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Wednesday, July 18, 2012

In the instant case, the first appeal filed by the petitioner was barred by 1717 days and the delay was condoned. This petition is also barred by 154 days. Petitioner for the reasons best known to him did not make the demand for a specific enhancement. Mere making a reference in the Memo of Appeal that the High Court had awarded a higher amount in respect of a land covered by the same Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not enough. The claimant has to satisfy the court that his land was similar in quality and had same geographical location or was situated in close vicinity of the land covered by the exemplar relied upon by him. In the instant case, no such attempt has ever been made by the petitioner. Thus, it is not that a meritorious case has been thrown out and the cause of justice stood defeated.


                                                                  REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                  SPECIAIL LEAVE PETITION(C) No……….of 2012
                           (CC No. 11497 of 2012)




    Girimallappa
    …Petitioner


                                   Versus
   The Special Land Acquisition                              …Respondents
    Officer M & MIP & Anr.




                                  O R D E R


    1.      Delay condoned.


    2.      Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that:
    A.       A huge area of land was notified under  Section  4(1)  of  the
    Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the `Act’) on  30.5.1984
    including the petitioner’s land measuring 11 Acres 32 Guntas at  Gobbur
    (K) Village in District Gulbarga for the purpose of construction  of  a
    tank.   The  possession  of  the  said  land  has  been  taken  by  the
    respondent authorities on 23.6.1985.  The  Land  Acquisition  Collector
    made an Award under Section 11 of the Act fixing the  market  value  of
    the land at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per Acre.
    B.      One LAC Case No. 500  of  1993  filed  by  another  person  was
    decided by  the  Reference  Court  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  on
    28.9.1994.  While placing reliance on the same,  the  petitioner  filed
    application  under Section 28-A of the Act.  The said  application  was
    allowed fixing the market  value  of  the  dry  land  at  the  rate  of
    Rs.10000/- per Acre.  Petitioner preferred a further reference  against
    that order claiming Rs.45000/- per Acre for dry land and Rs.75000/- per
    Acre for irrigated lands.  The said reference was  decided  vide  order
    dated 27.9.2003 assessing the market value at the rate of  Rs.  15000/-
    per Acre for  dry land and Rs.21500/- per Acre for irrigated land.
    C.      Aggrieved from the said reference award,  petitioner  preferred
    LAC Appeal No. 64 of 2008 before the District Judge, Gulbarga,  seeking
    enhancement of compensation assessing the market value of the  land  at
    the rate of Rs.24000/- per Acre which stood allowed vide  judgment  and
    decree dated 27.10.2009.
    D.      Petitioner filed MSA No. 510 of 2010 against the said  judgment
    and decree dated 27.10.2009 before High Court which has been  dismissed
    by the impugned judgment and order dated 12.9.2011.


            Hence, this petition.


    3.      Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for  the  petitioner,
    vehemently submitted that courts  cannot  defeat  the  claim  based  on
    substantial justice on mere  technicalities.   Learned  counsel   would
    submit that when technicalities are pitted against substantial justice,
    the latter must prevail;  in case petitioner was entitled for a  higher
    compensation, awarding a lesser amount of compensation, tantamounts  to
    expropriation of the property in violation of mandate of Article  300-A
    of the Constitution of India. Petitioner has been deprived  the  higher
    compensation as he could not afford to pay the court fees though he was
    entitled for higher compensation  claimed by him.


    4.      Record of the case reveals that petitioner’s land measuring  11
    Acres 32 Guntas had been acquired though there is nothing on record  to
    show as to whether petitioner had some more land. But the area of  land
    acquired makes it clear that petitioner was a man of means. We fail  to
    understand, in case, he did not file a reference under  Section  18  of
    the Act, under what circumstances his application under Section 28-A of
    the Act could be entertained.


    5.      This Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, JT 2009
    (13) SC 388, considered this aspect and held :

             “The scope of  provisions  of  Section  28-A  of  the  Act  was
             considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v. State  of  Haryana  AIR
             1987 SC 45, and the Court placed emphasis particularly on  para
             2 (ix) of the object and reasons of  the  Amendment  Act,  1987
             which provided for a special  provision  for  inarticulate  and
             poor people to apply for re-determination of  the  compensation
             amount on the basis of the court award in  a  land  acquisition
             reference filed by comparatively affluent land owner. The Court
             observed as under:


                    Section 28-A in terms does not apply to the case of  the
                 petitioners..... They  do  not  belong  to  that  class  of
                 society for whose benefit the  provision  is  intended  and
                 meant, i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by  reason  of
                 their poverty and ignorance have failed to  take  advantage
                 of the right of reference to the civil court under  Section
                 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.


                 This Court approved and reiterated the  law  laid  down  in
             Mewa Ram (Supra) in Scheduled  Caste  Cooperative  Land  Owning
             Society Ltd. Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1991 SC 730.
             In Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995) 2  SCC  689,
             this  Court again reiterated the law  laid  down  in  Mewa  Ram
             (Supra) observing as under:-


                 Legislature made a discriminatory policy between  the  poor
                 and inarticulate as  one  class  of  persons  to  whom  the
                 benefit  of  Section  28-A   was   to   be   extended   and
                 comparatively affluent  who  had  taken  advantage  of  the
                 reference under Section 18 and the latter  as  a  class  to
                 which  the  benefit  of  Section  28-A  was  not  extended.
                 Otherwise, the phraseology of  the  language  of  the  non-
                 obstante clause would have been differently worded.....  It
                 is true that the legislature intended to  relieve  hardship
                 to the poor, indigent and inarticulate  interested  persons
                 who generally failed to avail the reference  under  Section
                 18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, Section  28-A
                 was  enacted  giving   a   right   and   remedy   for   re-
                 determination......The legislature appears to have presumed
                 that the same state of affairs continue  to  subsist  among
                 the poor and inarticulate persons and they  generally  fail
                 to avail the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18  due
                 to poverty or  ignorance  or  avoidance  of  expropriation.




                    Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has carved out
             an exception in the form of Section 28-A  and  made  a  special
             provision to  grant  some  relief  to  a  particular  class  of
             society, namely poor,  illiterate,  ignorant  and  inarticulate
             people. It is  made  only  for  “little  Indians”.    (Emphasis
             added)


    6.      Petitioner cannot claim, by any means to fall  under  the  said
    category of “little Indians”.  However, as the said order has not  been
    challenged by the respondent(s), we cannot examine the  issue  further,
    even if the order is totally unwarranted.
    7.      Petitioner’s claim in  the  first  appeal  before  the  learned
    District Judge had been only to the tune of Rs.24000/- per  Acre.   The
    prayer before the learned District Judge in LAC No. 64 of 2008 reads as
    under:
             “ Hence, it is prayed that the  Hon’ble  Court  may  kindly  be
             pleased to set aside the order passed by the court below in LAC
             No. 193/01 and enhance it to  Rs.24,000/-  per  Acre  with  all
             statutory benefits and excluding the interest for  the  delayed
             period in the interest of  justice  for  which  the  appellants
             shall ever pray.”


    8.      It may be pertinent to mention  here  that  while  hearing  the
    appeal, the learned District Judge at Gulbarga condoned  the  delay  of
    1717 days in filing the appeal.
    9.    In the appeal before the  High  Court,  no  specific  amount  was
    demanded by the petitioner. The prayer made before the High Court reads
    as under:
             “Therefore, it is most humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Court may
             be pleased to allow this appeal and  modify  the  judgment  and
             Award dated 27.10.2009 passed in L.A.C. Appeal No.  64/2008  by
             the learned III Addl. District Judge at Gulbarga, modifying the
             judgment and award dated 27.9.2003 passed in LAC  No.  193/2001
             by the Prl. Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.)  Gulbarga and pass  any  other
             appropriate orders, in the interest of justice.”


    10.     Thus, it is apparent that no specific demand was raised by  the
    petitioner before the High Court.  The  Memo  of  Appeal  reveals  that
    Rs.25/- was paid as the court fees.  The  High  Court  dealt  with  the
    issue elaborately taking note of earlier  proceedings/orders  including
    the order passed under Section 28-A of  the  Act,  and  condonation  of
    delay of 1717 days by the first appellate court. Finally the High Court
    held that the claim itself was restricted  to  Rs.  24000/-  per  Acre.
    There was no justification to interfere as the claim of the  petitioner
    stood fully satisfied by the order passed in the first appeal.
    11.     This special leave petition is filed with a delay of 154  days,
    with an explanation that petitioner suffered from the ailment and could
    not approach the court within limitation.


    12.     The question does arise as to whether such a vague  prayer  can
    be entertained by the court. The memo of appeal before the  High  Court
    does not even reveal as to what was  his  demand.   Reliance  is  being
    placed on the judgment of this Court in Chandrashekhar & Ors. v.  Addl.
    Special Land Acquisition Officer,  AIR  2009  SC  3012,  wherein  after
    considering the earlier judgments, this Court held  that  court  should
    not be too technical in awarding the compensation in case  there  is  a
    shortfall of court fees. The said judgment is not an authority  on  the
    proposition advanced before us in this petition that court is bound  to
    enhance the  amount  of  compensation  though  no  specific  amount  is
    demanded by the petitioner.


    13.     It was not a case where an order could  be  challenged  on  the
    ground that the same is a nullity for want of competence of the issuing
    authority  and   proper   pleadings   including   appropriate   grounds
    challenging the same have been taken, but no prayer has been  made  for
    quashing the said order. In  such  an  eventuality  the  order  can  be
    examined only  after  considering  the  statutory  provisions  involved
    therein.  The court may reach a conclusion that the order suffers  from
    lack of jurisdiction.  (See:  Godrej  Sara  Lee  Limited  v.  Assistant
    Commissioner (AA) & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 338).


    14.     In case, the petitioner was serious about the matter, he  could
    have amended the Memo of Appeal and that application  could  have  been
    considered sympathetically by the High Court as held by this  Court  in
    Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43.


    15.    The facts mentioned in this petition depict  entirely  different
    picture and it gives an  impression  as  if  the  High  Court  had  not
    enhanced the compensation though demanded by the petitioner for want of
    payment of court fees which he could not afford to pay due  to  paucity
    of funds.


    16.     The case relied upon by Ms. Kiran Suri is the  case  where  the
    prayer was for a particular enhancement and it was further  made  clear
    that the applicants therein could not afford to pay the court fees  for
    financial constraints.  In the instant case, the first appeal filed  by
    the petitioner was barred by 1717 days and the delay was condoned. This
    petition is also barred by 154 days. Petitioner for  the  reasons  best
    known to him did not make the demand for a specific enhancement.   Mere
    making a reference in the Memo  of  Appeal  that  the  High  Court  had
    awarded a higher amount in respect  of  a  land  covered  by  the  same
    Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not enough.   The  claimant
    has to satisfy the court that his land was similar in quality  and  had
    same geographical location or was situated in  close  vicinity  of  the
    land covered by the exemplar relied upon by him.  In the instant  case,
    no such attempt has ever been made by the petitioner.  Thus, it is  not
    that a meritorious case has been thrown out and the  cause  of  justice
    stood defeated.
            More so, the exemplar cited first time before the High Court in
    Second Appeal has not been referred to in the First Appeal. In  absence
    thereof, it is beyond imagination as how findings recorded by the first
    Appellate Court could be termed as perverse and be a subject matter  of
    appeal.
    17.     Justice is  an  illusion  as  the  meaning  and  definition  of
    ‘justice’ varies from person to person and party to party. Party  feels
    having got justice only and only  if  it  succeeds  before  the  court,
    though it may not have a justifiable claim.
            Justice is the  virtue,  by  which  the  Society/Court/Tribunal
    gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong.  Justice is
    an act of rendering what is right and equitable  towards  one  who  has
    suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the  justice  with  mercy,
    the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice  in  exact
    conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human actions are
    found to be just or unjust  as  they  are  in  conformity  with  or  in
    opposition to the law. (Vide: Delhi Administration  v.  Gurudeep  Singh
    Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737).
    18.     Thus, in view of the above, we do not see any justification  to
    accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the  High  Court
    preferred technicalities over substantial justice.
           Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.



     ....…………….....................J.
                                                          ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
     )







     .…………............................J.
                                                      ( SWATANTER KUMAR )



     New Delhi,
     July 16, 2012








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