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Friday, May 11, 2012

It is, therefore, well-settled that awarding of life sentence is the rule, death is an exception. The application of the ‘rarest of rare case’ principle is dependant upon and differs from case to case. However, the principles laid down earlier and restated in the various decisions of this Court referred to above can be broadly stated that in a deliberately planned crime, executed meticulously in a diabolic manner, exhibiting inhuman conduct in a ghastly manner touching the conscience of everyone and thereby disturb the moral fibre of the society would call for imposition of capital punishment in order to ensure that it acts as a deterrent. While we are convinced that the case of the prosecution based on the evidence displayed, confirmed the commission of offence by the appellants, without any iota of doubt, we are of the considered opinion, that still the case does not fall within the four corners of the principle of the ‘rarest of the rare case’. However, considering the plight of the hapless young lady, who fell a victim to the avaricious conduct and lust of the appellant Sandeep, the manner in which the life of the deceased was snatched away by causing multiple injuries all over the body with all kinds of weapons, no leniency can be shown to the said appellant. In the decision reported in Swamy Sharaddananda (supra) even while setting aside the sentence of death penalty and awarding the life imprisonment, it was explained that in order to serve ends of justice, the appellant therein should not be released from the prison till the end of his life. Likewise, in Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh [AIR 2010 SC 420] this Court, while setting aside the death sentence, directed that the appellant therein should serve a minimum period of 20 years including the remissions and would not be released on completion of 14 years of imprisonment. 38. Taking note of the above decision and also taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, while holding that the imposition of death sentence to the accused Sandeep was not warranted and while awarding life imprisonment we hold that accused Sandeep must serve a minimum of 30 years in jail without remissions before consideration of his case for premature release. 39. Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009 and the Criminal Reference No.19 of 2007 thus stand disposed of modifying the punishments imposed on accused Sandeep as one for life and he should undergo the said sentence of life for a fixed period of 30 years without any remission to be allowed. The Criminal Appeal Nos.1425-26/2011 of accused Shashi Bhushan stand dismissed.





                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1651 OF 2009



              SANDEEP                                ….APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS
            STATE OF U.P.                              ….RESPONDENT




                                    WITH


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1425-26 OF 2011



             SHASHI BHUSHAN                          …APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS
               STATE OF U.P.                              …RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T



   Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

   1.       These appeals arise out  of the common judgment of the  Division
   Bench of the High Court of  Allahabad  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.4148/2007
   along with Criminal Reference No.19/2007 by which, the High  Court  while
   accepting the Criminal Reference  insofar  as  it  related  to  appellant
   Sandeep in Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009, rejected the same insofar as  it
   related to appellant Shashi Bhushan in Criminal Appeal  Nos.1425-26/2011.
   In other words, while upholding the sentence of death awarded to Sandeep,
   the  appellant  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1651/2009,  the  Division  Bench
   modified the sentence into one of life imprisonment insofar as it related
   to Shashi Bhushan, the appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.1425-26/2011.

   2.       Shorn of unnecessary facts,  the  case  of  the  prosecution  as
   projected before the trial Court was that on 17.11.2004 I D.N. Verma (PW-
   1) along with Sub-Inspector Chander Pal Singh  (PW-2),  Constable  Rambir
   Singh, Constable Sukhram, Constable Ashok Kumar and Driver Yashvir  Singh
   were on patrolling duty; that when they reached ahead of Badsu on Khatoli
   Road leading towards Falut, they met Constable Rajesh Kumar  and  another
   Constable Ramavtar who informed PW-1 and other persons  accompanying  him
   that one Indica car took a turn for going towards  Falut  road  and  that
   they heard some screaming noise from that vehicle.  PW-1, accompanied  by
   the other personnel referred to above, proceeded towards Falut  road  and
   after a distance saw an Indica car.  They stated to have seen through the
   focus light of the police jeep two young men trying to pull out a girl in
   an injured condition by opening the rear door of the car.  It  is  stated
   that it was around 21.30 hours.  The police jeep in which PW-1 and others
   were proceeding stopped ahead of the Indica car and caught  hold  of  the
   two young men and also noticed a girl, with injuries all  over,  on  whom
   acid was also sprinkled.  The girl had also  sustained  injuries  on  the
   head as well as on her right cheek.  On noticing the above, according  to
   PW-1, when he questioned her, she responded by stating that her name  was
   Jyoti and she is the daughter of one Baljeet Singh, R/o Lane No.16, House
   No.56, Jagatpuri, P.S. Preet Vihar, New Delhi and that her mother’s  name
   was Varsha whose cell number was 9871020368.  Inspector D.N. Verma (PW-1)
   stated  to  have  gathered  information  from  her  that  she   developed
   friendship with the appellant Sandeep while she was working in  a  mobile
   shop.  She also stated to have revealed that she was pregnant.  According
   to the information gathered from Jyoti, accused Sandeep had called her on
   that evening and asked her to come to Laxmi Nagar market, Delhi, around 6
   p.m. promising her that he will marry her  at  Haridwar.   Believing  his
   words, she went to Laxmi Nagar market from where she was taken in  a  car
   and that while they were moving in the  vehicle,  accused  Sandeep  asked
   Jyoti to get the foetus aborted at Meerut, to which  she  disagreed.   On
   this, he started beating her inside the vehicle right from the  point  of
   Modinagar.  She stated to have further informed PW-1 and others that  she
   told accused Sandeep that she  would  reveal  all  facts  to  his  family
   members as well as to the police and that when the vehicle in which  they
   were travelling turned towards an isolated place near Khatoli, they tried
   to throw her into the sugarcane field at which point  of  time  PW-1  and
   other police members reached the spot.  According to her  information  to
   PW-1, accused Sandeep and Shashi Bhushan caused the injuries on her  with
   the aid of a jack and pana (spanner) apart from cutting her with a  blade
   and also by pouring acid on her head.  PW-1 stated that on  noticing  the
   condition of the girl, he arranged  for  shifting  her  to  Muzaffarnagar
   Government Hospital in the police jeep along with Constable Rambir  Singh
   and the driver of the jeep.  It was further stated that  accused  Sandeep
   and Shashi Bhushan, on being apprehended, also revealed their  names  and
   informed that accused Sandeep used to visit deceased Jyoti while she  was
   working in a mobile shop in Mayur Vihar Phase-I for the last  six  months
   prior to the date of occurrence and developed friendship  with  her,  and
   that in course of time, deceased Jyoti pressurized him to marry her.   On
   the date of occurrence, around 6 p.m. he stated to have called  her  over
   phone to meet him at Laxmi Nagar red light, that  she  responded  to  his
   call and came to Laxmi Nagar red light where accused Sandeep was  waiting
   along with his friend Shashi Bhushan who drove  the  vehicle  Indica  car
   bearing registration No. DL  3CR  6666  which  belonged  to  his  mother.
   Accused Sandeep stated to  have  extended  a  promise  to  marry  her  at
   Haridwar.  While the vehicle started moving, accused Sandeep asked  Jyoti
   to get the foetus aborted to which she did not agree  instead  threatened
   him by saying that she will reveal all facts to his parents as well as to
   the police and that as they reached Modinagar, he  started  beating  her.
   According to the  version  of  accused  Sandeep,  as  told  to  PW-1,  at
   Modinagar he purchased two bottles of acid and four shaving blades,  that
   when they reached Khatoli, on seeing an isolated  place,  they  tried  to
   pull out the injured Jyoti from the vehicle and that  at  that  point  of
   time they were apprehended  by  the  police.   It  is  the  case  of  the
   prosecution that while both the accused  were  taken  into  custody,  the
   vehicle in which they were travelling was also seized along with the jack
   and pana, four blades and two acid bottles.  The articles, namely,  blood
   stained floor mat, empty bottles of acid, one  pair  of  ladies  footwear
   were stated to have been seized after preparing a seizure memo.   A  copy
   of the seizure memo was stated to have been handed over to  the  accused.
   It is the specific case of the prosecution that since it was late in  the
   night and it was a lonely place,  there  were  no  independent  witnesses
   other than the police personnel.  The seizure memo was marked as  Exhibit
   K-1.

   3.       The statement of PW-1 was registered as FIR No.Nil/2004  on  the
   files of P.S. Ratanpuri on 17.11.2004 against both  the  accused  persons
   for offences under Sections 307, 326, 324 and 328, Indian Penal Code  (in
   short ‘IPC’) which came to be subsequently altered later on as one  under
   Sections 302/34 IPC after the victim was declared dead  by  the  hospital
   authorities.  On the above set of facts,  District  and  Sessions  Judge,
   Muzaffarnagar  framed  charges  against  both  the  accused  persons  for
   offences under Section 302, IPC read with Section  34,  IPC  and  Section
   316, IPC read with Section 34, IPC and  proceeded  with  the  trial.   In
   support of the prosecution as many as 10 witnesses were examined.

   4.       When the accused persons  were  questioned  under  Section  313,
   Cr.P.C. for offences under Section 304, IPC read with Section 34, IPC and
   Section 316 read with Section 34,  IPC,  both  the  accused  pleaded  not
   guilty and also filed a written statement  to  that  effect.   The  trial
   Court in its judgment  dated  02.06.2007  ultimately  found  the  accused
   persons guilty of offences under Section 302 read with  Section  34,  IPC
   and 316 read with Section 34, IPC and  after  hearing  both  the  accused
   persons on the question of sentence, took the view that having regard  to
   the magnitude  and  the  diabolic  manner  in  which  the  offences  were
   committed by them and also having regard to the various  principles  laid
   down in the decisions of this Court in relation to  the  award  of  death
   penalty concluded that, the case on hand was one  such  case  which  fell
   under the category of ‘rarest of rare case’ in which the accused deserved
   to be inflicted with the capital punishment of death under  Section  302,
   IPC read with Section 34, IPC.  Ultimately, the trial Court convicted and
   sentenced both the accused persons to death under Section 302  read  with
   Section 34, IPC apart from imposing a fine of Rs.30,000/- each  and  also
   sentenced them to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment and pay  a  fine
   of Rs.10,000/- each for offences under Section 316 read with Section  34,
   IPC and in default of payment of fine sentenced them to  undergo  further
   rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year.   The  sentences  were   to   run
   concurrently.  On realization of fine from the accused persons, a sum  of
   Rs.50,000/- was directed to be paid to the parents of the deceased  Jyoti
   as compensation.

   5.       While hearing the  Criminal  Reference  No.19/2007  as  well  as
   Criminal Appeal No.4148/2007 preferred by the appellants, the High  Court
   while confirming the death penalty imposed on appellant Sandeep held that
   the case of accused Shashi  Bhushan  was  distinguishable  and  that  the
   gravity of the offence did not warrant infliction of  extreme  punishment
   of death and consequently altered the same into one of  imprisonment  for
   life.

   6.       We heard Mr.  Sushil  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
   appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009 assisted by  Mr.  Daya  Krishan
   Sharma and Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  in
   Criminal Appeal Nos.1425-26/2011 for appellant Shashi Bhushan.   We  also
   heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel assisted  by  Mr.  Rajeev
   Dubey, for the State.

   7.       Mr. Sushil  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  in  his  elaborate
   submissions after referring to the evidence of the prosecution  witnesses
   and medical evidence as well as expert witnesses submitted  that  the  so
   called dying declaration of the deceased Jyoti was not proved,  that  the
   confessional statement of the accused cannot be relied upon,  that  there
   were very many missing links in the chain of circumstances and  therefore
   the guilt of the accused cannot be held to be made out. According to  the
   learned  senior  counsel  there  were  discrepancies  in  the  timing  of
   registration of the F.I.R.,  delay  in  sending  of  the  report  to  the
   Magistrate apart from vital contradictions in the evidence of the  police
   witnesses.


   8.       Learned senior counsel also contended that  there  were  serious
   lacunae in  the  preservation  of  foetus  samples  and,  therefore,  the
   ultimate D.N.A. test result cannot be accepted.
   9.       Learned senior counsel further contended that non-examination of
   some of the cited witnesses caused prejudice to the accused and  on  that
   ground also the case of the prosecution should  be  faulted.  He  further
   contended that the case of the accused about the theft of the Indica  car
   was not properly appreciated by the Courts below. It was  also  contended
   that there were infirmities in regard to the recoveries  which  were  not
   properly examined by the Courts below. Lastly, it was contended  that  it
   was not a case for conviction and in any event not ‘rarest of rare  case’
   for imposition of capital punishment of death sentence.

   10.      Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for  the  accused
   –Shashi Bhushan apart from adopting the arguments of  Mr.  Sushil  Kumar,
   learned senior counsel contended that out of 17 injuries alleged to  have
   been sustained by the deceased Jyoti, at  least  7  to  8  injuries  were
   serious and in such circumstances there would not have been any scope for
   the deceased  Jyoti  to  have  made  any  statement  as  claimed  by  the
   prosecution.  According  to  him  there  was  absolutely   no  overt  act
   attributed to the accused Shashi Bhushan in the matter of  infliction  of
   injuries on the body of the deceased Jyoti  and   consequently  even  the
   imposition of life sentence was not warranted.

   11.      As against the above submission,  Shri  Ratnakar  Dash,  learned
   senior counsel appearing for the State contended  that  evidence  of  the
   prosecution witnesses who were all police personnel was  fair,  impartial
   and natural and there was no reason to  doubt  their  version.  He  would
   contend that when there was no independent witness present at  the  place
   of occurrence, there was  no  question  of  examining  any  such  private
   witness. According to him, the deceased was alive at the  time  when  the
   accused were apprehended by the police on 17.11.2004 at  21.30  hrs.  and
   the injuries noted by the doctor would show that the deceased was capable
   of making a statement and, therefore, the recording of such statement  by
   PW-1 in his complaint was perfectly in order. He further  contended  that
   even in the statements of the accused such of those versions made by them
   which did not in any way implicate them in  the  offence  was  admissible
   under Section 8 of the Evidence Act while  the  rest  of  the  statements
   which are likely to implicate them can be  distinguished  and  eliminated
   from consideration.

   12.      Learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in
   State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors.- 2000 (8) SCC 382  and  Somappa
   Vamanappa Madar & Shankarappa Ravanappa Kaddi v. State of Mysore – (1980)
   1 SCC 479] in support of his submissions.

   13.       Learned  counsel  also  contended   that   no   prejudice   was
   demonstratively shown by the non  examination  of  the  cited  witnesses.
   Learned counsel contented  that  going  by  the  version  of  the  expert
   witnesses, the preservation of the foetus was according to the prescribed
   norms and the D.N.A. result having been proved in the manner known to law
   cannot be doubted. He also contended that when the  registration  of  the
   F.I.R. was promptly made, simply because there was  minor  delay  in  the
   alteration of the offence from Section 307, IPC to Section 302,  IPC  and
   the subsequent forwarding of the express report to the Magistrate  cannot
   be fatal to the case of the prosecution.

   14.      Learned counsel relied upon the decision in Sunil Kumar and Anr.
   Vs. State of Rajasthan - (2005) 9 SCC 283, Ram Kumar v.  State  (NCT)  of
   Delhi- [(1999) 9 SCC 149, Tej Prakash v. The State of Haryana  -(1995)  7
   JT 561 in support of his submissions.

   15.      Having heard learned  Senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  and
   learned senior counsel for the State  and  having  perused  the  material
   papers, original records and the judgments of the trial Court as well  as
   the Division Bench of the High Court, we wish to note the broad  spectrum
   of the appellants’ challenge to the conviction and sentence which can  be
   noted as under:
           (I)   The case of the prosecution which was mainly based on  the
           so-called dying declaration of the deceased and the confessional
           statement of the accused cannot be accepted as the same was  not
           proved.

           (II)    The accused were able to demonstrate that they were  not
           present at the time of the commission of the alleged offence  on
           17.11.2004, as there were very many disruptions in the chain  of
           circumstances to rope in the appellants.

   16.      When the submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  are
   analyzed, the following facts were claimed to support their stand:-

        a) The entire case of the prosecution was dependent on the  version
           of witnesses, majority of whom were police personnel  and  there
           was no independent witness to support the version of the police.



        b) The source of the FIR was the alleged dying declaration  of  the
           deceased which was not proved and the  so-called  confession  of
           the accused Sandeep was inadmissible under  Section  25  of  the
           Evidence Act.

        c) If the confession is inadmissible, the whole  case  depended  on
           circumstantial evidence.

        d) The case which was originally registered under Section 307,  IPC
           was altered into one under Section 302, IPC belatedly.

        e)  There  were  very  many  missing  links   in   the   chain   of
           circumstances.

        f) There were serious infirmities in the  tests  conducted  in  the
           samples of the foetus which seriously undermine the case of  the
           prosecution.

        g) Though the occurrence took  place  in  a  public  place  near  a
           crusher unit where number of labourers were working, the absence
           of examination of independent witnesses was fatal to the case of
           the prosecution.

        h) Non-examination of some of the key witnesses cited in the charge-
           sheet whose evidence would have otherwise supported the case  of
           the accused caused serious prejudice and on that ground the case
           of the prosecution should fail.

        i) The delay in sending the express report was a serious  violation
           of Section 157, Cr.P.C. which would again vitiate  the  case  of
           the prosecution.

        j) The alleged  seizure  of  materials  from  the  car  was  highly
           doubtful, having regard to certain vitiating circumstances.

        k) Accused Sandeep was roped in falsely by creating a link with his
           mother’s car, which according to Sandeep, was stolen on the date
           of occurrence, which was omitted to be considered in the  proper
           perspective.

        l) When admittedly there was a pending rape case  relating  to  the
           deceased  in  which  certain  persons  were  accused  of  having
           committed rape on the deceased on 17.04.2004 which  was  tacitly
           admittedly by Baljeet Singh  (PW-8),  father  of  the  deceased,
           there was every scope for the  aggrieved  persons  in  the  said
           criminal  case  to  have  involved  in  the  crime  against  the
           deceased.

   17.      As against the above, when the stand of the learned counsel  for
   the State is analyzed, the following points emerge for consideration:-

               i) The relationship of Sandeep (A-1) with the  deceased  and
                  the carrying of the foetus in the womb  of  the  deceased
                  was not in dispute.

             ii) Merely because the key  witnesses  were  police  personnel,
             that by itself cannot be a ground to eschew that evidence  from
             consideration.

             iii) The case of the prosecution based on the statement of the
                  deceased as spoken to by the witnesses cannot be doubted.

              iv)  The statement of the deceased to the police  insofar  as
                  it related to the incident and such of  those  admissions
                  of the accused not implicating them to  the  offence  was
                  admissible in evidence under Section 8  and  not  hit  by
                  Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

               v) when there were no independent witnesses present  at  the
                  place of occurrence, the grievance of the accused on that
                  score does not merit consideration.

              vi) The medical evidence, in particular,  injuries  noted  in
                  the post-mortem certificate show that  the  deceased  was
                  capable and did make the statement as demonstrated by the
                  prosecution.

             vii) The forensic report established the presence of blood  on
                  the weapons used as well as in the car which was  one  of
                  the clinching circumstances to prove  the  guilt  of  the
                  accused.

            viii) The outcome of the DNA test established the link  of  the
                  accused with the deceased to prove  the  motive  for  the
                  crime.

              ix) The claim of theft of the car was not established  before
                  the trial Court in the manner known to law.

               x) The presence of the accused at  the  time  and  place  of
                  occurrence was proved beyond all reasonable doubts.

              xi) The  handling  of  the  samples  sent  for  chemical  and
                  forensic examination was carried out in  accordance  with
                  the prescribed procedure.

             xii)  The accused failed to show that the  non-examination  of
                  any of the  cited  witnesses  caused  prejudice  to  them
                  before the trial Court and, therefore, the grievance  now
                  expressed will not vitiate the case of the prosecution.

            xiii) The various other discrepancies alleged  were  all  minor
                  and the same do not in any way affect  the  case  of  the
                  prosecution.

   18.      Keeping the  above  respective  submissions  in  mind,  when  we
   analyze the case in hand the following facts are indisputable:-

              a. The relationship of Sandeep with  deceased,  prior  to  the
                 date of occurrence, namely, 17.11.2004 as his girlfriend;

              b. The deceased was carrying the foetus of six months  old  in
                 her womb;

              c. The Indica car in which the deceased was found on the  date
                 and time of occurrence belonged to the  mother  of  accused
                 Sandeep;

              d. At the time when the deceased was secured by the police  on
                 17.11.2004 at 21.30 hours she was seriously injured but was
                 alive;

              e. The death of the deceased was ascertained by the  Dr.  B.S.
                 Chaudhary (PW-6) at 10.55 p.m.

              f. As per the post-mortem certificate, there were as  many  as
                 17 injuries which were caused by blunt  weapons  like  jack
                 and pana (spanner), shaving blades and also chemical  acid.



              g. Police witnesses were all on patrol duty  on  the  date  of
                 occurrence.

              h. The  DNA  test  disclosed  that  accused  Sandeep  was  the
                 biological father of the foetus found in the  womb  of  the
                 deceased.

              i. The theory propounded by  the  accused  i.e.  the  car  was
                 stolen on 17.11.2004 was not established before  the  trial
                 Court in the manner known to law.

              j. The statement of the accused as stated to have been made to
                 PW-1 contained various facts unconnected to the  crime  and
                 also  the  self  incriminating   facts   which   could   be
                 distinguished.

              k. The absence of any independent  witness  at  the  place  of
                 occurrence.

   19.      Keeping the above factors, the existence of which is  borne  out
   by acceptable legal evidence, when we examine  the  submissions  made  on
   behalf of the appellants, in the foremost,  it  was  contended  that  the
   deceased could not have made a statement as  claimed  by  Inspector  D.N.
   Verma (PW-1) since according to  Constable  Ramavatar  Singh  (PW-3),  he
   noticed acid injuries in  the  inner  mouth  of  the  deceased.   However
   forceful the above submissions may be, we find  that  such  a  submission
   merely based on the version of PW-3 alone cannot be  accepted.   Whatever
   injuries sustained by the deceased were  borne  out  by  medical  record,
   namely, post-mortem certificate and the evidence of the doctor who issued
   the said certificate.  As many as 17 injuries were  noted  in  the  post-
   mortem certificate.  According to the version  of  PW-3,  injury  in  the
   mouth was caused by acid.  When we examine such of those injuries  caused
   by acid and as spoken to by PW-6, doctor, injury Nos. 4 and 17 alone were
   stated to have been caused by  acid.   Injury  Nos.4  and  17  have  been
   described as under:-

           “4.   chemical  burn  injury  from  all  over  head,  hair  were
                 charring and skin burnt chemically.

           17.   Chemical burn injury all over body ranging from 12cm x 8cm
                 to 2cm x 4 cm except upper part of chest.”

   20.      Going by the above description of the injuries, as noted by  the
   doctor who conducted the post-mortem,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the
   statement of learned senior counsel for the accused that  the  injury  in
   the mouth was such as the deceased could not have made any oral statement
   at all to the witnesses.  It is true that by the  pouring  of  the  acid,
   injury might have been caused on the head and other parts of the body  of
   the deceased but by no stretch of imagination, those injuries  appear  to
   have caused any severe damage to the mouth of the deceased, much less  to
   the extent of preventing her from making any statement to the  witnesses.
   In this context, when we peruse the evidence of the Doctor (PW-6), he has
   specifically expressed an opinion that he was not in a position to  state
   whether after receipt of injury on the body of  the  deceased  she  would
   have been in a position to speak or not.  In other words, the doctor  who
   had examined the injuries sustained by the deceased did not rule out  the
   possibility of the deceased making any statement irrespective of injuries
   sustained by her.  In this context, when we refer to the submission  made
   on behalf of the appellants themselves before the Division Bench  of  the
   High Court, we find that it was specifically contended that the  deceased
   sustained multiple injuries and except one  injury,  all  other  injuries
   were simple in nature and none of the injuries  were  sufficient  in  the
   ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased.  Therefore,
   even going by the stand of the appellants, the condition of the deceased,
   even after sustaining multiple injuries, was such  that  she  was  alive,
   conscious and her death was not instantaneous.

   21.      Having regard to the above factors, we are  convinced  that  the
   case of prosecution that the deceased made a statement about the sequence
   of the occurrence was really made as spelt out by the witnesses PW Nos. 1
   to 5.

   22.      With this, we come to the next submission of learned counsel for
   the appellants, that in the absence of independent witnesses, no reliance
   can be placed upon PW Nos.1 to 5, who  were  all  police  personnel.   To
   deface the evidence of PW Nos. 1 to 5, it was  contended  that  near  the
   place of occurrence, a crusher unit was existing, and at  that  point  of
   time, the crusher unit was also working.  It was suggested to  PW-1  that
   the crusher unit was around 100 yards away from the place of  occurrence.
   It was also suggested to PW-2 that the crusher unit was running  at  that
   point of time which was 100 yards away from the place of occurrence.   In
   another place, it was stated by PW-3 that the crusher unit was  around  ½
   KM away from the bridge and it was working.  It was also  stated  by  him
   that at that point of time, 3-4 persons were working in the crusher unit.
    From what has been stated by the above witnesses, what all that  can  be
   inferred was that a crusher unit was at least 100  yards  away  from  the
   place of occurrence and that even at that point of time, namely, at 21.30
   hours, the unit was working with at  least  3-4  labourers.   Beyond  the
   above fact, it was not the case of the appellant that any worker from the
   crusher unit was present at the spot and yet he was neither  shown  as  a
   witness nor  examined  and  thereby  any  prejudice  was  caused  to  the
   appellants.  It is also not the case of the appellants  that  apart  from
   the labourers working in the crusher unit, any other independent  witness
   was present at the spot who was not cited  nor  examined  as  a  witness.
   Therefore, when the above facts are clear, we are at a loss to understand
   as to how the grievance of the appellants as regards  non-examination  of
   any independent witness can be taken as a factor to put the case  against
   the prosecution and to hold that the whole case of the prosecution should
   be set at naught.  Apart from the above, no other  point  was  raised  as
   regards  the  non-examination  of  any  independent  witness  as  to  the
   occurrence narrated by the prosecution.

   23.      One other submission made by the learned senior counsel was that
   after finding out the cause of the occurrence from the deceased and after
   noting that she was seriously injured,  the  police  party  arranged  for
   shifting her to the hospital in the police jeep along with  Rambir  Singh
   and the driver of the jeep within 2-3  minutes  and  that  there  was  no
   justifiable ground for not examining Rambir Singh who was also cited as a
   witness but yet not examined and also  for  the  non-examination  of  the
   driver of the jeep.  The contention of the  learned  senior  counsel  was
   that after shifting the deceased from the Indica car to  the  jeep  in  a
   serious condition, the jeep would have travelled for at least an hour  or
   so to reach the hospital and Constable Rambir Singh who  accompanied  her
   would have been in a better position  to  state  as  to  what  transpired
   during that period and what was heard by  him  from  the  deceased  which
   would have thrown much light  on  the  occurrence.   The  learned  senior
   counsel, therefore, contended that serious prejudice was  caused  to  the
   accused by non-examination of the said Rambir Singh as well as the driver
   whose version would have otherwise been favourable to the appellants.

   24.       Learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  State,  however,
   contended that in every criminal case it is not a  rule  that  all  cited
   witnesses should be necessarily examined.  He also contended that the non-
   examination of a witness can be  put  against  the  prosecution  if  non-
   examination would have caused any serious prejudice to the  defence.   He
   also relied upon the decision reported in Tej Prakash (supra) in  support
   of his submission.  As far as the said submission is concerned,  when  we
   examine the sequence of events, we find  that  after  gathering  whatever
   information from the deceased, as regards the occurrence implicating  the
   accused, which were the required details for PW-1 to lodge the  necessary
   complaint, his immediate priority was to attend on the injured person  in
   order to save her life.  Such a course adopted by PW-1 and  other  police
   personnel at the place of occurrence was quite natural  and  appreciable.
   Visualizing what had happened at the place of occurrence as  narrated  by
   the prosecution  witnesses,  it  was  brought  out  that  whatever  basic
   information required to ascertain the cause of occurrence was gathered by
   the prosecution witnesses  as  disclosed  in  the  complaint,  which  was
   registered as FIR and also as stated by the witnesses before  the  Court.
   The contention that the examination of Constable  Rambir  Singh  and  the
   driver of the jeep, who took the injured deceased to the hospital,  would
   have disclosed very many other factors favourable to the accused was only
   a wishful thinking.  In any case, what those persons would  have  deposed
   as a witnesses and to what extent it could have been advantageous to  the
   appellants was not even highlighted before us.  We ourselves wonder  what
   other evidence, much less, favourble  to  the  accused  could  have  been
   spoken to by Constable Rambir Singh who was entrusted with  the  task  of
   admitting the injured victim in the hospital in order to  give  necessary
   treatment for her injuries.  Since PW-1  thought  it  fit  to  shift  the
   injured to the hospital after noticing her  serious  condition,  and  the
   further fact that by the time they  reached  the  hospital  around  10.55
   p.m., doctor found that the deceased was dead, it can be safely held that
   nothing worthwhile could have been drawn  from  the  mouth  of  Constable
   Rambir Singh or the driver of the jeep except stating that they dutifully
   carried out the task of admitting the injured in the hospital as directed
   by their superiors.  We, therefore, hold that the  appellants  could  not
   demonstrate as to any prejudice that was caused by the non-examination of
   Constable Rambir Singh and the jeep driver in order to  find  fault  with
   the case of the prosecution on that  score.  In  this  context,  reliance
   placed upon by the learned senior counsel for the State  in  Tej  Prakash
   (supra) can be usefully referred to.  In para 18 of  the  said  decision,
   this Court made it clear that all the witnesses of the  prosecution  need
   not be called and it is sufficient if witnesses who were essential to the
   unfolding of the narrative are examined.  Applying the said principle  to
   the case, it can be safely held that the witnesses who were examined were
   able to unfold the narration of events in a cogent and convincing  manner
   and the non-examination of Constable Rambir Singh  and  the  jeep  driver
   was, therefore, not fatal to the case of the prosecution.

   25.      Learned senior counsel for the appellants  then  contended  that
   the appellants were not present at all at the time  of  occurrence,  that
   the appellant Sandeep was called to the police station in furtherance  of
   the complaint lodged by him as regards the theft of his mother’s  car  on
   17.11.2004 and that for that purpose when he went to the police  station,
   he was falsely implicated into the offence.  According to the appellants,
   the deceased was already involved in a case  of  rape  committed  by  one
   Manoj on 17.04.2004.  In  that  case,  the  complaint  preferred  by  the
   deceased was at the stage of trial before the Court  of  Sessions  Judge.
   It was contended that by misusing  the  stolen  car  of  the  appellant’s
   (Sandeep) mother, the crime could have been committed  by  somebody  else
   but unfortunately the appellants were implicated into  the  offence.   In
   order to appreciate the said submission of the appellant-Sandeep, in  the
   first place, when we examine the stand that his mother’s car  was  stolen
   on 17.11.2004, we find that except the ipse dixit statement made  in  the
   written statement to the questioning made under Section 313  Cr.P.C.  and
   reference to an alleged report as regards the theft of the car, there was
   no other fact placed before the  trial  Court.   The  trial  Court  while
   dealing with the said contention has noted as under:-

          “…………the accused Sandeep filed a photo copy of the report which is
          neither proved nor it can be taken into consideration. No FIR  has
          been filed nor the same is proved by any  police  officials.   The
          accused has also not examined  himself  or  any  other  person  in
          support of his above contention.  The contention  of  the  accused
          Sandeep that the car was stolen on 17.11.2004 from Geeta Colony is
          totally false and frivolous. ADGC contended that father of accused
          Sandeep is in police department posted as  Sub-Inspector  and  had
          tried to manipulate a false story.  The recovery  of  Indica  car,
          namely, DL 3CR 6666 on the spot  along  with  accused  persons  by
          Inspector D.N. Verma (PW-1) of PS Ratanpuri with the injured Jyoti
          is a very important factor which proved  the  involvement  of  the
          accused person and strengthens the prosecution case.”




   26.      We see no reason to differ from  the  above  conclusion  of  the
   trial Court.  If the theory of theft of Indica car is ruled out  and  the
   presence of the car on the spot was indisputable, it should automatically
   follow that the car could have been brought at that place along with  the
   deceased, driven by accused Shashi Bhushan along with Sandeep only in the
   manner narrated by the prosecution.  Apart from  merely  suggesting  that
   the Indica car was stolen which was not fully supported  by  any  legally
   admissible evidence, no other case was suggested by the appellants.

    27.     When the accused Sandeep took a positive stand that he  was  not
   present at the place of occurrence by  relying  upon  a  fact  situation,
   namely, he was not responsible for bringing the Indica car  belonging  to
   his mother at the place of occurrence along with the deceased, the burden
   was heavily upon him to establish the plea that the  car  was  stolen  on
   that very date of occurrence, namely, 17.11.2004 and, therefore, he could
   not have brought the deceased in that car at that place.   Unfortunately,
   by merely making a sketchy reference to the alleged theft of the  car  in
   the written statement and the so-called complaint said to have been filed
   with the Geeta Colony police station nothing was brought out in  evidence
   to support that stand.  In this situation, Section 106  of  the  Evidence
   Act gets attracted.  When according to the accused, they were not present
   at the place of occurrence, the burden was on them  to  have  established
   the said fact since it was  within  their  special  knowledge.   In  this
   context, the recent decision of this Court reported in – Prithipal  Singh
   and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.-(2012) 1 SCC  10  can  be  usefully
   referred to where it has been held as under in para 53 :

                 “In State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar,  this  Court  held
           that if fact is especially in the knowledge of any person,  then
           burden of proving that fact is upon him.  It is  impossible  for
           the prosecution to prove certain facts particularly  within  the
           knowledge of the  accused.   Section  106  is  not  intended  to
           relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of  the
           accused beyond reasonable doubt.  But the section would apply to
           cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts  from
           which  a  reasonable  inference  can  be  drawn  regarding   the
           existence of certain other facts, unless the accused  by  virtue
           of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed  to  offer
           any explanation which might drive the Court to draw a  different
           inference.  Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to  meet
           certain exceptional cases, in which, it would be impossible  for
           the  prosecution  to   establish   certain   facts   which   are
           particularly within the knowledge of the accused……”

      The contention of accused Sandeep was, therefore, bound  to  fail  and
   the said defence taken was not proved to the satisfaction of  the  Court.
   The failure of the accused Sandeep in not having taken any steps to prove
   the said fact strikes at the very root of the defence,  namely,  that  he
   was not present at the place of occurrence.  As a sequel to it, the  case
   of  the  prosecution  as  demonstrated  before  the  Court  stood   fully
   established.

   28.      Having regard to the above  conclusion  that  the  deceased  did
   narrate the occurrence right from the  invitation  made  by  the  accused
   Sandeep to her over phone at 6 p.m. under the  guise  of  taking  her  to
   Haridwar to marry her, that after she responded to the said call and  met
   him from where she was picked up by both the accused in  the  Indica  car
   belonging to the mother of accused Sandeep, and  the  other  sequence  of
   events, namely, the threat posed  to  the  deceased  to  get  the  foetus
   aborted and her refusal ultimately enraged the appellants  to  cause  the
   assault with the weapon,  namely,  jack  and  pana,  shaving  blades  and
   chemical acid was quite convincing and there were no good grounds to dis-
   believe her statement.  No other motive or any other basis was  shown  to
   disbelieve her statement.  In that respect, when we consider the reliance
   placed upon the admissible portion of the statement of  the  accused,  we
   are unable  to  reject  outrightly  the  entirety  of  the  statement  by
   application of Section 25 of the  Evidence  Act.   According  to  learned
   senior counsel for the appellants, the prosecution could not have  relied
   upon the confessional statement of the accused implicating themselves  in
   the offence alleged against them by virtue of Section 25 of the  Evidence
   Act.

   29.      As against the  said  submission,  Mr.  Ratnakar  Dash,  learned
   senior counsel appearing for the State rightly pointed out  that  Section
   25 of the Evidence Act can be pressed into service  only  insofar  as  it
   related to such of the statements that would implicate himself while  the
   other part of the statement not relating to the crime would be covered by
   Section 8 of the Evidence Act and that a distinction can always be  drawn
   in the statement of the accused by carefully sifting the  said  statement
   in order to identify the admission part of it as against  the  confession
   part of it.  Learned senior counsel drew our attention to the evidence of
   PW-1 where the said  witness  narrated  the  statement  made  by  accused
   Sandeep which consisted of mixture of admission as  well  as  confession.
   In that learned senior counsel pointed out that the accused Sandeep  made
   certain statements, namely; that Jyoti was working in a  mobile  shop  in
   Mayur Vihar, Phase I where he used to  visit;  that  during  that  period
   around six months before he developed physical relations with  her;  that
   the deceased Jyoti was applying pressure on him to marry  her,  and  that
   around 6 p.m. on the date of occurrence, he called her over telephone  to
   meet him at Laxmi Nagar red light.  He further told the witness that  the
   Indica car bearing registration NO.DL 3CR 6666 was owned  by  his  mother
   and that promising to marry her at Haridwar, he took the  deceased  Jyoti
   along with him.  He also told the witness that while the car  was  moving
   he asked the deceased Jyoti to get the foetus aborted to  which  she  did
   not agree.  According to PW-1, Sandeep also told him  that  he  purchased
   two bottles of acid and four blades at Modinagar, that when they  reached
   Khatoli, he saw a road free from disturbance towards  which  the  vehicle
   was driven and that in that place they were apprehended  by  the  police.
   Learned senior counsel also referred to certain other statements made  by
   Sandeep to PW-1, namely, that on that day  he  planned  with  his  friend
   Shashi Bhushan to eliminate Jyoti from his life and that when Jyoti  told
   him that she was going to reveal the fact of carrying his  child  in  her
   womb to his family members and the police, he started beating  her  along
   with his friend.  Learned senior counsel fairly  stated  that  while  the
   last part of the statement would fall under the category  of  confession,
   which would be hit  by  Section  25  of  the  Evidence  Act,  the  former
   statements which do not in any way implicate the accused to the  offence,
   would be protected by Section 8 of the Evidence Act and consequently  the
   said part of the statement was fully admissible.  We find  force  in  the
   submission of learned senior counsel for the State.  It is  quite  common
   that based on admissible portion of the statement of accused whenever and
   wherever recoveries are made, the same are admissible in evidence and  it
   is for the accused in those situations to explain to the satisfaction  of
   the Court as to the nature of recoveries and as to  how  they  came  into
   possession or for planting the same at the places from  where  they  were
   recovered.  Similarly this part of the statement which does  not  in  any
   way implicate the accused but is  mere  statement  of  facts  would  only
   amount to mere admissions which can be relied upon for  ascertaining  the
   other facts which are intrinsically connected with the occurrence,  while
   at the same time, the same would not in any way result in implicating the
   accused into the offence directly.

   30.      In that view, when we examine  the  statements  referred  to  by
   learned senior counsel for the State  which  were  stated  to  have  been
   uttered by the accused to PW-1, we find the first statement only  reveals
   the fact of accused Sandeep’s  friendship  developed  with  the  deceased
   Jyoti six months prior to the occurrence and  the  physical  relationship
   developed by him with her.  Accepting the said statement cannot  be  held
   to straightway implicate the accused into the crime and  consequently  it
   cannot be construed as a confessional statement in order  to  reject  the
   same by applying Section 25 of the evidence Act.   In  this  context  the
   reliance placed upon the decision of this Court reported in  Bheru  Singh
   S/o Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan  –  (1994)  2  SCC  467  is  quite
   apposite.  In the said decision, this Court in paragraph 16  and  19  has
   held as under:-

           “16. A confession or an admission is evidence against the  maker
           of it so long as its  admissibility  is  not  excluded  by  some
           provision of law.  Provisions  of  Sections  24  to  30  of  the
           Evidence Act  and  of  Section  164  of  the  Cr.P.C  deal  with
           confessions. By virtue of the provisions of Section  25  of  the
           Evidence Act, a confession made to a  police  officer  under  no
           circumstance is admissible in evidence against an  accused.  The
           section deals with confessions made not only  when  the  accused
           was free and not in police custody but also with the one made by
           such a person before any investigation had begun. The expression
           "accused of any offence" in Section 25 would cover the  case  of
           an accused who has since been put on trial, whether  or  not  at
           the time when he made the confessional statement, he  was  under
           arrest or  in  custody  as  an  accused  in  that  case  or  not
           inadmissibility of a confessional statement  made  to  a  police
           officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act  is  based  on  the
           ground of public policy. Section 25 of the Evidence Act not only
           bars proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a  police
           officer or made by him while in the custody of a police  officer
           but also the admission contained in the  confessional  statement
           of all incriminating facts relating  to  the  commission  of  an
           offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act deals with  partial  ban
           to the admissibility of confessions made to a person other  than
           a police officer but we are not concerned with it in this  case.
           Section 27 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of a proviso  or
           an exception, which partially lifts the ban imposed by  Sections
           25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and makes admissible  so  much  of
           such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not,  as
           relates to the fact thereby discovered, when made  by  a  person
           accused of an offence while in police custody. Under Section 164
           Cr.P.C. a statement or confession  made  in  the  course  of  an
           investigation, may be recorded by a Magistrate, subject  to  the
           safeguards imposed by the section itself and can be relied  upon
           at the trial.(emphasis supplied)


           19. From a careful perusal of this first information  report  we
           find that it discloses the motive for the murder and the  manner
           in which the appellant committed the six murders. The  appellant
           produced the blood stained sword with which according to him  he
           committed the murders. In  our  opinion  the  first  information
           report Ex. P-42, however is not a wholly confessional statement,
           but only that part of it is admissible in  evidence  which  does
           not amount to a confession and is not hit by the  provisions  of
           Section  25  of  the  Evidence  Act.  The  relationship  of  the
           appellant with the deceased; the motive for  commission  of  the
           crime and the presence of his sister-in-law PW11 do  not  amount
           to the confession of committing any crime. Those statements  are
           non-confessional in nature and can be used against the appellant
           as evidence under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The  production
           and seizure of the sword by the appellant at the police station,
           which was blood stained, is also saved by the provisions of  the
           Evidence Act. However, the statement that  the  sword  had  been
           used to commit the murders as well as the manner  of  committing
           the crime is clearly inadmissible  in  evidence.  Thus,  to  the
           limited extent as we have noticed above and save to  the  extent
           only the other portion of the first information report Ex.  P-42
           must be excluded from evidence as  the  rest  of  the  statement
           amounts to  confession  of  committing  the  crime  and  is  not
           admissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)


   31.      Another submission made on behalf of  the  appellants  was  that
   there was inordinate delay in sending the express report as  well  as  in
   altering the offence.  The crime was initially registered  as  one  under
   Section 307, IPC and subsequently altered as one under Section 302,  IPC.
   It was pointed out that immediately after registration of the  FIR  based
   on the complaint of PW1 at 23.15  hours  on  17.11.2004,  the  crime  was
   registered under Section 307, etc., the same came to be altered  only  on
   20.11.2004 even though the factum  of  the  death  of  the  deceased  was
   intimated by PW-6  on  19.11.2004  itself  by  1  p.m.   It  was  further
   contended that the registration of the complaint after its alteration  on
   20.11.2004, the express report was forwarded to the  Magistrate  only  on
   25.11.2004 which was in  derogation  of  the  prescription  contained  in
   Section 157, Cr.P.C. Based on the above discrepancies, it  was  contended
   that the purported delay was  only  to  antedate  the  FIR  to  suit  the
   convenience of the prosecution. The submission is on the footing that the
   prosecution developed the case for  implicating  the  accused  while  the
   accused were not really involved in the offence and, therefore, they took
   their own time to register the complaint.  In order to support  the  said
   stand, learned counsel also went on to rely upon the statement of PW-1 as
   compared to Soubir Singh (PW-5), that while PW-1 stated in  his  evidence
   that they reached back the police station at around 23.45 hours, PW-5  in
   whose presence the complaint was stated to have been registered mentioned
   the time as 23.15 hours.  We do not find any serious infirmity  based  on
   the said statement.  When the preference of the complaint by PW-1 and its
   registration cannot be  doubted  in  the  absence  of  any  flaw  in  its
   preference and registration, minor difference in the timing mentioned  by
   the witnesses cannot be taken so very seriously to  hold  that  the  very
   registration of the complaint was doubtful.  In fact PW-1  in  his  chief
   examination in another place has also referred to the registration of the
   FIR at 23.15 hours though the appellants counsel wanted to  rely  on  the
   statement of the said witness to the effect that they  all  reached  back
   the police station at around 23.45 hours.  Apparently, there  appears  to
   be some mistake in recording the timing as stated  by  PW-1.   Therefore,
   nothing turns much on the said submission  of  learned  counsel  for  the
   appellants.  As far as the contention that there was  considerable  delay
   in altering the offence from Section 307, IPC to  Section  302,  IPC  was
   concerned the said submission was made by referring to  the  evidence  of
   the Doctor (PW-6) who conducted the post-mortem that  by  10.55  p.m.  on
   17.11.2004 itself the death of the deceased was confirmed when the victim
   was admitted to the hospital which was also  known  to  Constable  Rambir
   Singh who accompanied the victim to the hospital.  It  was  also  pointed
   out that PW-6 sent the intimation about the death of the deceased to  the
   police station at 23.10 hours while keeping the body in the mortuary.  To
   the above submission, on behalf  of  the  State,  it  was  sought  to  be
   explained that even though the  death  intimation  was  dated  17.11.2004
   itself, since the post-mortem was held only on 19.11.2004 and  the  post-
   mortem report was received on 20.11.2004 the offence came to  be  altered
   based  on  the  post-mortem  report  on  20.11.2004.   Though  the   said
   explanation cannot be said to be fully satisfactory, it will have  to  be
   stated that when there was no serious infirmity in  the  registration  of
   the FIR based on the complaint on 17.11.2004 (i.e.) immediately after the
   occurrence and every follow-up action was being  taken  meticulously,  we
   hold that such a minor discrepancy in the timing  of  alteration  of  the
   crime by itself  cannot be held to be so  very  serious  to  suspect  the
   registration of the crime or go to the extent of holding that  there  was
   any deliberate attempt on the part of the prosecution to  ante  date  the
   FIR for that purpose.  We have already held that  the  accused  miserably
   failed to substantiate the stand that he was not present at the  spot  of
   occurrence  whereas  he  was  really  apprehended  on  the  spot  by  the
   prosecution witnesses and was brought to the  police  station  from  whom
   other recoveries were made.   The  submission  by  referring  to  certain
   insignificant facts relating to the delay  in  the  alteration  of  crime
   cannot be held to be so very fatal to the case of the prosecution.

   32.      It was also feebly contended on behalf of  the  appellants  that
   the express report was not forwarded  to  the  Magistrate  as  stipulated
   under  Section  157,  Cr.P.C.  instantaneously.    According  to  learned
   counsel FIR which was initially registered  on  17.11.2004  was  given  a
   number on 19.11.2004 as  FIR  No.116  of  2004  and  it  was  altered  on
   20.11.2004 and was forwarded only on 25.11.2004 to  the  Magistrate.   As
   far as the said contention is concerned, we only wish  to  refer  to  the
   reported decision of this Court in Pala Singh and  Another  v.  State  of
   Punjab - AIR 1972 SC 2679 wherein this Court has clearly held that  where
   the FIR was actually recorded without delay and the investigation started
   on the basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought  to  the
   notice of the Court then, however improper or objectionable the delay  in
   receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned, in the absence of  any
   prejudice to the accused it cannot by itself justify the conclusion  that
   the investigation was tainted and  prosecution  insupportable.   Applying
   the above ratio to the case on hand, while pointing out the delay in  the
   forwarding of the FIR to the Magistrate, no prejudice was  said  to  have
   been caused to the appellants by virtue of the said delay.  As far as the
   commencement of the investigation  is  concerned,  our  earlier  detailed
   discussion discloses that there was no dearth in that  aspect.   In  such
   circumstances we do not find any infirmity in the case of prosecution  on
   that score.  In fact the above  decision  was  subsequently  followed  in
   Ishwar Singh v. State of Uttar  Pradesh-AIR  1976  SC  2423  and  Subhash
   Chander etc. v. Krishan Lal & Ors. -AIR 2001  SC 1903.

   33.      Another submission made on behalf  of  the  appellant  was  that
   there were serious infirmities in preserving and testing of the sample of
   the foetus and the consequent DNA report implicating the accused  Sandeep
   to the destruction of the foetus whose biological father was found to  be
   the accused himself.  The infirmity pointed out was that  the  sample  of
   the foetus of the child was taken as early as on 17.11.2004 while it  was
   sent for forensic lab only on 25.01.2005 and that since there was a  long
   gap in between, the prosecution ought to have disclosed  as  to  how  the
   samples were properly preserved in order to  ensure  proper  test  to  be
   conducted for ascertaining the correctness of its outcome.   Though  such
   submission was made with some emphasis, it was not pointed out as to what
   was the nature of procedure to be followed in regard to the  preservation
   of the samples taken apart from what was followed in taking  the  samples
   by the prosecution.  It is not in dispute  that  at  the  time  of  post-
   mortem, when the foetus was discovered, the same was preserved by  taking
   two samples one in the  Formalin  solution  and  the  other  one  by  ice
   preservation.  It is borne out by record that there  was  an  FSL  report
   dated 5.1.2005 as per which the SSP of Muzaffarnagar  was  informed  that
   the foetus which was preserved in  Formalin  solution  was  not  accepted
   since laboratory had no standard protocol for extracting the  amplifiable
   DNA of Formalin preserved tissues.

   34.      Therefore, in the evidence of PW-10 Junior Scientific Officer of
   Central Forensic Laboratory, Chandigarh, it  was  brought  out  that  the
   blood samples of accused Sandeep  and  the  foetus  received  by  him  on
   27.01.2005 and that necessary test was conducted based on which a  report
   on 13B/1, 13A/2 and 13C/3 were forwarded which confirmed that the accused
   Sandeep was the biological father of the foetus.  He  also  confirmed  in
   the cross examination that the earlier  sample  of  foetus  preserved  in
   Formalin solution  received  on  05.01.2005  was  returned  back  without
   opening the seal as the same was kept in Formalin solution  and  standard
   protocol analysis was  not  available  in  the  laboratory.   He  further
   confirmed that when the sample on second time was received along with the
   letter dated 25.1.2005, the same was preserved in  ice  separately  which
   they were able to test in their laboratory for finding  out  the  result.
   It has also  come  in  his  evidence  that  the  collection  of  samples,
   preservation of samples and transportation of samples  if  not  carefully
   done, it may affect the result, but  in  the  case  on  hand  the  result
   reported by him was not based on wrong facts.  In the light of  the  said
   expert evidence of the Junior Scientific Officer it is too  late  in  the
   day for the appellant-Sandeep to contend that  improper  preservation  of
   the foetus would have resulted in a wrong report to the effect  that  the
   accused Sandeep was found to be  the  biological  father  of  the  foetus
   received from  the  deceased  Jyoti.   As  the  said  submission  is  not
   supported by any relevant material on record and as the appellant was not
   able  to  substantiate  the  said  argument  with  any  other  supporting
   material, we do not find any  substance  in  the  said  submission.   The
   circumstance, namely, the report of the  DNA  in  having  concluded  that
   accused Sandeep was the biological father  of  the  recovered  foetus  of
   Jyoti was one other relevant circumstance to prove the guilt of the  said
   accused.

   35.      There were certain other  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the
   appellants, namely, the seizure of materials from  the  car  were  highly
   doubtful etc. We do not find any serious lacunae pointed out  in  support
   of the said submissions.  As rightly submitted on behalf of  the  learned
   senior counsel for the State, the discrepancies were minor  in  character
   and we do not find any serious infirmity based on the said  discrepancies
   argued on behalf of the accused/appellants.  In the light  of  the  above
   conclusion, we find that the chain of circumstances alleged  against  the
   appellants  was  conclusively  proved  without  any  missing  link.   We,
   therefore, do not find any scope to interfere with the conviction arrived
   at against the appellants by the trial Court as confirmed by the Division
   Bench of the High Court.

   36.      We, therefore, do not find  any  scope  to  interfere  with  the
   sentence of life and  other  sentences  imposed  against  accused  Shashi
   Bhushan under Section 302, IPC read with Section  34,  IPC  by  the  High
   Court and the other sentences under Section 316 read with Section 34 IPC.



   37.      When we come to the question of sentence of death as imposed  by
   learned Sessions Judge, which was also confirmed by the Division Bench as
   against the accused Sandeep, the same will have to  be  examined  in  the
   light of the principles laid down in the various decisions of this  Court
   right from Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1980  (2)  SCC  684],  Machhi
   Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1983  SC 957], Swamy Shraddananda v.  State
   of Karnataka [2008 (13) SCC 767], Santosh Kumar Satishbushan  Bariyar  v.
   State of Maharashtra [2009 (6) SCC 498],  Mohd.  Farooq  Abdul  Gafur  v.
   State of Maharashtra [2010 (14) SCC 641], Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State
   of Maharashtra [2011(12) SCC 56], State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji
   Adsul [AIR 2011 SC  2689].   The  principle  of  ‘rarest  of  rare  case’
   enunciated in Bachan Singh(supra) has been restated and  emphasized  time
   and again in the above referred to decisions.  In order to appreciate the
   principle in a nutshell, what is stated in Haresh Mohandas Rajput (supra)
   can be usefully referred to which reads as under:-
            “20. The rarest of rare case” comes when a convict would  be  a
       menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful coexistence of  the
       society.  The crime may be heinous or brutal but may not be  in  the
       category of “the rarest of the rare case”.  There must be no  reason
       to believe that the accused cannot be reformed or rehabilitated  and
       that he is likely to continue criminal acts  of  violence  as  would
       constitute a continuing threat to the society.  The accused may be a
       menace to the society and would continue to be so,  threatening  its
       peaceful and harmonious coexistence.  The manner in which the  crime
       is committed must be such that it may result in intense and  extreme
       indignation of the community and shock the collective conscience  of
       the society.  Where an accused does  not  act  on  any  spur-of-the-
       moment provocation and indulges himself in  a  deliberately  planned
       crime and meticulously executes it, the death sentence  may  be  the
       most appropriate punishment for such a  ghastly  crime.   The  death
       sentence may be warranted where the victims  are  innocent  children
       and helpless women.  Thus, in case the crime is committed in a  most
       cruel and inhuman manner which is  an  extremely  brutal,  grotesque
       diabolical, revolting and dastardly manner, where  his  act  affects
       the entire moral fibre of the society e.g. crime committed for power
       of political ambition or indulging in organized criminal activities,
       death sentence should be awarded.”

    It is, therefore, well-settled that awarding of life  sentence  is  the
    rule, death is an exception.  The application of the  ‘rarest  of  rare
    case’ principle is dependant  upon  and  differs  from  case  to  case.
    However, the principles laid down earlier and restated in  the  various
    decisions of this Court referred to above can be broadly stated that in
    a deliberately planned  crime,  executed  meticulously  in  a  diabolic
    manner, exhibiting inhuman conduct in a  ghastly  manner  touching  the
    conscience of everyone and thereby  disturb  the  moral  fibre  of  the
    society would call for imposition of capital  punishment  in  order  to
    ensure that it acts as a deterrent. While we  are  convinced  that  the
    case of the prosecution based on the evidence displayed, confirmed  the
    commission of offence by the appellants, without any iota of doubt,  we
    are of the considered opinion, that still the case does not fall within
    the four corners of the principle of the ‘rarest  of  the  rare  case’.
    However, considering the plight of the hapless young lady, who  fell  a
    victim to the avaricious conduct and lust of the appellant Sandeep, the
    manner in which the life of the deceased was snatched away  by  causing
    multiple injuries all over the body  with  all  kinds  of  weapons,  no
    leniency can be shown to the said appellant.  In the decision  reported
    in Swamy Sharaddananda (supra) even while setting aside the sentence of
    death penalty and awarding the life imprisonment, it was explained that
    in order to serve ends of justice, the appellant therein should not  be
    released from the prison till the end of his life.  Likewise, in Ramraj
    v. State of Chhattisgarh [AIR 2010 SC 420] this  Court,  while  setting
    aside the death sentence, directed that the  appellant  therein  should
    serve a minimum period of 20 years including the remissions  and  would
    not be released on completion of 14 years of imprisonment.

    38.     Taking note of the above decision and also taking into  account
    the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, while holding that the
    imposition of death sentence to the accused Sandeep was  not  warranted
    and while awarding life imprisonment we hold that accused Sandeep  must
    serve  a  minimum  of  30  years  in  jail  without  remissions  before
    consideration of his case for premature release.

    39.     Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009 and the Criminal  Reference  No.19
    of 2007 thus stand disposed of modifying  the  punishments  imposed  on
    accused Sandeep as one for life and he should undergo the said sentence
    of life for a fixed period of 30 years  without  any  remission  to  be
    allowed.   The  Criminal  Appeal  Nos.1425-26/2011  of  accused  Shashi
    Bhushan stand dismissed.
                                       ….…………………………...J.           [Dr. B.S.
                                                                    Chauhan]


                                                              ………………………………J.
                                    [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]


      New Delhi;
      May 11, 2012
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