
      filing the appeal including the period of limitation cannot be  called
      a substantive right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim  any  vested
      right claiming that  he  should  be  governed  by  the  old  provision
      pertaining to period of limitation. Procedural  law  is  retrospective
      meaning thereby that it will apply even to acts or transactions  under
      the repealed Act.”






31) In the case of Shyam  Sunder  Vs.  Ram  Kumar  -  (2001)  8  SCC  24,  a
  Constitution Bench of this Court discussing the  scope  and  ambit  of  a
  declaratory law has observed:


      “39. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of  the  appellants  that  the
      amending Act whereby new Section 15 of the Act has been substituted is
      declaratory and, therefore, has retroactive operation. Ordinarily when
      an enactment declares the  previous  law,  it  requires  to  be  given
      retroactive effect. The function of a declaratory statute is to supply
      an omission or to explain a previous statute and when such an  Act  is
      passed, it comes into effect when the previous enactment  was  passed.
      The legislative power to enact law includes the power to declare  what
      was the previous law and  when  such  a  declaratory  Act  is  passed,
      invariably it has been held to be retrospective. Mere absence  of  use
      of the word “declaration” in an Act explaining what was the law before
      may not appear to be a declaratory Act but if the court finds  an  Act
      as  declaratory  or  explanatory,  it   has   to   be   construed   as
      retrospective. Conversely where a statute uses the word “declaratory”,
      the words so used may not be sufficient to hold that the statute is  a
      declaratory Act as words may be used in order to bring into effect new
      law.”






32) In Katikara Chintamani Dora Vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu  -  (1974)  1  SCC
  567, this Court held:


      “50. It is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive  law  is
      altered during the pendency of an action, rights of  the  parties  are
      decided according to law, as it existed  when  the  action  was  begun
      unless the new statute shows a clear intention  to  vary  such  rights
      (Maxwell on Interpretation, 12th Edn. 220). That is to  say,  “in  the
      absence  of  anything  in  the  Act,  to  say  that  it  is  to   have
      retrospective operation, it cannot be so  construed  as  to  have  the
      effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at  the
      time when the Act is passed”.”






33) In Govind Das Vs. ITO - (1976) 1 SCC 906, this  Court  speaking  through
  P.N. Bhagwati. J., (as he then was) held:


      “11. Now it is a well settled rule of interpretation hallowed by  time
      and sanctified by judicial decisions  that,  unless  the  terms  of  a
      statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it,  retrospective
      operation should not be given to a statute  so  as  to  take  away  or
      impair an existing right or create a new obligation or  impose  a  new
      liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The  general
      rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of  the  Laws  of  England  (3rd
      Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this  Court  as  well  as
      English courts is that


        “all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which
        relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are  prima  facie
        prospective”


      and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as  to
      affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a  new  liability
      or obligation unless that  effect  cannot  be  avoided  without  doing
      violence to the  language  of  the  enactment.  If  the  enactment  is
      expressed  in   language   which   is   fairly   capable   of   either
      interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.”






34) In the case of Jose Da Costa Vs. Bascora  Sadasiva  Sinai  Narcornium  -
  (1976) 2 SCC 917, this Court held:


      31. Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid  passed
      by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals,  it  would  be
      appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. The first
      is that


        “while provisions of  a  statute  dealing  merely  with  matters  of
        procedure  may  properly,  unless  that  construction  be  textually
        inadmissible,  have  retrospective  effect   attributed   to   them,
        provisions which touch a right in existence at the  passing  of  the
        statute are not to be applied  retrospectively  in  the  absence  of
        express enactment or  necessary  intendment  (see  Delhi  Cloth  and
        General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC.)


      The second is that a right of appeal being  a  substantive  right  the
      institution of a  suit  carries  with  it  the  implication  that  all
      successive appeals available under the law  then  in  force  would  be
      preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career
      of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this  rule
      viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right  of  appeal  is  taken
      away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the
      court to which appeal lay at  the  commencement  of  the  suit  stands
      abolished (see Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury and Colonial
      Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving).






35) In K. Kapen Chako Vs. Provident Investment Co. (P) Ltd -  (1977)  1  SCC
  593, this Court discussing the dicta of the English Courts on the  aspect
  of retrospectivity observed:


      “37. A statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview
      of the statute and at  the  remedy  sought  to  be  applied.  In  that
      connection the former state of the law is to be  considered  and  also
      the  legislative  changes  contemplated  by  the  statute.  Words  not
      requiring  retrospective  operation  so  as  to  affect  an   existing
      statutory provision pre-judicially ought not be so construed. It is  a
      well recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so
      as to respect vested rights. Where the effect  would  be  to  alter  a
      transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid
      which was previously invalid, to  make  an  instrument  which  had  no
      effect at all, and from which the party was at liberty  to  depart  as
      long as he pleased, binding, the prima facie construction of  the  Act
      is that it is not to be retrospective. (See Gardner v. Lucas).


      38. In Moon v. Durden a question arose as to whether Section 18 of the
      Gaming  Act,  1845  which  came  into  effect  in  August   1845   was
      retrospective so as to defeat an action which had  been  commenced  in
      June 1845. The relevant section provided that no suit shall be brought
      or maintained for recovering any such sum of  money  alleged  to  have
      been won upon a wager. It was held  that  it  was  not  retrospective.
      Parke, B. said:


        “It seems a strong thing to hold that  the  legislature  could  have
        meant that a party who under a contract made prior to the  Act,  had
        as perfect a title to recover a sum of money as he had to any of his
        personal  property,  should  be  totally  deprived  of  it   without
        compensation.”


      39. Again in  Smithies  v.  National  Union  of  Operative  Plasterers
      Section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 which enacted that an action
      for tort against a trade union shall not be entertained by  any  court
      was held not to prevent the courts from hearing and giving judgment in
      actions of that kind begun before the passing of  the  Act.  It  is  a
      general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by
      taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments,  unless
      in express terms they apply to pending actions, do  not  affect  them.
      But there is an exception  to  this  rule,  namely,  where  enactments
      merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action. See  Re
      Joseph Suche & Co. Ltd. If  the  legislature  forms  a  new  procedure
      alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is
      some good reason or other why they should not be. In other words, if a
      statute deals merely with the procedure in an  action,  and  does  not
      affect the rights of the parties it will be held to apply prima  facie
      to all actions, pending as well as future.”






36) In the case of Dahiben Vs. Vasanji Kevalbhai - 1995 Supp. (2)  SCC  295,
  this Court held:


      “12. As the amendment in question is not to a procedural law,  it  may
      be  stated  that  the  settled  principle  of  interpretation,   where
      substantive law  is  amended,  is  that  the  same  does  not  operate
      retrospectively unless it is either expressly  provided  or  the  same
      follows by necessary implication. Lest it be  thought  that  a  vested
      right cannot be  taken  away  at  all  by  retrospective  legislation,
      reference may be made to Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri where  it
      was stated that even where vested rights are affected, legislature  is
      competent to take away the same by means of retrospective legislation;
      and retrospectivity can be inferred even by necessary implication.”






37) In the case of Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana - (2004) 8  SCC  1,  this
  Court examined the various authorities on  statutory  interpretation  and
  concluded:


      “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute  is
      prima facie  prospective  unless  it  is  expressly  or  by  necessary
      implication made to have a retrospective operation. But  the  rule  in
      general is applicable where the object of the  statute  is  to  affect
      vested  rights  or  to  impose  new  burdens  or  to  impair  existing
      obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to  show
      the intention of the legislature to  affect  existing  rights,  it  is
      deemed to be prospective  only  —  “nova  constitutio  futuris  formam
      imponere debet non praeteritis” — a new law ought to regulate what  is
      to follow, not the past. (See Principles of  Statutory  Interpretation
      by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at p. 438.) It is not  necessary
      that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective  and
      the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted  by  necessary
      implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure  an
      acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole  (ibid.,
      p. 440).


      14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not  applicable
      to declaratory statutes…. In determining, therefore, the nature of the
      Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a
      new Act is “to explain” an earlier Act, it  would  be  without  object
      unless construed retrospectively.  An  explanatory  Act  is  generally
      passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as  to  the
      meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a  statute  is
      curative or merely  declaratory  of  the  previous  law  retrospective
      operation is generally  intended….  An  amending  Act  may  be  purely
      declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision  of  the  principal  Act
      which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of  this  nature
      will have retrospective effect (ibid., pp. 468-69).”






38) In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Bhajan Kaur  -  (2008)  12  SCC  112,
  this Court held:


      “9. A statute  is  presumed  to  be  prospective  unless  held  to  be
      retrospective,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication.   A
      substantive law is presumed to be prospective. It is one of the facets
      of the rule of law.”






39) There is no doubt about the fact that the Act is a  substantive  law  as
  vested rights of entitlement to a higher rate  of  interest  in  case  of
  delayed payment accrues in favour of the  supplier  and  a  corresponding
  liability is imposed on the  buyer.  This  Court,  time  and  again,  has
  observed that any substantive  law  shall  operate  prospectively  unless
  retrospective operation is clearly  made  out  in  the  language  of  the
  statute. Only a procedural or declaratory law operates retrospectively as
  there is no vested right in procedure.


40)  In  the  absence  of  any  express  legislative   intendment   of   the
  retrospective application of the Act, and by virtue of the fact that  the
  Act creates a new liability of a high rate of interest against the buyer,
  the Act cannot be construed to have retrospective effect. Since  the  Act
  envisages that the supplier has an accrued right to claim a  higher  rate
  of interest in terms of the Act, the same can only  said  to  accrue  for
  sale agreements after the date of commencement  of  the  Act,  i.e.  23rd
  September 1992 and not any time prior.





Earlier Precedents


41) On a careful perusal of the judgment of this Court in Assam Small  Scale
  Industries, we find that even the question regarding the applicability of
  the Act to contracts concluded prior to coming into force of the  Act  is
  no longer res integra. This question is answered by  this  Court  in  the
  case of Assam Small Scale Industries Development  Corpn.  Ltd.  Vs.  J.D.
  Pharmaceuticals - (2005) 13 SCC 19 as under:


      “37. We have  held  hereinbefore  that  clause  8  of  the  terms  and
      conditions relates to the payments  of  balance  10%.  It  is  not  in
      dispute that the plaintiff had demanded both the principal  amount  as
      also the interest from the Corporation. Section  3  of  the  1993  Act
      imposes a statutory liability upon the buyer to make payment  for  the
      supplies of any goods either on or before the  agreed  date  or  where
      there is no agreement before the appointed day. Only when payments are
      not made in terms of Section 3, Section 4 would apply.  The  1993  Act
      came into effect from 23-9-1992 and will  not  apply  to  transactions
      which took place prior to that date. We find that out of the  71  suit
      transactions, Sl. Nos. 1 to 26 (referred to in the penultimate para of
      the trial court judgment), that is supply orders between  5-6-1991  to
      28-7-1992, were prior to the date of the 1993 Act coming  into  force.
      Only the transactions at Sl. Nos. 27 to  71  (that  is  supply  orders
      between 22-10-1992 to 19-6-1993), will attract the provisions  of  the
      1993 Act.


      38. The 1993 Act, thus, will have no application in  relation  to  the
      transactions entered into between June 1991 and 23-9-1992.  The  trial
      court as also the High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in
      directing payment of interest at the rate of 23% up to June  1991  and
      23.5% thereafter.”






42) In Shakti Tubes Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar - (2009) 7 SCC 673,  this  Court
  approved the ratio in Assam Small Scale Industries, and held:


      18. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision  in
      Assam Small Scale Industries case  is  clearly  applicable  and  would
      squarely govern the facts of  the  present  case  as  well.  The  said
      decision was rendered by this  Court  after  appreciating  the  entire
      facts as also all the relevant laws on the issue and therefore, we  do
      not find any reason to take a different view than what  was  taken  by
      this Court in the aforesaid judgment. Thus, we respectfully agree with
      the aforesaid decision of this Court which  is  found  to  be  rightly
      arrived at after appreciating all the facts and circumstances  of  the
      case.


      19. Now coming to the facts of the present case we find that there  is
      no dispute with regard to the fact that the supply  order  was  placed
      with the respondents on 16-7-1992 for supply of the pipes  which  date
      is admittedly prior to the date on which this Act came into effect.


      20. Being faced with  the  aforesaid  situation,  the  learned  Senior
      Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff sought to submit  before
      us that the decision of this Court in  Assam  Small  Scale  Industries
      case refers to the expression “transactions”. According  to  him,  the
      transactions would be complete only when the appellant-plaintiff  made
      the supply and since the supply was made in  the  instant  case  after
      coming into  force  of  the  Act,  the  appellant-plaintiff  would  be
      entitled to the benefit of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act.  Refuting  the
      aforesaid submission, the learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
      respondents submitted that  the  aforesaid  contention  is  completely
      misplaced. He pointed out that if such a  meaning,  as  sought  to  be
      given by the learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant-
      plaintiff, is accepted that  would  lead  to  giving  benefit  of  the
      provisions of the Act to unscrupulous suppliers who, in order  to  get
      the benefit of the Act, would postpone the delivery of  the  goods  on
      one pretext or the other.


      21. We have considered the aforesaid rival submissions. This Court  in
      Assam Small Scale Industries case has finally set at  rest  the  issue
      raised by stating that as to what is to be considered relevant is  the
      date of supply order placed by the respondents  and  when  this  Court
      used the expression “transaction” it only meant a  supply  order.  The
      Court made it explicitly clear in para 37 of  the  judgment  which  we
      have already extracted above. In our considered opinion  there  is  no
      ambiguity in the aforesaid judgment passed by this Court.  The  intent
      and the purpose of the Act, as made in para 37 of  the  judgment,  are
      quite clear and apparent. When this Court said “transaction” it  meant
      initiation of the transaction i.e. placing of the  supply  orders  and
      not the completion of the transactions which would be  completed  only
      when the payment is  made.  Therefore,  the  submission  made  by  the
      learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff fails.






43) The case of Assam Small Scale Industries has  been  followed  in  Rampur
  Fertilizers Limited as well as Modern Industries (supra).  Therefore,  we
  cannot agree with the submission that this Court  in  Assam  Small  Scale
  Industries Development Corporation’s case did not  specifically  consider
  and decide the issue of whether the Act would  apply  to  such  of  those
  contracts executed prior to the commencement of the Act but the  supplies
  being made after the commencement of the Act.





Binding precedent or sub-silentio


44) However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for  the  suppliers,  Shri
  Rakesh Dwivedi, and Shri Sunil Gupta would contend that the  decision  of
  this Court is not a binding precedent.


45) Shri Rakesh Dwivedi,  learned  Senior  Counsel  would  submit  that  the
  decisions of this Court in the case of Assam Small Scale  Industries  and
  Shakti Tubes (supra) regarding the prospective operation of the Act  were
  not law declared under Article 141, as the point under  consideration  in
  those cases were different from the issues raised in  these  appeals.  He
  would further submit that the question about operation  of  the  Act  for
  contracts concluded prior to 23rd September 1992 was not even a question,
  which came up for consideration before the Court and was not even  argued
  by the learned Counsel appearing in that matter, and hence would not form
  a part of the ratio of the decision. He would  further  submit  that  the
  question was answered without adequately considering  the  provisions  of
  the beneficial legislation and therefore,  it  cannot  be  treated  as  a
  binding precedent.





46) Shri Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel  while  adopting  the  argument
  advanced by Shri Dwivedi on this issue, would submit that there  are  two
  exceptions to the doctrine of precedent, namely,  per  incurium  and  sub
  silentio. It was on the strength of the  latter  that  Shri  Gupta  would
  submit that the decisions of this Court in Assam Small  Scale  Industries
  and Shakti Tubes (supra) cannot be considered as precedents. The  learned
  Senior Counsel would state that a decision would not apply as a precedent
  when the Court has failed to consider the objects and purpose of the  Act
  in question and also certain previous judgments of this Court.  He  would
  further contend that the aforesaid judgments suffer from the sub-silentio
  principle being rendered without  full  and  adequate  arguments  on  the
  issue. The learned Senior Counsel would also state that the Court did not
  look at the issue from the viewpoint canvassed presently.


47) The learned Senior Counsel would rely on the decision of this  Court  in
  Municipal Corporation, Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur - (1989)  1  SCC  101.  This
  Court has held:


      “11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio  decidendi
      are classed as obiter  dicta  and  are  not  authoritative.  With  all
      respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in  Jamna  Das  case
      and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot  concede  that
      this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered  without  argument,
      without reference to the relevant provisions  of  the  Act  conferring
      express power on  the  Municipal  Corporation  to  direct  removal  of
      encroachments from any public place like pavements or public  streets,
      and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not  propose
      to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us  that
      it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms  of  the
      relevant provisions.  A  decision  should  be  treated  as  given  per
      incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of
      a rule having the force of a statute. So far as the  order  shows,  no
      argument was addressed to the court on the question whether or not any
      direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal  Corporation
      to construct a stall at the pitching  site  of  a  pavement  squatter.
      Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of  the  Salmond  on  Jurisprudence,
      12th Edn. explains the concept of sub silentio  at  p.  153  in  these
      words:


        “A decision passes sub silentio, in the  technical  sense  that  has
        come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law
        involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to
        its mind. The court may consciously decide in favour  of  one  party
        because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon.  It  may
        be shown, however, that logically the court should not have  decided
        in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B  in
        his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by  the  court.
        In such circumstances, although point B was  logically  involved  in
        the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision
        is not an authority on  point  B.  Point  B  is  said  to  pass  sub
        silentio.”


      12. In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k)., the only point  argued  was
      on the question of priority of  the  claimant's  debt,  and,  on  this
      argument being heard, the court granted the  order.  No  consideration
      was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly  be
      made on an account standing in  the  name  of  the  liquidator.  When,
      therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before  the
      Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith  Ltd.,
      the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir  Wilfrid
      Greene, M.R., said that he could not help thinking that the point  now
      raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel  in  order
      that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to  say  that
      the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could  make
      the order which it did; nevertheless, since it  was  decided  “without
      argument, without reference to the crucial  words  of  the  rule,  and
      without any citation of authority”, it was not binding and  would  not
      be followed. Precedents sub silentio and without argument  are  of  no
      moment. This rule has ever since  been  followed.  One  of  the  chief
      reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that  has  once
      been fully argued and decided should not be allowed  to  be  reopened.
      The weight accorded to dicta varies with  the  type  of  dictum.  Mere
      casual  expressions  carry  no  weight  at  all.  Not  every   passing
      expression of a judge, however  eminent,  can  be  treated  as  an  ex
      cathedra statement, having the weight of authority.”






48) In the case of State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. -  (1991)
  4 SCC 139, His Lordship R.M. Sahai. J., in his  concurring  judgment  set
  out the principles of per incurium and sub silentio has held thus:


      “40.  ‘Incuria’  literally  means  ‘carelessness’.  In  practice   per
      incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed
      this principle in  relaxation  of  the  rule  of  stare  decisis.  The
      ‘quotable in law’ is avoided  and  ignored  if  it  is  rendered,  ‘in
      ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’. (Young v. Bristol
      Aeroplane Co. Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and  adopted  by
      this Court while interpreting Article 141 of  the  Constitution  which
      embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu
      v. Rajdewan Dubey this Court while pointing out the  procedure  to  be
      followed  when  conflicting  decisions  are  placed  before  a   bench
      extracted a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England incorporating  one
      of the exceptions when the decision  of  an  appellate  court  is  not
      binding.






      41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which
      was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In  other  words
      can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law?  Here  again
      the English courts and jurists have carved out  an  exception  to  the
      rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio.  “A
      decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come  to
      be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law  involved
      in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.”
      (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th  Edn.,  p.  153).  In  Lancaster  Motor
      Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. the Court did not feel bound  by
      earlier decision as it was rendered  ‘without  any  argument,  without
      reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of
      the authority’. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation
      of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. The bench held that, ‘precedents sub-silentio
      and without argument are of no moment’. The  courts  thus  have  taken
      recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by
      unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not  founded
      on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be  deemed
      to be a law declared to have a binding effect as  is  contemplated  by
      Article  141.  Uniformity  and  consistency  are  core   of   judicial
      discipline. But  that  which  escapes  in  the  judgment  without  any
      occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of
      Pondicherry it was observed, ‘it is trite to say that  a  decision  is
      binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio  and
      the principles, laid down  therein’.  Any  declaration  or  conclusion
      arrived without application of mind or  preceded  without  any  reason
      cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority  of  a  general
      nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting  or  overruling
      is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable
      limits is inimical to the growth of law.”






49) In the case of Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar - (2000)  5  SCC  488,  this
  Court held:


      “20. A decision not expressed, not  accompanied  by  reasons  and  not
      proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot  be  deemed
      to be a law declared to have a binding effect as  is  contemplated  by
      Article 141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not  the  ratio
      decidendi. This is the rule of sub silentio, in  the  technical  sense
      when a particular point of law was not  consciously  determined.  (See
      State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. SCC, para 41.)”






50) In the case of Tika Ram Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - (2009) 10 SCC  689,
  it was held:


      “104. We do not think that the law laid  down  in  these  cases  would
      apply to the present situation.  In  all  these  cases,  it  has  been
      basically held that  a  Supreme  Court  decision  does  not  become  a
      precedent unless a question is directly raised and considered therein,
      so also it does not become a  law  declared  unless  the  question  is
      actually decided upon. We need not take stock of all these  cases  and
      we indeed have no quarrel with the propositions settled therein.…”






51) Though the submissions made  by  Shri  Rakesh  Dwivedi  and  Shri  Sunil
  Gupta, learned Senior Counsel seems attractive in the first blush, we are
  of the view, they lack merit. In the case of Assam Small Scale Industries
  (supra), the question of retrospective operation of the  Act  or  whether
  past contracts were governed by the Act, was argued by the learned Senior
  Counsel appearing for the respondent. In the said judgment this Court has
  observed:


      “19……. The 1993  Act,  it  was  submitted,  being  also  a  beneficent
      statute, the same should be construed liberally. The Act, Mr Chowdhury
      would argue, will thus, have a retrospective effect.”






52) Further, in the case of  Shakti  Tubes  Ltd.  (supra),  this  issue  was
  canvassed by the learned Counsel, due to which, this  Court  referred  to
  the precedent in the case of Assam Small Scale  Industries  (supra).  The
  argument on this point has been noted thus:


      “9. According to the appellant-plaintiff, the said interest  has  been
      claimed by the appellant-plaintiff since it is entitled to so claim in
      terms of the provisions of the Interest on Delayed Payments  to  Small
      Scale and Ancillary Industrial  Undertakings  Act,  1993  (hereinafter
      referred to as “the Act”). Mr G.C.  Bharuka,  learned  Senior  Counsel
      appearing for  the  appellant-plaintiff  drew  our  attention  to  the
      provisions of the Act and to the decision of this Court in Assam Small
      Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. J.D.  Pharmaceuticals.  In
      support of his contention that the transaction  in  the  instant  case
      came to an end with the appellant-plaintiff supplying the goods  after
      coming into force of the Act he has  taken  us  through  the  relevant
      sections of the Act as also the Statements of Objects and  Reasons  of
      the Act. According to him, the appellant-plaintiff is entitled  to  be
      paid in terms of the provisions of the Act.


      10. Mr Bharuka contended that  the  earlier  supply  order  which  was
      issued on 16-7-1992 came to be materially altered and substituted by a
      fresh supply order issued on 18-3-1993 by which date the aforesaid Act
      had already been enforced and therefore, the  appellant-plaintiff  was
      entitled to claim interest at a higher rate as envisaged in Sections 4
      and 5 of the said Act.


      11. Mr Dinesh  Dwivedi,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
      respondents strongly refuted the aforesaid  submissions  made  by  the
      learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  appellant-plaintiff  on  the
      ground that the supply order was issued in the instant case  on  16-7-
      1992 and therefore, in terms of and in line with the decision of  this
      Court in Assam Small Scale Industries case the appellant-plaintiff was
      entitled to be paid interest only at the rate of 9% per annum and  not
      at a higher rate as contended by the appellant-plaintiff.”






53) This  Court,  in  Shakti  Tubes  Ltd.  (supra)  expressly  rejected  the
  argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing  for  the  appellant  in
  that case, that the Act should be given retrospective effect  because  it
  was a beneficial legislation, in paragraphs 24 to 26, which have been set
  out below:


      “24. Generally, an Act should always be  regarded  as  prospective  in
      nature unless the legislature has clearly intended the  provisions  of
      the said Act to be made applicable with retrospective effect.


        “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that  every  statute
        is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly  or  by  necessary
        implication made to have a retrospective operation. [The  aforesaid]
        rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is  to
        affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair  existing
        obligations. Unless there are words in  the  statute  sufficient  to
        show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights,  it
        is deemed to be prospective  only—nova  constitutio  futuris  formam
        imponere debet non praeteritis—a new law ought to regulate  what  is
        to follow, not the past. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation
        by Justice G.P. Singh,  9th  Edn.,  2004  at  p.  438.)  It  is  not
        necessary that an express  provision  be  made  to  make  a  statute
        retrospective and the presumption  against  retrospectivity  may  be
        rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new
        law is made to cure an acknowledged evil  for  the  benefit  of  the
        community as a whole (ibid., p. 440).”


      25. In Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana (supra),  SCC  at  p.  9,  this
      Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 15-16)


        “15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and  rather  there
        is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute
        Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws  having
        retrospective operation. This can be achieved by  express  enactment
        or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it  is  a
        necessary  implication  from  the   language   employed   that   the
        legislature intended a particular section to  have  a  retrospective
        operation, the courts will give it such an operation. In the absence
        of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the courts
        may be called  upon  to  construe  the  provisions  and  answer  the
        question whether the legislature  had  sufficiently  expressed  that
        intention giving  the  statute  retrospectivity.  Four  factors  are
        suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute;
        (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of  the
        law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. (p. 388) The
        rule against retrospectivity does not extend  to  protect  from  the
        effect of a repeal, a privilege which  did  not  amount  to  accrued
        right. (p. 392)


        16. Where a statute is  passed  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  an
        obvious omission in a  former  statute  or  to  ‘explain’  a  former
        statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the  time  when
        the prior Act  was  passed.  The  rule  against  retrospectivity  is
        inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory
        in nature. A classic illustration is  Attorney  General  v.  Pougett
        (Price at p. 392). By a Customs Act of 1873 (53 Geo.  3,  c.  33)  a
        duty was imposed upon hides of 9s 4d, but the Act omitted  to  state
        that it was to be 9s 4d  per  cwt.,  and  to  remedy  this  omission
        another Customs Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 105) was passed later in the same
        year. Between  the  passing  of  these  two  Acts  some  hides  were
        exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay  the
        duty of 9s 4d per cwt., but Thomson, C.B., in  giving  judgment  for
        the Attorney General, said: (ER p. 134)


           ‘The duty in this instance was, in fact, imposed  by  the  first
          Act; but the gross mistake of the omission  of  the  weight,  for
          which the sum expressed was to have been payable, occasioned  the
          amendment made by the subsequent Act: but that had  reference  to
          the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must  be  taken
          together as if they were one and the  same  Act;’  (Price  at  p.
          392)”


      26. There is no dispute with regard  to  the  fact  that  the  Act  in
      question is a welfare legislation which was  enacted  to  protect  the
      interest of the suppliers especially suppliers  of  the  nature  of  a
      small-scale industry. But, at the same time,  the  intention  and  the
      purpose of the Act cannot be lost sight of and  the  Act  in  question
      cannot be given a retrospective effect so long as such an intention is
      not clearly made out and derived from the Act itself.”






54) In the case of Rampur Fertilizers  Limited  (supra),  this  Court  again
  examined the entire scheme of the Act before following the dicta of  this
  Court in the case of Assam Small Scale Industries (supra). Even in Modern
  Industries (supra), this Court did not differ  from  the  dicta  of  this
  Court in Assam Small Scale Industries and Shakti Tubes (supra).


Binding value of a precedent


55) In the case of Waman Rao Vs. Union of India -  (1981)  2  SCC  362,  His
  Lordship Y.V. Chandrachud. C.J., speaking  for  the  Constitution  Bench,
  held:


      “40. It is also true to say that for the application of  the  rule  of
      stare decisis, it is  not  necessary  that  the  earlier  decision  or
      decisions of longstanding should have considered and  either  accepted
      or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the  case  on
      hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be  treated
      as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary
      to take resort to the principle of stare decisis.  It  is,  therefore,
      sufficient for invoking the rule  of  stare  decisis  that  a  certain
      decision was arrived at on a question which arose or  was  argued,  no
      matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis  of  the
      decision. In other words, for the purpose  of  applying  the  rule  of
      stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine  as  to  what
      was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate  as
      stare decisis.”






56) In Union of India Vs. Raghubir Singh - (1989)  2  SCC  754,  this  Court
  held:


      “8. Taking note of the hierarchical character of the  judicial  system
      in India, it is of paramount importance that the law declared by  this
      Court should be certain, clear and consistent. It  is  commonly  known
      that most decisions of the  courts  are  of  significance  not  merely
      because they constitute an adjudication on the rights of  the  parties
      and resolve the dispute between them, but also  because  in  doing  so
      they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding  principle  in
      future cases. In this latter aspect lies  their  particular  value  in
      developing the jurisprudence of the law.


      9. The doctrine of binding precedent has  the  merit  of  promoting  a
      certainty and  consistency  in  judicial  decisions,  and  enables  an
      organic development of the law, besides  providing  assurance  to  the
      individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part  of  his
      daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for  a  clear  and  consistent
      enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court.”






57) In Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India - (1990)  4  SCC  207,  this  Court
  observed:


      “33. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. To adhere  to  precedent  and
      not to unsettle things which are settled. But it applies to  litigated
      facts and necessarily decided questions. Apart from Article 141 of the
      Constitution of India, the policy of courts is to stand  by  precedent
      and not to disturb settled point. When court  has  once  laid  down  a
      principle of law as applicable to certain  state  of  facts,  it  will
      adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases where facts
      are substantially the same. A deliberate and solemn decision of  court
      made after argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and
      necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding  precedent
      in the same court, or in other  courts  of  equal  or  lower  rank  in
      subsequent cases where the very point is again in  controversy  unless
      there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to  vindicate
      plain, obvious principles of law and remedy  continued  injustice.  It
      should be invariably applied and should  not  ordinarily  be  departed
      from where decision is of long standing and rights have been  acquired
      under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it.”






58) In the case of Mishri Lal Vs. Dhirendra Nath - (1999)  4  SCC  11,  this
  Court held:


      “13.…It is further to be noted that Meharban Singh  case  came  to  be
      decided as early as 1970 and has been  followed  for  the  last  three
      decades in the State of  Madhya  Pradesh  and  innumerable  number  of
      matters have been dealt with on the basis thereof and in the event,  a
      different view is expressed today, so far as this specific legislation
      is concerned, it would unsettle the situation in the State  of  Madhya
      Pradesh and it is on this score also that reliance on the doctrine  of
      “stare decisis” may be apposite. While it is true  that  the  doctrine
      has no statutory  sanction  and  the  same  is  based  on  a  rule  of
      convenience and expediency and as also on “public policy” but  in  our
      view, the doctrine should and ought always to be strictly  adhered  to
      by the courts of law to subserve the ends of justice.”






59) In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,
  (2005) 2 SCC 673, a Constitution Bench of this Court held:


      “8. In Raghubir Singh case Chief Justice Pathak pointed  out  that  in
      order to promote consistency and certainty in the law laid down by the
      superior court the ideal condition would  be  that  the  entire  court
      should sit in all cases to decided questions of law, as is done by the
      Supreme Court of United States. Yet, His Lordship noticed, that having
      regard to the volume of work demanding the attention  of  the  Supreme
      Court of India, it has been found  necessary  as  a  general  rule  of
      practice and convenience that the Court should  sit  in  divisions  of
      consisting of Judges whose numbers may be determined by the exigencies
      of judicial need, by the nature of the case  including  any  statutory
      mandate relating thereto and by such other  considerations  which  the
      Chief Justice, in whom such authority devolves by convention, may find
      most appropriate. The Constitution Bench reaffirmed  the  doctrine  of
      binding precedents as it has been merit  of  promoting  certainty  and
      consistency in judicial decisions and enables an  organic  development
      of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual  as  to  the
      consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs.”






60) In the case of Shanker Raju Vs. Union of India - (2011) 2 SCC 132,  this
  Court observed:


      “10. It is settled principle of law that a judgment,  which  has  held
      the field for a long time, should not be unsettled.  The  doctrine  of
      stare decisis is expressed in the maxim stare decisis  et  non  quieta
      movere, which means “to stand by decisions and not to disturb what  is
      settled”. Lord Coke  aptly  described  this  in  his  classic  English
      version as “those things which have been so often  adjudged  ought  to
      rest in peace”. The underlying logic of this doctrine is  to  maintain
      consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy  is  that  a
      view which has held the field for a long time should not be  disturbed
      only because another view is possible….”






61) In the case of  Fida  Hussain  Vs.  Moradabad  Development  Authority  -
  (2011) 12 SCC 615, this Court held:


      “15. Having carefully considered the submissions of the learned Senior
      Counsel Shri Varma, we are of the view that the judgment in Gafar case
      does not require reconsideration by this Court.  In  Gafar  case  this
      Court had meticulously examined all the legal contentions canvassed by
      the parties to the lis and had come to the conclusion  that  the  High
      Court has not committed any error which warrants interference. In  the
      present appeals, the challenge is for the  compensation  assessed  for
      the lands notified and acquired under the same notification pertaining
      to the same villages. Therefore, it would not be proper for us to take
      a different view, on the ground that what was considered by this Court
      was on a different fact situation. This view of ours is  fortified  by
      the judgment  of  this  Court  in  Ballabhadas  Mathurdas  Lakhani  v.
      Municipal Committee, Malkapur, wherein it was held that a decision  of
      this Court is binding when the same question is  raised  again  before
      this Court, and reconsideration cannot be pleaded on the  ground  that
      relevant provisions, etc., were not considered by  the  Court  in  the
      former case.”






62) Judicial discipline demands that a decision of a Division Bench  of  two
  Judges should be followed by another Division Bench  of  two  Judges  and
  this has been stated time and again by  this  Court.  In  Raghubir  Singh
  (supra), a Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  speaking  through  Chief
  Justice R.S. Pathak, held:


      “28. We are of the opinion that a pronouncement of law by  a  Division
      Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the  same  or  a
      smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be  binding,
      it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the  Full
      Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court….”






63) In Union of India Vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. - (1990) 4 SCC  453  this
  Court has observed:


      “9. It is true that a bench of two members must not lightly  disregard
      the decision of another bench of the same  Tribunal  on  an  identical
      question. This is particularly  true  when  the  earlier  decision  is
      rendered by a larger bench. The rationale of this rule is the need for
      continuity, certainty and  predictability  in  the  administration  of
      justice. Persons affected by decisions of Tribunals or courts  have  a
      right to expect that those exercising judicial functions  will  follow
      the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases  on
      identical matters.  Classification  of  particular  goods  adopted  in
      earlier decisions  must  not  be  lightly  disregarded  in  subsequent
      decisions,  lest  such  judicial  inconsistency  should  shake  public
      confidence in the administration of justice….”






64) Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel contends  that  a  case  for
  referring the matter to a larger Bench though is pleaded by  the  learned
  Senior Counsel, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, this Court ought to test the same by
  the parameters laid down by this Court in the  case  of  CIT  Vs.  Saheli
  Leasing and Industries Limited - (2010) 6 SCC 384 to find out whether the
  matter deserves to be referred to a larger Bench. In Saheli Leasing, this
  Court held:


      “29…(x) In order to enable the Court to refer any  case  to  a  larger
      Bench  for  reconsideration,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out   that
      particular provision of law having a bearing over the  issue  involved
      was not taken note of or these is an error apparent  on  its  face  or
      that a particular earlier decision was not noticed, which  has  direct
      bearing or has taken a contrary view….”






65) The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case  of  Keshav  Mills  Co.
  Ltd. Vs. CIT - (1965) 2 SCR 908 crystallized the position with regard  to
  what the Court should do when a plea  for  consideration  of  an  earlier
  judgment is made. It was held:


      “…When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be
      reviewed and revised, it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for
      such review and revision to hold that though the  earlier  view  is  a
      reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the
      subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviving and  revising  its
      earlier  decision,  this  Court  should  ask  itself  whether  in  the
      interests of the public good or for any  other  valid  and  compulsive
      reasons it is necessary that the earlier decision should  be  revised.
      When this Court decided questions of law,  its  decisions  are,  under
      Art.  141, binding on courts within the territory of India, and so, it
      must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to  introduce
      and  maintain  an  element  of  certainty  and   continuity   in   the
      interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this  Court
      of its power to review its earlier decisions on the  ground  that  the
      view pressed  before  it  later  appears  to  the  Court  to  be  more
      reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and  introduce
      confusion which must be consistently avoided. This is not to say if on
      a subsequent  occasion,  the  Court  is  satisfied  that  its  earlier
      decision was clearly erroneous, it should  hesitate  the  correct  the
      error; but  before  a  previous  decision  is  pronounced  to  plainly
      erroneous the Court must be satisfied with fair  amount  of  unanimity
      amongst its members  that  a  revision  of  the  said  view  is  fully
      justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case  it  would
      be inexpedient to lay down any  principles  which  should  govern  the
      approach of the Court in dealing with the question  of  reviewing  and
      revising its earlier decisions. It  would  always  depend  on  several
      relevant considerations:- What is the nature of the infirmity or error
      on which a plea for a review and  revision  of  the  earlier  view  is
      based? On the  earlier  occasion,  did  some  patent  aspects  of  the
      question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn
      to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any  previous
      decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the  Court
      hearing such plea fairly unanimous there  is  such  an  error  in  the
      earlier view? What would be the impact of the  error  on  the  general
      administration of law or public good? Has the  earlier  decision  been
      followed on subsequent occasions either  by  this  Court  or  by  High
      Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public
      inconvenience,  hardship  or  mischief?  These  and   other   relevant
      considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court  is
      called upon to exercise its jurisdiction  to  review  and  revise  its
      earlier decisions….”






66) We are in full agreement with the view expressed in  Keshav  Mills  case
  (supra). The learned Senior Counsel Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has not been able
  to make out a case for reconsideration of the decision of this  Court  in
  Assam Small Scale Industries (supra). In fact, a plea for reconsideration
  of the same was rejected by a Division Bench  of  this  Court  in  Shakti
  Tubes (supra). We are unable to agree with the argument of  Shri  Dwivedi
  and Shri Gupta that the provisions of the Act were not considered in  its
  entirety. In fact, the entire scheme of the Act has  been  considered  in
  the case of Rampur Fertilizers (supra) and specific answer to  the  issue
  under consideration was answered.


67) In the case of Ambika Prasad Mishra Vs. State of U.P.  -  (1980)  3  SCC
  719, His Lordship V.R. Krishna Iyer. J., speaking  for  the  Constitution
  Bench held:


      “6. It is wise to  remember  that  fatal  flaws  silenced  by  earlier
      rulings cannot survive after death because a decision  does  not  lose
      its authority  “merely  because  it  was  badly  argued,  inadequately
      considered and fallaciously reasoned.”…”






68) In light of this dictum, and the factum that no case has been  made  out
  for reconsideration by the  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
  suppliers, we do not see any reason much or less good reason to doubt the
  correctness of the decision in Assam Small  Scale  Industries  or  Shakti
  Tubes (supra). When there are four decisions of this Court with regard to
  the applicability of the Act for contracts  entered  into  prior  to  the
  commencement of the Act, and when the plea for reconsideration  has  been
  expressly rejected in the past, we are of the view, it would  be  against
  the spirit of the doctrine of stare decisis for us to take  any  view  in
  divergence with same.


69) Lastly, learned Senior Counsel for suppliers  also  contended  that  the
  extension of date of supply order, from time to time by Board, amounts to
  a novation of contract or supply order in terms  of  Section  62  of  the
  Indian Contracts Act and, therefore, the new  contract  or  supply  order
  would be governed by the Act.  In our opinion, the  ground  or  issue  of
  novation of Contract is a mixed question of fact and law and it is  being
  raised, for the first time, at the time of hearing of the case before  us
  which cannot be permitted to be raised.  The said  fact  of  novation  or
  alteration  of  contract  is  required  to  be  urged  evidentially   and
  scrutinised by the courts below.  In absence of such factual findings, it
  is not possible to decide such a mixed question of  law  and  facts.   In
  Shakti Tubes Ltd. (supra), the issue of novation of contract  was  raised
  before this Court for the first time at the time of hearing.  This  Court
  declined to entertain such ground as being a mixed question  of  law  and
  fact.  This Court further observed that even on the merits  of  the  case
  the escalation of price, reduction of the quantity of  the  supply  order
  and extension of date of supply does not amount to novation or alteration
  in the supply order.


Conclusion


70) The result is appeals fail  and  accordingly,  they  are  dismissed.  No
  order as to costs.


                                                             …………………………………J.

                                                                [H.L. DATTU]



                                                             …………………………………J.

                                                              [ANIL R. DAVE]
   New Delhi,
   July 10 , 2012