REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPEALATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1042 OF 2002
Kathi Bharat Vajsur & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State of Gujarat ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
H.L. DATTU, J.
1) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No.
744/1985 dated 15.07.2002. By the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Amreli in Sessions Case No. 22/84 and convicted the two
appellants for the offence punishable under section 302 read with section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“the IPC” for short], sentencing them
to imprisonment for life and a fine of ` 1000/- each, in default of which
they are directed to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six
months.
2) At the outset, we note that initially there were three accused before
the Trial Court, and they were all acquitted for the offences alleged
against them. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court,
A1 (Kathi Fakira Vajsur) expired, and the appeal stood abated as against
him. The other two accused, namely A2 (Kathi Bharat Vajsur) and A3 (Kathi
Ramku Vajsur) are prosecuting this appeal. During the pendency of this
appeal, this Court had enlarged the appellants on bail vide order dated
03.12.2002.
3) The factual scenario giving rise to the present appeal is as follows:
The case of the prosecution is that, a part of the adjoining land of the
primary school in village Gigasan was leased out to A1, where he had
constructed a storage tank for storage of kerosene. It was resolved by the
Gigasan Panchayat to give the road between the school and the tank to the
school for their use. Therefore, Panchayat had proposed to construct a
wall on the land so granted. Prior to the date of the incident, when one
Amra Pitha and other labourers had commenced the work on the said plot, A1
protested to it and did not permit them to carry out the proposed work,
due to which Amra Pitha had to complain to the Sarpanch Jagu Dada and the
Secretary of the Panchayat Shri. Kanubhai about the interference caused by
A1. On the morning of the incident, i.e. 30th March 1984, when Jagu Dada
(PW6), Mulu Dada (deceased) and Dhoha Vasta (Informant) informed the
President of the Taluka Development Officer about the attitude of A1
towards Amra Pitha and other labourers, he directed Mulu Dada to ignore
the threat and complete the construction as resolved by the Panchayat.
4) On the same day, at about 3.30 pm, PW6, the deceased and two labourers,
namely Jetha (PW8) and Natha (PW7) went to the plot and began the
construction work as directed and they were assisted by Manjibhai and
Patel who were teachers working in the Primary School. When they began
digging for laying the foundation, A1 along with his brothers A2 and A3
came near the plot and asked them not to dig the pit. After verbal
exchange, A1 took out a double bore tamancha from his pocket and pointed
at PW6, and threatened him to leave. On his refusal to leave, A1 opened
fire which caused injury on his right hand and thereafter, again fired on
the chest of PW6. Meantime, A2 also fired from tamancha on the person of
Mulu Dada due to which Mulu Dada fell down, after which A3 caused injury
on the head with an axe which he was carrying with him. Thereafter they
fled from the place of incident. Due to the injuries caused, Mulu Dada
died on the spot. Immediately, PW5 reported the incident to the Police
Station, Dhari and on the basis of the written report the Station Officer
took-up the investigation and on completion thereof charge-sheet was
filed against the accused persons for the offences punishable under
Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for
short ‘the IPC’).
5) To substantiate its accusation, prosecution examined several witnesses
to prove its case before the Trial Court. The Trial Court, after
considering the entire evidence on record, acquitted the accused persons,
on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt.
6) Aggrieved by the same, the State preferred an appeal before the Gujarat
High Court. The Court, after examining the entire evidence on record, has
set aside the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court, and convicted
A2 and A3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, sentencing
them to life imprisonment and a fine of ` 1000/- each. However, as far as
A1 was concerned, the appeal had abated due to his death. Aggrieved by
the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court, the accused
-appellants are before us in this appeal.
7) Shri. Dholakia, learned senior counsel, submitted that the Trial Court
was justified in acquitting the accused persons, as the Trial Court had
recorded that there are material contradictions in the statements of PW5
and PW6 recorded by the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as “the Code”] and the evidence
that was tendered in the Court during the trial. He further submits that
the tamancha allegedly used, was a single barrel gun, which needs to be
reloaded after firing a single shot and that there was no evidence of
such reloading. By referring to the testimony of the ballistic expert (PW
18), the learned senior counsel would state that the answer given by him
was not conclusive whether such a fire arm could have been used. He
would submit that since the conviction and sentence is imposed under
Section 302 r/w Section 34, it was required for the prosecution to prove
which injury was caused by which accused and which injury was fatal to
the life of the accused. He would emphasize that there must be a live
link between all the alleged events, in order to prove the guilt of the
appellants beyond reasonable doubt, which he would submit, is missing in
this case.
8) The four main contradictions/discrepancies that Shri. Dholakia points
out in the prosecution story are: (a) The eye witnesses (PW5 and PW6),
when they were shown the arms recovered, emphatically denied that those
were not the arms used on the date of the incident; (b) the sequence of
the shooting by A1 and A2, and who shot whom was not clear from the
testimony of PW5 and PW6 when read along with their statements recorded
under section 161 of the Code; (c) that the clothes of PW5, which were
seized and who is said to have carried the body of the deceased, had
absolutely no blood stains on his clothes; and (d) the conduct of the
injured witness (PW6), in running away from the scene of the incident to
a room and locking himself, and then running back to the scene of the
incident, was suspicious and abnormal. Shri. Dholakia would then submit
that if two views are possible, then the one that was in favour of the
accused requires to be adopted. In conclusion, it is submitted that the
Trial Court, which had observed the demeanour of the witnesses and
considered all the facts and circumstances, had rightly acquitted the
appellants of all charges. It is also contended that in the absence of
any perversity or omission to consider material evidence or apparent
error in law, the judgment of the Trial Court was not open to
interference in an appeal against acquittal.
9) Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State
would fairly submit that some contradictions or discrepancies could be
found in the evidence recorded, but would contend that if the evidence is
read as a whole, there would not be even an iota of doubt left as to the
guilt of the appellants. She would further submit that even if portions
of the evidence of the hostile witnesses are eschewed from consideration,
still it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion as has been done by
the High Court. The learned counsel would rely on the testimony of PW6,
who is an injured witness to establish the presence of all the three
accused at the time of the incident. PW6 has further described the kind
of injuries that he had sustained, which, she would submit would
corroborate with the medical evidence as well as the testimony of the
doctor who had treated the injured witness. The learned counsel would
submit that though, PW6 may be confused about the sequence of the gun
shots, there is absolutely no dispute as to who fired the shots at the
deceased person. Smt. Divan would further refer to the evidence of PW12
(Manjibhai), a teacher in the Primary School, who has also testified that
the three accused were present at the scene of occurrence and they were
carrying tamanchas and one of them an axe, and that there was an heated
altercation between the accused persons and the deceased (PW5 and PW6),
when he (PW12) left the scene. She would also state that he had heard the
gun shots, and when he came out, saw the corpse of the deceased in pool
of blood. The learned counsel would then refers to the evidence of PW7
and PW8, the labourers who were present at the place of the incident, who
have also testified that the accused had come to the place with tamanchas
and axe, and that there was altercation between the accused and the
deceased, PW5 and PW6. They also testified that they had heard the gun
shots. She would then refer to the evidence of PW16 (Lakha), who had also
heard the gun shots fired, and was told about the incident by PW5.
10) Smt. Divan would fairly submit that though PW7, PW8 and PW12 are all
declared hostile, yet, she would state that by reading their evidence
with the evidence of PW5, PW6 and PW16, it is clear that the deceased,
PW5 and PW6 were present at the place of the incident, and so were the
accused appellants armed with tamanchas and axe. She would further submit
that the factum of an altercation between the two parties was also
established from the evidence on record, and that of the gun shots fired.
With this evidence, Smt. Divan would submit, it is clear beyond any doubt
that the death of the deceased was caused by the accused appellants, and
strongly refuted the contention of Shri. Dholakia that two views were
possible, stating that on this evidence no other view was possible, apart
from the view taken by the High Court.
11) Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel, would submit that this Court must
not give undue importance to the non-recognition of the weapons by PW5
and PW6 during the trial. According to the learned counsel, the panch
witnesses have identified the weapons recovered at the instance of the
accused during the trial. She would, for this purpose, refers to the
evidence of PW10 (Vallabhbhai), who not only narrated the place and
manner in which the axe and the other weapons were recovered at the
instance of A2, but also identified the same when shown the same in
Court. She would further state that it is reasonable for the
eyewitnesses, one of whom was injured in the incident, not to have seen
the weapons in the commotion of the incident properly. To sum up, the
learned counsel submits that the High Court, after re-appreciating the
entire evidence on record, has come to the conclusion that the Trial
Court has fallen in error in magnifying the minor contradictions to
arrive at a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
12) The circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with the
finding of the Trial Court are now well settled by catena of decisions of
this Court. In Dwarka Dass v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 204, the
dicta of all these decisions has been crystallized thus:
“2. While there cannot be any denial of the factum that the power and
authority to apprise the evidence in an appeal, either against
acquittal or conviction stands out to be very comprehensive and wide,
but if two views are reasonably possible, on the state of evidence:
one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then
and in that event the High Court would not be justified in interfering
with an order of acquittal, merely because it feels that it, sitting
as a trial court, would have taken the other view. While re-
appreciating the evidence, the rules of prudence requires that the
High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of
the trial Judge...”
13) In the case of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab 2000 Crl. LJ 3462
(SC), this Court has held that the High Court is entitled to re-
appreciate the evidence if it is found that the view taken by the
acquitting Court was not a possible view or that it was a perverse or
infirm or palpably erroneous view or the Trial Court taken into
consideration inconsequential circumstances or has acted with material
irregularity or has rejected the evidence of eye-witnesses on wrong
assumptions.
14) It is also now well settled that in a criminal trial the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, in order to convict him.
This court in the case of State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC
302, held:
“25. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of
an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher
standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of
probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of
one piece of evidence by another a learned Author says:
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate
pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they
tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be
said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of
evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the
prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally
dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged
confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the
defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather
than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be
multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the
other.”
Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for
abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than
truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over-
emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to
the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from the
lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt
is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the
evidence in the case.
26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot
obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically
enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the
evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust
common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.
While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused
persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed
legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration
of criminal justice.”
15) In the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 445, it is
observed:
“4……. The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent
man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to
circumstances. Exaggeration devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt
must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby
destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea
that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an
innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to
law.
5. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that
is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of
the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which
would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion.
Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of
the offence to be investigated.”
16) Now coming back to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that in
the incident, said to have taken place on 30th March, one person is
killed and the other person is seriously injured. In the trial, the
injured has fully supported the case of the prosecution. His evidence
finds support from the evidence of PW6 and the evidence of Doctor, PW 16.
While hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have also
perused the entire evidence on record, we are of the view that Trial
Court had erred in holding that the prosecution had not been able to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. We are inclined to agree with the
submission of Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, that by relying on the evidence of PW5, PW6, PW7, PW8, PW12
and PW 16, there can be no doubt that the A1, A2 and A3 were present at
the place of the incident and were carrying tamanchas and axe, and that,
there was an altercation between the accused persons and PW5, PW6 and the
deceased, and that gun shots were fired and the deceased died because of
the gun shot injuries and the blow on the head with the axe by A3.
Perhaps the Trial Court took a hyper-technical view by primarily
concentrating on minor contradictions to hold that the prosecution has
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. We are
not in agreement with the findings and conclusions reached by the Trial
Court.
17) The argument canvassed by Shri. S.K. Dholakia, learned senior counsel,
appearing for the appellants, that there was material discrepancies in
the evidence adduced by the eyewitnesses PW5 and PW6, with regard to the
sequence of shots fired and who shot whom. This, the learned senior
counsel would submit, is enough to punch a hole in the prosecution story.
He would further state that the High Court has brushed aside these
contradictions merely terming them as minor contradictions. Per contra,
Smt. Divan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, while not
denying that there were some discrepancies in the evidence given by PW5
and PW6, would state that on a complete reading of the evidence, there is
no doubt about the guilt of the accused. We are inclined to agree with
the learned counsel for the respondent.
18) In the case of Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525, this
Court held:
“12. It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or
embellishment — sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to
offer embellishment and sometimes in their overanxiety they may give a
slightly exaggerated account. The court can sift the chaff from the
grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses.
Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be
considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. If this element
is satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court
to accept the stated evidence though not however in the absence of the
same.”
19) This Court, in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State
of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, summarized the law on material
contradictions in evidence thus:
“Material contradictions
30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into
consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such
magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor
contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on
trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case
should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety.
The trial court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an
opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate court
in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again
without justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan.)
31. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a
serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the other
witness also makes material improvements before the court in order to
make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such
evidence. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh.)
32. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found to be
not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting
their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire
confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and
contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already
recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that the prosecution proved
its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State
of U.P.)
33. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his
statement under Section 161 CrPC, has not disclosed certain facts but
meets the prosecution case first time before the court, such version
lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide State v. Sait.)
34. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, while dealing with this issue,
this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 754, para 8)
“8. … In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal
discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. These
discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors
of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like.
Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
expected of a normal person.”
35. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy
belongs. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of
a party's case, material discrepancies do so. (See Syed Ibrahim v.
State of A.P.6 and Arumugam v. State.)
36. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh this Court examined the
issue and held: (SCC p. 192, para 9)
“9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it
can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution
version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being
tested on the touchstone of credibility.”
37. While deciding such a case, the court has to apply the aforesaid
tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as
improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by
the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in
material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect
the trial or core of the prosecution case, render the testimony of the
witness liable to be discredited.”
20) Moreover, by reading the evidence of the PW1 (Kamlesh), PW2 (Dr.
Savjibhai) and PW3 (Dr. Shobhanaben), the injuries on PW6 and the
deceased have come to light. These injuries are consistent with the
testimony of the evidence tendered by the eyewitnesses, namely PW5 and
PW6. This Court, in the case of Rakesh v. State of M.P.,(2011) 9 SCC 698,
held:
“13. It is a settled legal proposition that the ocular evidence would
have primacy unless it is established that oral evidence is totally
irreconcilable with the medical evidence. More so, the ocular
testimony of a witness has a greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis
medical evidence; when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony
improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the
evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so
far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular
evidence if proved, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. (Vide
State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. and Bhajan
Singh v. State of Haryana.)”
21) When the medical evidence is in consonance with the principal part of
the oral/ocular evidence thereby supporting the prosecution story, there
is no question of ruling out the ocular evidence merely on the ground
that there are some inconsistencies or contradictions in the oral
evidence. We are not inclined to agree with Shri. Dholakia on this count.
22) Shri. Dholakia would lay emphasis on the unusual conduct of PW6 after
the occurrence of the incident and therefore submits that the learned
trial judge was justified in disbelieving the evidence of PW6. We cannot
agree. This Court, in the case of Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp
SCC 241, held:
“11.… Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally
insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They
withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves
away from the court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime
like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they
should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general
public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in
village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with
which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court,
therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of
independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the
prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due
regard to probability if any, suggested by the accused. The court,
however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not
react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror
stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature
may react differently. Their course of conduct may not be of ordinary
type in the normal circumstances. The court, therefore, cannot reject
their evidence merely because they have behaved or reacted in an
unusual manner. In Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana Chinnappa Reddy,
J., speaking for this Court succinctly set out what might be the
behaviour of different persons witnessing the same incident. The
learned Judge observed: [SCC p. 330, SCC (Cri) p. 604, para 6]
“Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are
stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become
hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run
away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible.
Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the
extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his
own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To
discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not
react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly
unrealistic and unimaginative way.””
23) We are in agreement with the above observations. When an eyewitness
behaves in a manner that perhaps would be unusual, it is not for the
prosecution or the Court to go into the question as to why he reacted in
such a manner. As has been rightly observed by his lordship O.
Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Rana Pratap’s case (supra.) there is no fixed
pattern of reaction of an eyewitness to a crime. When faced with what is
termed as ‘an unusual reaction’ of an eyewitness, the Court must only
examine whether the prosecution story is in anyway affected by such
reaction. If the answer is in the negative, then such reaction is
irrelevant. We are afraid that the unusual behaviour of the injured
eyewitness, PW6, will not, in anyway, aid the appellants to punch a hole
on to the prosecution story.
24) Shri. Dholakia, learned senior counsel, would emphasis on the fact that
when the eyewitnesses PW5 and PW6 were shown the weapons recovered, they
explicitly stated that these were not the weapons used for by the
accused. He would state that this was a major discrepancy in the case of
the prosecution. In support of this, he would rely on the case of
Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of UP, (2009) 11 SCC 334. In reply, Smt.
Divan, learned counsel, would submit that it would be more reliable to
rely on the evidence of the Panch witness (PW10) and the PSI (PW20) than
on the eyewitnesses for the purpose of identifying the weapons,
especially when the weapons were recovered at the instance of the accused
persons. She would further state that in the commotion of the incident,
it is possible that the eyewitnesses might not have clearly seen the
weapons. We find that the argument of the learned counsel for the
respondent is reasonable and therefore, we accept the same.
25) When the entire evidence on record is considered, the fact that the
eyewitnesses did not recognize the weapons used, makes no difference to
the prosecution story.
26) We are afraid the decision of this Court in the case of Mahendra Pratap
Singh (supra.) cited by Shri. Dholakia would not help the appellants, as
in the case not only were the weapons used identified, but also the
evidence on record did not inspire confidence in the story of the
prosecution. In that case, this Court came to conclude that two views
were possible, and therefore gave the benefit of the same to the accused.
In the instant case, cumulative reading of the entire evidence makes the
prosecution story believable, thereby proving the guilt of the accused
appellants beyond any doubt. The High Court in the impugned judgment has
correctly appreciated the evidence on record, and we do not find any
infirmity in the same, therefore we uphold the conviction of guilt and
sentence imposed by the High Court.
27) In the light of the above discussion, we see no merit in the appeal and
accordingly, the same is dismissed. The appellants have been enlarged on
bail during the pendency of this appeal before this Court. Therefore, the
Jurisdictional Jail Superintendent is directed that the appellants herein
be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence of life
imprisonment.
..........................J.
(H.L.Dattu)
..........................J.
(anil r. dave)
NEW DELHI,
May 08, 2012.
