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Friday, May 11, 2012

whether the deceased knew or did not know swimming. But that issue may have assumed importance if the deceased was not disabled by the assault on a vital part of his body. In the case at hand he was assaulted with a sharp edged weapon on the head and was bleeding. His ability to swim, assuming he knew how to swim, was not, therefore, of any use to him. The injury on the head and the push into the sea have, therefore, to be construed as one single act which the appellant ought to have known was likely to cause death of the deceased. Even so exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC would come to the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the act of the appellant even when tantamount to commission of culpable homicide will not amount to murder as the same was committed without any pre-meditation and in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, in the course of a sudden quarrel without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The prosecution evidence sufficiently suggests that a scuffle had indeed taken place on the dinghy where the appellant and his companions were trying to recover the dinghy while the deceased was preventing them from doing so. In the course of this sudden fight and in the heat of passion the appellant assaulted the deceased and pushed him into the sea eventually resulting in his death. The act of the appellant is more appropriately punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC instead of Section 302 of the Code invoked by the Courts below. The appeal must to that extent succeed. 17. In the result, we allow this appeal in part and to the extent that while setting aside the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC, we convict him for culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years. Sentence of fine and imprisonment in default of payment of fine is, however, affirmed.




                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  801  OF 2012
                (Arising out S.L.P. (Crl.) No.10394 of 2010)


Abdul Nawaz                                  …Appellant

      Versus

State of West Bengal                         …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment and order  dated
30th August, 2010 passed by the High  Court  of  Calcutta  whereby  Criminal
Appeal No.5 of 2010 filed by the appellant assailing  his  conviction  under
Section 302 of the IPC and sentence of life  imprisonment  with  a  fine  of
Rs.50,000/- and a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment  for  two  years
has been dismissed.

3.    Two policemen deployed on patrol duty examined at the trial as  PWs  1
& 3 reached Chatham Jetty at about 23.50 hrs. on the 19th  of  March,  2008.
While at the Jetty they started smelling diesel odour  and  suspecting  that
something fishy was going on, parked their motor cycle to  take  a  walk  in
the surrounding area.  Soon they noticed that  two  dinghies  were  tied  to
M.V. Pillokunji, a vehicle ferry boat stationed at  the  jetty.  In  one  of
these dinghies there were 20 drums besides  a  man  present  on  the  dinghy
while in the other there were three to four men and  14  drums,  which  were
being filled with diesel using a plastic  pipeline  drawn  from  the  vessel
mentioned above.  The suspects jumped in to one  of  the  two  dinghies  and
escaped,  when  they  saw  the  approaching  policemen  that  included  Head
Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-2) and Constable K.Vijay Rao (PW-5).   The  police
party, it appears, tried to contact police station Chatham and  the  Control
Room. While they were doing so the Engineer, Master and the  Laskar  of  the
said vessel attempted to snatch the VHF set from them.   The  police  party,
therefore, caught hold of these persons as they appeared  to  be  in  league
with the miscreants, who had  escaped.  Soon  thereafter  arrived  Constable
Amit Talukdar (PW-4) and the deceased Head Constable Shri Shaji from  Police
Station, Chatham.  After hearing the version from the patrolling  constables
and the PCR van personnel who too had  arrived  on  the  spot  the  deceased
informed the SHO, Chatham police station and  requested  him  to  reach  the
spot.  In the meantime, the deceased and PW-1 boarded the  dinghy  that  had
been left behind by the miscreants leaving the three  crew  members  of  the
vessel under the vigil of the remaining members of the police  party.   PW-1
who accompanied the deceased on to the dinghy firmly tied the  rope  of  the
dinghy but while both of them were still in the  dinghy,  the  other  dinghy
that had earlier fled away returned to the spot with four persons on  board.
 The prosecution case is that the appellant and one Abdul Gaffar were  among
those who entered the dinghy and got into a scuffle  with  the  deceased  to
secure the release  of  the  dinghy.  In  the  course  of  the  scuffle  the
appellant is alleged to have picked up a dao (sharp edged  weapon  lying  in
the dinghy) and inflicted an  injury  on  the  head  of  the  deceased.  The
appellant is then alleged to have pushed the  deceased  into  the  sea.  The
rope of the dinghy was cut  by  the  miscreants  to  escape  in  the  dinghy
towards Bambooflat.
4.    A search for the deceased was launched by the SHO after he arrived  on
the spot which proved futile.  His dead body was eventually  recovered  from
the sea by the Coast Guard Divers on 20th March, 2008 at about  6.15  hours.
The inquest was followed by the post-mortem examination  of  the  dead  body
conducted by Dr. Subrata Saha.  Statements of  witnesses  were  recorded  in
the course of investigation and the dao recovered culminating in the  filing
of a  charge-sheet  against  as  many  as  seventeen  persons  for  offences
punishable under Sections 302/392/411/201/120B/341/109 IPC.  The  case  was,
in due course, committed for trial to the court of Sessions  Judge,  Andaman
& Nicobar Islands at Port Blair before whom the accused pleaded  not  guilty
and claimed a trial.
5.    At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 66  witnesses  apart
from placing reliance upon an equal number of documents marked at the  trial
apart from material exhibits. The accused did not examine any witnesses  but
produced a few documents in support of their defence.
6.    The Trial Court eventually convicted the appellant for an  offence  of
murder punishable under Section  302,  IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo
imprisonment for life.  A-1 to A-3 were also similarly  convicted  but  only
for offences punishable under Sections 332/34  of  the  IPC.  The  remaining
accused  persons  charged  with  commission  of  offences  punishable  under
Sections 392/409/411 of the IPC were, however, acquitted.
7.    Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded to them, A-1  to  A-3
and the  appellant  herein  preferred  appeals  before  the  High  Court  of
Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port  Blair.   By  the  impugned  judgment  under
appeal before us, the High Court has while allowing  three  of  the  appeals
filed by the other convicts, dismissed that filed by  the  appellant  herein
thereby upholding his conviction  and  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment
awarded to him.
8.    We have heard  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Mr. Ashok Bhan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent-State who have taken us through the judgments  under  appeal  and
the relevant portions  of  the  evidence  adduced  at  the  trial.   It  was
contended by Mr. Jaspal Singh that the prosecution case rests  primarily  on
the depositions of PWs  1  &  2  as  the  remaining  police  witnesses  were
admittedly at some distance from the  place  of  occurrence.  Out  of  these
witnesses PW-1, according to Mr. Jaspal Singh, was not worthy of credit  and
could not, therefore, be relied upon. A draft  FIR  was,  according  to  the
learned counsel, prepared by PW65-the investigating  officer  which  PW1  is
said to have signed without even reading the same.  This  implied  that  the
version given in the FIR was not that of the witness, but of the person  who
had drafted the same. It was further contended that  although  the  FIR  was
recorded at 1:30 a.m., the body of the deceased was recovered only at  about
5:40 a.m. In the intervening period it was not known  whether  the  deceased
was alive or dead. The FIR purportedly registered at  about  1:30  a.m.  all
the same alleged the commission of an offence under Section 302  IPC.  This,
according to Mr. Singh, indicated that the FIR was actually registered  much
after the recovery of the body.  Mr. Jaspal Singh, further,  contended  that
PW-2 was not an eye-witness and had not corroborated the  version  given  by
PW-1. He had instead improved his own version given in the  statement  under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. He further contended that the name of the appellant  had
been introduced subsequently as the contemporaneous  documents  showed  that
the name of the assailant was not known.
9.    The Trial Court has viewed the occurrence in two  distinct  sequences.
The first sequence comprises the police party’s  arrival  on  the  spot  and
discovering the process of removal of diesel from  the  bigger  vessel  into
the dinghies carrying drums with the help of a  pipe  and  a  pump  and  the
escape of the four persons from the place after the  police  went  near  the
spot. The second sequence comprises three crew members of the  vessel  being
detained by the police party, the arrival of  the  deceased  head  Constable
Shaji from police station-Chatham, the deceased entering the  second  dinghy
left behind by the miscreants, the return of the four persons including  the
appellant to the place  of  occurrence,  a  scuffle  ensuing  in  which  the
deceased was hit on the head and pushed  into  the  sea.   The  Trial  Court
considered the evidence on record carefully in the context of the above  two
sequences and came to the conclusion that the return  of  the  appellant  to
recover the second dinghy, a scuffle taking place between the appellant  and
the deceased Head Constable-Shaji  on  board  the  second  dinghy,  and  the
deceased being hit with a dao by the appellant and  being  pushed  into  the
sea was proved by the evidence on record.
10.   In appeal, the High Court re-appraised the  evidence  adduced  by  the
prosecution and affirmed  the  findings  recorded  by  the  Trial  Court  as
regards the presence and return of  Nawaz to recover the second dinghy  left
behind by the miscreants, the assault on the deceased with a  dao   and  his
being pushed into the sea.  The High Court found  that  the  depositions  of
PWs1 and 2 to the  extent  they  proved  the  above  facts  was  cogent  and
consistent hence acceptable.  The High Court observed:


         “From the above versions of the prosecution witnesses, it seems  to
         be clear that the victim had been  assaulted  by  a  dao  and  then
         pushed into the sea water and it  was  thereafter  that  PW-2,  for
         sending message, left for the PCR van. It is in the evidence of PWs
         1 and 2 that they noticed Nawaz to be the assailant of the  victim.
         While PW-1 was categorical that Nawaz pushed the  victim  into  the
         sea water, PW-2 did not specifically say who pushed the victim into
         the sea water but having regard to the sequence of  events  sighted
         by him  which  support  the  version  of  PW-1,  it  would  not  be
         unreasonable to conclude based on the version of PW-1 that  it  was
         Nawaz who had also pushed the victim into the sea water.
         Number of similarities appear from  a  reading  of  the  respective
         versions of PWs 1 and 2, viz. that PW-2 and other staff who were on
         the vehicle approaching the jetty were stopped by PW-1; that  there
         were 20 drums on one dinghy and 14 drums on the other; that through
         green coloured pipe, diesel was being supplied to  the  drums  from
         the said vessel; that the victim picked up the mobile  phone  lying
         in the detained dinghy; that PW-1 had come over to the said  vessel
         for tying the dinghy; that both recognized Nawaz as the person  who
         picked up the dao from the dinghy and hit  the  victim.  These  are
         some evidence tendered by PWs 1 and 2 which are absolutely mutually
         consistent. That apart, the other witnesses  present  at  the  spot
         (though had  not  recognized  Nawaz  or  been  informed  about  the
         identity of the assailant), had heard that the victim was assaulted
         with a dao.”


11.   Relying upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Bharwada  Bhoginbhai
Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,  (1983) 3 SCC 217, the High Court  held  that
minor discrepancies in the depositions of witnesses which did not go to  the
root of the matter cannot  result  in  the  entire  prosecution  case  being
thrown out.
12.   We do not see any palpable error in the approach adopted by  the  High
Court  in  appreciating  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution.   The
deposition of PWs 1 & 2 regarding the  presence  of  the  appellant  at  the
place of occurrence, his getting into a scuffle  with  the  deceased  in  an
attempt to recover the dinghy and the assault on the deceased, who was  then
pushed into  the  sea  is,  in  our  opinion,  satisfactorily  proved.   The
discrepancies indicated by Mr. Jaspal Singh in the recording of the FIR,  or
the offence under which it was registered are not of much  significance  and
do not, in our view, affect the  substratum  of  the  prosecution  case.  We
accordingly affirm the findings of the two Courts below to the  extent  that
the appellant was indeed one of the four persons who returned to  the  place
of occurrence to recover the second dinghy that  had  been  left  behind  by
them and  finding  the  deceased-Head  Constable  Shaji  inside  the  dinghy
assaulted him in the course of  a  scuffle  and  eventually  took  away  the
dinghy with the help of his companions, after  the  deceased  was  assaulted
and pushed into the sea.
13.    That brings us to the second limb of Mr.  Jaspal  Singh’s  contention
in support of the appeal.  It was contended by  him  that  the  evidence  on
record established that the appellant had not come armed  to  the  place  of
occurrence.  The dao allegedly used by him for assaulting the  deceased  was
even according to  the  prosecution  lying  within  the  dinghy.   That  the
appellant had not repeated the act and the intensity of  the  dao  blow  was
not severe enough inasmuch as it had not caused any fracture  on  the  skull
of the deceased.
14.     It was  further  argued  that  there  was  no  evidence  medical  or
otherwise to prove that the injury inflicted by the  appellant  was  in  the
ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death. As a  matter  of  fact,
the injury had not itself caused  the  death,  as  according  to  the  trial
Court, the victim had died of drowning.  It was urged that  while  according
to PW-1 the deceased was pushed into the sea  that  version   had  not  been
supported by PW2. To top it all the prosecution case itself  suggested  that
there was a sudden fight between the deceased  and  the  appellant  and  his
companions and it was in the course of the said fight  that  an  injury  was
sustained causing the death of the deceased thereby bringing the case  under
exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. Relying upon the  decisions  of  this
Court in Chinnathaman v. State [2007 (14) SCC 690],  Muthu  v.  State  [2009
(17) SCC 433], Arumugam v. State [2008 (15)  SCC  590]  and  Ajit  Singh  v.
State of Punjab [2011 (9) SCC 462] and judgment of this Court in  Elavarasan
v. State [2011 (7) SCC 110] it was  contended that  the  conviction  of  the
appellant under Section 302 of the  IPC  was  erroneous  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case and that the evidence at  best  made  out  a  case
punishable under Section 304 Part II  of the IPC,  and  in  the  worst  case
scenario, one punishable under Section 304 Part I.


15.    The contention urged by Mr. Jaspal Singh is not wholly without  merit
to be lightly brushed aside.  The  prosecution  case  clearly  is  that  the
appellant and his companions had returned to the place  of  occurrence  only
to recover the second dinghy which they  had  left  behind  while  they  had
escaped from the spot in the other  dinghy.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the
prosecution that there was any pre-mediation to commit  the  murder  of  the
deceased.   It is also common ground that the appellant was not  armed  with
any weapon. The weapon allegedly used by him to  assault  the  deceased  was
even according to the prosecution  case  lying  in  the  said  dinghy.   The
nature of the injury inflicted upon the victim has not  been  proved  to  be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.  The blow  given
by the appellant to the deceased had not caused any fracture on  the  skull.
The two courts below have, all the  same,  accepted  the  prosecution  story
that after the deceased was given a dao blow, the appellant pushed him  into
the sea.  That finding has been affirmed by us in the earlier part  of  this
judgment.  The question,  however,  is  whether  this  act  of  pushing  the
deceased into the sea after he was given a blow on the head, no  matter  the
blow was not proved to be severe enough to cause death by itself,  would  be
suggestive of an intention to kill.   According  to  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh  the
answer is in the negative.  That is so because,  the  main  purpose  of  the
appellant returning to the place of occurrence was not to kill any one,  but
only to have the dinghy back. The obstruction caused in  the  accomplishment
of that object could be removed by pushing the deceased  who  was  resisting
the attempt made by the appellant into the sea. The fact that  the  deceased
was pushed into the sea, should not, therefore, be seen as indication of  an
intention to kill the deceased.

16.   The appellant was interested only in having  the  dinghy  back.   That
could be done only by removing the obstruction caused by  the  deceased  who
was resisting the attempt.  Pushing the deceased into the sea could  be  one
way of removing the obstruction not necessarily  by  killing  the  deceased.
Having said that we cannot ignore the fact that the deceased  had  sustained
a head injury and was bleeding. Pushing  a  person  into  the  sea,  with  a
bleeding head injury may not have been with the intention to  kill,  but  it
would certainly show the “intention  of  causing  a  bodily  injury  as  was
likely to cause death”, within the meaning of Sections 300  &  secondly  304
Part I of the IPC.


The appellant having assaulted the deceased with a dao  and  having  thereby
disabled him sufficiently ought to have known that pushing him into the  sea
was likely to cause his death.  Pushing the deceased into  the  sea  was  in
the circumstances itself  tantamount  to  inflicting  an  injury  which  was
likely to cause the death of the deceased.  The High  Court  has  gone  into
the question whether the deceased knew or did not know swimming.   But  that
issue may have assumed importance if the deceased was not  disabled  by  the
assault on a vital part of his body.  In the case at hand he  was  assaulted
with a sharp edged weapon on the head and  was  bleeding.   His  ability  to
swim, assuming he knew how to swim, was not, therefore, of any use  to  him.
The injury on the head and the push into the  sea  have,  therefore,  to  be
construed as one single act which the appellant  ought  to  have  known  was
likely to cause death of the deceased.  Even so exception 4 to  Section  300
of the IPC would come to the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the act of  the
appellant even when tantamount to commission of culpable homicide  will  not
amount to murder as the same was committed without  any  pre-meditation  and
in a sudden fight, in the heat  of  passion,  in  the  course  of  a  sudden
quarrel without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel  or
unusual manner.  The  prosecution  evidence  sufficiently  suggests  that  a
scuffle had indeed taken place on the dinghy where  the  appellant  and  his
companions were  trying  to  recover  the  dinghy  while  the  deceased  was
preventing them from doing so. In the course of this  sudden  fight  and  in
the heat of passion the appellant assaulted  the  deceased  and  pushed  him
into the sea eventually resulting in his death.  The act  of  the  appellant
is more appropriately punishable under Section 304 (I) of  the  IPC  instead
of Section 302 of the Code invoked by the Courts below. The appeal  must  to
that extent succeed.

17.    In the result, we allow this appeal in part and to  the  extent  that
while setting aside the conviction of  the  appellant  for  the  offence  of
murder under Section 302 of the IPC, we convict him  for  culpable  homicide
not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304  (I)  of  the  IPC  and
sentence him to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years.   Sentence
of fine and  imprisonment  in  default  of  payment  of  fine  is,  however,
affirmed.




                                                          ……………………….……..……J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                          ………………………….…..……J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 10, 2012